FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR 
OF  1870 


SOURCE  BOOK 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 
THE  GENERAL  STAFF  SCHOOL 


THE    GENERAL    SERVICE    SCHOOLS    PRESS 
Fort   Leavenworth,    Kansas 


19  2  2 


!.A. 


y 


PREFACE 

This  book  contains  extract  copies  of  documents  relating 
to  the  Franco-German  war  of  1870  taken  from  the  School 
Library.  The  selection  of  the  documents  has  been  made 
with  a  view  to  the  use  of  this  book  for  the  study  of  the 
strategy  and  leadership  of  corps,  armies  and  groups  of 
armies  during  certain  parts  of  this  war.  Matter  concerned 
with  tactics  has  been  omitted  except  where  necessary  to 
bring  out  or  explain  some  point  of  strategy  or  leadership. 
The  documents  given  are  not  all  that  are  important.  They 
have  been  limited  to  what  is  thought  may  be  studied  in  the 
time  that  has  been  generally  assigned  at  these  Schools  to 
the  consideration  of  this  campaign. 

The  operations  of  the  Germans  in  1870  should  be  com- 
pared with  that  of  the  French  in  1800  and  1806,  and  the 
leadership  of  von  Moltke  contrasted  with  that  of  Napoleon. 
Students  should  be  prepared  to  discuss  this  at  any  time  dur- 
ing the  course. 

Conrad  H.  Lanza, 
Colonel,  Field  Artillery. 
May  1,  1922. 


'.>t>4  0  '^»^ 


Index 

Part  I 

Page 
Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War,  by  Captain 

C.  S.  Pratt 1 

Map  of  Battle  of  Woerth 12 

Part  II 

GERMAN   ACCOUNTS 

Page 

Order  of  Battle 41 

Moltke's  Correspondence 43 

Situation  Map,  Evening  of  August  31,  1870.  _  292 

Operations  of  the  Second  Army,  by  von  der  Goltz 295 

Plan  of  the  Battlefield  of  Spicheren 306 

Map  of  the  Attack  on  the  Red  Hill,  Spicheren _  306 
Situation  Map  at  Gravelotte-St.  Privat  la 

Montagne,  7:00  PM,  August  18 434 

General  Map  of  Operations,  August  16  to  18__  442 
The  III  Corps  at  Vionville-Mars  la  Tour,  by  the 

German  Great  General  Staff 443 

Map  of  Battle  of  Vionville-Mars  la  Tour 462 

Memoirs  of  General  P.  H.  Sheridan 465 

Map  of  Battle  at  Gravelotte,  5 :00  PM, 

August  18 472 

Siege  Operations,  by  von  Tiedeman 477 

Strasburg 477 

Map  of  Strasburg 512 

Sedan 513 

Map  of  the  Battle  of  Sedan 516 

Metz 518 

Map  of  Metz  and  vicinity 538 

Paris    541 

Map  of  Paris  and  vicinity 608 

Graphic  G2  Estimates 609 

Position  Sketches,  First  Army 618^ 

V 


INDEX 

Part  III 

FRENCH  ACCOUNTS 

Page 

Proclamation  of  the  Emperor 625 

Graphic  02  Estimates 629 

Messages  and  Orders  on  the  Battle  of  Spicheren 641 

Map  of  the  Battlefield  of  Spicheren 646 

March  of  the  V  Corps,  August  4  to  6 649 

Map  of  the  Battlefield  of  Worth 652 

Orders  and  Messages,  August  13  to  15 653 

Battles  around  Metz,  by  the  French  General  Staff, 

discussed  by  Colonel  von  Schmid 665 

Part  IV 
MISCELLANEOUS  ACCOUNTS 

Page 

The  London  Daily  News  Correspondence 743 

In  Pocket : 

General  Plan. 

Map  of  the  Theatre  of  Operations. 


French  and  German  Names  for  Some 
Important  Places 


French  : 

German  : 

Basle. 

Basel. 

Bitche. 

Bitsch. 

Boulay. 

Bolchen. 

Cologne. 

Coin. 

Faulquemont. 

Falkenberg. 

Herny. 

Herlingen. 

Liege. 

Luttich. 

Longeville. 

Lubeln. 

Mayence. 

Mainz. 

Meuse. 

Maas. 

Moscou. 

Moskau. 

Moselle. 

Mosel. 

Saarguemines. 

Saargemund. 

Saint  Jean. 

Johann. 

Sarrebruck. 

Sarrebriicken 

Thionville. 

Diedenhofen. 

Treves. 

Trier. 

ERRATA 

Page 

now  reads 

should  read 

238     No.  118.    Date 

8   August 

7  August. 

263     No.   178. 

4th  line  from 
bottom 

in  conjunction 

simultanfeously. 

402     13th  line 

four  miles 

four    [English]   miles, 

449     8th  line  from 
bottom 

6th  Infantry 

6th  Infantry  Division. 

476     2d  line 

August  15 

August   16. 

Vlll 


Part  I 

EXTRACT  FROM  THE 

Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

By 

Captain  S.  C.  Pratt,  R.  R. 


SAARBRUCKEN  TO  METZ 

To  review  the  political  causes  of  the  war  of  1870,  and 
sketch  the  tortuous  course  of  policy  which  placed  Prussia 
in  the  position  of  leader  of  the  German  race,  would  entail 
a  study  of  Continental  politics  from  the  commencement  of 
the  century.  By  violation  of  numerous  treaties,  by  whole- 
sale annexation  of  the  minor  states,  and  finally  by  the 
expulsion  of  Austria  from  Germany,  she  became  invested 
with  the  military  supremacy,  and  a  popular  war  with  a  for- 
eign power  was  all  that  was  necessary  to  re-establish  the  an- 
cient German  Empire  and  secure  the  long  desired  unity 
of  the  German  peoples.  In  France,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
growing  power  of  her  ancient  enemy,  the  astounding  suc- 


*This  short  precis  of  the  1870-1  campaign  has  been  written  in 
the  belief  that  it  will  be  acceptable  'to  many  officers  who  would  not 
consult  a  more  lengthy  account.  It  may  also  be  of  advantage  to  those 
entering  upon  the  study  of  the  campaign;  forming,  as  it  does,  a 
framework  the  details  for  the  filling  up  of  which  are  at  hand  in  the 
many  histories  now  issued.  Some  difficulty  has  been  experienced  in 
finding  out  the  actual  numbers  engaged  in  the  several  battles.  The 
German  official  accounts,  though  perfectly  accurate  in  the  detail  they 
give,  do  not  take  into  consideration  the  troops  outside  the  zone  of 
fire,  who  in  many  cases  affected  the  result  of  the  engagement.  For 
this  reason,  in  more  than  one  instance,  the  approximate  numbers 
given  by  Lecomte  have  been  adopted.  To  compress  the  description 
of  several  distinct  campaigns  into  a  few  pages  necessitates  the  omis- 
sion of  many  minor  facts  and  the  suppression  of  much  detail.  How 
far  the  judgment  of  the  writer  has  been  sound  in  his  work  of  excision 
must  be  left  to  the  opinion  of  the  military  student. 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

cesses  of  the  six  weeks'  war,  and  the  unsuccessful  attempts 
to  obtain  a  rectification  of  the  Rhine  frontier,  had  aroused 
a  feeling  of  bitter  hostility.  France  alone  was  determinedly 
hostile  to  German  unity ;  Prussia  was  open  to  an  arrange- 
ment, Austria  was  too  enfeebled  by  the  Sadowa  campaign 
to  interfere,  and  England  had  notoriously  withdrawn  her- 
self from  the  complications  of  Continental  politics.  The 
pretensions  of  the  two  great  rivals  had  to  be  decided  on 
the  battle-field  and  the  immediate  cause  of  rupture  is  a 
matter  of  little  importance.  A  diplomatic  quarrel  arising 
from  the  offer  of  the  Spanish  throne  to  the  Prince  of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen  afforded  a  plausible  pretext  for 
war,  which  was  formally  declared  by  the  French  on  the 
19th  July,  1870. 

Previous  to  entering  upon  a  description  of  the  cam- 
paign, it  will  be  necessary  to  refer  briefly  to  the  system  of 
recruitment  and  the  comparative  military  position  of  the  two 
rival  armies. 

The  military  organization  of  the  German  forces  was 
based  on  territorial  divisions  corresponding  more  or  less 
to  the  civil  ones ;  thus  the  provinces  each  furnished  a  corps 
d'armee,  the  districts  a  brigade,  and  the  circles  or  parishes 
a  battalion.  Every  German  was  liable  for  service,  no  sub- 
stitution was  permitted,  and  persons  unfit  to  serve  under 
arms  were  allotted  to  the  non-combatant  branches  as  hos- 
pital attendants,  military  tradesmen,  &c.  Liability  to  army 
service  lasted  12  years,  of  which  3  were  passed  in  the  stand- 
ing army,  4  in  the  reserve,  and  5  in  the  Landwehr.  In  case 
of  invasion,  the  Landsturm,  or  entire  able-bodied  popula- 
tion (up  to  the  age  of  42),  could,  in  addition,  be  called  to 
arms.  To  alleviate  the  burden  of  compulsory  enrollment,  a 
system  of  liberal  exemptions  was  organized ;  the  bulk  of 
the  men  passed  over,  forming  what  was  called  the  Ersatz 
Reserve.  The  army  in  peace  time  was  thus  composed  of 
four  distinct  classes: — 

1.  The  standing  army;  or  the  men  actually  in  the  ranks. 

2.  The  reserves,  or  men  who  had  passed  through  the  ranks  and 
were  liable  to  be  re-called  at  once  to  the  colors,  and  bring  up  the 
army  to  its  war  strength. 


Extract 

3.  The  Landwehr;  or  men  who  had  passed  through  both  army 
and  reserve — who  were  separately  organized  in  Landwehr  battalions 
and  constituted  a  2nd  line  of  defense. 

4.  The  Ersatz  Reserve  or  untrained  men  who  could  be  called  into 
the   depots  when    required. 

An  intimate  connection  was  maintained  between  the 
line  and  the  Landwehr;  to  each  three-battalion  regiment 
of  the  standing  army  there  being  attached  a  Landwehr 
regiment  of  two  battalions.  A  German  passed  the  first  3  years 
of  his  life  in  the  service  of  the  regular  army ;  he  then  returned 
to  civil  life,  but  was  borne  on  the  books  of  the  regiment  as  a 
reservist  for  the  next  four  years ;  after  which  period  he  was 
transferred  to  the  ranks  of  the  corresponding  Landwehr  bat- 
talion. The  address  of  each  man  was  registered,  and  at 
the  order  to  mobilize  he  was  required  at  once  under  heavy 
penalties  to  present  himself  at  the  nearest  military  centre 
for  the  purpose  of  taking  his  place  in  the  ranks.  Every 
civilian  knew  exactly  the  position  he  would  have  to  fill  if 
suddenly  called  upon.  By  maintaining  an  efficient  organi- 
zation at  all  the  military  centres,  it  was  apparent  that  an 
order  to  mobilize  could  be  rapidly  passed  on  from  the  Head- 
quarters at  Berlin  through  all  the  several  grades  of  terri- 
torial divisions  till  it  finally  reached  every  able-bodied  man 
liable  for  service  in  the  country.  At  each  of  the  local  cen- 
tres, stores  of  clothing  and  material  were  kept  ready  for 
issue.  Equally  complete  arrangements  with  regard  to  the 
mustering  of  horses,  the  formation  of  trains,  the  collec- 
tion of  supplies,  combined  with  a  detailed  transit  organi- 
zation, enabled  each  army  corps  to  be  assembled  completely 
armed  and  equipped  and  ready  to  take  the  field  within  a 
few  days  after  instructions  had  been  telegraphed  through- 
out the  country.  As  a  result  of  this  almost  perfect  system, 
the  army  of  the  North  German  Confederation,  combined 
with  those  of  the  affiliated  states,  was  enabled  to  reach  the 
gigantic  total  of  1,180,000  men  within  a  fortnight  after  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities. 

The  French  army  was  organized  on  a  very  different 
method,  there  being  no  regular  peace  formation  of  the 
higher  tactical  units.     The  country  was  certainly  divided 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

into  a  number  of  commands ;  but  these,  with  the  exception 
of  the  army  corps  at  Paris  and  Lyons,  formed  territorial 
and  not  tactical  combinations  of  troops.  On  declaration  of 
war,  the  staff  of  the  army  was  chosen  and  the  regiments 
apportioned  to  each  corps,  but  necessarily  the  component 
units  of  so  disunited  a  mass  could  not  work  together  at 
first  without  a  great  deal  of  friction.  In  1866  it  was  ap- 
parent that,  owing  to  many  causes — the  principal  of  which 
were  the  longer  service  in  the  ranks,  exemptions  by  pay- 
ment, and  the  "plague  of  substitutes" — the  Imperial  army 
was  vastly  inferior,  both  in  numbers  and  morale,  to  that 
of  Germany.  To  remedy  this  state  of  things  the  recruiting 
law  of  1868  initiated  a  system  of  trained  reserves,  abolished 
exemption  by  payment,  and  provided  for  the  formation 
of  Gardes  Mobiles — corresponding  somewhat  to  a  combina- 
tion of  the  German  Landwehr  and  Ersatz  Reserve.  By 
making  the  Act  partially  retrospective  it  was  hoped  that 
large  additions  could  be  at  once  made  to  the  defensive 
forces  of  the  country,  but  the  premature  declaration  of  war 
prevented  these  reforms  being  carried  out  in  their  entirety. 
On  the  1st  of  August,  the  total  of  the  available  troops,  in- 
cluding many  partially-trained  men,  amounted  to  567,000. 
After  making  the  necessary  deductions,  the  utmost  field 
force  that  could  be  assembled  consisted  of  300,000  men 
with  924  guns,  and  behind  these  in  second  line  there  were 
no  trained  reserves.  In  addition  to  numerical  inferiority, 
the  general  condition  of  the  French  army  was  by  no  means 
satisfactory.  The  general  officers  had  no  experience  in 
the  leading  of  large  bodies  of  troops,  the  staff  was  ineffi- 
ciently educated,  the  regimental  officers  had  not  sufficient 
authority  over  their  men,  the  mass  of  the  soldiery  M^ere 
contaminated  by  the  evils  of  substitution,  and  the  bonds  of 
discipline  were  relaxed  owing  to  the  enervating  effects  of 
the  Algerian  and  Mexican  campaigns  and  the  pernicious 
spread  of  democratic  principles  among  all  ranks.  To  rap- 
idly mobilize  the  army  was  a  matter  of  some  difficulty, 
owing  to  the  excessive  over-centralization  of  the  adminis- 
tration.   Every  matter  of  petty  detail  had  to  be  referred  to 


—4- 


Extract 

the  Paris  War  Office,  and  the  machinery  capable  of  con- 
trol in  time  of  peace  was  utterly  unable  to  cope  with  the 
exigencies  of  war.  Whereas  in  Germany  the  men  of  the 
reserves  joined  at  once  their  local  corps,  in  France  the 
reservist  was  sent  first  to  the  depot  companies,  however  dis- 
tant they  might  be,  to  receive  his  equipment,  and  then 
hurried  back  to  his  regiment,  which  in  many  cases  was 
close  to  his  home.  The  system  of  mobilization  was  not 
sufficiently  elastic  for  modern  war  requirements,  and  the 
first  days  after  the  declaration  of  hostilities,  which  should 
have  been  employed  in  the  general  interest  of  the  army, 
were  frittered  away  in  dealing  with  minor  administrative 
details.  To  the  German  system  of  decentralization  of  large 
localized  units,  was  opposed  an  excessively  concentrated 
machinery  working  a  mass  of  petty  isolated  elements. 

The  Prussians,  fully  aware  of  their  superiority  in  num- 
ber determined  from  the  first  to  anticipate  any  attempt  of 
their  adversaries  to  carry  the  war  on  to  German  soil.  It 
was  obvious  that  if  the  French  took  the  initiative  they 
would  be  forced,  owing  to  the  situation  of  the  neutral  ter- 
ritories of  Luxemburg  and  Switzerland,  either  to  advance 
into  Rhenish  Prussia  or  cross  the  upper  Rhine.  There  was 
no  valid  reason  for  expecting  a  rapid  mobilization ;  though, 
from  the  existence  of  the  eastern  camps  and  garrisons,  a 
part  of  the  Imperial  forces  might  be  ready  to  take  the  field 
in  a  very  short  time.  To  counteract  a  possible  invasion 
over  the  upper  or  lower  Rhine,  and  at  the  same  time  re- 
serve the  power  of  employing  their  numerically  superior 
forces  in  an  offensive  effort,  was  the  problem  to  be  solved 
by  the  Prussian  staff.  In  accordance  with  a  pre-arranged 
plan,  it  was  decided  that  three  large  armies  should  be  as- 
sembled in  the  Palatinate.* 

If  the  Emperor  invaded  the  Rhenish  provinces,  he 
would  encounter  the  whole  of  the  German  forces;  if  he 
crossed  the  Upper  Rhine,  his  line  of  communications  and 
further  advance  would  be  seriously  imperilled  by  the  pres- 
ence of  powerful  hostile  bodies  on  his  flank.     To  make  full 


'Rhein  Pfalz  on  map. 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

use  of  their  railway  system  for  rapid  concentration,  the 
French  would  presumedly  be  obliged  to  assemble  in  two 
main  groups  at  Metz  and  Strassburg,  with  the  Vosges 
separating  them.  In  the  Palatinate  the  Germans  would 
stand  on  interior  lines  to  masses  thus  formed,  and  be  able 
to  act  against  either  or  both  simultaneously.  If  the  Em- 
peror massed  his  forces  for  a  defensive  effort,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  Alsace  would  have  to  be  evacuated,  as  the  advance 
of  the  troops  of  the  Confederation  on  both  sides  of  the 
Vosges  completely  turned  the  first  defensive  line  formed 
by  that  mountain  chain.  In  this  case  a  wheel  to  the  right 
of  the  three  armies  would  be  necessary,  preparatory  to  a 
general  advance  westward  against  the  Imperial  forces. 

But  little  danger  was  to  be  apprehended  from  the  sepa- 
ration of  the  German  forces  by  the  Vosges.  If  the  armies 
on  either  side  of  the  mountains  were  defeated,  they  would 
fall  back  on  their  own  troops;  while  the  French  forces,  in 
case  of  disaster  acting  from  divergent  bases,  would  naturally 
be  driven  away  from  one  another.  The  sole  remaining  diffi- 
culty was  as  to  whether  the  German  armies  could  be  con- 
centrated beyond  'the  Rhine  in  the  Palatinate  without  en- 
countering the  risk  of  being  beaten  in  detail  by  a  rapid 
offensive  movement  of  the  French.  The  plan  of  campaign 
projected  by  the  Emperor  was  to  mass  150,000  men  at  Metz, 
100,000  at  Strasburg,  and  50,000  at  Chalons  as  a  reserve. 
The  two  first-mentioned  fractions  were  to  amalgamate, 
cross  the  Rhine  at  Maxau,  force  the  southern  German  states 
into  neutrality,  and  advance  towards  the  Main  to  seek  a 
general  action  with  the  Prussian  forces.  To  carry  out  this 
idea  it  was  obvious  that  the  passage  of  the  Rhine  would 
have  to  be  effected  before  the  German  armies  were  mobi- 
lized. Assuming  this  was  possible,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
further  successes  were  to  be  obtained.  To  force  South 
Germany  into  quiescence,  and  at  the  same  time  mask  the 
Rhine  fortresses,  would  absorb  a  large  proportion  of  the 
invading  troops.  With  a  line  of  powerful  fortified  cities  in 
rear,  a  large  entrenched  camp  on  the  flank  (Mainz)  and  a 
numerically  superior  army  in  front,  the  prospect  of  a  suc- 
cessful advance  to  Berlin  seems  somewhat  visionary. 

—6— 


w 


■-*•:, 


Extract 

To  carry  out  their  preconceived  plans,  the  armies  of 
the  two  nations  were  gradually  assembled  on  the  frontier. 
The  order  to  mobilize  the  North  German  forces  was  issued 
on  the  evening  of  the  15th  July,  for  both  the  line  and  Land- 
wehr  simultaneously;  it  being  apparent  that  the  coming 
struggle  would  in  all  probability  assume  gigantic  propor- 
tions. Within  ten  days  the  local  mobilizations  of  the  army 
corps  were  complete,  and  on  the  23rd  the  transport  by  rail 
to  the  frontier  commenced.  Precise  details  as  to  the  way 
in  which  each  corps  was  to  be  forwarded — including  the 
very  hours  of  departure  and  arrival,  and  the  number  of 
carriages  in  each  train — had  been  prepared  long  beforehand, 
and  on  the  30th  July  the  German  forces,  divided  into  three 
large  armies,  took  up  with  their  leading  troops  the  line  of 
the  Rhine  from  Coblenz  to  Germersheim. 


Commander 


Numbers 


Army.- 


II      Army.- 


-General    Steinmetz.  VII  and  VIII  Corps, 
50,000  inf., 
4800  cav. 


Position  on 
31st  July 

Treves 


-Prince  Frederick 
Charles 


Mayence, 
&  S.  of  it 


III      Army.— Crown  Prince 


Landau 


III,  IV,  IX,  X,  and 
XII   Corps,  and  Gd. 
152,000  inf., 
22,200  cav. 

V,  XI,  I  Bav.,  and  II 
Bav.  Corps, 
Baden  Div.  and  Wur- 
temburg  Div. 
126,000  inf. 
14,800  cav. 

Total 328,000  inf.,  41,800  cav.,  with  1,206  guns. 

The  I  Corps  joined  the  I  Army,  the  II  Corps  the  II 
Army,  and  the  VI  Corps  the  III  Army  a  few  days  later, 
forming  with  the  addition  of  the  17th  Inf.  and  four  Landwehr 
divisions,  a  total  of  462,000  Inf.,  56,800  cav.,  and  1584  guns.* 


*The  German  corps  consisted  on  an  average  of  25  battalions,  8 
squadrons,  and  15  batteries,  and  including  the  cavalry  divisions  may  be 
valued  at  30,000  combatants.  Officers  and  noncombatants  not  in- 
cluded in  above  totals. 


—7- 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

The  French  forces  at  this  period  consisted  of  210,000 
men,*  divided  into  three  main  groups  in  the  neighborhood 
of  St.  Avoid,  Strasburg  and  Chalons.  Though  nominally 
one  army,  it  was  practically  two,  the  right  wing  of  which 
(47,000  men)  was  east  of  the  Vosges,  under  the  command  of 
Marshal  Macmahon,  while  the  left  128,000)  was  superin- 
tended by  the  Emperor  personally  at  St.  Avoid.  The  seven 
corps  comprised  in  these  totals  were  bivouacked  in  a  very 
dispersed  order,  and  echeloned  along  the  whole  frontier, 
from  Thionville  to  Strasburg.  Besides  these  troops,  there 
was  a  reserve  corps  of  about  35,000  men,  chiefly  at  Chalons. 
It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  French  numbers 
were  increasing  daily,  owing  to  the  constant  influx  of  the 
reserves,  and  at  the  commencement  of  August  the  strength 
may  be  put  down  at  from  260  to  270,000  men. 

The  difference  between  the  two  systems  of  concentra- 
tion is  strikingly  apparent.  Each  German  army  corps,  com- 
pletely furnished  with  men,  horses  and  equipment,  in  its 
own  local  district,  was  forwarded  to  the  front  an  effective 
unit  of  the  army  of  which  it  was  to  compose  a  part.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  French  corps  were  actually  mobilized  on  the 
frontier. 

Difficulties  first  arose  about  calling  in  the  reserves,  after- 
wards in  their  transport  and  equipment,  and  the  events  of 
each  succeeding  day  accumulated  evidence  as  to  the  state  of 
insufficient  preparation  and  the  other  evils  inherent  in  the 
French  system.  The  railways  were  blocked  with  trains  of 
reservists  unable  to  get  forward,  the  regimental  and  corps 
transport  was  incomplete,  horses  had  to  be  taken  from  the 


'Strength  of  French  army  the  29th  July: 

Guard     (Bourbaki)     20,500 

1st   Corps    (Macmahon)    37,000 

2nd    Corps    (Frossard)    23,430 

3rd    Corps    (Bazaine)     35,800 

4th    Corps    (Ladmirault)    26,000 

5th   Corps    (De  Failly)    23,000 

6th    Corps    (Canrobert)     29,900 

7th    Corps    (Douay)     9.900 

Reserve  Cavalry  and  Engineers 4,550 

Total 210,080   men 


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Extract 

artillery  to  bring  forward  the  necessary  food  supplies,  and 
the  actual  necessaries  of  bread  and  meat  were  in  many 
cases  not  forthcoming.  In  addition  to  the  failure  of  the 
field  administration^  it  was  found  that  the  fortresses  were 
in  a  most  defective  condition.  Around  Metz,  the  detached 
forts  were  neither  revetted  nor  armed,  the  depots  for  provi- 
sions had  not  been  filled,  nor  any  arrangements  made  for 
standing  a  siege.  Strasburg  and  the  minor  fortresses  fared 
but  little  better ;  armed  with  obsolete  weapons,  and  deficient 
in  men  and  stores,  the  energies  of  their  Commandants  were 
taxed  to  the  uttermost. 

Veiled  by  a  thin  cordon  of  outposts,  the  Germans  formed 
their  armies  on  the  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  pushed  for- 
ward, strong,  compact,  united,  to  the  frontier;  while  in 
front  of  them,  sprinkled  along  the  whole  line,  stood  detached 
French  corps,  weak  in  men,  deficient  in  equipment  and 
swayed  to  and  fro  by  contradictory  orders. 

Up  to  the  2nd  August  there  was  no  serious  fighting  on 
either  side,  but  on  that  date  the  Emperor  determined  to 
make  a  reconnaissance  in  force  towards  Saarbrucken,  with 
the  left  wing  of  the  army.  From  lack  of  preparation,  his 
plan  was  not  carried  out  in  its  entirety,  but  resulted  in  an 
offensive  movement  of  the  2nd  Corps  (Frossard)  alone. 
Neither  the  I  and  II  German  armies  having  yet  received 
the  orders  to  advance  to  the  frontier,  the  defence  of  the 
town  was  left  to  a  few  outpost  troops,  who  made  a  gallant 
stand  but  were  naturally  obliged  to  evacuate  their  position. 
The  capture  of  Saarbrucken,  to  effect  which  an  entire 
French  army  corps  was  deployed  in  battle  order,  was  there- 
fore but  a  trifling  success.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  object 
was  gained  by  this  military  demonstration,  as  no  further 
offensive  movement  was  made,  and  the  French  forces  re- 
mained in  quietude  on  the  banks  of  the  Saar.  Great  uncer- 
tainty as  to  military  situation  appeared  at  this  period  to 
exist  on  the  French  side  as  to  whether  their  strategy  should 
be  of  an  offensive  or  defensive  character,  and  even  at  this 
early  stage  their  movements  seem  regulated  by  those  of  their 
opponents. 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

In  the  beginning  of  August,  Marshal  MacMahon,  in 
obedience  to  orders  from  Headquarters,  pushed  forward 
his  troops  to  northern  Alsace,  directing  his  main  forces  to- 
wards a  chosen  position  at  Froesehwiller  and  sending  a 
division  under  General  Douay  to  the  ancient  fortress  of 
Weissenburg. 

On  the  German  side  all  ideas  of  defensive  measures 
had  been  abandoned,  and  the  armies  were  gradually  de- 
ploying into  an  east  and  west  line,  preparatory  to  forcing 
the  frontier.  It  was  evident  that  the  III  Army  would 
have  the  arduous  task  of  passing  through  the  mountain 
roads  of  the  lower  Vosges,  and  eventually  have  to  force  the 
defiles  of  the  main  range.  To  allow  sufficient  time  for  this 
extra  work,  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  was  put  into 
motion  on  the  4th  August,  with  orders  to  advance  into  Al- 
sace, and  the  bulk  of  the  army  marched  accordingly  in  four 
columns  to  the  Lauter  stream,  which  formed  the  frontier 
line.  On  arriving  at  Weissenburg,  it  was  found  that  the 
town  and  a  line  of  hills  south  of  it  was  held  by  the  troops  of 
Douay's  division,  about  5000  in  number.  The  old  fortress 
was  speedily  captured,  and  a  general  frontal  attack  made 
on  the  defensive  position  held  by  the  French  General.  The 
gradually  advancing  German  forces  reinforced  the  assault- 
ing troops,  and  enabled  a  flank  movement  to  be  directed 
against  the  right  of  the  French  line.  Completely  outnumbered 
after  a  stubborn  and  gallant  resistance,  the  French  gave 
way,  and  retired  precipitately  on  their  main  body,  then  as- 
sembling in  the  neighborhood  of  Worth. 

The  baneful  effect  of  the  undue  dissemination  of 
forces  is  here  fully  exemplified.  The  detachment  of  General 
Douay's  small  division  to  the  frontier  must  be  looked  on  as 
a  strategical  error.  If  the  German  forces  were  making  an 
inroad  into  Alsace,  it  was  clear  that  5000  men  would  not 
stop  them;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  French  troops  were 
employed  merely  as  an  advanced  post,  their  role  should 
have  been  more  clearly  pointed  out  to  them. 

On  the  evening  of  the  4th  all  contact  with  the  enemy 
was  lost,  and  the  next  day,  in  rear  of  large  bodies  of  recon- 
noitering  cavalry,  the  III  Army  advanced,  prepared  to  con- 

—10— 


Extract 

centrate  for  battle  in  either  a  southerly  or  westerly  direc- 
tion. Information  was  received  on  the  5th  that  the  French 
were  assembling  in  force  in  the  neighborhood  of  Worth, 
with  the  evident  intention  of  disputing  the  passes  of  the 
Vosges,  and  orders  were  issued  in  consequence  for  a  con- 
centrated advance  in  that  direction. 

On  the  French  side  confusion  reigned  supreme.  Owing 
to  the  defective  and  tardy  concentration,  the  original  plan 
of  campaign  could  not  be  carried  out.  Reduced  to  defensive 
measures  by  the  threatening  advance  of  the  German  forces, 
it  was  obvious  that  a  general  union  of  the  dispersed  corps 
would  be  advisable.  It  was  clearly  impossible  for  the  left 
wing  of  the  army  to  advance  through  the  Vosges  and  leave 
the  I  and  II  German  Armies  on  its  flank.  If,  however,  the 
French  right  wing  was  to  retire  westward,  the  whole  of 
Alsace  would  be  given  up  without  a  general  engagement — a 
proceeding  likely  to  be  received  with  little  favor  by  the  tur- 
bulent spirits  in  the  capital.  The  independent  command  of 
the  right  wing  was  accordingly  bestowed  on  Macmahon,  with 
the  clear  understanding  that  he  should  endeavor  to  make 
head  against  the  invader.  Telegraphing  to  the  corps  of 
De  Failly  at  Bitsch,  which  had  been  placed  under  his  orders, 
and  hurrying  up  available  troops  from  Strassburg,  were 
the  measures  he  adopted  preparatory  to  taking  up  at  Worth 
a  tactically  strong  position,  which  defended,  both  directly 
and  indirectly,  the  main  passes  through  the  mountains. 

The  French  troops  facing  east  (left  wing  retired),  oc- 
cupied a  line  about  31/0  miles  in  extent  along  the  undulating, 
partly  wooded,  partly  vine-clad  spurs  of  the  western  Vosges. 
In  front,  within  musketry  range,  was  a  valley  of  flat  mead- 
ow land  traversed  by  the  Sauer — a  stream  fordable  with 
difficulty  in  consequence  of  recent  rains.  The  range  of 
heights  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  valley  afforded  but  little 
shelter  to  an  advancing  force,  the  right  flank  was  open  and 
could  be  swept  with  artillery  fire,  but  the  existence  of  wooded 
ravines  rendered  a  refusal  of  the  left  necessary.  A  main 
chaussee,  running  at  right  angles  to  the  defensive  line, 
passed  through  the  villages  of  Worth  on  the  Sauer  and 
Froeschwiller  in  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  position. 

—11— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  the  leading  troops  of  the  III 
Army  came  in  contact  with  the  French  outposts,  and  at- 
tacked impetuously.  On  neither  side  was  it  intended  to  fight 
a  general  action,  but  the  serious  engagement  initiated  by  the 
German  advanced  guards  rendered  a  withdrawal  from  the 
fight  rather  compromising.  Up  to  mid-day  isolated  attacks 
attended  with  great  loss  were  made  against  the  position, 
finally  culminating  in  an  artillery  duel  between  the  batteries 
of  both  armies.  Supported  by  the  concentrated  fire  of  their 
massed  artillery,  and  the  hourly  increasing  numbers  of 
their  troops,  the  V  and  XI  German  Corps  made  a  general 
advance  against  the  French  right  and  centre.  The  fire-swept 
low-lying  meadows  were  traversed  with  heavy  loss,  and  a 
footing  gradually  gained  on  the  western  side  of  the  valley. 
The  central  attack  made  but  slow  progress,  but  ground  was 
gradually  gained  in  the  Niederwald — a  wood  on  the  French 
right — and  a  portion  of  the  Imperial  troops  were  cut  off 
and  retreated  in  disorder  toward  Haguenau.  The  attack- 
ing line  gradually  converged  towards  Froeschwiller — the  key 
of  the  position — the  great  superiority  in  numbers  of  the 
Germans  leading  to  the  gradual  envelopment  of  the  French 
flanks.  Heroic  attempts  were  made  to  change  the  fortunes  of 
the  day  by  charges  of  cavalry ;  but  the  nature  of  the  ground 
was  too  unfavorable  to  admit  of  the  slightest  success.  Over- 
matched in  artillery  and  completely  outnumbered,  the 
French  at  last  gave  way,  and  fled  to  the  rear  in  the  greatest 
confusion.  Some  of  the  fugitives  took  the  road  to  Bitsch, 
many  made  their  way  to  Strasburg,  but  the  bulk  of  the  army 
retreated  to  Saverne,  where  they  were  eventually  reduced 
to  a  semblaiice  of  order.  Owing  to  the  impossiblity  of  push- 
ing unsupported  cavalry  through  the  mountain  passes,  and 
the  rapid  forced  marches  of  Macmahon,  all  contact  be- 
tween the  two  armies  was  lost.  The  7th  was  a  day  of  rest  for 
the  German  forces,  with  the  exception  of  the  Baden  Divi- 
sion, which  was  sent  off  in  the  direction  of  Strassburg, 
which  was  summoned  to  surrender  on  the  9th  August.* 

Suddenly  given  command  of  an  army  dispersed  along 
the  frontier  from  Bitsch  to  Strassburg,  with  an  enemy  of 

*The  siege  of  Strasburg  is  referred  to  subsequently. 

—12— 


BATTLE   or    WOKRTH 


Extract 

threefold  strength  within  a  day's  march,  the  position  of 
Macmahon  was  certainly  unenviable.  Exception  may, 
however,  be  fairly  taken  to  his  stand  at  Worth;  though 
tactically  strong,  the  position  was  strategically  defective. 
For  an  inferior  force  to  offer  battle  with  a  series  of  defiles 
in  its  rear  cannot  but  lead  to  disaster  in  case  of  retreat,  and 
to  defend  the  passes  of  the  Vosges  in  such  a  manner  when 
they  were  practically  turned  by  the  advancing  I  and  II  Ger- 
man Armies  seems  injudicious.  If  from  political  causes 
it  was  necessary  to  fight  east  of  the  Vosges,  it  would  appear 
that  the  retention  of  Strassburg  as  a  base  would  give  the 
opportunity  of  striking  an  offensive  blow  on  the  flank  of  an 
army  attempting  to  cross  the  mountains,  and  at  the  same 
time  secure  a  safe  retreat.  The  non-appearance  of  De 
Failly's  corps  on  the  field  has  been  the  subject  of  much  com- 
ment, arising  as  it  did  from  the  reception  of  contradictory 
orders  from  the  Headquarters  of  each  wing  of  the  army. 
Although  the  defeated  troops  were  much  disorganized,  it 
seems  scarcely  necessary  for  them  to  have  taken  such  a  cir- 
cuitous route  westward,  or  retreat  so  far.  It  has  been  sug- 
gested that  a  better  course  would  have  been  to  gain  Metz 
by  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle  and  join  the  forces  of  Ba- 
zaine,  or  retreat  southward  on  Belfort.  In  the  one  case  the 
union  of  the  entire  French  army  would  be  effected,  in  the 
other  the  presence  of  regular  troops  in  the  south  would  un- 
doubtedly compel  a  division  of  the  German  forces,  and 
possibly  arrest  the  general  advance. 

In  the  meantime,  the  I  and  III  German  Armies  ad- 
vanced side  by  side  to  the  frontier.  Acquainted  with  the 
success  of  the  II  Army  and  suspecting  a  retreat  of  the 
French  forces  in  their  front,  they  pushed  forward  their 
advanced  guards  towards  Saarbrucken  and  the  line  of  the 
Saar.  It  was  intended  that  the  main  body  of  the  II  Army 
should  pass  through  the  town  while  the  I  Army  was  utiliz- 
ing points  of  passage  lower  down  the  river. 

Onthe6thof  August, General  Frossard  (the  commandant 
of  the  corps  that  made  the  demonstration  on  the  2nd) ,  with- 
drawing his  outposts,  took  up  a  position  on  the  Spicheren- 
Steiring  heights,  opposite  the  town  of  Saarbrucken.     De- 

—13—, 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

ceived  by  the  apparent  retreat  of  the  French,  and  under  the 
impression  that  a  weak  rear  guard  had  alone  to  be 
dealt  with,  the  leading  German  troops  boldly  crossed 
the  river.  A  heavy  fire  of  artillery,  however,  soon  made  it 
apparent  that  the  nearly  impregnable  heights  were  held  in 
force.  In  spite  of  great  inferiority  in  numbers,  a  bold 
attack  was  made  on  both  flanks  of  the  position,  but  without 
success;  and  the  small  German  force  (a  division),  fought 
unsupported  against  the  whole  of  Frossard's  corps  for  more 
than  two  hours.  Gradually  accruing  reinforcements  gave  a 
new  impetus  to  the  attack,  which  became  general  along 
the  whole  line.  The  steep  slopes  of  the  plateau  were  grad- 
ually surmounted,  in  spite  of  the  murderous  fire  of  the 
Chassepot,  and  with  incredible  exertions  twelve  guns  were 
eventually  hauled  up  to  the  crest.  As  at  Worth,  a  wood  on 
the  right  of  the  French  line  was  successfully  utilized  in  the 
advance,  and  the  superior  direction  of  the  German  artillery 
plainly  evinced.  Against  the  Prussian  position  on  the  edge 
of  the  plateau,  frontal  attacks  in  force  were  repeatedly 
made.  Disheartened  by  their  want  of  success,  and  threat- 
ened on  their  left  flank  by  newly  arriving  troops,  the  French 
gave  way  at  nightfall  and  retreated  in  good  order  on  Saarge- 
mund. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  attribute  to  its  true  causes  the 
double  defeat  suffered  by  the  French  on  this  day.  Superior- 
ity in  numbers  and  organization,  combined  with  the  advan- 
tage of  taking  the  offensive,  were  on  the  German  side.  The 
advance  of  their  powerful  armies  on  both  sides  of  the  Vosges 
with  their  flanks  covered  by  Luxemburg  and  the  Rhine, 
was  a  safe  operation ;  and  though  either  wing  might  have 
received  a  check,  a  disaster  was  impossible.  On  the  French 
side  a  defective  administration  nullified  all  the  attempts 
to  carry  out  the  original  plans  of  the  Emperor.  The  dispo- 
sition of  the  several  corps  seems,  moreover,  very  injudicious, 
and  to  violate  the  sound  principle  that  inferior  forces 
should  be  massed.  Whether  for  offensive  or  defensive  pur- 
poses, it  was  essential  that  the  French  troops  should  be 
concentrated ;  and  while  effecting  that  object  it  was  unsafe 


-14- 


Extract 

to  place  isolated  corps,  liable  to  defeat,  so  close  to  the  fron- 
tier. Distributed,  however,  as  they  were,  the  lack  of  com- 
mon reconnoitering  precautions  seems  inexcusable.  In  the 
several  engagements,  notably  at  Spicheren — the  want  of  mu- 
tual co-operation  of  corps  on  the  French  side  is  especially 
remarkable,  while  the  sound  of  firing  apparently  hurried 
all  available  German  forces  to  the  field  of  battle.  This  prin- 
ciple seems,  however,  to  have  been  carried  to  excess  at 
Worth,  where  the  German  outflanking  troops  lost  sight 
of  their  proper  objective. 

After  their  defeats,  the  beaten  armies  retreated  in  a  west- 
erly direction  in  two  large  masses.  The  greater  portion  of  one 
of  these  bodies  consisted  of  the  troops  routed  at  Worth, 
whose  retirement  was  compulsory  and  attended  with  dis- 
aster. The  left  wing,  on  the  other  hand,  was  composed  of 
the  main  Imperial  army,  only  one  of  whose  corps  had  yet 
been  in  contact  with  the  enemy.  With  their  right  wing 
utterly  disorganized,  and  their  main  body  threatened  in 
front  with  superior  numbers,  it  was  obvious  that  all  of- 
fensive action  was  impossible,  and  that  immediate  meas- 
ures had  to  be  taken  to  secure  the  defense  of  the  country. 
To  effectually  utilize  their  inferior  forces,  it  was  necessary 
to  unite  the  two  separated  portions  (now  bearing  the  names 
of  the  armies  of  Chalons  and  Metz).  Owing  to  the  disor- 
ganized state  of  MacMahon's  troops,  it  was  hopeless  to 
expect  a  concentration  east  of  the  Moselle,  and  a  general 
retreat  to  that  river  was  ordered.  There  was  much  dis- 
pute as  to  the  best  course  to  pursue — whether  to  retire 
direct  on  Chalons,  and  thereby  unite  the  two  armies ;  or  to 
retreat  on  Metz  with  the  main  body,  and  endeavor  to  close 
in  the  right  wing  to  it;  or  to  take  up  a  defensive  position 
south  of  Metz,  and  dispute  the  passage  of  the  Moselle.  As 
a  consequence,  between  the  6th  and  12th  of  August,  orders 
and  counter  orders  succeeded  one  another  with  lamentable 
rapidity;  but  eventually  the  retreat  on  Chalons  was  defin- 
itely decided  on.  The  main  body  retired  from  the  district 
of  St.  Avoid  directly  on  Metz,  the  vicinity  of  which  was 
reached  on  the   12th   inst.     The  6th   Corps    (originally  a 

—15— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

portion  of  the  reserve),  was  hurried  up  to  the  fortress, 
and  on  the  13th  an  army  of  176,000  men  was  assembled 
under  the  detached  forts  lying  to  the  east  of  Metz.  Mac- 
Mahon,  in  the  meantime,  was  retreating  via  Luneville  on 
Chalons,  where  he  eventually*  succeeded  in  collecting  about 
120,000  men,  the  greater  portion  of  whom  consisted  of  the 
1st,  5th,  and  7th  Corps. 

While  the  two  armies  were  in  full  retreat,  strenuous 
efforts  were  made  by  the  Government  to  increase  the  de- 
fensive power  of  the  country.  The  Gardes  Mobiles  were 
called  out  throughout  the  whole  of  France,  old  soldiers  were 
recalled  to  the  ranks,  the  troops  destined  for  the  Baltic 
expedition  (including  marines),  were  hurried  to  the  capi- 
tal, and  provisions  laid  in  with  the  utmost  despatch. 

Whether  it  was  necessary  to  give  up  the  whole  of  the 
country  east  of  the  Moselle  without  resistance  is  a  matter 
for  discussion,  but  under  the  circumstances  it  was  probably 
advisable.  The  defensive  positions  on  the  Nied  were  not 
suitable  for  an  army  so  large  as  that  of  Bazaine,  and  the 
co-operation  of  MacMahon  could,  moreover,  scarcely  be 
expected.  At  Frouard,  however,  on  the  Moselle,  both  armies 
might  easily  have  been  concentrated  by  the  13th,  and  the 
position  would  have  been  both  strategically  and  tactically 
powerful.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fortress  of  Metz  was  in 
a  most  defenceless  state,  and  urgent  appeals  were  made  to 
secure  its  safety  by  the  detachment  of  a  large  force.  By 
marching  the  troops  of  Bazaine  through  the  town,  time 
and  opportunity  would  be  given  for  strengthening  the 
works  and  reinforcing  the  garrison  of  the  virgin  city. 

After  their  successes  at  Worth  and  Spicheren,  the 
three  German  armies  occupied  with  their  leading  troops 
a  south-easterly  line  passing  through  the  two  places,  the 
III  Army  (Crown  Prince)  being  separated  from  the  other 
two  by  the  ngountain  chain  of  the  Vosges.  Owing  to  the 
hurried  retreat  of  the  French  forces,  contact  was  lost  for 
the  time ;  but  it  was  naturally  supposed  that  a  serious  stand 
would  be  made  on  the  line  of  the  Moselle.     To  effectually 

*21st  August. 

—16— 


Extract 

link  the  armies  together  and  make  a  simultaneous  advance 
towards  the  retreating  troops,  it  was  necessary  to  make  a 
strategical  M'heel  to  the  right  on  the  pivot  of  Saarbrucken. 
To  carry  out  this  measure  the  I  Army  (Steinmetz)  had  to 
remain  halted,  the  II  Army  (Prince  Frederick  Charles), 
gathering  up  its  rearmost  troops,  had  to  push  forward 
south  to  form  the  centre  of  the  line,  while  the  III  Army 
(Crown  Prince),  forming  the  outer  flank,  had  to  traverse 
the  difficult  defiles  of  the  Vosges,  and  close  in  on  to  the  left 
of  the  II  Army.  The  passes  through  the  mountains  which 
the  Crown  Prince  had  to  utilize  were  closed  by  small  forts, 
none  of  which  proved  a  real  obstacle  with  the  exception  of 
Bitsch  and  Phalsbourg.*  Advancing  in  five  different  col- 
umns, the  mountain  range  was  crossed  in  two  days,  and 
union  with  the  left  of  the  II  Army  effected  on  the  line 
of  the  Saar.  As  soon  as  the  wheel  was  completed,  the 
three  armies  marched  westward  through  Lorraine,  linked 
together  in  one  homogeneous  body,  with  their  front  covered 
by  a  numerous  cavalry,  two  days'  march  ahead.  On  the 
12th  of  August  the  positions  marked  in  the  map  were 
reached,  the  right  of  the  whole  force  resting  on  the  Nied, 
the  left  somewhat  withdrawn  at  Saarburg, 

The  same  evening  the  French  Emperor,  constrained 
by  public  opinion,  handed  over  the  command  to  Bazaine, 
with  definite  instructions  to  retreat  at  once  through  Metz 
on  Chalons.  Numerous  temporary  bridges  had  been  pre- 
viously thrown  across  the  Moselle,  but  were  rendered  use- 
less for  the  most  part  on  account  of  heavy  floods.  The 
whole  of  the  13th  was  occupied  in  arranging  the  details  of 
a  passage,  which  was  not  commenced  till  the  following 
morning.  The  French  troops  were  encamped  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river  in  a  wide  semi-circle,  within  range  of  the 
detached  forts.     The  cavalry  patrols  sent  out  in  the  morn- 


*Bitsch — a  strong'  isolated  fort — was  invested  by  Bavarian 
troops,  and  did  not  fall  into  German  hands  during  the  w^ar. 

Phalsbourg-,  commanding  the  high  road  through  Vosges,  was 
bombarded  by  the  XI  Corps  and  eventually  invested  by  Landv^^ehr 
troops.  The  commandant  made  a  most  gallant  resistance  with  the 
small  garrison  at  his  disposal  (1200  men),  and  held  the  fort  up  to 
the  12th  December,  when  famine  forced  him  to  capitulate. 

—17—. 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

ing  did  not  report  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  and  the  re- 
treat was  leisurely  begun  from  both  flanks  of  the  line  of 
bivouacs.  By  3  o'clock  half  the  French  forces  had  crossed 
the  river. 

In  the  meantime,  the  three  German  armies,  steadily 
advancing,  had  reached  with  their  advanced  troops  the 
vicinity  of  Metz  and  the  general  line  of  the  Moselle. 

The  General  commanding  the  advanced  guard  of  the 
VII  Corps  (I  Army)  arriving  at  Laquenay  saw  the  French 
troops  gradually  defiling  to  the  rear.  Aware  that  it  was 
highly  important  that  the  French  retreat  should  be  delayed 
as  much  as  possible,  in  view  of  the  contingency  that  a  flank 
attack  might  be  made  on  the  leading  troops  of  the  II  Army 
now  crossing  the  Moselle,  he  determined  to  assault  at  once 
with  the  small  force  at  his  command  (a  brigade),  inform- 
ing at  the  time  the  commanders  of  the  corps  nearest  him 
(the  I,  VII,  and  IX)  of  his  intention.  Covering  the  French 
retreat  was  the  3rd  Corps  (Decaen),  deployed  in  two  lines 
facing  to  the  east  on  the  heights  above  the  village  and 
valley  of  Colombey.  These  troops  were  in  the  act  of  re- 
tiring when  attacked  impetuously  on  their  centre  by  the 
Goltz  brigade.  On  the  German  side  were  advancing  in 
support  the  leading  troops  of  the  I  and  VII  Corps,  on  the 
outer  flanks  of  which  were  two  cavalry  divisions.  The 
gradual  reinforcement  of  the  fighting  line  eventually  con- 
verted into  a  battle  what  was  originally  but  a '  vanguard 
action.  To  meet  the  increasing  hostile  forces,  a  portion  of 
the  French  4th  Corps  (Ladmirault),  which  had  crossed 
the  river,  was  repassed  to  the  right  bank,  and  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  troops  of  Decaen  resisted  the  German  ad- 
vance with  success.  The  Imperial  Guard  was  available  for 
offensive  purposes,  but  was  employed  solely  as  a  reserve. 
As  night  closed  neither  side  had  given  way,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  orders  of  the  morning  the  French  retreat 
was  continued,  and  the  remainder  of  the  army  passed  across 
the  river  under  the  protection  of  the  detached  forts. 

This  battle — commenced  at  an  hour  at  which  engage- 
ments often  terminate — may  be  cited  as  a  successful  ex- 

—18— 


Extract 

ample  of  an  advanced  guard  action,  where  a  small  body 
of  troops  initiated  a  strategical  victory  by  arresting  the 
retreat  of  an  army,  maintaining  at  the  same  time,  without 
retiring,  the  forward  position  to  which  a  bold  attack  had 
committed  them.  Victory  has  been  claimed  by  both  sides, 
and  tactically  it  may  fairly  be  considered  to  be  a  drawn 
fight.  The  strategical  importance  of  the  engagement  was, 
however,  clearly  seen  by  the  German  Headquarters,  as 
evinced  by  the  order  issued  on  the  morning  of  the  15th : — 
"The  fruits  of  the  victory  (i.  e.  Borny)  can  only  be  gained  by 
a  vigorous  offensive  by  the  II  Army  towards  the  Metz-Ver- 
dun  Road  (east  of  Metz)."  The  attack  of  General  Goltz 
with  his  advanced  guard  brigade  was  certainly  justified  by 
its  success  but  it  is  an  open  question  whether  in  case  of 
failure  it  would  not  have  incurred  much  hostile  criticism. 
The  conduct  of  Bazaine  at  this  period  has  been  much  com- 
mented on.  It  has  been  urged  that  if  he  was  bent  on  re- 
treating, he  should  not  have  fought  at  all  on  the  14th,  but 
let  the  guns  of  the  Metz  forts  keep  the  enemy  at  a  distance ; 
or  if  he  accepted  battle,  he  should  have  taken  a  vigorous 
offensive  against  the  inferior  forces  in  his  front.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  has  stated  as  his  opinion  that  he  was  com- 
mitted to  a  retreat,  but  that  the  outer  detached  forts  were 
in  such  a  defenceless  state  that  they  were  liable  to  be  taken 
by  assault,  and  that  therefore  the  onward  pressure  of  the 
Germans  had  to  be  resisted  up  to  a  certain  point. 

On  the  following  day  the  march  westward  of  the 
French  was  continued.  From  Metz  two  main  chaussees  lead 
towards  Verdun — the  northern  passing  through  Woippy, 
St.  Privat,  and  Briey,  the  southern  through  Longeville  to 
Gravelotte,  where  the  road  bifurcates.  It  was  intended 
that  the  retreat  should  take  place  by  the  southern  of  these 
roads  as  far  as  Gravelotte,  and  thence  by  the  chaussees 
leading  through  Doncourt — Conflans  and  Rezonville — 
Mars-la-Tour.  On  the  Rezonville  Road  the  2nd  Corps 
iFrossard)  was  to  lead,  followed  by  the  6th  (Canrobert) 
and  the  Guard;  on  the  more  northern  route  the  4th  Corps 


-19- 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

(Ladmirault),  followed  by  the  3rd  (Leboeuf)*  which  was 
again  to  act  as  rear  guard  in  anticipation  of  an  attack  from 
the  north  of  Metz  by  the  I  Army.  Great  delay  was  caused 
in  passing  through  Metz,  owing  to  the  encumbrance  of  quan- 
tities of  unnecessary  baggage, f  and  the  insufficient  bridg- 
ing of  the  Moselle.  Some  additional  time  was  also  undoubt- 
edly lost  on  account  of  the  action  of  Borny.  The  troops 
on  the  most  southern  road  were  ready  to  advance,  but  were 
obliged  to  wait  until  the  rest  of  the  forces  had  reached 
their  assigned  positions.  On  the  evening  of  the  15th,  the 
2nd  and  6th  Corps  were  bivouacked  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Rezonville,  the  Guard  being  to  their  rear  on  the  Gravelotte 
plateau.  During  the  day  the  presence  of  German  cavalry 
and  artillery  on  the  left  flank  made  itself  apparent,  but 
the  importance  of  the  fact  does  not  appear  to  have  sug- 
gested itself  to  the  French  staff.  Aware  that  Bazaine  was 
in  full  retreat,  the  German  II  Army  pushed  forward  with 
alacrity  in  the  direction  of  Verdun,  in  order  to  intercept 
him.  It  was  necessary  to  keep  some  troops  on  the  eastern 
side  of  Metz,  to  prevent  sallies  of  the  garrison — a  duty 
which  naturally  fell  to  the  I  Army,  which  was  already  in 
position. 

On  the  evening  of  the  15th,  the  II  German  Army  had 
four  of  its  corpsj  on  the  line  of  the  Moselle  (Metz  to 
Frouard)  one  division  having  reached  the  advance  position 
of  Thiancourt.  Further  south,  the  general  line  of  advance 
was  taken  up  by  the  troops  of  the  III  Army. 

The  French  retreat  was  to  have  been  resumed  at  4 
A.  M.,  but  owing  to  the  4th  Corps  not  having  come  up  into 
line  was  deferred  till  midday.  Early  in  the  morning  a 
reconnaissance  in  force  was  made  by  the  5th  (German) 
Cavalry  Division,  and  four  batteries  of  horse  artillery.  Ad- 
vancing at  a  gallop,  the  batteries  unlimbered  on  a  hill  south- 
west of  Vionville,  and  rapidly  shelled  the  French  cavalry 


*General  Decaen  was  mortally  wounded  at  Borny. 

fAccompanied  by  large  trains  of  personal  baggage,  luxurious 
mess  equipages,  and  crowds  of  servants  and  adventurers,  the  army 
of  Bazaine  has  with  some  severity  been  entitled  the  army  of  Darius. 

JThe  II,  X,  IX,  and  IV. 

—20— 


Extract 

camp  to  the  west  of  that  village.  Taken  completely  by  sur- 
prise, the  French  squadrons  galloped  to  the  rear  in  com- 
plete disorder,  and  eventually  re-formed  behind  the  line 
of  their  infantry  bivouacs  at  Rezonville.  More  to  the  east- 
ward, from  the  direction  of  Gorze,  the  6th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion now  drove  in  the  outposts  in  front  of  them,  and  com- 
pleted the  arc  of  observation.  Against  the  wide  circle  of 
cavalry,  extending  from  the  Bois  de  St.  Arnold  to  the 
Tronville  heights,  the  French  infantry  advanced  to  attack 
in  lines  radiating  from  the  centre — Rezonville.  At  10 
o'clock,  at  the  extremities  of  the  cavalry  arc,  the  first 
Prussian  infantry  appeared  on  the  ground — the  5th  and 
6th  Divisions  of  the  III  Corps.  An  immediate  advance  was 
made  by  these  troops,  and  the  villages  of  Flavigny  and  Vion- 
ville  captured  with  heavy  loss.  At  noon  the  French,  act- 
ing generally  on  the  defensive,  occupied  the  heights  west 
of  Rezonville  with  two  corps  facing  westward.  Bazaine. 
apprehensive  of  being  cut  off  from  Metz,  kept  his  reserves 
on  the  Gravelotte  plateau.  The  French  right  (3rd  and  4th 
Corps)  were  moving  southward  towards  the  line  of  battle. 
It  will  be  seen  that  one  German  corps,  preceded  by  two 
cavalry  divisions,  had  thus  placed  themselves  across  the 
road  in  front  of  the  whole  French  army.  At  2 :  00  P.  M.  the 
French  3rd  Corps  came  into  action,  and  it  was  apparent 
that  an  advance  was  about  to  be  made  by  the  right  of  the 
French  line.  In  order  to  effect  delay,  and  give  time  for 
reinforcements  to  come  up,  a  brigade  of  German  cavalry 
was  launched  against  the  threatening  troops,  and  their  dar- 
ing charge,  in  spite  of  enormous  loss,  effected  its  object. 
At  3  o'clock  the  X  Corps  arrived  in  time  to  reinforce  the 
threatened  German  left,  and  about  the  same  time  the 
French  right  was  increased  by  the  addition  of  the  4th 
Corps.  The  line  of  battle,  which  formerly  stood  nearly 
west,  now  faced  due  south.  A  series  of  attacks  with  vary- 
ing success  were  made  by  the  newly  arriving  French  troops, 
and  finally  led  to  a  great  cavalry  engagement  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Mars-la-Tour,  for  which  both  nations  claim  success. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  battle-field  a  desultory  fight  was 


-21- 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

kept  up  as  long  as  daylight  lasted.  The  losses  of  the  con- 
tending forces  were  very  heavy — amounting  on  each  side  to 
about  16,000  men. 

The  true  importance  of  this  day  cannot  be  judged  of 
by  its  tactical  results.  The  Prussians  had  certainly  not  been 
able  to  drive  the  French  out  of  their  main  positions;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  French  had  not  been  able  to  recover 
the  ground  lost  before  noon,  nor  re-continue  their  march. 
The  victory,  however,  clearly  lay  with  the  Germans  in  a 
strategical  point  of  view.  By  a  bold  employment  of  their 
numerically  inferior  forces  they  had  stopped  the  French 
retreat,  and  given  time  for  their  main  body  to  effectually 
interpose  between  the  junction  of  the  two  Marshals.  Much 
criticism  has  been  expended  on  the  unnecessary  delay  under 
the  eastern  forts  of  Metz,  and  the  time  occupied  in  crossing 
the  Moselle.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  the  northern 
route  by  Briey  was  not  utilized.  Every  moment  was  of  con- 
sequence, and  to  endeavor  to  march  the  greater  part  of  a 
large  army  by  one  route  out  of  Metz  could  only  lead  to  great 
loss  of  time.  There  appears  to  have  been  an  idea  that  an 
attack  would  be  made  to  the  northward  by  troops  crossing 
the  Moselle  lower  down  than  Metz.  At  the  same  time,  it 
was  well  known  that  the  bulk  of  the  II  Army  was  approach- 
ing the  line  of  the  Moselle  above  Metz,  and  common  precau- 
tion might  have  suggested  the  destruction  of  the  permanent 
bridges  at  Ars  and  Pont-a-Mousson.  Bazaine  (who  took 
over  the  command  of  the  army  on  the  evening  of  the  12th) 
did  not  apparently  realize  the  necessity  of  a  retreat  west- 
ward, but  was  more  inclined  to  rest  on  Metz  as  a  base  from 
which  offensive  operations  might  be  directed.  This  view 
was  perhaps  not  unnatural,  particularly  when  the  weak 
state  of  the  detached  forts  was  considered;  but  still  it  was 
against  the  spirit  of  the  orders  he  had  received  and  mili- 
tated against  their  being  effectively  carried  out.  The 
French  forces  were  considerably  inferior  in  numbers  to 
those  of  their  adversaries,  and  the  best  hope  of  success  lay 
in  a  retreat  for  the  purpose  of  combination.  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  why  the  fatal  delay  in  marching  off  was  per- 

—22— 


Extract 

mitted.     Assuming  that  the  previous  loss  of  time  was  un- 
avoidable, the  reason  for  a  further  stoppage  seems  insuffi- 
cient.   The  presence  of  the  German  cavalry  was  well  known 
and  if  an  uninterrupted  retreat  was  desirable,  every  mo- 
ment was  of  value.    Admitting  that  the  4th  Corps  was  late 
in  its  appearance,  this  defect  might  still  have  been  partially 
obviated  by  directing  it  to  act  as  a  rear  guard  on  the  more 
direct   southern   road,   while   the   Guard   could   have   been 
shifted  to  the  more  northern  chaussee.     When  committeed 
to  the  engagement  at  Rezonville,   why  was  a  continuous 
defensive  so  sedulously  maintained?     The  German  troops, 
if  attacked  with  the  vigour  naturally  in  accord  with  the 
French  spirit,  during  the  morning  must  have  been  defeated. 
Even  in  the  afternoon,  when  their  reinforcements  came  up, 
they  were  numerically  much  inferior  to  the  troops  of  the 
Marshal.     The  bulk  of  the  German  forces  were  in  the  act 
of  crossing   the   Moselle,    and   a   vigorous   effort   directed 
southward  must  have  driven  back  their  leading  troops  in 
confusion,  and  possibly  allowed  the  army  to  pursue  its  re- 
treat.    A  defensive  line  was,  however,  taken  up  instead, 
and  the  reserves  kept  on  the  left  flank.     Bazaine  allows 
himself  that  he  was  afraid  of  being  cut  off  from  Metz ;  but 
that  surely  cannot  be  admitted  as  a  valid  plea.    His  orders 
were  to  retreat  on  Verdun,  and  in  natural  concurrence  with 
this  would  be  a  departure  from  Metz.     The  fear  of  leaving 
the  fortress  which  he  avowedly  shows,  demonstrates  how 
completely  he  failed  to  realize  the  exigencies  of  the  strate- 
gical situation.     With  regard  to  the  bold  attack  of  the  III 
German  Corps,  it  may  be  fairly  questioned — despite  most 
of  the  German  accounts — whether  its  commander  was  at 
all  aware  of  his  having  the  whole  French  army  in  front  of 
him.     Throughout  the  battle  the  Germans  laid  themselves 
open  to  be  beaten  in  detail,  and  that  they  were  not  so  must 
be  attributed  more  to  the  inaction  of  the  French  Marshal 
than  to  any  tactical  combination  of  their  own. 

On  the  night  of  the  16th  both  armies  bivouacked  on 
the  fiejd  of  battle,  but  at  daybreak  the  French  forces  retired 
according  to  orders  towards  Metz — the  retrograde  move- 

—23— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

ment  being  adopted  ostensibly  on  the  ground  of  want  of 
ammunition  and  food  supplies.  The  army  eventually  took 
up  a  position  on  the  continuous  chain  of  heights  to  the  east 
of  and  overlooking  the  Mance  rivulet  (extending  from 
Rozerieulles  to  St.  Privat-la-Montagne).  On  the  evening 
of  the  16th  orders  were  issued  for  the  concentration  of 
the  II  Army  on  the  battle-field.  The  III  and  X  Corps,  and_ 
a  portion  of  the  VIII  and  IX  were  already  on  the  ground. 
There  was  little  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  a  sortie 
from  the  fortress  to  the  south  or  east,  so  the  VII  and  VIII 
Corps  of  the  I  Army  were  ordered  to  cross  the  river  and 
form  with  the  IX  the  right  of  the  bivouacked  troops.  The 
XII  Corps  and  Guards  were  directed  northward  to  the  left 
of  the  line  in  the  neighborhood  of  Mars-la-Tour.  The  I 
Corps  was  left  as  a  precautionary  measure  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river,  and  the  II  Corps,  which  was  somewhat 
in  rear,  hurried  forward  to  Pont-a-Mousson. 

There  was  some  uncertainty  at  the  German  Head- 
quarters as  to  whether  the  French  intended  to  attempt 
pursuing  their  retreat  by  a  more  northerly  route,  or  offer- 
ing a  defensive  battle  under  the  forts  of  Metz.  Equally 
prepared  for  either  contingency,  the  order  was  given  for 
an  advance  in  echelon  of  corps  from  the  left  in  a  northerly 
direction,  the  XII  Corps,  leading,  followed  by  the  Guards 
and  IX  Corps,  the  X  and  III  Corps  following  in  second  line. 
The  VIII  Corps  was  to  move  on  the  right  rear  of  the  IX 
and  the  VII  still  further  to  the  right,  forming  the  pivot 
in  the  case  that  a  wheel  to  the  right  towards  Metz  should 
be  necessary. 

The  French  position  extended  for  7  miles  along  the 
crest  of  an  open  and  broad  ridge,  the  western  slope  of 
which  mostly  fell  with  a  gentle  declivity.  The  left  wing- 
was  very  strongly  posted,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground  and  the  protection  afforded  by  the  fort  of  St. 
Quentin  and  the  Moselle  valley.  The  right  wing  rested  on 
no  natural  or  artificial  obstacle,  and  but  few  temporary 
arrangements  were  made  for  its  protection,  owing  to  the 
absence  of  engineering  tools.  The  reserve  was  posted  in 
rear  of  the  left  wing, 

—24— 


Extract 

As  the  German  echeloned  corps  marched  northward, 
covered  by  their  cavalry  scouts,  it  soon  became  apparent 
that  the  French  had  delayed  their  retreat  and  taken  up  a 
defensive  position  resting  on  Metz.  Orders  were  accord- 
ingly issued  to  move  up  into  line  in  order  to  attack,  it 
being  intended  that  the  two  leading  corps  (the  VII  and 
Guards)  should  envelop  the  French  right  flank.  The  sim- 
ultaneous assault  on  the  whole  of  the  front  line  was  pre- 
vented principally  from  a  misconception  as  to  the  limit  to 
which  the  French  defensive  position  extended,  and  the 
battle  was  commenced  at  midday  by  the  artillery  of  the  IX 
Corps.  In  order  to  afford  support,  the  VI  and  VIII  Ger- 
man Corps  advanced  against  the  left  of  the  French  line, 
while  the  left  wing  of  the  II  Army  continued  its  steady 
movement  onward.  The  artillery  of  the  Guards  by  2  P.M. 
came  into  action  on  the  left  of  the  IX  Corps,  its  infantry 
adyancing  against  St.  Marie-aux-Chenes.  At  5  o'clock  the 
French  army  held  intact  its  whole  main  position,  after  a 
frontal  attack,  chiefly  of  artillery,  had  been  raging  for 
five  hours  without  intermission.  Soon  after  this  time  an 
advance  across  the  gently  sloping  glacis  of  St.  Privat  (the 
right  of  the  French  line)  was  made  by  the  Prussian  Guard, 
but  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  The  XII  Corps  by  6  :30 
o'clock  eventually  carried  out  its  flank  movement,  and  com- 
menced the  attack  of  St.  Privat  from  the  north.  A  second 
advance — this  time  successful — was  made  at  the  same  mo- 
ment by  the  Prussian  Guard,  and  the  French  right  was 
thrown  back  in  utter  confusion,  just  as  darkness  set  in. 
Early  on  the  19th  the  beaten  French  troops  took  up  their 
bivouacs  in  a  concentrated  position  under  the  Metz  forts. 

The  objective  of  the  two  armies  was  at  this  period  the 
same — an  advance  towards  Paris — The  French  for  the  pur- 
pose of  combination,  the  Germans  to  reach  their  natural 
goal,  the  Capital.  If  Bazaine  could  have  left  a  sufficient 
garrison  in  Metz  forts  and  have  resumed  his  march,  the 
double  advantage  would  have  been  gained  of  detaining  a 
large  investing  force  round  the  fortress  and  uniting  the 
two  French  armies.     Success   depended  on  the  factor  of 

—25— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

time;  and  how  this  element  was  on  the  one  side  frittered 
away  in  baneful  hesitation,  and  on  the  other  utilized  to 
its  fullest  extent,  is  study  replete  with  interest. 

On  the  18th  August  retreat  westward  was  impossible, 
unless  preceded  by  a  decided  success,  for  the  obtention  of 
which  it  was  obviously  necessary  that  more  than  purely 
defensive  measures  should  be  taken,  A  defeat  to  the  Ger- 
man forces  might  have  been  most  disastrous,  and  it  is  a 
question  whether  Bazaine  did  not  lose  a  valuable  oppor- 
tunity in  not  taking  the  offensive  against  the  centre  of 
the  allied  line.  Whether  it  was  expedient  for  the  Germans 
to  accept  battle  at  all  is  somewhat  doubtful.  The  inter- 
ception of  the  French  retreat  was  complete  on  the  16th, 
and  the  French  General  could  only  resume  his  march  by 
becoming  the  assailant  and  laying  himself  open  to  be  at- 
tacked in  flank.  In  lieu  of  taking  up  the  Amanvillers  posi- 
tion, it  has  been  suggested  that  Bazaine  might  have  passed 
his  troops  through  Metz  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle 
on  the  17th  and  taken  the  offensive  in  a  south-easterly  direc- 
tion, pushing  his  army  towards  Strassburg  and  cutting  the 
German  communications.  That  this  course  was  possible 
with  a  well-led  army  has  been  pretty  generally  admitted; 
but  it  is  doubtful  whether  under  the  inferior  direction  that 
signalized  the  warfare  round  Metz  any  such  attempt  could 
have  been  successful. 

The  position  of  the  combatants  in  this  battle  is  espe- 
cially striking.  Each  army  was  facing  towards  its  orig- 
inal base — the  Prussians  having  their  back  to  Paris,  while 
the  French  faced  towards  it.  As  at  Rezonville,  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  French  reserve  seems  very  faulty,  and  to  have 
arisen  from  an  entire  misconception  of  the  value  of  the 
supporting  fortress.  If  the  Imperial  Guard  had  been  sent 
in  time  to  the  assistance  of  the  right  wing,  it  is  very  doubt- 
ful whether  the  turning  movement  of  the  Saxons  would 
have  resulted  in  success. 

The  retreat  of  Bazaine  having  been  effectually  put  a 
stop  to,  the  next  object  of  the  German  leaders  was  neces- 
sarily to  make  innocuous  the  flower  of  the  French  army, 

—26— 


Extract 

so  recently  beaten,  while  a  rapid  advance  was  made  against 
the  troops  of  MacMahon,  Orders  were  accordingly  issued 
by  the  King,  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  detailing  a  certain 
number  of  corps  (comprising  the  I  Army,  and  the  II,  III, 
IX  and  X  Corps  of  the  II  Army),  for  the  duty  of  investing 
Metz ;  while  the  Guards,  IV,  and  XII  Corps  were  constituted 
into  a  fourth  Army,*  destined  to  operate  with  the  already 
advancing  III  Army  against  Chalons  and  Paris.  A  circle  of 
investment  about  32  miles  in  extent  was  formed  outside 
effective  range  of  the  detached  forts,  and  diligently 
strengthened  by  means  of  earthworks  and  obstacles.  Owing 
to  the  heavy  losses  of  the  preceding  days,  the  German  corps 
were  much  reduced  in  numbers,  and  the  investing  force 
may  be  estimated  at  from  160  to  170,000  men — an  effective 
the  total  of  which  was  daily  increasing,  on  account  of  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements.  The  army  of  Bazaine  numbered 
about  the  same,  inclusive  of  a  large  number  of  wounded 
and  noncombatants. 

The  III  Army,  in  the  meantime,  had  advanced  nearly 
to  the  Meuse  (south  of  Toul),  and  was  awaiting  the  issue 
of  the  engagements  about  Metz.  On  the  19th  it  received 
orders  to  continue  its  march  westward,  and  on  the  20th 
the  main  body,  in  four  columns,  protected  by  cavalry  on 
the  left  flank,  had  crossed  the  river.  MacMahon's  troops, 
consisting  of  the  1st,  5th,  7th,  "and  12th  Corps,  were  at  this 
period  at  the  camp  of  Chalons. 

Part  II 

{20th   August  to  31st  October) 

METZ  TO  PARIS 

The  original  left  wing  of  the  French  army,  under 
the  command  of  Marshal  MacMahon,  which  was  concen- 
trating since  the  middle  of  August  at  the  camp  of  Chalons, 
consisted  of  the  1st,  5th,  7th,  and  12th  Corps,  with  the 
cavalry    divisions    of   Bonnemain    and    Marguerite.      Con- 


^Called  the  Army  of  the  Meuse. 

—27— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

tinuous  retreats  and  defective  administration,  had  exer- 
cised a  most  demoralizing  influence  on  the  morale  of  the 
troops  already  engaged,  but  the  newly  formed  12th  Corps 
contained  an  excellent  nucleus  of  well-trained  men  hitherto 
unshaken  by  defeat.  A  futile  endeavor  was  made  to  utilize 
the  Parisian  Gardes  Mobiles,  who  proved  mutinous  and 
unmanageable,  and  were  obliged  to  be  sent  back  to  their 
homes.  At  the  capital  itself  two  more  corps  (the  13th  and 
14th)  were  in  process  of  formation,  though  they  were  not 
organized  in  sufficient  time  to  take  the  field.  Exclusive  of 
these  last  mentioned  troops,  the  Army  of  Chalons  had  an 
effective  on  the  20th  inst.  of  120,000  men  with  324  guns.* 

The  position  of  the  French  General  was  undoubtedly  a 
difficult  one;  on  the  one  hand  it  was  his  object  to  cover 
the  capital,  on  the  other  to  assist  Bazaine  and  enable  him 
to  break  through  the  formidable  circle  of  investment  that 
surrounded  him.  To  risk  the  defeat  of  his  troops  by  offer- 
ing battle  at  Chalons  would  be  dangerous,  and  but  tempo- 
rarily check  the  German  advance ;  to  retreat  on  Paris  would 
undoubtedly  lead  to  the  fall  of  the  Napoleonic  dynasty,  the 
prestige  of  which  was  already  severely  shaken.  The 
exigencies  of  the  political  situation  demanded  an  attempt 
to  succour  Bazaine,  while  purely  military  grounds  dictated 
the  necessity  of  a  retirement  to  the  capital.  The  plan  of 
campaign  suggested  by  the  War  Ministry  was  to  advance  in 
three  main  columns  through  the  Argonne  towards  Ver- 
dun, and  thus  gain  the  valley  of  the  Meuse.  Such  an  opera- 
tion could  only  be  effected  by  making  a  flank  march  be- 
tween the  III  German  Army  and  the  Belgian  frontier,  and 
incurring  the  risk  of  a  simultaneous  attack  on  front  and 
flank.  Taking  the  most  favorable  view,  it  might  possibly 
lead  to  the  corps  of  the  Meuse  Army  being  beaten  in  detail, 
and  as  a  probabl|^  consequence  enforce  the  raising  of  the 
Metz  investment.  The  hazardous  nature  of  such  a  move- 
ment, combined  with  the  fact  that  in  case  of  Bazaine  break- 
ing out  southwards  it  would  be  perfectly  futile,  was  fully 


*0n  the  25th,  408  guns   and  84  mitrailleuses,   the  total   number 
of  combatants  being  slightly  increased. 

—28— 


Extract 

apparent.  The  absence  of  the  authentic  information  as  to 
the  exact  position  in  which  the  army  of  the  Rhine  was  placed 
increased  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  and  MacMahon, 
to  temporarily  escape  his  dilemma,  determined  on  the 
medium  course  of  marching  on  Rheims,  to  take  up  a  posi- 
tion which  would  enable  him  to  await  the  development  of 
the  enemy's  plans,  and  at  the  same  time  flank  the  direct 
approaches  on  Paris. 

On  the  21st  the  march  northward  was  commenced,  the 
camp  being  evacuated  in  such  haste  that  large  stores  of 
food,  forage  and  clothing  had  to  be  burnt.  On  the  morning 
of  the  22nd  a  telegram  from  Bazaine,  stating  that  he  be- 
lieved he  could  continue  his  retreat  in  a  north-westerly  di- 
rection through  Montmedy,  was  received,  and  led  to  the  can- 
celling of  previously  issued  orders  for  retirement  towards 
Paris.*  Influenced  by  this  despatch,  and  fortified  by  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  the  War  Ministry,  the  Marshal  start- 
ed in  column  of  corps  on  the  morning  of  the '23rd  in  a  north- 
easterly direction  towards  Dun  and  Stenay,t  having  pre- 
viously warned  Bazaine  of  his  movement.^  In  consequence 
of  the  difficulties  experienced  in  feeding  the  troops,  it  was 
found  necessary  to  approach  the  line  of  railway,  and  the 
whole  of  the  25th  was  occupied  in  rationing  the  army  in 
their  bivouacs  at  Vouziers-Rethel. 

Whilst  the  I  and  II  German  Armies  were  taking  part  in 
the  decisive  struggles  before  Metz,  the  III  Army  was  ad- 
vancing slowly  westward  on  the  capital.  Its  main  body  had 
crossed  the  Meuse  on  the  20th  of  August,  the  three  leading 
corps  having  reached  the  line  of  the  Ornain.    To  co-operate 


*This  despatch  was  dated  19th  August,  and  written  the  morning 
after  the  battle  of  Gravelotte.  It  appears  there  was  also  a  sec- 
ond telegram,  couched  in  somewhat  less  hopeful  language,  dated  the 
20th  August,  which  MacMahon  declares  he  did  not  receive.  As  a 
duplicate  of  this  second  message  (which  Col.  Stoffel  was  accused  of 
intercepting),  did  not  strike  the  Parisian  War  Ministry  as  containing 
any  additional  information,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  why  so  much  im- 
portance has  been  attached  to  it.  (Vide  "Proces  Bazaine.  La  de- 
peche  du  Vingt  Aont,"  by  Stoffel.) 

fThe  direct  route  through  Verdun  being  already  intercepted. 

JA  duplicate  of  this  despatch  reached  Metz  on  the  30th  August, 
and  led  to  the  sortie  towards  Noisseville  the  following  day. 

—29— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

with  these  troops,  three  army  corps  were — as  before  men- 
tioned— detached  from  the  forces  investing  Bazaine,  and 
formed  what  was  called  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  under  the 
command  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony.  The  III  Army 
was  obliged  temporarily  to  halt,  to  allow  this  new  body — 
which  started  from  the  Gravelotte  plateau  on  the  19th — to 
come  up  into  line.  The  entire  German  force  destined  for 
the  advance  on  Paris  was  eventually,  on  the  evening  of  the 
22nd,  in  a  line  facing  west  extending  from  Etain  to  Gondre- 
court  (50)  miles ;  the  Meuse  Army  forming  the  right  wing, 
and  the  cavalry  on  the  left  being  pushed  forward  as  far  as 
the  Marne  valley.  Aware  that  the  French  forces  were  in 
the  vicinity  of  Chalons,  the  advance  was  continued  on  a 
broad  front  in  a  westerly  direction.  On  the  24th  the  gen- 
eral line  of  Verdun — St.  Dizier  was  reached ;  on  the  25th 
that  of  Dombasle — Vitry,  the  cavalry  of  the  right  wing  be- 
ing pushed  through  the  Argonne  to  St.  Menehould. 

Reviewing  for  the  moment  the  position  at  this  date, 
it  will  be  seen  that  a  French  army  of  more  than  100,000 
men  was  moving  eastward  towards  Montmedy,  while  the 
Prussian  forces,  two  days'  march  to  the  south  and  unaware 
of  the  circumstance,  were  marching  westward  towards 
Paris.  The  first  information  the  Germans  received  of  the 
evacuation  of  the  Chalons  camp  arrived  late  on  the  night  of 
the  24th,  in  the  form  of  a  telegram,  which  stated  that  Mac- 
mahon  had  taken  up  a  position  at  Rheims,  and  was  about  to 
relieve  Bazaine.  As  the  direct  road  to  Metz  was  barred  by 
the  Meuse  army,  it  was  obvious  that  the  only  means  of  car- 
rying out  such  a  plan  would  entail  a  hazardous  flank  march 
in  close  proximity  to  the  Belgian  frontier.  As  this  seemed 
a  somewhat  improbable  course,  the  German  leaders  con- 
tented themselves  with  directing  their  general  line  of  ad- 
vance in  a  north-westerly  direction  towards  Rheims. 

MacMahon,  on  the  other  hand,  was  on  the  21st  un- 
doubtedly aware  of  the  existence,  numbers,  and  general  sit- 
uation of  both  the  German  armies.  His  flank  march  was 
made  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  danger  incurred,  and  it 
was  easily  apparent  that  its  only  chance  of  success  lay  in 


-30— 


Extract 

extreme  rapidity  of  execution.  The  delays  at  Rheims  and 
Rethel  had  already  imperilled  the  movement,  and  the  fur- 
ther causes  that  led  to  the  disaster  of  Sedan  can  be  best 
traced  by  following  the  movements  of  both  armies  for  the 
next  few  days. 

On  the  26th,  the  French  army  wheeled  leisurely  to  the 
right  on  the  pivot  of  Vouziers,  for  the  purpose  of  advanc- 
ing in  two  main  columns  on  the  Beaumont  and  Buzancy 
roads.  In  the  afternoon,  the  cavalry  of  the  right  column 
(7th  Corps,  under  Douay)  reported  the  presence  of  hostile 
troops  at  Grand  Pre,  and  this  corps,  in  consequence,  formed 
up  in  battle  order,  somewhat  unnecessarily,  at  Vouziers. 

Owing  to  information  received  late  on  the  25th  as  to 
the  movements  of  MacMahon,  provisional  orders  were  is- 
sued to  both  German  armies,  depending  on  the  reports  to 
be  brought  in  by  reconnoitering  cavalry.  As  a  result,  the 
Meuse  Army  changing  its  front,  moved  northward  in  anti- 
cipation, and  with  its  leading  troops  reached  Varennes. 
The  III  Army  closed  in  their  corps  to  their  right  flank,  so 
as  to  be  ready  either  to  advance  toward  Rheims  or  follow 
the  movement  of  the  Saxon  Crown  Prince.  Covering  these 
changes  of  direction,  the  cavalry  extended  in  arc  from  Dun 
to  Chalons ;  their  persistence  and  daring  forming  a  strong 
contrast  with  the  inaction  of  their  opponents. 

Apprehensive  of  an  attack  from  the  south,  MacMahon 
moved  three  of  his  corps  into  the  line  Vouziers-Buzancy ; 
but  as  no  attack  was  made,  counter-orders  were  issued  for 
the  resumption  of  the  march  in  a  northeasterly  direction. 
Resulting  from  these  conflicting  movements,  but  little 
ground  was  gained  on  this  day. 

From  the  reports  of  the  German  cavalry,  the  presence 
of  hostile  troops  of  all  arms  at  Vouziers  and  Buzancy  was 
clearly  established,  and  the  orders  for  a  march  northward 
accordingly  confirmed.  The  Meuse  Army  seized  with  its 
leading  corps  the  river  passages  at  Dun  and  Stenay,  while 
the  III  Army,  a  long  day's  march  in  rear,  reached  with  its 
advanced  troops  the  line  Clermont-St.  Menehould. 

In  view  of  the  threatening  advance  of  the  enemy,  a  re- 
treat northward  was  determined  on,  and  the  relief  of  Ba- 

—31— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

zaine  abandoned.  Unfortunately,  the  persistence  of  the 
War  Ministy  again  constrained  MacMahon  to  a  course  op- 
posed to  his  military  judgment  and  counter  orders  were  is- 
sued for  a  continued  advance  eastward.  The  objective  of 
Montmedy  was  clearly  pointed  out  to  the  corps  comman- 
ders, and  the  necessity  of  seizing  the  bridges  over  the 
Meuse  at  Stenay  and  Mouzon  insisted  upon.  These  con- 
stantly changing  instructions  led  naturally  to  much  discom- 
fort and  confusion;  the  roads  were  encumbered  with  bag- 
gage and  provision  columns  in  inextricable  disorder,  and 
but  short  marches  were  made  at  nightfall  the  5th  Corps 
reached  Bois-des-Dames  (south  of  Beaumont)  on  the  south- 
ern road,  and  XII  Corps  the  neighborhood  of  Stonne  on  the 
northern,  the  two  corps  in  rear  gaining  the  line  of  the  Bar. 

The  IV  Army  meanwhile  moved  up  its  rearmost  corps 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  still  holding  the  river  pas- 
sages with  its  advanced  troops,  while  the  III  Army  steadily 
advanced  up  the  valley  of  the  Aisne. 

On  the  evening  of  the  28th  information  was  received 
that  Stenay  was  occupied  in  force  by  Saxon  troops,  and  the 
bridge  blown  up.  As  the  army  of  Chalons  had  no  pontoon 
train,  it  was  decided  to  retire  northward,  making  use  of  the 
bridges  at  Mouzon  and  Remilly  and  eventually  gaining  Metz 
through  Carignan. 

The  troops  on  the  northern  road  were  unmolested,  but 
the  7th  Corps,  harassed  in  rear  by  cavalry  and  impeded  by 
bad  roads,  only  succeeded  in  reaching  Oches — half  its  des- 
tined march.  The  5th  Corps  (owing  to  the  capture  of  the 
officer  carrying  the  order  for  retreat)  continued  its  march 
on  Stenay,  was  attacked  by  the  Saxons  at  Nouart,  and  re- 
tired fighting,  eventually  reaching  Beaumont  much  disor- 
ganized by  its  night  march. 

On  the  German  side  there  was  a  general  tendency  for 
the  Meuse  Army  to  halt  till  the  III  Army  came  up  into  the 
line  Grand  Pre-Dun,  the  French  movements  being  watched 
by  cavalry.  The  XII  Corps  was,  however,  pushed  somewhat 
forward,  and  brought  on  the  action  above  alluded  to.  Both 
German  armies  completed  their  deployment  in  the  evening, 


Extract  ""-^.^  ""^^ 

and  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Argonne  six  corps  stood 
ready  for  advance  northward — a  general  forward  movement 
towards  Beaumont  being  projected   for  the  following  day. 

To  effect  the  passage  of  the  Meuse  at  all  risks  with  the 
greatest  promptitude  was  the  burden  of  the  French  in- 
structions. In  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  staff,  the  troops 
on  the  northern  road,  though  unmolested,  did  not  succeed 
in  crossing  at  Remilly  till  late  at  night.*  The  columns  on 
the  southern  road  were  still  more  unfortunate,  and  had  to 
pay  the  inevitable  penalty  of  mismanagement.  The  5th 
Corps,  owing  to  the  fatiguing  countermarches  of  the  last 
few  days,  and  the  demoralizing  effect  of  the  night  retreat 
it  had  just  concluded,  was  very  tardy  in  its  movements, 
and  shortly  after  noon  was  brusquely  awakened  from  a 
fancied  security  by  vigorous  shell  fire.  It  appears  that  De 
Failly,  its  commander,  was  under  the  impression  that  the 
German  forces  were  marching  towards  Stenay,  and  that  his 
retirement  would  be  uninterrupted.  As  a  fact,  the  whole 
German  armies  were  advancing  down  the  Meuse,  expecting 
to  find  MacMahon  in  a  defensive  position ;  and  it  was  some 
of  the  batteries  of  the  Meuse  Army  that  spread  such  con- 
sternation through  the  bivouacs  at  Beaumont.  The  advance 
of  the  XII  and  I  Bavarian  Corps  into  line  rendered  a  re- 
treat through  the  village  compulsory,  and  the  position  tak- 
en up  north  of  Beaumont  had  to  be  relinquished  with  heavy 
loss.  Pressed  in  front  and  flank  by  superior  numbers,  De 
Failly  retreated  fighting  on  Mouzon — a  movement  much 
facilitated  by  the  woody  and  intersected  nature  of  the 
ground.  Eventually  the  river  was  crossed,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  a  portion  of  the  12th  Corps,  after  severe  losses 
had  been  sustained. 

The  7th  Corps,  harassed  in  rear  by  cavalry,  left  its 
camping  grounds  at  Oches  at  9  a.  m,,  and  marched  by  two 
roads  to  the  river.  The  rear  of  its  leading  division,  mis- 
taking its  way,  approached  close  to  Beaumont,  and  was 
utterly  routed  by  the  advancing  troops  of  the  I  Bavarians. 


*The  1st  Corps — the  12th  having  crossed  at  Mouzon  the  previous 
day. 

—33- 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

The  main  body  of  the  corps,  after  a  tiresome  march,  crossed 
the  river  late  at  night  at  Remilly.  Under  the  influence  of 
the  defeats  sustained  by  his  rearmost  troops,  MacMahon 
gave  orders  for  an  immediate  retreat  on  Sedan,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  procuring  them  food,  ammunition,  and  rest. 
Throughout  the  night  troops  of  2CII  arms,  intermingled  pell- 
mell,  strove  each  man  for  himself  to  reach  the  required 
destination,  and  early  the  next  morning  the  greater  portion 
of  the  French  army  was  bivouacked  in  an  exhausted  con- 
dition around  the  fortress. 

The  two  German  armies,  in  a  concentrated  mass  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  occupied  meanwhile  with  their  lead- 
ing troops  the  line  of  Mouzon-Raucourt. 

The  French  fugitives  came  pouring  into  Sedan  from 
both  banks  of  the  river  during  the  early  morning.  The  12th 
Corps,  which  was  somewhat  in  rear,  did  not  arrive  at  Ba- 
zeilles  till  9  a.  m.,  when  it  was  fired  on  from  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  Meuse.  A  brisk  contest  with  some  Bavarian 
troops  was  carried  on,  finally  resulting  in  the  railway  bridge 
being  left  intact  in  the  enemy's  hands.  The  1st  Corps, 
which  had  acted  as  rear  guard,  made  from  mistaken  orders 
a  circuitous  march,  and  did  not  reach  its  camping  ground 
till  late  at  night. 

It  was  apparently  intended  to  give  the  troops  rest  dur- 
ing this  day,  as  no  arrangements  were  made  or  orders 
given  for  further  movement.  Several  courses  were  open 
now  to  the  French  commander — either  to  break  out  towards 
Carignan  and  Metz,  retire  on  to  Belgian  soil,  retreat  towards 
Mezieres,  or  fight  in  the  positions  already  taken  up.  Of 
these  undoubtedly  the  retreat  westward  was  most  in  favour, 
and  it  was  considered  that  plenty  of  time  was  still  available 
for  its  execution. 

The  13th  Corps,  which  had  been  forwarded  from  Paris 
under  the  command  of  General  Vinoy,  was  assembhng  at 
this  time  at  Mezieres. 

The  German  armies  continued  their  march  northward, 
detaching  two  corps  (XII  and  Guard)  to  the  right  bank  of 
the  Meuse,  in  order  to  bar  the  space  between  that  river  and 

—34— 


Extract 

the  frontier.  On  the  evening  of  the  31st  the  contending 
forces  were  facing  one  another  with  their  advanced  troops 
in  immediate  contact.  The  badly  conceived  flank  march  of 
Macmahon  had,  owing  to  defective  organization,  utterly 
failed,  and  his  army  now  stood  assembled  in  a  curve  round 
the  small  fortress  of  Sedan.  Pressing  it  back  against  the 
neutral  Belgian  frontier,  advanced  the  numerically  superior 
German  forces,  deployed  on  a  broad  front. 

The  position  taken  up  by  the  French  was  tactically  a 
strong  one,  and  well  calculated  to  ensure  a  stubborn  de- 
fence. Its  eastern  boundary  was  formed  by  the  valley  of 
the  Givonne,  from  the  western  heights  of  which  effective 
fire  could  be  maintained  over  any  direct  approach.  Continu- 
ous ranges  of  hills  formed  parallel  lines  of  defence  to  the 
north-west,  and  the  south  and  west  were  protected  by  the 
broad  valley  of  the  Meuse.  The  fortress  of  Sedan,  com- 
manded by  the  higher  ground  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  was  but  of  little  defensive  value.  Two  corps  overlooked 
the  Givonne  valley  facing  east,  one  corps  (the  7th),  faced 
north-west  on  the  Illy  plateau,  the  remaining  5th  Corps, 
under  De  Failly  forming  the  reserve.  In  order  to  advance 
against  the  position  from  the  west,  a  detour  had  to  be  made 
round  the  bend  of  the  Meuse,  through  a  single  road  pre- 
senting the  characteristics  of  a  defile.  The  country  lying  to 
the  north  was  hilly  and  intersected,  but  towards  the  east 
was  practicable  for  large  bodies  of  troops. 

In  accordance  with  orders,  the  German  forces  moved 
forward  to  the  attack  during  the  early  morning  of  Septem- 
ber 1st.  Three  army  corps  moved  from  the  eastward 
against  the  Givonne  position,  while  two  crossed  the  Meuse 
at  Donchery  and  advanced  towards  the  Sedan-Mezieres 
road.  South  of  the  fortress,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  one  corps  kept  guard.* 


*Towards  Givonne  Valley. — Guard,  XII  and  I  Bavarian. 

Towards   Sedan-Mezieres  Road. — V  and  XI   Corps. 

Watching  southern  exit. — II  Bavarian. 

In  Reserve. — IV  Corps,  Wurtemburg  Division,  and  four  cavalry 

divisions. 
The  VI  Corps  and  6th  Cavalry  Division   remained   in  rear  near 

Vouziers,  covering  the  left  flank. 

—3.5- 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

It  will  thus  be  evident  that  two  distinct  attacks  were 
to  take  place — one  on  each  flank  of  the  French  lines.  No 
special  orders  appear  to  have  been  issued  for  this  day  by 
MacMahon,  it  being  intended  to  give  a  rest  to  the  troops, 
and  eventually  lead  them  either  to  Carignan  or  Mezieres, 
according  to  force  of  circumstances. 

The  engagement  commenced  at  an  early  hour  in  the 
morning  by  an  attack  of  the  I  Bavarian  Corps  on  Bazeilles 
— the  village,  occupied  by  the  French  right,  which  was 
shelled  the  previous  evening.  After  six  hours  desperate 
fighting  the  town  was  captured,  and  accruing  reinforce- 
ments led  to  the  French  being  forced  back  to  the  heights 
south  of  Fond-de-Givonne.  Between  Bazeilles  and  Daigny 
the  XII  Corps  (Saxons)  entered  into  line,  while  further 
north  the  Prussian  Guard  captured  the  village  of  Givonne. 
By  noon  the  whole  of  the  Givonne  Valley  was  in  German 
hands,  the  French  holding  the  general  line  of  the  western 
crest.  This  loss  of  ground  was  mainly  attributable  to  un- 
fortunate changes  in  the  supreme  direction.  Marshal  Mac- 
Mahon, wounded  in  the  early  morning,  handed  over  the 
command  to  General  Ducrot,  who  at  once  issued  orders  for  a 
withdrawal  westward,  with  a  view  to  immediate  retreat  on 
Mezieres.  General  Wimpfen,  a  senior  ofllicer,  considering 
the  retreat  impracticable,  countermanded  the  movement 
whilst  in  process  of  execution,  and  endeavored  to  re-occupy 
the  valley,  in  order  to  make  an  offensive  sortie  towards 
Carignan. 

On  the  western  side,  the  V  and  XI  Corps  crossed  the 
Meuse  at  Donchery  and  advanced  through  Vrigne-au-Bois 
skirting  the  bend  made  by  the  Meuse. 

The  artillery  of  both  corps  d'armee  came  into  action  on 
the  hills  north  of  Floing,  and  canonaded  the  position  held 
by  the  7th  Corps  under  Douay.  As  the  infantry  came  up, 
they  deployed  along  the  heights  and  pressed  forward  strong- 
ly, especially  against  the  French  left  at  Floing.  This  vil- 
lage was  carried,  after  hard  fighting,  and  a  general  ad- 
vance made  against  the  French  line.  The  cavalry  of  Mar- 
guerite's Division  sacrificed  themselves  in  a  vain  attempt 
to  turn  the  fortune  of  the  day,  and  the  troops  of  Douay 

—36— 


Extract 

gave  way  in  all  directions.  On  the  eastern  side  the  French 
were  also  losing  ground,  and  the  German  right  and  left 
wing  pushed  forward  north  till  they  came  in  contact. 

On  the  south  side  of  the  fortress,  the  batteries  on  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  Meuse  were  during  the  battle  firing  at 
long  ranges  on  the  reserves  and  large  fugitive  bodies. 

By  3  o'clock  the  circle  of  investment  was  complete,  and 
overwhelmed  by  the  fire  of  nearly  500  guns,  the  French 
retreated  in  confusion  to  the  nearest  cover.  A  bold  sortie 
towards  Bazeille  was  attempted,  but  with  little  success, 
and  by  4  o'clock  all  the  main  positions  had  been  abandoned. 
To  show  the  futility  of  further  resistance,  the  guns  of  the 
victorious  army  were  turned  on  the  mass  of  fugitives  in- 
side the  fortress,  and  about  5  o'clock  the  white  flag  of  sur- 
render was  hoisted  on  the  Citadel. 

Negotiations  were  carried  on  with  a  view  to  capitula- 
tion^ng'the  night,  and  the  terms  finally  arranged  by  11  a, 
m.,  the  following  day,  by  which  the  French  Emperor  and 
83,000  men  became  prisoners  of  war.* 

The  ten  days'  campaign  against  the  Army  of  Chalons 
forms  one  of  the  most  striking  episodes  of  the  war  of  inva- 
sion. The  plan  projected  in  Paris  for  the  relief  of  Bazaine 
was  undoubtedly  bold  in  its  conception,  though  difficult  to 
defend  on  strategical  grounds.  To  successfully  evade  the 
blow  of  the  advancing  German  armies  by  a  flank  march,  two 
conditions  were  necessary,  sufficient  time  to  gain  a  fair 
start,  and  ample  space  to  carry  out  the  movement  in.  When 
the  advance  was  made  from  Chalons,  the  most  northern 
German  corps  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Verdun,  a  march  had 
to  be  effected  through  the  narrow  band  of  territory  ex- 
tending between  that  fortress  and  the  neutral  Belgian  fron- 
tier. Assuming  the  greatest  expedition  to  have  been  used, 
it   would   have   been   impossible,    under   ordinary   circum- 

f  Killed    3,000 

*In  the  Battle  ;  Wovmded    14,000 

[  Prisoners     21,000 

Prisoners   at   Capitulation    83,000 

Disarmed   in    Belgium    3,000 

Total 124,000 

—37— 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

stances,  to  escape  the  notice  of  the  cavah-y  of  the  Meuse 
Army,  and  contact  between  the  contending  forces  would 
have  taken  place,  in  any  case,  more  to  the  eastward  in  the 
vicinity  of  Montmedy,  Etain,  or  Thionville.  If  an  extensive 
territory  had  existed  to  the  northward,  it  might  have  been 
possible  to  make  a  long  detour  and  successfully  avoid  ob- 
servation ;  but  the  limited  zone  for  maneuvering  forbade 
hope  of  any  such  advantage.  To  gain  the  requisite  time  on 
the  enemy,  it  was  necessary  to  draw  him  further  away  from 
Metz,  either  towards  Paris  or  the  south,  or  by  a  feint  de- 
ceive him  temporally  as  to  the  projected  movement.  As 
it  happened,  the  German  armies  were  in  a  central  position, 
and  were  enabled  to  take  advantage  of  the  lesser  space  they 
had  to  traverse  on  the  interior  lines  they  occupied.  In  ad- 
dition to  the  strategical  difficulties  of  the  situation,  the 
Army  of  Chalons  was  not  in  that  thoroughly  prepared  state 
to  make  it  equal  to  the  requirement  demanded  of  it.  In 
spite  of  these  unfavorable  circumstances  partial  success 
was  at  one  time  by  no  means  impossible.  On  the  25th  Au- 
gust the  French  army  of  over  100,000  men  was  on  the  flank 
of  the  German  advance,  and  might,  if  expedition  had  been 
have  beaten  in  detail  the  northern  corps  of  the  Meuse 
Army.  Whether  Metz  could  have  been  reached  is  a  matter 
of  opinion,  but  undoubtedly  a  well-timed  sortie  from  Ba- 
zaine  would  have  given  an  impulse  towards  success.  To 
an  army  incapable  from  its  nature  of  rapid  maneuvering, 
the  safest  movement  was  assuredly  towards  the  fortified 
capital,  where  a  prolonged  stand  might  be  counted  on  and 
an  investment  rendered  nearly  impossible.  As,  however,  in 
the  political  situation  this  course  was  impolitic,  it  would 
seem  that  a  retreat  to  the  north-west  through  Rheims, 
drawing  the  German  army  after  it,  would  have  been  advis- 
able. If  a  forward  movement  towards  Metz  was  a  neces- 
sity, it  would  have  been  safer  to  make  a  detour  southward 
and  endeavor  to  conceal  the  movement  by  a  feint  towards 
the  northern  Argonne.  Paris  would  have  been  left  to  de- 
fend itself  (as  it  was  afterwards  compelled  to  do)  with  the 
nucleus  of  regular  troops  it  possessed,  and  the  further  ad- 


-38— 


Extract 

vance  of  the  German  forces  been  endangered  by  the  posi- 
tion of  a  powerful  field  army  on  their  flank.  The  deplorable 
slowness  of  the  marching  and  the  insufficient  scouting  of 
the  cavalry,  that  led  to  the  surprises  at  Nouart  and  Beau- 
mont have  already  been  alluded  to,  and  combined  with  the 
want  of  unanimity  in  direction,  formed  a  series  of  secon- 
dary faults  that  conducted  in  no  small  measure  to  the  dis- 
astrous capitulation. 

The  unfortunate  delay  at  Sedan  on  the  31st  is  not  easy 
to  understand.  The  retreat  on  Mezieres  would  have  been 
practicable  on  the  following  day,  according  to  MacMahon's 
opinion ;  but  it  is  inexplicable  that  (as  a  precautionary  meas- 
ure) more  care  was  not  taken  in  destroying  the  permanent 
bridges  over  the  Meuse  and  scouting  along  the  flank  of  the 
projected  movement  with  cavalry.  The  successive  changes 
in  the  supreme  direction  during  the  engagement  undoubted- 
ly influenced  its  result ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  the  order  of 
battle  was  in  itself  defective,  as  it  did  not  cover  the  line 
of  retreat. 

It  has  been  maintained  that  the  German  strategy  was 
over  cautious,  and  that  a  portion  of  their  forces  might  have 
been,  after  the  25th  of  August,  detached  towards  Paris.  It 
is  diflficult,  however,  to  see  what  advantage  could  have  been 
gained.  The  French  capital  was  too  strongly  fortified  to 
have  been  taken  by  storm,  and  the  great  advantage  of  nu- 
merical superiority  over  the  sole  French  army  in  the  field 
would  have  been  thrown  away.  With  a  portion  of  the  Im- 
perial army  closely  invested  at  Metz,  and  the  remainder 
compelled  to  capitulate,  no  further  obstacle  opposed  itself 
to  an  advance  on  Paris.  Within  an  hour  after  the  capitula- 
tion was  signed,  orders  were  issued  for  the  march  west- 
ward, the  I  Bavarian  and  XI  Corps  being  left  behind  in 
charge  of  the  prisoners,  for  the  conveyance  of  whom  to 
Pont-a-Mousson  and  Etain  arrangements  were  at  once  made. 
At  these  two  places  they  were  despatched  for  internment 
in  Germany. 

The  first  measure  to  be  effected  was  the  opening  out  of 
the  two  armies  from  their  closely  concentrated  position 


—39- 


Precis  of  the  Franco-German  War 

round  Sedan.  The  order  of  march  had  been  somewhat  in- 
verted, the  lines  of  communication  of  several  corps  having 
crossed,  and  this  inconvenient  displacement  had  to  be  recti- 
fied. The  III  Army  started  in  a  south-westerly  direction 
to  gain  its  former  position  on  the  left  flank,  while  the  Saxon 
Crown  Prince  with  slower  marches  advanced  westward.  By 
regulating  the  length  of  the  stages  the  different  corps  re- 
gained their  respective  positions  in  line,  and  on  the  15th  the 
whole  force,  preceded  by  four  cavalry  divisions,  occupied 
a  line  30  miles  to  the  east  of  Paris,  extending  on  both  banks 
of  the  Marne  from  Villers-Cotterets  to  Rozony-en-Brie. 

As  a  result  of  the  catastrophe  of  Sedan,  the  French  em- 
pire was  overturned  by  a  bloodless  revolution  on  the  4th 
September,  and  a  Provisional  Government  formed  for  the 
national  defence,  under  the  presidency  of  General  Trochu. 


—40— 


Part  II 


German  Accounts 


Order  of  Battle  of  the  German  Armies  on  the  1st 

August  1870  Under  the  Supreme  Command  of 

H.  M.  King  William  of  Prussia 


Headquarters  of  H.  M.  King  William 

Federal  Chancellor  and  Minister  President:  Major-General  Count 
V.   Bismarck-Schonhausen. 

Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army:  General  of  Infantry 
Baron  V.  Moltke. 

Quartermaster  General :      Lieutenant-General  v.  Podbielski. 

Inspector  General  of  Artillery:     General  of  Infantry  v.  Hinder. 

Inspector  General  of  Engineers:     Lieutenant-General  v.  Kleist. 

Adjutant  General  to  H.  M.  the  King:  General  of  Infantry  v. 
Boyen. 

Principal  Adjutant  and  Chief  of  the  Military  Cabinet:  Lieuten- 
ant-General V.  Tresckow. 

Intendant  General  of  the  Army:     Lieutenant-General  v.  Stosch. 

General  attached  to  H.  M.  Staff:     Major-General  v.  Steinacker. 

General  Staff 

Adjutants  to  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army:  (1) 
Major  de  Claer,  attached  to  13th  Dragoons;  (2)  1st  Lieutenant  v. 
Burt,  60th  Regiment. 

Chiefs  of  Sections:  (1)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bronsard  v.  Schellen- 
dorf;  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  v.  Verdy  du  Vernois;  (3)  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  V.  Brandenstein. 

War  Ministry 

Ministry  for   Foreign  Affairs 

War  Minister :     General  of  Infantry  v.  Roon. 
Chief  of  Staff:     Lieutenant-Colonel  Hartrott. 

Summary  of  Forces   (1st  August) 


1st    Army    

lid     Army     

Hid     Army     

Other  field  troops 

Total  ot   German   Armies 


a 

to 

2 

o 

n 

m 

n 

50 

32 

30 

156 

148 

91 

128 

102 

8t» 

140 

100 

63 

474 

382 

264 

180 
546 
480 
378 
1584 


-41— 


EXTRACTS  FROM 

Moltke's  Correspondence 

PERTAINING  TO  THE  WAR  OF  1870-71 
CHAPTER  I 


TRANSLATED   BY 

HARRY  BELL 

Master  Signal  Electrician,  U.S.A. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR 

General  von  Moltke's  first  work  concerning  location  and  position 
of  the  Prussian  forces  in  a  probable  war  between  France  and  Ger- 
many was  written  in  1857,  when  that  general  was  detailed  as  chief  of 
the  general  staff  of  the  army.  In  that  year  an  assembly  of  the  Ger- 
man Confederation  in  Frankfurt  on  the  Main  had  under  consideration 
conditions  of  the  garrison  of  the  Confederate  fortress  of  Rastatt. 
Being  requested  by  the  minister  of  war,  Count  v.  Waldersee,  to  give 
his  opinion  concerning  the  right  of  Prussia  to  participate  in  the  gar- 
risoning of  that  fortress  and  concerning  the  advisability  of  abandon- 
ing Landau  as  a  Confederation  fortress  and  constituting  Germersheim 
as  such,  General  v.  Moltke  composed  the  following  memorial,  which 
also  considered  in  its  scope  the  possibility  of  a  war  with  France: 

MEMORIAL  NO.   1 

Berlin,  28  November,  1857. 

The  military  frontier  between  Germany  and  France 
diyides  itself  into  two  main  sectors ;  one,  the  line  of  the 
Rhine  from  the  Wesel  to  Mayence,  made  extraordinarily 
strong  by  numerous  fortresses,  and  the  other,  the  line  from 
Mayence  to  Switzerland,  which  is  protected  only  by  the 
fortresses  of  Germersheim  and  Rastatt  and  the  Black  For- 
est. 

In  case  of  war  between  France  and  Germany  it  is  al-^ 
most  certain  that  the  French  main  attack  will  be  made  on 
the  line  Strassburg — Ulm,  while  a  secondary  deployment 

—43— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

of  forces  from  direction  of  Metz  and  Valenciennes  will  be 
made  in  the  hope  of  containing  the  Prussian  forces  on  the 
lower  Rhine. 

Not  counting  on  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  at- 
titude of  the  Netherlands,  the  chain  of  fortresses  along  the 
Rhine  forms  a  serious  obstacle  to  an  advance  farther  north. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  ease  wiith  which  France  can  con- 
centrate an  enormous  mass  of  troops  at  Strassburg,  and 
the  projected  building  of  a  permanent  bridge  there  across 
the  Rhine,  the  splitting  up  of  SoutherYi  Germany  into  small 
states  and  before  all  the  isolation  of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth 
German  Confederation  Corps,  leaves  no  doubt  but  that 
France  will  be  successful  at  the  start  in  this  very  theater 
of  operations. 

Existing  conditions  clearly  define  Prussia's  attitude 
in  case  of  a  French  attack. 

Two  army  corps,  presupposing  that  they  are  mobihzed 
at  the  proper  time,  will  dispute  possession  of  the  advantage- 
ous terrain  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  with  the  opponent 
until  the  mass  of  our  forces  and  the  Xth  Confederation 
Corps  are  concentrated  between  Cologne  and  Mayence.  Two 
hundred  thousand  men  then  will  enable  us  to  relieve  Jiilich 
and  Saarlouis  and  to  take  the  offensive,  be  that  on  the  right 
or  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  which  at  the  same  time  will 
call  a  halt  to  any  advance  of  the  enemy  into  Southern 
Germany. 

It  was  just  this  view  of  things  and  of  course  the  firm 
confidence  in  the  power  of  Prussia  and  in  its  good  will 
which,  in  1831,  caused  the  South  German  States  to  send  the 
Vllth  and  Vlllth  Confederation  Corps  not  to  the  Lech 
(thereby  leaving  themselves  unprotected),  but  to  the  Main, 
where  an  army  was  there  concentrating  numbering  at  least 
300,000  men,  while  one  Prussian  and  the  IXth  Confedera- 
tion Corps  assembled  at  Bamberg  as  a  reserve. 

Since  then  conditions  have  changed.  Prussia  is  no 
longer  regarded  in  the  same  light,  and  Austria's  influence 
In  Germany  has  increased.  The  fortified  places  Ulm,  Ras- 
tatt  and  Germersheim  give  the  South  German  States  greater 
independence.     As  far  back  as  1853  Austria,  supposing  a 

—44— 


Preparations  for  War 

threatened  attack  by  France,  insisted  that  Germany  take  a 
combined,  so-called  central,  position  on  the  Main. 

The  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Confederation  Corps,  from  Ba- 
varia, Wiirtemberg,  Baden  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse, 
are  to  assemble  between  Germersheim,  Rastatt  and  Stutt- 
gart, and  the  theater  of  war  is  to  be  prepared  on  the  central 
Rhine  by  a  fortified  camp,  the  cost  of  which  is  estimated  at 
12  million  gulden.  Austria  says  it  will  send  150,000  men 
there  in  the  shortest  time  possible,  and  follow  these  up  with 
50,000  reserves.  It  approved  the  location  and  position  of 
the  Prussian  and  of  the  IXth  and  Xth  Confederation  Corps. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  these  are  two  central  stations  with 
entirely  diverging  lines  of  retreat.  Still  Prussia  will  al- 
ways have  its  own  army  and  its  separate  theater  of  war, 
which,  for  defensive  purposes,  is  bounded  by  the  Main. 

The  organization  of  the  Prussian  army,  its  readiness 
for  war  and  Prussia's  own  interests  guarantee  that  Prussia 
will  be  on  the  Main  with  all  available  forces  within  six  or 
eight  weeks. 

In  the  convention  Austria  declared  that,  under  unfavor- 
able circumstances,  it  would  take  twelve  weeks  to  concen- 
trate 120,000  men  on  the  Rhine.  It  is  of  course  true  that  the 
completion  of  the  railroads  from  Linz  via  Munich,  Ulm  and 
Stuttgart  will  facilitate  matters,  but  in  this  case  not  only 
is  the  distance  a  great  factor,  but  also  the  time  required  by 
Austria  to  organize  new  formations,  especially  should  it 
have  greatly  reduced  its  army  in  the  meantime. 

If  France  has  decided  on  an  attack  on  Germany,  that 
attack  will  be  in  the  nature  of  a  surprise. 

In  time  of  peace  there  are  some  150,000  men  garri- 
soned between  Paris  and  the  northwestern  frontier ;  Strass- 
burg  is  connected  by  rail  with  Metz,  Paris  and  Lyons  and  is 
but  half  the  distance  from  Stuttgart  as  from  Munich 
and  Nuremburg,  the  southern  central  position  between 
Stuttgart  and  Rastatt — therefore  Germersheim  would  be 
entirely  too  near  the  hostile  frontier  to  serve  as  a  point  of 
concentration.  Only  if  Austria  places  an  army  before  or 
at  the  outbreak  of  war  on  the  upper  Rhine,  may  the  South 
German  States  hope  to  directly  protect  their  domains.     If 

—45— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Austria  does  not  do  this,  the  retrograde  movement  of  the 
Vllth  and  Vlllth  Confederation  Corps  will  come  to  a  stop 
in  favorable  conditions  at  Ulm,  and  possibly  only  behind  the 
Lech  or  still  farther  to  the  rear. 

An  impartial  estimate  of  the  situation  would  lead  the 
South  German  Governments  therefore  to  the  conclusion  that 
their  immediate  succor  may  be  found  in  Prussia  and  that 
the  first  retreat  must  be  directed  not  eastward  but  north- 
ward towards  the  Main. 

Prussia's  position  on  the  Rhine  protects  Northern 
Germany.  If  Austria  can  not  take  over  this  role  of  pro- 
tection for  Southern  Germany,  then  the  fortified  places 
there  will  have  to  rely  on  their  own  resources. 

Considered  from  a  mere  military  point  of  view,  it  does 
not  appear  desirable  that  Prussia  should  extend  its  original 
position  beyond  the  Main,  and  we  can  but  designate  it  a  dis- 
advantage if  we  would  weaken  our  forces  in  the  field — al- 
ready much  exhausted  by  participation  in  garrisoning  fort- 
resses— by  an  additional  or  new  participation  in  garrison- 
ing a  Confederation  fortress  in  Southern  Germany. 

But,  if  political  conditions  imperatively  require  a  par- 
ticipation in  the  peace  garrisoning,  then  sight  must  not  be 
lost  of  the  fact  that  just  Rastatt  may  be  invested  in  the 
first  few  days  after  the  outbreak  of  war  and  threatened  by 
a  formal  investment. 

This  is  almost  certain  considering  the  proximity  of 
this  fortress  to  the  left  flank  of  the  probable  hostile  line  of 
operations,  the  supplies  now  in  Strassburg,  and  the  facility 
of  communications.  To  draw  off  the  Prussian  garrison  in 
such  an  event  will  only  lead  to  the  loss  of  the  fortress.  In 
case  of  an  unfortunate  outcome  Prussia  will  have  to  bear 
all  the  blame. 

Landau  and  Germersheim  are  a  little  closer  to  the 
Prussian  central  position  and  can  therefore  be  more  easily 
reinforced. 

If  we  have  the  choice  whether  to  make  one  or  the  other 
of  these  places  a  Confederation  fortress,  we  undoubtedly 


-46— 


Preparations  for  War 

will  decide  on  Germersheim*,  it  being,  provided  the  garrison 
is  equally  strong,  a  better  point  and  of  more  strategical  im- 
portance on  account  of  its  position  on  the  Rhine.  It  is 
evident  that  Landau,  after  Germersheim  has  been  properly 
fortified,  will  be  of  little  importance  to  the  general  interest 
of  the  German  Confederation,  considering  that  it  is  sur- 
rounded by  dominating  hills,  that  it  can  be  reached  directly 
from  Strassburg  over  an  unprotected  railroad,  and  that  it 
covers  or  protects  no  material  sector. 

Still,  as  in  the  case  of  Rastatt,  the  same  holds  good  for 
Landau,  i.e.,  none  of  the  Prussian  troops  stationed  there 
in  peace  can  be  diverted  from  there  in  case  of  outbreak  of 
hostilities. 

In  how  far  these  mere  military  disadvantages  may  be 
offset  by  permanent  political  interests  of  peace,  has  to  be 
decided  by  higher  authority. 


The  following  memorial  of  October  1858  seeks,  in  connection  with 
an  exposition  of  the  relation  of  Germany  to  its  smaller  neighboring 
States,  to  outline  Prussia's  primary  military  measures  in  a  probable 
war  with  France. 

MEMORIAL  NO.  2 

Berliyi,  October  1858. 

I.    Military — Political  Conditions 

It  is  not  possible  to  state  accurately  the  attitude  of 
two  large  powers  in  the  event  of  outbreak  of  war,  even  if 
only  in  general  outlines,  without  at  the  same  time  paying 
proper  attention  to  the  military-political  situation  of  the 
smaller  states  adjoining  the  theater  of  war. 

In  case  of  war  between  France  and  Germany  the 
Netherlands,  Belgium,  Switzerland  and  Sardinia  would 
have  to  be  considered. 


*H.  R.  H.  the  Prince  Regent  of  Prussia  made  the  following  no- 
tation in  the  margin:  "This  point  of  view,  originated  by  me,  is  just 
now  very  important  to  Prussia  and  should  be  pressed  in  the  convention, 
that  is,  to  insist  on  Prussia's  right  of  transferring  the  garrison  of 
Landau  to  Germersheim  and  to  enlarge  it  already  in  time  of  peace 
and  thus  to  transfer  to  another  field  the  entire  question  of  the  fortress 
of  Rastatt." 

—47— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  Netherlands  are  apparently  outside  of  the  probable 
theater  of  war — only  Maastricht  and  Luxemburg  being 
within  it.  The  main  point  to  consider  is  whether  it  would 
be  friendly  or  hostile  to  Belgium.  It  is  confined  to  a 
strictly  defensive  attitude,  which  is  also  favored  by  the  con- 
ditions of  the  terrain. 

It  is  true  that  a  Dutch  army  might  appear  offensively 
from  this  state  (which  is  hard  to  traverse  and  is  protected 
by  streams  and  overflows  and  is  not  endangered  on  any 
side)  and  to  defend — in  conjunction  with  Belgium  and 
Prussia — its  domain  more  surely  outside  its  frontiers.  But 
the  state  of  the  Dutch  army  makes  it  impossible  to  count 
on  success  in  a  campaign. 

Undoubtedly  the  Schiitterie  (i.  e.  the  Netherlands 
Militia),  supported  by  line  troops,  may  help  to  defend  the 
half  ruined  fortresses,  the  dikes  and  dams  of  the  father- 
land against  invasion. 

Considering  the  actual  strength  of  the  army  in  winter 
time — 10,000  men — the  mobile  army  can  hardly  amount 
to  more  than  30,000  men.  And  for  this  organization  there 
is  an  absence  of  necessary  cadres  and  equipment.  The 
greater  part  of  the  men  only  serve  four  months  with  the 
colors.  Cavalry  horses  can  be  obtained  only  from  Hanover 
and  Oldenburg  and  that  requires  six  months  time.  Only 
the  artillery  is  up  to  date. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  seems  certain  that  the 
intention  is  to  merely  defend  the  so-called  Utrecht  line. 
Bergen,  Breda  and  Herzogenbusch  are  already  considered 
merely  as  advanced  posts  and  Maastricht,  so  important  for 
the  entire  Rhine  country,  is  to  be  abandoned.  It  appears 
that  the  defensive  works  at  that  place  are  intentionally 
allowed  to  deteriorate  and  that  the  munitions  of  war  stored 
there  are  being  transferred. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  or  not  the  king  of  the  Nether- 
lands, as  a  German  Confederation  Prince,  will,  under  these 
conditions,  furnish  his  contingent  for  Luxemburg.  It 
would  not  be  at  all  improbable,  that  Prussia  would  have  to 
take  over  the  defense  of  this  important  place  by  itself  and 

—48— 


Preparations  for  War 

even  have  to  occupy  Maastricht  in  order  to  prevent  it  from 
becoming  a  French  depot  to  serve  as  a  base  for  an  advance 
towards  the  Rhine. 

It  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that  Holland  would  take 
sides  against  Germany  in  order  to  regain,  with  the  help  of 
France,  Belgium  or  a  part  of  it.  In  such  a  case  we  may 
certainly  count  on  Belgium  to  fulfill  its  obligation  under 
the  treaty  of  the  Confederation. 

To  occupy  Holland  at  the  very  start  by  Prussian  troops, 
to  make  sure  of  having  in  our  possession  the  very  rich 
sources  of  supplies  offered  by  that  country,  would  mean  an 
unjustifiable  splitting  up  of  our  forces  and  would  undoubt- 
edly lead  to  war  with  England. 

Belgium,  since  gaining  its  independence,  has  made 
more  progress  than  any  other  European  State.  In  spite 
of  its  different  elements  there  has  arisen  a  strong  feeling 
of  nationality.  The  original  feeling  of  absolutely  necessary 
dependence  on  France  no  longer  exists.  Belgium  sees  in 
France  its  only  actual  enemy  to  its  national  independence; 
it  considers  England,  Prussia  and  even  Holland  as  its  best 
allies. 

If  we  respect  Belgium's  neutrality  we  would  protect 
thereby  the  largest  part  of  our  western  frontier. 

It  is  of  course  true  that  France  can  concentrate  with 
ease  and  in  the  shortest  time  a  large  army  at  our  immediate 
frontier  in  Metz.  Still,  operations  against  the  lower  Rhine 
require  a  broader  base,  which  can  be  furnished  only  by 
Belgium.  As  it  is  not  probable  that  Belgium  will  ally 
itself  with  France,  France's  first  step  will  always  be  to  in- 
vade that  country  in  order  to  take  serious  measures  against 
Prussia. 

To  protect  its  neutrality,  Belgium  intends  to  organize 
a  force  of  100,000  men.  Peace  measures,  however,  have 
not  been  taken  in  such  a  manner  as  to  allow  us  to  hope  that 
it  could  put  an  efficient  army  in  the  field.  The  Belgian 
fortresses  require  an  army  of  40,000  men.  Entirely  aban- 
doning the  rest  of  the  country  and  the  capital,  it  is  the  in- 
tention to  concentrate  the  rest  of  the  army  in  a  fortified 

—49— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

camp  at  Antwerp  and  to  make  a  stand  there  until  outside 
support  arrives. 

Considering  the  extended  net  of  railroads  it  is  possible 
that  in  a  very  short  time  50,000  to  60,000  men — the  larger 
part  of  them  being  reserves — can  be  assembled,  who  have 
served  but  a  few  months.  The  cavalry  will  be  very  inferior 
and  the  artillery  will  form  the  best  part  of  the  army. 

But  even  if  this  army  occupies  the  best  permanent 
works,  help  for  it  must  not  be  too  long  delayed.  There  is 
no  hope  to  expect  such  help  from  Holland. 

England's  army  is  in  India  and  will  be  required  there 
for  years  to  come.  Even  if  10,000  to  15,000  British  can 
make  a  landing  at  Ostend  or  Nieuport,  which  is  very  diffi- 
cult, or  even  if  their  ships  go  as  far  as  Antwerp,  that  would 
not  mean  that  it  would  be  possible  to  proceed  offensively 
against  a  French  army. 

Belgium  can  expect  help  only  from  Prussia. 

But  for  this  purpose  the  fortified  camp  at  Antwerp  is 
badly  chosen.  With  the  means  which  remain  in  the  open 
field  to  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Prussian  Army  Corps  after 
occupying  the  Rhine  and  Confederation  fortresses,  and 
eventually  also  Maastricht  and  Venloos,  there  is  no  chance 
of  direct  support  within  twenty  miles  [German  miles=4^ 
English  miles].  Now,  however,  the  recommendations  of 
the  government  to  build  a  fortified  camp  at  Antwerp  has 
been  rejected  by  the  House  of  Parliament,  and  the  Belgian 
army  will  be  disappointed  in  its  expectation  to  find  protec- 
tion behind  the  present  works  there. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  fortified  camp  at  Namur  would 
cover  the  larger  part  of  the  country,  and  even  the  capital  in 
some  manner,  and  secure  the  direct  support  of  the  Prussian 
troops,  or  eventually  their  falling  back  on  that  camp,  while 
there  is  no  chance  to  fall  back  on  Antwerp  at  all.  The  flank 
position  on  the  Maas,  in  connection  with  the  fortified  Na- 
mur, protected  on  the  left  by  the  Ardennes,  but  a  day's 
march  from  the  fortresses  of  Charleroi,  Dinant  and  Huy, 
with  the  rich  Liittich  and  the  railroad  in  rear,  seems  very 
suitable  for  the  offensive  as  well  as  for  the  defensive,  as 

—50— 


Preparations  for  War 

also  for  the  subsistence  and  reinforcement  of  the  Belgian 
army. 

It  is  unquestionable  that  the  location  of  the  Belgian 
army  at  Antwerp  is  also  of  advantage  to  us  in  so  far  as  the 
French  attack  will  have  to  leave  there  a  large  corps,  and  will 
be  considerably  weakened  in  consequence  when  reaching 
our  frontier.  Still  we  must  consider  that  Belgium,  the 
frontier  places  of  which  are  in  bad  condition,  will  be  lost 
sooner  than  our  corps  can  reach  the  Rhine  from  the  center 
of  the  Monarchy  and  that  it  will  have  to  be  retaken. 

Consequently  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  the 
Belgian  Government,  without  our  entering  into  definite 
agreements  with  it,  can  be  induced  to  concentrate  its  army 
on  the  Maas  instead  of  at  Antwerp. 


More  unfavorable  than  in  the  northern,  are  the  political 
conditions  in  the  southern  part  of  the  large  theater  of  war 
in  case  of  a  war  between  France  and  Germany. 

In  similar  manner  as  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands, 
Sardinia,  in  the  Paris  Peace  Convention,  was  made  a  bul- 
wark against  future  attacks  by  France  on  Germany.  Sar- 
dinia is  in  possession  of  the  important  passes  across  the 
Alps  from  Mont  Blanc  to  the  sea ;  it  received  ten  millions  of 
French  contribution  money  to  secure  these  passes  by  fort- 
resses, while  on  the  other  hand  Alessandria,  close  to  Lom- 
bardy,  was  deprived  of  many  things.  Still,  conditions  since 
those  days  did  not  develop  in  accordance  with  the  policies  of 
the  different  cabinets;  and  the  latter  themselves  have  been 
brought  to  a  different  standpoint  partly  by  national  and 
social  ideas  taking  possession  of  the  people. 

For  a  number  of  years  the  national  movement  has  been 
increasing  in  Italy,  having  for  its  aim  the  confederation  of 
all  Italian  states  under  one  general  government. 

Sardinia  feels  called  upon  to  be  the  champion  of  this 
movement.  The  domination  of  Austria  in  Italy  is  the  main 
obstacle  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  object.    At  the  Euro- 


—51- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

pean  Congress  at  Paris  in  1856  a  Sardinian  minister  pro- 
tested, in  the  name  of  Italy,  against  that  domination  :  "There 
can  be  no  understanding  between  Sardinia  and  Austria,  as 
long  as  the  latter  owns  an  inch  of  Italy."  The  Sardinian 
army  waits  impatiently  for  the  moment  when  it  can  even, 
in  a  new  campaign,  scores  with  Austria.  Alessandria  and 
Casale,  now  fortified,  are  the  supporting  points  for  the  ex- 
pected war. 

In  Italy,  with  this  national  tendency,  is  felt  far-reach- 
ing republican  sentiment.  In  case  of  conflict  both  will 
separate,  will  oppose  each  other.  Even  now  the  Sardinian 
government,  which  is  the  most  powerful  of  the  Italian  de- 
pendencies, cannot  shake  off  its  suspicious  ally.  More  than 
once  a  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Austria 
was  imminent,  in  place  of  the  government  having  the  cour- 
age to  muzzle  the  press.  If  in  a  probable  war  the  goverii- 
ment  or  the  Mazzini  faction  will  control  the  movements  is 
doubtful  and  will  mainly  depend  on  conditions  under  which 
France  enters  the  theater  of  war.  So  far,  however,  and  up 
to  a  certain  point  all  the  different  parties  are  in  accordance 
and  relentlessly  insist  on  war  with  Austria. 

On  account  of  its  excellent  military  system,  Sardinia 
is  a  formidable  opponent.  It  does  not  at  all  profess  to  await, 
inactively,  foreign  interference.  It  can  concentrate  within 
four  or  five  weeks  an  army  of  60,000  men  at  Turin,  ready 
to  take  the  field,  which  can  reach  Stradella  within  a  few 
marches  and  there,  based  on  Casale,  Alessandria  and  Genoa, 
cover  the  entire  country  in  a  strong  position,  flank  a  hostile 
crossing  over  the  Ticino,  immediately  threaten  Milan,  and 
also  can  be  reinforced  for  an  offensive  operation  by  a  part 
of  the  very  important  fortress  garrisons  (40,000  men). 

So  much  for  the  threatening  position  of  Sardinia.  The 
remaining  Italian  powers  are  of  less  importance,  but  as 
long  as  France  keeps  troops  in  the  "Church  Domain"  the 
southern  frontier  of  Lombardy  cannot  be  considered  secure. 

It  is  clear  that  in  this  case  Austria  cannot  appear  in 
Germany  in  force  nor  in  a  short  time. 


-52- 


Preparations  for  War 

Of  special  importance,  finally,  is  Switzerland,  which 
forms  a  bulwark  in  the  center  between  the  German  and 
Italian  line  of  defense. 

Neutral  Switzerland  separates  the  armies  which  Aus- 
tria can  place  in  Germany  and  in  Lombardy;  it  is  the  key 
to  the  interior  of  Fi^ance,  to  the  "Franche-Comte  "  If  we 
may  now  assume  that  a  French  army  will  enter  this  moun- 
tainous country,  then  it  will  find  itself  there  m  a  central 
position  difllicult  to  attack,  from  which  it  can  debouch  via 
the  upper  Rhine  against  Southern  Germany  or  via  the  easy 
Alpine  passes  against  Upper  Italy,  in  which  case  not  only 
Austria's  offensive  against  Sardinia  but  also  its  defensive 
in  Lombardy  can  be  taken  in  rear  and  from  which  even  the 
Tyrol  can  be  threatened. 

The  consequence  of  hostile  occupation  of  Switzerland 
would  be  that  the  Rhine  and  the  Ticino  would  no  longer 
form  the  original  defensive  line  of  the  German  armies  but 
rather  the  Iller  and  the  Mincio.  The  line  of  the  first  posi- 
tion would  be  from  Rastatt  via  Ulm,  Feldkirch  and  Peschiera 
to  Mantua  and  the  rich  countries  of  Suabia  and  Lombardy 
would  at  the  very  start  be  abandoned  to  the  enemy. 

Consequently  the  question,  whether  Switzerland  can 
maintain,  and  will  maintain  its  neutrality — assured  to  it 
since  the  peace  of  Westphalia — becomes  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. 

Switzerland  emerged  from  the  war  of  1847  as  a  Con- 
federation State  and  with  a  well  organized  army  of  some 
100,000  men;  it  is  true  that  this  people's  army  has  many 
defects,  has  hardly  any  cavalry,  but  it  is  well  suited  to  the 
defense  of  the  fatherland  and  can  be  concentrated  in  a  very 
short  time — that  is  within  three  weeks. 

Even  though  the  fortifications  of  Geneva  have  been 
razed,  and  those  of  Basel  are  useless,  and  though  France 
dominates  the  approaches  to  Lyon  and  Besangon  in  French 
Switzerland,  still  the  Jura  and  the  Aar  compose  a  very 
strong  defensive  line.  If  now  Switzerland  intends  to  main- 
tain its  neutrality,  France  must,  in  its  very  serious  war 
against  Germany,  detach  a  special  army  for  operations,  the 

—53— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

outcome  of  which  is  doubtful  and  which  will  be  of  great 
advantage  only  if  the  operations  can  be  quickly  ended  and 
before  the  German  armies  are  able  to  take  up  the  offensive. 

Liberal  and  radical  principles  have  also  found  a  foot- 
hold in  Switzerland.  As  is  known,  France  has  sympa- 
thetic followers  in  the  Waadtland,  and  in  Geneva  it  has  in- 
creased its  influence  with  success  and  has,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  furnished  the  arbitrator  lately  in  a  matter  of  great 
importance  to  Switzerland.  There  seems  to  exist  no  fav- 
orable sentiments  towards  Germany.  Public  opinion  and 
the  press  will  apparently  take  France's  side  in  case  of 
hostilities.  Still  Switzerland's  interests  are  well  estab- 
lished. In  giving  up  its  neutrality  the  independence  of  the 
country  is  endangered  ;  the  country  will  immediately  become 
the  theater  of  war,  in  which  it  can  gain  nothing  because 
additions  to  its  country  are  entirely  beyond  the  interests 
of  Switzerland. 

We  may  therefore  reasonably  assume  that  the  Swiss 
Government,  at  the  decisive  moment  and  in  spite  of  all 
party  opinions  and  sympathies,  will  guard  its  neutrality 
and  protect  it  with  the  entire  forces  at  its  command. 

If  the  policies  of  the  Sardinian  Government  are  in  en- 
tire opposition  to  those  of  the  Austrian  Government,  if  on 
the  other  hand  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  has  dropped 
down  to  military  unimportance,  still  we  cannot  deny  that  it 
is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  pave  the  way  in  the  very 
start  to  a  friendly  understanding  with  Belgium  and  Switzer- 
land. In  this  the  question  is :  Shall  Germany,  in  case  of 
war  with  France,  have  two  armies  of  100,000  men  for  or 
against  it,  and  shall  we  have  to  defend  the  lines  from  Lux- 
emburg to  Basle  or  from  Ostend  to  Geneva? 


Germafiy,  with  its  two  world  powers,  has  an  army  of 
over  a  million  of  men.  If  we  consider  the  number  only,  we 
are  justified  in  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  France  by 
itself  alone  is  far  from  being  strong  enough  to  wage  a  war 
against  Germany.     This  conclusion  is  entirely  justified,  if 

—54— 


Preparations  for  War 

we  may  assume  that  Germany  will  be  united,  or  will  in  the 
end  be  united — i.e.,  that  Austria  and  Prussia  will  form  a  un- 
ion. The  greatest  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe  lies  in  the 
unity  of  the  two  German  world  powers,  and,  if  circum- 
stances still  demand  war,  that  unity  guarantees  a  favorable 
outcome. 

In  order  to  take  up  an  enormous  war  with  German 
Central  Europe,  in  which  war  England  might  finally  par- 
ticipate, France  needs  to  take  additional  preparatory  steps 
— i.e.,  the  spreading  of  its  power  in  the  Roman  West  (Ro- 
manischen  Westen) . 

The  situation  in  the  Italian  peninsula  furnishes  an  op- 
portunity (which  France  will  not  allow  to  go  to  waste,  as 
soon  as  interior  conditions  show  this  to  be  advisable)  to  oc- 
cupy the  attention  of  the  different  parties  with  exterior 
matters. 

By  an  armed  interference  in  Italian  politics  France 
threatens  in  the  first  place  neither  Prussia  nor  the  main 
part  of  the  German  Confederation  States.  The  operation  is 
first  of  all  directed  against  Austria,  and  that  is,  only  against 
that  part  of  Austria  outside  of  Germany.  In  this  France 
probably  does  not  insist  on  an  addition  of  terrain,  it  ostensi- 
bly fights  for  national  ideas,  and  the  primary  question  is  to 
reestablish  Italy. 

No  matter  how  weak  Southern  Germany  is  on  account 
of  its  disunion,  France  will  there,  between  Austria  and 
Prussia,  seek  no  addition  of  terrain,  but  only,  as  in  Italy, 
influence,  prestige  and  protectorate.  On  the  other  hand  it 
will  concentrate  all  its  force  for  the  recapture  of  the  Rhine 
line,  the  loss  of  which  has  never  yet  been  forgotten.  And 
this  Prussia  will  have  to  prevent  by  itself  alone,  if  Austria, 
driven  out  of  Italy,  has  no  longer  the  will  nor  the  power  to 
engage  in  a  new  campaign. 

In  quiet  times  Prussia's  prestige  in  Germany  may  be 
minimized  or  forced  into  the  background  by  Austria's  riv- 
alry, but  in  case  of  threatened  danger  it  will  always  come  to 
the  front.  If  Prussia  should  show  its  disapproval  of  the 
pressure  on  Austria  in  Italy  by  it  (Prussia)  placing  its 
army  on  the  Rhine,  then  the  smaller  German  states  cannot 

—55— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

decline  to  participate  in  the  general  battle,  which  then  will 
assume  threatening  proportions  as  far  as  France  is  con- 
cerned. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  in  advance  in  which  manner  this 
participation  will  be  made.  In  the  year  1830  the  South 
German  states  were  very  glad  to  believe  that  Prussia  would 
be  their  first  support.  They  diligently  sought  that  support. 
Later  discussions,  treaties  and  conventions  did  not  bring  a 
definite  agreement,  and  the  question  as  to  the  supreme  com- 
mand will  always  be  a  difficult  one.  In  accordance  with  the 
treaties  of  1848,  the  IX  and  X  Confederation  Corps  are  to 
join  the  Prussian  army,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  VII  and 
VIII  Confederation  Corps  are  to  concentrate  at  Rastatt. 
To  support  these  corps,  Austria  expects  to  immediately  pro- 
ceed with  150,000  men  to  the  Rhine,  or  to  at  least  behind 
the  Black  Forest,  to  be  followed  by  a  reserve  of  50,000  men 
as  shortly  thereafter  as  possible.  The  actual  carrying  out 
of  that  plan  would  correspond  entirely  to  the  general  in- 
terest ;  we  shall  see  in  how  far  it  will  actually  be  carried  out. 

It  is  of  course  true  that  the  VII  and  VIII  Confederation 
Corps  can  be  assembled  at  Ulm  or  Wiirzburg  in  about  the 
same  time  as  they  can  be  at  Rastatt  and  Germersheim — 
that  is,  between  the  thirtieth  and  the  forty-first  day.  In  this 
matter  the  deciding  factor  will  be  the  difference  that  in  one 
case  the  separate  contingents  will  advance  against  a  con- 
centrated hostile  army,  while  in  the  other  case  they  will 
march  away  from  that  army. 

If  we,  as  undoubtedly  appears  to  be  the  case,  leave  the 
initiative  to  France,  a  concentration  at  Rastatt — Germers- 
heim is  impossible,  and  consequently  there  remains  but  a 
choice  between  Ulm  and  Wiirzburg  as  points  of  concentra- 
tion. 

If  the  South  German  contingents  intend  to  seek  Aus- 
tria's help,  then,  no  matter  whether  that  help  is  met  at  the 
Iller,  on  the  Lech,  or  even  at  the  Inn,  the  retreat  and  sub- 
sequent advance  will  make  Suabia  and  Bavaria  the  perma- 
nent theater  of  war.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  contingents 
can  count  on  finding  Prussian  support  at  Wiirzburg,  then  it 


—56- 


Prei)arations  for  War 

is  very  doubtful  if  a  French  army  will  try  to  penetrate 
deeper  into  South  Germany, 

No  matter  how  desirable  it  is  to  ascertain  all  these 
conditions  in  advance,  conventions  treating  with  that  matter 
would,  at  the  present  time,  hardly  come  to  a  satisfactory 
agreement.  But  when  forced  by  necessity  the  South  Ger- 
man Governments  will  not  very  long  vacillate  between  the 
far  off  and  uncertain  support  which  will  result  in  making 
their  country  the  theater  of  war,  and  the  nearby  support 
which  will  protect  their  domain.  In  the  latter  case  the  im- 
portant and  difficult  question  as  to  supreme  command  will 
answer  itself. 

II.    First  Position  of  the  Prussian  Armies 

Eventually  to  be  in  Connection   with  the  German 
Confederation  Corps 

The  above  views  seem  to  make  it  advisable,  after  leav- 
ing the  observation  troops  on  the  western  frontier,  to  divide 
the  balance  of  the  army  into  three  larger  detachments,  of 
which  the  first  takes  over,  on  the  lower  Rhine,  the  defense 
of  the  Rhine  Province  and  its  line  of  fortresses ;  the  second 
forms  on  the  Main  the  offensive  army  proper,  and  the  third 
being  held  in  readiness  on  the  Saale  to  march  toward  the 
one  or  the  other  directions  according  to  how  the  hostile  at- 
tack develops. 

It  should  be  stated  how  strong  each  army  detachment 
is  to  be,  what  army  corps  are  to  compose  it,  and  when  it 
can  be  concentrated. 

The  army  on  the  lower  Rhine,  in  addition  to  the  Vllth 
and  Vlllth  Army  Corps  already  there,  would  consist  of  the 
Illd  Army  Corps  and  finally  also  of  the  Xth  German  Con- 
federation Corps. 

The  Illd  Army  Corps  is  selected  for  this  army  de- 
tachment because  it  is  the  most  suitable  one  in  the  center 
of  the  Monarchy  and  can  be  sent  to  the  Rhine  even  before 
the  general  mobilization,  to  protect  there  the  concentration 
of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Corps. 

If  the  Xth  German  Confederation  Corps  can  be  counted 
on  at  all,  its  geographical  situation  makes  it  advisable  to 

—57— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

designate  it  for  the  lower  Rhine,  where  it  will  protect  the 
districts  of  its  separate  contingents. 

There  would  arrive  in  the  vicinity  of  Diisseldorf : 

the  Illd  Army  Corps  on  the  30th  day, 
the  Xth  Army  Corps  on  the  44th  day, 

after  orders  for  mobilization  are  issued.  Consequently  there 
would  be  at  our  disposal  on  the  Rhine,  within  four  weeks, 
three  Prussian  army  corps ;  or  about  100,000  men,  not 
counting  the  strong  fortress  garrisons,  and  in  about  six 
weeks  more  than  135,000  men  which,  based  on  the  Rhine 
line,  will  have  to  bring  each  and  any  hostile  operations  to  a 
standstill. 

Even  in  case  we  cannot  reckon  on  the  participation  of 
the  Xth  German  Confederation  Corps,  it  does  not  appear 
advisable  to  send  a  larger  force  than  three  Prussian  army 
corps  to  the  lower  Rhine  in  the  start  and  before  conditions 
have  better  developed.  The  line  of  Prussian  fortresses  there 
is  so  strong  that  it  can  for  a  long  time  be  held  even  against 
superior  forces,  and  it  has  already  been  shown  that  the 
enemy  can  hardly  reach  that  line  without  having  materially 
weakened  his  force  by  detachments. 

France  can  secure  to  itself  permanent  possession  of 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  only  by  taking  Cologne  and 
Coblenz,  and  this  would  mean  sieges  connected  with  the 
utmost  difficulties  considering  the  activities  of  the  defensive 
army  and  the  fact  that  the  French  army  would  have  the 
Wesel  and  Mayence  on  its  flank. 

It  would  not  be  advisable  to  engage  in  battle  on  the 
left  bank  with  superior  forces,  still  we  can  not  abandon 
that  part  of  the  Province  without  resistance. 

Conditions  in  Belgium  will  have  to  decide  whether  the 
Vllth  Army  Corps  is  to  be  advanced  as  far  as  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle  and  the  Vllth  to  Trier,  or  if  it  will  be  possible  to  merely 
observe  the  frontier  (for  the  present  covered  by  neutral 
terrain)  and  to  meet  at  the  Mosel  with  our  entire  force  the 
advance  coming  from  Metz. 

The  army  on  the  Main  is  to  be  formed  of  three 
Prussian  with  later  on  the  IXth  German  Confederation 
Corps.     Of  these  the  former  will  arrive : 

—58— 


Preparations  for  War 

The  IVth  Army  Corps  on  the  36th  day,  by  marching, 

The  Vth  Army  Corps  on  the  32d  day,  by  rail, 

The  Vlth  Army  Corps,  it  leaving  the  12th  Division  behind  on  the 

42d  day, 
The  IXth  Confederation  Corps  on  the  33d  day, 

after  orders  for  mobilization  have  been  issued. 

Consequently,  by  about  the  same  time  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  Rhine  Army  has  been  completed,  an  additional 
86,000,  or  respectively  120,000  men,  would  be  consolidated 
on  the  lower  Rhine,  and  of  these  the  larger  part  would 
already  be  there  when  the  contingents  of  the  Vllth  and 
Vlllth  Confederation  Corps  leave  for  their  points  of  con- 
centration. It  is  clear,  that  this  available  force  will  give 
greater  protection  to  the  concentration  of  the  two  men- 
tioned corps  at  Wiirzburg  or  Bamberg,  than  were  that  con- 
centration made  at  Ulm,  where  the  Austrian  corps  will 
arrive  only  one  or  two  months  later.  If  the  Vllth  and 
Vlllth  Confederation  Corps  join  the  main  Prussian  army 
on  the  Main,  there  will  be  formed,  by  the  42d  day,  an  army 
of  over  200,000  men,  which  will  protect  the  territory  of  the 
South  German  States. 

The  Reserve  army  on  the  Saale  consists  of  the  lid 
Army  Corps  and  the  Guard  Corps,  a  total  of  66,000  men, 
for  which  we  recommend  the  vicinity  of  Halle  and  Weis- 
senfels  as  a  point  of  concentration  because  the  most  impor- 
tant railroads  center  there  and  by  the  utilization  of  which 
roads  the  corps  can  reach  in  a  very  short  time  either  Diis- 
seldorf,  Frankfort  or  Bamberg,  as  also,  in  case  of  need, 
Breslau  and  Hamburg. 

The  Guard  Corps  can  reach  Halle — Weissenfels  on  the 
4th  day,  the  lid  Army  Corps  on  the  46th  day. 

Only  by  that  time  some  conditions,  uncertain  until  then, 
will  be  cleared  up ;  first,  the  steps  taken  by  Russia,  and  the 
necessity  of  taking  steps  against  Denmark.  By  that  time 
we  can  ascertain  further  whether  France  makes  its  main 
attack  against  Belgium  and  consequently  against  Prussia; 
if  we  can  count  on  an  active  participation  of  the  Belgian 
army,  provided  we  give  that  country  open  support;  if  the 
South  German  States  have  actually  received  Austria's 
promised   help   and   if  their   contingents   have   joined   the 

—59  — 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Austrian  army ;  and  finally,  if  we  can  not  count  at  all  on  the 
support  of  Germany  and  Austria  in  the  ensuing  war.  In 
all  these  cases  an  immediate  move  of  the  Reserve  Army  to 
the  lower  Rhine  via  Hanover  and  Cassel  would  appear  neces- 
sary. The  army  on  the  Main,  in  that  case  but  86,000  men, 
would  under  such  conditions,  by  a  defensive  attitude,  cover 
the  left  flank  of  the  Rhine  Army,  which  would  be  reinforced 
to  at  least  165,000  men,  which  latter  army  then  would  be 
charged  with  the  offensive  to  be  made  in  Belgium  and,  if 
ever  possible,  in  France. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Belgian  army  remains  in 
passive  defense  of  its  fortified  camp  at  Antwerp  and  thereby 
draws  a  part  of  the  French  army  to  it,  while  the  contingent 
of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Confederation  Corps,  possibly  after 
an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  concentrate  at  Rastatt,  are  fall- 
ing back  on  Franconia,  the  Reserve  Army,  to  give  them  a 
rallying  place,  would  have  to  be  sent  to  either  Wiirzburg, 
Bamberg  or  Bayreuth,  and  to  join  thereafter  the  Army  of 
the  Main. 


In  the  spring  of  1860  General  v.  Moltke  composed  a  memorial 
which  treated  of  the  political  and  military  situation  of  Prussia,  as 
well  as  of  the  advance  of  its  army  in  case  of  a  war  with  either 
Russia  or  Austria  or  France.  The  following  is  that  part  of  the 
memorial  treating  of  a  war  with  France. 

MEMORIAL  NO.  3 

Berlin,  Spring  of  1860. 

Positions  of  the  Prussian  Army  in  a  War  With 
France 

The  skillfulness  of  Emperor  Louis  Napoleon  accom- 
plished the  separation  of  the  politics  of  the  European  Cab- 
inets. The  dismembering  of  the  treaties  of  1815,  fundamen- 
tally declared  and  actually  accomplished,  did  not  conduce 
to  again  bring  the  cabinets  into  harmony. 

With  the  help  of  other  first  class  powers  Russia  had 
been  humbled,  without  that  help,  Austria.  From  that  first 
campaign    France   emerged   without   any   material    re^sult 

—60— 


Preparations  for  War 

whatsoever,  and  with  but  little  from  the  second.  But  the 
moral  success  obtained  is  immense.  The  emperor  has 
strengthened  his  position  in  the  country,  the  army  has 
gained  the  feeling  of  invincibility.  France  not  only  has 
become  the  head  of  the  Roman  world,  it  has  also  chained 
the  entire  German  territory  to  its  policies,  whether  or  no. 
Neither  Russia  nor  Austria  found  help  anywhere,  and  they 
on  their  part  will  hardly  give  any  help.  The  one,  engaged 
in  reconstruction,  will  require  years  befora  it  again  can 
bring  its  force  to  be  felt  outside  its  territory;  the  other, 
deprived  of  some  of  its  territory,  shaken  in  its  finances, 
disarms  and  lets  things  around  it  take  their  own  course. 
There  is  no  reasonable  hope  to  expect  the  Idees  Napoleonnes 
to  stand  still ;  a  European  coalition  which  could  oppose  their 
advance  is  now  less  possible  than  heretofore.  Up  to  now 
France  has  battled  for  others,  now  it  will  fight  and  conquer 
territory  for  itself.  Theories  of  peoples'  elections,  of  nation- 
alities and  of  the  natural  frontiers  are  excuses  for  all  pur- 
poses ;  the  army  and  navy  are  the  means  for  carrying  them 
out.  It  is  now  England's  and  Prussia's  turn ;  Cherbourg 
and  Chalons  threaten  both  of  them. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  at  all  but  what  the  French  are 
able  to  land  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel  and  that  there 
they  can  cause  serious  damage.  But  it  is  impossible  that 
the  emperor  can  capture  England  or  incorporate  a  part  of 
it  permanently  in  France.  An  actual  increase  in  territory 
is  only  possible  on  the  Rhine.  There  Prussia  stands,  and 
probably  Prussia  alone.  The  French  navy  is  the  forceful 
means  to  keep  England  quiet,  while  the  French  army  de- 
mands back  the  once  possessed  and  never  forgotten  Rhine. 
That  once  accomplished,  Europe  will  acquiesce  in  the  fact, 
as  it  did  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  Krakau,  Neuenburg  and 
Savoy. 

The  help,  on  which  we  may  count  from  outside,  should 
not  be  estimated  too  high  as  to  its  effect. 

Even  if  Russia  should  decide  on  participation,  we  must 
remember  that  the  mobilization  of  its  army  is  very  slow, 
that  concentration  takes  time,  that  it  stands  a  hundred 
marches  behind  the  front,  which  we  will  have  to  defend  in 

—61— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

the  start.  In  any  war,  especially  a  war  with  France,  Russia 
dare  not  leave  the  kingdom  of  Poland  unprotected,  and 
cannot  disregard  Turkey.  A  Russian  auxiliary  corps  of 
even  only  66,000  men  could  hardly  reach,  by  rail,  the  Rhine 
within  four  months. 

From  the  entire  territory  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
England  at  the  present  moment  cannot  assemble  60,000 
men  to  defend  the  Channel ;  it  cannot  utilize  its  militia  on 
the  main  land.  Seriously  threatened  in  its  own  country, 
it  cannot  support  us  directly. 

More  important  to  us  than  these  two  powers  in  a  war 
are  the  two  small  powers  on  the  Rhine,  Belgium  and  Holland, 
on  account  of  their  immediate  participation,  for  with  them 
it  is  a  matter  of  absolute  existence  should  France  reach  out 
toward  the  Rhine,  and,  though  thus  far  they  have  shown 
little  inclination  to  support  Prussia,  they  will  undoubtedly 
perceive  at  the  decisive  moment  that  they  can  expect  help 
only  from  Prussia. 

The  census  shows  that  Belgium  has  80,000,  Holland 
30,000  able-bodied  men.  If  this  force  could  be  timely 
assembled  in  time  at  Liittich  and  Maastricht  and  supported 
at  Aix-la-Chapelle  by  a  few  Prussian  corps,  we  could  exe- 
cute an  excellent  defense  of  the  Maas  [Meuse] . 

But  we  cannot  count  on  this.  Both  armies,  especially 
that  of  Holland,  have  been  neglected  in  the  highest  degree. 
In  Brussels  and  at  the  Hague  nothing  is  thought  of  but  the 
strictest  defense.  The  Belgian  army  is  to  be  assembled 
at  Antwerp  in  a  position  yet  to  be  made,  and  there,  abandon- 
ing the  entire  country  and  its  capital,  without  possibility  of 
retreat,  its  back  to  the  sea,  wait  for  help  from  England, 
which  latter  cannot  help  itself.  The  Hollanders  hope  to 
finally  arrive  there  and  to  engage  in  a  passive  defense 
behind  the  Utrecht  line  until  somebody  or  other  saves  them. 

Prussia  is  a  member  of  the  German  Confederation. 
Attacked  by  France,  it  may  expect  help  from  the  Confed- 
eration, the  help  of  half  a  million  soldiers  in  the  field. 

We  will  assume  that  the  Confederation  war  is  declared 
in  Frankfurt  and  that  none  of  the  German  states  evades 
its  duty.     Prussia  now  will  be  required  to  place  half  of 

—62— 


Preparations  for  War 

its  fighting  force  at  the  disposal  of  a  still  unknown  com- 
mander-in-chief at  a  moment  when  it,  attacked  on  its  own 
frontiers,  needs  all  its  means  to  save  its  very  existence.  The 
immense  Confederation  help  can  shrivel  down  to  an  Aus- 
trian— South  German  army  passively  defending  the  Black 
Forest. 

Of  the  North  German  States,  we  cannot  count  at  all  on 
Saxony,  but  on  the  other  hand  Hesse  and  Nassau  cannot 
prevent  their  countries  from  being  garrisoned  by  Prussian 
troops.  The  states  of  the  Xth  Confederation  Corps  are 
also  compelled  to  join  us;  the  corps  itself,  in  the  start, 
ought  to  be  held  at  our  disposal  for  protection  of  the  coast. 

It  is  not  probable  that  Sardinia  will  emancipate  itself 
from  France  in  the  near  future  and  demand  back  Savoy. 
If  it,  continuing  the  inaugurated  liberation  of  Italy,  should 
turn  against  Venice,  it  will  undoubtedly  hold  the  four  Aus- 
trian corps,  at  the  present  time  still  mobile  and  which  are 
now  stationed  at  Verona,  Treviso,  Padua  and  Laibach.  It 
is  true  that  in  that  case  the  mobilization  and  start  of  the 
corps  intended  for  Germany  will  not  be  very  quick,  but 
just  through  this  fact  conditions  in  Germany  will  take  a 
shape  more  favorable  to  us,  for  the  South  Germans  will 
be  compelled  to  seek  on  the  Main  and  on  the  Neckar  the 
help  which  they  will  not  find  on  the  Iller  and  on  the  Lech. 

It  is  clear,  on  the  other  hand,  that  France  will,  in  its 
attack  on  Prussia,  find  no  active  ally  except  in  Sardinia  and 
possibly  Denmark. 

The  time  has  not  yet  arrived  for  Russia  when  com- 
bined action  of  the  Slavic  East  and  the  Roman  West  against 
Central  Europe  can  transform  the  situation  of  the  world. 
Such  an  advance  would  unite  all  German  elements  and 
would  require  the  complete  and  free  development  of  power 
of  all  our  neighbors  to  carry  out  that  Titantic  struggle. 
Russia  is  not  in  such  a  situation  at  present. 

If  we  could  believe  that  Austria  would  ally  itself  with 
France  against  Prussia,  that  step  would  immediately  unite 
all  Germany  under  Prussia,  for  the  annihilation  of  Prussia 
and  supremacy  on  the  part  of  Austria  are  not  to  the  best 
interests  of  the  minor  states.     Austria  itself  would  be  but 

—63— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

a  weak  ally  to  France.  Its  power  would  be  lamed  in  the 
highest  degree  by  Russia  and  Sardinia  as  well  as  by  interior 
conditions  in  Hungary  and  also  in  the  German  countries. 

Emperor  Napoleon  and  his  official  journals  will  un- 
doubtedly easily  prove  that  a  war  against  Prussia  is  the 
latter's  own  doing  and  that  war  does  not  concern  the  Con- 
federation. But  in  the  case  of  actual  invasion  of  other 
than  Prussian  territory,  this  argument  would  hardly  be 
sound.  Although  the  preparations  for  war  in  the  Confed- 
eration may  not  indicate  very  active  steps,  still  they  are 
very  disquieting  to  France,  as  those  preparations  will  chain 
a  part  of  the  attacking  army  in  the  Vosges.  If  France  is 
now  enabled  to  come  into  contact  with  Prussia,  without 
invading  other  Confederation  territory,  it  will  be  because 
an  entire  passiveness  of  our  German  allies  is  not  entirely  be- 
yond the  realm  of  possibility. 

France  can  come  into  contact  with  Prussia  in  two  diff- 
erent ways.  One  of  them  would  be  a  direct  landing  on  the 
Baltic  Sea  coast.  It  is  said  that  the  French  navy  can  trans- 
port 60,000  men,  possibly  even  a  greater  number,  if  the 
question  is  one  of  a  journey  of  but  a  few  hours  to  land  a 
force  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel.  Different  are  con- 
ditions of  transport  over  foreign  seas.  History  since  the 
Crusades  shows  but  expeditions  of  30,000  men,  and  only 
then  where  an  attack  by  land  was  absolutely  impossible.  In 
the  Crimean  war,  to  make  this  possible,  it  required  the  fleets 
of  two  great  European  sea  powers  to  do  this. 

The  distance  from  Cherbourg  through  the  Kattegatt 
on  the  Pomeranian  coast  is  250  miles  (1000  English  miles). 
A  steam  fleet  towing  transports  can  cover  that  distance  even 
under  favorable  conditions  in  hardly  less  than  eight  days. 

What  is  England's  attitude  as  to  such  an  undertaking? 
The  preparations  on  a  grand  scale  in  the  French  ports  can- 
not be  kept  secret ;  they  threaten  England  as  well,  in  such  a 
degree  that  even  the  most  positive  promise  would  not  alto- 
gether allay  uneasiness.  England  would  have  to  put  its 
Channel  fleet  into  commission  and  reenforce  it  from  dis- 
tant stations. 


-64- 


Preparations  for  War 

Would  England  allow  such  a  favorable  opportunity  to 
destroy  the  entire  dangerous  French  fleet  at  one  fell  swoop, 
which,  having  an  army  on  board,  would  be  unable  to  fight? 

Still,  we  will  assume  that  this  fleet  passes  the  Downs  un- 
molested, that  its  further  objective  is  unknown,  that  it 
would  anchor  in  the  Griefswald  Deep,  that  it  would  not 
encounter  any  forces  preventing  a  landing,  and  that  60,000 
French  disembark  at  Riigen.  Even  the  undisputed  pos- 
session of  this  island,  as  long  as  no  naval  establishment 
exists  there,  would  not  justify  the  expense.  Sixty  thousand 
men,  who  would  have  to  invest  Stralsund  and  Stettin,  could 
hardly  attempt  further  operations  toward  Berlin.  The  fleet 
would  have  to  return  and  bring  another  contingent  after 
an  interval  of  weeks,  during  which  time  the  corps  first 
landed  would  be  left  helpless  in  hostile  country,  without  a 
possible  chance  of  retreat. 

If  France  at  all  decides  on  a  naval  attack,  it  is  far  more 
probable  that  the  Elbe  will  be  the  objective.  The  distance 
is  but  half  of  that  to  Riigen,  a  landing  could  be  made  near 
Gliickstadt,  and  after  taking  Hamburg  and  Liibeck  the 
French,  based  on  Denmark  and  in  connection  with  the  Dan- 
ish army,  could  try  to  advance  towards  Berlin  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Elbe.  That  these  allies  then,  during  the  14 
days'  march  or  even  in  Holstein,  will  experience  a  complete 
catastrophe  before  the  arrival  of  the  next  contingent  is  so 
apparent  that  such  an  undertaking  could  only  be  very  de- 
sirable to  us. 

But  it  is  hardly  possible  that  a  main  operation  will  be 
based  on  the  sea,  as  long  as  there  is  a  land  base. 

France  joins  Prussia  directly,  and  the  second  method 
to  attack  us  without  entering  anything  but  Prussian  terri- 
tory would  be  an  advance  from  Metz  across  the  Saar;  that 
means  on  a  front  ten  miles  long  from  Luxemburg  to  Saar- 
louis,  while  the  shortest  line  of  operation  to  Coblenz  and 
Cologne  leads  twice  that  distance  across  the  Mosel  and  the 
mountains  along  that  stream.  Any  attack  from  Mayence 
would  flank  such  an  advance  and  bring  it  to  a  halt.  Even 
if  the  Palatinate  is  drawn  into  the  French  base,  it  will  make 
no  difference,  for  from  Bingen  to  Trier  we  can,  in  three 

—65— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

marches,  cut  through  all  communications  with  France;  the 
enemy's  main  operations  consequently  will  undoubtedly  come 
from  the  lower  Rhine  towards  the  Main ;  that  is,  towards 
Southern  Germany. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  France  needs  a  larger  base  to  attack 
Prussia.  It  dare  not  violate  Belgium's  neutrality.  It  cannot 
capture  the  Rhine  without  traversing  Belgium,  and  it  can- 
not hold  the  Rhine  without  possessing  Belgium.  The  Em- 
peror has  the  choice  in  an  attack  on  Prussia  to  either  have 
the  German  Confederation  or  Belgium  and  England  against 
him.  Now,  we  must  not  place  too  high  a  value  on  the  help 
of  either  the  one  or  the  other,  for  France  is  strong  enough 
to  carry  out  its  operations  against  Germany,  Belgium  and 
England  by  itself  without  allies  if  Prussia  does  not  prevent 
it  therefrom  with  the  forces  at  its  command.  We  may  only 
hope  that  our  neighbors  will  occupy  a  part  of  the  enemy 
north  and  south  and  hold  him — we  will  have  to  bear  the 
main  attack.  For  this  we  must  keep  together  all  of  our 
fighting  forces.  We  must  not  detach  either  towards  Bel- 
gium or  Holland,  nor  give  any  corps  to  the  Confederation 
army,  the  Confederation  contingents  should  rather  join  the 
Prussian  army.  Not  treaties  with  the  Confederation  but 
the  necessity  of  the  moment  will  require  this. 

As  is  known,  in  time  of  peace  the  largest  part  of  the 
French  artillery  and  cavalry,  whose  transportation  by  rail 
is  more  difficult,  is  now  in  garrisons  in  France.  The  ex- 
cellent railroad  net  allows  all  fighting  forces  of  the  country 
to  be  concentrated  at  Paris  on  six  or  eight  special  main 
lines. 

Chalons  is  in  direct  connection  by  rail  with  Basle, 
Strassburg,  Mannheim,  Saarbriicken,  Mezieres,  Lille  and 
Calais.  A  primary  concentration  in  a  prepared  camp  there 
threatens  at  the  same  time  Southern  Germany,  Prussia,  Bel- 
gium and  even  England. 

A  more  distant  concentration  of  troops  behind  the  Seille 
at  Nancy  leaves  us  in  doubt  whether  the  attack  will  be  made 
via  Strassburg  or  Metz.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Belgium  be 
the  objective,  a  concentration  must  be  made  at  Maubeuge, 
Valenciennes  and  Lille  and  we  must  regulate  our  primary 

—66— 


Preparations  for  War 

concentration  in  such  a  manner  that  we  are  prepared  for 
an  attack  from  Liittich,  Metz  and  Mannheim. 

It  has  been  recommended  in  case  of  a  war  with  France, 
to  concentrate  under  any  and  all  conditions  the  Prussian 
army  at  Trier,  to  reinforce  the  country  there  by  fortifica- 
tions and  thus  to  protect  the  entire  country  by  means  of  an 
impregnable  flank  position  which  no  enemy  could  afford  to 
pass.  It  is  true  that  the  Saar,  Mosel,  Sauer  and  Kyll,  which 
flow  together  here  in  a  very  confined  space,  are  of  themselves 
no  very  important  stream.s,  but,  having  deep  mountain 
passes,  form  important  defiles  of  extraordinary  power  of  re- 
sistance even  against  very  superior  forces.  The  bridges  at 
Conz,  Wasserbillig  and  Trier,  as  well  as  crossings  to  be  con- 
structed, facilitate  crossing  if  they  should  be  fortified  and 
even  without  being  so ;  and  as  in  Trier,  considering  the  prox- 
imity of  the  Rhine  line,  we  are  in  direct  communication  with 
Wesel,  Cologne,  Coblenz  and  Mayence,  we  can  always  have 
towards  the  south,  west  and  north  a  line  of  retreat  perpen- 
dicularly behind  our  front,  which  on  and  of  itself  promises 
an  unusual  freedom  in  maneuvering.  Thereto  should  be 
added,  that  finally  the  retreat  in  all  directions  leads  through 
a  terrain  which  allows  avoiding  superior  numbers,  before 
these  can  fully  deploy. 

The  theory  goes  still  further;  it  does  not  want  to  re- 
treat to  the  Rhine ;  it  wants  to  advance  offensively  from  a 
flank  position,  but  also  return  to  here.  It  also  wants  to 
front  towards  the  east  and  to  base  on  Trier. 

An  absolute  requirement  for  such  a  procedure  is  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium.  Could  we  now  be  certain  of  that, 
the  concentration  at  Trier  would  answer  all  purposes.  It, 
better  than  any  other  position,  would  directly  protect  the 
Rhine  province  and  would  flank  any  advance  of  the  opponent 
towards  the  Main.  In  connection  with  Luxemburg  and 
Saarlouis  it  would  allow  the  shortest  and  most  effective 
offensive  against  Lorraine.  But  we  know  that  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  is  questionable,  almost  improbable.  If  a  French 
army  could  cross  the  Maas  at  Liittich  and  Maastricht,  it 
would  not  allow  itself  to  be  prevented  from  operating  against 
Cologne  by  the  fact  that  the  Prussian  army,  double  the  dis- 

—67— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

tance  away,  is  in  a  flank  position  at  Trier.  As  a  matter  of 
necessity,  we  would  have  to  leave  that  flank  position,  ad- 
vance through  the  Eifel  and  in  doing  so  lose  our  base  at 
Trier.  For,  should  we  be  thrown  back  in  that  direction, 
we  would  be  completely  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  the  Mon- 
archy and  would  enter  into  most  unnatural  and  most 
disadvantageous  conditions.  This  fact  confines  into  narrow 
limits  the  value  of  Trier  in  theory;  in  practice  the  concen- 
tration of  our  main  force  there  is  absolutely  impossible, 
because,  considering  the  readiness  for  war  of  our  neighbors, 
we  have  no  time  therefor. 

For  the  defense  of  the  Rhine  province  the  Rhine  will 
remain  the  base,  even  if  an  army  detachment,  to  defend  the 
country  on  the  left  hand  as  long  as  possible,  cannot  be  con- 
centrated better  than  at  Trier. 

The  Rhine  forms  an  obstacle  forty  miles  long  from 
Mayence  to  Cleves  which  on  account  of  the  breadth  of  the 
stream  is  hard  to  overcome,  and  this  barrier  is  advantageous 
to  defensive  as  well  as  offensive  purposes  on  account  of 
four  important  fortresses.  Mayence,  Coblenz,  Cologne  and 
Wesel  are  on  the  average  but  three  days'  march  from  each 
other.  A  hostile  crossing  between  them  is  threatened  on 
both  banks  in  flank  and  rear  at  one  and  the  same  time.  Each 
one  of  the  Rhine  bridges,  held  by  us,  forms  a  flank  position 
for  the  next  one. 

The  front  of  the  Rhine  line  can  be  enveloped  only  on  the 
left  flank.  Considering  its  extraordinary  strength  it  would 
be  neither  necessary  nor  advisable  to  concentrate  all  our 
fighting  forces  behind  it.  Far  rather  will  the  larger  half 
of  them  remain  at  our  disposal  to  secure  on  the  Main  the  only 
vulnerable  flank. 

This  shows  that : 

1.  We  will  place  two  armies  in  position  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, which  will  directly  support  each  other  in  the 
defensive  or  disengage  themselves  by  the  offensive. 

2.  The  first  concentration  of  these  armies  can  be  ef- 
fected only  with  certainty  under  the  protection  of  the  Rhine 
fortresses  behind  the  Rhine  and  the  Main,  where  also  rail 

—68— 


Preparations  for  War 

transportation   ceases  and   where   the   operations,   that   is 
marching,  must  commence. 

A  French  attack  may  be  considered  under  four  combi- 
nations : 

1.  Exclusively  against  Prussia,  avoiding  Belgium  and 
South  German  territory;  we  have  already  stated  that  this 
operation  is  very  improbable. 

2.  France  respects  Belgian  neutrality  and  advances 
directly  against  the  Mosel  and  through  Southern  Germany 
towards  the  Main. 

This  attack  is  improbable,  considering  political  rea- 
sons, because,  as  already  stated,  France  cannot  per- 
manently keep  the  Rhine  province,  without  also  possessing 
Belgium.  The  danger  will  not  be  lost  sight  of  in  Brussels, 
and  Belgium  would  always  have  to  be  observed,  even  if 
only  with  a  small  force  at  the  start.  We  assume  that  for 
this  purpose  the  army  at  Lille  would  remain — 40,000  men. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  army  of  Paris  would  effect  a  junction 
with  that  of  Chalons  and  would  form  an  army  of  some 
140,000  men  at  Metz  for  an  attack  on  the  Mosel,  and  further- 
more, the  armies  of  Nancy,  Lyons,  Tours  and  Toulouse' 
with  that  of  Strassburg,  in  similar  strength  of  140,000  men, 
would  be  disposable  for  operations  against  Germany  and  the 
Main. 

This  combination  allows  the  concentration  of  our  entire 
fighting  forces  between  Coblenz  and  Frankfurt.  In  the  de- 
fensive w^e  could  hold  the  Rhine  or  the  Main,  according  to 
whether  we  would  advance  through  Mayence  or  Coblenz 
offensively  with  superior  forces  against  either  the  one  or 
the  other  of  the  hostile  armies. 

Trier  would  be  the  point  of  assembly  for  those  of  our 
fighting  forces  which  are  ready.  The  Mosel  and  its  branches 
assure  the  retreat  of  these  corps  on  Coblenz  and  Cologne, 
if  they  have  to  retreat  before  superior  numbers.  As  soon 
as  our  fighting  forces  are  concentrated,  the  Rhine  army,  re- 
inforced as  much  as  possible,  would  advance  toward  Trier, 
th3  Main  army,  for  the  time  being  behind  the  Main,  in  case 
of  need  behind  the  Lahn  and  the  Sieg,  would  confine  itself 
to  the  defense  or  even  fall  back  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 

—69— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  offensive  of  our  Rhine  army  from  the  Mosel  will  soon 
bring  the  operations  of  the  French  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Rhine  to  a  standstill. 

Such  a  procedure  is  mostly  to  the  best  and  exclusive 
Prussian  interests,  it  best  protects  our  own  domain.  On 
the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine  the  enemy  would  have  to  ad- 
vance as  far  as  across  the  Lahn  before  he  could  reach  this 
domain. 

Should  the  South  German  contingents  have  joined  our 
main  army,  then  that  array  would  become  of  such  strength 
that  it  would  be  far  superior  to  the  Strassburg  army  and 
could,  instead  of  falling  back,  advance  toward  the  Neckar. 
It  would  press  back  the  enemy  on  Strassburg  and  would 
get  into  connection  with  our  Rhine  army  via  Mannheim  and 
Germersheim  and  would  disengage  that  army  should  it  be 
thrown  back  on  the  Mosel. 

3.  France  advances  through  Belgium  against  Prussia 
without  touching  the  rest  of  Germany. 

This  case  is  probable,  if  Southern  Germany,  favoring 
Austria  or  even  France,  should  declare  its  neutrality  under 
the  pretext  that  Prussia  has  forced  the  war.  55,000  men 
from  Lyon  and  Toulouse,  concentrated  at  Strassburg,  would 
be  sufficient  for  the  present  for  observation.  There  could 
be  assembled :  From  Paris,  Tours,  and  Lille,  at  Lille  145,000 
men;  from  Nancy,  Chalons  and  Algiers,  at  Metz,  120,000 
men.  The  French  in  that  case  would  be  compelled  to  occupy 
Belgium,  to  hold  the  Belgian  army  in  Antwerp,  possibly 
also  to  observe  the  Hollanders  behind  the  Waal,  and  thus 
they  would  reach  Aix-la-Chapelle  with  hardly  more  than 
100,000  men.  The  Metz  army  will  have  to  invest  Luxem- 
burg and  Saarlouis,  to  observe  Mayence  and  Coblenz,  and 
would  have  finally  but  200,000  men  or  less  to  advance  against 
the  Rhine.  As  in  that  case  our  flank  is  secured,  the  main 
army  may  be  called  up  to  defend  the  Rhine  and  we  would 
be  enabled,  before  the  armies  of  Metz  and  Lille  could  units, 
to  take  the  offensive  in  greatly  superior  numbers  against 
the  one  or  the  other  from  Coblenz  or  from  Cologne. 

It  appears  to  be  of  more  advantage  if  we  carry  on  a 
defensive  war  on  the  Mosel  if  we,  based  on  Cologne  and 

—70— 


Preparations  for  War 

Wesel,  attack  the  enemy  advancing  via  Aix-la-Chapelle,  in 
order  to  disengage  by  victory  the  Belgians  at  Antwerp. 
In  this  case  we  would  have  to  occupy  Trier  with  our  fight- 
ing forces  first  ready,  and  to  support  them  from  Coblenz  so 
as  to  keep  our  hold  on  the  Mosel. 

4.  France  attacks  Belgium,  Prussia  and  Germany. 

This  case  is  the  most  probable  one.  In  the  war  against 
Prussia  there  is  such  danger  for  Belgium  and  Germany  that 
France  cannot  count  on  a  permanent  neutrality  of  these 
countries.  Both  would  gain  time  to  complete  their  arma- 
ment and  a  change  in  politics  can  become  exceedingly 
dangerous.  An  English  auxiliary  corps  would  lead  the 
Belgian  army  to  active  operations,  and  in  Southern  Ger- 
many the  sentiment  of  the  people  might  easily  make  it  im- 
possible for  the  Cabinets  to  entertain  anti-German  politics. 

If  it  is  necessary  to  guard  Belgium  and  Germany  by  sep- 
arate armies,  it  appears  to  be  advantageous  for  France  to 
increase  these  armies  in  the  very  start,  to  advance  offen- 
sively and  thus  to  prevent  assemblies  of  hostile  fighting 
forces,  to  gain  territory,  to  support  the  war  from  foreign 
sources  and  to  gain  a  larger  base. 

It  will  have  to  be  the  first  endeavor  of  the  French  to 
reach  the  Prussian  army  as  the  center  of  gravity  of  the 
German  forces  and  to  defeat  it.  An  advance  towards  the 
Main  would  disrupt  the  concentration  of  the  South  German 
contingents  and  would  endanger  the  strategic  advance  of 
the  Prussian  army,  which  advance  in  that  direction  is  not 
protected  by  a  strong  line  of  fortresses.  Consequently  there 
is  for  France  no  more  favorable  operation  than  to  appear 
as  quickly  and  as  strong  as  possible  on  the  lower  Main. 
To  protect  its  left  flank  a  weaker  army  would  have  to  ad- 
vance toward  the  Mosel  and  advance  against  us  through 
Belgium,  and  a  stronger  army  to  advance  against  the  Maas, 
which  latter  the  French  should  endeavor  to  take  immediate 
possession  of;  this  advance  would  also  draw  off  a  part  of 
the  Prussian  army  from  the  Main. 

We  imagine  the  division  of  the  French  fighting  forces 
to  be  about  as  follows : 

—71— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


40,000  men  at  Lille  against  the  Belgian  army  which  is  falling 

back  on  Antwerp; 
80,000  men  at  Valenciennes  and  Maubeuge  against  the  lower 

Rhine; 
40,000  men  at  Metz  against  the  Mosel; 
100,000  men  at  Nancy  {  as  main  army 

90,000  men  at  Strassburg    \  against  the  Main. 


Total  350,000  men 

These  forces  could  be  opposed  by 

300,000  Prussians 
1,000,000  Austrians 
120,000  Confederation   troops 

50,000  Belgians 

30,000  Hollanders 


Total  600,000  men 

If  we  assume  that  for  the  time  being  the  Belgians  and 
Hollanders  will  be  held  back  by  from  40,000  to  50,000 
French,  this  will  leave  300,000  French  against  more  than 
500,000  Germans. 

If,  however,  for  the  present  the  Xth  Confederation 
Corps  has  to  remain  where  it  is,  opposed  to  Denmark,  if 
the  Austrians  do  not  come  at  all  or  come  too  late,  if  the 
Belgians  and  Wtirtembergers  have  to  concentrate  first  at 
Ulm  or  Wurzburg,  if  we  cannot  count  at  all  on  Saxony, 
then  only  the  Badeners,  the  Hessians  and  Nassauers  would 
join  us  with  25,000  men. 

Even  under  these  assumptions  we  will  be  numerically 
equal  on  the  Rhine  and  the  Main  to  the  French  fighting 
forces,  and  even  superior,  not  counting  that  the  latter  will 
be  weakened  by  the  investment  of  Luxemburg,  Saarlouis, 
Landau,  Germersheim  and  Rastatt. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  we  would  have  to  remain  on  the  de- 
fensive on  the  Rhine,  and  advance  offensively  from  the  Main. 

By  the  defensive  we  do  not  mean  a  passive  waiting. 
Four  fortresses  of  the  first  class  assure  to  the  Rhine  not 
only  an  extraordinary  power  of  resistance,  but  also  make 
a  crossing  of  the  stream  possible.  The  defender  may  change 
his  base  from  one  to  the  other  bank  without  danger.  Should 
the  attacker  have  actually  forced  a  crossing  at  some  point, 
he  sees  all  his  communications   endangered   at  the   same 

—72— 


Preparations  for  War 

moment.  To  invest  fortresses  in  such  a  case  is  impossible. 
The  Mosel  and  Erft,  the  Lahn  and  Sieg  form  sectors  on 
both  their  banks  against  which  the  enemy  will  have  to 
deploy,  while  we  can  either  accept  the  attack  or  avoid  it. 
Should  the  armies  of  Valenciennes  and  that  of  Metz  have 
joined,  then  100,000  Prussians  would  suffice  to  prevent 
them,  by  an  active  defense,  from  taking  a  foothold  on  the 
Rhine.  It  is  of  course  true  that  in  such  an  event  our  Rhine 
province  would  be  the  theater  of  war  and  that  it  would 
have  to  be  relieved  therefrom  from  the  Main. 

And  there  the  entire  rest  of  our  fighting  forces  must 
be  concentrated. 

An  army  on  the  Main,  which  is  strong  enough  to  take 
the  offensive,  secures  at  one  and  the  same  time  Southern 
Germany  and  the  eastern  provinces  of  our  Monarchy,  but  an 
eventual  retreat  must  not  be  made  on  those  but  on  the  Rhine 
Province.  No  matter  if  the  French  advance  from  Strass- 
burg  to  Wurzburg,  Nuremberg  or  even  to  Ulm,  as  long 
as  we  hold  the  Rhine  our  advance  from  the  Main  will 
threaten  their  communications ;  each  battle  will  threaten 
their  flank.  Before  the  enemy  has  gained  a  larger  victory 
it  is  impossible  for  him  to  penetrate  into  Franconia  or  into 
Suabia.  He  is  absolutely  attracted  by  our  flank  position 
on  the  Main  and  he  must  attack  it.  The  right  flank  of  that 
position  is  impregnable  on  account  of  the  fortresses  of 
Mayence,  and,  to  gain  that  position  farther  up  the  Main,  our 
opponents  must  endanger  all  of  his  communications,  es- 
pecially when  by  additions  to  the  works  of  Mainspitz  a  de- 
ployment from  that  place  is  more  facilitated. 

We  may  accept  with  more  confidence  the  decisive  battle 
on  the  Main,  because  we  can,  in  that  case,  reinforce  the 
Main  army  in  the  shortest  time  by  one  corps  of  the  Rhine 
army  and  because  in  case  of  absolute  necessity  that  army 
can  be  received  by  the  Rhine  army  on  the  Lahn.  A  victory 
in  our  favor  will  throw  the  French  back  on  Strassburg, 
and  if  we  pursue  in  that  direction,  we  would  be  enabled  at 
the  same  time  to  transfer  the  main  offensive  via  Mayence 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Conditions  then  existing 
will   decide   whether   the   offensive   then   can    be   directed 

—73— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

against  the  Eifel  in  order  to  disengage  our  Rhine  army  or 
at  once  against  the  Vosges. 

A  concentration  on  the  Main  is  imperatively  required. 
It  covers  the  left  flank  of  our  Rhine  position,  directly  covers 
the  North  and  indirectly  the  South  of  Germany  and  affords 
them  the  possibility  to  concentrate  their  fighting  forces  and 
to  have  them  join  the  Prussian  army.  An  offensive  start- 
ing from  the  Rhine  would  lead  to  Belgium,  where  we  can- 
not acquire  anything  for  ourselves;  one  from  the  Main 
would  lead  towards  Lorraine  and  Alsace,  the  only  part  of 
France  where  we  will  be  enabled  to  get  a  foothold  by  an 
investment  of  Metz  and  Strassburg. 

Still,  the  offensive  effect  of  the  Main  army  is  dependent 
on  the  fact  of  its  being  strong  enough.  We  have  seen  that 
the  French  can  send  190,000  men  towards  the  Main,  who 
of  course  will  have  to  invest  Rastatt,  Landau  and  Germer- 
sheim. 

We  cannot  hope  that  in  a  war  with  France  we  can  do 
with  but  a  part  of  our  army;  we  cannot  form  a  reserve 
army  for  eventual  cases,  but  will  have  to  concentrate  all  of 
our  forces  at  once  and  await  a  decision  on  the  Rhine  or  on 
the  Main. 

Without  help  from  the  Confederation,  three  of  our 
army  corps  would  suffice  to  carry  on  the  defensive  on  the 
Rhine  and  that  would  leave  us  six  corps  for  the  Main, 

We  think  the  first  position  to  be  about  as  follows : 

The  Vlllth  Army  Corps  at  Trier,  to  protect  as  far  as 
possible  the  Rhine  Province  against  immediate  and  most 
pressing  danger;  the  15th  Division  will  join  the  16th  there 
by  marching  on  the  21st  day. 

The  Vllth  Army  Corps  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  to  observe 
there  our  frontier  and  to  be  a  factor  in  Belgium's  policies. 
The  corps  will  reach  that  place  by  marching  mainly,  on  the 
24th  day. 

The  IVth  Army  Corps  at  Cologne,  which  it  can  reach 
by  rail  on  the  28th  day  and  where  it  will  go  into  cantonments 
at  Enskirchen. 

If  the  authorities  in  Brussels  decide  to  concentrate  the 
Belgian  army  not  in  Antwerp  but  at  Liittich,  then  by  draw- 

—74— 


Preparations  for  War 

ing  the  IVth  Army  Corps  to  the  Maas  an  army  of  120,000 
men  would  be  formed. 

If  France  respects  Belgium's  neutrality,  the  Vllth  and 
IV  Army  Corps  should  be  concentrated,  in  five  days'  march- 
ing, at  Trier,  and  there  would  be  100,000  men  on  the  Mosel. 

About  the  same  time,  with  help  of  the  railroads,  the 
Illd  and  Vth  Army  Corps  could  reach  a  point  between 
Mayence  and  Frankfurt,  could  be  reinforced  by  troops  from 
Baden,  Hesse,  Nassau,  and  consequently  there  could  be 
90,000  men  on  the  Main. 

This  shows  that  we  will  require  thirty-three  days  for 
the  first  stages  of  the  defense.  The  center  of  gravity, 
however,  will  be  formed  only  with  the  arrival  of  the  Vlth 
and  the  Guard  Corps,  which  will  reach  Frankfurt  on  the 
Main  by  rail  on  the  forty-seventh  day;  it  may  be  possible 
that  we  could  not  assume  a  vigorous  offensive  until  the 
arrival  also  of  the  1st  and  lid  Army  Corps,  which  will  take 
about  two  months. 

If  we  once  have  our  fighting  forces  together  then  we 
may  expect  to  be  equal,  with  God's  help  and  our  own  means, 
to  any  French  attack.  Our  only  danger  lies  in  time  condi- 
tions. We  must  not  hide  the  fact  from  ourselves  that 
France  can  easily  surprise  us  strategically.  We  must  not 
await  the  enemy's  initiative. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  show  our  forces 
on  the  Main  as  soon  as  possible  in  case  of  war  in  order 
to  dominate  the  sentiments  of  the  South  German  govern- 
ments; even  should  our  Vlllth  Army  Corps  arrive  in  time 
at  the  Mosel,  it  would  not  be  strong  enough  to  permanently 
hold  its  position  there  against  the  forces  which  may  be  ex- 
pected to  come  from  Metz. 

This  clearly  shows  how  important  it  is  for  us  at  this 
moment  to  have  a  greater  part  of  our  army  on  the  Rhine 
than  is  furnished  by  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps.  To 
call  up  a  mobile  corps  from  the  central  provinces  would 
result  in  expense  and  evil  and  would  appear  as  a  provoca- 
tion. 


—75- 


Moltke's  Coirespondence 

On  the  other  hand,  we  might  gain  our  object  by  the 
establishment  of  a  maneuver  camp.  As  France  occupies 
a  camp  at  Chalons  with  60,000  men,  it  could  not  raise  a 
protest  against  such  a  procedure. 


In  dose  connection  with  the  line  of  thought  in  the  preceding 
memorial,  General  v.  Molke  composed  a  memorial  in  November  1861, 
in  which  he  treated  of  the  importance  of  the  Prussian  fortresses 
for  the  defense  of  the  country  in  a  war  with  France.  This  mem- 
orial reads: 

MEMORIAL  NO.  4 

Berlin,  November  1861. 

Concerning  the  Strategical  Importance  of  the 

Prussian  Fortresses  in  Regard  to  the 

Defense  of  the  Country  in  a 

War  With  France 

Only  the  strategical  value  of  a  fortress  in  regard  to  the 
defense  of  the  country  should  decide  whether  larger  sums 
are  to  be  expended  for  its  upkeep  or  enlargment.  Only 
the  conditions  of  the  place  in  regard  to  facility  of  building 
and  fortification  decide  in  the  second  place  what  should  be 
done  for  it  with  due  consideration  of  requirements  of  the 
times. 

We  cannot  construe  in  advance  the  course  a  war  will 
take,  and  consequently  it  will  be  impossible  to  judge  the  in- 
fluence of  fortresses  on  the  war ;  still,  certain  definite  condi- 
tions may  be  considered  as  permanent  or  guiding  for  a  short 
duration. 

The  political  situation  of  States  changes,  but  it  re- 
quires larger  periods  of  time  to  materially  change  their 
relations  to  each  other.  No  one  will  deny  that  Russia  or 
Austria,  being  engaged  now  and  for  decades  to  come  in 
internal  renovation,  are  less  dangerous  neighbors  than  is 
France  with  its  immense  available  force,  and  that  consider- 
ing this  fact  our  fortresses  on  the  Rhine  are  more  impor- 
tant than  the  ones  on  the  Vistula  or  those  in  the  Silesian 
mountains. 

—76— 


Preparations  for  War 

The  strength  of  the  armies  of  the  neighboring  states, 
and  the  points  where  they  can  be  advantageously  assembled, 
are  well  known  and  based  on  permanent  considerations.  The 
railroad  net,  following  up  the  main  requirements  of  com- 
merce, is  clearly  defined  for  all  time  to  come.  It  may  be 
added  to  but  never  materially  changed. 

The  large  rivers  which  traverse  our  land  from  south 
to  north  form  an  unchangeable  form  of  defense.  By  all 
these  permanent  conditions,  the  direction  of  transportation 
and  the  first  concentration  of  the  Prussian  army  are  gov- 
erned. These  can  be  ascertained  in  advance,  and  prepared 
for  accordingly,  and  the  value  of  fortresses  in  event  of 
war  can  be  definitely  ascertained. 

However,  what  course  our  own  operations  will  take 
is  more  uncertain  the  more  we  study  out  their  probable 
course.  Still  we  may  ascertain  in  advance  probable  events, 
because  they  are  connected  with  probable  or  permanently 
existing  conditions. 

We  cannot  neglect  to  consider  experiences  of  former 
wars,  even  if  they  give  us  no  definite  standpoint  for  future 
action.  Half  centuries  and  whole  centuries  have  passed 
since  then  and  have  materially  changed  the  political  and 
strategical  situation.  What  a  different  importance  had 
Schweidnitz  in  the  newly  conquered  Silesia,  and  Graudenz 
as  the  single  Vistula  fortress,  in  the  time  of  the  Great  King, 
than  it  has  for  us  now,  and  who  may  assume  that  Stettin 
will  again  have  the  importance  it  had  in  1806? 

In  order  to  arrive  at  our  probable  aim,  we  must  study 
military  events  as  they  will  presumably  happen  in  the  future 
and  consider  present  conditions  as  much  as  possible.  In 
this  case  we  have  to  reckon  partly  with  unknown  and 
changed  conditions  and  also  with  known  and  permanent 
ones.  We  cannot  arrive  at  a  material  and  correct  result, 
still  we  can  arrive  at  a  probable  result,  and  in  war  that  one 
will  always  remain  the  only  base  on  which  we  have  to 
take  our  measures. 

A  war  with  our  neighbors  on  the  west  is  just  one  which, 
considering  our  present  conditions,  is  the  most  probable. 

—77— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

France  can  hardly  put  more  than  350,000  men  in  the 
field  for  an  attack  against  us ;  it  might,  in  case  of  need,  put 
twice  that  number  in  the  field  to  defend  its  home  country. 
The  French  army  is  in  a  very  efficient  state  to  take  the  field ; 
in  time  of  peace,  it  is  stationed  prepared  against  the  east 
and  may  be  concentrated  in  a  very  short  time  by  utilizing 
the  net  of  railways.  We  cannot  reckon  on  taking  France 
by  surprise. 

These  very  conditions  show  that  an  offensive  war 
against  France  promises  success  only  under  special  un- 
usual conditions. 

Such  a  war  may  be  avoided,  supposing  our  entire  fight- 
ing forces  were  concentrated  on  the  Rhine  and  would  not 
be  attacked,  a  situation  which  would  have  been  brought 
about  even  without  the  Peace  of  Villaf ranca  in  1859 ;  it 
may  be  executed,  if,  as  at  that  time,  a  larger  part  of  the 
French  fighting  army  were  held  in  some  other  theater  of 
war.  But  in  most  other  cases  we  should  have  to  be  con- 
tented if  we  should  succeed  in  concentrating  our  main 
forces  under  the  protection  of  the  Rhine  line,  in  order  to 
form  there,  probably  on  our  own  territory,  for  battle  with 
the  invading  enemy  and  drive  him  back. 

According  to  our  calculations,  there  could  arrive: 
100,000  French  at  Trier  on  the  21st  day ;  80,000  French  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle  on  the  31st  day;  100,000  French  at  Mayence 
on  the  35th  day;  consequently,  the  defensive  war  against 
France  comes  into  the  foreground  which,  however,  does  not 
preclude  an  offensive  continuation  of  the  same. 

In  order  to  attack  Prussia  only,  France  can  advance  be- 
tween Sierck  and  Saarbriicken  without  violating  non-Prus- 
sian territory.  But  such  a  base  misses  but  seven  miles  (31 
English  miles),  while  the  operations  against  Cologne,  which 
must  be  made  on  the  same  base,  cover  four  times  that  dis- 
tance, lead  across  the  Mosel  and  the  Eiffel  against  the 
strong  Rhine  barrier  and  can  be  flanked  by  the  latter.  As 
an  additional  matter  of  fact,  France  can  never  permanently 
hold  the  Rhine  province  if  it  captures  it,  without  at  the 
same  time  holding  Belgium. 

—78— 


Preparations  for  War 

Consequently  there  are  but  two  lines  of  action  possible : 
one  through  Belgium  towards  Cologne,  the  other  through 
the  Palatinate  or  Southern  Germany  towards  Mayence.  To 
connect  the  two,  or  to  cover  the  flank  of  one  of  them,  a  sec- 
ondary operation  via  Trier  will  have  to  be  made.  And  this 
already  shows  the  necessity  of  a  concentration  of  the  Prus- 
sian field  forces  at  Cologne  and  Mayence  and  the  desirability 
of  a  position  in  observation  at  Trier. 

A  French  advance  on  the  lower  Rhine  threatens  the 
very  existence  of  Belgium  as  well  as  Holland  and  endangers 
England's  interests.  And  still  the  Belgian  army  confines 
itself  to  its  camp  at  Antwerp,  the  Holland  army  behind  its 
Utrecht  lines,  and  England,  which  is  hardly  able  to  protect 
itself,  cannot  bring  help  either  by  land  or  sea  which  will 
amount  to  anything.  We  ourselves,  considering  the  times, 
cannot  afford  to  protect  Belgium's  frontiers  and  have  there- 
fore less  need  to  engage  in  treaties,  because  it  v/ill  always 
be  advantageous  to  us  to  have  a  French  army  weaken  itself 
in  advancing  through  Belgium  and  because  it  will  have  to 
leave  at  least  40,000  men  in  front  of  Antwerp.  Such  an  op- 
eration will  in  the  end  lead  to  our  very  strong  Rhine  front. 

The  advance  through  Southern  Germany  would  bring 
France  into  conflict  with  the  German  Confederation.  As 
long  as  Austria  must  use  all  its  forces  to  maintain  its  po- 
sition at  the  southern  foothills  of  the  Alps  and  to  dominate 
conditions  in  its  interior,  it  cannot  at  all  be  counted  on  to 
appear  for  the  protection  of  the  upper  Rhine,  even  not  if  it 
is  threatened  at  the  Mincio  only  by  the  Italian  army.  Prus- 
sia also,  in  the  start,  cannot  meet  a  French  invasion  coming 
from  Strassburg,  it  can  only  drive  off  the  invading  enemy 
by  an  operation.  Therefore  the  VHth  and  VIHth  Confed- 
eration Corps  will  be  too  weak  to  defend  Germany's  frontier 
against  very  material  superior  forces. 

Which  of  the  two  operations  France  will  choose  is  hard 
to  say  in  advance  and  may  possibly  not  be  ascertained  at  the 
very  moment  of  mobilization.  The  first  leads  directly  to  the 
objective,  the  latter  promises  the  better  assured  success.  An 
invasion  of  Southern  Germany  might  easily  be  but  the  pre- 
paratory campaign  for  the  execution  of  an  attack  on  Bel- 

—79— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

gium  and  Rhenish  Prussia  in  order  to  first  split  up  Germany, 
to  isolate  Prussia,  and  then  to  defeat  the  latter. 

A  concentration  of  the  Prussian  armies  requires  ad- 
vance preparations,  which  have  to  be  made  even  before  we 
know  the  enemy's  intentions.  Therefore  the  first  position 
must  meet  the  requirements  of  different  eventualities  and 
must  be  made  in  such  manner  that  the  enemy  cannot  inter- 
fere with  it. 

Cologne  and  Mayence  are  the  terminals  of  large  rail- 
ways, which  traverse  North  and  Central  Europe  towards 
the  west ;  on  these  railways  transportation  can  be  had  with 
surety  under  the  protection  of  the  Rhine  fortresses.  From 
the  Rhine  on,  marching  will  begin;  there  the  operations 
commence. 

If  proper  preparations  are  made,  it  will  be  possible  to 
concentrate  three  army  corps  on  the  lower  Rhine,  three  on 
the  Main,  a  total  of  200,000  men,  within  three  weeks.  In 
this  we  need  not  fear  that  we  will  be  disturbed  in  our  pri- 
mary concentrations  by  a  French  attack.  Conditions  are 
not  the  same  at  the  Mosel,  where  25,000  men  from  Metz  can 
arrive  within  ten  days  at  Trier,  that  is  earlier  than  the  16th 
Division  can  be  mobilized  there. 

By  the  time  the  railroads  leading  toward  the  Rhine 
will  again  be  free,  the  mobilization  of  the  other  three  Prus- 
sian army  corps  will  be  completed.  They  of  themselves  will 
form  a  reserve,  possibly  on  the  central  Elbe  or  on  the  Saale. 
It  is  possible  that  a  part  of  them  has  to  be  held  back  there 
for  the  present;  for  instance,  to  oppose  a  landing  of  hostile 
forces  on  the  German  north  coast — the  advance  prepara- 
tion of  which  cannot  be  concealed  in  the  French  harbors — 
in  order  to  exercise  a  necessary  coercion  in  Germany,  to 
meet  interior  conditions.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  these 
corps  should  not  be  used  to  operate  by  themselves  as  a  re- 
serve army  or  to  take  up  rallying  positions,  but  they  should, 
as  soon  as  communications  are  opened,  advance  to  the  rein- 
forcement of  the  first  line  of  the  armies.  After  these  three 
first  weeks  we  may  be  able  to  see  in  which  direction  this 
reinforcement  has  to  be  made,  whether  towards  Cologne, 
towards  Mayence,'or  supposing  misfortune  in  Southern  Ger- 

—80— 


Preparations  for  War 

many,  towards  Wiirzburg  or  even  towards  Bamberg.  If 
in  a  war  towards  the  west,  France  must  be  assumed  to  be 
taking  the  initiative,  its  operations  have  to  be  a  governing 
factor  in  the  matter  of  using  our  reserves. 

But  even  should  the  French  main  operations  be  directed 
through  Belgium,  it  would  be  a  question  if  the  lower  Rhine 
army  ought  to  be  reinforced. 

We  can  count  with  assurance  on  the  fact  that  the  Xth 
Confederation  Corps  will  join  the  Prussian  position  on  the 
lower  Rhine,  which  position  protects  the  entire  district  of 
the  North  German  States  which  furnish  this  corps.  Then, 
after  deducting  the  Holstein-Lauenburg  contingent,  there 
will  be  130,000  men  concentrated  there,  which  will  be  suffi- 
cient for  defense  behind  the  strong  Rhine  line  in  any  case, 
and  which  will  make  the  siege  of  a  fortress  there  impos- 
sible. 

A  further  reinforcement  of  the  Rhine  army  would  be 
justifiable  only  if  we  wanted  to  take  the  offensive  with  it. 
This  offensive  through  Belgium  would  in  the  first  place  re- 
lieve Antwerp  and  would  consequently  be  reinforced  by 
some  60,000  men ;  but  a  further  continuation  of  the  same 
would  lead  through  the  French  line  of  fortresses  to  the  forti- 
fied Paris.  It  can  have  no  objective,  cannot  come  to  an 
earlier  stand  until  the  French  capital  is  taken  and  the 
French  Monarchy  overthrown.  Direct  captures  and  acqui- 
sitions of  territory  we  cannot  make  or  maintain  either  in 
Belgium  or  between  Belgium  and  Paris.  Consequently  we 
could  arrive  but  on  an  indirect  road  to  the  object  of  war 
indemnification,  by  dictating  peace  terms  either  on  the 
Seine  or  on  the  Loire. 

The  offensive  from  the  Main  has  a  less  important  but 
more  easily  attainable  objective.  It  is  directed  against  the 
weaker  fortified  part  of  the  French  frontier.  If  the  prov- 
inces of  Lorraine  and  Alsace,  in  prior  times  belonging  to 
Germany,  should  be  recaptured,  it  is  quite  reasonable  to 
assume  that  we  will  keep  them.  A  requirement  for  this  is 
that  the  French  army  be  defeated  first  in  one  or  more  bat- 
tles, that  Metz  and  Strassburg  are  invested,  and  that 
these  investments  are  protected  by  our  main  forces  in  the 

—81— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

field.  If  this  is  successful,  then  we  would  have  an  advantage 
in  peace  negotiations  which  cannot  be  attained  in  operations 
through  Belgium. 

A  concentration  of  as  many  troops  as  possible  on  the 
Main  is  necessary,  however,  not  only  for  the  offensive  but 
also  for  the  defensive. 

The  defensive  task  of  the  Main  army  is  the  protection 
of  the  lower  as  well  as  of  the  upper  Rhine  by  offensive 
flank  operations.  Advancing  through  Mayence,  making  the 
Mosel  a  base  for  a  continuous  movement  towards  the  north, 
it  will  threaten  all  communications  of  a  French  army  which 
may  have  advanced  from  Belgium  against  the  lower  Rhine. 
Such  hostile  movements  may  be  met  more  effectively  in  such 
a  manner  than  by  a  direct  advance  of  the  same  numbers 
from  the  Rhine  line  itself. 

An  offensive  advance  of  the  Main  army,  on  the  left  or 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  as  circumstances  may  dic- 
tate, will  most  effectively  stop  any  operation  of  the  French 
main  army  which  may  be  directed  against  the  upper  Rhine 
or  which  may  have  already  been  commenced. 

In  all  these  cases  we  do  not  consider  the  Main  as  a 
flank  position  but  as  the  base  for  a  flank  operation. 

If  the  South  Germans  intend  to  directly  defend  the 
upper  Rhine  or  the  Black  Forest,  they  would  completely 
scatter  their  fighting  forces,  which  are  far  from  sufficient 
for  all  purposes.  Neither  an  Austrian  nor  a  Prussian 
army  could  support  them  there  in  the  start.  They  have 
only  the  choice  to  retreat  on  Ulm  or  to  advance  on  Mayence 
in  order  to  draw  close  to  the  one  or  to  the  other  army. 

The  retreat  of  the  upper  Rhine  army  in  the  first  di- 
rection would  draw  along  the  enemy  into  the  interior  of 
Germany,  would  make  Suabia  the  theater  of  war  and  would 
force  Baden  and  Wiirtemberg  to  treat  with  the  enemy  to 
save  their  very  existence.  And  just  the  fortified  camps 
proposed  by  Austria  offer  the  best  opportunities  for  such 
treaties  with  the  enenjy.  If  opposed  by  a  strong  French 
army  the  retreat  would  not  come  to  a  halt  even  at  Ulm 
should  the  Austrian  forces  not  be  there. 

—82— 


Preparations  for  War 

At  the  first  glance,  an  advance  of  the  upper  Rhine  army 
in  the  direction  of  Mayence  appears  to  abandon  Southern 
Germany.  It  is  true  that  Karlsruhe  and  Stuttgart  may  be 
occupied  or  endangered  by  the  enemy,  and  even  Munich 
may  also  be  in  the  same  danger  from  flying  columns.  But 
it  would  be  impossible  for  the  enemy  to  remain  there  or 
even  to  advance  farther  from  there  if  300,000  men  were  to 
be  in  his  immediate  flank  by  the  advance  of  the  Main  Army 
and  its  junction  with  the  upper  Rhine  Army.  Such  a  force 
in  such  a  position  would  draw  the  enemy  and  would  liberate 
Southern  Germany. 

It  is  the  intention  of  the  South  German  governments 
to  concentrate  their  troops  between  Rastatt  and  Germers- 
heim.  If  this,  considering  the  probability  of  a  rapid  French 
advance,  will  be  possible,  if  the  concentration  can  be  made 
possible  only  on  the  Jagst  or  on  the  Main,  is  an  open  ques- 
tion. An  absolute  requirement  for  joining  Prussia  will  al- 
ways be  the  certainty  of  finding  a  Prussian  army  on  the 
Main. 

This  clearly  shows  how  important  it  is  for  us,  in  a 
military  as  well  as  political  respect,  to  appear  on  the  Main 
as  rapid  and  as  strong  as  possible.  In  most  cases  three 
corps  will  be  sufficient  for  our  purposes  on  the  lower  Rhine, 
but  we  cannot  be  too  strong  on  the  Main.  Only  there  can 
Prussia  protect  Southern  Germany,  only  there  can  it  assure 
to  the  smaller  states  the  possibility  of  sticking  to  Germany, 
and  only  there  can  Prussia  stand  at  the  head  of  all  German 
fighting  forces. 

Not  counting  the  German  general  interests,  and  only 
considering  mere  Prussian  conditions,  it  will  be  clear  that 
the  French  can  not  advance  even  with  the  strongest  army 
from  Southern  Germany  on  Berlin  as  long  as  Prussia  stands 
on  the  Main  with  large  forces.  The  worst  step  we  could 
take  would  be  marching  off  in  an  easterly  direction  to  oppose 
such  an  advance.  There  is  no  doubt  but  what  our  fighting 
force  on  the  Rhine  will  draw  the  hostile  fighting  force  as  a 
magnet  will  iron.  Back  of  the  Main,  between  Mayence  and 
Frankfurt,  we  find  an  excellent  position  to  await  the  attack 
of  even  superior  forces  in  which  we  can  reinforce  our  force 

—83— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

by  parts  of  the  lower  Rhine  ArmJ^  The  right  flank  of  that 
position  is  protected  by  the  fortress  of  Mayence  and  by  the 
Rhine,  and  a  French  Army  can  envelop  the  left  flank  only 
by  endangering  its  own  communications.  This  would  be 
even  more  difficult  of  execution  if  Mayence  should,  more 
than  is  the  case  now,  facilitate  an  offensive  advance  between 
the  upper  Rhine  and  Mayence. 

The  very  great  importance  of  Mayence  is  clearly  shown 
by  what  has  been  said  above. 

In  a  war  against  the  West,  Mayence  is  a  shield  and  a 
sword  at  the  same  time  for  Prussia.  It  protects  the  primary 
concentration  of  our  army  on  the  Main,  secures  the  left 
flank  of  our  entire  Rhine  position,  compels  the  enemy  who 
has  invaded  Southern  Germany  to  an  attack  on  an  almost 
impregnable  position  or  forces  him  to  an  enveloping  move- 
ment which  uncovers  all  of  his  communications  and,  finally, 
forms  the  supporting  point  for  our  offensive  in  the  only  di- 
rection promising  success.  We  might  say  that  Mayence, 
without  being  Prussian  property,  is  now  the  most  important 
fortress  for  Prussia.  Its  loss  would  shatter  our  entire  hold 
on  the  Rhine  and  give  the  unprotected  southern  part  of 
Germany  to  the  enemy. 

If  we  now  assume  that  the  Prussian  army,  in  its  strong 
position  at  Mayence  and  behind  the  Main,  could  be  over- 
come, then  such  an  assumption  necessarily  presupposes  that 
we  are  opposed  by  the  French  main  force  and  that  at  the 
same  time  the  lower  Rhine  cannot  be  attacked  in  superior 
numbers. 

The  retreat  of  the  Main  army  across  the  Taunus  can 
not  be  endangered,  as  only  the  left  flank  of  the  Main  posi- 
tion can  be  enveloped.  Consequently  we  would  unite  on  the 
Lahn  or  on  the  Sieg  with  the  lower  Rhine  army  for  renewed 
opposition,  and  finally,  after  subsequent  defeats,  retreat 
from  superior  numbers  through  Coblenz  or  Cologne.  On 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  we  also  find  a  country  entirely 
sufficient  to  support  the  army,  and  after  the  army  has  been 
reorganized  for  renewed  operation  under  the  protection  of 
the  river,  it  would  utilize  for  the  offensive  the  crossings 
which  are  protected  by  fortresses. 

—84— 


Preparations  for  War 

If  the  Prussian  fighting  force  on  the  Rhine  is  not  com- 
pletely annihilated,  which  would  presuppose  grave  errors  in 
leadership,  the  French  army  can  not  operate  against  Berlin. 
If  an  advance  by  us  through  Coblenz  or  Mayence  were  made, 
the  French  army  would  find  its  communications  with  France 
endangered  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  while  we  would 
have  the  western  half  of  the  Monarchy  behind  us.  Ac- 
cording to  my  views,  Berlin  and  the  Provinces  are  protected 
in  the  surest  and  most  effective  manner  by  a  continuous 
stand  on  the  Rhine.  The  retreat  from  the  Main  to  the 
eastern  Provinces  would  easily  take  the  form  of  a  dangerous 
parallel  march  with  the  enemy  and  would  hardly  come  to  a 
stand  at  the  Thuringian  Forest  at  Erfurt,  but  far  rather 
only  behind  the  Elbe. 

There  now  remains  to  be  considered  the  case  of  the 
French  main  attack  being  made  through  Belgium  towards 
the  lower  Rhine  and  probably  supported  by  a  secondary 
operation  from  Metz. 

Undoubtedly  the  French  will  find  but  little  resistance 
in  Belgium,  but  they  will  have  to  occupy  Brussels  and  will 
have  to  invest  Antwerp  with  its  new,  immense  fortifications. 
The  highroads  and  the  railroads  indicate  that  a  further  ad- 
vance will  be  made  in  direction  of  Luttich  and  Aix-la- 
Chapelle. 

Maastricht  then  would  become  of  great  importance. 
But  this  place,  which  requires  a  very  large  garrison,  the 
Hollanders  have  intentionally  allowed  to  fall  into  decay  and 
have  evacuated.  A  defensive  position  on  our  part  between 
Diiren  and  Jiilich  is  not  without  military  value.  On  the 
left  are  the  mountains  accompanying  the  Roer  as  far  as 
Gemiind,  a  distance  of  some  three  to  four  miles ;  these  moun- 
tains have  no  road  suitable  for  an  army  which  has  to  be 
accompanied  by  wagons,  and  on  the  right  Jiilich  forms  a 
very  strong  flank  protection,  even  in  the  state  it  is  now  after 
having  been  razed. 

If  we  will  conduct  a  decisive  battle  on  the  Roer  to  pro- 
tect our  province  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  depends  en- 
tirely on  the  question  whether  or  not  we  have  had  time  to 


-86- 


Moltke's  Coirespondence 

throw  a  fighting  force  there  which  is  equal  to  that  of  the 
enemy,  and  on  this  we  cannot  reckon  with  any  certainty. 

The  hostile  operation  from  Metz  would  have  for  us  the 
disadvantage  of  being  made  at  a  time  when  the  mobilization 
of  the  16th  Division  has  not  been  completed.  Still,  if  that 
operation  is  to  have  a  far  reaching  result,  it  can  be  made 
only  with  the  employment  of  enormous  forces. 

The  necessary  investment,  or  at  least  the  observation, 
of  Luxemburg  and  Saarlouis,  will  weaken  the  attack  by 
about  20,000  or  15,000  men,  and  an  absolute  superiority  of 
forces  is  required  to  overcome  the  resistance  of  a  Prussian 
detachment  at  Trier.  A  division  in  position  there  can  front 
towards  the  south  as  well  as  towards  the  west  behind  strong 
sectors,  and  can  allow  an  enveloping  movement  to  take  its 
course,  before  giving  up  its  position,  as  it  has  a  freedom 
of  choice  to  fall  back  on  Cologne,  Coblenz  or  Mayence  by  one 
or  the  other  bank  of  the  Mosel,  and  because  it  will  find,  in 
any  direction  taken,  a  support  in  the  terrain  for  renewed 
resistance. 

In  a  further  advance  the  army  from  Metz  will  have 
its  rear  to  Luxemburg  and  the  Ardennes,  and,  as  long  as 
the  main  French  force  has  not  deployed  beyond  the  Maas, 
it  will  get  into  the  most  difficult  situation  if  we  on  our  part 
take  the  offensive  in  force  from  Mayence  or  Coblenz. 

Of  course  we  know  that  Luxemburg  and  Saarlouis 
cannot  prevent  the  invasion  of  the  enemy,  but  can  merely 
hold  a  force  of  the  enemy  equal  to  about  their  own  garrisons. 
This  small  effect  is  not  on  account  of  the  construction,  but 
on  account  of  the  situation  of  the  two  places.  The  fortresses 
will  gain  their  full  importance  only  in  connection  with  the 
army  of  operations.  All  places  on  the  extreme  frontier  (or 
as  in  this  case,  Luxemburg  beyond  the  frontier)  have  the 
disadvantage  that  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  ready  for  war, 
the  army  of  operation  cannot  be  concentrated  in  their  vicin- 
ity, and  that  consequently  they  will  attain  their  actual  im- 
portance only  in  the  later  phases,  if  the  offensive  is  taken 
by  us,  if  that  offensive  can  be  made  in  their  direction,  and 
if  until  that  happens  they  have  not  been  taken  (being  left 
to  their  own  resources).     We  may  of  course  expect  from 

—86— 


Preparations  for  War 

Luxemburg  that  it  can  hold  out  for  several  weeks  after  be- 
ing invested ;  this,  however,  is  doubtful  of  Saarlouis,  con- 
sidering its  small  extent  and  the  well  known  peculiarity  of 
the  place.  To  this  comes,  that  our  offensive,  in  case  of  an 
attack  on  the  lower  Rhine,  will  be  made  probably  against  the 
right  flank  of  the  French  main  army  in  its  advance  across 
the  Maas,  that  is  towards  the  northwest,  and  that  time  and 
forces  on  our  part  may  easily  be  insufficient  to  make  de- 
tachments at  the  same  time  towards  the  southwest  to  re- 
lieve Saarlouis. 

Trier,  of  itself  much  more  important  than  Saarlouis, 
is  not  so  close  to  the  frontier,  can  consequently  be  easier 
reached  and  supported,  and  would  have  a  far  greater  value 
as  a  fortress. 

In  our  entire  military-political  relation  to  France  it 
would  undoubtedly  be  desirable  to  have  a  larger  force  than 
two  of  our  army  corps  permanently  stationed  in  time  of 
peace  in  the  western  half  of  the  Monarchy.  A  permanent 
maneuver  camp,  but  far  better  a  fortress  of  the  first  class, 
at  Trier  would  fulfill  all  requirements.  A  peace  garrison 
there  of  from  10,000  to  12,000  men,  which  would  be  joined 
at  mobilization  by  the  16th  Divison,  would  be  sufficient  to 
protect  this  part  of  our  frontier,  the  only  part  which  di- 
rectly joins  France. 

We  have  already  mentioned  the  operation  so  important 
for  the  defense  of  our  Rhine  front,- which  the  main  army 
will  make  through  Mayence  toward  the  Mosel.  If  Trier  does 
not  furnish  sufficient  support  to  the  detachment  concentrat- 
ing there,  then  that  detachment  will  already  have  started  its 
retreat  towards  the  Rhine,  and  the  Main  Army  will  un- 
doubtedly find  the  difficult  defiles  of  the  Mosel  already  oc- 
cupied by  the  enemy.  In  that  case  it  could  advance  only  via 
Coblenz.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Trier  were  fortified,  then  a 
body  of  troops  could  maintain  itself  there  even  against 
greatly  superior  numbers,  a  second  crossing  over  the  Mosel 
would  be  assured  to  the  Main  Army,  and  its  further  ad- 
vance would  have,  on  the  base  Coblenz — Trier,  a  far  greater 
freedom  of  movement  and  far  greater  security  for  the  re- 
treat. 

—87— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

We  undoubtedly  could  abandon  Saarlouis  as  soon  as 
Trier  becomes  a  fortress.  If  that  could  be  done  without 
Trier  being  a  fortress  is  a  question,  in  the  answer  of  which 
we  must  consider  also  the  not  altogether  military  factor,  of 
what  impression  this  would  have  on  the  inhabitants  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  Jiilich  having  been  already  razed. 

The  invasion  of  the  Rhine  Province  on  the  left  bank 
does  not  at  all  give  an  assurance  of  possessing  the  country, 
as  long  as  the  Prussian  army  has  not  been  beaten  and  as 
long  as  one  of  the  three  great  Rhine  fortresses  has  not  been 
taken. 

The  French  main  army  cannot  operate  directly  against 
Coblenz  through  the  Ardennes  and  the  Eifel  Mountains,  for 
such  an  advance  would  expose  its  flank,  after  leaving  the 
central  Maas,  to  the  force  assembled  at  Coblenz.  To  invest 
Coblenz  on  the  banks  of  three  streams  requires  very  large 
means.  It  is  one  of  the  peculiarities  of  this  place  that  the 
fall  of  one  of  the  independent  forts  would  close  to  us  the 
Rhine  crossing  there,  but  that  the  opponent  himself  can 
use  that  crossing  only  after  he  has  taken  all  the  forts,  in- 
cluding Ehrenbreitstein. 

Even  then  the  further  operations  will  lead  not  only 
through  the  difficult  terrain  of  the  Wester  Forest,  but  also 
into  the  direct  sphere  of  action  of  our  large  concentration 
of  troops  on  the  Main. 

Of  far  greater  importance  than  Coblenz  to  a  French 
attack  is  Cologne,  considering  its  relation  to  the  Rhine 
Province  and  its  highways  and  railroads.  Five  marches 
would  bring  the  French  army  from  Liittich  to  the  gates  of 
the  Rhenish  capital.  In  such  a  direct  advance  all  of  its 
communications  would  remain  protected. 

Arrived  at  Cologne,  it  will  have  to  be  decided  whether 
to  attack  that  place  on  the  left  bank,  or  to  invest  it  on  the 
right  bank,  or  whether  to  cross  the  stream  in  the  face  of 
the  lower  Rhine  Army,  to  beat  that  army,  and  to  start  the 
investment  after  that  and  protect  it  by  the  main  force  of  the 
army. 

The  possession  of  Wesel  would,  for  a  French  army,  be 
of  far  less  importance  than  that  of  Cologne  and  Coblenz. 


Preparations  for  War 

In  order  to  secure  communications  in  some  measure,  the 
French  army  could  march  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Maas  down 
to  Roermond  and  Venlo,  and  in  doing  so,  of  course,  would 
keep  as  far  as  possible  from  the  Main  army.  But  in  order 
to  reach  Wesel,  the  Rhine  would  have  to  be  crossed  at 
Xanten,  and  an  advance  by  the  lower  Rhine  Army  would 
bring  about  a  situation,  the  disadvantages  of  which  a  French 
army  could  avoid  only  by  a  decisive  victory.  The  entire 
operation  is  possible  only  by  a  complete  change  of  the  base 
of  operations,  by  landings  on  a  large  scale  on  the  coast  of 
the  North  Sea,  by  cooperation  of  Denmark  and  combina- 
tion of  a  doubtful  nature. 

What  we  have  stated  above  ought  to  be  sufficient  to 
show  the  great  importance  of  Cologne  for  defending  the 
Rhine.  The  foremost  requirement  to  be  made  of  this  place 
is  that  it  should  not  go  to  pieces  at  the  first  forcible  attack ; 
that  means  it  should  be  impregnable,  for  a  formal  siege 
requires  that  it  be  invested  on  two  sides  and  protected  to 
the  right  and  left  on  both  banks  of  the  river  against  the 
two  neighboring  fortresses — requirements  which  are  hard 
to  attain  as  long  as  the  lower  Rhine  Army  is  on  the  Rhine. 

The  operation,  probably  easiest  of  execution,  might 
be  that  the  French  invest  Cologne  by  a  strong  corps  on  the 
left  bank,  gain  at  Diisseldorf  or  at  Ruhrort  a  Rhine  crossing 
by  surprise  or  by  force,  and  then  attack  the  lower  Rhine 
Army. 

If,  however,  the  latter  army  accepts  the  battle  7iot  with 
its  rear  to  the  Eastern  provinces,  not  with  its  front  to  the 
west,  but  to  the  north,  its  left  wing  touching  the  Rhine  val- 
ley, its  right  flank  the  mountains,  then  even  the  loss  of  the 
battle  cannot  prevent  its  retreating  behind  the  sectors  of 
the  Sieg  or  the  Lahn,  its  joining  the  Main  Army  and 
with  it  advancing  to  a  renewed  offensive,  in  which  case 
Cologne  and  Coblenz  would  furnish  material  support 
whether  the  one  or  the  other  bank  of  the  Rhine  is  used. 

The  extraordinary  strength  of  our  theater  of  war  on  the 
Rhine  cannot  be  misjudged.  It  could  be  endangered  only, 
if  we  should  take  the  offensive  on  the  left  bank  prematurely 
and  with  insufficient  forces. 

—89— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

In  June,  1863,  General  v.  Moltke  worked  out  a  memorial,  basing 
his  views  on  a  war  inaugurated  by  Napoleon  III  to  capture  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine.  After  an  exhaustive  contemplation  of  the  proba- 
ble attitude  of  all  interested  European  Powers,  the  General  gives  com- 
parisons of  the  French  and  Prussian  forces  as  well  as  of  their  con- 
centrations, and  finally  discusses  necessary  measures  in  case  the 
French  should  be  in  superior  numbers  in  the  start. 

MEMORIAL  NO.  5 

Berlin,  June  1863. 

If  in  the  near  future  the  political  situation  of  Europe 
invites  Emperor  Napoleon  III  to  a  new  operation  towards 
the  exterior,  or  if  interior  conditions  in  France  compel  him 
to  do  so,  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  will,  before  all,  form 
that  terrain  which  can  be  immediately  reached,  taken  pos- 
session of,  and  maintained.  The  landing  of  an  actual  fight- 
ing force  on  the  Baltic  coast  deserves  no  serious  considera- 
tion. 

It  required  the  fleets  of  the  two  largest  maritime  powers 
to  transport  only  64,000  men,  almost  without  cavalry  and 
entirely  without  means  of  transportation,  from  one  side  of 
Black  Sea  to  the  other.  Preparations  for  and  actual  em- 
barkation required  14  days;  debarkation,  not  at  all  enter- 
fered  with  by  the  enemy,  10  days.  A  similar  expedition, 
five  times  the  distance  and  not  made  against  an  isolated  ex- 
tremity but  against  the  heart  of  Russia,  or  against  Prussia 
with  its  network  of  railways,  promises  certain  defeat. 

The  sympathetic  war  against  Russia,  for  the  restoration 
of  Poland,  is  merely  the  war  against  Prussia  for  the  capture 
of  the  Rhine,  which  with  all  its  difficulties  at  least  promises 
a  certain  object  and  practical  results.  This  long  desired  an- 
nexation, which  in  the  course  of  events  also. makes  the  cap- 
ture of  Belgium  necessary,  touches  the  vital  conditions  or 
existence  of  all  states  in  such  a  degree  that  it  becomes  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  France  to  cease  the  war  against  the 
immediate  participants,  before  the  rest  of  the  world  can 
take  a  hand. 

The  fact  of  the  two  powers  adjoining  each  other  di- 
rectly appears  to  make  this  possible,  at  a  time  when  in  the 
largest  countries  of  both  hemispheres  threatens  a  war  of 

—90— 


Preparations  for  War 

principles  or  of  nationalities,  or  where  the  war  is  already 
in  progress. 

It  is  true  that  at  the  present  moment  Russia  stands  on 
its  western  frontier  ready  for  war  and  with  large  fighting 
forces ;  but,  harassed  by  an  interior  crisis  and  in  war 
against  Poland,  it  will  hardly  feel  inclined,  nor  be  able  to 
send  an  army  against  French  encroachments  on  the  Rhine. 
Under  ordinary  conditions,  when  its  army  is  scattered  in 
the  large  expansion  of  the  country  from  the  Vistula  to  the 
Volga,  a  Russian  army,  on  account  of  the  slowness  of  mobili- 
zation, concentration  and  transportation  cannot  in  time 
arrive  from  such  a  distance  before  the  end  of  the  first  cam- 
paign. 

Austria's  military  forces  also  are  chained  down  to 
many  points.  The  Magyar  and  Slavonic  races  are  not  yet 
satisfied  with  the  union ;  Austria  has  to  continuously  watch 
Russia  in  the  Orient  concerning  the  steadily  progressing 
decay  of  the  Ottoman  Empire ;  it  has  to  guard  in  Italy  its  en- 
dangered possessions,  to  regain  what  it  has  lost. 

In  tlie  new  Italy,  France  may  see  an  ally  who  will  draw 
Austria's  power  in  a  very  large  degree  to  itself  and  away 
from  the  Rhine.  But  this  new  friend  can  easily  do  too  much, 
can  do  what  Catholic  France  dare  not  countenance.  There- 
fore he  will  have  to  be  watched. 

The  Tuilieries  may  count  on  Denmark,  and  possibly 
also  on  Sweden,  to  make  a  diversion,  which,  eventually  sup- 
ported by  a  French  oversea  expedition  on  a  small  scale,  may 
contain  a  part  of  the  fighting  forces  in  Northern  Germany. 
But  to  do  this,  E7igland's  acquiescence  is  necessary.  If  the 
latter  should  declare  against  French  aggression,  its  veto  in 
the  Rhine  question  will  not  have  an  indirect  but  an  immedi- 
ate effect,  not  by  augmenting  the  German  fighting  means 
on  the  Rhine,  but  by  holding  back  those  of  the  French.  At 
the  present  time  England  is  France's  ally;  still  nothing 
would  try  this  alliance  harder  than  an  invasion  of  Belgium, 
a  threatening  of  the  coast  of  the  North  Sea,  or  a  threaten- 
ing of  AntwerD.  The  Emoire  will  have  to  have  a 
regard  in  respect  to  England  in  so  many  and  so  very  impor- 
tant matters,  that  it  may  be  presupposed  with  great  cer- 

—91— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

tainty  that  it  will,  in  an  attack  on  the  Rhine,  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  for  the  sake  of  England. 

In  this  case  France  is  still  opposed  by  the  entire  German 
Confederation,  the  defensive  resistance  power  of  which  will 
occupy  the  entire  offensive  power  of  France,  and  the  main 
point  will  be  to  confine  the  battle  into  limited  spaces.  At 
the  present  time,  in  addition  to  Prussia,  Bavaria,  Hesse, 
Oldenburg  and  the  Netherlands  occupy  territory  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Prussia  can  in  no  way  be  elimi- 
nated, it  stands  with  all  its  power  for  the  support  of  the 
Rhine  Province.  Should  the  remainder  of  the  Confederation 
States  be  recompensed  elsewhere,  the  material  for  that 
recompense  could  be  found  only  in  the  Prussian  territory  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine.  From  it  the  Rhine  will  have  to  be 
captured,  it  will  have  to  defray  the  costs  of  recompense,  the 
war  is  directed  before  all  against  Prussia,  and  in  that  Prus- 
sia must  be  isolated,  if  at  all  possible. 

It  is  of  course  true  that  a  French  army  can  invade  the 
Prussian  Rhine  Province  without  entering  territory  not 
belonging  to  Prussia.  Still,  the  frontier  from  Sierck  to 
Saargemiind  is  but  32  (English)  miles  long.  An  operation 
based  on  Metz  leads  for  120  (English)  miles  parallel  to  the 
Rhine  front  across  the  Mosel  and  the  mountains  along  it 
to  Cologne.  Saarlouis  would  at  the  same  time  have  to  be 
attacked,  Luxemburg  and  Mayence  observed,  Coblenz  in- 
vested and  detachments  would  have  to  be  made  against 
Wesel  in  order  to  invest  Cologne.  Without  capturing  this 
center  of  the  province,  the  possession  of  the  latter  would 
never  be  secure.  It  will  hardly  be  possible  to  involve  the 
Prussian  fighting  forces  in  a  decisive  battle  against  their 
will  and  before  completion  of  this  concentration  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  because  they,  being  in  firm  possession  of 
all  crossings  from  Wesel  to  Mayence,  can  draw  back  in  any 
desired  direction.  On  the  Rhine,  of  course,  a  longer  halt 
would  ensue,  which  appears  dangerous,  politically  consid- 
ered. But  if  the  entire  Prussian  fighting  force  is  once  con- 
centrated there,  then  an  offensive  advance  via  Coblenz  or 
Mayence  or  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Mosel  will  cut  off  all 
communications  of  the  French  army  with  France  and  force 

—92— 


Preparations  for  War 

that   army   to    reconstruct   them,    with   a    changed    front, 
through  the  defiles  of  that  stream. 

But  France  needs  a  broader  base  for  an  attack  on 
Prussia,  and  must  extend  its  base,  if  Belgium  remains 
out  of  the  question  in  consideration  of  politics,  to  Southern 
Germany  for  military  reasons. 

The  defense  of  the  entire  western  frontier  of  Ger- 
many requires  three  armies  to  be  placed  into  position  on  the 
lower,  central  and  upper  Rhine.  The  strength  of  the  Con- 
federation fighting  force  not  only  allows  this  division,  but 
requires  it  as  well  as  the  expansion  of  the  stretch  to  be 
protected.  With  due  regard  to  the  issue  of  orders,  subsis- 
tence and  to  mobility,  we  cannot,  without  disadvantage, 
make  the  separate  armies  stronger  than  from  150,000  to 
200,000  men  and  the  stream  from  Schliegen  to  Cleves  is  320 
(English)  miles  long. 

Of  these  three  armies  the  central  one  would  have  to  be 
the  strongest.  It  forms  Germany's  offensive  force,  which 
flanks  the  French  advance  across  the  lower  as  well  as  the 
upper  Rhine  and  which  transfers  the  war  into  hostile  ter- 
ritory. 

But  the  dispositions  of  the  enormous  fighting  means 
of  the  Confederation  is  dependent  upon  collective  Confed- 
erate acts,  for  which  not  only  national  strategic  thoughts, 
but  also  manifold  local  requirements  and  special  interests 
would  be  the  basis.  It  is  easily  understood  that  based  on 
actual  conditions  that  the  States  of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth 
Confederation  Corps  require  a  special  and  strong  army 
for  the  direct  protection  of  their  own  domain,  and  if  for 
this  they  demand  that  parts  of  their  contingents  support 
them,  they  are  justified,  in  so  far  as  that  can  be  done — but 
these  States  would  labor  under  a  delusion  if,  for  instance, 
they  should  demand  that  the  IXth  and  the  Xth  Confedera- 
tion Corps  should  join  the  army  of  the  upper  Rhine.  The 
Prussian  position  covers  all  the  States  of  these  corps  and  the 
nearest  interests  of  these  States  is  to  do  their  share  in  the 
maintaining  of  that  position,  the  Xth  Corps  to  be  on  the 
lower  Rhine,  the  IXth  Corps  to  be  on  the  central  Rhine. 

—93— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Even  the  Saxon  Division,  should  the  French  troops 
suddenly  spread  through  the  open  door  of  Strassburg  over 
Southern  Germany  could  not  arrive  in  time  for  the  defense 
of  the  Black  Forest.  It  would  work  on  the  same  lines  as 
the  Prussian  or  the  Austrian  corps. 

The  Hessian  troops  undoubtedly  will  not  leave  their 
endangered  land  in  order  to  go  to  Rastatt  or  to  Ulm,  and  the 
transportation  of  the  contingents  of  the  Xth  Corps  from 
north  to  south  would  cross  the  general  movement  of  the 
masses  from  east  to  west,  which  would  ruin  any  projected 
concentration  of  the  armies  on  the  Rhine. 

A  direct  help  in  Southwestern  Germany  can  be  fur- 
nished only  by  Austria.  The  relation  of  Austria  to  Germany 
is  far  too  important  to  the  former  to  let  us  believe  that  it 
would  not  reinforce  the  upper  Rhine  Army  with  all  available 
forces  and  as  quickly  as  possible.  It  is  of  course  true  that 
Austria's  position  as  a  European  power  is  very  complicated. 
Experience  has  shown  that  it  cannot  at  all  times  have  an 
army  disposable  in  Germany.  Even  in  less  unfavorable 
political  situations  than  in  1859,  and  not  counting  what  it 
has  to  protect  in  the  East  and  in  its  interior,  it  must  guard 
its  own  and  German  interests  in  Italy,  Tyrol  and  Switzer- 
land. The  occupation  of  the  latter  by  France  touches  Aus- 
tria as  directly  as  would  an  invasion  of  Suabia. 

The  extension  of  the  territory  alone  makes  it  difficult 
for  Austrian  help  to  become  effective  on  the  Rhine  and  in 
the  Black  Forest,  and  this  help  may  be  possible  only  on 
the  Iller  or  on  the  Danube  even  with  the  best  and  most 
patriotic  intentions. 

The  fact  is  there  is  an  absence  of  a  great  power  in 
Southern  Germany  directly  joining  the  Rhine,  which,  as 
is  the  case  in  Northern  Prussia,  would  be  compelled  to  an 
immediate  holding  of  the  most  advanced  frontier  for  its 
vital  interests. 

At  the  first  movement  of  a  French  attack  the  contin- 
gents of  Southwestern  Germany  would  hardly  be  sufficient 
to  protect  Baden  and  Wiirttemberg  and  may  possibly  not  be 
able  to  offer  any  resistance  except  at  Ulm. 

—94— 


Preparations  for  War 

In  these  conditions  the  empire  might  see  the  possibility 
of  separation,  which  would  localize  the  battle  with  Prussia. 
However,  this  very  unnatural  union,  so  much  in  opposition 
to  actual  interests,  or  even  only  neutrality,  finds  little  en- 
couragement in  the  sentiment  of  the  princes  or  the  people 
of  Southern  Germany.  They  would  have  to  be  forced  into 
a  renewal  of  the  Rhine  Confederation  by  armed  demonstra- 
tion and  France  would  in  any  case  have  to  send  a  special 
army  to  Southern  Germany. 

If  we  may  presuppose  Belgium's  neutrality,  then  the 
French  fighting  forces  will  have  to  concentrate  between  Metz 
and  Strassburg  for  an  attack  on  the  Rhine  territory,  and 
the  main  operations  would  have  to  be  made  on  the  Main, 
against  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  defense,  against  the 
Prussian  army  concentrated  there.  This  direction  goes 
around  the  strong  line  of  fortresses  on  the  lower  Rhine  in 
the  very  start,  touches  the  domains  of  the  smaller  states, 
separates  Prussia  from  Southern  Germany  and  threatens 
the  former's  communications  between  the  western  and  eas- 
tern halves  of  the  Monarchy.  It  leads  to  the  quick  deci- 
sion, on  the  shortest  road  which  France  needs. 

But  in  order  to  reach  the  Main,  the  Rhine  will  first 
have  to  be  crossed.  A  direct  advance  through  the  Bavarian 
Palatinate  and  the  Hesse-Darmstadt  against  Franfurt  is 
threatened  in  the  very  start  in  the  left  flank  from  the  Mosel 
and  must  be  protected  on  that  side  by  a  special  army  detach- 
ment. 

After  Landau  and  Germersheim  are  invested,  the  prin- 
cipal crossing  is  at  Mannheim  as  indicated  by  its  road  con- 
nections, which  is  beyond  the  interference  of  the  important 
point — Mayence. 

From  there  the  right  flank  of  the  operation  also  will 
have  to  be  secured  against  all  that  may  be  disposable  from 
the  Vlllth  and  Vllth  Confederation  Corps. 

Furthermore,  it  is  possible  that  already  at  Mannheim 
resistance  from  the  Prussian  Army  of  the  Main  may  be 
encountered,  which  might  increase  the  difficulties  of  cross- 
ing there  or  farther  down  stream. 

—95— 


Moltke's  Coirespondence 

It  is  necessary  therefore  to  have  a  special  army,  start- 
ing from  Strassburg,  to  throw  back  from  the  Rhine  the  con- 
tingents of  Southwestern  Germany  and  by  advancing  down 
stream  on  the  right  bank  open  the  crossings  for  the  main 
army. 

Consequently  it  is  no  arbitrary  assumption,  but  one 
based  on  necessity,  to  say  that  France  will  have  to  put  three 
separate  armies  into  the  field.  The  strength  of  each  one 
of  them  is  governed  by  the  objects  already  discussed. 

The  left  auxiliary  army,  starting  from  Metz  and  Thion- 
ville,  can  in  the  start  have  the  Prussian  Vlllth  Army 
Corps  in  its  front,  and  if  it  advances  quickly  the  latter 
corps  may  not  be  fully  concentrated.  A  strength  of  45,000 
men  assures  it  the  necessary  superiority,  at  least  at  the 
start. 

The  army  from  Strassburg  also  will  find  the  contin- 
gents from  Baden,  Hesse,  Wiirtemberg  and  Bavaria  con- 
centrated, as  its  offensive,  should  the  army  be  of  ordinary 
strength,  may  extend  as  far  as  Ulm.  Still,  Rastatt  will 
have  to  be  invested  and  an  advance  made  towards  the  Neckar 
in  such  strength  that  below  the  point  where  the  latter  flows 
into  the  Rhine  the  defender  will  have  to  evacuate  the  bank 
of  the  Rhine. 

Finally,  the  army  from  Strassburg  would  probably 
find  Bavarian  or  possibly  Austrian  forces  at  Ulm  and  should 
not  be  weaker  than  these,  even  on  the  defensive. 

All  these  military,  and,  later  on,  political  tasks,  could 
hardly  be  solved  with  less  than  90,000  men. 

The  French  main  army  then  would  be  composed  of  the 
remainder  of  the  French  offensive  forces. 

At  the  present  time  France  is  engaged  outside  of  its  own 
territory  with : 

40,000  men  in  Mexico 

1,900  men  in  Cochin  China 
16,200  men  in  Rome 


Total  58,100  men. 

To  these  detachments  Algeria  has  contributed   17,466 
men  and  there  remain  in  Algeria  only  37,542  men,  the  num- 

—96— 


Preparations  for  War 

ber  of  which  cannot  be  decreased  on  account  of  conditions 
existing  there.  Regiments  may  be  taken  from  there,  it  is 
true,  but  they  will  have  to  be  replaced  by  others. 

Accordingly,  100,000  men  should  be  deducted  from 
France's  entire  active  force. 

Not  counting  111,600  men  for  depots  nor  new  recruits, 
France  can  now  put  into  the  field : 

23  infantry  divisions 230,000  men 

15  cavalry  divisions 32,000  men 

Artillery  reserve ' 24,000  men 

A  total  of 286,000  men 

Were  Emperor  Napoleon  compelled,  in  order  to  re- 
main master  of  the  situation  in  Italy,  to  keep  an  observa- 
tion army  in  readiness  at  Lyons,  he  would  hardly  be  in  the 
situation  to  commence  a  war  against  Germany  with  any  hope 
of  success.  Only  were  King  Victor  Immanuel  to  give  a 
guaranty  for  the  wordly  possessions  of  the  Pope  and  be  sat- 
isfied with  taking  Venice,  the  above  stated  strength  would 
be  available,  and  then  of  course  the  Austrian  fighting  force 
would  be  drawn  from  the  Rhine. 

The  fortresses  situated  on  the  northeastern  French 
frontier  require  about  152,000  men  for  garrisons.  Longwy 
and  New  Breisach,  lying  on  the  first  line,  have  to  be  occu- 
pied with  44,500  men.  For  this  the  conscription  and  oc- 
cupation troops  of  the  Second  and  Third  Corps  Districts  are 
insufficient.  It  is  true  that  troops  may  be  called  up  from 
districts  farther  in  rear,  but  war  garrisons  like  those  of 
Strassburg,  Metz  and  Diedenhofen  would  undoubtedly  al- 
ways require  a  nucleus  of  line  troops. 

If  we  however  assume,  so  as  not  to  underestimate 
France's  offensive  power,  that  for  this  and  for  the  Vosges 
between  Paris  and  Lyon,  as  well  as  for  the  protection  of  the 
coast  and  the  Belgian  frontier,  34,000  men  would  be  suffi- 
cient, then  there  would  finally  be  about  250,000  men  dis- 
posable for  active  operations  in  the  field,  and  we  would  have 
to  estimate  the  strength  of  the  different  French  armies  as 
follows : 


-97- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

1st  Army  of  Metz 45,000  men 

2d  Army  of  Strassburg 90,000  men 

3d  Army  of  Weissenburg  and 

Bitsch,  at  most   115,000  men 

Emperor  Napoleon  was  enabled  to  bring  his  armies  into 
the  wars  in  the  Orient  and  in  Italy  into  the  field  in  a  sur- 
prisingly short  time,  but  there  were  not  over  150,000  men 
then,  and  the  regular  army  furnished  the  men,  horses  and 
materials  for  these  armies.  It  will  be  different  if  the  en- 
tire French  army  has  to  be  mobilized  at  one  and  the  same 
time,  and  the  most  careful  researches  lead  to  the  belief  that 
France  can  do  this  no  quicker  than  can  Prussia. 

The  intention  of  France  to  proceed  to  war  will  make 
itself  manifest  in  its  purchasing  many  horses,  which  it 
can  do  in  its  own  country  only  partly,  in  spite  of  the  ma- 
terially increased  breeding  of  horses  and  the  Algerian  re- 
mounts. 

For  a  comparative  estimate  of  time  required  we  should 
count  only  that  day  as  the  first,  on  which  France  issues 
orders  for  the  joining  of  the  men  on  furlough  and  reserves. 
This  order  cannot  be  kept  secret  and  it  can  be  assumed  that 
it  will  immediately  be  wired  to  Frankfurt,  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  That  day  consequently  should  also  be  counted  the 
first  for  the  mobilization  of  the  German  Confederation 
forces. 

In  order  to  have  the  troops  ready  in  their  garrisons 
to  allow  the  transportation  to  their  concentration  points 
to  proceed  without  interruption,  it  will  require,  as  with  us, 
14  days. 

For  simultaneous  concentration  on  both  sides  of  the 
Vosges  between  Strassburg  and  Metz  the  3d  and  2d  Corps 
will  be  ordered  to  march;  the  1st,  4th,  5th,  6th  and  7th 
Corps  would  go  by  rail. 

The  troops  in  garrisons  in  the  south  and  west  of  France 
have  to  pass  either  through  Lyons  or  Paris.  There  is  a 
double  track-railroad  from  Lyons  to  the  area  of  concentra- 
tion, from  Paris  three  may  be  used  with  the  addition  of  a 
few  marches. 


-98— 


Preparations  for  War 

With  these  communications  it  will  be  possible  to  con- 
centrate all  disposable  French  fighting  forces  along  the 
Rhine-Bavaria-Baden  frontier  quicker  than  can  be  done 
on  the  Prussian  side,  having  but  three  trunk  railroads  from 
east  to  west  (two  of  them  single  track). 

There  will  be  assembled  for  the  French  main  army 
and  the  army  of  Strassburg : 

In  three  weeks 112,000  men 

In  four  weeks  (or  to  be  more 

accurate  in  26  days)   205,000  men 

In  addition,  France  has  at  its  immediate  disposal  in 
the  camp  at  Chalons  a  corps  of  23,000  men  which  is  but 
eight  marches  from  the  frontier.  If  we  calculate  three  days' 
preparation,  three  days  of  rest,  and  two  marches  toward 
Prussian  terrain,  if  12,000  reserves  are  sent  by  rail  to  follow 
the  corps  to  Diedenhofen,  if  the  corps  is  reinforced  by 
10,000  men  from  Metz,  Luneville,  or  nearby  garrisons,  then 
it  may  be  possible  that  45,000  men  can  be  at  Trier  on  the 
16th  day  to  interfere  with  the  mobilization  of  the  17th  Di- 
vision and  to  prevent  the  bringing  uf>  of  war  garrisons  for 
Luxemburg  and  Saarlouis. 

This  utilization  of  the  nearest  ready  fighting  means 
would  only  then  be  resultless,  if  at  the  stated  time  the  Vlllth 
Prussian  Army  Corps  were  already  concentrated  on  the 
Mosel. 

Furthermore,  preparations  might  be  made  in  secret  to 
bring  the  23,000  men  in  camp  at  Chalons  in  about  four  days 
to  Forbach  immediately  after  orders  therefor  are  received; 
from  there  they  would  probably,  without  encountering  re- 
sistance, appear  in  seven  to  eight  forced  marches  through 
the  Palatinate  on  the  12th  day  in  front  of  Mayence,  to  try 
to  execute  a  blow  against  that  place.  But  Mayence,  as  a 
fortress,  is  in  an  excellent  condition  for  defense;  all  that 
remains  to  be  done  is  to  provide  it  with  a  garrison  of  in- 
fantry and  especially  of  artillery.  If  we  are  at  all  alert  it 
will  not  be  diflficult  to  do  this,  using  Prussian  or  Darmstadt 
detachments.  For  a  permanent  support  of  this  and  other 
similar  undertakings,  as  well  as  for  the  opening  of  the  cam- 

—99— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

paign  on  the  Rhine,  the  necessary  fighting  forces,  as  already 
shown,  are  not  so  readily  at  hand. 

If  we  now  take  a  glance  at  the  defensive  means  of  Ger- 
many, we  see  that  the  eight  Confederation  corps  are  equal 
to  the  French  offensive  force,  and  that  by  the  junction  of 
other  Prussian  or  Austrian  corps  we  will  have  a  decided 
superiority,  as  soon  as  the  masses  are  at  our  disposal  on 
the  frontier. 

We  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that,  considering 
the  enemy  will  take  the  initiative  and  also  considering  the 
extensive  railroad  net,  the  entire  hostile  fighting  force  can 
be  concentrated  on  the  northern  frontier  of  France  against 
Belgium  and  Germany  quicker  than  can  our  forces  on  the 
Rhine.  That  frontier  and  the  Rhine  converge  from  the 
100  [English]  miles  long  line  between  Lille  and  Wesel  to- 
ward the  southeast  and  finally  join  on  the  Lauter. 

Consequently  danger  of  an  immediate  contact  is  smaller 
on  the  lower  Rhine  and  the  possibility  of  an  uninterrupted 
concentration  there  more  secure,  than  on  the  upper  Rhine. 

Therefore  we  see  in  advance  that  the  necessary  forces 
to  defeat  a  hostile  advance  through  Belgium  are  easier  to 
concentrate  than  would  be  the  case  against  an  advance  from 
Alsace. 

For  the  assembly  of  the  Prussian  main  forces,  three 
different  fields  of  concentration  come  into  main  considera- 
tion. 

1.  The  Bavarian  Palatinate.  In  addition  to  the 
main  army  there  the  Vlllth  Prussian  Army  Corps  would 
have  to  be  placed  on  the  Mosel,  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Con- 
federation Corps  on  the  Murg.  The  distance  between  Lux- 
emburg and  Rastatt  is  more  than  80  [English]  miles,  and 
one  main  army  and  two  auxiliary  armies  (in  direct  com- 
munication with  the  main  army)  will  be  sufficient. 

This  first  position  of  the  German  arms  in  the  face  of 
their  restless  neighbor  should  receive  the  preference,  theo- 
retically, to  any  other ;  it  more  than  any  other  covers  all 
Confederation  lands  against  the  west,  has  an  absolute  offen- 
sive character,  and  leads  most  surely  to  a  retorsion  of  the 

—100— 


Preparations  lor  War 

hostile  attack.  But  it  presupposes  Belgium's  neutrality ;  at 
least  were  that  not  to  be  presupposed,  all  those  fighting 
means  would  drop  away  which  are  required  for  the  defense 
of  the  lower  Rhine.  It  further  presupposes  a  single  leader- 
ship, and  one  which  is  forceful  enough  and  not  allow  itself 
to  be  confused  or  hindered  in  the  pursuit  of  the  general 
object  by  particular  and  special  interest — requirements 
hard  to  meet  in  practice  considering  the  division  of  Ger- 
many into  states  and  position  of  its  two  great  Powers  ex- 
tending beyond  the  frontier  of  the  Confederation.  And  not 
at  all  counting  these  considerations,  the  very  unequal  con- 
dition of  readiness  for  war  of  the  different  contingents,  of 
the  great  distance,  in  spite  of  the  generally  favorable  con- 
verging of  the  trunk  lines  of  the  German  railways  towards 
the  central  Rhine,  will  hardly  allow  a  concentration  in  the 
Palatinate,  which  is  unprotected  by  a  larger  natural  ob- 
stacle and  so  near  the  French  frontier.  We  have  seen  that 
after  four  weeks  already  200,000  French  can  advance,  to 
that  point. 

'  This  shows  that  we  must  enter  the  Palatinate  in  the 
course  of  the  operation  but  must  not  designate  it  as  the 
rendezvous  of  separately  arriving  corps. 

2.  More  easy  of  access  and  next  in  offensive  effect 
appears  to  be  a  concentration  of  the  main  force  behind  the 
protecting  sector  of  the  Mosel.  It  would  be  possible,  by  rail 
transportation  to  Cologne,  Coblenz,  and  Mayence,  in  addi- 
tion to  marches,  to  concentrate  within  33  days  on  the  Mosel : 

1  Prussian  army  corps  at  Trier  and  beyond, 
4  Prussian  army  corps  at  Wittlich, 
1  Prussian  army  corps  at  Coblenz, 

a  total  of  200,000  men.  This  position  covers  the  Prussian 
possessions  directly,  is  protected  from  envelopments  on  the 
right  by  Luxemburg,  on  the  left  by  the  Rhine,  has  a  strong 
obstacle  in  its  front,  and  the  most  assured  retreat  to  the 
Rhine  fortresses. 

The  distance  from  Luxemburg  to  Basel  is  160  [English] 
miles  and  consequently  it  becomes  necessary  to  have  two 
independent  main  armies,  that  is,  in  addition  to  the  one 

—101— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

on  the  Mosel  another  one  on  the  upper  Rhine.  If  Austria 
is  in  the  situation  to  send  its  three  Confederation  corps  to 
the  latter  and  to  the  Rhine,  then  both  armies  will  co-operate, 
at  least  in  the  offensive.  And  even  in  the  defensive  each 
and  any  attack  movement  of  the  French  against  the  one 
or  the  other  would  have  one  of  them  on  their  flank. 

But  unfortunately  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  oppon- 
ent can  appear  on  the  Mosel  or  on  the  upper  Rhine  several 
days  earlier,  i.e.,  in  the  start  with  superior  forces,  before 
the  concentration  there  is  completed. 

This  position  consequently  would  be  the  correct  and 
executable  one,  if  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  were  assured 
and  if  the  first  concentration  were  prepared  in  advance  by 
corps  mobilized  before  then. 

3.  More  secure  and  more  certain  of  execution  in  any 
event  finally  is  a  co7icentration  of  the  main  forces  on  the 
Main,  because  this  field  of  concentration  is  directly  reached 
by  rail  from  all  parts  of  Germany,  is  more  distant  from  the 
French  frontier,  and  protected  by  the  powerful  Rhine  line. 
Of  course  in  this  case  we  cannot  protect  at  the  first  moment 
with  the  means  at  hand  the  German  territory  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine  against  hostile  invasion. — The  concentra- 
tion on  the  Main  is  a  necessary  make-shift  in  the  face  of 
the  initiative  left  to  France  by  the  separation  of  Germany, 
and  the  defensive  line,  280  [English]  miles,  from  Wesel  to 
Basel  requires  the  placing  of  three  separate  armies,  namely : 
One  on  the  lower  Rhine,  which,  however,  if  Belgium  re- 
mains neutral  and  if  time  allows,  can  immediately  advance 
to  the  Mosel,  one  on  the  Main  and  one  on  the  upper  Rhine. 

Prussia  has  the  military  power  and  has  enough  general 
German  as  well  as  special  Prussian  interests  to  furnish  the 
preponderant  part  of  two  of  these  armies,  which  the  Con- 
federation States  can  join  in  accordance  with  their  geo- 
graphical situation.  It  will  furnish  these  two  armies  even 
should  it  be  confined  entirely  to  its  own  resources. 

The  Rhine  with  its  fortresses  will  always  remain  the 
defensive  front  of  Prussia  against  France.  This  line  is  so 
exceedingly  strong,  as  to  not  at  all  require  the  total  fight- 

—102— 


Preparations  for  War 

ing  forces  of  the  Monarchy  for  holding  it  and  the  larger 
part  of  the  forces  will  remain  available  for  an  offensive 
which  can  be  made  from  the  center  or  from  one  of  the 
wings. 

The  right  wing  is  secured  against  France  by  distance 
mainly.  Its  envelopment,  200  (English)  miles,  across  the 
lower  course  of  the  Schelde,  Maas  and  the  Rhine  and  past 
Antwerp  through  Belgium  and  Holland  is  impossible  in  con- 
sideration of  military  and  political  reasons. 

It  is  true  that  the  left  wing  is  advantageously  sup- 
ported by  Mayence,  still  for  reasons  which  have  already 
been  explained,  it  needs  a  strong  army  for  the  offensive  as 
well  as  for  a  permanent  defensive. 

In  assigning  positions  to  the  contingents  of  the  central 
and  minor  States  of  Germany,  we  cannot  leave  their  terri- 
torial interests  out  of  sight.  Each  one  of  them  will  demand 
to  have  its  domain  secured.  Prussia's  position  on  the  Rhine 
secures  this  protection  to  the  north.  Giving  political  riv- 
alries first  consideration,  we  can  adopt  other  systems  in 
timie  of  peace,  but  in  case  of  war  with  France  the  pressure 
of  the  situation  will  force  the  Xth  and  Xlth  Confederation 
Corps  to  join  the  Prussian  defense.  Even  the  Saxon  Divi- 
sion, if  it  actually  joined  the  South  German  army  at  Ras- 
tatt,  would  certainly  not  retreat  on  Ulm  but  on  Wiirzburg, 
and  would  consequently  enter  the  sphere  of  operations  of 
the  Army  of  the  Main. 

The  defense  of  Southern  Germany  will  in  the  start  be 
the  task  of  the  Vllth  and  the  Vlllth  Confederation  Corps 
and  the  Illd  Austrian  Corps. 

We  have  mentioned  above  that  Austria  will  have  to 
protect  not  only  its  own  interests  but  also  German  territory 
by  a  strong  deployment  of  forces  in  Italy,  the  Tyrol,  and 
Switzerland.  The  distance  alone  shows  that  it  is  improb- 
able that  the  corps,  which  Austria  designates  for  a  German 
theater  of  war,  can  be  disposable  in  the  start  at  the  upper 
Rhine.  If  they  will  be,  after  the  course  of  about  three 
weeks,  in  position  there  or  in  Voralberg,  or  in  Tyrol,  or  in 
lower  Austria,  depends  on  the  very  much  complicated  Euro- 

—103— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

pean  position  of  the  Empire.  Consequently  we  must  con- 
sider the  possibility  that  the  Austrian  contingent  cannot 
appear  at  the  start  on  the  upper  Rhine  for  the  defense  of 
Southern  Germany. 

If  in  the  time  mentioned  (3  weeks)  100,000  French- 
men can  deploy  via  Strassburg,  then  of  course  the  most 
obvious  reasons  force  Southern  Germany  to  at  once  con- 
centrate all  of  its  own  forces. 

A  local  defense  of  the  Rhine  can  have  no  possible  suc- 
cess and  to  concentrate  the  Vllth  and  the  Vlllth  Confed- 
eration Corps,  even  if  immediately  behind  the  Black  Forest, 
would  mean  to  leave  Baden  at  least  entirely  defenseless. 
Having  an  extent  of  300  [English]  miles  and  directly  join- 
ing France,  and  with  a  depth  of  but  two  or  three  marches, 
this  frontier  territory  can  be  protected  only  by  a  flank  posi- 
tion in  the  Rhine  valley,  and  Rastatt  is  the  only  place  for 
that. 

Wiirtemberg  also  cannot  be  held  at  the  start  against 
superior  hostile  forces,  and  both  of  these  states  can  be 
liberated  again  only  by  the  help  of  Austria  or  Prussia.  In 
accordance  as  to  whether  this  help  arrives  quicker  and 
stronger  from  the  north  or  from  the  east,  the  retreat  will 
have  to  be  made  on  either  the  Iller  or  the  Main.  Thus  it  is 
probable  that  in  that  case  only  the  latter  direction  is  the 
proper  one  for  all  troops  which  Bavaria  places  in  the  field 
for  the  protection  of  the  Palatinate,  and  also  for  the  Baden 
contingent. 

Concentrated  on  the  Murg  the  Baden  contingent  covers 
at  least  its  lower  Rhine  district ;  there  it  forms  the  advance 
guard  of  the  Main  army  which  is  then  only  but  five  marches 
distant,  and  through  which  army  alone  it  can  be  supported 
in  time. 

It  is  of  undoubted  interest  to  Prussia,  the  political  con- 
ditions of  which  are  more  simple  than  those  of  Austria,  to 
meet  a  French  attack  against  Germany  with  its  entire 
forces. 

Even  if  we  can  expect  no  gratitude  from  Russia  on 
account  of  our  attitude  during  Poland's  insurrection,  that 

—104— 


Preparations  for  War 

power  is  chained  down  too  much  by  interior  conditions  to 
prevent  or  interfere  with  the  utilization  on  the  Rhine  of 
our  army  corps  in  the  east  of  the  Monarchy.  We  can  with- 
out fear  trust  the  cadre  and  garrison  battalions  of  the  dis- 
tricts close  by  to  maintain  order  in  the  Grand-Duchy  of 
Posen. 

It  seems  improbable  that  Denmark,  even  if  Sweden 
helps  it,  will  take  the  offensive  against  Germany.  If  France 
would  bring  about  such  a  diversion  it  has  to  support  it  by 
troops  which  we  would  not  have  to  fight  on  the  Rhine  in 
that  case.  A  Prussian  and  the  Xth  Confederation  Corps 
will  probably  be  sufficient  to  meet  this  threatening  danger 
and  to  guard  the  coasts. 

The  mobilization  of  the  army  and  the  transportation 
of  four  army  corps  to  the  Rhine  will  take  the  first  four 
weeks.  Thereafter  we  may  be  able  to  see  how  many  of 
the  others  will  have  to  be  held  back,  how  many  can  follow 
up  and  into  which  direction  they  are  to  be  started. 

We  may  in  general  designate  Cologne  and  Mayence  as 
the  first  concentration  direction  in  any  war  with  France, 
consequently  we  can  regulate  the  transportation  in  advance. 
Our  railroad  net  does  not  lead  across  the  Rhine  in  toto; 
there  are  now  only  two  single-track  lines  to  Aix-la-Chapelle 
and  a  similar  one  to  Trier,  the  latter  in  addition  passing 
immediately  along  the  French  frontier.  Consequently  an 
interruption  has  to  occur  on  the  Rhine  and  marching  re- 
sorted to  for  any  further  concentration  farther  west.  On 
the  other  hand,  railroads  and  steamers  connect  the  two  ter- 
minals, Cologne  and  Mayence,  which  allows,  according  to 
necessity,  of  sending  troop  transports  from  one  to  the  other 
wing. 

To  the  Rhine  and  to  the  Main  the  present  railroad  net 
forms  three  independent  trunk  lines  from  east  to  west  and 
one  like  it  from  north  to  south. 

The  concentration  will  be  effected  in  the  shortest  pos- 
sible time  if 

The  Vllth  Army  Corps  concentrates  by  marching, 
The  Vlth  Army  Corps  is  sent  via  Bamberg, 

—105— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


The  IVth  Army  Corps  is  sent  via  Cassel, 
The  Vth  Army  Corps  is  sent  via  Hanover, 
The  Vllth  Army  Corps  is  sent  via  Wetzlar. 

The  last  four  corps  (exclusive  of  a  part  of  the  Land- 
wehr  cavalry)  will  reach  with  their  rear  detachments  the 
terminals  of  the  transport  by  the  27th  day. 

To  where  these  terminals  should  be  transferred,  how 
far  the  transport  trains  should  go,  whether  the  troops  ar- 
riving at  Cologne  should  be  immediately  sent  farther  up 
stream  or  those  arriving  at  Mayence  and  Frankfurt  down 
stream,  can  be  regulated,  considering  connections  anl  facil- 
ities along  the  river,  according  to  conditions  then  existing. 

Should  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  be  still  doubtful,  then 
we  could  place,  after  the  end  of  the  first  four  weeks : — 

The  Vth  and  Vllth  Army  Corps  at  Cologne  and  Aix-la-Chapelle; 
The  Vlllth  Army  Corps  at  Coblenz  and  Trier; 
The    IVth    and    Vlth    Army    Corps    at    Frankfurt   and    Mayence, 
respectively. 

If  we  can  ascertain  by  that  time  that  the  Belgian  terri- 
tory will  not  be  touched,  the  Vth  Army  Corps  can  immedi- 
ately be  sent  via  Cologne  to  Coblenz  and  the  Vllth  via  Wetz- 
lar also  to  Coblenz  or  to  Frankfurt. 

Thus,  in  the  same  space  of  time,  there  would  be  as- 
sembled either : — 

The  Vlllth,  Vllth  and  Vth  Army  Corps  on  the  Mosel  between 

Trier  and  Coblenz, 
The  Vlth  and  IVth  Army  Corps  on  the  Main  between  Mayence 

and  Frankfurt; 

Or,  if  we  may  expect  but  an  auxiliary  army  on  the 
Mosel,  and  the  main  hostile  force  in  the  Palatinate  and 
Southern  Germany: — 

The  Vlllth   and  Vth   Army  Corps  on   the   Mosel   between   Trier 

and  Coblenz, 
The   Vlth,   IVth   and   Vllth   Army   Corps   on   the   Main,   between 

Frankfurt,    Mayence   and    Darmstadt. 

Then  there  would  be,  for  bringing  up  the  corps  from 
the  eastern  provinces,  in  any  case  two  (the  northern)  rail- 
roads clear  and  within  five  days  one  corps,  the  Illd,  could 
be  brought  to  Cologne,  Coblenz  or  Mayence,  followed  by 
the  lid  Corps. 

—106— 


Preparations  for  War 

Within  five  weeks  we  can  have  concentrated: 

On  the  Mosel  On  the  Main 

Either  140,000     and  70,000] 

or  105,000     and  105,000     a  total  of  210,000  men. 

or     35,000     and  175,000  J 

If  by  that  time  at  least  the  Vllth  and  the  Vlllth  Con- 
federation Corps  have  reached  the  upper  Rhine  and  the 
IXth  Confederation  Corps  the  Main,  and  if  by  that  time 
the  French  masses  have  not  yet  crossed  the  frontier,  then 
we  could  take  the  position  mentioned  under  (1)  above: 

200,000  men  in  the  Palatinate, 
35,000  men  on   the  Mosel, 
80,000  men  on  the  Murg. 

But  there  is  little  hope  of  being  able  to  do  that,  considering 
what  we  have  already  said  of  the  enemy's  preparedness. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  question  arises  for  Prussia: 
Is  it  more  advantageous  and  more  correct  to  concentrate 
the  larger  number  of  Prussian  corps  on  the  Mosel  or  on  the 
Main? 

If  our  own  main  force  can  be  in  position  at  the  proper 
time  and  strong  enough  on  the  Mosel  and  occupy  the  Saar 
line,  then  we  will  defend  at  the  same  time  our  entire  terri- 
tory, abandon  not  a  single  foot  of  it  to  the  enemy,  secure 
the  inhabitants  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  against  hostile 
invasion,  and  will  not  have  to  commence  at  the  very  start 
with  a  retreat.  If  we  are  strong  enough  our  offensive  from 
the  Mosel  will  protect  the  Rhine  Palatinate  and  indirectly 
even  the  upper  Rhine.  These  advantages  are  self-evident; 
the  question  only  is,  can  the  concentration  be  made? 

A  comparison  of  rail  transportation  in  France  and 
Germany  shows : 

During  the  first  stages  of  the  war,  we  cannot  oppose  a 
suitable  detachment  ready  for  operation  to  the  French 
corps  assembled  in  Chalons,  which  is  35,000  men  strong, 
inclusive  of  reserve,  and  which  can  reach  Trier  on  the 
fourteenth  day. 

In  order  to  secure  the  mobilization  of  the  16th  Division 
it  would  have  to  be  started  before  the  outbreak  of  war ;  or, 

—107— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

a  permanent  maneuver  camp  must  be  prepared  by  us  on 
the  Mosel;  or,  Trier  must  be  made  a  fortress  of  the  1st 
class. 

On  the  twenty-first  day  160,000  men  can  be  assembled 
at  those  points  on  the  French  northeastern  frontier  from 
which  the  advance  is  to  be  made.  (That  the  French  would 
commence  their  mai7i  operations  earlier  than  on  that  day 
and  with  less  forces  is  not  probable,  considering  the  lack 
of  artillery  necessary  for  the  mobilization  of  a  larger  army.) 
But  if  they  start  only  on  the  twenty-second  day  from  the 
line  Diedenhofen — Bitsch,  they  can,  after  investing  Saar- 
louis  with  about  10,000  men,  be  ready  without  doubt  on  the 
twenty-eighth  day  to  cross  the  Mosel  from  Trier  to  Trar- 
bach  with  150,000  men. 

We  have  seen  above  that  by  that  day  the  Vlllth,  Vllth 
and  Vth  Corps  can  be  concentrated  at  Wittlich.  These  three 
corps  number  together  about  100,000  men. 

It  is  true  that  the  transports  of  the  Vlth  Army  Corps 
on  the  Saxony — Bavaria  line,  which  unfortunately  is  not 
very  reliable,  can  be  ordered  to  proceed  at  once  via  Mayence 
down  the  Rhine  to  Coblenz.  As  the  direct  march  from 
Bingen  via  Simmern  is  then  hardly  safe,  and  as  the  facilities 
of  all  steamers  and  of  the  railroads  along  the  Rhine  will  be 
fully  taken  up  by  transporting  the  Vth  Army  Corps  from 
Cologne  to  Coblenz,  the  timely  arrival  of  the  corps  at  Witt- 
lich is  somewhat  doubtful  and  even  if  it  arrives  in  time  it 
would  not  make  our  force  there  equal  to  the  French." 

In  addition,  as  shown  above,  a  part  of  the  French  fight- 
ing force  coming  from  Chalons  can  have  occupied  Trier 
several  days  before  and  can  have  started  towards  Wittlich. 

Therefore  the  first  assembly  of  our  fighting  force  there 
cannot  be  ordered  with  certainty.  For  that,  security  of  the 
upper  Mosel  is  necessary,  and  there  is  not  time  for  that. 
Here  also  the  strategic  importance  of  Trier  plainly  appears. 

Considering  the  conditions  as  stated  and  the  railroads 
now  existing,  the  first  concentration  of  our  main  force  can 
be  effected  with  absolute  certainty  on  the  Main  only,  should 
the  outbreak  of  war  find  our  army  still  on  a  peace  footing. 


—108- 


Preparations  for  War 

If  in  that  case  the  French  intend  to  advance  with  150,- 
000  men  towards  the  Mosel,  an  invasion  of  the  Rhine  Pro- 
vince would  ensue,  as  we  have  already  stated,  but  by  no 
means  a  permanent  occupation  of  the  same.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  army  designated  to  undertake  the  task  must  not  be 
weaker  than  45,000  men,  if  after  all  unavoidable  detach- 
ments, it  is  to  be  equal  to  our  Vlllth  Army  Corps,  which 
gradually  assembles. 

This  will  leave  the  French  115,000  men,  which,  con- 
centrated in  front  of  the  Forbach — Lauterburg  line  and 
crossing  the  frontier  on  the  22d  day,  cannot  appear  before 
the  29th  day  in  front  of  Mayence  and  Frankfurt  and  that 
with  100,000  men  at  most,  even  if  they  do  not  encounter 
any  resistance  in  the  Palatinate  or  when  crossing  the  Rhine. 
We  have  seen  that  by  that  time  the  Vlth,  IVth  and  Vllth 
Army  Corps,  also  100,000  men  strong,  will  be  concentrated 
on  the  Main;  and  in- addition  a  part  of  the  Illd  Army  Corps 
will  have  arrived  there  and  we  can  also  count  on  the  arrival 
of  the  Hesse-Nassau  contingents. 

The  French,  who  will  also  have  to  secure  themselves 
against  Mayence,  would  then  have  to  force  a  crossing  of  the 
Main  against  probable  superior  forces.  Through  a  junc- 
tion of  the  Vth  with  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps  there  would 
be,  at  the  same  time,  considerably  superior  forces  opposed 
to  the  French  auxiliary  army  in  the  Rhine  Province. 

It  is  therefore  very  probable  that  the  French  will  com- 
mence their  main  operations  only  when  all  their  fighting 
forces,  250,000  men,  are  disposable,  that  is,  on  the  26th  day, 
at  which  time  Prussia  can  have  but  176,000  men  concen- 
trated on  its  western  frontier. 

As  the  French  cannot  encounter  serious  resistance  in 
either  the  Rhine  Province  or  in  the  Palatinate,  they  would 
reach  with  their  auxiliary  army  Trier,  and  with  a  strong 
advance  guard  (after  having  invested  Landau  and  Ger- 
mersheim)  Mannheim  on  the  26th  day,  would  try  to  secure 
the  Rhine  crossings  there  and  in  that  vicinity,  and,  follow- 
ing with  the  main  body  in  the  same  direction,  reach  the 
Main  with  about  180,000  men  on  the  32d  day. 

—109— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Although  on  the  32d  day  the  Hid  Corps  will  have  joined 
the  Vlth,  IVth  and  Vllth  there,  the  total  strength,  inclusive 
of  the  Hesse-Nassau  contingents,  will  be  only  150,000  men. 

Of  course  in  the  meantime  the  transport  of  the  Vth 
Army  Corps  would  have  been  continued  via  Cologne  to  and 
on  the  Rhine  and  thereby  we  could  oppose  the  French  at- 
tack on  the  Main  in  equal  force ;  still  in  that  case  the  VHIth 
Army  Corps  would  remain  without  any  support  and  our 
Rhine  Province  would  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

In  order  to  meet  this  primary  superiority  of  the  French, 
the  Main  army  has  three  different  options.    It  can : 

(a)  Take  the  offensive  via  Mayence  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  to  interfere  with  the  enemy's  advance,  or 

(b)  await  that  advance  on  the  defensive  behind  the  Main,  or 
finally 

(c)  conduct  an  active  defense  behind  the  Rhine  line  from  May- 
ence to  Mannheim. 

The  offensive  procedure  is  the  most  desirable  one.  it 
is  the  more  audacious  operation,  although  the  most  pre- 
carious one. 

(a)  The  fortifications  of  Mayence  favor  the  deploying 
as  well  as  the  retreat  of  large  masses  of  troops,  which  later, 
in  an  unfavorable  outcome,  can  also  be  directed  toward 
Coblenz. 

With  a  full  strength  of  140,000  men  we  could  take  up 
this  operation  hardly  before  the  33d  day.  But  we  know  that 
the  French  will  be  ready  with  larger  forces  already  on  the 
26th  day  and  that  they  can  have  invested  Mayence  on  the 
left  bank  on  the  33d  day.  Therefore  we  must  start  earlier, 
about  the  28th  day,  and  consequently  weaker,  with  100,000 
men,  in  which  case  the  first  contact  would  take  place  very 
close  to  Mayence.  It  is  possible  that  this  contact  will  come 
unexpectedly  to  the  French,  that  we  will  meet  with  our 
whole  force  only  one  of  their  columns  and  will  gain  a  suc- 
cess at  the  very  start.  For,  considering  the  enormous  num- 
bers, the  opponent  will  probably  advance  on  the  five  exist- 
ing roads,  which  are  52  [English]  miles  from  each  other  at 
the  frontier.  These  roads  converge  towards  Mayence  in 
such  manner  that  about  opposite  Alzey  it  would  require  but 

—110— 


Preparations  for  War 

one  march  to  assemble  all  columns,  and  we  might  possibly 
have  to  fight  with  double  our  number,  which  would  not  be 
offset  even  if  we  could  count  by  that  time  on  the  co-operation 
of  the  Vth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps  coming  from  the  Mosel. 

Even  if  at  this  time  the  French  have  crossed  the  Rhine 
at  Strassburg  with  90,000  men,  they  would  meet  us  in  the 
Palatinate  with  about  equal  numbers.  Should  a  stronger 
detachment  towards  the  Black  Forest  suffice  to  secure  the 
right  flank  of  the  Strassburg  Army  against  the  South  Ger- 
man contingents,  then  at  about  the  time  when  we  are  en- 
gaged in  the  Palatinate,  that  army  could  have  reached  the 
Neckar  and  we  would  hardly  have  any  other  choice  than  to 
either  return  to  behind  the  Main  or  to  base  ourselves  on  the 
Mosel  only. 

In  that  case  it  would  most  decidedly  be  best  for  us  to 
take  the  offensive  through  the  Palatinate,  if  the  rest  of 
Germany  is  willing  and  ready  for  a  forceful  and  offensive 
conduct  of  the  war,  if  the  IXth  Confederation  Corps  were 
joined  with  the  Prussian  corps  on  the  Main,  if  the  Vllth  and 
Vlllth  Confederation  Corps,  supported  by  Austrian  corps, 
would  attack  the  Strassburg  Army  or  hold  it.  But  if  we 
could  presuppose  such  a  deployment  of  the  German  fight- 
ing forces  and  such  a  combined  action,  the  French  attack 
would  hardly  be  made. 

(b).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  remain  on  a  strict 
defensive  behind  the  Main,  then  the  French,  provided  they 
start  on  the  27th  day  and  advance  through  the  Palatinate 
across  the  undefended  Rhine,  could,  after  leaving  20,000 
men  in  front  of  Landau  and  Germersheim,  reach  Darmstadt 
with  180,000  men  on  the  33d  day. 

According  to  reconnaissances  so  far  made  it  is  true 
that  our  Main  Army  of  150,000  men  will  find  a  favorable 
defensive  position  behind  the  Nidda,  between  Hochst  and 
Bonames.  In  attacking  its  front  the  enemy  would  be  con- 
fined, in  a  very  disadvantageous  manner,  to  the  limited 
terrain  between  that  creek  and  the  Main.  Enveloping  our 
left  wing  via  Hanau  and  Aschaffenburg  would  endanger 
all  French  communications,  must  be  protected  against  May- 

—111— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

ence,  and  requires  more  than  one  day's  march  to  reach 
our  roads  of  retreat  across  the  Taunus. 

But  the  danger  in  the  defensive  lies  in  the  enemy's 
throwing  back  our  right  wing,  forcing  us  into  the  direction 
of  Cassel  and  cutting  our  communications  with  the  lower 
Rhine,  on  which  stream  we  intend  to  base  all  our  operations, 
even  towards  the  east,  should  the  French  desire  to  pass  our 
position  that  way, 

Mayence  being  12  [English]  miles  distant,  no  longer 
directly  protects  this  right  wing,  and  a  mere  observation  of 
the  Main  as  far  as  Mayence  would  not  at  all  suffice,  as  that 
stream,  unimportant  in  itself,  can  easily  be  bridged,  and 
is  even  fordable  at  places.  To  this  must  be  added,  that  on 
account  of  the  densely  wooded  terrain  to  the  south,  the 
exact  intention  of  the  enemy  can  be  preceived  only  at  the 
last  moment. 

Therefore  the  position  behind  the  Nidda  cannot  be 
occupied  in  the  very  start  and  held  under  all  eventualities. 
After  the  enemy  will  have  driven  back  all  our  observation 
detachments  sent  across  the  Main,  the  corps  would  first 
have  to  be  concentrated  in  bivouacs,  about  around  Hofheim, 
so  that  they  could  take  a  position  with  the  right  as  well  as 
with  the  left  wing  on  Hochst.  In  this  the  left  flank  should  be 
covered  by  a  detached  division  which,  through  local  defense 
of  Frankfurt,  gains  the  necessary  time  for  the  army  to  go 
into  position  behind  the  Nidda  or  on  the  Main  below  the 
mouth  of  the  Nidda. 

Should  there  be  no  good  defensive  position  between 
Hochst  and  Mayence,  then  one  must  be  sought  farther  in 
rear  and  in  immediate  connection  with  that  place,  that  is 
at  Erbenheim,  in  order  that  above  all  else  the  right  wing 
and  the  connection  through  the  Taunus  with  the  Rhine  will 
remain  secure. 

Nevertheless,  a  hostile  superiority  of  30,000  or  40,000 
men  will  be  felt  in  any  position.  It  would  be  off"set  after 
five  days  by  the  arrival  of  one  Prussian  corps  (probably  the 
lid)  which  would  be  disposable  even  if  we  were  compelled 
to  leave  two  corps  in  the  eastern  Provinces  against  Den- 

—112— 


Preparations  for  War 

mark  or  Poland.  Finally,  by  the  38th  day,  the  Saxon  Divi- 
sion would  probably  complete  the  IXth  Confederation  Corps 
on  the  Main,  for  the  purpose  of  which  the  railroad  would 
become  available  on  the  28th  day.  Then  the  superiority 
would  be  on  our  side,  and  it  is  self-evident  how  important 
it  is  to  delay  the  French  advance,  even  if  for  but  a  few 
days.  This,  it  is  plain,  can  be  done  only  if  we  are  able  to 
dispute  the  Rhine  crossing  with  the  enemy. 

(c).  If  the  Vlth  Army  Corps  is  transported  at  once 
to  Darmstadt  and  partly  beyond  it,  the  most  important 
points  between  Mayence  and  Mannheim  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Rhine  can  be  occupied  on  the  28th  day,  that  is,  on  the 
arrival  of  the  French,  and  if  any  French  detachments  have 
already  arrived  that  far  they  can  be  driven  back ;  thereafter 
the  IVth  and  Vllth  Army  Corps  can  be  concentrated  about 
Bensheim  in  a  central  position  of  readiness,  from  where 
they  can  reach  threatened  points  between  Mannheim  and 
Oppenheim  in  one  day's  march.  On  this  stretch  then  a 
Rhine  crossing  could  hardly  be  forced  in  the  face  of  100,000 
men,  because  during  the  execution  of  the  crossing  the  enemy 
could  not  bring  his  superiority  of  numbers  into  play. 

If  the  opponent  declines  to  take  the  shortest  route  to 
the  Main  and  should  try  a  crossing  above  Mannheim,  it 
would  be  doubtful  if  he  could  throw  a  bridge  there  consid- 
ering the  proximity  of  Germersheim  and  the  presence  of 
the  Baden  contingents  which  we  would  support.  In  case 
of  success  he  would  still  have  to  force  the  Neckar  line,  from 
which  line  our  retreat  to  behind  the  Main  would  not  at  all 
appear  to  be  endangered. 

The  French  at  the  present  time  own  at  Strassburg  a 
crossing  over  the  Rhine  which  the  Main  army,  on  account 
of  its  distant  situation  from  there,  cannot  dispute  with 
them.  If  they  intend  to  take  that  route  with  their  entire 
force,  then  to  cover  that  distance,  the  necessity  of  moving 
two  such  important  masses  in  the  narrow  Rhine  valley  on 
at  most  two  roads,  the  siege  of  Rastatt  and  Germersheim, 
and  the  crossing  of  the  Neckar  would  take  so  much  time  as 
to  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  reach  the  Main  before  the 

—113— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

38th  day,  at  which  time  our  reinforcements  would  have 
arrived  and  we  would  have  become  the  stronger  party. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  French  have  the  numerical 
superiority  only  in  the  first  phases  of  the  campaign  and, 
in  order  to  bring  them  into  play,  are  compelled  to  attack  the 
Prussian  army  on  the  Main  in  the  shortest  possible  time, 
that  is,  on  the  most  direct  route.  For  this  they  will  require 
an  army  which,  advancing  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
opens  the  crossings  on  that  stream  to  their  main  army. 
This  means  that  the  French  army  will  have  to  be  separated 
into  two  parts,  the  main  army  advancing  through  the  Pal- 
atinate, and  the  second  army,  which,  however,  must  also 
be  strong,  operating  from  Strassburg  down  stream.  This 
of  course  complicates  our  task  more  and  more. 

We  have  to  make  a  defense  of  not  only  our  front  on 
the  Rhine,  but  also  of  the  flank  on  the  Neckar.  This  is  not 
so  serious  as  it  looks,  because  we  will  be  in  a  position  be- 
tween the  two  separated  main  forces  of  the  enemy.  We  can 
defend  the  Rhine  with  smaller  forces  and  the  Neckar  with 
our  main  forces.  As  the  danger  increases  so  also  increases 
the  prospect  of  a  decisive  victory. 

If  the  Strassburg  army  has  been  compelled  to  weaken 
itself  materially  in  front  of  Rastatt  and  the  South  German 
contingents,  then  we  will  oppose  it  on  the  Neckar  with  su- 
perior forces.  If  then  the  Wiirttembergers  and  Bavarians 
are  able  to  take  the  offensive  on  their  part,  it  will  hardly 
be  possible  for  the  army  of  the  French  right  wing  to  avoid 
a  complete  defeat. 

Still  we  must  not  shut  our  eyes  to  the  danger  threaten- 
ing us  should,  during  our  advance  south,  the  French  main 
army  succeed  in  crossing  the  Rhine  below  Mannheim.  In 
that  case  we  would  be  cut  off  from  the  lower  Main  and  from 
the  Rhine  Province,  and  would  have  to  lay  our  base  on  the 
eastern  provinces. 

It  is  true  that  in  the  closest  connection  with  the  Vllth 
and  Vlllth  Confederation  Corps,  we  would,  after  having 
driven  the  French  right  wing  back  across  the  Rhine,  be 
fully  equal  to  the  center  of  the  French  army  after  it  has 

—114— 


Preparations  for  War 

advanced,   but   in  that  case   entirely   new   conditions  will 
obtain. 

Which  of  the  three  operations  here  discussed  will  be  the 
correct  one  for  the  Main  army,  cannot  be  definitely  decided 
on  in  advance,  for  that  depends  on  conditions  obtaining 
after  concentration  has  been  completed. 


When  in  August,  1866,  during  the  peace  negotiations  between 
Prussia  and  Austria,  the  attitude  of  France  seemed  to  indicate  an 
interference  of  France  in  those  negotiations.  General  v.  Moltke  ad- 
dressed a  memorial  to  the  Minister-President  Count  v.  Bismarck, 
in  which  he  discussed  the  military  measures  to  be  taken  in  case  of 
a  war  with  France. 


MEMORIAL  NO.  6 

To  THE  Minister-President,  Count  v.  Bismarck- 

SCHOENHAUSEN 

Berlin,  8  August,  1866. 

Your  Excellency  will  allow  me  to  hand  you  the  en- 
closed short  exposition  concerning  our  military  attitude 
against  France  at  this  time,  and  I  desire  to  remark  that 
according  to  our  calculations  France  cannot  concentrate 
an  army  of  operation  of  250,000  men  between  Metz  and 
Strassburg  earlier  than  in  26  days. 

MEMORIAL 

It  is  of  manifest  importance  to  arrive  at  a  definite  set- 
tlement with  Austria  as  soon  as  practicable  in  order  to  have 
a  free  hand  against  the  east  and  the  west,  if  our  neighbors 
should  try  to  rob  us  of  the  fruits  of  our  victory.  In  the  nego- 
tiations at  Prague,  consequently,  minor  points  are  of  no 
importance ;  the  main  point  should  be  to  again  have  at  our 
disposal  the  troops  now  in  Bohemia  and  in  Moravia. 

The  first  probability  might  be  that  France  may  demand 
from  us  cession  of  terrain,  which  would  be  in  opposition 
to  the  task  now  set  Prussia  to  unite  all  of  Germany  and  to 

—115— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

protect  it,  a  task,  for  the  solution  of  which  we  have  just 
taken  the  first  and  most  important  step. 

Should  France  make  such  a  demand,  the  naturally 
resulting  war  would  be  a  popular  one  within  the  entire 
German  territory,  outside  of  Austria.  It  cannot  be  at  all 
doubtful  that  an  alliance  against  France  would  be  formed 
with  the  South  German  States  against  the  surrender  of  the 
whole  or  of  even  the  greater  part  of  the  territory  occupied 
by  us  south  of  the  Main.  In  such  a  case  not  only  a  con- 
federation with  the  North  German  States,  but  also  with 
the  states  composing  the  entire  territory  of  Germany  would 
ensue,  and  would  receive  new  life.  Considering  their  pres- 
ent state  of  readiness  for  war  and  their  present  location, 
the  South  German  contingents  could  be  concentrated  at 
Mannheim  within  from  8  to  10  days  numbering  some 
80,000  men.  By  the  same  time  there  could  be  concentrated 
around  Mayence  our  Main  army  (by  marching)  and  the 
lid  Reserve  Corps,  dependent  on  whether  the  latter  re- 
mains at  Nuremburg  or  is  at  once  started  on  the  march 
to  Wiirzburg,  by  rail  or  by  marching — a  force  of  90,000 
men. 

In  no  case  could  France  concentrate  in  so  short  a  time 
an  offensive  army  which  would  be  strong  enough  to  cross 
the  Rhine  at  any  point  in  the  face  of  these  first  positions ; 
and  when  peace  has  been  established  with  Austria,  the  ques- 
tion would  only  be  as  to  the  time  in  which  the  French  army, 
equal  to  our  own,  can  be  concentrated  in  the  west. 

Conditions  for  a  war  of  the  French  Empire  against 
victorious  Prussia  and  the  united  German  people  at  this 
very  instant  appear  so  little  favorable,  that  it  undoubtedly 
will  not  be  engaged  in,  unless  an  understanding  has  already 
been  arrived  at  with  Austria  for  the  continuation  of  the 
war,  which  of  course  would  make  all  peace  negotiations  of 
no  use. 

Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  this  probability  from 
a  military  standpoint. 

As,  in  accordance  with  treaty  stipulations,  Italy  cannot 
come  to  peace  terms  without  our  sanction,  Austria  would 

—116— 


Preparations  for  War 

have  to  send  at  least  the  largest  part  of  its  South  Army  to 
the  other  side  of  the  Alps,  and  this  appears  to  have  been 
done  already.  Consequently  there  could  be  only  some  150,000 
men  opposed  to  us  on  the  Danube,  a  force  which  is  in  part 
badly  demoralized  by  the  battle  of  June  and  July  of  the 
present  year. 

Still,  I  do  not  believe  that  we  can  afford,  in  a  simul- 
taneous war  with  France,  to  continue  the  offensive  war 
against  Vienna,  as  that  offensive,  provided  it  is  not  to 
come  to  a  standstill  on  the  Danube,  would  require  all  our 
forces.  Of  course,  should  the  Austrians  advance  beyond 
the  Danube,  we  could  concentrate  160,000  to  180,000  men 
on  the  Thays  within  eight  days  and  presumably  win  an- 
other battle  with  that  force.  However,  it  is  not  at  all  prob- 
able that  they  will  do  that,  they  will  far  rather  remain  on 
the  defensive  behind  that  stream  until  French  codperation 
becomes  effective.  The  armistice  agreed  on  is  for  four  weeks 
and  that  space  of  time  is  sufficient  for  the  French  prepara- 
tions and  even  if  our  preparations  are  completed  before  then, 
we  need  time  to  transport  our  armies  from  the  Danube  to 
the  Rhine. 

Should  Austria  raise  serious  difficulties  in  the  confer- 
ence at  Prague,  it  will  indicate  an  understanding  with 
France,  and  consequently  our  military  forces  in  Bohemia 
should  not  be  reinforced,  but  should  at  once  be  transported 
to  the  Rhine. 

Four  army  corps,  about  120,000  men,  will  be  sufficient 
to  successfully  carry  on,  from  the  vicinity  of  Prague,  a  de- 
fensive based  on  Dresden,  which  is  fortified. 

By  the  9th  of  September  there  can  have  arrived  at 
Mayence  and  Mannheim  a  total  strength  of  150,000  men — 
two  army  corps  by  rail  via  Oderberg — Berlin — Cologne, 
one  army  corps  by  rail  from  Dresden — Leipzig — Cassel 
and  the  Elbe  army,  presupposing  a  union  with  South  Ger- 
many, on  the  two  roads  from  Eger — Wiirzburg — Frankfurt 
on  the  Main  and  Pilsen — Nuremberg — Stuttgart — Bruchsal, 
provided  a  start  is  made  on  August  22 ;  the  strength  of  the 
North  German  forces  there  will  then  be  increased  to  a 
total  of  240,000  men. 

—117 — 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

We  would  have  to  count  off  15,000  troops  of  the  line  for 
Mayence,  the  exclusive  possession  of  which  place  must  be 
secured  in  the  treaties  with  the  South  German  States,  and 
further  about  that  many  more  troops  of  the  field  army  for 
Saarlouis,  Coblenz,  Cologne,  Wesel  and  Luxemburg. 

This  will  leave  more  than  200,000  men,  and  counting 
in  the  South  German  contingents  we  will  have  an  army  of 
operation  of  nearly  300,000  men. 

But  in  arriving  at  these  results  we  must  take  cogni- 
zance of  the  following  assumptfons : 

(a)  That  Prussia  alone  exercises  the  right  of  garrison- 
ing Mayence,  in  order  to  have  that  place  absolutely  secure 
against  any  and  all  French  undertakings. 

(b)  That  the  governments  of  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg, 
Baden  and  Hesse-Darmstadt  place  their  railroads  and  ma- 
terials at  our  disposal  for  the  transportation  of  the  Elbe 
army. 

(c)  That  the  Bavarian  troops  at  once  take  a  position 
somewhere  along  the  Wiirttemberg  frontier,  to  be  in  a 
position  to  reach  the  Rhine  by  marching  within  ten  days. 
We  cannot  count  on  the  contingents  of  the  remaining  South 
German  States  reaching  there  within  that  time,  if  they  are 
now  at  their  respective  stations. 

In  treaties  with  the  South  German  States  these  three 
points  should  not  be  lost  sight  of. 

It  is  not  probable  that  France  will  make  its  attack 
through  Belgium.  By  doing  so  it  would  come  into  conflict 
with  England  and  would  have  to  weaken  its  forces  materi- 
ally by  occupying  Belgium  and  Antwerp. 

An  invasion  of  Southern  Germany  would  not  directly 
lead  to  the  desired  object,  because  it  would  leave  Prussia 
unendangered  and  would  always  have  the  German  armies 
on  its  flank. 

Without  doubt,  ths  French  attacking  army  would,  ad- 
vancing between  Luxemburg  and  Rastatt,  directly  proceed 
to  that  country  the  possession  of  which  it  strives  to  gain. 
Our  Rhine  fortresses,  which  naturally  should  be  placed  in 
a  state  of  preparedness,  are  consequently  not  in  immediate 

—118— 


Preparations  for  War 

danger,  and  we  would  be  justified  in  concentrating  the  en- 
tire fighting  force,  which  Germany  can  assemble  against 
France,  between  the  Main  and  the  Neckar.  Insofar  as  there 
is  no  time  for  concentrating  that  army  in  the  Palatinate, 
the  attack  may  be  awaited  behind  the  Rhine,  for  the  mere 
possession  by  the  French  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  does 
not  secure  them  possession  of  the  land.  They  will  not  be 
able  to  overcome  the  necessity  of  crossing  the  stream  in  the 
face  of  the  defender,  and  have  to  weaken  their  army  by  the 
investment  of  Luxemburg  and  Saarlouis,  by  observation 
against  Coblenz,  Mayence,  Germersheim,  Landau  and  Ras- 
tatt. 

Therefore,  it  can  be  said  in  general,  that  the  war 
against  Austria,  considering  its  present  weakness,  and 
against  France  will  have  to  be  conducted  in  a  defensive  man- 
ner, but  should  not  be  avoided,  considering  the  large  object 
to  be  gained  thereby.  Even  if  the  outcome  should  not  be 
entirely  successful,  Germany  would  for  all  time  to  come  be 
assembled  around  Prussia,  while  the  voluntary  cession  of 
even  the  smallest  part  of  German  territory  would  make  the 
future  leadership  of  Prussia  impossible. 

If  we  are  successful  in  concluding  peace  with  Austria 
within  the  next  few  days,  France  would  surely  object  to 
all  conditions  of  the  treaty ;  it  could  choose  no  more  favora- 
ble time  for  war  than  the  present.  In  that  case  it  would  be 
material  to  quickly  consolidate  North  Germany  in  order 
to  oppose  in  sufficient  force  dangers  coming  from  the  west 
and  the  east. 


-119 — 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


The  following  work — without  date — presupposes  the  possibility  of 
utilizing  the  territory  of  Luxemburg  and — differing  from  former  mem- 
orials, which  in  the  main  were  based  on  a  defensive  attitude  of  Prus- 
sia— treats  of  an  advance  of  the  North  German  fighting  forces  on 
France. 

MEMORIAL  NO.  7. 


A.    Advance  Against  the  Line  Metz — Diedenhofen 
Prior  concentration  of: 

The  1st  Army  at  Luxemburg,  Sierck; 

The  2d  Army  at  Rehlingen,  Saarlouis; 

The  4th  Army  at  Sulzbach,  Saarbriicken,  Volklingen,  utiliz- 
ing the  Nahe  and  the  Bexbach  railroads; 

The  3d  Army  to  secure  against  Strassburg  or  act  as  a  left 
flank  army  following   via   Saargemiind — Morchingen. 


1st 
Army 


f  Luxemburg 

I 

i 

L  Sierck 
Rehlingen 


2d 
Army 


4th 
Army 


[  Saarlouis 

f 

J 
I 

L 


1st  Day 


f  Busendorf, 
I  Felsburg, 

I  Tromborn, 
|_  Hargarten, 

[  Ham    below 
I  Varsberg, 

i  Ludweiler, 
I  St.  Avoid, 
L  Merlenbach, 


2d   Day 

f  Kattenhofen, 

I 

■! 

I 

[  Konigsmachern 

Dalstein, 
Busendorf, 

Brittendorf, 
[  Eblingen, 

f  Bolchen, 
I 

■{  Hallingen, 
I  Fullingen, 
[  Buschborn, 


3d    Day 

f  in    front   of 
I  Thionville 

Remingen, 

Metzervisse 

r  Betsdorf, 
I  Homburg, 

I  Vigy, 

[  Brittendorf, 

r  St.    Barbe, 

-i  Bolchen, 
I  Flanville, 
L  Courcelles. 


4th  Day.  Eight  corps  (250,000  men)  one  to  two  miles 
from  the  Mosel.  One  division  in  front  of  Diedenhofen,  one 
corps  against  Metz. 

First  Army  south  of  Bussy  across  the  Mosel,  to  sup- 
port the  attack  in  the  front. 

Eight  corps,  on  a  front  of  12  [English]  miles,  two 
echelons  deep. 

Start :  First  line  early  in  the  morning,  second  line  in 
the  afternoon. 


-120— 


Preparations  for  War 


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—121- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  political  situation  after  1866,  and  the  task  of  the  fortress  of 
Luxemburg  in  the  year  1867,  had  brought  about  a  change  in  the  mili- 
tary relations  of  Northern  Germany  towards  France.  Details  of  this 
are  contained  in  the  following  two  letters. 

NO.  8 


To  THE  Minister  of  War,  General  of  Infantry  v.  Roon 

Berlm,  15  May,  1867.      ' 

If  we  abandon  our  military  position  in  Luxemburg  the 
question  arises,  should  some  other  point  near  the  French 
frontier  be  fortified  to  protect  the  Rhine  Province. 

The  most  natural  procedure  would  be  to  enlarge  Saar- 
louis,  which  lies  at  about  the  center  of  the  line  only  thirty- 
two  [English]  miles  long,  from  Luxemburg  to  the  Ba- 
varian Palatinate.  A  large  fortified  place  with  a  strong 
garrison  would  of  course  have  a  general  influence  on  this 
entire  stretch  of  frontier.  Saarlouis  cannot  be  trans- 
formed, except  by  material  enlargement,  into  a  fortress 
which  will  be  able  to  withstand  a  formal  attack  consid- 
ering present-day  fire  effect. 

Not  counting  the  fact  that  the  terrain,  especially  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Saar,  is  unfavorable  to  a  more  extend- 
ed fortification,  we  have  but  lately  learned  the  difiicul- 
ties  any  fortress  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  frontier 
causes  us.  Such  a  fortress  must  be  fully  prepared  and  gar- 
risoned in  time  of  peace.  The  first  may  be  gone  pecuniarily, 
but  not  the  latter,  for,  as  a  matter  of  policy,  the  Landwehr 
is  designated  to  garrison  the  fortresses,  and  it  cannot  be 
assembled  in  time  of  peace. 

Consequently  there  would  only  remain  to  throw  troops 
of  the  field  army  into  a  fortress  and  that  is  field  troops  of 
our  peace  organization — considering  that  we  are  opposed  by 
an  enemy  who  is  fully  prepared  and  stationed  so  close  to 
us.  The  enlarged  Saarlouis  would  require  the  entire  infan- 
try of  the  16th  Division  to  be  secure  against  a  sudden  attack. 

In  any  case,  under  present  strained  conditions,  the  en- 
largement of  the  place  could  hardly  be  finished  at  the  time 

—122— 


Preparations  for  War 

when  required.  Although  one  element  of  the  state  of 
"strained  conditions,"  i.e.  Luxemburg,  is  now  eliminated, 
the  main  disturbing  factor  remains,  the  demand  of  France 
for  supremacy  in  Europe  (which  of  course  is  not  justified 
at  all)  ;  that  means,  forcing  Prussia  to  relinquish  the  posi- 
tion which  it  has  gained  in  Germany.  In  spite  of  all  its 
preparatory  arming,  France,  still  without  an  ally,  would 
hardly  be  in  the  situation  to  conduct  war  against  Germany. 
It  is  probable  that  France  will  wait  for  its  new  armament 
which  may  be  completed  by  next  year. 

Even  if  by  that  time  the  reorganization  of  the  French 
army  should  be  completed  and  if  consequently  300  battal- 
ions can  take  the  field  in  future  1000  men  strong  instead  of 
700  men  strong,  the  North  German  army  would  be  numeri- 
cally superior.  After  organizing  a  field  army,  a  third  of 
which  in  any  case  would  be  composed  of  raw  levies,  France 
would  have  exhausted  its  reserves,  and  replenishment  and 
new  formations  could  be  effected  only  by  recruitment  or  by 
volunteers,  while  our  Prussian  Landwehr  forms  a  nucleus 
from  which  even  the  army  of  operations  can  be  reinforced. 
In  the  French  artillery  the  number  of  guns  will  have  been 
increased  to  1014,  but  not  the  number  of  trained  artillery- 
men, while  Prussia  can  this  year  put  1240  guns  into  the 
field. 

Consequently,  next  year  the  means  for  a  successful 
war  against  France  will  be  available  in  North  Germany 
without  counting  on  South  Germany,  and  the  main  point 
will  only  be  to  concentrate  these  means  at  the  proper  time 
and  correct  place. 

Therefore  I  see  more  security  for  us  in  hastening  the 
extension  of  our  railroads  than  there  would  be  in  construc- 
tion of  any  fortifications. 

With  existing  railroad  connections  we  can  transport  to 
the  Rhine  by  the  30th  day  after  orders  are  issued  for  mobili- 
zation : 

3  army  corps  by  marching, 

4  army  corps  by  rail,  a  total  of 

7  army  corps. 

—123— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  remaining  six  army  corps  can  be  transported  only 
after  that  day,  and  the  march  into  position  of  the  army  can- 
not be  effected  in  less  than  six  weeks. 

But  it  is  doubtful  if  the  200,000  men,  first  assembled, 
will  be  sufficient  to  carry  the  offensive  into  France  which 
would  better  than  anything  else  protect  our  Rhine  Province. 

In  order  to  augment  the  North  German  railroad  net, 
we  do  not  need  the  construction  of  railroads  for  strategical 
purposes,  but  only  the  completion  of  such  lines  as  are  al- 
ready projected  by  the  requirements  of  commerce  and  com- 
munication. 

In  order  to  open  new  trunk  lines  for  military  transpor- 
tation to  the  Rhine,  the  following  lines  will  have  to  be  com- 
pleted : 

1.  The  Borssum — Halberstadt  line. 

2.  The  continuation  of  the  Halle — Nordhausen  railroad  from 
Heiligenstadt,  be  that  directly  via  Witzenhausen,  via  Miinden,  or 
even  Gottingen. 

3.  The  Fulda — Hanau   railroad. 

Should,  in  case  of  the  last  named  road,  the  terrain  dif- 
ficulties be  so  great  that  its  construction,  by  using  all  pos- 
sible means,  could  not  be  completed  within  a  year — which  is 
of  course  a  matter  to  be  decided  by  professional  men — 
then, 

4.  A  second  track  M^ould  have  to  be  laid  on  the  railroad  from 
Bebra  to  Guntershausen. 

In  the  first  three  cases  the  question  is  of  a  construction 
of  about  80  [English]  miles,  which  will  give  us  5  indepen- 
dent lines,  an  advantage  w^orth  millions  to  us  in  case  of  war, 
for  then  we  would  be  able  to  complete  the  concentration  of 
the  army  within  four  weeks. 

If  hastening  the  work  means  additional  cost,  the  sums 
so  expended  ought  to  be  considered  as  mere  loans. 

If  the  state  should  be  required  to  advance  a  few  mil- 
lions for  hastening  the  completion  of  the  projected  lines, 
it  would  be  entirely  justified  by  the  political  situation. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  mention  that  in  addition  to 
the  above  named,  practical  but  short  lines,  the  connection 
between  Trier  and  Cologne  and  the  construction  of  a  sec- 

—124— 


Preparations  for  War 

ond  track  on  the  railroad  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  will 
always  remain  desirable  from  a  military  standpoint.  Still, 
I  consider  communication  from  the  center  to  the  west  of  the 
Monarchy  under  existing  political  conditions  the  most  im- 
portant, and  respectfully  leave  it  to  the  excellent  judgment 
of  Your  Excellency,  if  this  matter  cannot  be  facilitated  by 
communicating  with  the  Minister  of  Finance  and  Com- 
merce. 


NO.  9 


To  THE  Minister  of  War,  General  of  Infantry  v.  Roon 

Berlin,  6  July,  1867. 

I  respectfully  return  to  Your  Excellency  the  inclos- 
ures  to  the  correspondence  of  the  1st  of  this  month,* 

Concerning  the  enlargement  of  Saarlouis,  I  have  al- 
ready, under  date  of  15  May,  this  year,  expressed  my  opin- 
ions of  the  necessity  of  keeping  this  place,  which  is  on  the 
immediate  frontier,  in  a  continuous  state  of  readiness,  and 
that  all  of  the  battalions  of  the  16th  Division,  which  would 
have  to  be  thrown  into  the  fortress  at  the  first  sign  of  dan- 
ger, would  be  sufficient  as  a  garrison. 

If  we  were  compelled  to  conduct  the  war  defensively 
on  the  Rhine,  the  operation  of  relieving  this  division,  be- 
sieged by  the  enemy  in  Saarlouis,  would  be  a  very  difficult 
one. 

If  we  are  able,  as  it  is  hoped,  to  offensively  invade 
France,  we  need  no  fortress  in  order  to  debouch  across  the 
Saar. 

Streams  Hke  the  Rhine  and  the  Vistula  of  course  can 
be  crossed  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  only  on  fortified  bridges. 


*  This  correspondence  contained  information  that  the  General 
Department  of  the  War  Ministry  had  sketched  out  a  tentative  plan 
for  the  enlargement  of  the  fortress  of  Saarlouis.  The  inclosures 
mentioned  above  contained  extracts  from  that  plan  with  explanatory 
notes. 

—125— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Still  the  Saar  and  the  opposite  bank  of  it  can  be  passed  eas- 
ier at  any  other  point  than  via  the  rocky  slope  at  Saarlouis 
or  the  single  road  at  Ober-Felsberg. 

I  also  do  not  think  very  much  of  the  place  as  a  depot 
for  an  offensive  advance.  A  good  railroad  net  in  our  rear, 
which  of  course  has  first  to  be  prepared  here  on  the  Rhine, 
and  which  must  be  prepared,  secures  the  transportation  of 
all  necessities,  even  if  the  depots  are  in  the  Rhine  fortresses. 
I  again  call  attention  to  the  fact  that,  according  to  my  view, 
all  means  which  are  available  for  the  defense  of  the  country 
should  be  utilized  first  and  foremost  for  construction  of 
railroads  which  are  strategically  the  most  important. 

According  to  the  projected  work,  Saarlouis  of  to-day 
would  form  a  part  of  the  fortified  camp  to  be  provisionally 
constructed  by  next  year,  for  the  establishment  of  which 
there  is  no  need. 

Fortified  camps  have  a  great  disadvantage  in  so  far 
as  there  is  no  actual  guaranty  that  an  army  will  be  in  them, 
that  they  are  weak  in  the  absence  of  the  army,  especially 
if,  as  is  the  case  here,  there  is  no  existing  central  fortifica- 
tion. 

They  also  cannot  assure  actual  rest  to  troops  within 
their  limits.  The  troops  would  nightly  be  alarmed  by  some 
battery  or  other  going  into  position  in  a  fold  in  the  terrain 
and  firing  at  long  range.  Only  if  the  camp  is  situated  on 
a  large  river  or  delta,  like  the  Alsen  Sound,  an  army  detach- 
ment can,  by  crossing  to  the  other  bank,  find  the  protection 
and  rest  necessary  for  its  reorganization  or  for  a  more  ex- 
tended stay. 

So  far,  in  the  annals  of  war,  the  history  of  fortified 
camps  is  in  most  cases  connected  with  their  capitulation, 
and  I  would  recommend  the  construction  of  such  a  camp 
least  of  all  at  Saarlouis,  where,  for  instance,  the  range  of 
the  forts  on  the  Felix  Hill  reaches  to  beyond  French  terri- 
tory. 

Concerning  the  projected  smaller  forts  which  are  in- 
tended to  prevent  the  enemy  from  using  our  railroads,  I 
believe  that  these  forts  will  certainly  accomplish  no  more 

—126— 


Preparations  for  War 

in  that  connection  than  will  arrangements  made  in  ad- 
vance than  blowing  them  up  at  suitable  points.  The  de- 
struction of  a  viaduct  like  that  at  Saarbriicken  or  Gorlitz 
interrupts  the  continuity  of  a  line  for  the  entire  course  of 
a  campaign  and  I  doubt  if  a  fort  of  smaller  dimensions  will 
hold  out  for  that  length  of  time. 

It  is  of  course  true  that  these  forts  would  be  useful, 
could  they  prevent  the  enemy  from  destroying  valuable 
structures. 

Should  the  French  utilize,  for  instance,  their  fighting 
forces  which  are  first  ready  to  invade  the  country  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  then  they  would  undoubtedly  destroy 
the  crossing  at  Saarlouis  if  forced  to  fall  back,  which  would 
be  very  much  against  our  interests.  Still,  then  also  the 
tunnels  of  the  Nahe  railroad  would  have  to  be  protected  in 
similar  manner,  for  should  they  be  destroyed,  we  could  not 
use  that  road  for  a  long  time  to  come.  However,  it  is  de- 
pendent on  the  locality  in  each  case  whether  or  not  it  will 
be  possible  to  take  any  structure  under  fire  in  such  manner 
as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  destroying  it. 

Consequently,  I  do  not  believe  that  there  will  be  any 
material  advantage  in  the  projected  forts. 


The  continuous  preparations  for  war  by  France  since  the  spring 
of  1867 — even  after  the  Luxemburg  question  was  settled— caused  the 
Minister-President  Count  v.  Bismarck  to  call  on  the  Chief  of  Staff  of 
the  army  in  the  beginning  of  September,  for  a  written  opinion: 

NO.  10 


To  the  Minister-President,  Count  v.  Bismarck-Schoen- 
hausen,  Berlin : 

Creisau  at  Schweidnitz, 

6  September,  1867. 

In  reply  to  Your  Excellency's  letter  of  the  2d  instant, 
I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following: 

—127— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

According  to  my  opinion  France  is  arming  and  prepar- 
ing for  war  under  the  auspices  of  its  War  Ministry  since  last 
spring,  partly — 

1.  in  order  to  rectify  prior  neglects  in  its  military  organi- 
zation; 

2.  in  order  to  bring  the  French  defensive  forces  to  a  higher 
plane  corresponding  to  new  conditions,  especially  in  order  to 
facilitate  quicker  mobilization,  and  finally,  partly 

3.  under  the  supposition  that  the  apparently  vacillating  poli- 
cies of  the  Emperor  may  bring  about  a  sudden  outbreak  of  war. 

In  each  one  of  the  many  measures  taken  by  the  French 
for  readiness  for  war,  we  can  trace  one  of  these  three  mo- 
tives as  either  a  basis  or  an  auxiliary  reason  for  them. 

As  the  development  of  the  French  forces,  mentioned 
under  (2),  cannot  yet  have  been  reached,  considering  the 
material  shortcomings  and  long  standing  neglects,  meas- 
ures for  preparedness  for  war  will  continue  probably  even  if 
French  politics  should  be  of  an  entirely  peaceful  aspect. 

What  weight  we  will  have  to  give  different  reports 
received  concerning  this  matter,  will  depend  mainly  on 
whether  they  can  be  explained  as  being  based  on  the  one 
or  the  other  motive,  or  if  they  are  to  be  brought  into  con- 
nection with  an  imminent  political  question. 

In  general,  there  is  no  doubt  whatever  but  what  France 
is  hostile  towards  us  and  will  remain  so  for  the  present; 
all  measures  taken  by  it  consequently  will  have  the  char- 
acter of  ill  will  and  preparation  for  war.  Whether  or 
not  there  is  any  reason  in  the  present  political  situation 
to  await  an  actual  development  of  the  crisis,  is  beyond  my 
judgment;  Your  Excellency  is  in  a  better  situation  to  know 
all  about  that. 

The  separate  exterior  symptons,  which  have  apppeared 
lately,  and  which  may  be  of  military  importance,  are: 

(a)  The  purchase  of  horses  in  Hungary,  commenced  since  the 
settlement  of  the  Luxemburg  question,  and  still  continuing,  the  horses 
being  sent  via  Nabresina  (northwest  of  Trieste  on  the  railroad  to 
Vienna)  and  the  Mont  Cenis  route  to  France.  This  measure  seems  to 
indicate  an  intention  to  improve,  not  the  quantity  but  the  quality  of 
the  French  military  horses.  In  the  spring,  unsuitable  horses  pur- 
chased in  a  hurry  were  sold^l31  head  in  the  9th  Dragoons  alone — 
and  10,000  head  loaned  out  to  farmers.  According  to  a  report  in  our 
hands,  dated  the  end  of  July,  of  the  Horse  Artillery  Regiment  of  the 
Guards,  that  regiment  was  from  ten  to  thirty  horses  per  batery  be- 
low its  peace  strength. 

—128— 


Preparations  for  War 

(b)  The  reported  purchase  of  grain  and  beef  cattle  in  Italy;  the 
purchase  in  England  of  woolen  blankets  and  other  articles  neces- 
sary for  a  winter's  campaign ;  the  reported — not  yet  confirmed — 
placing  of  orders  in  Vienna  for  maps  of  the  German  theater  of  war, 
especially  of  the  rivers. 

(c)  The  reported  intention  of  moving  the  regiments  from  the 
camp  at  Chalons  to  the  northeastern  districts  of  Dunkirchen  and  as 
far  as  Strassburg — the  unusual  keeping  up  of  the  divisions  and  bri- 
gades of  these  troops — and  the  reported  new  formation  of  a  division 
in  Paris.  The  latter  two  reports  are  denied  by  official  organs  (news- 
papers) and  it  is  said  lately  that  the  intended  change  of  station  of 
troops  would  not  be  made,  because  it  has  made  the  French  people 
too  uneasy.  Should  it  actually  be  made,  there  would  be  forty-eight 
battalions  of  field  troops  more  in  the  terrain  situated  east  and  north 
of  the  line  Calais — Paris — Basel  than  were  there  last  year.  The  con- 
sequent decrease  in  the  number  of  troops  in  the  remaining  provinces 
of  France  would,  however,  amount  to  but  fifteen  battalions,  which  may 
be  explained  by  the  return  of  the  troops  from  Mexico  and  Rome. 

(d)  Under  certain  conditions  also  the  proposed  measures  to  be 
taken  in  the  French  navy  are  a  strange  symptom.  Whether  and  to 
what  extent  the  French  navy  is  to  play  a  role  in  a  war  against 
Prussia,  is  hard  to  determine  in  advance.  It  is  a  fact  that  the  French 
navy  is  superior  to  ours,  even  if  no  additional  steps  are  taken  to  in- 
crease it;  still  a  report  of  such  a  contemplated  increase  might  easily 
excite  the  mistrust  of  other  maritime  powers,  though  they  would 
keep  aloof  in  the  conflict.  Consequently  it  is  a  question  whether  the 
naval  preparations  on  the  part  of  France  are  connected  more  with 
an  Oriental  than  with  a  German  question. 

(e)  The  completion  of  new  formations  in  the  infantry,  artillery 
and  train  troops  possibly  may  be  regarded  less  in  a  military  sense 
than  judged  as  motives  mentioned  in  (1)  and  (2)   above. 

(f)  Under  the  same  category  would  be  classed  the  fortification 
work  started  in  the  spring  and  lately  resumed.  Those  at  Belfort  I 
specially  hold  as  entirely  irrelevant  to  us,  and  they  probably  would 
play  no  role  at  all  in  a  war  between  France  and  Germany. 

I  will  also  remark  as  follows : 

We  cannot  deny  that  French  army  matters  have,  since 
the  spring,  taken  a  great  step  ahead  in  most  directions. 

The  effective  strength  of  trained  men  has  been  in- 
creased by  70,000  men  through  the  addition  of  two  years' 
conscripts,  the  number  of  horses  available  now  may  suffice 
to  mobilize  the  army  in  about  the  same  time  as  can  the  Prus- 
sian army, — the  field  artillery  has  been  increased  by  34 
batteries.  But  two  very  important  results  have  not  yet 
been  attained :  on  the  other  hand,  according  to  numerous 
reports  confirming  each  other,  the  number  of  completed 
chassepot  rifles  is  less  than  50,000  (only  the  larger  part  of 
the  infantry  of  the  Guards  and  the  16  infantry  regiments 
up  to  this  time  in  the  camp  at  Chalons  can  be  supplied  with 

—129— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

them  so  far),  and  in  the  second  place  the  number  of  trained, 
but  not  the  number  of  available  men,  has  been  increased, 
because  no  new  recruitment  has  so  far  been  started. 

The  increased  recruitment  expected  heretofore  (in 
June)  of  about  160,000  men  has  not  yet  been  effected,  and 
by  the  Decree  of  the  7th  of  August  only  the  usual  contingent 
of  about  100,000  me«  has  been  called  to  the  colors  at  the 
regular  September  recruitment  and  that  under  keeping  to 
the  old  custom  of  allowing  conscripts  to  purchase  their 
freedom  from  service,  etc. 

Consequently,  according  to  our  conception,  France  will 
at  the  present  time  not  be  able  to  oppose  against  Prussia  a 
stronger  army  than  the  above  mentioned  field  army  of  at 
most  300,000  men. 

As  it  now  appears  that  Emperor  Napoleon  did  not  suc- 
ceed in  forming  in  Salzburg  the  desired  Austria — South 
German  alliance,  the  above  military  considerations  do  not 
lead  to  the  belief  that  France  can  undertake  a  campaign 
this  fall,  which  at  the  present  time  it  is  not  strong  enough 
to  carry  on  without  an  ally. 

Another  deciding  factor  might  be — what  measures  date 
from  the  time  before  the  convention  at  Salzburg,  and  what 
after  that  convention,  and  therefore  started  in  consequence 
of  that  convention.  The  Moniteur  de  VArmee  reports  that 
the  Decree  of  August  24  dismissed  the  present  oldest  active 
class  (1862)  to  the  reserve,  and  in  addition  that  by  the  De- 
cree of  August  31,  after  the  usual  autumn  maneuvers  the 
semi-annual  furloughing  of  officers,  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers and  soldiers  will  be  more  numerous  than  heretofore. 
Although  these  measures  are  no  absolute  indication  of  peace, 
but  in  the  main  have  for  their  object  making  room  for  the 
training  of  younger  men,  they  do  not  absolutely  indicate 
hostile  intentions.  Should  in  the  meantime  Your  Excellency 
have  reasons  to  suspect  contrivances  of  France  in  the  matter 
of  new  political  dissensions  in  the  near  future,  the  above 
points  contained  in  from  (a)  to  (d)  would  be  entitled  to 
careful  consideration. 


-130- 


Preparations  for  War 
NO.  11 


To  THE  Minister-President,  Count  v.  Bismarck- 

SCHOENHAUSEN,   BERLIN: 

Creisau,  9  September,  1867. 

In  continuation  of  my  letter  of  the  6th  instant  (No.  10) 
I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  from  the  publications  of 
the  Moniteur  de  Varmee  it  has  been  ascertained : 

1.  The  increase  of  troops  in  the  northeastern  garri- 
sons in  France  does  not,  as  stated  in  that  letter  as  possible, 
amount  to  forty-five,  but  to  twenty-eight  battalions.  The 
earlier  assumption  that  the  troops  of  the  camp  at  Chalons 
would  remain  in  the  northeast  has  been  confirmed,  it  is  true, 
but  in  their  place  troops  have  been  transferred  from  the 
northeast  to  the  south  and  west. 

2.  The  same  number  of  the  Moniteur  declares  expressly 
that  the  troops  up  to  now  at  Chalons  would  become  part  of 
the  territorial  command  in  their  garrisons.  In  the  same 
sense  this  number  of  the  Moniteur  brings  a  "Denial  of  the 
Constitution"  against  keeping  these  troops  as  a  part  of  the 
active  divisions. 

3.  The  rumor  of  the  reinforcement  of  the  Army  of 
Paris  by  a  division  reduces  itself,  according  to  the  same 
number  of  the  Moniteur,  to  the  fact  that  in  place  of  the 
1st  Division,  to  be  disorganized  (the  regiments  of  that  divi- 
sion to  go  to  the  west  and  south),  a  new  division  under  the 
same  numerical  designation  is  to  be  formed  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Douay. 

4.  The  late  reports  of  contemplated  movements  of  the 
navy,  especially  at  Toulon,  are  now  explained  to  be  con- 
nected with  an  intended  inspection  on  a  large  scale. 


—131— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

To  serve  as  a  basis  in  a  discussion  with  the  Assistant  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  concerning  the  positions  and  the  first  operations 
of  the  army  in  a  campaign  against  France,  General  v.  Moltke  made 
the  following  notes: 

NO.  12 

Berlin,  16  November,  1867. 

In  the  event  of  difficulties  with  France  next  spring,  it 
is  probable  that  Austria's  and  Denmark's  attitude  will  be 
doubtful,  to  say  the  least,  and  that  therefore  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  leave  parts  of  our  fighting  forces  opposed  to  them. 

As  in  such  a  case  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  could  hardly 
be  utilized  in  Saxony  or  Silesia,  the  Vlth  Army  Corps  would 
have  to  concentrate  at  Neisse,  the  1st  Army  Corps  trans- 
ported via  Bamberg  and  Frankfurt  to  Hansdorf  to  march 
from  there  to  Gorlitz,  and  a  strong  division  of  the  IXth 
Army  Corps  would  have  to  proceed  by  rail  via  Hamburg, 
Berlin  and  Kottbus  also  to  Gorlitz,  making  a  total  of  80,000 
men,  which,  reinforced  by  Landwehr,  would  have  to  unite 
along  the  mountains  according  to  the  nature  of  the  opera- 
tions taken  later  on  by  Austria ;  but  they  would  have  to  oc- 
cupy Dresden  in  any  case.  The  rest  of  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  concentrates  in  the  fortified  camp  at  Diippel. 

In  this  movement  all  the  lines  leading  west  will  remain 
untouched,  and  we  can  send  there  ten  army  corps,  a  total 
of  more  than  300,000. 

The  advance  guard  marching  on  France  will  be  formed 
by  the  5th  Division,  which  can  be  at  Saarbriicken  on  the 
17th  day,  and  the  16th  Division,  which  concentrates  about 
the  same  time  the  other  side  of  Trier. 

Both  divisions  will  have  to  cover  the  march  of  the  army 
in  the  Rhine  Palatinate  and  also  the  march  of  the  Vllth 
Army  Corps,  as  well  as  to  secure  the  railroad  as  far  as 
possible. 

By  the  twenty-fifth  day  the  6th  Division  and  the  IVth 
Army  Corps  will  arrive  at  Neunkirchen,  the  former  via 
Kreuznach,  the  latter  via  Kaiserslautern ;  the  Vllth  Army 
Corps  will  arrive  at  Wittlich,  and  parts  of  these  three  or- 
ganizations may  arrive  at  those  places  even  before  then, 

—132— 


Preparations  for  War 

which  will  enable  the  advance  guards,  supported  by  them  and 
by  the  terrain,  to  hold  their  position  in  front  and  will  pre- 
vent the  necessity  of  their  having  to  retreat  via  Neunkirchen 
and  Wittlich. 

In  case  these  movements  could  not  be  made,  then  of 
course  transportation  on  the  Nahe  and  the  Bexbach  rail- 
roads would  have  to  be  commenced  earlier. 

At  the  stated  time  the  15th  Division  is  assembled  at 
Morbach,  the  lid  and  the  Xlth  Corps  are  echeloned  between 
Alzey  and  Mayence,  and  the  Vth  and  the  Xllth  Corps  at 
Mannheim  (the  latter  probably  a  little  later?). 

On  the  whole,  on  the  twenty-fifth  day,  there  will  be  at 
our  disposal  eight  army  corps,  about  250,000  men,  between 
the  Saar  and  the  Rhine,  which  can  be  concentrated  in  the 
center  in  three  marches,  to  the  front  or  to  one  of  the  flanks 
in  seven  marches. 

At  our  disposal  then  in  home  garrisons  are  the  Guard 
Corps  and  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  some  65,000  men,  which 
can  be  transported  to  Dresden  or  via  Bingen  and  Mayence 
after  the  twenty-fifth  day,  to  allow  us  to  utilize  150,000  men 
against  Austria  and  250,000  men  against  France. 

If  by  that  time  it  were  ascertained  that  no  large  force 
would  be  required  against  Austria,  then  the  army  against 
France  could  be  reinforced  by  the  thirty-second  day  to  over 
300,000  men,  without  leaving  Silesia  and  Saxony  unguarded. 

Fighting  forces  against  France: 

1st  Army:  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps, 

2d  Army:  Illd,  IVth  and  finally  Guard  Corps, 

3d  Army:  lid,  Xlth,  and  finally  Xth  Army  Corps, 

4th  Army:   Vth  and  Xllth  Army  Corps. 

DEFENSIVE 

If  we  should  be  unable  to  complete  our  preparations 
ahead  of  the  French,  then  we  must  expect  the  enemy's  offen- 
sive operations  to  begin  by  the  twenty-fifth  day. 

Smaller  detachments  of  the  enemy,  which  may  advance 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mosel,  will  offensively  advance 
against  the  16th,  13th,  and  14th  Divisions  or  against  parts 
of  these. 

—133— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Should  50,000  French  or  more  march  against  Coblenz 
— Cologne,  which  is  not  probable,  then  the  above  mentioned 
divisions  will  unite  with  the  15th  behind  the  Mosel  to  guard 
the  crossings.  An  offensive  executed  by  the  center  of  the 
army  via  Saarbriicken  and  Saarlouis  will  compel  the  enemy 
to  immediately  evacuate  the  country  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine. 

Should  the  French  main  force  advance  from  Metz — 
Nancy  against  Mayence — Mannheim,  we  will  learn  that 
fact  through  the  resistance  which  the  Illd  Army  Corps  will 
have  to  make  at  Saarbriicken  and  Neunkirchen. 

Then  it  will  be  a  question  whether  or  not  we  will  be 
able  to  make  a  front  halfway  on  our  advance,  at  Homburg, 
about  the  thirtieth  or  the  thirty-second  day,  with  the  Hid, 
IVth  and  the  Xlth  and  lid  Corps  (about  125,000  men),  the 
latter  continuing  the  march. 

A  position  prepared  in  advance  behind  the  upper  Blies 
and  at  so  important  a  railroad  appears  to  be  favored  by  the 
terrain. 

It  will  undoubtedly  be  the  enemy's  endeavor  to  combine 
his  attack  at  that  point  from  the  west  with  one  from  the 
south,  the  latter  executed  probably  by  the  fighting  forces 
assembled  at  Strassburg.  To  meet  that,  it  is  necessary  to 
leave  the  Vth  and  the  Xllth  Corps  in  march  on  Landau,  in 
order  to  hold,  by  an  offensive  from  there,  the  Strassburg 
Corps  or  to  draw  near  to  the  main  army  via  Piermasens, 
should  that  army  march  on  Bitsch. 

Should  our  left  wing  be  threatened  by  such  a  move  it 
would  at  the  most  result  in  a  retreat  on  Coblenz,  which  is 
not  an  unfavorable  direction  at  all.  On  the  other  hand,  and 
being  strategically  of  more  disadvantage,  the  left  wing  of 
the  French  main  force  is  endangered  by  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth 
Army  Corps,  should  we  succeed  to  bring  these  up  by  the  day 
of  the  decision. 

Leaving  nothing  but  observation  detachments  on  the 
Mosel,  these  two  corps  should  be  started  in  the  general  di- 
rection of  Birkenfeld,  St.  Wendel  or  Tholey.  But  as  their 
actual  arrival  at  a  certain  point  cannot  be  counted  on  as  to 
day  and  hour,  the  battlefield  cannot  be  designated  definitely 

—134— 


Preparations  for  War 

in  advance.  Still  an  apt  and  competent  leader  will  be 
able  to  regulate  the  march  of  the  two  corps  with  that  of 
the  main  army — by  having  the  former  make  longer,  the 
latter  shorter  marches — so  as  to  insure  the  union  of  both 
on  the  day  of  the  decision,  should  that  be  farther  to  the  rear 
of  the  Lauter  or  Alsenz,  where  then  in  addition  to  the  lid 
and  Xlth  Corps,  possibly  also  the  Guard  Corps  and  the  Xth 
Army  Corps  might  be  disposable  on  the  thirty-fourth  or  the 
thirty-sixth  day. 

It  remains  to  be  decided  later,  whether  we  will  make  a 
stand  on  the  twenty-fifth  day  with  the  Hid  and  IVth  Corps, 
65,000  men,  at  Neunkirchen  or  Homburg,  or  accept  battle 
about  the  thirtieth  day  with  the  Hid,  IVth,  Vllth,  Vlllth, 
lid  and  Xlth  Corps,  200,000  men,  opposite  Kaiserslautern, 
or  wait  until  the  thirty-fourth  day  for  the  Guard  Corps  and 
the  Xth  Corps,  presupposing  of  course  that  the  Strassburg 
Army  is  held  in  check  by  the  Vth  and  the  Xllth  Corps. 

OFFENSIVE 

If  we  are  able  to  bring  our  army  into  position  oppo- 
site the  French  army  in  time  so  that  the  latter  has  not  been 
able  to  drive  back  the  Illd  and  IVth  Army  Corps  behind  the 
line  Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken  by  the  thirty-third  day, 
then  by  that  day  the  Xlth  and  lid  Army  Corps,  coming  from 
Alzey,  will  have  approached  to  behind  that  line,  and  the 
Guard  Corps  or  the  Xth  Corps,  continuing  their  travel  on 
the  Nahe  and  Bexbach  railroad,  have  reached  there,  a  total 
of  150,000  men. 

The  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Corps  will  have  marched  to  the 
vicinity  of  St.  Wendel  and  Tholey. 

The  advance  guards  will  be  advanced  to  the  Saar. 

The  Vth  and  Xllth  Corps  are  concentrated  at  Landau. 
Their  attitude  depends  on  that  of  the  hostile  fighting  forces 
assembled  at  Strassburg.  They  have  to  cover  towards  the 
south  the  advance  of  the  main  army  westward,  to  protect 
the  railroad  connections  and  to  finally  draw  near  the  main 
army. 

The  offensive  of  the  main  army  will  be  directed  on  its 
object,  the  French  offensive,  which  at  that  time  we  may  as- 

—135— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

sume  to  be  close  in  our  front.  Even  should  that  not  be  the 
case,  we  are  certain  to  meet  it  if  we  advance  in  the  direction 
Nancy — Pont-a-Mousson,  which  threatens  France  the  most, 
and  which  line  can  be  reached  within  seven  marches. 

In  that  advance  the  strictest  concentration  is  necessary. 

The  Second  Army  is  assigned  to  the  Saarbriicken — St. 
Avoid — Han  on  the  Nied  roads;  the  Third  Army  the  Saar- 
gemiind — Piittlingen — Baronweiler  road. 

On  the  whole  only  the  artillery  will  march  on  these 
roads,  the  cavalry  and  at  least  a  part  of  the  infantry  will 
use  parallel  roads,  consequently  short  marches  and  bivouacs. 

The  marching  depth  of  the  corps  must  be  regulated  so 
that  it  will  not  be  more  than  eight  [English]  miles. 

The  advance  guards,  accompanied  by  as  much  cavalry 
as  the  terrain  demands,  will  be  half  a  march  in  front. 

The  leading  corps  of  each  army  starts  at  daybreak, 
the  second  corps  after  dinner,  the  third  corps  follows  at 
the  proper  time  the  next  morning. 

The  opponent  cannot  advance  in  close  concentration. 
Considering  the  nature  of  French  troop  leading  it  is  not 
probable,  though  possible,  that  the  French  army  will  await 
us  in  a  prepared  position  and  thus  have  all  its  fighting 
forces  in  hand. 

If  the  advance  guards  encounter  resistance  which  they 
cannot  overcome,  main  bodies  in  rear  support  the  advance 
guard.  Two  corps  of  each  army  are  concentrated  each  even- 
ing, the  third,  if  necessary,  can  be  brought  up  by  a  night 
march,  or  will  arrive  behind  the  front  the  next  morning  as 
a  reserve. 

The  First  Army  marches  via  Kreuzwald  to  Fullingen, 
one  division  as  right  flank  guard  via  Bolchen  to  Contchen  on 
the  Nied  towards  Metz. 

On  the  first  day  after  crossing  the  frontier  the  leading 
elements  of  the  three  armies  will  be  twelve  [English]  miles 
apart,  on  the  third  day  but  eight  [English]  miles,  on  the 
line  Fullingen — Baronweiler.  The  depth  of  the  column, 
with  flank  bivouacs  and  short  marches,  would  be  con- 
fined to  eight  [English]  miles  (measures  for  subsistence  to 
be  taken  in  accordance  therewith) .    Thus  we  could  deploy 

—136— 


Preparations  for  War 

any  day  250,000  men  for  battle,  not  only  to  the  front,  but 
also  towards  the  flank,  should  the  French  army  advance  to 
the  attack  from  either  the  Nied  or  the  Seille. 

The  latter  operation  would  have  the  Fourth  Army  in 
the  flank  and  would,  in  case  of  a  lost  battle,  merely  force  us 
to  retire  on  the  Rhine  line. 

A  concentration  behind  the  Seille  has  the  advantage 
for  the  French  main  army  of  being  in  the  very  start  in  con- 
nection with  the  Strassburg  army.  But  a  rapid  advance 
on  our  part  via  Saarbriicken  and  Finstingen  will  lead  us  to 
the  inner  line  of  operations  between  the  two  armies.  Should 
these  armies  already  be  united  at  Saarburg,  then,  bringing 
up  our  Fourth  Army,  and  having  a  good  base,  the  battle 
would  lead  in  the  direction  which  would,  in  case  of  victory 
on  our  part,  drive  the  French  army  away  from  Paris. 

More  dangerous  would  be  the  first  operation,  which, 
in  case  of  reverse,  would  cut  all  our  communications.  It  is 
true  that  then  also  conditions  would  be  precarious  for  the 
enemy,  but  not  so  much  as  on  our  side,  considering  the 
proximity  of  two  fortresses  and  the  Mosel  sector. 

Still,  this  presupposes  that  the  French,  in  accordance 
with  a  strictly  defensive  plan  of  war,  have  concentrated 
their  main  force  between  Diedenhofen  and  Metz,  which 
would  mean  all  absence  of  connection  with  the  part  of  the 
forces  which  are  compelled  to  leave  the  railroad  in  the  Rhine 
valley  at  Strassburg  to  avoid  great  loss  of  time.  Thereby 
these  forces  would  run  into  danger,  as  we  can  easily  rein- 
force our  Fourth  Army  from  the  concentration  at  Homburg. 

If  after  the  end  of  from  four  to  five  weeks,  we  should 
still  be  without  information  as  to  the  position  of  the  French 
main  force,  a  reconnaissance  in  force  sent  out  by  the  First 
Army  via  Kedingen  towards  Reichersberg  and  one  by  the 
Third  Army  towards  the  Seille  would  be  the  means  to  de- 
cide if  we  would  have  to  seek  the  opponent  there.  In  that 
case  of  course  our  advance  would  have  to  be  made  towards 
the  Nied  or  up  the  Saar. 

Finally,  we  must  consider  the  possibility  that  the 
French  will  defensively  hold  the  weaker  part  of  the  course 
of  the  Mosel  between  Luneville  and  Metz. 

—137— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

In  that  case  one  division  of  the  First  Army  would  hold 
the  Nied  crossings  east  of  Metz,  the  Army  itself  take  a  po- 
sition at  Peltre  against  Metz,  and  one  corps  of  the  Third 
Army  would  have  to  proceed  to  Chateau-Salins,  to  protect 
the  left  flank. 

The  remainder  of  the  army,  more  than  200,000  men, 
would  proceed  towards  Cheminot  and  Nomeny,  would  drive 
off  the  outpost  position  of  the  enemy  on  the  Seille  and  direct 
the  attack  towards  Pont-a-Mousson. 

The  probability  will  be  that  we  will  meet  the  French 
army  between  the  Blies  and  the  Seille,  and  our  measures 
should  principally  be  based  on  that  supposition. 

In  any  case  the  Fourth  Army  should  be  so  much  rein-' 
forced  that  the  westward  advance  will  not  be  disturbed  from 
the  south.  This  can  easily  be  done,  as  the  larger  the  Strass- 
burg  Army  is,  the  smaller  will  be  the  French  main  army. 

Should  the  operation  be  conducted  from  Strassburg  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  that  would  not  change  anything 
herein ;  the  separation  of  the  French  forces  would  be  more 
complete,  the  danger  of  our  offensive  advance  less.  The 
Fourth  Army  would  cross  the  Rhine  at  Germersheim. 


The  measures  to  be  taken  in  case  of  an  offensive  advance  of  the 
French  before  completion  of  their  mobilization  are  discussed  by  Gen- 
eral V.  Moltke  in  the  following : 

NO.  13 

Berlin,  21  March,  1868. 

It  cannot  be  seen  in  advance  if  the  French  will  wait  for 
the  regular  mobilization  of  their  fighting  forces,  or  if  they 
will  advance  to  the  attack  with  what  they  now  have  at  their 
disposal. 

We,  on  our  part,  can  hold  to  but  one  method  of  placing 
our  army  in  readiness,  which  must  be  in  accordance  with 
both  eventualities. 

Our  plans  for  this  were  worked  out  last  November,  and 
we  now  have  only  to  examine  the  latest  tables  of  mobiliza- 

—138— 


Preparations  for  War 

tion,  to  see  the  addition  (Hansu — Hersfeld)  to  the  railroad 
net  might  hasten  a  concentration  on  the  Rhine. 

Then  we  should  examine,  in  what  relation  this  method, 
to  be  designated  as  the  permanent  one,  stands  to  a  strate- 
gical attack  made  by  France. 

Taking  the  case  of  a  strategical  attack,  70,000  French 
could  reach  the  Rhine  line  on  the  20th  day,  their  leading 
elements  probably  a  few  days  earlier;  that  is,  at  a  time  when 
the  Rhine  fortresses  are  not  completely  supplied,  before  the 
Landwehr  garrisons  have  arrived  and  when  consequently 
active  fighting  troops  of  the  line  would  be  required  there. 

It  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  French  will  go  as  far  as 
the  Wesel,  even  if  they  should  ignore  Luxemburg's  neutral- 
ity.   The  disadvantages  would  all  be  on  their  side. 

There  are  six  battalions  of  the  14th  Division  in  Cologne. 
The  three  in  Aix-la-Chappele  and  Jiilich  could  wait  until 
completion  of  their  mobilization ;  their  communication,  at 
least  via  Diisseldorf ,  would  not  be  endangered ;  the  three  in 
Coblenz  should  for  the  present  be  left  there. 

We  cannot  reckon  with  certainty  on  the  four  battal- 
ions of  the  16th  Division  in  Saarlouis;  they  can  neither  at 
once  be  drawn  off  nor  relieved  by  Landwehr. 

At  the  start  we  would  have  to  renounce  holding  the 
terrain  on  the  left  of  the  Rhine  under  the  stated  assumptions. 
Consequently  we  could  bring  back  at  once  their  supplies  by 
steamer  and  rail.  I  do  not  believe  that  this  procedure  would 
cause  a  less  unfavorable  impression  than  if  they  were  to 
retreat  fighting. 

Five  battalions  and  five  squadrons  in  Trier  form  an 
advanced  detachment,  which,  especially  if  reinforced  by  half 
a  battery  from  Coblenz  by  steamer — may  calmly  await  the 
enemy's  advance.  Their  reinforcements  will  arrive  on  the 
8th  day.  The  road  to  Coblenz  offers  a  series  of  positions, 
in  which  a  fight  can  be  broken  off  without  danger,  and  the 
river  can  easily  be  crossed  at  Bernkastel. 

More  difficult  is  the  retreat  for  the  battalion  in  Saar- 
briicken,  but  that  will  be  protected  by  five  squadrons.  It  is 
desirable  that  this  battalion  should  withdraw  along  the 
Nahe  railroad,  then  via  Simmern, 

—139— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

I  am  of  the  opinion  that  we  should  not  blow  up  the 
works  on  the  railroad,  as  we  have  good  chances  to  again  be 
on  the  Saar  in  fourteen  days.  That  the  enemy  may  destroy 
the  works  is  possible  and  probable,  but  not  certain,  and  then 
it  would  make  no  difference  had  we  done  it  or  the  enemy. 

Conditions  will  have  to  decide  whether  we  will  destroy 
an  embankment  (but  not  a  viaduct  or  tunnel)  which  delays 
the  enemy  some  days,  draws  his  attention,  but  can  be  re- 
constructed within  a  few  days. 

By  the  20th  day  there  will  have  arrived  at  Mayence  the 
largest  part  of  the  Xlth,  IVth  and  Vth  Corps.  It  is  possi- 
ble that  the  transportation  of  the  Hid  Corps  from  Cologne 
cannot  be  continued  up  the  Rhine. 

But  in  any  case  there  probably  will  be  so  many  fighting 
forces  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine  from  Cologne  to  May- 
ence by  the  20th  day,  that  70,000  French  cannot  attempt  to 
cross  the  stream. 

Then  we  would  have  to  take  the  offensive  as  early  as 
possible  from  Cologne,  Coblenz,  Mayence  and  finally  also 
from  Mannheim.  The  French  railroad  will  undoubtedly 
be  taken  up  with  the  transport  of  peace  cadres  up  to  the 
10th  day.  Thereafter  the  reinforcing  detachments,  more 
than  100,000  men,  will  have  to  be  brought  up  after  comple- 
tion of  clothing,  equipment  and  organization,  as  well  as  the 
mobile  National  Guard  for  the  frontier  fortresses. 

Reaction  would  then  set  in. 


Shortly  thereafter  General  v.  Moltke  sketched  out  his  views  as 
to  the  marching  into  position  of  the  German  fighting  forces  and  the 
probable  first  movements,  in  the  foUovi^ing  memorial:* 

NO.  14 

Berlin,  in  April  1868. 
■   If  war  should  happen  this  year,  we  may  count  with 
certainty  on  the  fact  that  it  will  be  only  with  France  alone. 


*0n  the  cover  of  this  there  is  a  note  in  the  handwriting  of  the 
general  as  follows: — "final,  and  govei-ned  by  present  conditions, 
sketch  of  a  plan  of  onerations.     20-5  v.  M." 

—140— 


Preparations  for  War 

Incomplete  equipments,  armament,  etc.,  the  disinclination 
of  Hungary,  and  the  attitude  of  Russia,  preclude  Austria's 
participation.  Consequently  we  will  be  able  to  utilize  nearly 
all  of  our  forces  against  the  one  enemy. 

Still,  it  is  advisable  to  leave  the  Vlth  Corps  at  home  at 
the  start,  or  at  least  to  move  it  last  to  relieve  the  Xllth 
Corps,  which  cannot  be  left  in  its  present  station.  Finally, 
it  is  necessary  to  leave  a  strong  force  to  protect  the  prov- 
inces and  the  coast,  especially  the  North  Sea  coast,  as 
France  will  hardly  leave  an  arm  like  its  fleet  unused. 

In  less  than  three  years  we  can  build  no  fortification 
for  maritime  protection,  an  active  defense  will  have  to  do 
its  best. 

Accordingly  the  Vlth  and  IXth  Corps  cannot  be  counted 
on,  they  will  form  only  the  last  echelon. 

This  leaves  eleven  army  corps,  360,000  men,  and  these 
will  form  a  force  which  is  equal  to  the  French  force,  even  if 
the  latter  does  not  direct  itself  against  separate  attacking 
points. 

We  will  gain  a  material  superiority  as  soon  as  the 
South  Germans  join  us,  even  if  they  do  so  with  only  from 
40,000  to  60,000  men. 

Equality  or  superiority  will  be  attained  only  if  we  are 
able  too  concentrate  our  forces  opposite  the  French  at  the 
proper  time. 

This  concentration  will  take  place  within  two  time 
limits,  which  are  determined  by  the  capacities  of  the  avail- 
able railroads. 

First  period,  from  the  first  mobilization  day  to  the 
227id  day: — 

Army    Men 

1st    60,000     Vllth  Army  Corps  by  marching  ]  Coblenze  and 

Vlllth  Army  Corps  by  marching  and  j  beyond  on   the 
using  auxiliary  line  via  Call  J  Mosel 

2d     60,000  1  Mayence  and 

Hid  Army  Corps,  R.  R.  Hanover  I  beyond  in  the 

IVth  Army  Corps,  R.R.  Halle-Marburg  j  p^J^a^tlnTte 

J 

3d     70,000     Hd  Army  Corps,  R.R.  Halle-Fulda        ] 

Xth  Army  Corps,   R.R.  Paderborn-      \  Mayence 
Wetzlar  j 

—141— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

4th  90,000     Hessian  Division  in Darmstadt 

One  Bavarian  Brigade  in Landau 

Vth  Army  Corps,  R.R.  Leipzig-  ] 

Wiirzburg  \  Mannheim 

Xlth   Army  Corps,    (21st  Division 
marching)  J 

Wiirtemberg    Division,   rail   and  [  9t   tt       t 

marching  I  ^^^^•'K^" 

1 
Baden  Division,  rail  and  marching      [  Rastatt 

Total  280,000  men. 

The  First  Army  concentrates  towards  Wittlich.  It  will 
try  to  see  if  it  can  support  its  advance  guard  at  Trier. 
Should  a  superior  French  army  advance  through  Luxem- 
burg, it  will  give  way,  probably  at  Bernkastel,  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Mosel,  keeping  possession  of  the  crossings.  If 
it  has  no  enemy  in  its  front,  it  will  draw  near  the  Second 
Army  with  which  it  will  keep  in  connection  and  march 
abreast  of.  In  a  battle  in  the  Palatinate  it  would  be  of  de- 
cisive importance  for  the  First  Army  to  appear  at  the  right 
time  on  the  enemy's  left  flank. 

The  detachment  of  the  16th  Division  at  Saarbriicken 
will  not  be  ordered  back,  but  will  be  immediately  reinforced 
from  Mayence  via  the  Nahe  railroad  by  the  5th  Division, 
to  keep  us  informed  what  parts  of  the  enemy  advance  on 
the  Palatinate. 

If  after  that  conditions  permit,  the  Illd  and  IVth  Army 
Corps  will  continue  their  journey  without  interruption  on 
the  Nahe  and  Bexbach  railroad,  and  the  Second  Army  will 
assemble  on  the  line  Homburg — Zweibriicken. 

The  Third  Army  follows  immediately  by  marching  in 
reserve. 

Conditions  obtaining  at  place  and  time  will  govern 
whether  we  will  accept  battle,  even  before  the  arrival  of  the 
second  transport  echelon  between  the  Blies  and  the  Rhine, 
with  the 

Second   and    Third   Army    130,000  men 

later  supported  by  the  First  Army 60,000  men 

that  is,  with 190,000  men 

—142— 


Preparations  for  War 

Should  the  French  army  have  already  invaded  the 
Palatinate  in  force  when  our  army  corps  reach  the  Rhine 
then  of  course  the  two  railroads  diverging  there  could  not  be 
used  for  transporting  the  entire  Second  Army. 

Both  armies  would  then  await  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments in  a  strong  defensive  position  in  front  of  Mayence, 
for  instance,  with  their  right  wing  on  the  Donnersberg. 
Accordingly  the  First  Army  should  be  sent  through  the 
Hunsriick. 

Concerning  the  destruction  of  the  Nahe  railroad  the  de- 
tachment at  Saarbrucken  will  receive  direct  orders  from 
general  headquarters. 

The  Fourth  Army  is  designated  to  receive  or  support 
the  South  Germans.  Southern  Germany  will  best  be  pro- 
tected by  an  offensive  with  all  forces  far  into  France. 

If  by  the  22d  day  a  French  army  has  not  yet  crossed 
the  upper  Rhine,  the  Fourth  Army  concentrates  on  the  line 
Neustadt — Landau  (the  contigents  from  Baden  via  Maxau, 
those  from  Wiirttemberg  via  Germersheim)  and  follows 
the  forward  movement  of  our  main  army  as  a  left  echelon. 

Even  if,  as  is  probable,  a  French  army  is  concentrated 
at  Strassburg,  it  will  not  dare,  considering  the  deployment 
of  our  large  forces  in  the  Palatinate,  to  cross  the  line  below 
Strassburg.  (An  incursion  through  the  Breisgau  with  an 
auxiliary  army  would  be  of  no  effect  on  the  campaign  and 
would  merely  weaken  the  French  fighting  force.)  The 
Strassburg  Army  can  operate  only  against  the  left  flank  of 
our  offensive  advance.  But  we  stand  on  the  inner  line  of 
operation  between  the  Strassburg  Army  and  the  enemy's 
main  line,  which  latter,  if  it  desires  to  make  full  use  of  the 
railroad  net,  can  concentrate  only  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Vosges,  about  on  the  line  Diedenhofen — Nancy.  Therefore 
we  have  the  choice,  if  the  advance  of  the  Strassburg  Army 
offers  the  opportunity  of  a  short,  quick,  offensive  advance 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  upstream,  to  give  to  the 
Fourth  Army  a  decided  superiority  by  reinforcing  it  from 
the  Third  Army ;  against  the  west  we  would  confine  ourselves 
in  the  meantime  to  the  defensive. 

—143— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

If  on  the  other  hand,  the  French  have  been  enabled  to 
cross  the  upper  Rhine  before  we  complete  our  concentration, 
the  Vth  and  Xlth  Corps  would  march  up  the  Rhine  on  the 
right  bank,  would  receive  the  Wiirttembergers  and  Baden- 
ers  in  Bruchsal  and  Rastatt,  advance  on  the  enemy's  com- 
munications, and  compel  him  to  turn  about.  We  should 
not  be  afraid  of  this  partition  of  our  fighting  forces  and  we 
can  carry  out  the  offensive  with  our  main  force  towards 
the  west  after  the  arrival  of  the  second  transport  echelons, 
because  the  enemy  has  also  divided  his  forces  and  abandoned 
all  connections  between  them. 

The  fact  that  the  South  German  contingents  do  not 
directly  join  the  Fourth  Army  but  operate  independently, 
based  on  Ulm,  for  the  defense  of  the  Black  Forest,  must  not 
be  lost  sight  of  and  in  that  case  we  would  allow  them  to  do 
so  and,  leaving  but  an  observation  detachment  on  the  Neckar, 
open  the  offensive  on  France  with  all  four  armies.  The 
capture  of  Southern  Germany  can  have  no  effect  on  us,  be- 
fore we  have  had  a  battle  which  will  call  back  the  French 
for  the  defense  of  their  own  territory.  During  the  time 
the  French  march  from  Strassburg  to  Ulm  we  march  from 
Mayence  to  Nancy.  There  we  will  endanger  the  communi- 
cations even  of  the  French  South  Army,  while  we  on  our 
part  will  have  our  Rhineland  in  our  immediate  rear. 

Only  the  loss  of  the  South  German  fortresses  would 
be  a  material  disadvantage. 

Second  Period — to  the  30th  day. 

Immediately  following  the  above  mentioned  corps  there 
would  have  to  be  transported : 

The  Guard  Corps  via  Hanover — Cologne; 

The  Xllth  Corps  via  Corbetha— Fulda; 

(the  22d  Division  joins  the  Xlth  Corps  by  marching). 

Should,  after  three  weeks,  conditions  be  such  as  to 
show  that  the  18th  Division  is  a  sufficient  force  in  Schles- 
wig,  and  should  a  Landwehr  garrison  suffice  for  Dresden, 
then  within  this  period  the  following  could  be  brought  to 
the  Rhine : 

The  17th  Division  via  Kreiensen — Wetzlar, 
The  1st  Army  Corps  via  Cassel. 

—144— 


Preparations  for  War 

After  three  weeks  the  Bavarian  corps  also  would  have 
to  be  concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Wiirzburg — Nordlingen. 

In  case  the  French  have  invaded  Southern  Gemany,  the 
Bavarian  corps  would  co-operate  with  the  Fourth  Army, 
provided  it  could  not  immediately  join  that  army  via : — 

Stuttgart-Bruchsal ;  ^  Heidelberg ; 

Heilbronn;  Darmstadt. 

Aschanenburg;  ^ 

The  order  of  battle*  would  then  be  about  as  follows: — 

First    Army,    Vllth    and    Vlllth    Corps    60,000  men; 

Second  Army,  Hid,  IVth  and  Guard  Corps 110,000  men; 

Third  Army,  lid,  Xth.  Xllth  and  1st  Corps 125,000  men; 

Fourth  Army,  Vth,  Xlth,  each  one  Baden,  1  Wiirttemburg 

Div.,  2  Bavarian  corps 140,000  men. 

A  total   of   430,000  men. 

The  Third  Army  forms  the  reserve  for  the  other  three. 

A  second  army  reserve  would  have  to  be  formed  of  the 
17th  Division  and  eventually  the  Vlth  Corps,  which  would 
bring  the  fighting  force  to  a  numerical  strength  of  480,000 
men,  and  which  reserve  would  have  to  secure  the  communi- 
cations to  the  rear  of  the  greatly  extended  line  of  operations. 

Concerning  the  Bavarians  specially,  Nordlingen — Wiirz- 
burg is  to  be  recommended  as  a  point  of  concentration  for 
them,  "because  the  concentration  will  first  have  to  be  ef- 
fected in  their  own  territory,  and  because  the  Bavarian 
government  will  willingly  accede  to  these  views,"  the  Bavar- 
ian territory  being  thereby  directly  protected. 

In  case  of  a  French  invasion  there  will  of  course  be  an 
inclination  to  throw  the  1st  Corps  to  Ulm,  and  that  corps 
will  then  draw  on  itself  the  French  fighting  forces,  and  that 
in  a  direction  very  dangerous  to  us.    But  if  the  contingents 


*As  shown  by  a   marginal  notation,   General  v.   Moltke  assumed 
as   Army  Commanders,   Chiefs  of   General    Staff   and   Quartermaster 
Generals  of  these  armies  as  follows:  — 
First  Army — Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  or   General  v.   Herwarth; 

Schlotheim.     Vieth. 
Second  Army — Prince  Frederic  Charles; 

Stiilpnagel.     Strantz. 
Third  Army — v.  Steinmetz; 

Wittlich.     Stiehle. 
Fourth  Army — Crown  Prince; 

Blumenthal.     Stosch. 

—145— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

from  Baden  and  Wiirttemberg  have  joined  our  Fourth 
Army,  the  Bavarian  corps  can  find  support  nowheres. 

For  the  event,  that  we  can  advance  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine  with  all  our  forces,  the  Bavarian  corps  would 
have  to  be  drawn  up  directly  via  Maxau,  Germersheim  and 
Ludwigshafen. 

If,  however,  there  is  no  necessity  for  the  entire  Fourth 
Army  to  advance  towards  Strassburg,  a  position  of  the 
Bavarian  corps  at  Vendenheim  against  Strassburg  might 
be  sufficient  to  secure  to  us,  after  the  forcible  capture  of  the 
barrier-forts,  the  important  Mannheim — Weissemburg — 
Vendenheim — Nancy  R.  R. 

We  might  possibly  also  charge  the  Bavarians  with  an 
investment  of  Strassburg. 


On  May  13,  1868,  a  conference  took  place  in  Berlin  between  Gen- 
eral von  Moltke  and  the  military  plenipotentiaries  of  Bavaria  and 
Wiirttemburg  concernin,e:  the  combined  employment  of  the  North  and 
South  German  fighting  forces  in  case  of  a  war  with  France.  The 
subject  matter  of  his  views  expressed  in  that  conference  General  v. 
Moltke  submitted  to  the  Chancellor,  Count  v.  Bismarck,  as  follows: 

NO.  15 


Berlin,  13  May,  1868. 

Theoretically  speaking,  and  considering  the  existing 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Southern  Germany, 
nothing  will  be  necessary  except  for  the  South  German  con- 
tingents to  be  ready  at  the  proper  time  and  in  full  number 
to  carry  out  the  orders  which  His  Majesty,  the  King  of 
Prussia,  will  issue  in  his  capacity  as  commander-in-chief  in 
accordance  with  the  situation  of  war  with  France.  Prac- 
tically, however,  the  matter  is  different. 

An  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  is  always  an  in- 
complete form  of  mutual  help,  and  has  just  so  much  value,  as 
each  party  of  the  alliance  is  able  to  give  help.  In  this  rela- 
tion conditions  of  proportion  are  by  no  means  equal. 

—146— 


Preparations  for  War 

The  North  furnishes  an  army,  the  South  furnishes  con- 
tingents ;  we  have  a  war  lord,  the  South  but  a  confederation 
commander-in-chief;  the  South  with  the  best  intentions  can 
but  furnish  us  a  coalition. 

The  difference  between  a  Union  army  and  a  coalition 
is  well  shown  by  the  campaign  of  1866. 

Austria  had  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance  with 
Southern  Germany.  It  demanded  no  less  than  that  the 
South  German  contingents  should  unite  with  the  Austrian 
army  in  Bohemia.  With  a  superiority  of  90,000  men  there 
was  a  hope  to  attain  the  main  object  of  the  war.  But  in  this 
plan  the  South  Germans  were  expected  to  leave  their  terri- 
tory defenseless  against  an  invasion  and  it  is  easily  under- 
stood that  they  declined  to  do  so. 

The  same  thing  occurred  in  a  less  degree  with  Bavaria. 
Bavaria  had  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance  with  the 
South  German  States  and  had  the  supreme  command.  Its 
field  marshal  demanded  what  was  entirely  correct  from  a 
military  standpoint,  i.e.,  that  the  VlHth  Confederation 
Corps  join  the  Vllth  Confederation  Corps.  But  Nassau, 
Frankfurt  and  Darmstadt  demanded  protection,  and  an  ad- 
vance was  made  west  around  the  Vosges  Mountains,  where 
a  junction  to  the  front  was  impossible. 

And  vice  versa :  Assuming  that  the  Rhine  land  and 
Westphalia  had  been  a  Sovereign  Grand-Duchy,  would  it 
have  been  possible,  even  with  the  existence  of  a  defensive 
and  offensive  alliance,  for  it  to  send  its  entire  force  out  of 
the  country  and  to  Bohemia,  where  the  decision  was  to  be 
found  ? 

All  special  considerations  may  be  disregarded  in  a 
Union,  in  a  Confederation  they  have  to  be  taken  into  ac- 
count. Consequently  the  question  is  not  to  demand  from 
the  South  Germans  what  is  militarily  correct  for  the  at- 
tainment of  the  war  objective,  but  to  demand  what  they  can 
and  will  perform  with  due  regard  to  their  own  security.  And 
that  may  be  arrived  at  by  discussion. 

An  immediate  offense  in  superior  force,  which  threatens 
the  enemy  in  his  own  country,  which  holds  his  fighting  force 
there,  secures  indirectly  the  whole  of  Germany.  All  states 

—147— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

will  willingly  participate  in  that  offense.  But  for  such  an 
offense  political  initiative  is  required  and  a  readiness  for 
war  which  cannot  be  found  now  in  Southern  Germany. 

Consequently  also  the  first  defensive  protection  of  South 
Germany  has  to  be  considered. 

We  believe  the  lower  as  well  as  the  upper  Rhine  is  best 
protected  by  an  army  on  the  central  Rhine.  The  South 
German  States  need  a  firm  guaranty  that  we  will  be  there 
in  time  and  in  great  strength,  in  order  to  come  to  a  decision 
as  to  their  measures,  and  that  guaranty  I  can  give. 

There  are  two  ways  for  a  defense: 

1.  The  direct,  for  which  the  South  German  States  can 
concentrate  within  their  frontier,  in  order  to  hold  the  Rhine 
Valley  or  the  Black  Forest  from  about  Rottweil,  or  to  at 
least  hold  the  Iller  in  protecting  Ulm.  We  do  not  consider 
this  way  the  correct  one,  but  we  cannot  object  thereto.  That 
in  this  way  a  direct  participation  by  North  German  troops 
is  excluded,  is  the  result  of  long  distance  as  well  as  of  the 
guarding  of  the  independence  of  the  South  German  States. 
This  then  leaves  but — 

2.  The  indirect  defense,  which  bases  itself  on  the  North 
German  fighting  force  on  the  Neckar  and  Main,  advances 
on  the  flank  and  on  the  communications  of  the  invasion 
made  by  the  enemy  and  forces  an  immediate  retreat  of  the 
same.  Two  Prussian  army  corps,  66,000  men,  would  be 
expressly  assigned  to  form,  with  a  combination  Wiirttem- 
berg — Baden  corps  and  two  Bavarian  corps,  a  left  wing 
army  of  140,000  men.  This  army  would  operate  up  the 
Neckar  or  up  the  Rhine,  dependent  on  whether  the  enemy 
has  already  advanced,  and  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  in 
case  the  advance  is  only  threatened.  It  can  be  reinforced 
as  necessary,  if  the  enemy  uses  larger  forces  in  his  under- 
taking against  Southern  Germany,  as  in  that  case  he  will 
weaken  his  forces  in  our  front  by  just  so  much.  If  he 
should  renounce  such  a  precarious  expedition,  as  seems  prob- 
able under  the  conditions,  then  the  left  wing  army  would  at 
once  conform  to  the  movements  of  the  main  army  and  join 
it. 


—148- 


Preparations  for  War 

Of  course  all  this  presupposes  that  the  South  German 
contingents  are  at  hand  at  the  proper  time. 

Considering  the  existing  readiness  for  war  of  our  neigh- 
bors we  must  insist  that  on  the  21st  day,  after  orders  have 
been  issued  in  Berlin  for  the  mobilization  of  the  North 
German  Army,  the  South  German  contingents  are  ready  for 
march  and  transportation  in  larger  detachments  within  their 
territorial  frontiers,  that  the  rolling  stock  of  the  respective 
railroads  is  in  readiness  and  that  each  State  has  taken  proper 
steps  for  the  erection  of  depots  to  subsist  its  troops  and  has 
the  means  of  transport  supplies. 

Concerning  now  specially  the  different  points  of  con- 
centration, we  would  have  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  the 
separate  States,  with  due  regard  to  local  conditions,  and 
special  interests,  as  to  the  following : 

The  Baden  division  assembles  the  troops  garrisoned  in 
the  southern  part  of  the  Grand  Duchy  under  protection  of 
Rastatt,  the  ones  in  the  northern  part  will  join  after  they 
become  disengaged  through  the  advance  of  the  left  wing 
army.  The  Wtirttemberg  division  has  only  to  draw  up  the 
regiments  becoming  disposable  by  cutting  the  Ulm  garrison 
in  half,  to  be  concentrated  at  Stuttgart — Ludwigsburg. 

We  would  counsel  for  Bavaria  a  formation  of  two  army 
corps,  of  which  the  1st  Corps  assembles  at  Nordlingen,  the 
lid  at  Wiirzburg.  The  troops  in  the  Palatinate  would  form 
into  a  strong  brigade  at  Landau,  which  in  case  of  need  re- 
tires on  Germersheim. 

Of  course  in  this  distribution  of  the  South  German 
fighting  forces  not  the  strategic  advance  of  these  but  the 
first  position  of  readiness  made  necessary  by  existing  con- 
ditions, is  meant.  The  actual  junction,  considering  the  lim- 
ited time,  may  have  to  be  made  possibly  during  the  course 
of  operations  against  the  enemy. 

If  a  French  army  should  have  already  crossed  the  Black 
Forest  on  the  21st  day,  the  Prussian  corps  of  the  left  wing 
army  would  advance  in  the  direction  Heilbronn — Ludwigs- 
burg— Stuttgart,  would  receive  the  Wtirttemberg  division, 
and  draw  up  the  lid  Bavarian  Corps  from  Wiirzburg.  Thus 
Ulm  and  the  1st  Bavarian  Corps  would  secure  the  Bavarian 

—149— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

territory  against  the  invasion  of  the  hostile  leading  ele- 
ments. The  left  wing  army  must  under  all  circumstances 
be  made  numerically  superior  to  and  must  immediately  at- 
tack the  hostile  main  force  in  Southern  Germany  in  a  di- 
rection endangering  all  of  that  force's  communications. 

When,  on  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  who  has  advanced 
across  the  Rhine  (as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  cannot  do  other- 
wise) turns  down  the  Rhine  against  our  strong  fighting 
force  concentrated  on  the  Neckar,  then  the  Wiirttemberg 
division  would  immediately  have  to  join,  fully  utilizing  the 
railroads,  the  left  wing  army  going  via  Bruchsal,  and  the 
lid  Bavarian  Corps  also,  going  via  Darmstadt  and  Heidel- 
berg, as  well  as  the  1st  Bavarian  Corps,  via  Stuttgart. 

If  the  decision  to  proceed  to  war  has  been  arrived  at 
in  proper  time  it  at  least  will  not  be  impossible  to  assemble 
the  left  wing  in  the  Palatinate  even  before  the  enemy  crosses 
the  upper  Rhine,  in  order  to  thus  protect,  in  connection 
with  our  main  force,  this  valuable  part  of  German  ground 
and  to  give,  through  an  offensive  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  the  best  security  to  the  south.  This  means  that  the 
entire  South  German  contingents,  utilizing  the  already  men- 
tioned railroads  via  Maxau,  Germersheim  and  Ludwig- 
shafen,  should  join  with  the  Prussian  Corps,  at  the  start, 
in  the  vicinity  of  Landau. 


Based  on  his  discussions  with  the  representatives  of  the  South 
German  Armies,  General  von  Moltke  composed,  in  1868,  the  following 
sketch  of  a  plan,  which  he  revised  and  supplemented  in  January  and 
March  18C9:— 

NO.  16 

A.    First  Concentration  of  the  Army  in  a  War 
With  France  Alone 

In  a  war  which  we  conduct  against  France  alone,  we 
are  in  the  fortunate  situa>tion  of  being  able  to  concentrate 
our  entire  fighting  forces  in  the  Bavarian  Palatinate,  uti- 
lizing six  trunk  lines. 

—150— 


Preparations  for  War 

If  the  French  desire  to  utilize  their  entire  railroad  net, 
they  will  be  compelled  to  concentrate  around  Metz  and 
Strassburg  in  two  groups  separated  by  the  Vosges,  between 
which  we  will  be  in  the  very  start  on  the  inner  line  of 
operations. 

It  would  not  be  justifiable  to  leave  a  part  of  our  field 
army  for  direct  defense  on  the  lower  Rhine.  That  is  pro- 
tected by  Belgium's  neutrality  and,  if  this  should  not  be 
respected,  by  the  distance  of  the  French  frontier  from  ours. 
In  the  Palatinate  we  will  be  as  close  to  Aix-la-Chapelle  and 
Cologne  as  are  the  French  to  Diedenhofen  and  Mezieres. 
Our  operation  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  across  the  Mosel 
takes  the  French  operation  against  the  Rhine  in  rear  and 
compels  the  French  to  make  front  to  the  south  with  all  their 
communications  toward  the  flank. 

It  would  be  just  as  little  justifiable  were  the  South 
Germans  to  try  and  directly  defend  the  upper  Rhine,  or  even 
only  the  Black  Forest.  In  connection  with  the  North  Ger- 
man fighting  forces  and  supported  by  them,  an  advance  from 
the  Palatinate  on  the  left  bank  and  up-stream  will  be  of 
the  utmost  effect,  even  should  the  enemy  have  already 
crossed  the  stream. 

But  the  most  assured  protection  to  the  strong  lower, 
as  well  as  to  the  weaker  upper  Rhine  would  be  given  by 
a  decisive  offensive  with  superior  fighting  forces  into  France, 
and  it  requires  but  a  timely  concentration  of  the  means  at 
hand  to  take  that  offensive. 

Four  armies  would  have  to  be  formed : 

MEN 

First    (right  wing)    Army  around   Wittlich,  Vlllth 

and   Vllth   Army   Corps   60,000 

Second     (main)     Army    at    Neunkirchen — Homburg 

Illd,  IVth,  Xth  and  Guard  Corps 130,000 

Third     (left    wing)     Army — at    Landau, — Vth    and 

Xlth    Army    Corps    1         60,000 

with    the    latter    two    South    German    army  [ 

corps   later    J         80,000 

Fourth    (reserve)    Army  in  front  of   Mayence,  the 
combined   IXth    Corps    (18th   Hessian,    Inf.    1 

Div.)  and  Xllth  Army  Corps I        60,000 

And  eventually  the   1st,  lid  and  Vlth  Corps  J       100,000 

We  can  count  on  300,000  Prussian  combatants  for  the 
offensive,  and  under  favorable  conditions  on  500,000. 

—151— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

First  Army 
Vlllth  Army  Corps. 

The  Vlllth  and  Vllth  Army  Corps  are  to  be  assembled 
in  the  shortest  possible  time  in  the  vicinity  of  Wittlich — 
Bernkastel-on-the-Mosel. 

To  protect  this  concentration  the  garrison  of  Trier 
forms  the  advance  guard  and  should  be  reinforced  imme- 
diately by  at  least  one  battery  from  Coblenz  by  rail,  by 
steamer  or  by  forced  marches.  The  detachment  must  hold 
positions  as  near  Trier,  Schweich  or  Wittlich  as  possible. 

The  battalion  of  the  69th  Regiment  joins  the  garrison 
in  Saarbriicken.  It  falls  back  in  the  direction  of  St.  Wendel, 
but  only  when  forced  to  do  so,  and  tries  to  protect  the  rail- 
road as  long  as  possible,  the  destruction  of  which  is  to  occur 
only  when  directly  ordered  by  superior  headquarters. 

In  order  to  affect  the  concentration  of  the  remaining 
troops  of  the  army  corps,  it  appears  best  to  direct  the  29th 
Regiment,  the  remainder  of  the  3d  Battalion  Foot  Artillery, 
and  the  Jager  battalion  (to  be  brought  up  from  Wetzlar  by 
rail  to  Boppard)  to  the  vicinity  of  Bernkastel  by  the  road 
via  Castellaun. 

The  60th,  67th  and  72d  Regiments  will  be  transported 
on  the  10th  and  11th  day  to  Andernach  and  Coblenz 
and  with  the  mounted  battalion  of  the  artillery  regiment 
and  the  pioneer  battalion  march  by  the  road  via  Kaiseresch 
to  Wittlich. 

It  will  be  advisable  to  have  the  33d  Regiment,  which 
will  complete  its  organization  on  the  16th  day,  brought  by 
steamer  to  Andernach  and  let  it  follow  on  the  same  road. 

The  8th  Cuirassier  Regiment  and  the  7th  Hussar  Regi- 
ment can  march  via  Adenau  and  in  addition  the  1st  Bat- 
talion of  the  Artillery  Regiment. 

The  28th  Regiment  and  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  Artillery 
are  to  be  sent  via  Priim  and  from  there  according  to  cir- 
cumstances to  Trier  or  Wittlich.  Only  in  case  (which  is 
very  improbable)  that  this  march  will  be  endangered  from 
Luxemburg,  the  troops  in  Aix-la-Chapelle  and  Jiilich  will 
first  have  to  be  drawn  back  to  the  Rhine. 

—152— 


Preparations  for  War 

Thus,  the  concentration  of  the  entire  corps,  except  the 
33d  Regiment,  in  the  district  Trier — Wittlich — Gonzerath 
can  be  completed  by  the  evening  of  the  16th  day  of  the  mobil- 
ization. 

To  be  able  to  assemble  it  on  the  left  as  well  as  on  the 
right  bank,  it  is  advisable  to  throw  a  boat  bridge  at  Bern- 
kastel  even  before  the  arrival  of  the  ponton  train. 

On  the  14th  already  the  advance  guard  can  be  reinforced 
by  three  battalions,  four  squadrons,  and  several  batteries. 

Vllth  Army  Corps. 

According  to  the  travel  and  march  tables  sketched  out 
for  the  Vllth  Army  Corps,  it  will  use  the  railroad  lines 
Buende  —  Rhine  —  Unna  —  Cologne — Diiren — Call  and  the 
14th  Infantry  Division  the  line  via  Viersen  to  Eupen. 

Only  the  pioneer  troops  will  start  by  marching  from 
Deutz. 

Considering  that  the  road  from  Call  to  Wittlich  will  be 
taxed  to  its  full  capacity,  it  is  advisable  to  establish  an  aux- 
iliary depot  and  a  line  of  communications  headquarters  in 
Stadtkyll. 

In  this  manner  the  troops  of  the  corps,  exclusive  of 
their  trains,  will  be  concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Wittlich 
on  the  evening  of  the  17th  mobilization  day. 

The  entire  corps  with  all  of  its  columns  and  trains 
will  be  ready  and  able  to  take  up  operations  in  Wittlich 
on  the  20th  day,  at  Trier  on  the  21st  day. 

This  means  that  the  First  Army,  after  the  close  of 
the  17th  day,  can  enter  a  battle  at  Wittlich,  or  march  off  in 
any  ordered  direction,  with  50  battalions,  32  squadrons  and 
30  batteries — a  total  of  60,000  men. 

The  advance  guard  in  Trier  will  probably  have  to  be 
reinforced  earlier  than  that,  according  to  circumstances. 

Headquarters  of  the  First  Army  will  have  to  regulate 
the  station  of  the  troops  arriving  successively  at  Wittlich, 
and  the  Supply  Department  will  have  to  take  proper  steps 
in  advance  for  their  subsistence  in  crowded  cantonments, 
which  presumably  will  be  for  but  a  very  short  time. 

—153— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

SECOND  ARMY 

Illd,  IVth,  Xth  and  Guard  Corps. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  troop  trains  we  will  learn  from 
the  weak  detachment  at  Saarbrucken  (2  battalions,  4  squad- 
rons of  the  Vlllth  A.  C.)  to  what  extent  and  in  what 
direction  the  Nahe  and  the  Ludwig  railroad  can  be  used  in 
the  Palatinate. 

On  these  lines,  of  which  the  latter  is  protected  in  the 
very  start  by  a  Bavarian  brigade  at  Landau,  the  first  de- 
tachments of  the  Hid  and  IVth  Army  Corps  will  arrive 
early  on  the  12th  day.  These  then  detrain  as  far  to  the  front 
as  circumstances  will  allow,  in  order  to  first  support  the 
detachment  of  the  Vlllth  Corps,  then  to  relieve  it  and  to 
protect  the  railroads;  they  will  also  eventually  move  more 
to  the  rear  in  order  to  drive  off  weaker  hostile  detachments 
which  may  already  have  invaded  the  country. 

The  two  above  mentioned  corps  will  have  their  full 
quota  of  troops  on  the  15th  day  and  will  take  a  position  in 
front  of  the  line  Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken  (about  near 
Bildstock  and  St.  Ingbert),  behind  which  position  the  Xth 
and  the  Guard  Corps  will  debark  hy  the  19th  day  at  Neun- 
kirchen and  at  Homburg. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  day  after  mobilization  then, 
the  troops  of  the  entire  Army,  but  without  trains,  will  be 
concentrated ;  about  104  battalions,  107  squadrons,  and  60 
batteries — about  130,000  combatants. 

It  is  not  probable  that  by  that  time  a  stronger  French 
army  will  have  crossed  the  frontier.  Should  this  be  the 
case,  then  the  Second  Army  will  have  to  fall  back  in  the 
direction  of  Kaiserslautern  on  the  Reserve  Army,  in  which 
case  the  railroads  in  rear  of  Neunkirchen  and  Homburg 
should  be  but  temporarily  interrupted. 

If  on  the  other  hand  the  Second  Army  holds  the  posi- 
tion on  the  frontier,  its  headquarters  can  ordsr  a  reconnais- 
sance of  four  cavalry  divisions,  supported  by  infantry, 
against  the  Mosel  district  Thionville — Nancy  to  gain  in- 
formation concerning  the  enemy. 

—154— 


Preparations  for  War 

THIRD  ARMY 

Vth,  Xlth  Corps,  1st,  and  lid  Bavarian  Corps, 
WUrttemberg  ayid  Baden  Division. 

By  the  arrival  of  the  two  infantry  Divisions  of  the 
Vth  Army  Corps,  the  Bavarian  position  at  Landau  will  be 
reinforced  between  the  13th  to  the  15th  mobilization  day. 
By  noon  of  the  18th  mobilization  day  the  troops  of  the  Vth 
Army  Corps  will  have  arrived,  and  also,  by  marching  and 
partly  by  rail,  the  larger  part  of  the  Xlth  Army  Corps, 
about  44  battalions,  40  squadrons,  26  batteries,  a  total  of 
about  55,000  Prussian  combatants,  which  will  find  a  strong 
position  behind  the  Kling  creek. 

(Bridge  at  Maxau  to  be  kept  intact  and  protected. 
Rastatt  to  be  occupied  by  the  34th  Regiment ;  supplies,  rein- 
forcements, etc.,  to  be  sent  there.  A  Prussian  engineer 
officer  to  be  sent  to  Rastatt.) 

The  arrival  of  the  South  Germans  has  been  promised 
by  that  day,  which  would  augment  the  Third  Army  to  a 
strength  of  about  150,000  men. 

Here  also  army  headquarters  will  order  a  reconnais- 
sance by  the  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Strassburg. 

FOURTH   (RESERVE)   ARMY 

Combined  IXth  Corps,  Saxon  Xllth  Corps  and  even- 
tually 1st  and  lid  Corps. 

By  the  twentieth  mobilization  day  there  can  be  as- 
sembled in  an  extremely  favorable  battle  position  at  Marn- 
heim  on  the  road  to  Kaiserlautern  : 

The  18th  and  the  Hessian  Division  (concentrated  at 
Worms)  combined  as  the  IXth  Army  Corps,  and  the  Xllth 
Army  Corps,  in  the  start  60,000  men,  which  will  immedi- 
ately be  followed  by  reserve  artillery  and  by  the  cavalry. 

Had  the  Second  Army  been  forced  to  retreat,  we  would 
accept  the  decisive  battle  at  Mannheim  with  about  160,000 
men  (six  complete  army  corps). 

The  Vth  and  Xlth  Army  Corps  undoubtedly  can  also 
be  brought  up  in  time  from  the  Third  Army,  and  that  with- 
in three  marches. 

—155— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Furthermore,  the  corps  of  the  First  Army  concentrated 
on  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  days  at  Wittlich  (in  so  far 
as  they  do  not  have  important  fighting  forces  in  their  front, 
which,  however,would  then  also  be  absent  from  the  French 
fighting  forces)  can  be  started  in  the  direction  of  Lauter- 
ecken  to  the  enemy's  left  flank  and  rear. 

Presupposing  timely  arrival,  on  the  twentieth  day 
300,000  men  (nine  complete  corps,  even  if  the  Vllth  cannot 
come  up)  can  be  engaged  together,  and  this  fighting  force 
can  be  materially  strengthened  in  the  next  succeeding  days ; 
if  at  all  possible  the  1st,  lid  and  the  Vlth  Army  Corps 
should  also  be  brought  up. 

If  the  Second  Army  has  maintained  its  position,  then 
the  Fourth  (Reserve)  Army  can  have  reached  the  former's 
immediate  rear  by  the  evening  of  the  twenty-first  day. 

All  army  corps  will  be  completely  supplied  with  their 
trains  only  by  the  twenty-third  or  twenty-fourth  day,  still 
the  offensive  can  commence  on  the  twenty-second. 

Should  it  be  found  that  the  hostile  main  force  turns 
through  Luxemburg  or  finally  through  Belgium  against  the 
lower  Rhine,  then  in  a  movement  against  the  north  the 
First  Army  would  form  the  advance  guard  behind  the  Mosel, 
the  Second  Army  the  left,  the  Fourth  the  right  wing,  and 
the  Third  Army  would,  according  to  conditions,  advance 
offensively  against  Strassburg  or  against  Metz. 

Consequently  the  proposed  concentration  makes  it  pos- 
sible to  accept  a  defensive  battle  in  front  of  the  Rhine  on 
the  twentieth  day  after  commencement  of  mobilization  and 
with  probably  superior  numbers,  and  to  advance  offensively 
in  a  westerly  direction  across  the  frontier  on  the  twenty- 
second  day  with  300,000  men.  Whether  or  not  the  1st,  lid 
and  Vlth  Corps,  still  in  rear,  can  also  be  drawn  up  to  the 
Rhine  can  be  ascertained  then.  Possibly  it  will  always 
be  necessary  to  send  one  division  from  one  of  these  corps 
to  relieve  the  Xllth  Corps  in  Dresden. 


-158— 


Preparations  for  War 

COAST  DEFENSE 

For  active  defense  of  our  coast  four  Landwehr  divi- 
sions will  be  organized  and  that  at  the  same  time  as  the 
above  discussed  main  concentration  of  the  army. 

1st  District. — Emden — Bremerhaven;  in  addition  to 
8,000  men  local  garrisons,  the  3d  Landwehr  Division — 10,800 
men — at  Bremen. 

2d  District. — Hamburg — Wismar;  in  addition  to  local 
garrison  (17,750  men),  the  mobile  17th  Infantry  Division 
— 15,000  men — at  Hamburg. 

As  a  reserve  for  both,  the  mobile  Guard  Landwehr 
Division,  15,000  men,  in  Hanover. 

Thus  we  can  concentrate  about  40,000  men  for  defense 
of  the  North  Sea  coast. 

3d  District. — Stralsund — Colberg;  in  addition  to  local 
garrisons,  the  2d  Landwehr  Division,  10,400  men,  at  Stettin. 

4th  District. — Danzig — Memel ;  in  addition  to  local  gar- 
risons, the  1st  Landwehr  Division,  10,400  men,  at  Elbing. 

A  total  of  about  60,000  men. 

Should  a  French  landing  expedition  be  intended,  it 
undoubtedly  will  occur  in  the  North  Sea  and  probably  in 
the  very  first  stages  of  hostilities.  If  the  French  fighting 
forces  are  attacked  in  their  own  country,  the  French  will 
hardly  undertake  such  an  operation. 

The  coast  divisions  (the  mobile  ones  first)  would  then 
be  available  to  guard  the  lines  of  communications  to  the  rear. 

Should  Denmark  participate  in  the  war,  then  it  may 
become  necessary  to  bring  up  the  17th  Infantry  Division  to 
support  the  18th  in  the  Duchies. 

Should*  the  French  occupy  Belgium  they  must  utilize 
at  least  120,000  men  for  that  purpose,  in  order  to  occupy 
Brussels  and  to  besiege,  invest  or  at  least  observe  the  Bel- 
gian army  assembled  in  Antwerp. 

But  as  this  procedure  cannot  be  tolerated  by  either 
England  or  Prussia,  France  will  be  forced  to  at  once  place 
all  of  its  fighting  forces  on  a  war  footing.     In  addition  to 


*Here  commences  the  addition  to  the  memorial  composed  on  the 
10th  of  March,  1869. 

—157— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Rome  and  Algiers  it  would  have  to  observe  the  western  fron- 
tier and  the  north  coast.  After  garrisoning  the  fortresses 
of  Paris  and  Lyons,  it  would  have  about  180,000  men  to 
carry  out  its  offensive. 

It  surely  cannot  be  their  intention  to  await  develop- 
ment of  events  retaining  this  large  force  in  a  passive  at- 
titude; on  the  whole,  the  entire  matter  might  only  be  the 
start  of  a  war  against  Germany,  and,  of  course,  in  a  direc- 
tion which  is  the  least  dangerous  to  us. 

Should  the  French  main  force  be  concentrated  in  the 
vicinity  of  Metz — Strassburg,  the  two  armies  would  in  two 
separate  theaters  of  war,  160  to  200  [English]  miles  dis- 
tant, and  without  possibility  of  mutual  support. 

Should  the  Hollanders  join  a  French  alliance,  this  rein- 
forcement would  be  offset  by  an  English  landing  in  Ant- 
werp. 

The  French  North  Army  would  be  contained  in  Belgium 
and  could  not  undertake  anything  serious  against  our  line 
of  fortresses  on  the  Rhine.  We  would  assemble  in  the  Rhine 
Palatinate  all  disposable  forces  against  the  South  Army, 
would  take  the  offensive  with  a  superiority  of  100,000  men, 
would  frustrate  a  march  by  the  enemy  via  Luxemburg 
to  Aix-la-Chapelle  to  join  the  North  Army,  would  force  the 
South  Army  back  on  Paris,  and  would  at  the  same  time 
force  the  evacuation  of  Belgium. 

If  the  French  enter  Belgium  at  all,  they  can  do  so  only 
by  concentrating  their  main  force  on  the  line  Lille — Mezi- 
eres  and  advancing  through  Belgium  across  the  Maas. 

That  would  mean  that  they  will  reach  our  frontier  from 
ten  to  fourteen  days  later  than  they  could  from  the  line 
Metz — Strassburg;  that  they  have  no  hope  of  receiving 
support  in  Southern  Germany ;  and  that  they  will  have  to 
weaken  their  army  by  at  least  80,000  men  by  investing 
Antwerp.  They  could  then  reach  our  Rhine  front  with 
hardly  more  than  200,000  men. 

According  to  my  view,  we  could  meet  such  a  procedure 
more  effectively  if  we  advance  against  the  French  from  the 
Mosel  than  were  we  to  appear  from  the  Rhine  fortresses  in 
the  front.     We  could  compel   the   French   to  make   front 

—158— 


Preparations  for  War 

towards  the  south,  which  would  leave  all  their  communica- 
tions on  the  flank. 

The  distance  from  Maubeuge  to  Cologne  is  larger  than 
that  from  Homburg  to  Cologne.  Supposing  that  mobili- 
zation starts  at  the  same  time  on  both  sides,  we  would 
arrive  in  good  time  from  the  Palatinate,  still  we  could  do 
that  quicker  from  Coblenz  and  Mayence  on  a  shorter  road. 

If  we  desired  to  advance  on  Paris  with  our  main  force 
from  the  Palatinate,  not  paying  any  attention  to  the  in- 
vasion of  the  French  main  force,  then  we  would  reach  the 
vicinity  on  the  other  side  of  the  Argonne  Forest,  as  we 
would  find  no  resistance,  at  about  the  same  time  that  the 
French  would  reach  our  frontier  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  We 
are  120  [English]  miles,  the  French  320  [English]  miles 
from  the  opponent's  capital. 

Still  a  mere  advance  on  fortified  Paris  would  of  course 
not  bring  matters  to  a  decision,  and  we  might  better  oper- 
ate from  the  line  Luxemburg — Pont-a-Mousson,  converg- 
ing along  the  Mosel  in  the  direction  of  Sedan.  From  there 
we  will  at  one  and  the  same  time  threaten  Paris  and  com- 
pel the  French  army  to  return  from  Belgium,  to  make  front 
against  us  and  accept  our  battle,  without  which  the  war 
cannot  be  ended. 

That  operation  would  bring  the  conditions  between 
both  sides  to  a  crisis.  We  conduct  the  operation  in  a  hos- 
tile country,  but  that  country  might  also  be  in  a  state  of 
insurrection  at  the  same  time ;  we  have  no  railroad  behind 
us  and  weaken  ourselves  at  Thionville,  Metz  and  Verdun. 
The  result  of  the  loss  of  the  battle  could  not  be  calculated, 
still  in  the  battle  we  will  be  the  stronger,  as  the  French 
will  have  to  leave  a  part  of  their  forces  opposed  to  the  Bel- 
gium army,  or  will,  should  they  march  off,  draw  the  Bel- 
gians after  them. 

We  would  gain  the  same  advantage  with  less  danger 
if  we  advance  from  the  line  Luxemburg — Trier — Coblenz 
converging  on  Luttich,  in  which  case  of  course  we  would 
have  to  march  through  the  Eifel,  Ardennes  and  Hohe  Venn. 

In  order  to  reach  the  line  Coblenz — Luxemburg  for  our 
first  position  no  material  changes  are  necessary  in  the  meas- 

—159— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

ures  already  sketched  out  for  the  concentration  in  the 
Palatinate;  all  that  is  required  would  be  to  stop  the  troop 
transports  at  Coblenz  and  diverge  them  from  Mayence  to 
Bingen  and  Coblenz. 

The  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps  would  be  concen- 
trated on  the  15th  day  of  mobilization  at  Stadtkyll  __60,000  men 

The  Second  Army  can  reach  the  vicinity  of  Luxemburg 
— Trier,  in  3  marches,  even  if  the  route  of  trans- 
port is  not  changed,  consequently  by  the  18th  to 
the  21st  day 130,000  men 

The  Xlth  and  Xllth  Corps,  as  well  as  the  18th  In- 
fantry Division,  can  be  concentrated  at  Coblenz 
by  the   18th  day   73,000  men 

The  Vth  Corps  and  the  Darmstadt  Division,  via  Bingen, 

at  Zell-on-the-Mosel  by  the  20th  day 45,000  men 

In  about  4  to  5  marches,  that  is  by  the  26th  day,  and 

by  converging  marches,  an  army  of  a  total  of 308,000  men 

The  distance  from  Lille — Maubeuge  to  Liittich  could 
be  covered  by  ten  average  marches.  If  we  assume  that  the 
French  will  complete  mobilization  and  march  into  position 
by  the  15th  day,  they  cannot  interfere  with  this  advance. 

B. — First  Concentration  of  the  Army  in  a  War 
Against  France  and  Austria 

In  case  Austria  takes  part  in  a  war  with  France  against 
Prussia,  we  could  not  bring  to  bear  a  superiority  in  num- 
bers towards  either  side  by  a  division  of  our  forces. 

Consequently  the  question  of  first  importance  is: 
against  which  enemy  will  carry  out  a  defensive  at  the  start 
with  weak  forces,  in  order  to  take  the  offensive  against 
the  other  with  as  strong  a  force  as  possible. 

Undoubtedly  the  Rhine  with  its  fortresses  gives  us  a 
better  defensive  line  against  France  than  we  have  against 
Austria.  We  can  count  with  certainty  on  the  fact  that  this 
defensive  line,  supported  by  100,000  men,  will  hold  out  from 
six  to  eight  weeks,  but  we  would  have  Southern  Germany, 
if  not  against  us,  certainly  not  with  us.  The  French  would 
go  around  our  Rhine  front  via  Worms,  and  operate  through 
Franconia  against  Berlin,  and  only  an  offensive  in  strong 
force  from  the  Palatinate  can  prevent  them  from  doing  so. 
To  this  is  to  be  added  that  the  Austrians  probably  will  not 

—160— 


Preparations  for  War 

accept  a  battle  in  Bohemia  nor  in  Moravia,  but  will  await 
the  effects  of  a  French  invasion  in  a  fortified  camp  at  Olmiitz 
or  behind  the  Danube,  which  might  then  easily  bring  our 
offensive  to  a  standstill. 

Austria — at  the  present  time  having  but  100  men  per 
battalion — will  hardly  be  ready  as  soon  as  we  will  if  we 
commence  mobilization  early  for  an  unavoidable  war,  and 
we  may  have  a  free  hand  from  six  to  eight  weeks. 

France  not  only  is  our  most  dangerous  enemy,  but  also 
the  one  most  ready.  If  we  invade  French  territory,  French 
pride  will  not  wait  for  Austria,  we  will  be  attacked  at 
once.  If  we  have  superior  numbers  we  may  hope  to  gain  a 
victory  in  the  very  first  few  days.  Such  a  victory  will  prob- 
ably cause  a  change  in  the  French  dynasty.  As  we  desire 
nothing  from  France,  we  may  be  able  to  conclude  an  early 
peace  with  the  new  reigning  power. 

Should  Austria  in  the  meantime  have  actually  occupied 
Silesia,  Brandenburg  and  the  capital,  if  our  weak  defensive 
army — without  having  been  beaten — had  given  away,  noth- 
ing definite  would  have  happened  to  our  disadvantage. 

Add  to  this,  in  the  west  we  cannot  expect  foreign  sup- 
port and  have  to  be  strong  here  in  consequence,  while  in 
the  east  Russia  would  presumably  give  us  more  or  less  ac- 
tive support.  If  we  advance  against  Vienna,  it  is  true  that 
Russia  has  no  active  interests  in  helping  us;  but  it  is  differ- 
ent if  the  Austrians  threaten  Berlin. 

For  these  reasons  I  would  suggest  concentrating  ten 
army  corps  for  an  immediate  offensive  in  the  Palatinate, 
and  placing  three  army  corps  in  position  against  Austria, 
which,  reinforced  by  the  1st  and  2d  Landwehr  Divisions, 
would  be  of  a  strength  of  about  120,000  men.  The  defense 
of  the  little  endangered  Baltic  coast  will  in  that  case  have 
to  be  abandoned. 

Should  Austria  intend  to  turn  its  entire  force  against 
us,  Russia  would  be  left  completely  free  to  carry  out  its 
probable  intentions  in  the  Orient;  Austria  can  hardly  leave 
the  Wallachia — Moldavia  frontier  entirely  without  troops. 

An  advance  into  Silesia  is  seriously  endangered,  should 
a  Russian  observation  army — concentrated,  say,  at  Czensto- 

—161— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

chau  (on  the  Warsaw — Kattowitz  R.  R.) — commence  oper- 
ations. Such  an  observation  army  presumably  will  be  as- 
sembled in  consideration  of  conditions  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Poland,  and  the  Austrians  will  be  compelled  to  have  an 
army  opposite  it  at  Olmiitz. 

Only  troops  not  required  for  this  army  will  be  avail- 
able for  an  advance  from  Prague  directly  on  Berlin.  This 
is  the  most  dangerous  direction  for  us. 

We  on  our  part  would  have  to  decide  in  the  first  place 
whether  to  base  our  weak  defensive  army  on  the  Oder  or 
on  the  Elbe.  The  former  direction  facilitates  connection  of 
the  fighting  forces  from  Silesia  with  those  which  must  be 
started  to  Dresden — Gorlitz  to  relieve  the  Xllth  Corps. 
A  retreat  behind  the  Oder  brings  us  closer  to  Russian  sup- 
port and  leads  finally  to  the  large  fortresses  on  the  Vistula 
and  to  Danzig,  which,  situated  on  the  sea,  is  more  suited 
than  any  other  of  our  war  depots  to  receive  and  protect 
an  entire  army  for  a  longer  time. 

Still  in  spite  of  these  large  advantages  we  must  con- 
sider that  the  Russian  support  is  not  at  all  assured,  and 
that  it  is  a  dangerous  practice  to  directly  join  a  stronger 
ally.  By  doing  so  the  Prussian  defensive  army  would  lose 
its  independence  and  must  coordinate  its  movements  to  the 
intentions  of  its  ally. 

To  this  is  to  be  added  that  the  probable  advance  of  the 
enemy  directly  on  Berlin  can  be  flanked  closer  and  more 
effectively  from  the  Elbe  than  from  the  Oder. 

In  a  retreat  on  Torgau  we  remain  in  connection  with 
our  main  forces  on  the  Rhine  and  finally  find  a  receiving 
place  in  the  enlarged  Madgeburg,  which,  actively  defended 
by  an  as  yet  unbeaten  army  of  100,000  men,  would  be  diflfi- 
cult  to  attack. 

I  would  therefore  prefer  the  latter  direction,  if  it  can 
be  done. 

Should  the  force  designated  for  the  defense  of  the 
eastern  half  of  the  Monarchy  be  assembled  at  one  point, 
that  point  ought  to  be  Gorlitz,  on  account  of  its  location  and 
railroad  connections,  from  which  we  can  meet  the  advance 

—162— 


Preparations  for  War 

of  the  enemy  in  Silesia  as  well  as  we  can  in  the  Lausitz  or 
in  Saxony. 

Consequently  there  remains  to  be  considered — 

1st.  That  we  cannot  possibly  leave  Silesia  at  the  very 
start  without  troops  and  abandon  it  altogether; 

2d.  that  it  is  not  advisable  to  draw  the  Xllth  Army 
Corps  to  the  Rhine,  if  it  cannot  be  replaced  in  Dresden 
by  at  least  one  infantry  division ; 

3d.  that  even  if  fully  concentrated  we  should  accept  a 
decision  only  under  the  most  favorable  conditions,  as  very 
probably  we  may  be  compelled  to  retreat. 

Consequently,  a  partition  of  forces  appears  to  me  abso- 
lutely necessary. 

Finally,  with  our  forces  combined  we  can  appear  only 
in  Silesia  or  in  Brandenburg  and  the  Austrians  can  advance 
in  both  directions ;  they  can  do  so  in  the  first  direction  with 
a  secondary  army,  the  concentration  of  which  I  presume  to 
be  at  Olmiitz — which  at  the  same  time  would  serve  as  an 
observation  army  against  Russia  and  might  therefore  be 
easily  stopped  from  a  further  advance,  so  that  but  a  weaker 
detachment  may  possibly  be  sufficient  to  guard  Breslau ; 
but  in  the  latter  direction  the  Austrians  will  advance  with 
their  main  force  via  Dresden  directly  on  Berlin. 

I  believe  the  Vlth  Army  Corps  will  have  to  concentrate 
at  Neisse — Frankenstein,  threatening  via  Glatz  the  hostile 
main  railroad  at  Wildenschwerdt.  A  detachment  in  the 
fortified  camp  at  Cosel,  eventually  supported  by  Landsturm, 
will  serve  for  observation  of  at  least  upper  Silesia.  Com- 
pelled by  superior  numbers,  the  corps  will  fall  back  on 
Liegnitz,  taking  the  hostile  advance  on  Breslau  in  the  flank. 
The  movement  via  Gorlitz  is  protected  by  the  "Riesenge- 
birge"  (the  chain  of  mountains  between  Silesia  and  Bo- 
hemia)  and  facilitated  by  the  railroads. 

The  lid  and  1st  Army  Corps  would  in  general  have  to 
be  drawn  up  to  Dresden,  with  exception  of  the  1st  Division, 
which  should  be  posted  in  Gorlitz  to  keep  up  the  connection 
with  Silesia.  The  two  Landwehr  divisions  would  join  the 
concentration  at  Dresden. 

—163— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

An  advance  on  Dresden  is  difficult  for  the  Austrians 
and  offers  us  a  presumably  fortunate  offensive.  Should  we 
be  compelled  to  retreat,  we  can  do  so  either  on  the  one  or 
the  other  bank  of  the  Elbe  and  at  Riesa,  and  in  any  event  at 
Torgau,  we  cut  loose  from  the  pursuit. 

It  is  not  probable  that  the  Austrians  would  advance  be- 
yond Dresden  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe;  to  reach  Berlin 
they  would  have  to  cross  the  stream  between  our  fortresses 
and  in  the  face  of  our  defensive  army. 

There  are  but  two  through  routes  on  the  right  bank, 
the  highways  via  Herzberg  and  via  Liibben,  which  run 
about  parallel  at  an  average  distance  of  six  miles  from  each 
other.  The  first  has  the  advantage  of  running  along  the 
railroad,  but  it  runs  so  close  to  the  Elbe  that  we  can  reach 
it  via  Torgau  and  even  via  Wittenberg  in  one  march.  The 
enemy  can  hardly  pass  and  pay  no  attention  to  our  army 
there,  which  in  any  case  is  some  60,000  men  strong.  To  at- 
tack that  army  behind  the  covering  Elbe,  is  difficult.  Even 
the  complete  investment  of  the  bridgehead  at  Torgau  and 
of  the  fortress  of  Wittenberg  would  not  give  entire  security 
against  the  army's  advance.  With  that  obstacle  behind  it, 
advancing  straight  against  the  enemy's  line  of  operation, 
against  one  (necessarily  very  deep)  or  several  (in  that  case 
two  marches  distant)  columns  of  the  enemy,  we  would  not 
have  to  be  afraid  of  a  decisive  battle,  as  in  case  of  misfor- 
tune the  river  precludes  pursuit — the  bridges  being  open 
to  us  and  closed  to  the  enemy — and  as  the  connection  with 
Madgeburg  can  not  be  endangered. 

But  in  order  to  guard  Berlin  as  much  as  possible  against 
danger,  at  least  against  hostile  detachments,  one  detach- 
ment would  have  to  directly  retire  on  the  capital  in  addition 
to  the  flank  defense  which  is  so  important  according  to  my 
views.  That  detachment  would  be  composed  of  the  1st 
Division  at  Gorlitz,  and  it  has  to  remain  fully  oriented  as  to 
the  enemy's  advance.  It  is  not  so  easy  for  an  enemy  to 
march  with  weak  forces  into  a  city  of  some  half  a  million  in- 
habitants, as  long  as  there  is  nucleus  of  armed  force  around 
which  armed  resistance  could  rally. 


—164- 


Preparations  for  War 

We  still  have  to  consider  the  position  or  attitude  the 
South  German  States  will  take  in  the  supposed  war  situation, 
and  what  we  can  demand  of  them. 

As  always  with  mere  coalitions,  which  are  not  always 
exactly  what  is  desirable  from  a  military  standpoint,  noth- 
ing is  done  but  what  is  thought  to  be  advantageous  to  both 
parties  to  the  coalition.  It  would  be  entirely  useless  to  stipu- 
late anything  else  in  advance,  because  it  is  never  carried  out. 
We  can  not  expect  of  the  Bavarians  that  they  will  send  their 
entire  fighting  force  to  the  Rhine  Palatinate  and  abandon 
Munich  to  an  Austrian  invasion.  We  cannot  even  demand 
that  they  join  us  behind  the  Iron  Mountains  (Erzgebirge) . 

An  army  in  the  Rhine  Palatinate  would  protect  the 
Rhine  as  far  as  Basle  more  effectively  than  it  could  protect 
the  Bavarian  eastern  frontier  by  a  concentration  around 
Dresden,  seeing  that  Salzburg  is  twice  the  distance,  and  be- 
fore all  because  we,  even  if  united  with  Bavaria,  would 
hardly  be  strong  enough  for  an  offensive  through  which 
such  a  flank  position  gains  its  value. 

The  Bavarians  have  a  vital  interest  in  seeing  their 
Rhine  Palatinate  protected  and  they  will  not  object  to  the 
brigade,  now  there,  joining  our  fighting  forces  at  Landau. 
According  to  my  view  the  Bavarian  main  army  should  con- 
centrate on  the  lower  Inn. 

Passau  offers  a  strong  defensive  position,  the  Danube 
and  the  Isar  secure  the  retreat  on  Regensburg,  and  also  se- 
cures Ingolstadt  against  superior  forces.  But  the  Bavarians, 
in  consideration  of  direct  protection  to  Munich,  may  prefer 
a  concentration  at  Altotting — Tittmoning,*  although  they 
will  always  have  to  fall  back  to  one  side  on  Ingolstadt  if 
opposed  by  a  stronger  army. 

Both  concentrations  are  acceptable  to  us.  They  seri- 
ously threaten  Austria's  capital  and  its  connection  through 
Moravia.  The  Austrians  cannot  do  without  an  observation 
army  against  the  Bavarians  and,  in  order  to  make  that  enemy 
of  no  danger  in  rear,  that  army  must  be  strong,  thereby 


*  Altotting  is  east  of  Munich  near  the  Inn;  Tittmoning  is  on  the 
Salzach,  southeast  of  Altotting;  consequently  a  concentration  between 
the  Inn  and  the  Salzach  would  result. 

—165— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

weakening  the  main  army  some  other  place.  Austria  can- 
not at  one  and  the  same  time  observe  the  Russians  and 
offensively  advance  in  Silesia,  in  the  Lausitz,  or  against  the 
Bavarians.  It  will  be  weak  in  one  of  these  places  and  there 
we  must  take  the  offensive  and  disengage  the  endangered 
auxiliary  army. 

However,  we  could  not  approve  a  concentration  of  the 
Bavarian  forces  say  in  a  fortified  camp  at  Ingolstadt,  to  re- 
main inactive  there. 

Not  only  Baden  but  also  Wurttemberg  are  threatened 
sooner  and  more  directly  by  France  than  by  Austria.  Their 
contingents  would  have  to  be  sent  to  the  Rhine  Palatinate 
as  has  already  been  agreed  on. 

There  would  be  then  disposable  there,  inclusive  of  a 
Bavarian  brigade: 

North  Germans  310,000  men 

South   Germans   40,000  men 

350,000  men 

French  active  army 336,000  men 

Deduct:  in  Algiers 35,000  men 

in  Rome 5,000  men     40,000  men 

296,000  men 

From  this  total  should  be  deducted  the  necessary  line 
troops  for  the  fortresses  Strassburg,  Metz,  Thionville, 
Lille,  etc.,  and  for  Paris  and  Lyons,  at  least  if  we  get  ahead 
of  the  French  offensive.  Even  if  there  is  no  necessity,  con- 
sidering conditions  in  Spain,  for  placing  an  observation 
corps  near  the  Pyrenees,  we  will  have  hardly  more  than 
250,000  men  in  the  first  line  opposed  to  us. 

The  French  Reserve  Army,  93,000  men,  has  still  to  be 
organized. 

Of  our  immediately  available  Landwehr  divisions  we 
can  utilize  at  least  35,000  men  against  the  west. 

Consequently : 

350,000  men  against     295,000  men 
35,000  men  against       93,000  men 
and  reserves 

A  total  of 

385,000  men  against     343,000  men. 

—166— 


Preparations  for  War 


The  Bavarians  surely  would  put  forward  their  best  efforts  for 
the  protection  of  their  own  country. 

Under  such  conditions  their  strength  might  be  estir«ated 
as    50,000  men 

Opposed  to  Austria  there  would  be  (Prussians) 110,000  men 


a  total  of  160,000  men, 

but  these  would  be  in  separate  groups  without  direct  mutual 
support.  There  is  no  doubt  but  what  the  Austrians  can  ad- 
vance with  superior  numbers  against  any  of  these  groups, 
but  it  is  just  as  certain  that  these  groups  will  fall  back  and 
that  Austria's  offensive  operations  will  be  materially  hin- 
dered by  the  other  groups. 

As  soon  as  we  are  able  to  have  a  part  of  our  fighting 
forces  available  against  the  French,  we  will  assure  our- 
selves, as  well  as  to  the  Bavarians,  the  greatest  help,  by 
bringing  up  the  available  troops  to  the  Danube  via  Stutt- 
gart and  Wiirzburg. 


NO.  17 

To  Colonel  Veith  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Count 
Wartensleben* 

Berlin,  1  December,  1868. 

It  should  be  considered,  whether  it  would  be  advisable 
to  transport  the  available  artillery  ahead  of  the  reserve 
cavalry. 

With  the  Second  Army,  which  is  more  or  less  on  out- 
post, numerous  artillery  would  be  an  impediment  in  case  of  a 
necessary  retreat.    Strong  cavalry  would  be  a  great  help. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  artillery  is  of  more  value  than 
the  cavalry  in  the  strong  position  at  Mannheim. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  a  large  cavalry  reconnaissance 
can  be  dispensed  with  up  to  the  28th  day,  because  we  will 
be  ready  for  operations  only  from  the  30th  to  the  36th 
day. 


*Chiefs  of  Sections,  Great  General  Staff. 

—167— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

I  leave  it  to  you  whether  or  not  changes  can  be  made  in 
the  march  and  travel  tables,  in  order  to  make  the  Second 
Army  ready  for  operations  as  early  as  possible,  even  at  the 
cost  of  the  Reserve  Army. 

In  any  case  it  appears  advisable  to  me  to  complete  the 
full  equipment  of  the  Vth  Corps  ahead  of  the  Xllth  Corps. 
If  a  front  has  to  be  made  against  the  south,  the  latter  corps 
will  in  any  case  have  to  be  relieved  first. 


In  the  winter  of  1868-69,  General  v.  Moltke  again  worked  out  a 
memorial,  in  which  he  fully  discussed  the  first  position  of  the  army 
in  a  war  against  France  and  against  Austria  at  one  and  the  same 
time,  and  also  in  a  war  with  the  former  alone.  This  work,  published 
in  part  in  the  General  Staff  Account  of  the  War  of  1870-71,  has 
Moltke's  own  notation:  "Applies  also  to  1870."  During  1869  and  1870 
this  work  was  revised  several  times,  the  last  time  in  July  1870. 

NO.  18 
First  Position  of  the  Army 

If  the  political  situation  brings  about  a  war  of  France 
against  Prussia,  then  the  attitude  of  Austria  will  be  either 
decidedly  hostile  or  at  least  very  doubtful. 

Should  we  oppose  one  half  of  our  army  to  each  of  these 
two  powers,  we  would  be  superior  to  neither.  Therefore 
the  first  thing  to  be  considered  is:  against  which  enemy 
will  we  in  the  start  assume  the  defensive  with  minor  forces, 
in  order  to  advance  offensively  as  strong  as  possible  against 
the  other? 

The  Rhine  with  its  fortresses  undoubtedly  affords  us  a 
defensive  line  against  France,  which  we  have  not  against 
Austria — a  line  which  100,000  men  can  hold  from  four  to 
six  weeks  against  any  and  all  superior  numbers. 

But  in  a  defensive  attitude  against  that  side  we  would 
hardly  have  South  Germany  with  us,  if  we  do  not  have  it 
against  us.  The  French  would  go  around  our  Rhine  front 
via  Worms  to  operate  through  Franconia  against  Berlin, 
while  our  main  force,  even  after  successful  operations, 
would  come  to  a  stand  possibly  in  front  of  Olmiitz  or  on  the 

—168— 


Preparations  for  War 

Danube.  It  would  not  at  all  be  impossible  for  the  Austrians 
to  decline  to  accept  a  decision  in  Bohemia  or  Moravia,  and 
await  behind  their  defensive  lines  the  success  of  their  allies. 
In  financial  straits,  with  weak  peace  cadres,  Austria  re- 
quires in  any  case  a  longer  time  to  complete  its  mobilization, 
and  it  is  very  probable  that  we  will  have  a  free  hand  against 
France  for  some  six  to  eight  weeks,  if  we  take  the  initiative. 

Neither  Austria  nor  France  is  strong  enough  to  carry 
on  a  war  without  allies  against  Northern  Germany.  As 
soon  as  Austria  commences  its  mobilization,  we  ought  to 
immediately  declare  war  against  France.  We  should  not  be 
kept  from  doing  this  by  the  fact  of  being  the  aggressor,  for 
we  may  be  sure  that  Austria  will  not  mobilize,  before  an  un- 
derstanding has  been  arrived  at  betw^een  both  powers  as  to 
an  advance,  for  which  France  merely  gives  its  ally  time  to 
prepare. 

If  we  invade  French  territory,  then  French  sentiment 
will  not  wait  for  Austria.  France  is  not  only  the  most 
dangerous  but  the  most  ready  enemy,  and  we  will  be  cer- 
tain to  encounter  this  enemy  very  soon.  The  size  of  the 
armies,  their  limited  space  for  concentration  and  the  diffi- 
culties of  subsistence  and  supply,  indicate  a  quick  decision 
as  far  as  both  sides  are  concerned,  and  we  may  say  with 
certainty,  that  in  the  first  few  weeks  a  contact  will  be  had, 
which,  in  case  of  being  to  our  advantage,  would  cause  Aus- 
tria to  return  its  half-drawn  sword  to  the  scabbard. 

Had  the  Austrians  completed  their  armament  and  con- 
centration while  we  were  seeking  a  rapid  decision  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Rhine,  had  they  occupied  Silesia  and  a  part 
of  the  provinces  of  Brandenburg  and  Prussia,  then  surely 
nothing  definite  would  have  been  lost,  as  long  as  our  fort- 
resses there  hold  their  own  and  as  long  as  the  defensive 
army  there  retreats  unbeaten.  It  is  probable  that  after  the 
first  unsuccessful  battle  a  change  in  the  dynasty  will  occur 
in  France,  and  as  we  do  not  desire  to  take  anything  away 
from  France  we  may  soon  be  able  to  come  to  terms  with 
the  new  government  or  new  monarchy. 

Considering  all  these  reasons,  I  suggest  that  we  desig- 
nate ten  army  corps  for  an  offensive  against  France,  and 

—169— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

three  army  corps  for  a  defensive  against  Austria.  For  the 
reinforcement  of  the  latter  and  for  the  active  defense  of  the 
coast,  a  mobile  Landwehr  division  should  be  formed,'  and  the 
17th  Division  should  be  kept  back  for  observation  against 
Denmark — that  division  to  be  replaced  in  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  by  the  Hessian  Division. 

It  is  self-evident  that  all  forces  should  be  employed 
against  France  if  we  have  to  fight  against  it  alone  for  a 
longer  time. 

1. — Defense  Against  Austria 

It  is  hard  to  state  in  advance  with  what  numerical  su- 
periority Austria  can  take  the  field  against  us,  but  it  is 
certain  that  that  country's  superiority  will  develop  only 
with  the  progress  of  its  mobilization  and  armament. 

In  1866  Austria  put  340,000  men  in  the  field,  which  took 
it  four  months.  There  is  no  reason  to  assume  that  at  the 
present  time  it  could  arm  and  mobilize  more  quickly  or  in 
stronger  force. 

Interior  conditions  of  the  Empire  will  hardly  allow  the 
provinces  to  be  stripped  of  all  troops;  considerations  in  re- 
spect to  other  countries,  especially  Russia,  and  possibly  also 
Bavaria,  will  compel  Austria  to  place  troops  also  on  other 
frontiers  besides  the  Prussian  frontier.  It  is  not  to  be  as- 
sumed that  Austria  will  leave  a  free  hand  to  Russia  in  the 
Danube  Principalities  nor  in  Galicia  in  order  to  employ  all 
its  forces  against  us.  If  Russia,  not  counting  the  Caucasian 
Army,  places  in  the  field 

8  inf.  divisions  at  Bender; 
12  inf.  div.  and  2  cav.  div.  at  Wolocysk; 
2  inf.  divisions  against  Brody, 

it  can  still  concentrate  18  infantry  divisions  and  2  cavalry 
divisions  in  a  comparatively  short  time  around  Czenstochau, 
which  would  threaten  the  rear  of  any  advance  through 
Silesia. 

It  seems  probable  that  Austria  will  be  forced  to  con- 
centrate an  observation  army  possibly  at  Olmiitz  and  event- 
ually on  the  lower  Inn,  and  then  only  the  remainder  of  its 
fighting  forces,  exclusive  of  many  garrisons,  could  be  utilized 
against  us. 

—170— 


Preparations  for  War 

Even  if  Russia  does  not  actually  interfere  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign,  all  Austrian  operations  in  Silesia 
are  endangered  from  the  Russian  side  in  the  degree  in  which 
they  advance. 

Consequently  all  considerations  make  it  apparent  that 
the  Austrians  will  march  from  Bohemia  directly  on  Berlin, 
and  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe,  as  otherwise  they  would 
have  to  re-cross  that  stream  between  our  fortresses  and 
in  the  face  of  our  defense. 

Therefore  we  must  take  our  measures  primarily  against 
such  an  operation. 

With  due  regard  to  the  most  rapid  and  combined  as- 
sembly of  all  of  the  North  German  army  corps  it  is  advis- 
able to  designate  the  1st  and  lid  for  the  defensive  against 
Austria  and  to  reinforce  them  by  the  1st  and  3d  mobile 
Landwehr  divisions  to  83,600  men.  Under  the  pressure  of 
the  moment  the  active  defense  of  the  Baltic  sea  coast  must 
be  left  to  the  forces  now  stationed  for  defense  on  the  North 
Sea,  and  this  can  be  done,  because  there  is  little  probability 
of  an  expedition  in  the  North  Sea. 

Furthermore,  there  would  remain  disposable  for  defense 
in  Silesia  the  Vlth  Army  Corps  with  a  strength  of  30,000 
men  and  adding  to  it  the  above  82,600  men  would  give  a 
total  of  113,600  men. 

To  assemble  that  force  at  one  point,  for  instance  at 
Gorlitz,  is  not  allowable. 

On  the  one  hand  it  would  not  be  justifiable  were  we  to 
take  all  the  troops  from  Silesia,  and  on  the  other  hand  we 
could  not  draw  off  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  from  Dresden  be- 
fore it  is  relieved,  and  that  by  at  least  one  Prussian  division. 

The  Silesian  Army  Corps  can  best  be  concentrated  on 
the  line  Nisse — Frankenstein  to  guard  the  frontier  and  to 
threaten,  via  Glatz,  the  enemy's  main  railroad  at  Wilden- 
schwerdt. 

Should  the  enemy  enter  Silesia  at  all,  he  would  do  so 
with  that  part  of  his  army,  the  concentration  of  which  I  pre- 
suppose to  be  at  Olmiitz,  which  must  at  the  same  time  serve 
for  observation  against  the  Russians,  and  the  operations  of 
which  consequently  can  be  made  more  difficult  by  having  to 

—171— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

detach  minor  forces.  Presumably  that  corps  would  not  be 
strong  enough  to  oppose  an  enemy's  advance  on  Breslau, 
but  it  would  flank  such  an  advance  by  retiring  via  Schweid- 
nitz. 

However,  if  the  Austrians  advance  with  their  combined 
forces  against  the  Lausitz,  then  the  bringing  up  of  the  Vlth 
Corps  to  Gorlitz  will  be  protected  against  Bohemia  by  the 
mountains  and  hastened  by  using  two  railroads. 

It  is  also  to  be  presumed  that  the  main  power  of  our 
defensive  army  will  be  too  weak  to  directly  oppose  the  en- 
emy. Retiring  on  Berlin,  it  would  draw  the  enemy  after  it 
to  that  place,  which  is  just  his  objective,  or  the  decision 
would  have  to  be  accepted  in  the  open  field  this  side  of  the 
capital. 

Better  success  is  promised  by  a  flank  position,  which 
can  be  based  on  the  Oder  or  on  the  Elbe,  or  both  at  one  and 
the  same  time.  For  the  former,  we  would  take  a  position 
at  Gorlitz,  which  facilitates  connection  with  the  Vlth  Corps 
and  in  which  we  would  be  closer  to  Russian  support.  But 
this  support  is  only  a  conditional  one,  and  it  will  always  re- 
main a  matter  of  grave  doubt  whether  or  not  to  join  a 
stronger  ally  directly,  and  that  means  to  place  ourselves 
under  )iis  orders.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  Elbe  flanks 
a  hostile  advance  on  Berlin,  and  effectively  so,  because  on 
that  stream  our  defensive  army  could  remain  in  connection 
with  our  main  forces  on  the  Rhine  and  finds,  until  it  can 
be  reinforced  from  there,  a  sure  rallying  point  in  the  en- 
larged Madgeburg.  The  Elbe  with  its  fortresses,  affords 
to  an  offensively  conducted  flank  defense  great  advantages 
which  will  be  acceptable  when  opposed  to  a  superior  enemy. 
Each  and  every  advance  from  any  bridge-head  compels 
the  enemy  to  make  front  and  to  fight  with  all  of  his  com- 
munications on  one  flank.  In  case  of  reverses,  we  find 
complete  security  behind  the  stream,  and  a  pursuit  would 
take  the  enemy  away  from  Berlin. 

That  the  enemy  can  get  ahead  of  us  in  that  direction 
would  not  scare  us ;  the  advantages  of  the  situation  will  ap- 
pear only  when  the  enemy  undertakes  to  pass  us.  Of  course 
in  such  a  procedtire  Berlin  will  have  to  be  guarded  by  a  de- 

—172— 


Preparations  for  War 

tachment  on  the  road  thereto  against  incursions  by  flying 
columns.  The  enemy  also  must  weaken  himself  by  sieges 
the  farther  he  advances ;  at  least  on  the  right  bank,  at  Dres- 
den, Torgau  and  Wittenberg  and  by  a  careful  guarding  of 
his  line  of  communications.  Thus  he  may  easily  lose  his 
numerical  superiority  before  he  reaches  the  capital,  when 
then  correct  leadership  will  succeed  in  uniting  all  forces  and 
chance  a  decision,  having  a  line  of  retreat  open  to  Madge- 
burg. 

As  the  flank  operation  becomes  more  effective  the  far- 
ther upstream  it  commences,  Dresden  would  be  the  proper 
point  for  the  concentration  of  the : 

1st,  2d,  3d,  and  4th  Infantry  Divisions; 
1st  and  3d  Landwehr  Divisions; 
2d  Cavalry  Division. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  1st  Cavalry  Division  would  have  to 
be  brought  to  Gorlitz  to  facilitate  its  reaching  the  Vlth 
Corps. 

If  shortly  before  breaking  out  of  hostilities  our  main 
forces  move  from  Dresden  to  the  strong  position  at  Stolpen 
(25  km.  east  of  Dresden),  in  which  operation  they  would  re- 
main protected  on  the  right  flank  by  the  impassable  Sand- 
stone Mountains,  and  if  at  the  same  time  the  Gorlitz  de- 
tachment is  called  up  to  Bautzen,  then  the  possiblity  exists 
at  the  very  start  of  attacking,  with  all  disposable  forces,  the 
enemy  deploying  from  the  Lausitz  Mountains.  In  any 
case  we  v/ould  draw  him  on  our  force  and  into  the  direction 
of  Dresden.  All  the  rest  falls  into  the  province  of  opera- 
tions, which  we  can  touch  here  only  in  so  far  as  they  demand 
the  first  position  of  the  fighting  forces. 

Concerning  now  the  South  German  States,  we  must  not 
expect  in  this  nor  in  any  other  coalition  anything  except 
what  is  to  the  immediate  interest  of  all  parties. 

In  a  v/ar  against  Francs  alone  the  direct  joining  of  the 
Bavarian  army  to  the  North  German  fighting  force  on  the 
central  Rhine  gives  the  best  protection  against  a  French  in- 
vasion into  Bavarian  territory,  and  if  correct  military  views 
in  Munich  have  the  upper  hand,  this  requirement  will  be 

—173— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

complied  with.  We  cannot  require  this,  however,  when 
Bavaria  has  to  defend  its  own  frontier  against  Austria. 

We  may  assume  that  in  that  case  Bavaria  would  un- 
doubtedly be  able  to  concentrate  60,000  men  on  the  lower  Inn. 
Such  a  position  would  assure  us  the  help  which  we  have  to 
expect  of  Bavaria.  Being  in  rear  of  the  hostile  concentra- 
tion in  Bohemia  and  Moravia  it  threatens  Vienna  in  such  a 
degree  that  Austria  cannot  help  but  send  a  force  at  least 
equally  strong  against  it.  Against  such  a  force  the  Bavarian 
army  would  hardly  be  able  to  permanently  protect  Munich, 
but  it  could  contain  that  force  until  a  general  decision  had 
been  reached  at  Ingolstadt.  However,  we  can  not  allow  the 
Bavarians  to  take  a  waiting  position  in  the  start  at  Ingol- 
stadt ;  we  must  demand  that  they  exchange  shots  at  the  very 
beginning  with  Austria. 

Wiirtemberg  and  Baden  are  directly  threatened  by 
France  as  well  as  by  Austria,  and  we  can  expect  them  to 
join  our  offensive. 

If  we  succeed  in  bringing  about  an  early  decision  in 
France,  then,  even  if  the  Austrians  have  made  progress  in 
the  meantime  in  Silesia  or  Brandenburg,  the  direction  of 
our  operations  would  be  against  them  through  Wiirttem- 
berg  and  Bavaria. 

Consequently  it  is  of  main  importance  to  take  the  field 
against  France  quickly  and  in  superior  numbers. 

2.  Offensive  Against  France 

Less  complicated  than  for  the  defensive  against  Austria 
is  the  plan  of  operations  for  the  offensive  against  France. 
It  consists  mainly  in  seeking  out  the  enemy's  main  force 
and  to  attack  it  where  found. 

The  only  difficulty  lies  in  executing  this  simple  plan 
with  very  large  masses. 

In  its  mobile  stage  the  French  active 

army  numbers   336,000  men 

deduct  for  Algiers 35,000)      ^n  aaa 

and  for  Rome 5,000  S  "  ^^'^^^  ™«" 

Which  leaves  available 296,000  men. 

—174— 


Preparations  for  War 

But  as  soon  as  we  get  ahead  of  the  French  offensive,  a 
part  of  these  troops  will  be  absolutely  necessary  for  gar- 
risoning Strassburg,  Metz,  Thionville,  Lyons  and  Paris, 
50,000  men  at  the  lowest  estimate. 

If  after  that,  conditions  do  not  require  an  observation 
corps  to  be  placed  at  the  Pyrenees  or  on  the  Channel,  we  still 
would  at  the  start,  meet  hardly  more  than  260,000  men  in 
the  field. 

The  ten  North  German  corps  number  330,000  men. 

Of  course  there  are  still  93,000  reserves  in  France. 
The  simplest  manner  to  utilize  them  would  be  to  increase 
the  battalions  of  800  men  up  to  1000  men,  and  this  would 
bring  the  French  army  in  the  field  to  about  the  same 
strength  as  that  of  the  North  German  army.  But  it  ap- 
pears that  that  is  not  the  intention,  but  that  a  special  reserve 
army  is  to  be  formed,  and  this  pre-supposes  new  forma- 
tions, and  is  an  additional  reason  for  us  to  advance  quickly. 

We  have  a  reserve  of  26,000  men  in  the  already  or- 
ganized Guard  and  3d  Landwehr  Divisions,  which  pre- 
sumably follow  in  the  course  of  the  campaign. 

If  we  can  count  with  some  certainty  on  30,000  men  of 
the  Baden  and  Wiirtemberg  Division,  then  the  proportion, 
at  the  opening  of  hostilities,  of  our  forces  to  the  hostile 
fighting  forces,  will  be  as  360,000  to  250,000,  and  later  on 
386,000  to  343,000  men.* 

It  is  self-evident  how  important  it  is  to  fully  utilize  the 
superiority  which  we  have  in  the  start,  and  in  the  North 
German  forces  alone. 

This  superiority  will  be  materially  increased  at  the  de- 
cisive point,  if  the  French  engage  in  expeditions  against 
the  North  Sea  coast  or  into  Southern  Germany.  To  meet 
the  former  we  have  sufficient  means  without  weakening  the 
field  army,  and  the  latter  expedition  cannot  be  dangerous 
to  us  for  the  present.   ■ 


^Addition  in  1870: — "How  conditions  are  now  in  July,  1870,  we 
are  justified  in  assuming  that  all  South  German  forces  will  join  us, 
that  is  60,000  men.  In  that  case  we  would  oppose  the  250,000  French 
with  400,000  men  and  would  still  have  three  army  corps  in  reserve." 

—175— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  main  point  is  to  concentrate  our  actual  superiority 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  enable  us  to  bring  it  to  account  at 
the  decisive  moment  and  in  that  the  first  question  is :  where 
may  we  expect  to  meet  the  enemy. 

The  neutrality  of  Belgium,  Holland  and  Switzerland 
confine  the  theater  of  war  to  the  area  between  Luxemburg 
and  Basle.  Should  France  disregard  this  neutrality  and 
advance  through  Belgium  against  the  Prussian  Rhine,  then 
it  would  have  to  weaken  itself  by  80,000  to  100,000  men  in 
Brussels  and  in  front  of  the  Belgian  army  assembled  in 
Antwerp,  not  counting  probable  difficulties  with  England. 
A  further  advance  across  the  Maas  could  be  more  effec- 
tively opposed  from  the  direction  of  the  Mosel,  than  from 
the  Rhine.  Our  Rhine  front  is  so  strong  that  it  requires 
no  immediate  support,  and  in  addition,  the  distance  from 
Brussels  to  Cologne  is  greater  than  from  Mayence,  Trier 
or  Kaiserslautern  to  Brussels.  Our  advance  from  the 
south  forces  the  enemy  to  make  front  and  to  fight  with  his 
communications  in  the  flank — which  are  already  threatened 
by  Belgium.  An  original  concentration  of  our  fighting 
forces  south  of  the  Mosel  would  consequently  enable  us  to 
meet  the  danger  of  this  invasion  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  as  well  as  to  get  ahead  of  it  by  an  offensive  on 
French  ground.  Not  counting  political  difficulties  with 
England,  the  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality  offers  too 
little  hope  of  success  to  be  probable. 

France  would  encounter  no  less  diflliculties  should  it 
attempt  to  carry  out  operations  through  Switzerland  to  join 
hands  with  Austria.  Capturing  and  holding  this  mountain- 
ous country  would  occupy  more  than  100,000  men  for  a 
long  time.  In  addition  a  direct  joint  operation  of  both 
allied  armies  would  be  of  no  interest  to  each  one  separ- 
ately; they  will  have  to  pursue  entirely  different  objects  on 
separate  theaters  of  war  in  order  to  finally  gain  their  com- 
bined object — the  defeat  of  the  Prussian  power. 

We  are  therefore  justified  in  assuming  that  the  French 
will  effect  their  first  concentration  on  the  line  Metz — Strass- 
burg  in  order  to  advance  against  the  Main,  going  around 
our  strong  Rhine  front,  to  separate  North  and  South  Ger- 

—176— 


Preparations  for  War 

many,  to  reach  an  understanding  with  the  latter  and,  based 
on  that,  to  advance  against  the  Elbe. 

This  also  will  mean  a  concentration  south  of  the  Mosel 
and  of  all  disposable  North  and  South  German  fighting 
forces  in  the  Bavarian  Palatinate  as  the  most  suitable 
means  to  oppose  such  plans. 

Expectation  of  easy  success  might  easily  induce  the 
French  to  advance  with  a  part  of  their  fighting  force  from 
Strassburg  against  Southern  Germany.  But  an  operation 
upstream  on  the  flank  of  this  march  would  prevent  any  and 
all  further  advance  across  the  Black  Forest  and  would 
compel  the  opponent  to  first  gain  elbow  room  against  the 
north.  If  the  Baden — Wiirtemberg  Corps  has  joined  the 
left  wing,  then  vv^e  are  in  the  situation  to  reinforce  it  from  the 
Palatinate  to  such  an  extent  that  a  decision  may  be  sought 
in  the  vicinity  of  Rastatt,  and  should  the  outcome  be  for- 
tunate for  us,  the  enemy's  retreat  would  result  in  anni- 
hilation. To  attain  that  object  we  can  without  fear  make 
detachments  from  our  main  force,  as  the  enemy  in  front 
will  have  to  be  weakened  by  just  as  much  as  he  has  made 
detachments  from  his  main  army  for  operations  on  the  upper 
Rhine. 

Should  the  South  German  governments  prefer  a  direct 
defense  of  their  domain  by  a  position  behind  the  Black 
Forest  or  at  Ulm,  then  we  would  be  relieved  of  the  neces- 
sity of  supporting  them.  We  can  leave  them  to  their  own 
devices,  as  the  march  of  a  French  army,  extending  via 
Stuttgart  and  Munich,  will  become  effective  on  our  strategic 
flank  only,  after  the  important  operations  against  the 
weakened  enemy  in  our  front  have  fallen. 

If  the  French  desire  to  fully  utilize  their  railroad  sys- 
tem for  quick  concentration  of  all  their  fighting  forces,  they 
will  be  compelled  to  detrain  in  two  main  groups,  at  Strass- 
burg and  at  Metz,  separated  by  the  Vosges  Mountains.  If 
the  presumably  smaller  group  at  the  first  point  is  not  as- 
signed against  South  Germany,  then  it  can  join  the  main 
force  on  the  upper  Mosel  only  by  marching. 

In  the  Palatinate  we  stand  on  the  inner  line  of  opera- 
tions between  both  hostile  groups.     We  can  turn  against 

—177— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

the  one  or  the  other  and,  provided  we  are  strong  enough, 
against  both  at  the  same  time.  The  concentration  of  all  our 
forces  in  the  Palatinate  protects  the  lower  as  well  as  the 
upper  Rhine  and  allows  an  offensive  into  the  enemy's  country 
which,  provided  it  is  made  at  the  correct  time,  will  probably 
get  ahead  of  the  French  advancing  upon  German  ground. 

The  only  question  remains,  if  we,  without  running 
danger  of  being  interfered  with  in  our  first  concentration, 
can  transfer  the  points  of  concentration  across  the  Rhine 
into  the  Palatinate  and  to  the  immediate  French  frontier, 
and  this  question,  according  to  my  opinions,  should  be 
answered  affirmatively. 

Our  mobilization  is  prepared  down  to  the  very  last 
detail.  There  are  six  trunk  lines  available  for  transport- 
ing troops  to  the  vicinity  between  the  Mosel  and  the  Rhine. 
The  time  tables,  showing  day  and  hour  of  starting  and 
arrival  of  each  troop  unit,  are  prepared.  On  the  12th  day 
the  first  detachments  can  detrain  close  to  the  French  fron- 
tier; and  on  the  15th  day  the  fighting  troops  of  two  army 
corps  will  be  assembled  there.  On  the  20th  day  the  number 
of  our  fighting  forces  will  be  300,000  men  and  on  the  21i.th 
day  the  armies  will  have  their  full  complements.* 


*The  notes  concerning  the  position  in  readiness  of  the  fightingr 
forces  in  this  memorial  have  been  changed  by  the  marginal  note  "For 
1870."  It  states:  for  the  12th  day,  read  "10th":  for  the  15th,  "13th"; 
for  the  20th,  "18th",  and  for  the  24th,  "20th"  with  "nearly  all  trains." 

These  changes  apparently  are  based  on  the  following  marginal 
notes  in  the  handwriting  of  General  v.  Moltke: 

"According  to  the  preparations  for  1870: 

SECOND  ARMY 

ENS.       SQDS.         bat's. 

on  the  10th  mobilization  day 8  —  — 

up  to  incl.  the  12th  mobilization  day 30  14  8 

up  to  incl.  the   15th   mobilization  day 64  75  27 

up  to  incl.  the   17th  mobilization  day 104  84  48 

up  to  incl.  the  19th  mobilization  day 104  108  60 

inclusive  of  the  1st  section  of  trains  and  columns  of  all  four  army 

corps. 
In    the   vicinity   of    Landau    there   will    be    concentrated — of    the 
Third  Army: 
the  Xlth  A.  C.  not  later  than  the  13th  day  of  mobilization, 
the  Vth  A.C.  not  later  than  the  18th  day  of  mobilization, 
inclusive  of  the  first  section  of  the  trains; 

—178— 


Preparations  for  War 

We  have  no  reason  at  all  to  suppose  that  the  concen- 
tration of  the  French  army  to  a  mobile  footing,  for  which 
so  far  they  have  had  no  experience,  can  be  made  more 
quickly.  Since  Napoleon  Bonaparte's  time  France  has 
known  only  partial  mobilization,  in  which  the  part  of  the 
army  taking  the  field  was  completed  from  the  part  remain- 
ing at  home. 

Considering  the  numerous  garrisons  and  camps  in  the 
northeastern  part  of  the  country,  France  can  of  course,  on 
account  of  the  excellent  railroad  system  and  plentiful  roll- 
ing stock,  assemble  an  army  of  150,000  men  at  the  frontier  in 
a  very  short  time.  Such  a  procedure  for  a  quick  initiative 
would  correspond  with  the  national  character  and  has  been 
discussed  in  military  circles.  Assuming  such  an  impro- 
vised army,  which  would  be  well  supplied  with  cavalry  and 
artillery,  were  concentrated  on  the  5th  day  at  Metz  and  on 
the  8th  day  crossed  the  frontier  at  Saarlouis ;  we  still  could 
start  our  railroad  transportation  in  time  and  detrain  our 
main  force  on  the  Rhine  by  that  time.  To  that  line  the  in- 
vader would  have  to  cover  six  marches  and  would  come 
to  a  standstill  there  on  the  14th  day  opposite  equally  strong 
forces.  Being  in  possession  of  the  stream  crossings,  a  few 
days  later  we  would  take  the  offensive  in  doubly  superior 
numbers. 

The  disadvantages  and  dangers  of  such  a  procedure 
on  the  part  of  France  are  so  apparent  that  France  would 
hardly  decide  on  it,  and  in  any  case  it  will  be  unable  of  ex- 
ecution should  we  ourselves  take  the  initiative. 

DAY    OF 

of  the  Fourth  Army:  mobilization 

25th  Div.  will  reach  Gollheim  on  the 13th 

18th  Div.  with  the  troops  the  same  line  on  the 15th 

so  that  the  IXth  Corps,  able  to  commence  operations  by  the  ad- 
dition of  the  trains,  etc.,  of  the  25th  Div.,  can  after  1  day 

of  rest,  reach   Homburg  on   the   19th 

the  Xllth  A.  C.    (with  the  1st  sec.  of  trains,  etc.)    detrains 

at   Mayence   by   the    16th 

and  can  be  echeloned  from  Homburg  to  Kaiserslautern   by 

the 19th 

of  the  First  Army: 

the  Vllth  A.  C.  can  reach  Saarburg — Zerf — Trier 18th 

and  the  Vlllth  A.  C.  can  be  echeloned  from  west  of  Saar- 
louis to  Hermeskeil. 
The  1st  sections  of  trains  are  present  with  both  corps." 

—179— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

If  this  shows  the  correctness  of  concentrating  in  the 
Palatinate,  objection  still  may  be  raised  against  a  concen- 
tration of  all  disposable  fighting  forces  there  and  on  the 
Mosel,  based  on  an  apparent  exposure  of  our  Rhine  front. 
We  have  already  indicated  that  that  is  protected  by  Bel- 
gium's neutrality  and,  should  that  be  violated,  by  distance, 
by  its  own  strength,  and  by  operations. 

A  fighting  force  like  the  one  we  place  in  the  field 
against  France,  can  of  course  operate  only  if  divided  into 
several  armies.  The  strength  of  each  of  these  armies 
should  depend  on  special  tasks  and  the  assignment  of  the 
separate  army  corps  to  the  armies  should  be  made  with  due 
regard  to  having  all  in  readiness  in  the  shortest  time. 

Without  interfering  greatly  with  the  latter  point,  the 
following  organization  ought  not  to  be  changed : 

1st  Army — Vllth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps — as 

right  wing  around  Wittlich 60,000  men 

2d  Army— Illd,  IVth,  Xth  and  Guard  Corps— 

in  the  center  at  Neunkirchen — Homburg  __     131,000  men 

3d  Army — Vth,    Xlth,    Baden-Wiirtemberg 

Corps  and  eventually  a  Bavarian  brig,  as 

left  wing  at  Landau  and  Rastatt 99,000  men 

or,  should  the  two  Bavarian  Corps  join  __     130,000  men 

4th,  a  Reserve,  consisting  of  the  combined  IXth 

and  Xllth  Army  Corps  in  front  of  Mayence       63,000  men 

Total    353,000  men 

or,  under  above  assumption 384,000  men 

Of  course,  should  we  be  engaged  with  France  alone, 
then  the  1st,  lid,  and  finally  the  Vlth  Corps,  100,000  men, 
can  also  be  drawn  up.  However,  these  corps  can  arrive 
only  later  on,  as  the  railroads  will  be  fully  occupied  up  to 
the  20th  day.  On  the  other  hand,  the  two  Bavarian  corps 
could  immediately  join  the  Third  Army,  which  would  bring 
the  strength  of  that  army  up  to  130,000  men  and  the  whole 
force,  after  three  weeks,  would  be  increased  to  484,000 
men. 

First  Army 

To  secure  the  concentration  of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth 
Corps  on  the  upper  Mosel,  it  will  be  correct  to  not  draw 
back  the  troops  garrisoned  there,  but  to  leave  them  as  an 

—180— 


Preparations  for  War 

advance  guard  at  Trier  and  Saarbrticken  and  to  reinforce 
them. 

The  position  of  the  latter  place  will  of  course  be  occu- 
pied for  the  present  by  the  troops  there  and  the  two  bat- 
talions and  four  squadrons  in  Saarlouis,  which  will  be  suffi- 
cient for  mere  observation  and  protection  of  the  railroads 
against  minor  raids  by  the  enemy.  Orders  will  be  issued 
by  higher  authority  for  successive  destruction  of  the  rail- 
road and  that  for  that  purpose  a  railroad  detachment  will 
be  attached  to  the  detachment  there.  If  at  all  Dossible.  the 
detachment  will  not  retire  beyond  Neunkirchen,  and  will 
either  be  reinforced  or  relieved  on  the  twelfth  day  by 
strong  detachments  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps.  Thereupon 
it  will  return  to  its  corps. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  garrison  at  Trier — four  battal- 
ions, four  squadrons  and  one  battery  (which  latter  is  to  be 
immediately  sent  from  Coblenz) — forms  a  body  of  troops 
which  is  not  so  directly  threatened  by  the  enemy  and,  very 
favorably  supported  by  the  terrain,  must  hold  itself  at  Trier, 
Schweich  or  a  least  at  Wittlich.  On  the  fourteenth  day  de- 
tachments will  arrive  there  for  permanent  support,  by  the 
sixteenth  the  entire  Vlllth  Corps  (exclusive  of  the  33d  Regi- 
ment) will  reach  there,  and  by  the  seventeenth  the  Vllth 
Corps  (exclusive  of  trains)  and  then  50  battalions,  32  squad- 
rons, 30  batteries  will  be  ready  for  battle  and  able  to  start 
on  the  twentieth  day  entirely  mobile  in  any  desired  direction. 

Second  Army 

The  troops  at  Saarbrticken  and  eventually  at  Neun- 
kirchen will  keep  us  informed  how  far  the  Palatinate  rail- 
roads may  be  used  with  security.  On  these  roads  the  first 
detachments  of  the  Illd  and  IVth  Army  Corps  will  arrive 
by  the  twelfth  day.  After  both  corps  have  their  full  comple- 
ment of  troops  by  the  fifteenth  day,  they  will  take  position 
near  the  frontier  (near  Bildstock  and  St.  Ingbert),  behind 
which  the  Xth  and  the  Guard  Corps  will  detrain,  and  thus 
104  battalions,  108  squadrons,  60  batteries  will  be  assembled 
around  Homburg  by  the  nineteenth  day. 

—181— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Third  Army 

The  position  of  the  Bavarian  brigade  at  Landau  will 
be  reinforced  on  the  fifteenth  or  sixteenth  day  by  the  ar- 
rival of  the  infantry  divisions  of  the  Vth  Corps.  By  the 
eighteenth  the  largest  part  of  the  Xlth  Corps — mainly  by 
marching — will  be  assembled  and  there  will  be  in  a  strong 
position  behind  the  Kling  creek  50  battalions,  40  squadrons, 
30  JDatteries  of  Prussian  combatants  alone,  which  will  be 
able  to  extend  help  to  the  Baden — Wiirttemberg  Corps  be- 
tween Rastatt  and  Karlsruhe,  if  the  French  should  have 
crossed  the  upper  Rhine,  or,  should  this  not  be  the  case,  that 
corps  will  be  closed  in  on  the  Xlth  Corps. 

Should  a  French  army  have  already  crossed  the  Rhine 
and  be  marching  on  Stuttgart,  the  Third  Army  will  concen- 
trate on  the  line  Pforzheim — Calw  in  two  marches,  and  the 
Reserve  Army  would  then  form  the  left  wing  echelon  of  the 
offensive  towards  the  west. 

The  Reserve 

Of  the  Reserve  the  IXth  Corps  (formed  by  the  18th 
Division  and  the  Hessian  Division  to  be  assembled  at  Kirch- 
heimbolanden)  and  the  Xllth  Corps — 52  battalions,  40 
squadrons,  31  batteries — will  be  assembled  on  the  other  side 
of  Mayence  by  the  twentieth  day.  At  present  it  seems  im- 
probable that  the  French  will  have  attacked  our  farthest 
advanced  Second  Army  with  superior  numbers  prior  to  that 
day. 

If  France  concentrates  its  entire  force  against  that 
army,  if  the  Second  Army  has  to  fall  back  on  the  Reserve 
Army,  then  we  would  be  in  a  good  situation  after  the  twen- 
tieth day  to  accept  battle  with  200,000  men  in  an  exceed- 
ingly favorable  position  at  Mannheim.  Should  that  be  the 
case,  the  French  could  not  start  any  other  large  operation 
against  the  upper  Rhine  or  the  lower  Mosel,  and  it  would 
be  entirely  correct  to  reinforce  our  main  force  with  the 
Third  Army,  and  to  direct  the  First  Army  across  the  Nahe 
to  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  hostile  advance.  With  only 
moderately  good  leadership  300,000  men  would  be  concen- 
trated for  the  decision. 

—182— 


Preparations  for  War 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Second  Army  holds  its 
ground  on  the  frontier,  as  we  may  assume  with  some  prob- 
ability will  be  the  case,  reinforcements  will  reach  it  in 
time  from  the  reserve,  while  the  First  and  Third  Army 
secure  the  flanks,  and  thus  the  offensive  might  be  taken  into 
the  enemy's  country  at  once. 

Should  we  still  be  in  ignorance  by  then  as  to  the  point 
of  assembly  of  the  main  forces  of  the  enemy,  there  are  four 
cavalry  divisions  of  seventy-six  squadrons  each  at  hand, 
which,  supported  by  infantry,  should  furnish  us  the  desired 
information. 

3.    Coast  Defense 

For  the  defense  of  our  coasts  and  for  simultaneous 
observation  of  Denmark,  four  divisions  are  detailed,  be- 
sides the  garrisons  of  the  fortified  places,  especially  that  of 
Sonderburg,  viz. : 

one  Guard  Landwehr  division, 
two  Landwehr  divisions, 
the  17th  Infantry  Division. 

There  are  local  garrisons  of  about  8,000  men  on  the 
stretch  of  coast  from  Emden  to  Bremerhaven  and  the  2d 
Landwehr  Division,  a  total  of  10,800  men,  should  be  sta- 
tioned at  Bremen  for  active  support. 

To  protect  the  Elbe  and  the  coast  of  Schleswig-Holstein, 
as  well  as  the  stretch  from  Hamburg  to  Liibeck,  there  are 
assigned  as  local  garrisons  17,750  men,  and  furthermore 
the  mobile  17th  Infantry  Division,  15,000  men,  which  latter 
should  be  concentrated  around  Hamburg. 

The  Guard  Landwher  Division,  11,000  men,  should  be 
stationed  as  a  general  reserve  at  Hanover,  in  consideration 
of  the  existing  railroad  net. 

The  1st  Landwehr  Division  remains  disposable  for 
defense  of  the  less  endangered  Baltic  Sea  coast  of  Pomerania 
and  Prussia. 

It  appears  justifiable  to  draw  off  the  17th  Infantry 
Division  from  Schleswig,  as  it  can  quickly  be  returned  by 
rail  in  case  of  need,  and  especially  because  it  seems  im- 
probable that  Denmark  will  decide  at  the  start  of  the  cam- 
paign to  be  hostile. 

—183— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

A  French  landing,  if  at  all  intended,  will  undoubtedly  be 
made  in  the  very  first  stages  of  the  war.  As  soon  as  we 
have  entered  French  ground  such  far-reaching  expeditions 
will  logically  have  to  be  abandoned. 

Furthermore,  the  French  fleet  will  hardly  undertake 
an  invasion  of  the  Baltic  Sea.  The  route  around  Skagen 
could  hardly  be  kept  concealed  and  we  would  have  ample 
time  to  follow  it  with  our  fighting  forces  via  the  railroads. 

Far  more  probable  appears  a  debarkation  on  the  North 
Sea  coast  or  at  some  Jutland  port,  in  order  to  at  least  gain 
a  land  base  for  such  a  hazardous  undertaking,  and  in  order 
to  finally  unite  with  the  Danish  reinforcements. 

After  what  has  been  stated  above,  we  could  very  soon 
oppose  to  such  an  expedition  40,000  men  of  our  field  troops, 
reinforcement  for  which  does  not  need  to  bother  us,  because 
there  will  be  sufficient  troops  left  in  the  country  which  up 
to  then  could  not  be  transported  to  the  theater  of  war,  and 
which  are  not  absolutely  required  at  the  frontier  on  ac- 
count of  the  weakness  of  the  French  main  army. 

In  the  further  course  of  the  campaign  presumably  the 
two  above  mentioned  Landwehr  divisions  can  be  spared 
and  be  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  army,  or  they  can  be  used 
for  guarding  the  line  of  communications. 


Concerning  the  presumable  strength  of  the  French  army,  General 
von  Moltke  made  the  following  notes,  which  bear  no  date,  but  may  be 
assumed  to  have  been  made  during  the  winter  of  1869-1870. 

NO.  19 


If  the  entire  cadres  of  the  French  army  are  filled  to 
their  war  strength  there  would  be — 

370    battalions    259,000  men 

62  cavalry  regiments 31,000  men 

164  batteries 25,000  men 

Engineers    8,000  men 

Combatants  proper 323,000  men. 

—184— 


Preparations  for  War 

This  total  does  not  include  12,000  men  of  artillery  trains 
and  baggage  trains  nor  65,000  reserves  required  at  the  de- 
pots which  in  time  of  peace  are  guarded  by  cadres  only. 
These  numbers  are  offset  by  our  own  train  and  recruit  bat- 
talions. 

If  we  deduct  only  10,000  troops  of  the  line  for  Algiers, 
and  15,000  only  for  Paris,  Lyons,  Strassburg  and  Metz — 
the  National  Guards  taking  over  the  service  of  all  other 
places — it  will  leave  an  army  of  operations  of  hardly  300,000 
men. 

There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  mobilization  of 
the  French  army  will  be  completed  any  sooner  than  that  of 
the  Prussian.  On  the  other  hand,  the  more  complete  French 
railroad  net  will  enable  France  to  have  the  largest  part  of 
all  their  available  fighting  forces  at  the  initial  concentra- 
tion points  near  our  frontier  at  a  time  when  we  reach  the 
Rhine  with  but  a  part  of  our  fighting  force. 

If  the  French  desire  to  fully  utilize  their  railroads, 
they  will  have  to  detrain  one  part  of  their  fighting  force 
east,  the  other  (main)  part  west  of  the  Vosges  mountains. 

If  the  Army  Detachment  concentrated  in  the  Rhine 
valley  is  to  gain  a  political  or  military  objective,  it  must  be 
at  least  50,000  strong.  This  will  leave  250,000  men  at  most 
opposite  the  line  Luxemburg — Weissenburg. 

We  are  justified  in  assuming  that  these  concentrations 
can  be  completed  after  the  course  of  three  weeks. 


For  the  information  of  the  Chiefs  of  Sections  of  the  Great  Gen- 
eral Staff  General  von  Moltke  composed  the  following  memorandum  in 
the  spring  of  1870,  in  which  he  explained  his  views  as  to  the  execution 
of  the  advance  of  the  army  against  the  Mosel  line.  Note  than  in  the 
attached  march  table  cognizance  is  taken  of  only  the  North  German 
fighting  forces. 

NO.  20 


Berlin,  6  May,  1870. 

The  operation  against  France  will  consist  simply  in  our 
advancing,  closed  up  as  much  as  possible,  a  few  marches  into 


—185- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

French  territory  until  we  meet  the  French  army,  then  to 
give  battle. 

The  general  direction  of  this  advance  is  Paris,  because 
in  that  direction  we  are  most  certain  to  find  our  objective 
— the  hostile  army. 

On  the  direct  road  from  the  Palatinate  to  Paris  is 
Metz.  This  place  will  be  turned  by  the  left  and  will  be 
observed  only. 

The  next  strategic  advance,  if  a  battle  does  not  ensue 
sooner,  is  the  line  of  the  Mosel,  Luneville — Pont-a-Mousson. 

In  this  advance,  the  Second  Army  will  be  in  the  first 
line,  the  Fourth  in  the  second,  and  the  flanks  will  be  cov- 
ered by  the  First  and  Third  Armies.  Our  initiative  will  lay 
down  the  law  to  the  opponent. 

On  the  line  Luneville — Pont-a-Mousson,  we  have  two 
railroads  in  our  rear;  there,  if  not  sooner,  a  decisive  battle 
must  ensue  and  beyond  this  we  can  arrange  no  details. 

Not  counting  the  resistance  which  we  may  encounter 
sooner,  this  advance  of  60  [English]  miles  finds  its  main 
difficulty  in  the  limited  area  in  which  large  masses  have  to 
advance.  If  the  French  advance  to  meet  us  in  correspond- 
ing strength,  that  difficulty  will  be  common  to  both  sides. 
It  is  different  if  they  await  us  assembled  or  advance  to 
meet  us  deployed  for  battle. 

To  enable  us  to  deploy  for  battle  we  need  a  whole  day, 
which  the  advance  guard  must  secure  to  the  army.  We  can 
learn  where  we  are  likely  to  meet  the  enemy  only  through 
the  advance  guard.  Therefore  it  must  be  strong,  and  es- 
pecially so  in  cavalry. 

The  advance  guard  will  be  formed  of  the  5th  Infantry 
Division  and  one  cavalry  corps.  For  the  latter  there  are 
76  squadrons  of  the  3d,  4th  and  10th  and  the  Guard  Cavalry 
Divisions  available  under  a  commander  to  be  specially  se- 
lected.   The  6th  Division  follows  as  support. 

Differing  from  seeking  a  decision  in  battle,  the  cavalry 
is  not  to  be  kept  closed  up,  but  it  will  advance  in  differ- 
ent directions  by  divisions  and  these  latter  will  send  out 
detachments  until  the  main  concentration  point  of  the  en- 
emy has  been  ascertained.    The  infantry  division  can  sup- 

—186— 


Preparations  for  War 

port  these  smaller  detachments,  using  wagons,  but  on  the 
whole  it  will  remain  in  close  order  so  as  to  afford  a  rallying 
point  in  strong  positions  to  the  cavalry. 

The  cavalry  can  advance  several  marches  ahead  of  the 
infantry ;  its  strength  secures  its  return. 

The  larger  infantry  detachments  must  avoid  each  and 
every  movement  to  the  rear.  It  is  advisable  to  make  all  as- 
semblies towards  the  front.  The  5th  Division  is  protected 
by  the  cavalry  from  the  danger  of  encountering  a  concen- 
trated hostile  force;  in  connection  with  that  division,  it 
can  hold  out  against  a  hostile  corps  for  24  hours.  It  must 
precede  the  army  by  a  whole  march. 

It  is  true  that  the  Second  Army  will  be  concentrated  on 
the  19th  day  at  the  frontier  (Bildstock — St.  Ingbert),  but 
it  will  have  no  train  as  yet.  In  addition  the  Fourth  Army 
will  have  to  be  drawn  up.  The  first  echelons  arriving  of 
the  latter  can  be  started  successively  in  the  direction  of 
Zweibriicken,  but  the  last  will  require  four  days  to  close 
up,  and  the  complete  concentration  behind  the  Second  Army 
may  take  until  the  24th  day. 

It  does  not  appear  advisable  to  cross  the  frontier  sooner 
than  we  are  ready  to  accept  battle. 

Under  existing  conditions  it  will  be  necessary  for  Royal 
Headquarters  to  regulate  the  marches  of  all  corps  and  di- 
visions. 

It  will  be  possible  to  make  the  march  as  far  as  the 
Mosel  with  the  Second  and  Fourth  Army  in  three  main 
columns  and  in  two  echelons  on  a  breadth  and  depth  of 
one  march,  so  that  the  assembly  of  150,000  men  towards 
the  center  and  even  towards  a  wing  of  the  first  line  can  be 
made  in  one  march. 

All  corps  will  be  immediately  followed  by  their  trains ; 
the  latter  will  halt  (parking  alongside  the  roads)  only 
when  the  advance  guard  reports  the  proximity  of  the  enemy. 

The  length  of  a  march  should  be  10  [English]  miles; 
the  start  to  be  made  early  every  morning. 

The  IVth  and  Xth  Corps  will  have  independent  advance 
guards. 

—187— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

As  the  cavalry  divisions  of  the  Second  Army  are  in 
front,  the  marching  depth  of  the  infantry  divisions  of  that 
army  will  be  six  hours.  Therefore  the  Fourth  Army  will 
come  in  contact  at  noon  with  the  trains  of  the  Second  Army, 
which  should  not  prevent  it  going  into  bivouac,  even  if, 
when  necessary,  the  march  is  to  be  continued  in  the  after- 
noon. 

According  to  the  political  situation  it  is  not  probable 
that  the  First  Army  will  encounter  resistance  in  its  ad- 
vance to  join  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  very  possible  that  the  Third 
Army  will  have  to  be  reinforced  by  the  Fourth  Army  at  the 
start.  If  this  is  done  in  a  large  measure,  the  residue  of  the 
Fourth  Army  will  follow  the  advance  of  the  First  and  Sec- 
ond Army. 

Should  the  French  have  concentrated  their  main  force 
opposite  our  front,  the  Third  Army  will  join  the  general 
advance  against  the  Mosel,  but  sight  must  not  be  lost  of 
the  possibility  that  we  may  have  to  front  towards  the  south. 

Concerning  the  concentration  of  all  or  at  least  the  larger 
part  of  our  fighting  forces,  that  matter  will  be  governed 
each  day  by  general  orders. 


■188— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 


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-189  — 


CHAPTER  II 


Operations  from  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Translations  as  follows: 

Nos.  21  to  93,  by  Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza,  Field  Artillery. 
Nos.  94  to  248,  by  Mr.  Harry  Bell. 


No.   21 

Autograph  pencil  note  by  General  von  Moltke  on  a  report  of  Ma- 
jor Count  von  Waldersee*  dated  July  12,  1870. 

Not  dated    (apparently  written  between  July  13-15,  1870). 

The  transports  appear  to  be  intended  for  the  transportation  of 
troops  coming  from  Algiers,  and  possibly  from  Civita  Vecchia.  The 
armoured  vessels  mentioned  cannot  have  a  landing  in  view,  but  are 
more  likely  to  bombard  our  sea  ports. 

It  is  not  therefore  necessary  to  call  out  the  Landwehr  for  coast 
defense,  but  instead  to  arm  the  coast  batteries. 

Kiel  only  is  now  well  fortified. 


No.  22 

To  Colonel  v.  WixzENDORFF.f 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin,  July  16,  1870. 

With  reference  to  the  telegram,  regarding  a  possible  destruction 
of  railroads,  which  Your  Honor  should  have  received  this  night,  I  wish 
to  state  that  it  is  still  the  intention  to  concentrate  the  army  on  the 
French  frontier  in  order  to  take  the  offensive,  and  we  therefore  need 
the  railroads  ourselves. 

It  is  only  if  the  French  advance  without  mobilizing  that  they 
can  get  a  start  on  us.  It  is  asserted  that  this  is  their  intention,  in 
which  case  the  destruction  ordered  must  not  be  delayed. 

In  case  of  such  a  strategical  surprise  the  main  thing  is  to  delay 
the  advance  of  the  enemy  from  the  border  towards  the  Rhine,  until 
we  have  sufficient  forces  concentrated  to  advance  ourselves.     Here- 


*Major  Count  von  Waldersee,  Aide-de-camp  to  his  Majesty  the 
King  of  Prussia  and  attached  to  the  Prussian  embassy  in  Paris  had 
reported  activity  in  French  naval  ports. 

tChief  of  Staff,  Vlllth  Corps. 

—190— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

after  no  destruction  will  be  undertaken,  which  cannot  be  promptly  re- 
stored; but  we  should  proceed  to  a  series  of  repeated  small  interrup- 
tions only  if  superior  hostile  forces  force  us  to  evacuate  Sarrebruck. 
This  at  first  will  be  on  the  line  Sarrebruck — Neunkirchen,  and  also  if 
possible  in  rear  of  Sarreguemines. 

The  commanding  General  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  General  of  In- 
fantry V.  Voigts-Rhetz,  had  asked  from  the  war  ministry  for  authority 
to  take  preparatory  measures  for  the  employment  of  the  Landstrum 
on  the  threatened  coasts  of  his  districts.  The  Minister  of  War  for- 
warded this  request  to  General  von  Moltke  for  remarks,  stating  that 
as  far  as  he  was  concerned  he  was  opposed  to  such  a  step.  General 
V.  Moltke  answered  this  communication  as  follows: 


No.  23 

To  THE  War  Department. 

Berlin,  July  18,  1870. 

I  have  the  honor  to  reply  that  as  far  as  I  am  concerned  the  atten- 
tion of  General  Voigts-Rhetz  should  be  invited  to  the  prospective  nom- 
ination of  Governor-General,  who  will  attend  to  all  necessary  matters. 

If  it  becomes  indispensable  to  protect  the  coasts  before  the  or- 
ganization of  important  forces,  which  are  to  be  provided  for  this 
purpose,  the  General  commanding  must  use  nearest  available  forces, 
even  if  they  are  not  yet  mobilized. 

I  no  longer  consider  the  calling  out  of  the  Landstrum  as  advisa- 
ble. It  would  be  of  no  advantage  and  would  only  give  pretext  for  agi- 
tations. 


The  War  Department  had  asked  the  following  questions  of  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff:  "Must  the  Austrian  front  be  regarded  as 
threatened;  or  may  a  part  of  the  garrison  troops  which  were  assigned 
to  this  front  according  to  the  plan  of  occupation  be  withdrawn  for  ser- 
vice on  the  L  of  C?  Can  the  23d  Infantry  be  used  for  the  field  army?" 
General  von  Moltke  answered: 


No.  24 

To  THE  War  Department. 

Berlin,  July  18,   1870. 

The  Austrian  front  is  up  to  the  present  time  not  threatened.  My 
honest  opinion  is  to  avoid  in  the  frontier  provinces  all  measures  likely 
to  lead  to  demonstrations. 

For  this  reason  it  is  also  intended  to  echelon  the  Vlth  Army  Corps 
now  in  lower  Silesia  along  the  railway  lines. 

The  part  employment  of  garrison  troops  elsewhere,  and  the  as- 
signment of  the  23d  Infantry  to  the  field  army  are  for  this  reason 
considered  for  the  present  inadvisable. 


-191— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  25 

Note  by  General  von  Moltke. 

Berlin;  July  18,   1870. 

The  Wurtemberg  troops  will  have  completed  their  mobilization 
by  the  26th  of  this  month.  They  march  off  successively  behind  the 
Baden  troops,  to  whose  help  they  will  send  two  cavalry  regiments 
to  Rastatt.  They  request  a  Prussian  General  as  division  commander; 
a  Prussian  General-Staff  officer;  General  von  Prittwitz  as  Governeur 
for  Ulm;  and  for  a  consolidation  with  a  Prussian  Division  into  a 
corps. 

The  Bavarians  by  the  25th  of  the  month  have  a  division  ready  for 
the  field  at  Landau,  although  not  completely  mobilized;  not  until  the 
22d,  mobilization  day  (7  August)  will  their  two  corps  be  complete 
on  the  Haardt. 

The  trains  will  not  be  complete  until  27th  day.  (12  August.)  They 
ask  for  direct  orders  from  his  Majesty;  these  previously  have  been 
sent  through  Major  von  Fryberg  to  the  Bavarian  Minister  of  War,  v. 
Pranckh;  but  hereafter  they  will  be  sent  direct  to  the  Commanders 
of  the  two  corps,     (v  der  Tann  and  von  Hartmann.) 


.  No.  26 

To  Lt.  General  von  Frankenberg* 
Cologne. 

Berlin;  Juhj  18,   1870. 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your  Excellency,  that  it  has  come  to 
my  knowledge,  that  a  few  commanders  have  taken  the  question  of 
the  destruction  of  various  railroad  lines,  in  a  manner  absolutely  con- 
trary to  existing  conditions. 

I  believe  it  my  duty  to  remark  that  the  continued  use  of  the 
railroads  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  safe  and  quick  concentration 
of  the  army.  Unjustified  destruction  of  particular  tracks  is  for  this 
reason  inadvisable  and  dangerous. 

Should  an  invasion  by  important  hostile  forces  make  a  partial 
destruction  necessary,  it  should  consist  only  in  the  removal  of  rails, 
etc.  Generally  speaking,  it  must  be  possible  to  easily  repair  the 
railroads  in  order  to  assist  the  offensive  which  Prussia  has  in  view. 

No  commander  of  troops  or  commandant  of  a  fort  is  authorized 
to  destroy  bridges  or  other  works  without  directions  from  superior 
authority.  Only  if  the  enemy  approaches  a  fortified  place  with  con- 
siderable forces  within  a  day's  march,  is  the  commander  authorized 
within  the  limits  of  his  command,  to  proceed  with  destructions  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  the  defense. 


*  Commandant  of  Cologne. 


-192— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  27 

To  Major  von  Grolman."^ 
Munich. 

Berlin;  July  18,   1870. 

In  reply  to  your  Honor's  telegram  of  today,  I  beg  you  to  advise 
Major  General  Freiherr  von  Pranckh,  as  follows: 

I.  It  is  assumed  that  the  holding  of  Landau  and  Germersheim  as 
also  of  the  bridge  of  Maxau  will  be  done  at  first  by  Royal  Bavarian 
troops.  The  protection  of  the  Palatinate,  as  well  as  all  German  ter- 
ritory is  the  common  task  of  the  German  armies,  whose  early  arri- 
val is  hoped  for.  But  so  far  as  it  can  be  estimated  at  present,  the 
detail  of  troops  from  Bavaria  most  directly  interested  will  unfortun- 
ately not  arrive  until  after  Prussian  troops  coming  from  the  province 
Posen. 

II.  The  two  Bavarian  army  corps  will  be  put  under  direct  orders 
of  his  Royal  Highness,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia. 

III.  No  order  as  to  whether  our  infantry  will  leave  in  helmets  or 
in  caps  has  yet  been  issued.  The  first  headgear  mentioned  is  more 
probable,  however,  according  to  my  opinion  the  Royal  Bavarian  infan- 
try are  not  in  any  way  bound  to  a  like  procedure. 

IV.  According  to  the  intentions  of  his  Majesty,  the  King,  which 
are  known  to  me,  nobody  should  be  sent  to  G.H.Q.  whose  presence  is 
not  necessary  for  official  reasons. 

It  would  be  therefore  advisable  to  attach  Major  General  Count 
Bothmer  to  the  Army  Headquarters  of  his  Royal  Highness,  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia. 


No.  28 

To  Lt.  Colonel  von  LESzczYNSKLf 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin,  July  18,  1870,  evening. 

A  number  of  ships  of  small  draught  equipped  with  one  gun  have 
been  sent  from  Toulon  to  Strassburg.  They  might  be  intended  to 
damage  or  destroy  the  permanent  crossings  over  the  Rhine. 

Your  Honor  has  already  designated  a  place  in  the  river  not  far 
from  Rastatt,  where  a  dam  could  be  erected,  covered  by  artillery  fire. 
If  this  has  not  already  been  done,  it  is  now  time  to  do  it. 

I  have  issued  orders  that  a  Navy  officer  leave  tomorrow  morning 
for  Rastatt,  to  assist  in  this  work;  from  there  he  will  go  to  Ger- 
mersheim for  the  same  purpose.!  Please  advise  the  commander  of 
Rastatt. 

I  have  just  received  a  report  from  Speyer  via  Munich,  that  not  a 
single  Frenchman  can  be  seen  on  the  frontier.  It,  however,  states: 
"Bridge  by  Maxau  about  to  be  destroyed."  I  presume  that  this  is 
an  error,  as   a  Baden  battalion  is   stationed  beyond  the  bridge  near 


^Prussian  military  attache  in  Munich  and  attached  to  the  General 
Staff  of  the  army. 

tChief  of  Staff  of  the  Baden  Division. 

JThe  Royal  Bavarian  War  Department,  and  the  Commandant  at 
Germersheim  were  notified  accordingly. 

—193— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


Hagenbach,  and  it  would  never  be  advisable  to  intercept  so  important 
a  communication. 

The  Emperor  will  leave  Paris  in  a  few  days.  20,000  men  from 
Algiers  are  expected  on  Friday  at  Toulon.  Count  Waldersee*  is  of 
the  opinion  that  decisive  operations  are  hardly  to  be  expected  before 
the  24th. 

On  July  18,  1870  General  von  Moltke  received  the  following  cabi- 
net orders: 

Berlin,  July  18,  1870. 

I  send  you  enclosed  a  copy  of  my  order,  which  was  forwarded  to- 
day to  the  Minister  of  War,  directing  that  effective  the  5th  day  of 
mobilization,  my  orders  as  to  the  movements  and  operations  of  the 
Army  of  the  Confederation  of  the  North  and  its  separate  detachments 
shall  be  transmitted  to  the  proper  commanders  through  the  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  of  the  Army.  You  will  at  all  times  keep  the  Min- 
ister of  War  informed  as  to  all  measures  taken  by  you. 

(Signed)    Wilhelm. 


No.  29 

To  Colonel  von  Witzendorff. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin,  July  19,  1870. 

According  to  a  report  from  Count  Waldersee  no  severe  hostilities 
are  to  be  expected  from  the  French  before  the  24th  of  this  month. 
To  complete  the  time  and  march  tables  of  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps, 
which  have  already  been  sent  to  your  General  Staff  I  remark,  you 
are  advised  that  the  Vllth  Army  Corps  will  be  transported  by  rail 
between  the  9th  to  the  11th  mobilization  day  to  Call,  Stolberg,  Aachen, 
thence  by  marching  towards  the  territory  of  Trier,  where  the  heads 
of  columns  should  arrive  on  the  16th,  and  the  tails  of  columns  on  the 
18th  mobilization  day.  The  marches  marked  in  pencil  on  the  time 
and  march  tables  of  the  two  army  corps,  have  been  arranged  to  agree 
with  one  another. 

The  Illd  and  then  the  Xth  Army  Corps  will  be  brought  up  by  the 
line  Coin,  Coblenz,  Bingen,  Neunkirchen  and  will  detrain  at  the  latter 
place. 

On  the  10th  mobilization  day   with    8  Battalions  Squadrons    Batteries 

On  the  11th  mobilization  day 

On  the  12th  mobilization  day 

On  the  13th  mobilization  day 

On  the  14th  mobilization  day 

On  the  15th  mobilization  day 

On  the  16th  mobilization  day 


with  11  Battalions 

4 

with    2  Battalions 

9i 

4 

with    2  Battalions 

5J 

4 

with    2  Battalions 

15i 

with    6  Battalions 

8 

3 

with    9  Battalions 

21 

4 

*See  Document  No.  21. 


-194- 


Operatigns  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  30 

Berlin,  July  19,  1870. 

If  the  French  intend  to  await  the  arrival  of  their  reserves,  before 
they  start  operations,  they  would  not  have  declared  war  today. 

It  is  therefore  probable,  that  they  will  cross  the  border  tomor- 
row, on  our  5th  mobilization  day. 

As  their  forces  are  without  reserves,  it  is  possible  that  they  will 
abandon  completely  any  idea  of  invasion  of  South  Germany  (they  are 
now  advised  as  to  the  sentiment  of  these  states)  and  will  invade  the 
Palatinate  on  the  front  Saarbruecken — Bitsch. 

They  can  reach  a  position  near  Marnheim  on  the  10th  mobiliza- 
tion day,  and  attack  on  the  11th  mobilization  day. 

On  that  date  we  can  concentrate  only  about  half  of  the  Illd,  IVth 
and  Xlth  Corps  and  the  25th  Division,  say  about  60,000  men  with  in- 
sufficient artillery. 

For  this  reason  we  cannot  for  the  present  take  Marnheim  as 
assembly  point  for  the  army;  it  is  more  probable  that  the  French  if 
they  advance  in  a  determined  manner,  will  arrive  before  Maince  on 
the  12th  day. 

There  would  be  there  assembled  on  the  following  day: 

The  Illd,  IVth  and  IXth  Army  Corps— 100,000  men. 

On  the  same  date  at  Germersheim,  Xlth  Army  Corps,  the  Baden 
Division,  and  a  part  of  the  Wurtemberg  Division — 50,000  men.  If  the 
French  do  not  debouch  from  Strassburg  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rhine  the  Xlth  corps  would  be  directed  towards  Maince. 

On  the  17th  mobilization  daywith  9  Battalions  1^  Squadrons  5  Batteries 
On  the  18th  mobilization  daywith  _  Battalions  41  5 

On  the  19th  mobilization  daywith  1  Battalion  __  3 

On  the  20th  mobilization  daywith  3  Battalions 
On  the  21st  mobilization  daywith  1  Battalion  __  2 

Should  the  border  be  crossed  earlier  by  considerable  French  forces 
during  the  concentration,  the  detraining  will  be  effected  at  a  point 
situated  farther  to  the  rear. 

Your  Honor  will  readily  see  from  the  above  mentioned  facts,  how 
it  is  of  extreme  importance,  that  the  command  of  the  detachment  of 
Saarbruecken  be  entrusted  only  to  a  cool  and  intelligent  officer. 

I  will  further  state  that  two  fortress  Pioneer  companies  of  the 
Illd  Army  Corps  should  arrive  in  the  forenoon  of  the  9th  mobilization 
day  at  Neunkirchen,  and  two  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  at  Homburg. 
These  organizations  are  to  assist  in  detraining  operations  and  are 
placed  at  the  disposition  of  Captains  Mantey  and  von  Huene  of  the 
General  Staff  who  have  been  sent  to  the  places  mentioned.  The  de- 
tachment at  Saarbruecken  will  keep  in  liaison  with  the  above  named 
officers,  and  will  protect  their  operations  by  cavalry  patrol.* 


*At  the  same  time  information  was  sent  to  Colonel  von  Hertz- 
berg,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Vllth  Corps,  that  the  Vlllth  Corps  would 
assemble  by  marching  in  the  vicinity  of  Saarlouis,  and  that  its  last 
elements  should  arrive  there  on  the  19th  mobilization  day. 


-195— 


Moltke's  Correspondence. 

No.  31 

If  we  receive  intelligence  within  the  next  few  days,  that  the 
French  troops  are  marching  off  from  their  peace  stations  waiting  only 
for  their  men  on  furlough,  but  not  for  their  reserves,  it  will  indicate 
an  intention  on  their  part  of  surprising  us  strategically. 

The  interference  which  would  then  result  in  mobilizing  a  part 
of  the  16th  Division  cannot  be  a  goal  which  could  justify  such  a 
measure.  The  garrisons  at  Trier  and  Saarbruecken  would  have  to 
withdraw  their  depots  toward  Coblenz;  the  District  H.  Q.  Staffs  would 
have  to  evacuate  their  depots  and  call  out  the  men  of  the  Landwehr. 
Such  a  hostile  measure  will  have  no  influence  over  the  mobilization  of 
our  army  and  over  the  transport  of  the  corps  to  the  Rhine,  but  it  will 
influence  its  strategical  deployment. 

We  could  just  as  little  prevent  an  incipient  invasion  of  the  terri- 
tory on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  as  the  French  can  prevent  the 
garrison  of  Saarlouis  marching  against  Metz  on  the  first  mobilization 
day. 

In  the  very  start  we  will  have  an  army  of  weak,  but  numerous 
battalions,  filled  very  completely  with  officer  and  non-commissioned 
officers,  fully  equipped  with  cavalry  and  artillery  and  with  a  strength 
of  presumably  130,000  to  150,000  combatants. 

If  our  mobilization  takes  place  immediately,  the  8th  day  would  be 
considered  as  the  one  on  which  this  army  by  ixsing  all  railroads  can 
be  brought  to  the  frontier;  from  there  on,  7  to  8  marches  will  be  needed 
to  reach  the  Rhine. 

If  the  French  are  in  a  position  in  the  course  of  these  8  days  to 
clothe,  arm  and  transport  their  reserves,  which  are  without  doubt  or- 
dered out  at  the  same  time  as  order  for  the  departure  of  the  active 
toops,  their  first  deployment  might  take  place  near  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine  instead  of  on  the  line  Metz — Strassburg. 

All  this  shows  how  important  the  occupation  of  Landau  would  be 
for  us  in  the  presumed  case  and  the  carrying  out  of  numerous  inter- 
ruption on  the  Nahe  Railroad  as  well  as  on  the  Ludwigsbahn.  This 
brings  up  the  question  of  the  need  of  utilizing  the  last  days  before 
arrival  of  the  French  reinforcements,  to  deliver  the  first  battle. 

We  need  for  that  five  army  corps,  which  must  be  available  on 
the  16th  mobilization  day  at  the  latest. 


No.  32 

Start  of  operations  on  July  25 

Only  a  part  of  the  troops  at  Belfort  and  Colmar  can  be  brought 
to  Strassburg. 

1st  Corps,  and  Douay's  Division  about 35,000  men. 

25th  Drusenheim. 

26th  Rhine  crossing. 

27th   Cos. 

28th  Fight  with  Baden  troops.' 

29th  Ettlingen. 

In  Germersheim  will  be  the  Xlth  Corps 30,000  men 

On  the  27th  ready  for  action, 

28th  Karlsruhe. 

—196— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

29th  Ettlingen,  to  cover  the  debouch- 
ment of  the  Baden  troops 

from  the  mountains 15,000  men. 

Wurtemberg   troops    coming   from    Dur- 

lach    20,000  men. 


65,000  men. 

French  XI  Corps  V  Corps  Baden  and  Wtir- 

temberg   troops 

25.  Hagenau,   Birschweiler. 

26.  Sulz,  Selz.  Landau  Maxau.   (Blow  up 

27.  Winden,  Maxau.  bridge.) 

28.  Landau,  Germersheim. 

If  the  5th  Corps   (Failly)  be  brought  up  from  Bitsch. 

25.  Bitsch. 

26.  Pirmasens. 

27.  Annweiler. 

28.  Landau. 

85,000  Germans  against  55,000  French. 
Everything  will  be  surer  if  the  operations  do  not  commence  un- 
til the  26th. 


No.  33 

On  the  13th  mobilization  day,  July  28: 

Illd  Corps:  between  Bingen  and  Mainz. 

Advance  Guard:  Kreuznach. 
IVth  Corps: 

Advance  Guard:  Duerkheim. 
IXth  Corps,  18th  Division:   Maince. 

25th  Division:  Worms. 
Xlth  Corps:   Near  Landau. 

On  the  14th  mobilization  day,  July  29th,  there  can  be  concentrated 
near  Alzey: 

Illd  and  IVth  Corps 65,000  men. 

Near  Neustadt  or  Duerkheim: 

IVth  and  Xlth  Corps 60,000  men. 

Or  if  necessary: 

Behind  Maince:  the  Hid  Corps  and  the  18th 

Division    50,000  men. 

Near  Germersheim:  25th  Division 15,000  men. 

Near  Worms:   IVth  Corps 30,000  men. 

Near  Mannheim:  Xlth  Corps 30,000  men. 

Near  Rastatt,  Speyer;  Baden  and  Wurtem- 
berg  troops    30,000  men. 

On  the  18th  mobilization  day,  August  2,  possibly: 
Second  Army  and  Reserve: 

Illd  Corps:    Kreuznach. 

IXth  Corps:  Alzey. 
Xth  and  Xllth  Corps:   Mainz. 
Guard  Corps:  Mainz. 

IVth  Corps:  Gruenstadt. 

—197— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


In    all    beyond    Mainz    180,000  men. 

Vth  and  Xlth  Corps:  Landau,  Germersheim 60,000  men. 

Baden  and  Wurtemberg  troops  at  Mazau 30,000  men. 


Total 270,000  men. 

Vlllth  Corps  on  the  Nahe 30,000  men. 


Vllth  Corps  approaching  Total 300,000  men. 


No.   34 

Without  counting  Bavarians. 
Vllth  Corps  en  route. 
Eleven  North  German  and  one  South  German 

army  corps,  consisting  of 380,000  men. 

In  complete  readiness  for  action,  will  be  on  the  farther  side  of 
the  Rhine  in  21  days   (July  16  to  August  5). 

We  can  meet  a  hostile  attack  w^ith  sufficient  forces: 
(a)    On  the  upper  Rhine  after  July  29: 

(1)  On  the  right  bank, 

Xlth  Corps,  Baden  and  Wurtemberg 

troops    55,000  Infantry. 

against    45,000  Infantry. 

(2)  On  the  left  bank, 

Xlth  and  Vth  Corps,  and  a  part  of  the 

Baden  and  Wurtemberg  troops 62,000  Infantry. 

(b)    In  the  Palatinate  beyond  Mainz  after  August  1: 
Illd,  IVth,  Xlth,  Guard,  IXth  and 

Xllth  Corps 140,000  Infantry. 

And  if  the  Vlllth  and  Vth  Corps 

join    200,000  Infantry. 

against    136,000  Infantry. 

(c)    On  the  Mosel,  tow^ards  Wittlich  on  August  1: 

Vllth  Corps 26,000  Infantry. 

And  eventualy  the  Vlllth  Corps 50,000  Infantry. 

Consequently,  if  the  French  advance  by  Saarbruecken  and  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  upper  Rhine,  the  Vlllth  army  corps  must  be  directed 
from  Kirchbach  where  it  can  arrive  on  August  2  to  Kreuznach,  in  or- 
der to  obtain  a  desirable  numerical  superiority.  If  on  the  contrary 
the  French  advance  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  the  Vllth  and 
Vlllth  Corps  could  continue  their  march  toward  Saarlouis,  etc. 

All  the  above  mentioned  corps  will  be  provided  by  the  evening  of 
August  3,  with  the  first  echelon  of  their  trains,  and  will  conse- 
quently be  ready  to  commence  operations. 

The  corps,  which  were  so  equipped  prior  to  this  date,  can  for 
this  reason  continue  their  march  forward  as  a  first  line. 


No.  35 

The  French  may  commence  their  offensive  on  July  25: 

In  the  Palatinate. 
It  seems,  that  the  3d  Corps,  Bazaine — 26,000  Infantry,  is  already 
brought  up  toward  Bolchen   in  line  with  the  2d  Corps,   Frossard:— 
19,500  Infantry. 

—198— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The  4th  Corps,  Ladmirault,  can  then  only  march  either  against 
Trier,  or  in  second  line  towards  the  Palatinate. 


First  line 

65,000  Infantry. 

3d   Corps                           2d  Corps 

5fh  Corps 

25. 

South  of  Saarlouis  Saarbrucken 

Saargemund 

26. 

Sulzbach                    Blieskastel 

Zweibruecken 

27. 

St.  Wendel                Landstuhl 

Primasens 

28. 

Kusel                          Kaiserslautern 

Heltersberg 

29. 

Wolfstein                   Winnweiler 

Frankenstein 

30. 

West  of  Doners-     East  of  Donersburg 
burg 

Gruenstadt 

Six  marches  without  rest  days;   also  the  arrival  of  the  second 
line  must  be  awaited. 

6th    Corps,    Canrobiert, 19,500 

Guard    Corps,    Bourbaki, 13,000 

—32,500  Infantry. 


Total 97,500  Infantry. 

(Ladmirault  20,000  men,  will  be  contained  by  the  Vllth  Army 
Corps.)  The  attack  on  a  position  in  the  vicinity  of  Alzey  or  Marn- 
heim  can  for  this  reason  not  take  place  before  August  1. 

By  that  time  we  can  dispose  of  the  Second 

Army 130,000  men. 

two  reserve  corps 60,000  men. 


190,000  men. 

And  if  the  French  advance  march  takes  place  on  the  right  river 
bank,  the  Vth  army  corps  can  also  be  brought  up  in  three 
marches 30,000  men. 


220,000  men. 
Deduct  s  for  Cavalry  and  Artillery 44,000  men. 


176,000  Infantry. 

The  French  start  operations  on  July  25. 

Only  with  great  difficulty  can  the  division  of  Douay  at  Comar 
and  Belfort  be  brought  up  to  Strassburg  to  reenforce  the  1st  Corps, 
McMahon,  and  thereby  bring  it  up  to 36,000  Infantry. 

25  July,  Drusenheim. 

26  July,  Rhine  crossing. 

27  July,  Oos. 

28  July,  Fight  with  Badea  troops. 

Our  Xlth  Corps  will  be  at  Germersheim  ready  for  action  after 
the    27th    30,000  men. 

27.  a   Germersheim. 

28.  Karlsruhe. 


-199— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


29.  At  Ettlingen,  with  Wurtemberg  troops  20,000  men  to  secure 
the  debouchment  of  the  Baden  troops  from  the  mountains 

15,000  men. 


65,000  men. 


Deduct  for  Cavalry  and  Artillery  about  13,000  men. 

52,000  men  Infantry. 
Or  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 

French 

25  July:   Hagenau,   Bischweiler       XI  Corps     V  Corps     Baden    and 

Wurtemberg 
troops 

26  July:  Sulz  Selz.  Maxau  (blow 

up  bridge) 

27  July:Winden  Maxau.  Landau     Germers-       Germers- 

heim  heim 

Position  behind  the  Klingbach 

28  July:  Battle.  36,000  men  against  (95,000  men,  deduct  Cavalry 
and  Artillery  20,000  men)  75,000  Infantry. 

If  the  5th  Corps,  Failly  be  brought  up  from  Saargemuend. 

25.  Bitsch 

26.  Pirmasens. 

27.  Annweiler. 

28.  Landau. 

In  this  case  there  will  be  55,000  French  against  75,000  Germans; 
this  case  is  not  probable,  as  the  army  in  the  Palatinate  is  already  too 
weak. 


The  5th  Rhine  Dragoon  regiment  should  be  advanced  to  the  vi- 
cinity of  Kaiserslautern,  for  the  observation  of  the  frontier  between 
the  detachment  at  Saarbruecken,  and  a  Royal  Bavarian  brigade  sta- 
tioned at  Speyer,  and  also  for  the  protection  of  the  railroad  line  Lud- 
wigshafen — Homburg.  For  this  purpose  the  following  order  was 
issued: 

No.  36 

To  THE  Rhone  Dragoon  Regiment, 
Mainz, 

To  the  5th  Rhine  Dragoon  regiment,  Mainz.* 

The  regiment  will  reach  Alzey  on  the  22d,  Winnweiler  and  vicinity 
on  the  23d,  Kaiserslautern  on  the  24th  of  this  month,  it  will  observe 
the  Bavarian — French  frontier,  connecting  on  the  right  with  the  7th 
Rhine  Ulan  regiment  (now  at  Saarbruecken)  and  on  the  left  with 
the  Royal  Bavarian  brigade  (now  at  Speyer)  which  is  under  command 
of  Major  General  Maillinger. 


*To  the  governor  of  Mainz  for  information  and  transmission; 
copy  to  CG  Xlth  Corps  at  Cassel;  for  information  of  the  21st  Divi- 
sion at  Francfort. 

—200— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Maintain  liaison  to  both  flanlis,  and  especially  protect  the  railroad 
Ludwigshafen — Homburg  against  attempts  at  interruptions  by  weak 
hostile  detachments.  Captain  v.  Huene  of  the  General  Staff  is  in 
command  of  the  above  mentioned  railroad  line. 

Two  fortress  Pioneer  companies  from  Ludwigshafen  should  ar- 
rive with  him  at  Homburg  on  the  forenoon  of  July  24. 

Important  reports  should  always  be  telegraphed  directly  to  me, 
and  to  the  governor  at  Mainz. 

Should  the  regiment  be  pushed  back  by  superior  forces,  it  will 
retire  on  Mainz. 

Captain  v.  Huene  is  in  charge  of  railway  destructions. 

Only  if  the  officer  is  not  to  be  present,  may  slight  destructions 
through  removing  of  rails  and  switches  be  undertaken,  and  wherever 
possible  this  will  be  done  under  the  supervision  of  a  technical  man. 

Major  General  Maillinger  and  the  Commander  of  the  7th  Rhine 
Ulan  regiment  has  been  informed  of  the  mission  of  the  regiment. 


No.  37 

To  Lt.  Colonel  von  Pestel. 
Saarbruecken.* 

Berlin,  July  20,  1870,  8:00  P.M. 
Telegram. 

Try  with  a  small  detachment  sent  from  Saarbruecken,  to  destroy 
thoroughly  the  railroad  Saargemund — Hagenau.  Ask  the  railroad 
administration  for  technical  assistance. 


No.  38 

To  THE  1st  HaNSEATIC  INFANTRY   REGIMENT  No.   75. 

Bremen. 

Berlin,  July   20-21,   1870,   midnight. 
Telegram. 

Two  companies  will  be  sent  immediately  and  if  possible  by  rail 
from  Brelin  to  Geestemuende  on  account  of  the  nearness  of  hostile 
ships.f 


No.  39 

To  THE  Governor  of  Mainz. 

Berlin,  July  21,  1870. 

Referring  to  your  telegram  of  yesterday,  I  have  the  honor  to 
advise  the  Royal  government  that  it  is  urgently  desirable  to  build 
quickly  a  permanent  floating  bridge,  instead  of  the  flying  bridge  at 

♦Commander  of  the  7th  Rhine  Ulan  regiment;  at  the  same  time 
in  command  of  frontier  guard  at  Saarbruecken. 

tThe  corps  headquarters  of  the  IX  army  corps  and  the  war  min- 
istry were  also  notified. 

—201— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


Petersau.  The  material  of  the  bridge  at  Worms  is  not  available  for 
this  purpose,  as  it  is  in  our  interest  to  maintain  this  bridge  intact  as 
long  as  possible. 

In  view  of  the  important  facilities,  which  the  river  navigation 
offers,  it  will  be  very  easy  for  the  Royal  government  to  establish  a 
new  floating  bridge,  utilizing  if  necessary  the  assistance  of  civil  engi- 
neers and  mechanics. 

The  point  of  cost  is  insignificant. 


No.  40 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Third  Army. 
Berlin. 

Berlin,  July  21,  1870. 

I  have  the  honor  to  advise  the  Royal  Army  Headquarters  as  to 
the  positions,  etc.,  of  the  troops  under  its  command,  as  follows: 

The  Royal  Prussian  Vth  and  Xlth  Army  Corps  are  in  process  of 
mobilization,  and  will  be  moved  in  accordance  with  the  time  and 
march  tables  which  have  been  transmitted  to  their  respective  com- 
manders. 

The  Vth  Army  Corps  will  be  brought  to  Landau  by  rail  via  Leip- 
zig— Hof — Mainz  and  detrains  there  from  the  12th  to  the  18th 
mobilization  day  inclusive. 

The  Xlth  Army  Corps  will  reach  the  line  Germersheim — Landau, 
partly  by  rail  via  Fulda — Aschaffenburg — -Mainz  and  partly  on  foot, 
between  the  10th  and  13th  mobilization  days  inclusive.  The  greater 
part  of  the  troops  of  this  corps  will  be  assembled  by  the  evening  of  the 
10th  mobilization  day.  Only  the  5th  Rhine  Dragoon  regiment  arrives 
at  Maince  today,  and  marches  from  there  on  the  22d  of  this  month 
to  Alzey,  on  the  23d  to  the  vicinity  of  Winnweiler,  on  the  24th  to 
Kaiserslautern.  It  will  take  over  in  the  first  instance  the  observation 
of  the  hostile  frontier  between  a  detachment  of  the  Vlllth  Army 
Corps,  stationed  at  Saarbruecken,  and  a  Royal  Bavarian  brigade,  sta- 
tioned at  Speyer  under  command  of  Major  General  Maillinger. 

As  far  as  known  here,  the  last  mentioned  has  a  battalion,  at  Win- 
den  (railway  center  between  Landau  and  Weissenburg),  supported 
by  a  Baden  Squadron  and  a  pioneer  company  at  Maxau. 

The  position  of  the  almost  mobilized  Baden  Division  was  on  the 
evening  of  the  18th  July  as  follows: 

Headquarters,  Karlsruhe. 

lid  battalion,  2d  Grenadier  regiment,  and  one  squadron  1st  Dra- 
goon regiment  at  Hagenbach  Bavarian  Palatine,  south  of  the  Maxau 
bridge):   patrols  on  the  Lauterbach. 

One  squadron  at  Winden  (see  above),  patrols  at  Weissenburg. 

One  company  at  Maxau. 

3d  Dragoon  Regiment  observes  the  Rhine  from  Maxau  to  Stein- 
mauern   (mouth  of  the  Murg). 

2d  Dragoon  Regiment  observes  the  Rhine  from  Steinmauem  to 
Lichtenau. 

Besides  the  34th  Pomerenian  Fusilier  regiment  and  a  Prussian 
Mining  company,  the  2d  and  3d  Baden  Infantry  brigades  (12  bat- 
talions)  including  fortress  artillery  and  pioneers,  are  at  Rastatt. 

Kehl  is  occupied  with  11  companies  of  the  3d  regiment,  40  artil- 
lerymen, a  few  pioneers  and  20  horses. 

—202— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Troops  not  mentioned  are  stationed  in  northern  garrisons. 

At  Heidelberg  is  a  reserve  hospital  of  300  beds. 

Arrangements,  to  block  the  passage  of  the  Rhine  by  Steinmau- 
ern  have  been  made;  19  large  boats  and  70  launches  are  ready  to  be 
sunk. 

The  Wuertemberg  Division  is  completely  mobilized  and  is  ready 
to  be  transported  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  of  this  month.  Their 
destination  is  Karlsruhe.  Ten  squadrons  are  ready  to  move  today 
and  are  temporarily  at  the  disposition  of  the  Baden  Division. 

As  to  the  Royal  Bavarian  Army  Corps,  the  following  mentioned 
troops  are  ready  for  action  at  Germersheim  and  Speyer: 

On  the  1st  of  August,  the  2d,  3d  and  4th  Division. 

On  the  2d  of  August,  the  1st  Division. 

On  the  3d  of  August,  the  reserve  cavalry  of  both  corps. 
•  On  the  7th  of  August,  the  reserve  artillery  of  the  lid  Corps. 

The  Bavarian  Army  Corps  will  not  be  equipped  with  all  their 
trains  until  the  evening  of  August  8th. 


No.  41 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  the  Royal  Wurtemberg  Divi- 
sion. 
Stuttgart. 

Berlin,  July  21,  1870,  11:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Place  temporarily  at  the  disposition  of  the  Baden  Division  all 
the  cavalry  which  is  ready  to  march,  and  place  these  in  movement  at 
once,  and  if  possible  by  rail.* 

Lt.  General  v.  Beyer,  Commanding  the  Baden  Division,  inquired 
by  telegraph  if  he  could  leave  Mannheim  unoccupied.  According  to 
his  report  French  troops  had  been  seen  near  Stollhofen.  The  enemy 
was  examining  the  course  of  the  river.     General  von  Moltke  answered : 

No.  42 

To  Lt.  General  von  Beyer. 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin,  July  21,  1870,  9:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

As  Hagenbach,  Landau  and  Speyer  are  occupied,  there  is  no  ob- 
jection of  withdrawing  the  battalions  at  Mannheim.  The  consolida- 
tion of  the  Baden  Division  around  Rastatt  is  desirable. 


On  the  necessity  of  detraining  the  Second  Army  in  rear  of  the 
Rhine,  General  von  Moltke  expressed  himself  as  follows: 


•"The  Baden  Division  was  informed  by  telegraph  of  this  order. 


—203— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  43 

Report  for  His  Majesty  the  King. 

Berlin,  July  22,  1870. 

The  French  had  not  crossed  the  frontier  up  to  yesterday;  but  they 
may  do  so  at  any  moment. 

If  today,  our  7th  mobilization  day,  they  take  the  offensive,  with 
142,000  men,  which  they  have  assembled,  they  may  on  the  13th  mobili- 
zation day  by  a  resolute  advance  reach  the  vicinity  of  Kirchheimbol- 
anden. 

At  most  the  French  may  reach  on  our  15th  mobilization  day  the 
Rhine,  where  they  will  meet: 

the  Hid,  IVth  and  IVth  Corps. -100,000  men  near  Mainz 

the  Xlth  Corps,  the  Baden  Divi- 
sion and  a  part  of  the  Wurtemberg 
Division,  about   50,000  men  near  Worms 

the  Vlllth  Corps   20,000  men  near  Kreuznach 

Total    170,000  men 

so  that  the  hostile  movement  even  in  the  most  favorable  case  for  them 
will  come  to  a  standstill. 

After  the  17th  mobilization  day  we  will  be  reenforced  by:  The 
Guard  and  Xth  Corps  near  Mainz  and  the  Vth  and  Xllth  Corps  near 
Worms. 

August  1.     On  this  day  we  may  debouch  with: 

near    Kreuznach    30,000  men 

from    Mainz    130.000  men 

from  Worms   90,000  men 

Total,  less  Bavarians  250,000  men 

The  Vllth  Corps  remains  available  for  use  against  the  enemy's 
communications. 

It  is  possible  that  the  French  may  delay  their  invasion.  52,000 
men  are  being  concentrated  behind  the  Corps  already  completely  mo- 
bilized; 70,000  reserves  will  join  the  depots  on  July  23,  and  the  troops 
on  the  28th.  It  is  however  neither  certain,  nor  probable,  that  the 
French  will  wait  this  long. 

We  can  meet  the  French  even  if  they  do  not  commence  their 
march  before  the  9th  mobilization  day  (July  24)  by  Kirchheimbolan- 
den  or  in  advance  thereof  only  with  the  Hid  and  IVth  Corps;  60,000 
men.     We  would  have  to  fight  a  retreating  action. 

I  have  the  honor  to  propose  now  as  a  conclusion,  "that  the  Second 
Army  detrains  on  the  Rhine." 

This  will  not  preclude  sending  two  Divisions  after  the  12th  mo- 
bilization as  advance  guard  beyond  Mainz,  and  according  to  circum- 
stances of  moving  the  Second  Army  forward  by  marching. 

No  changes  are  necessary  in  railroad  and  march  tables  for  the 
present. 


—204— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  44 

To  THE  Administration  of  the  Hessian  Ludwigs  Railroad. 
Mainz. 

Berlin,  July  22,  1870,  9:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

It  is  important  from  a  military  point  of  view  to  go  ahead  with 
the  construction  of  the  railway  line  Armsheim — Alzey.  It  is  for 
this  reason  desirable  that  you  continue  this  work  vigorously.  If  nec- 
essary the  viaduct  may  temporarily  be  provided  with  a  wooden  struc- 
ture instead  of  a  stone  arch,  about  which  I  must  be  informed.  Please 
answer. 


No.  45 


To  the  C.  G.  1st  Army  Corps. 
Koenigsberg  i.  Pr. 


Berlin,  July  22,  1870. 


I  most  respectfully  request  the  Royal  Corps  H.  Q.  while  continu- 
ing the  transportation  arrangements  already  provided  for,  to  arrange 
for  extending  in  the  general  direction  of  Dresden,  the  movements  of 
fractions  of  the  Army  Corps  which  are  to  detrain  at  Hansdorf  and 
Goerlitz.  The  troops  which  are  to  detrain  at  Dresden  will  similarly 
continue  their  movement  as  far  as  Riesa. 

The  Army  Corps  will  thereby  be  in  position  to  continue  its  move- 
ment by  rail  as  soon  as  the  lines  which  lead  west  are  free. 

The  necessary  orders  will  be  sent  at  the  proper  time  and  it  is 
desirable  that  I  be  advised  as  soon  as  possible  as  to  the  march  tables 
of  the  units  of  the  Army  Corps  from  Hansdorf,  Goerlitz  and  Dresden. 
A  copy  of  these  orders  above  mentioned,  has  been  sent  confidentially  to 
the  Royal  Saxonian  War  Minister.  The  commander  of  the  army  corps 
should  enter  into  communication  with  the  above  mentioned  authority 
concerning  the  billeting  of  troops  which  will  pass  through  Saxon  ter- 
ritory.* 


No.  46 

To  the  Headquarters  of  the  VIth  Army  Corps. 
Breslau. 

Berlin,  July  22,  1870. 

I  enclose  herewith  for  the  Royal  Corps  Headquarters,  two  copies 
of  the  instruction  tablesf  for  the  garrison  troops  of  the  VIth  Army 
Corps  for  transmission.  At  the  same  time  I  desire  respectfully  to  re- 
quest that  you  issue,  orders  that  the  11th  Infantry  Division  be  con- 
centrated by  marching  and  be  billeted  widely  east  of  and  near  Goer- 
litz; the  12th  Infantry  Division,  the  Corps  Artillery  and  the  trains  be 
concentrated  in  the  same  manner  near  Breslau.  The  cavalry  regi- 
ments will  until  further  orders  march  with  the  Divisions  to  which 
they  belong  according  to  peace  formation. 


*See  No.  53  for  modifications  of  this  order. 
fNot  found. 

—205— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


The  staff  of  the  2d  Cavalry  Division,  which  is  to  be  formed  at 
Breslau,  will  remain  for  the  present  in  Breslau  with  the  Staff  of  the 
Army  Corps. 


No.  47 

REGULATION   FOR   THE    DETRAINING,   BILLETING   AND    SE- 
CURITY OF  THE  TROOPS  DURING  THE  CON- 
CENTRATION OF  THE  ARMY 

Berlin,  July  22,  1870,  evening. 

The  decision  of  His  Majesty  the  King,  that  the  concentration  of 
the  army  will  take  place  in  the  first  instance  on  the  Rhine,  seem  to 
require  the  following   special   instructions: 

I.  By  line  A  (Illd  Army  Corps,  followed  by  the  Xth  Army  Corps), 
Bingen  is  designated  as  the  detraining  railhead.  The  Illd  Army 
Corps  will  send  an  advance  guard  beyond  Kreuznach  and  will  be  bil- 
leted east  of  the  line  Bingen — Kreuznach.  As  soon  as  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  arrives,  the  Illd  Army  Corps  will  move  towards  Mainz. 

II.  On  line  C  (the  IVth  army  corps,  followed  by  the  Guard 
Corps)  Mannheim  is  designated  as  the  detraining  railhead.  The  IVth 
Army  Corps  will  sent  an  advance  guard  beyond  Dirkheim,  which  will 
keep  in  liaison  with  the  advance  guard  of  the  Illd  Army  Corps  by 
means  of  the  5th  Dragoon  regiment  stationed  at  Kaiserslautern.  The 
main  body  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  will  be  billeted  around  Mann- 
heim. The  Army  Corps  will  then  be  ready  to  march  off,  either  on 
Marnheim  or  on  Mainz  by  either  the  right  or  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine.  It  will  be  in  position  to  support  the  Xlth  Army  Corps  and 
the  Bavarians  by  Landau — Germersheim,  or  else  the  Baden  and  Wur- 
temburg  troops  near  Rastadt.  As  to  v.'hether  the  Guard  Corps  shall 
also  detrain  near  Mannheim  or  better  be  near  Darmstadt,  this  is  a 
question  the  solution  of  which  will  depend  on  future  circumstances. 

III.  The  Grand  Ducal  Hessian  (25th)  Division  (belong  to  the 
mobilized  IXth  Army  Corps)  must  not  be  advanced  beyond  Worms. 

IV.  The  rest  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  (18th  Infantry  Division, 
Corps  Artillery  and  trains),  and  the  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps 
which  detrain  at  Mosbach  or  Castel  will  be  billeted  near  Mainz. 

V.  Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  is  charged  with  regulating 
the  billeting  and  L.  of  C,  of  the  two  reserve  corps,  the  IXth  and 
Xllth  about  Mainz. 


No.    48 

To  THE  Headquarters  ov  the  First,  Second  and  Third  Armies. 
Berlin. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  all  staffs  and  commands,  pre- 
scribed by  Tables  of  Organization,  or  the  order  of  battle  will  im- 
mediately commence  to  function.  They  will  not  control  directly  the 
troops  until  after  these  have  left  the  rail  lines. 


— 20C- 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  49 

To  ALL  Headquarters  Staffs. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  orders  that  telegraphic  reports  be  as  brief 
as  clearness  permits.  All  unnecessary  words  in  the  address,  titles, 
signatures,  etc.,  are  particularly  to  be  avoided. 

Avoid  the  use  of  cipher  telegrams  as  much  as  possible;  they  easily 
result  in  misunderstandings,  and  if  they  are  used  too  often,  they 
may  lead  to  the  discovery  of  the  cipher.  In  all  cases  the  original 
cipher  telegrams  are  to  be  completely  destroyed  after  they  have  been 
deciphered. 


No.  50 

To  THE  Staff  of  the  Second  Army. 
Berlin. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  the  Royal  H.  Q.  be  informed  as 
follows: 

The  intelligence  which  has  been  received  concerning  the  mobili- 
zation and  concentration  of  the  Imperial  French  army,  indicates  that 
it  is  possible  that  within  a  few  days  important  hostile  forces  will  cross 
the  frontier  between  Trier  and  the  Rhine. 

Therefore  His  Majesty  has  decided,  that  the  Illd  and  Xth  Army 
Corps  which  are  to  be  transported  by  the  Line  Cologne — Coblenz — 
Bingen  will  commence  to  detrain  at  the  last  place.  They  will  be  bil- 
leted at  first  in  the  direction  of  Kreuznach  and  Maince,  under  protec- 
tion of  an  advance  guard  posted  the  first  mentioned  of  these  two 
towns. 

In  the  same  manner  should  the  IVth  and  Guard  Corps  be  trans- 
ported by  rail  only  as  far  as  Mannheim  via  Frankfort  M.;  the  ad- 
vance guard  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  will  be  posted  towards  Durk- 
heim.  The  5th  Rhine  Dragoons  who  are  at  Kaiserslautern  will  tem- 
porarily maintain  liaison  between  the  advance  guards  of  the  Hid  and 
IVth  Army  Corps  but  they  should  however  be  relieved  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible by  another  cavalry  regiment  from  the  Second  Army.  The  main 
body  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  will  be  billeted  along  around  Mannheim. 
Furthermore  His  Majesty  places  the  Second  Army  in  charge  of  regu- 
lating billeting  in  the  vicinity  of  Maince  and  of  L.  of  C.  affairs  for 
the  IXth  and  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps. 

The  Headquai'ters,  Second  Army,  will  be  transported  on  the  eve- 
ning of  July  26th  from  here  by  rail  to  Mainz. 

Report  if  a  change  becomes  necessary  as  to  this  billeting  as- 
signment. The  IXth  and  Xllth  Army  Corps  have  been  directed  to 
send  a  general  staff  officer  and  an  intendance  official  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble in   advance  to   Mainz. 

The  direct  observation  of  the  hostile  frontier  is  now  assured: 

(a)  from  Trier  to  Saarbruecken  through  detachments  of  the 
Vlllth  Army  Corps,  now  in  process  of  concentration  in  the  direction 
of  Saarlouis. 

(b)  from  Saarbruecken  to  the  Rhine  through  Royal  Bavarian 
troops    (H.  Q.  Speyer,  Major  General  Maillinger). 

On  the  24th  of  this  month  the  5th  Rhine  Dragoons  will  arrive  at 
Kaiserslautern,  as   mentioned   above,  to   assure   liaison  with   the   ob- 

—207— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


servation  detachments  of  the  Vlllth  Corps.  The  Royal  Bavarian 
troops  can  thus  close  in  towards  their  left. 

Finally  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine  is  the  Grand  Ducal  Baden 
Division,  reinforced  by  10  Royal  Wurtemberg  squadrons  now  south 
of  Karlsruhe  and  completely  mobilized.  The  Royal  Prussian  Xlth 
Army  Corps  is  in  motion  by  rail  and  march  towards  Landau — Ger- 
mersheim. 

The  enclosure  herewith  which  is  to  be  kept  very  secret  and  is  not 
to  be  copied  is  intended  to  give  you  a  general  idea  as  to  the  movements 
of  the  army  within  the  next  few  days. 

Enclosure 
General  idea  as  to  the  initial  movements  of  the  entire  army. 

First  Army 

Vllth  Corps— 13th  Division;  24th-27th  July,  to  Call  by  rail;  31st 
July-lst  August,  to  Trier  by  road.  14th  Division;  24th-26th  July,  to 
Aachen  and  Stolberg  by  rail;  lst-2d  August,  to  Trier  by  road. 

Vlllth  Corps — To  march  generally  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle  (the  troops  coming  from  the  north  crossing  at  Berncastel), 
and  to  be  echeloned  between  Saarlouis  and  Hermeskeil  on  the  2d  Au- 
gust, or  to  be  assembled  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kirchberg  between  the 
28th  and  31st  July. 

Second  Army 

Hid  Corps;  25th-28th  July,  to  Bingen  by  rail. 

Xth  Corps;  29th  Julv-5th  August,  to  Bingen. 

IV  Corps;  26th  to  29th  July,  to  Mannheim. 

Guard  Corps;  30th  July-5th  August,  to  Darmstadt  or  Mannheim. 

Third  Army 

Xlth  Corps;  25th-27th  July  to  Germersheim  and  Landau. 

Vth  Corps;  27th  July-3d  August,  to  Landau. 

Bavarians: — 1st  Corps  at  Speyer;  lid  Corps  at  Germersheim; 
both  to  be  completely  mobilized  bv  the  3d  August,  and  ready  to  move 
by  the  9th. 

Wurtembergers;  27th-28th  July,  concentrated  at  Carlsruhe;  10 
squadrons  moved  there  yesterday  (22d  July). 

Badeners;  the  Baden  Division  is  now  north  of  Rastatt. 

Reserves 

IXth  Corps;  of  this  Corps,  the  25th  Division  moves  to  Worms  on 
the  26th  July,  18th  Division,  28th  July— 2d  August,  to  Mainz. 
Xllth  Corps;  27th  July-2d  August,  to  Mainz. 

Corps  in  the  Eastern  Districts  of  the  Monarchy 

1st  Corps;  27th  July-5th  August,  to  move  westward  as  far  as 
Berlin. 

lid  Corps;  26th-31st  July,  to  Berlin. 

Vlth  Corps;  to  move  chiefly  by  marching  after  the  25th  and  26th 
July.    The  11th  Division  at  Goerlitz;  12th  Division  at  Breslau. 


—208— 


Operations  Julj^  18  to  September  2,  1870 

17th  Infantry  Division  and  Landwehr  Divisions 

17th  Division;  26th-28th  July,  to  Hamburg. 

Guard  Landwehr  Division;  28th  July-3d  August,  to  Hanover. 

2d  Landwehr  Division;  29th  July-lst  August,  at  Bremen. 

1st  Landwehr  Division To  be  echeloned  along  the  railways 

until  the  5th  August,  viz.,  at  Schnei- 

2d  Landwehr  Division demuehl,  Magdeburg,  Stettin,  Glogau, 

Posen  and  Tilsit. 

The  garrisons  of  the  fortresses  will  be  on  a  war  footing  as  fol- 
lows: 

Saarlouis  (is  now  fully  garrisoned  as  per  war  establishment). 
Mainz — on  28th  July. 
Cologne — on  1st  August. 
Coblenz— on  30th  July. 

and  the  menaced  coast-fortresses  on  the  29th  and  30th  July. 


NB. — On  all  transportation  lines  times  have  been  calculated  to 
include  the  first  line  ammunition  columns  and  trains. 


No.  51 
To  THE  Headquarters  of  the  First  Army. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

In  compliance  with  his  Majesty's  orders,  I  send  the  Royal  H.  Q. 
staff  a  very  secret,  and  not  to  be  copied,  synopsis  of  the  movements 
of  the  army,  which  are  to  take  place  in  the  near  future. 

At  the  same  time  I  also  inform  the  H.  Q.  staff  that  it  will  be 
transported  from  here  on  the  afternoon  of  July  26th  by  rail  to 
Coblenz. 

Finally  I  respectfully  request  that  you  send  to  my  office  as  soon 
ag  possible  as  march  table  showing  the  Headquarters  of  the  corps 
commanders  and  the  commander  of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps. 


No.  52 
To  the  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

In  compliance  with  his  Majesty's  orders,  I  send  the  Royal  H.  Q. 
staff  a  very  secret  and  not  to  be  copied  synopsis  of  the  movements  of 
the  army,  which  are  to  take  place  in  the  near  future.  Please  note  that ' 
the  Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  has  been  directed  to  relieve  as 
soon  as  possible  the  5th  Rhine  Dragoon  regiment  at  Kaiserslautern 
by  another  cavalry  regiment.  The  first  mentioned  regiment  is  there- 
upon to  be  returned  to  the  control  of  its  own  Division. 

—209— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


The  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  will  be  transported  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  28th  by  rail  to  Mannheim. 

A  report  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  change  the  location  of  the 
headquarters. 


No.  53 

To  THE  Headquarters  of  the  1st  Army  Corps. 

KOENIGSBERG  i.   Pr. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  orders  that  the  1st  Army  Corps  shall  be 
transported — changing  our  earlier  order — by  rail  to  Berlin,  and  shall 
be  billeted  in  this  vicinity  until  the  rail  lines  toward  the  west  are 
free.  I  respectfully  request  the  Corps  Headquarters,  in  reply  to  your 
telegram  of  the  22d  of  this  month,  to  get  in  connection  at  Berlin  with 
the  Royal  General  government  for  the  districts  of  the  Hid  and  IVth 
Army  Corps  areas  in  regard  to  billeting  the  army  corps. 


No.  54 

To  THE  Headquarters  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps. 
Schleswig. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  the  IXth  Army  Corps  report 
temporarily  to  the  Second  Army  in  regard  to  billeting  areas  near 
Mainz  and  the  regulation  of  the  lines  of  communication.  I  respect- 
fully advise  you  that  the  Grand  Ducal  Hessian  (25th)  Division  has 
received  orders  direct  from  here  to  move  on  the  25th  of  this  month 
to  Gernsheim,  on  the  26th  of  this  month  to  Worms,  and  to  billet  at 
the  latter  place  and  vicinity.  I  request  you  in  consequence  to  get  in 
communication  with  the  Royal  Headquarters  staff  of  the  Second  Army 
(up  to  the  26th  evening  here,  from  the  28th  noon  at  Mainz),  as  to  the 
above  mentioned  points,  and  to  send  in  advance  as  soon  as  possible 
General  Staff  Officer,  and  an  Intendance  official  to  the  last  mentioned 
place. 


No.  55 

To  the  Headquarters  of  the  Guard,  IIId,  IVth,  Vth,  VIIth, 
VIIIth,  IXth,  Xth,  and  XIth  Army  Corps. 

Berlin,  July  23,  1870. 

In  regard  to  march  and  rail  routes  of  supply  trains,  the  Royal 
Corps  H.  Q.  is  requested  to  note  the  following: 

'  I.  All  auxiliary  trains  that  can  arrive  by  marching  before  August 

6  in  line  with  the  points  designated  as  the  principal  depots  of  the  army 
corps,  are  by  August  5  to  be  started  off  as  soon  as  they  are  organ- 
ized. 

II.  Where  this  cannot  be  done,  the  auxiliary  trains  will  be  for- 
warded by  rail.     It  should  be  considered  that  transportation  will  not 


—210— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

be  available  before  August  the  1st.    It  is  even  possible  that  rail  trans- 
portation will  not  be  available  before  August  4th  or  5th. 

III.  In  consideration  of  the  above,  the  Royal  Corps  Headquar- 
ters will  please  report  quickly  to  this  office,  when  and  by  which  route 
the  auxiliary  trains  will  be  started  off,  or  else  when  and  where  they 
will  be  organized  and  ready  for  rail  transportation. 

IV.  All  auxiliary  trains  must  be  loaded,  regardless  as  to  whether 
they  proceed  by  marching  or  by  rail. 


No.  56 

To  THE  Headquarters  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps. 
Magdeburg. 

Berlin,  July  2A,  1870,  10:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

The  first  echelons  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  will  be  detrained  at 
Mannheim  and  will  be  billeted  there.  Orders  to  this  effect  have  been 
given  to  the  railroads.     Advise  the  troops. 


No.  57 

To  the  Grand  Ducal  Hessian  G.  H.  Q.,  and  to  the  Prussian 
Pioneer  Headquarters  at  Mannheim. 

Berlin,  July  2h,  1870,  10:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Preserve   under   all   circumstances   the   railroad   bridge   over   the 
Rhine.    Destruction  absolutely  inadmissible. 


Lieut.  Colonel  Wright,  commanding  the  5th  Rhine  Dragoons,  had 
telegraphed:  "Kaiserslautern,  7,  24,  1870;  10:20  A.M.  Dragoon  regi- 
ment arrived.  If  your  Excellency  does  not  answer  in  three  hours, 
leave  today  for  Landstuhl.  Tomorrow  to  Homburg,  possibly  Blies- 
kastel.  Will  be  in  daily  telegraphic  connection  with  Saarbrueck  and 
Homburg "     General  von  Moltke  answered: 

No.  58 

To  Lt.  Colonel  Wright. 
Kaiserslautern. 

Berlin,  July  2U,  1870,  1:15  P.M. 
Telegram,. 

Keep  moving,  but  keep  in  liaison  to  your  left. 


—211- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  59 

To  Lt.  Colonel  von  Pestel. 
Saarbruecken. 

Berlin,  July  2U,  1870,  U:00  P.M. 
Telegrarn. 

In  our  own  country,  structures  of  great  importance  will  not  be 
destroyed.  If  your  retreat  becomes  necessary,  carry  one  minor,  but 
repeated  interruptions  on  both  railroads. 


No.  60 

To  Lieutenant  Colonel  von  Pestel. 
Saarbruecken. 

Berlin,   July  25,   1870,   10:30   A.M. 
Telegram. 

The  numbers  of  the  regiments,  of  prisoners,  of  killed  and  of  de- 
serters are  to  be  telegraphed  immediately  to  this  office.  (14)  Report 
railway  destruction  carried  out  on  the  24th,  also  the  name  of  the 
technical  engineer  who  participated  therein. 


No.  61 

To  Vice-Admiral  Jachmann. 
Wilhelmshaven. 

Berlin,  July  25,  1870,  9:45  P.M. 
Telegram. 

The  embassy  in  London  telegraphs: 

"Dover,  July  25,  1870. 
The  French  fleet,  consisting  of  ten  iron  vessels  has  just  passed 
the  straits  going  east." 


Lt.  General  von  Gersdorff,  commanding  the  22d  Division  reported 
on  the  morning  of  July  25th,  that  he  had  arrived  at  Landau  and  in 
view  of  intelligence  just  received  by  him  as  to  a  hostile  advance  soon 
to  be  made  on  Pirmasens,  to  be  intended  to  concentrate  all  Prussian 
troops  already  arrived  northwest  of  Landau. 

General  von  Moltke  answered  immediately: 


No.  62 

To  Lt.  General  von  Gersdorff. 

Berlin,  July  26,  1870,  morning. 
Telegratn. 

Your  telegram  of  this  morning  received.     I  approve  your  inten- 
tion, and  invite  your  attention  towards  Annweiler. 

—212— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The  Baden  and  Wurtemberg-  Divisions  at  Carlsruhe  have  been 
instructed  from  this  office,  to  rally  on  the  Third  Army,  if  a  hostile 
advance  takes  place  only  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 

Until  the  arrival  of  General  Werder  and  later  of  the  headquar- 
ters of  the  Third  Army,  the  senior  g-eneral  is  in  command.  The  IVth 
Army  Corps  near  Mannheim  will  later  be  able  to  support  you. 

Advise  General  Bose*  and  General  Bothmerf  as  to  this  message. 


No.  63 

To  THE  Headquarters  of  the  Grand  Ducal  Baden  and  Royal 
Wurtemberg  Divisions. 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin,  July  26,  1870,  morning. 
Telegram.X 

It  is  improbable  that  60,000  men  advance  on  Weissenburg  from 
Bitsch,  Strassburg,  Colmar,  Belfort. 

If  important  forces  advance  towards  the  Lauter,  without  it  ap- 
pearing that  a  crossing  of  the  Rhine  is  to  be  effected  simultaneously 
or  earlier,  the  Baden  Division  with  the  Wurtembergers  will  join  im- 
mediately with  the  Third  Army  by  Maxau  or  Germersheim. 

See  that  the  bridges  at  Maxan  are  safely  guarded. 

The  Xlth  Corps  detrains  on  the  25th  in  Germersheim;  the  Vth 
Corps  on  the  27th  at  Landau;  the  Bavarians  should  be  on  August  3d 
at  Speyer  and  Germersheim.  If  the  French  rather  advance  on  the 
right  bank,  the  Baden  and  Wurtemberg  Divisions  be  supported  in 
time  near  Ettlingen. 

Acknowledge  receipt  by  telegraph. 


Lt.  Colonel  von  Pestel  reported  on  July  24th,  1:45  P.M.,  that  he 
had  made  the  viaduct  between  Saargemuend  and  Blieskastel  impassa- 
ble, and  that  destructions  would  continue.  (See  No.  37.)  General  von 
Moltke  answered: 

No.  64 

To  Lt.  Colonel  von  Pestel. 
Saarbruecken. 

Berlin,  July  26,  1870,  7:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

The  mission  assigned  you  from  here  is  considered  as  accom- 
plished. 


^Commanding  General  of  the  Xlth  Army  Corps. 
fCommanding  General  of  the  Royal  Bavarian  4th  Division. 
JA  copy  of  this  telegram  was  sent  to  the  Third  Army  at  Berlin. 


—213- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


Lt.  Colonel  Wright  received  the  following  answer  to  an  inquiry 
concerning  his  future  actions. 

No.  65 

To  Lt.  Colonel  Wright. 
HOMBURG  I.   P. 

Berlin,  July  26,  1870,  7:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

Observe  and  keep  in  liaison  on  both  flanks  until  you  are  relieved. 


On  July  27,  3:12  P.M.,  Lt.  Colonel  von  Leszczynski  inquired  from 
Carlsruhe,  if  he  should  carry  out  the  dam  across  the  Rhine,  near  Al- 
trip,  south  of  Mannheim. 

General  von  Moltke  answered: 

No.  66 

To  Lt.  Colonel  von  Leszczynski. 
Karlsruhe. 

Berlin,  July  27,  1870,   7:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

I  approve  the  preparation  for  obstructing  the  river  near  Altripp. 
While  reserving  the  right  to  carry  out  this  project,  the  water  com- 
munications between  Mainz  and  Germersheim  are  important  for  us. 
See  that  the  obstruction  prepared  according  to  my  orders,  at  the  last 
mentioned  town*  will  not  prevent  the  possible  destruction  of  the 
Maxau  bridges. 


No.  67 
To  all  Headquarters. 


Berlin,   July   27,   1870. 


His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  there  be  submitted  every  ten 
days  to  G.  H.  Q.,  commencing  August  1,  situation  reports  on  mobil- 
ized troops. 

These  returns  will  show  by  Army  Corps  and  Cavalry  Divisions, 
the  situation  of  troops  on  the  first,  eleventh  and  twenty-first  of  each 
month. 

Casualty  lists  are  to  be  submitted  within  24  hours  after  every 
engagement.  The  regimental  numbers,  etc.,  of  prisoners  captured  will 
also  be  immediately  reported  to  this  office. 

Generals  and  Staff  Officers  will  be  reported  by  name. 

*See  No.  28. 


—214— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  68 

To  ALL  Army  and  Corps  Headquarters. 

Berlin,  July  28,  1870. 
Telegram. 

The  military  authorities,  the  Intendance  and  the  contractors 
cannot  figure  on  transportation  during  great  troop  movements.  They 
are  to  be  positively  informed  not  to  push  the  railroad  administration 
in  this  matter.  Arrangements  made  for  train  movements  and  num- 
ber of  cars  in  trains  must  be  strictly  complied  with. 

Send  here,  up  to  the  31st  instant  inclusive,  all  pressing  requests 
on  the  Intendance,  giving  quantities,  and  untraining  and  detraining 
stations. 


No.  69 
To  THE  VIIIth  Army  Corps. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin,  July  28,  1870,  12:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

Direst  your  troops  to  wire  me  all  information  concerning  the 
enemy,  especially  engagements;  as  far  as  possible  give  the  numbers 
of  the  hostile  regiments. 


No.  70 

To  THE  Lt.  General  von  Stosch. 
Mainz. 

Berlin,  July  28,  1870,  P.M. 
Telegram. 

It  is  desirable  that  subsistance  supplies  be  pushed  forward;  at 
first  up  to  the  line  Kreuznach — Alzey — Worms.  A  large  depot  at 
Alzey;  depots  at  Gaubickelheim  and  Monsheim.  Bakeries  at  Neunkir- 
chen,  Homburg  and  Saarlouis.  To  assist  the  bakers  call  on  the  pio- 
neers of  Captain  Mantey  in  Bingerbrueck  and  Captain  Huene  in  Mann- 
heim. But  do  not  interfere  with  the  great  troop  movements.  The 
1st  Corps  will  arrive  by  lines  A  and  C;  the  Vlth  Corps  by  lines  E 
and  D  commencing  on  the  3d  of  August;  the  lid  Corps  not  yet  decided. 
Details  by  letter.* 


No.  71 

Memorandum. 

Berlin,  28  July,  1870. 

By  the  30th  of  this  month  there  will  be  equipped  and  ready  for 
operations : 

First  Army 

VII  Corps,  marching  on  Trier,  with  main  body  within  two  days' 
march  of  this   point. 

*See  No.  77. 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

VIII  Corps,  marching  on  Saarlouis,  with  main  body  near  the 
heights  near  Morbach    (two  miles   *   south  of  Berncastel). 

3d  Cavalry  Division,  in  part  watching  the  frontier  and  in  part 
in  march  on  Corps  liaison. 

Second  Army  and  Reserves 

III  Corps  (less  Corps  artillery),  east  of  the  line  Bingen;  Kreuz- 
nach. 

IV  Corps,  astride  the  high  road  Mannheim;  Durkheim. 

I         IX  Corps    (less  Corps  artillery),  between  Mainz  and  Worms. 

5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Division  (less  regiment  with  X  Corps),  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  III  and  IV  Corps. 

The  Guard,  X  and  XII  Corps  along  four  railroad  lines  in  the 
area  Bingen;    Mainz;   Mannheim. 

In  order  to  secure  sufficient  room  for  the  last  mentioned  corps, 
and  to  improve  the  supply  arrangements,  it  is  desirable  that  the  III 
and  IV  Corps  move  their  main  body  to  the  line  Alsenz;  Gollheim; 
Grunstadt,  with  advance  guards  securing  the  line  Lauterechen ;  Kais- 
erslautern.  While  advancing  Cavalry  Divisions  should  be  formed 
to  be  pushed  still  further  towards  the  frontier.  Headquarters  of  the 
Second  Army — Alzey. 

On  the  other  hand  by  holding  back  the  Second  Army  the  First 
Army  must  halt  on  the  line  Trier;  Wadern  in  order  not  to  isolate 
it  by  pushing  it  forward  to  the  frontier,  where  up  to  the  present 
time  only  some  advance  troops  and  the  3d  Cavalry  Division  are  in 
observation. 

In  the  dispositions  which  have  hitherto  been  directed  for  the 
Third  Army  changes  as  to  time  should  not  be  allowed. 

Finally  it  is  necessary  to  clear  up  the  situation,  since  the  French 
army  has  already  crossed  the  frontier  today  with  important  forces. 

Especially  does  this  apply  to  the  center  where  the  Second  Army 
and  the  Reserves  are.  These  Headquarters  can  assemble  on  the 
line  Alsenz;  Gollheim;  Grunstadt,  in  one  line;  but  not  before  August 
5th,  even  with  extraordinary  marches;  so  that  by  that  date  there 
will  be  the  following  troops 

The  Guard  Corps 29000  infantry 

III  Corps    25000  infantry 

IV  Corps    25000  infantry 

X   Corps    25000  infantry 

IX  Corps  23000  infantry 

XII    Corps    29000  infantry 

I  Corps  25000  infantry 

h   VI   Corps   13000  infantry 

Total    194000  infantry 

in  a  good  position,  able  to  debouch  from  high  ground  on  the  heads 
of  the  enemy's  columns.     Lastly  there  may  be  found  on  this  line: 

3d   Corps,   Bazaine 36000  infantry 

2d    Corps,    Frossard    27000  infantry 

5th    Corps,    Failly    27000  infantry 

Guard    Corps,   Bourbaki    18000  infantry 

Reserves,  Canrobert 25000  infantry 

Total    133000  infantry 

*These  are  German  miles.  A  German  mile  is  equal  to  about 
7500  yards  or  41  English  miles. — C.H.L. 

—216— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

On  the  flanks  the  enemy  may  assemble: 

Right  Flank: 
1st  Corps   MacMahon,  44000   infantry   against  which   the   Third 
army  has  today 

XI    Corps    25000  infantry 

i  V  Corps  13000  infantry 

Baden    Division    12000  infantry 

Wurtemberg  Division 15000  infantry 

One  Bavarian  Division 12000  infantry 

Total    77000  infantry 

to  oppose  them.     These  troops  will  be  reenforced  by  August  5th  by: 

h   V   Corps    12000  infantry 

3  Bavarian  Divisions 36000  infantry 

Total 48000  infantry 

As  noted  above  77000  infantry 

Total  for   Illd   Army 125000  infantry 

On  the  left  flank  the  enemy  has  available: 

4th  Corps,   Ladmirault,  27000  infantry  against   which  the  First 
Army  has  50000  infantry. 

Therefore  on  August  5th: 

First  Army  Second   Army                   Third  Army 

50,000  infantry  194,000  infantry  125,000  infantry 

against  against                              against 

27,000   infantry  133,000  infantry                44,000  infantry 


No.  72 

Telegravi. 

To  General  of  Infantry  v.  Steinmetz. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin,  29  July,  1870,  3:00  P.M. 

His   Majesty  directs  that  the   First  Army  main  body  shall  not 
pass  the  line  Saarburg;  Wadern.     Hold  Trier  against  enemy  attacks. 


No.  73 

Telegram. 

To  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
Mainz. 

Berlin,  29  July,  1870,  3:00  P.M. 

His    Majesty    directs   that   the   Second    Army   push   forward   its 
cantonments   to   the    line   Alsenz;    Gollheim;    Grunstadt.         Advance 


—217— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


guards   should   be  formed   from  the   5th   and   5th    Cavalry   Divisions 
still  further  forward. 


No.  74 

To  THE  Commanding  General. 
First  Army. 

Berlin,  29  July,   1870. 

His  Majesty,  the  King,  leaves  here  at  6:00  P.M.  the  31st  in- 
stant passing  through 

Magdeburg    at  8:30  P.M.,  July   31st 

Fraunschweig    3:00  A.M.,  August  1st 

Hanover    6:00  A.M.,  August  1st 

Hamm    3:00  P.M.,  August  1st 

Cologne    ^___10:30  P.M.,  August  1st 

Coblenz    3:00  A.M.,  August  2d 

for  Mainz,  where  GHQ  will  be  after  7:00  A.M.,  August  2d. 

Wire  information   to   above   mentioned    stations. 

From  the  enclosed  report  it  can  be  seen  what  is  known  as  to  the 
strength,  formation   and   positions  of  the  hostile   army. 

At  the  same  time  I  advise  you  that  in  compliance  with  cipher 
GHQ  telegram*  of  this  date,  the  Second  Army  has  been  ordered 
to  advance  their  cantonments  to  the  line  Alsenz;  Gollheim;  Grun- 
stadt,  and  that  the  1st  and  Vlth  Corps  are  soon  to  be  brought  by 
rail  to  South  of  Mainz  to  the  area  Bingen;  Mainz;  Mannheim  by 
August  5th. 

The  Commanding  General,  Second  Army  moves  his  Headquarters 
in  the  morning  to  Alzey. 

(Enclosure  to  Above.) 

REPORT :     Trustworthy  information  on  the  Formation  and  Po- 
sition of  the  French  Army  for  the  Period  July  27  to  July  29. 
1st  Corps,  MacMahon;  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Colson. 
2  Divisions  at  Strassburg 

2   Divisions   near   Strassburg  in   bivouac  along  the   railroad 
to  Brumath. 
The   1st  Corps   should  have   19   batteries,  consisting  of  12   Divi- 
sion  batteries,    1   horse   battery  belonging  to   the    Cavalry  Division, 
and  four  12-pounder  and  two  4-pounder  batteries  of  the  Corps  artil- 
lery. 

Strassburg  is  fully  armed;  although  machine  guns  are  still  to 
be   mounted  on  field  carriages. 

2d  Corps,  Frossard;  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Saget. 
Headquarters  at  St.   Avoid. 

Bataille's    Division    is   opposite   our   outposts   near    Forbach. 
Near  Morsbach  several  points  have  been  fortified. 
3d  Corps,  Bazaine;   Chief  of  Staff,  General  Manique. 
The   advance    of   this   corps   on   the   22d    instant   from    Metz   to 
Bolchen  has  been  confirmed. 

The  3d  Division   (Lebrun)   is  to  be  commanded  by  Lorencez. 

*See  No.  72. 

—218— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

4th  Corps,  Ladmirault;  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Deiant  de  Mart- 
hille. 

This  corps  is  to  be  assembled  near  Diedenhofen. 

The  advance  guard  near  Sierck  is  to  consist  of  the  20th  Rifle 
Battalion;  the  13th  and  33d  Infantry;  and  the  11th  Chasseurs 
(mounted). 

Two  divisions  of  this  corps  are  to  be  commanded  by  Generals 
Eissey  and  Payol. 

5th  Corps,  de  Failly;   Chief  of   Staff,  General   Besson. 

Headquarters   at   Bitsch. 

This   corps   is   to   have  four   divisions.     Nothing   further  known. 

6th  Corps,  Canrobert;  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Henry. 

To  assemble  near  Chalons. 

Nothing  further  known  as  to  its  mobilization. 

7th  Corps,  Donay;   Chief  of  Staff,  General  Benson. 

Headquarters ;    at   Belf ort. 

Reported  as  still  in  progress  of  mobilization. 

But  news  received  that  it  is  to  consist  of  three  cavalry  and  one 
infantry  divisions.  The  commanders  of  the  cavalry  divisions  are 
to  be  Generals  Barail,  de  Bonnemains  and  de  Forton. 

Guard  Corps,  Beurbaki;   Chief  of  Staff,  General  d'Auvergne. 

Stationed  near  Nancy. 

The  Emperor  Napoleon  left  yesterday  to  join  his  army.  His 
headquarters   are   at   Nancy. 

The  Army  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine  is  designated  as  "the  Army 
of  the  Rhine." 

There  is  also  talk  of  other  corps,  among  which  are  probably 
that  of  General  Count  Palikao  for  the  expeditionary  forces  to  be 
sent  by  sea,  and  it  is  understood  Reserve  Corps  are  being  formed 
at  Chalons. 

Contact  between  the  advance  troops  of  both  sides  has  been 
quickly  obtained  since  July  27th.  As  to  an  offensive  by  the  French, 
no  evidence  thereof  has  yet  been  reported. 

A  telegram  received  today  (July  29th)  from  Florence  reports 
the  embarkation  at  Civita  Vecchia  of  French  troops  for  France. 
They  consisted  of: 

Infantry  Brigade,  Guilheim 
6th  Rifle  Battalion 
35th  and  42d  Infantry 
2  squadrons,  7th  Chasseurs,  mounted 
2  batteries,  14th  Artillery 
1  Engineer  company 

All  under  command  of  Major  Dumont. 


No.  75 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Second  Army. 
Alzey. 

Berlin,  29th  July,  1870. 

(Note:  First  three  paragraphs,  same  as  No.  74  omitted. — C.H.L.) 

At  the  same  time  I  advise  you  that  in  compliance  with  cipher 
GHQ  telegram*   of  this   date,  the  First  Army   main  body  has  been 

*See  No.  73. 

—219— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


pushed  forward  to  the  line  Saarburg;  Wadern  which  is  not  to  be 
crossed. 

The  1st  and  Vlth  Corps  are  soon  to  be  brought  by  rail  to  south 
of  Mainz  to  the  area  Bingen;  Mainz;  Mannheim  by  August  5th,  and 
for  this  reason  it  is  desirable  that  the  IXth  and  Xllth  Corps  should 
move  their  cantonments. 

GHQ  understands  that  changes  in  plans  which  may  delay  the 
Third  Army  are  at  present  not  allowed. 


No.  76 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Third  Army. 

Berlin,  29th  July,  1870. 

(Note:  First  three  paragraphs,  same  as  No.  74,  omitted. — C.H.L.) 

Your  excellency  is  further  advised  that  His  Majesty  has  ordered, 
that  the  First  Army  main  body  is  for  the  present  not  to  cross  the  line 
Saarburg;  Wadern;  that  the  Illd  and  IVth  Corps  are  to  advance 
their  cantonments  to  the  line  Alsenz;  Gollheim;  Grumstadt,  and  that 
also  the  1st  and  Vlth  Corps  are  to  be  brought  by  the  four  rail  lines 
A,  B,  C  and  D  to  the  area  south  of  Mainz  by  August  5th.  Early  on 
the  19th  mobilization  day  (August  3d)  a  considerable  number  of  supply 
trains  will  have  arrived  near  Mosbach  and  Castel,  which  should  be 
loaded  at  once,  in  order  to  free  the  railroad  stations  and  allow  the 
railroad  cars  to  be  quickly  sent  back. 


No.  78 

Telegram. 

To  General  of  Infantry,  v.  Goeben. 

COBLENZ, 

Berlin,  SO  July,  1870,  2:00  P.M. 

Small  detachments  at  Saarbruecken  must  not  be  sacrificed.  Sup- 
port by  the  Second  Army  not  yet  possible;  the  detachment  at  Wadern 
should  not  occupy  Sulzbach  or  Neunkirchen.  Destruction  of  rail- 
roads no  longer  forbidden. 


No.  79 

Telegram. 

To  Lieut.  General  v.  Pestel. 
Saarbrucken. 

Berlin,  30  July,  1870,  7 :50  P.M. 

In    view    of    the    great    superiority    of    the    enemy    the    infantry 
should  be  withdrawn  as  early  as  possible  from   Sulzbach;   Bildstock. 

—220— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The   cavalry   should   maintain   touch   with   the    enemy.     Acknowledge 
receipt  of  this  order. 


No.  80 

Telegram. 

To  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
Alzey. 

Berlin,  30  July,  1870,  £:15  P.M. 

His  Majesty  directs  that  the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  shall 
be  sent  without  delay  to  reconnoitre  towards  the  frontier  about  Saar- 
brucken ;   Bitsch. 

The  IXth  and  Xllth  Corps  until  further  notice  are  entirely  under 
the  orders  of  your  Royal  Highness,  and  are  hereby  so  advised. 

The  IXth  Corps  will  at  once  move  up  to  the  line  of  the  Illd  and 
IVth  Corps;  the  other  Corps  will  close  up  immediately  . 


No.  81 

Telegram. 

To  Lieut.  General  v.  Blumenthal. 
Speyer. 

Berlin,  30  July,  1870,  AM. 

Second  Army  assembled  forward  on  Alzey;  IV  Corps  near  Grun- 
stadt. 

Telegram  from  Colonel  Gottberg  of  yesterday  evening  received. 

It  appears  that  the  junction  of  the  French  5th  and  1st  Corps 
on  the  lower  Lauter  is  intended. 

Information  has  been  received  from  Zweibrucken  that  yesterday 
evening  strong  detachments  were  about  Breidenback;  Bitsch. 

I  believe  it  desirable  that  the  Wurttembergers  and  Badeners 
be  brought  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  as  long  as  the  Maxau  bridge 
can  be  used. 

No  danger  is  to  be  feared  for  the  right  bank  as  soon  as  the 
Third  Army  proceeds  with  its  offensive  in  the  direction  of  Hagenau; 
Bischweiler. 

Directions  for  this  will  be  given  by  His  Majesty;  the  decision 
will  be  communicated  without  delay. 

No  orders  yet,  but  advise  His  Royal  Highness  the  Crown  Prince 
on  matters  to  be  considered. 

Answer   soon. 


-221— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 
No.  82 

Telegram. 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Third  Army. 

Berli7i,  30  July,  1870,  7:30  P.M. 

His  Majesty  is  of  the  opinion  that  as  soon  as  the  Baden  and 
Wurtemberg  Division  has  joined  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  the 
Third  Army  should  advance  in  a  southerly  direction,  to  seek  and 
attack  the  enemy. 

A  bridge  fight  south  of  Lauterburg  will  be  thus  avoided,  all 
South  Germany  w^ill  be  effectively  protected. 


No.  83 

Telegram. 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Third  Army. 

Speyer. 

Berlin,  31   .July,  1870,   12:20  P.M. 

When  do  you   expect  the  Third  Army  vf\\\   be  ready  for  opera- 
tions? 

Note:   General  v.   Blumenthal  replied  to  the  foregoing,  that  the 
Third  Army  would  be  ready  to  advance  on  August  3d. 


No.  84 

Telegram. 

To  the  Commanding  Generals,  First  and  Third  Armies. 
CoBLE^fz  and  Speyer. 

Berlin,  31   July,  1870,  10:30  A.M. 

Hid,  IVth  and  IXth  Corps  will  be  on  August  3d  in  front  of 
Alzey;  the  Guard,  Xth  and  Xllth  Corps  closed  up  in  rear;  the  5th 
and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions,  with  one  Division  each  from  the  Illd 
and  IVth  Corps,  today  move  forward  and  are  authorized  to  reach 
the  frontier  on  August  3d. 

(The  following  is  in  the  telegram  to  the  Third  Army  only:) 
Posts  in  Saarbrucken  are  still  held. 


— 22S 


d- 


id 


ill 
be 

St 


Left  Winif— Third  Army 


PROPOSED   MARCH   TABLE 

(No  date,  but  about  end  of  July,  1870.) 
Second  Army  and  Reserves 


Aug.  2 

March  to 

on 
Aug.  3 

Aug.  4 

Aug.  B 

Aug.  (J 

Aug.  7 

Aug.  8 


Xlth  Corps 
&  Baden  Div. 
42000 

Vth  Corps 

&  Wurttemberg  Div. 

42000 

lid  Bav. 
Corps 

1st  Bav. 
Corps. 

IVth  Corps 

IXth  Corps 

Illd  Corps 

Xth  Corps 

840 
Gcrmersheim 
&  Karlaluhe 

00 

Laudau  & 
Germersheim 

57000 
Germersheim           Speyer 

Mannheim 

Gollheim 

130000 
Alzey 

Kreuznach 

Langendankel 
&  Maxau 

Weissenburg 

Landau 

Neustadt 

Durkheim 

Minnweiler 

Alsenz 

Sobernheim 

Selz 

Sulz 

Annweiler 

Elmstein 

Frankenstein 

Wolf  stein 

Lauterecken 

Oberstein 

ITagenau 

Reichshofen 

Pirmasens 

Weldfichbach 

Kaiserslautern 

Kusel 

Baumholder 

Turkiomuhle 

Pfaffunhosen 

Ingweiler 

Neu-Hornbach 

Zweibrucken 

Bruchmuhlbach 

Ottweiler 

St.  Wendel 

Tholey 

Lut'/.elstein 
Finstingi-n 

Puberg 

Rohrbach                  Reinheim,  E. 

of    Saargemund 
according  to 
circumstances 

Blieskastel 
Saargemund 

Sulzbach 
Saarbrucken 

Landsweiler 
Volklingen 

Lebach 
Saarlouis 

1st  Corps 


Kaiserslautern 


Villi  Corps 


Landau  or  Mussbach 


Vlllth  Corps 


First  Army — Right  Wing 
Vllth  Corps 


can  reach 
Saarlouis  Rehlingen 


Rehlingen 


Note:— GHQ   was  enroute   to   Mainz. — C.H.L. 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  85 

Telegram. 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  First  Army. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin,  31  July,  1870. 

His  Majesty  directs  that  the  First  Army  be  assembled  on  the 
line  Wadern ;  Losheim.  Observation  to  be  continued  towards  the 
Saar. 


No.  86 

Telegram. 

To  Lieut.  General  v.  Stosch. 
Mainz. 

Berlin,  31   July,  1870,  2:00  P.M. 

Depots  at  Birkenfeld,  Kusel   and  Kaiserlautern   desirable.       Ad- 
vance in   immediate  prospect. 


No.  87 

To  the  Commanding  General,  Second  Army. 
Alzey. 

Magdeburg  RR.  Station,  31  July,  1870. 

Kaiserslautern  and  Birkenfeld  will  be  cleared  by  early  morning 
August  2d.  Line  commissions  have  been  advised.  Illd,  Xth  and 
Guard  Corps  should  inform  the  High  Command. 


Np.  88. 

(See  Proposed  March  Table) 


No.  89 

To  the  Commanding  General,  Second  Army. 

GHQ,  Mainz,  2  August,  1870. 

By  Royal  order,  the  1st  Corps  cantonments  and  movements  will 
be  supervised  by  GHQ.  Of  the  1st  Corps,  five  battalions  will  be 
available  at   Birkenfeld   from   August  3d;   the  remainder  of  the  1st 

—223— 


T] 
at 

Sc 


Te 

tio 
Th 


Tel 


Alz 
and 
and 
the 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  85 

Telegram. 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  First  Army. 

COBLENZ. 

Berlin,  31  July,  1870. 

His  Majesty  directs  that  the  First  Army  be  assembled  on  the 
line  Wadern;  Losheim.  Observation  to  be  continued  towards  the 
Saar. 


No.  86 

Telegram. 

To  Lieut.  General  v.  Stosch. 
Mainz. 

Berlin,  31   July,  1870,  2:00  P.M. 

Depots  at  Birkenfeld,  Kusel  and  Kaiserlautern  desirable.       Ad- 
vance in  immediate  prospect. 


No.  87 

To  the  Commanding  General,  Second  Army. 
Alzey. 

Magdeburg  RR.  Station,  31  July,  1870. 

Kaiserslautern  and  Birkenfeld  will  be  cleared  by  early  morning 
August  2d.  Line  commissions  have  been  advised.  Hid,  Xth  and 
Guard  Corps  should  inform  the  High  Command. 


Np.  88. 

(See  Proposed  March  Table) 


No.  89 

To  the  Commanding  General,  Second  Army. 

GHQ,  Mainz,  2  August,  1870. 

By  Royal  order,  the  1st  Corps  cantonments  and  movements  will 
be  supervised  by  GHQ.  Of  the  1st  Corps,  five  battalions  will  be 
available   at   Birkenfeld   from   August  3d;   the  remainder  of  the   1st 

—223— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Infantry  Division,  and  three  regiments  of  the  1st   Cavalry  Division 
of  the  1st  Corps,  will  quickly  follow  in  in  one  column. 

The  remaining  half  of  the  1st  Corps  detrains  at  the  rate  of  18 
trains  a  day  at  Kaiserslantern  commencing  August  4th. 


No.    90 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Third  Army. 
Speyer. 

GHQ,  Mainz,  2  August,  1870. 

By  Royal  order  the  Vlth  Corps  cantonments  and  movements 
will  be  supervised  by  GHQ. 

The  Vlth  Corps,  less  the  Cavalry  regiment,  attached  by  the  2d 
Cavalry  Division  order  of  battle,  will  detrain  at  the  rate  of  12 
trains  a  day  at  Landau  commencing  early  on  August  4th. 


No.  91 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Second  Army. 
Alzey. 

GHQ,  Mainz,  2  August,  1870,  11 :00  A.M. 

With  reference  to  telegrams  sent  yesterday  from  Royal  GHQ, 
His  Majesty  the  King  has  proposed,  and  orders  as  follows: 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  up  to  today  has  not  advanced 
with  any  strong  forces,  the  IVth  Corps  main  body  will  advance  to 
Landstuhl,  but  will  not  proceed  beyond  this   point. 

Should  there  develop  today  a  determined  hostile  advance  in  the 
area  between  Saarbrucken  and  Saargemund,  the  Illd  Corps  will  not 
advance  tomorrow  on  Baumholder,  and  the  IV  Corps  main  body  will 
remain  at  Kaiserslautern.  Further  detraining  at  Birkenfeld  and 
Kaiserslautern  appears  secure.  With  reference  to  Birkenfeld  the 
presence  of  the  First  Army  at  Wadern  for  the  moment  secures  this 
point.  An  earlier  advance  of  the  two  above  mentioned  corps,  is  un- 
desirable until  the  remainder  of  the  Second  Army  is  distant  about 
a  half  day's  march. 

For  arranging  the  further  advance  of  the  Army,  GHQ  needs 
to  know  as  to  the  progress  of  the  advance  ordered  for  the  IXth, 
Guard,  Xllth  and   Xth   Corps. 

Concerning  the  difficulty  of  furnishing  supplies  full  orders  will 
be  given,  and  I  will  undertake  with  this  in  mind  to  write  to  Lieut. 
General  v.  Stosch. 

The  present  advance  of  three  complete  supply  trains  to  Birken- 
feld necessary  for  the  coming  detraining  of  the  three  ammunition 
trains  (1st  Train  Column)  of  the  Illd  Corps  already  at  Bingen 
cannot  result  in  alack  of  ammunition  in  the  last  mentioned  Corps, 
as  the  IXth  and  Xllth  Corps  have  their  ammunition  trains  with 
them. 

—224— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

In  addition,  as  Royal  GHQ  has  apparently  advised,  His  Ma- 
jesty the  King  has  assigned  effective  tomoi'i-ow  afternoon  Line  A, 
and  the  following  morning  Line  C,  to  the  1st  Corps  for  its  concen- 
tration, lines  px-eviously  assigned  to  the  Second  Army.  In  conse- 
quence the  necessary  steps  will  be  taken  to  assure  the  above  men- 
tioned corps  joining  the  right  wing.  The  1st  Cavalry  Division  is 
by  Royal  order,  effective  today,  assigned  to  the  First  Army. 


No.  92 

Tcleg7-am. 

To  THE  Commanding  General,  Second  Army. 

GHQ,  Mainz,  2  August,  1870,  9:00  P.M. 

The  Third  Army  is  concentrated  today  in  bivouac  north  of  the 
Kling — Bach.  According  to  information  from  Zweibrucken  the  en- 
emy crossed  the  frontier  this  afternoon  at  Saargemund.  Telegraphic 
news  leads  us  to  suppose  that  our  posts  in  Saarbruecken  have  been 
withdrawn. 

(Note: — The  foregoing  information  was  also  sent  to  the  Third 
Army.) 

Early  deployment  of  the  Second  Army  necessary. 


No.  93 

To  THE  Royal  Minister  of  War. 
Munich. 

GHQ,  Mainz,  2  August,  1870. 

To  provide  for  the  previously  determined  advance  of  the  German 
troops  without  weakening  the  field  armies  by  leaving  behind  them 
line  of  communication  detachments,  it  becomes  necessary  to  provide 
special  troops  for  the  lines  of  communications.  These  can  at  first 
take  over  fortresses  not  in  danger  uncovered  as  the  army  advances. 

It  is  also  recommended  that  the  Third  Army  Line  of  Communi- 
cations Command  attach  trustworthy  people  with  local  parties. 

In  this  regard  the  favorable  consideration  of  the  War  Minister 
is  hereby  requested,  that  the  Royal  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army 
from  now  on  enter  into  direct  communication  with  the  War  Minis- 
ter on  matters  of  supply.  The  Prussians  will  furnish  eight  bat- 
talions and  four  squadrons  for  the  line  of  communications. 


-225— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  94 
To  General  of  Infantry,  v.  Steinmetz. 

LOSHEIM. 

Hq.  Mayence,  3  August,  1870,  11:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Dilatory  advance  of  the  French  justifies  assumption  that  the 
Second  Army  can  be  concentrated  on  the  6th  instant  in  front  of  the 
forest  zone  at  Kaiserslautern. 

If  rapid  advance  of  enemy  cannot  be  prevented,  concentration  of 
Second  Army  takes  place  behind  the  Lauter. 

Combined  action  of  both  armies  in  the  battle  intended;  First 
Army  from  St.  Wendel  and  Baumholder. 

His  Majesty  orders  that  First  Army  concentrates  on  the  4th 
against  Tholey.  Tomorrow  Third  Army  crosses  frontier  at  Weis- 
senburg.     General  offensive  intended. 


No.  95 

To  H.  R.  H.  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
Alzey. 

Hq.  Mayence,  3  August,  1870,  11:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Dilatory  advance  of  the  French  justifies  assumption  that  the 
Second  Army  can  be  concentrated  on  the  6th  instant  in  front  of  the 
forest  zone  at  Kaiserslautern. 

First  Army  will  be  drawn  to  Tholey  tomorrow.  Combination  of 
both  armies  in  the  battle. 

If  rapid  advance  of  the  enemy  cannot  be  prevented,  concentration 
of  Second  Army  takes  place  behind  the  Lauter.  First  Army  to  Baum- 
holder. 

Third  Army  crosses  frontier  tomorrow  at  Weissenburg.  General 
offensive  intended. 


No.  96 
To  Headquarters  First  Army. 

LOSHEIM. 

Hq.  Mayence,  3  August  1870,  noon. 
Telegram. 

By  orders  of  the  King  1st  Cavalry  Division  attached  to  First 
Army.  Will  reach  Birkenfeld  from  noon  the  5th  to  incl.  8th  of  August, 
Hq.  probably  7  August. 


—226— 


OiDerations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  97 

To  Headquarters  Third  Army. 
Speyer. 

Hq.  Mayeyice,  3  August  1870,  noon. 
Telegram. 

By  order  of  the  King  2d  Cavalry  Division  attached  to  Third  Army. 
Headquarters  will  reach  Castel  on  the  Rhine  August  4,  the  regi- 
ments of  the  Vlth  Corps  there  also  from  the  3d  to  6th  August,  the 
regiments  of  the  1st  and  lid  Corps  reach  Bingen  on  the  5th  and  the 
7th  or  8th  August  respectively. 


By  noon  August  3,  only  indefinite  information  had  been  received 
at  Royal  Headquarters  of  the  battle  at  Saarbriicken  the  day  before. 
This  caused  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army  to  ask  the 
following: 


No.  98 

To  Commanding  Officer. 

Saarlouis. 

Hq.  Mayence,  3  August  1870,  noon. 
Telegram. 

What  happened  yesterday  at  Saarbriicken  ?  We  have  only 
rumors,  but  no  official  report. 

(Same  to  Hq.  Vlllth  A.  C.) 

Only  at  5:15  P.M.  a  telegram  was  received  in  Mayence,  sent  from 
Lebach  at  11:20  A.M.  and  from  Saarlouis  at  2:28  P.M.,  from  General  v. 
Goeben  containing  more  definite  information  of  the  battle  at  Saar- 
briicken, which  caused  General  v.  Moltke  to  issue  the  following  orders: 


No.  90 

To  Headquarters  VIIIth  Army  Corps. 
Lebach    (via   Saarlouis). 

Hq.  Mayence,  3  August  1870,  7:^5  P.M. 
Telegram.. 

Possession  of  Saarbriicken  at  present  time  of  no  importance  to 
us.  First  Army  has  orders  to  assemble  at  Tholey.  VKIth  Corps  will 
move  guiding  its  march  accordingly. 


—227— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  100 

To  Headquarters  Second  Army. 

WiNNWEILER. 

Hq.  Mayence,  U  August  1870,  12:00  noon. 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  headquarters  Second  Army  that  the 
orders  of  the  instant  brought  by  Lieutenant  General  v.  Stosch  to 
these  headquarters  and  containing  intended  movements  are  in  accord- 
ance with  the  King's  intentions. 

For  the  purpose  of  orientation  for  the  next  few  days  I  will 
state: 

The  First  Army  is  concentrating  to-day  in  the  triangle  Tholey — 
Lebach — Ottweiler  (hq.  Tholey,  connection  via  St.  Wendel)  and  will 
remain  there  for  the  present.  It  has  not  yet  been  decided  whether 
the  1st  Army  Corps  will  be  permanently  attached  to  that  army  or 
kept  at  the  disposition  of  the  King.  Consequently  it  might  be  ad- 
visable to  send  the  troops  of  that  corps  to  the  vicinity  of  Tiirkismiihle 
— Tholey — St.  Wendel  and  to  keep  headquarters  of  the  First  Army 
permanently  informed  of  the  location  of  headquarters  of  1st  Army 
Corps. 

The  Third  Army  takes  the  offensive  today,  for  the  present  in 
southerly  direction.  After  it  has  advanced  to  Hagenau  and  if  it  has 
not  met  strong  hostile  forces,  it  will  turn  against  the  Saar  at  Saarge- 
niund,  proper — protecting  its  left  wing. 

If  that  is  the  case,  it  is  the  intention  to  have  the  Vlth  Army  Corps, 
now  detraining  at  Landau,  march  to  Pirmasens  as  connecting  link  be- 
tween the  Second  and  Third  Army. 

Still,  the  Third  Army  will  hardly  reach  the  upper  Saar  before 
August  9th,  and  it  is  therefore  not  necessary  for  the  Second  Army  to 
reach  the  Saar  with  its  main  forces  before  that  day. 

The  enclosed  sketch  shows  what  is  knoM'n  here  so  far  of  the  posi- 
tion and  strength  of  the  hostile  army.  The  advance  of  the  Third  Army 
will  bring  certain  information  concerning  the  whereabouts  of  the 
corps  MacMahon  and  Failly.  The  intentions  of  the  enemy  appear 
to  be  a  strict  defensive  on  the  Saar  for  the  present.  Considering 
these  points  and  in  so  far  as  hostile  forces  do  not  cross  the  Saao  today, 
it  is  left  to  H.R.H.'s  discretion  whether  or  not  the  leading  elements 
of  the  Illd  and  IVth  Army  Corps  very  soon  advance  to  the  line  Ott- 
weiler—Neunkirchen—Homburg,  but  if  they  do  they  must  halt  there 
and  await  the  arrival  of  the  rear  echelons,  in  order  to  get  as  soon  as 
possible  across  the  terrain  which  greatly  interferes  with  the  deploy- 
ment of  larger  forces. 

Finally,  I  will  state  that  the  King  has  to-day  ordered  the  bringing 
up  of  the  lid  Army  Corps,  and  that  it  will  detrain  probably  on  the 
9th  or  10th  of  August  in  Neunkirchen  and  Homburg  with  both  infan- 
try divisions. 

The  3d  Landwehr  Division,  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Second 
Army  for  guarding  the  line  of  communications,  which  has  been  sent 
from  here  for  the  present  toward  Homburg  (to  arrive  there  on  the 
7th  or  8th  August),  can  be  detrained  in  toto  or  in  part  at  points  far- 
ther in  the  rear,  at  your  discretion,  and  doing  this  would  relieve  two 
companies  sent  from  here  to-day  by  steamer  to  Bingen  and  Worms. 

On  the  9th  instant  a  ferry  service  will  be  ready  at  Rosengarten 
— Worms  to  allow  loaded  wagons  coming  from  Darmstadt  to  be  fer- 
ried there  and  sent  on  to  Alzey. 


—228- 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

In  the  matter  of  assuring  subsistence,  after  today  several  trains 
will  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  proper  authorities  on  Lines  A  and  B. 
Complete  control  of  projected  lines  will  be  given  to  the  authorities 
of  the  lines  of  communications  of  the  Second  Army  only  after  com- 
pletion of  transport  of  the  lid  Army  Corps,  that  is  at  about  the  11th 
instant  (when  that  corps  reaches  the  terminus).  It  will  also  have 
control  of  Line  B  by  the  10th  instant. 

Here  follows  a  sketch  of  the  area  between  Metz  and  Strassburg, 
showing   French   forces   as   follows: — 

Bourbaki's  Corps  (Guard)  at  Metz;  Bazaine's  (3d  Corps)  at 
Bolchen;  Ladmirault's  (4th  Corps)  west  and  east  of  Busendorf  (lar- 
ger part  west,  smaller  east)  ;  Frossard's  (2d  Corps)  between  For- 
bach  and  Saarbriicken;  one  division  or  brigade  of  the  2d  Corps  west 
of  Saargemiind;  Failly's  (5th  Corps)  south  of  Bitsch;  MacMahon's 
(1st  Corps)  south  of  Hagenau;  with  one  brigade  from  either  1st  or 
7th  Corps  advanced  to  the  immediate  north  of  Strassburg. 

Notes  to  this  sketch : 

There  are  no  further  reports  of  the  6th  Corps,  except  that  the 
47th  Regiment  is  supposed  to  have  still  been  at  Chalons  on  the  29th 
July. 

It  is  said  that  the  attempt  to  embark  an  expeditionary  corps  has 
been  given  up   (latest  reports). 

It  is  also  questionable  whether  the  1st  Corps  has  not  already 
marched  via  Zabern. 

There  is  no  information  at  hand  concerning  the  7th  Corps  re- 
ported as  concentrating  upon  the  upper  Rhine. 


No.  101 

To  Lieutenant  General  v.  Blumenthal. 
Landau. 

Hq.  Mayence,  h  August  1870,  12:00  noon. 

In  reply  to  your  communication  of  5  P.M.  yesterday,  I  have  the 
honor  to  inform  you  that  the  intentions  stated  therein  are  entirely  in 
accord  with  our  views  and  intentions. 

P"'ull  freedom  is  left  the  Third  Army  in  the  execution  of  its  task.  A 
direct  combined  movement  with  the  Second  Army  is  at  present  im- 
possible, if  for  no  other  reason  than  the  difficult  Haardt  Mountains. 
To  bring  the  operation  of  both  armies  into  consonance  can  be  done 
only  from  these  headquarters  with  due  regard  to  the  measures  taken 
by  the  enemy. 

It  would  be  very  desirable  if  H.  R.  H.  could  encounter  the  Corps 
of  MacMahon,  or  Failly,  as  soon  as  possible.  At  Hagenau,  if  not 
prior  to  reaching  there,  it  must  be  ascertained  if  those  parts  of  the 
French  army  have  also  been  drawn  up  to  the  line  St.  Avoid — Saarge- 
miind. A  further  advance  southward  would  in  that  case  be  but  a 
thrust  into  the  air  and  necessitate  a  change  of  direction  to  the  upper 
Saar. 

The   Second  Army  will  to-day  reach  the  following  points: 

Illd  Corps,  Baumholder — Kusel;  advance  guard  towards  St. 
Wendel; 

IVth   Corps,  Landstuhl;  advance  guard  towards   Homburg; 

5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  advanced  to  near  the  frontier. 

—229— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


Both  corps  will  have  to  halt  for  the  present  until  the  remaining 
ones  close  up.       These  latter  reach  today: 

Xth  Corps,  Meisenheim; 

IXth  Corps  Winneweiler;    (Hq.  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles); 

Guard  Corps,  Otterberg — Kaiserslautern; 

Xllth  Corps,  Gollheim. 

The  First  Army  today  stands  in  the  triangle  Tholey — Lebach 
— Ottweiler. 

By  the  7th  of  August  presumably  the  Second  and  First  Army 
will  come  into  direct  connection  on  the  line  Ottweiler — Zweibriicken. 

The  hostile  army,  the  position  of  which  as  far  as  known  here 
will  be  shown  by  enclosed  sketch  (see  Note  No.  100),  is  remaining 
in  a  passive  attitude. 

It  is  true  that  day  before  yesterday  our  detachment  in  Saar- 
brucken  was  dislodged  by  three  of  Frossard's  divisions,  but  the  rail- 
road depot  in  St.  Johann  is  today  still  unoccupied  by  the  enemy.  This 
seems  to  show  that  the  intention  is  to  take  a  defensive  position  in 
force  behind  the  Saar,  after  interrupting  the  railroads,  the  construc- 
tion of  fortifications,  etc. 

In  that  case  the  frontal  attack  of  the  Second  Army  will  be  ma- 
terially supported  by  an  advance  of  the  Third  Army,  which,  in  order 
to  use  as  many  roads  as  practicable,  should  be  made  in  as  much  breadth 
as  the  proximity  of  the  enemy  allows. 

It  has  not  yet  been  decided  whether  to  attach  the  Vlth  Corps 
to  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  armies;  for  the  present  it  will  be  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Third  Army.  That  corps,  in  the  advance  west- 
ward, may  effect  a  very  desirable  connection  between  the  Third  and 
Second  Army  on  the  road  to  Pirmasens  and  would  prevent  a  possible 
advance  of  the  enemy  from  Bitsch  between  the  two  armies. 

The  object  to  be  sought  is  the  simultaneous  action  of  all  three 
armies  in  the  decisive  battle,  and  these  headquarters  will  try  to  regu- 
late all  movements  with  this  idea  in  view. 

The  Baden  as  well  as  the  Wiirttemberg  divisions  have  signified 
their  desire  to  be  attached  to  a  Prussian  division  and  have  no  inten- 
tion to  form  a  corps  by  themselves.  H.  R.  H.  will  use  his  discretion 
in  arranging  this  matter. 

When  the  Vth  Army  Corps  no  longer  requires  the  railroad  trans- 
portation facilities,  the  troops  of  the  line  of  communications  (8  bat- 
talions, 4  squadrons)  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Third  Army,  vdll 
reach  Landau  on  the  9th  of  August,  and  the  further  movements  of 
whether  troops  (by  rail  or  otherwise)  is  left  to  H.  R.  H.'s  discretion, 
with  the  remark  that  on  the  whole,  after  the  9th  instant,  Line  D  and 
Line  E  are  entirely  at  the  disposal  of  the  authorities  of  the  lines  of 
communications  of  the  Third  Army. 


No.  102 

To  General  of  Infantry  v.  Steinmetz, 
Tholey. 

Hq.  Mayence,  U  August  1870,  12:00  noon. 
Telegram. 

Your    position     (Tholey — Lebach — Ottweiler)    approved;    remain 
there  until  further  orders. 


—230— 


operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  103 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 
Tholey. 

Hq.  Mayence,  U  August  1870,  12:00  noon. 

In  explanation  of  my  telegram  of  today,  I  inform  you  as  follows: 

The  Third  Army  commences  the  offensive  today  in  the  direction 
of  Hagenau,  and  then  against  the  upper  Saar.  The  Second  Army 
remains  on  the  march  towards  the  line  Neunkirchen — Homburg.  The 
First  Army  will  receive  further  orders  to  either  support  the  latter  or 
to  advance  against  the  left  flank  of  the  hostile  army.  We  have  no  in- 
tention of  crossing  the  Saar  before  the  9th  instant,  behind  which  the 
enemy  apparently  intends  remaining  on  the  defensive. 

The  1st  Army  Corps,  which  is  still  detraining  at  Birkenfeld  and 
Kaiserslautern,  will  be  placed  in  position  by  the  Second  Army  in  such 
manner  that  it  can  be  attached  to  either  the  First  or  the  Second  Army 
for  further  operations.    Orders  for  this  will  be  issued  later. 

The  enclosed  sketch  [see  note  to  No.  100]  shows  the  details  of 
the  hostile  positions  as  far  as  known  here. 

Line  F  is  from  now  on  entirely  at  the  disposition  of  the  authori- 
ties of  the  lines  of  communications  of  the  First  Army. 


At  8  P.M.,  August  4,  the  following  telegram  sent  by  General  v. 
Steinmetz  was  received  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  at  Royal 
headquarters : 

"Hq.  St.  Wendel,  h  August  1870,  3:36  P.M. 

By  orders  of  the  King  I  marched  today  with  the  First  Army  to 
the  vicinity  of  Tholey,  but  would  rather  have  preferred  to  remain  in 
the  position  at  the  Saar,  because  that  forms  an  offensive  flank  for 
the  advance  of  the  Second  Army,  and  the  First  Army  could  accom- 
plish more  than  in  position  at  St.  Wendel  or  even  at  Baumholder, 
where  the  First  Army  is  but  an  elongation  of  the  front  of  the  Second 
Army.  Consequently  I  do  not  understand  the  strategic  thought  in  giv- 
ing up  the  position  on  the  Saar,  for  which  there  is  no  reason  in  the 
general  situation.  Information  concerning  the  matter  would  be  very 
acceptable  in  order  to  correctly  guide  my  fui-ther  actions.  Had  the 
Crown  Prince  been  at  Weissenburg  on  the  6th,  this  fact  and  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Second  and  Third  Army  toward  Nancy  or  Luneville  would 
have  compelled  the  enemy,  deployed  on  an  extended  line,  to  leave  the 
Saar  and  would  have  offered  opportunity  to  the  First  Army  to  success- 
fully interfere.  I  fear  now  that  the  French  will  see  an  advantage 
gained  for  them  by  our  taking  a  new  position." 


General  v.  Moltke  replied  the  same  evening: 

No.  104 

To  General  of  Infantry  v.  Steinmetz. 
Tholey. 

Hq.  Mayence,  U  August  1870,  8:45  P.M. 
Telegram. 

Desired  information  concerning  motives  of  King  as  to  measures 
taken  now  en  route  by  letter.  The  Crown  Prince  was  already  at 
Weisenburg  on  the  4th. 

—231— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

In  the  preceding  telegram  G^ieral  v.  Moltke  refers  to 
the  orders  of  4  August,  12  :00  noon,  see  No.  103.  In  addi- 
tion, the  request  of  General  v.  Steinmetz  caused  the  follow- 
ing written  explanations,  which  were  sent  at  noon  on  the 
5th: 

No.  105 

To  General  of  Infantry,  v.  Steinmetz, 
Tholey. 

Hq.  Mayence,  5  August  1870,  6:00  AM. 

I  thoroughly  agree  with  Your  Excellency  as  to  the  importance  of 
your  understanding  and  knowing  correctly  the  motives  on  which  are 
based  the  orders  of  the  King  to  you.  I  therefore  now  have  the  honor 
to  answer  as  follows  to  your  inquiry  of  the  4th  instant  more  in  detail 
than  could  be  done  by  wire. 

As  already  discussed  in  Berlin,  I  mean  with  Your  Excellency  in 
person,  or  in  any  case  with  your  Chief  of  Staff  and  Chief  Quartermas- 
ter, it  is  the  task  of  the  First  Army,  in  addition  to  protecting  the 
Rhine  Province,  to  decisively  intervene  in  the  battle  against  the  left 
flank  of  the  enemy. 

This  intervention,  of  course,  cannot  be  executed  independently,  but 
must  take  place  in  conjunction  with  the  Second  Army. 

The  point,  where  it  may  take  place,  is  not  only  dependent  on  that 
army,  but  also  on  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

The  day  when  orders  were  issued  for  the  concentration  at  Wa- 
dern,  the  Second  Army  was  still  so  far  in  rear  that  contact  on  the 
other  side  of  Kaiserslautern  was  probable,  even  certain.  Therefore 
we  had  to  be  certain  of  the  possibility  of  bringing  up  the  First  Army 
to  Baumholder  for  the  battle. 

Today  it  is  still  possible  that  contact  will  take  place  on  the  line 
Ottweiler — Homburg.  At  Tholey  then  the  First  Army  would  be  in 
the  correct  position. 

Only  when  the  Second  Army  has  approached  the  Saar  will  the 
time  have  arrived  to  send  the  First  Army  across  that  stream. 

A  separate  advance  of  the  First  Army  against  the  enemy,  who 
appears  to  be  closely  concentrated  with  all  his  forces,  could  lead 
only  to  defeat. 

The  combined  movements  of  all  three  armies  can  be  ordered  only 
by  the  King  and  in  those  orders  the  freedom  of  executing  them  will 
be  left  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  different  army  headquarters  and 
they  can  act  according  to  the  situation. 


In  the  meantime  General  v,  Steinmetz  had  also  sent 
a  telegram  to  the  King  on  this  matter,  as  follows : 

"Hq.  St.  Wendel,  5  August  1870,  1:30  A.M. 

General  Moltke  has  informed  me  that  a  general  offensive  is  in- 
tended and  in  the  same  telegram  has  ordered  the  concentration  of  the 
First  Army  at  Tholey  by  your  command.  Today  he  informs  me  that 
the  First  Army  will  remain  until  further  orders  in  its  position  at 
Tholey — OttWeiler — Lebach.     On  the  other  hand  the  Second  Army  in- 

—232— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

forms  me  that  it  will  occupy  the  line  Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken  on 
the  sixth.  By  this  the  Second  Army  gets  ahead  of  the  First,  and  as 
I  have  not  received  any  orders  concerning  a  further  advance,  I  have 
no  base  on  which  to  act  intelligently." 


This  caused  General  v.  Moltke  to  give  further  explana- 
tions of  his  views  on  which  the  orders  were  based,  to  the 
First  and  Second  Army : 

No.  106 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 
Tholey. 

Hq.  Mayence,  5  August  1870,  12:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

The  road  St.  Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen  will  be  cleared  to- 
morrow by  the  First  Army. 

The  1st  Army  Corps  is  definitely  assigned  to  the  First  Army; 
goes  by  rail  via  Homburg  and  detrains  at  Neunkirchen.  Letter  en 
route.  Headquarters  of  line  of  communications  and  field  raihoad  de- 
tachment detrain  in  Birkenfeld  commencing  early  tomorrovv  morning. 


No.  107 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 
Tholey. 

Hq.  Mayence,  5  August  1870,  noon. 
Telegram. 

In  reply  to  telegram  to  His  Majesty,  First  Army  headquarters 
is  informed  that  even  if  the  leading  elements  of  the  Second  Army 
reach  the  line  Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken  on  the  6th,  the  assembly  of 
that  army  will  be  completed  only  on  the  7th,  and  the  troops,  if  at  all 
possible  after  their  exhausting  march,  should  receive  a  welcome  day 
of  rest  on  the  8th. 

Considering  this,  it  is  entirely  correct  for  the  First  Army  to  re- 
main in  its  present  position  today  and  tomorrow,  and  merely  clear 
the  St.  Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen  road,  which  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  movement  of  the  Second  Army. 

However,  on  the  7th,  the  First  Army,  to  which  the  1st  Army 
Corps  (Hq.  Birkenfeld)  is  permanently  assigned  by  orders  of  the 
King,  must  approach  to  the  Saar,  using  the  Lebach — Saarlouis  and 
the  Illingen — Volklingen  roads  without  creating  unnecessary  atten- 
tion, so  near  that,  crossing  the  Saar,  between  Saarlouis  and  Volk- 
lingen, it  will  be  ready  after  the  8th  to  take  the  offensive  against  the 
hostile  left  flank,  while  the  Second  Army  simultaneously  advances 
to  the  front. 

His  Majesty  especially  reserves  to  himself  the  right  to  order  the 
execution  of  such  operation,  as  the  commencement  and  the  direction 
of  it  are  dependent  on  the  conditions  which  will  have  arisen  at  that 
time  with  the  Third  Army. 


—233— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

No.  108 
To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 

Hq.  Mayence,  5  August  1870,  12:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

The  St.  Wendel— Ottweiler — Neunkirchen  road  will  be  cleared  by 
the  First  Army. 

Headquarters  lines  of  communications  and  field  railroad  battalion 
deti'ain  early  tomorrow  morning  in  Birkenfeld,  the  provision  column 
of  the  Hid  Army  Corps,  now  behind,  in  the  succeeding  night.  Ad- 
vance of  strong  cavalry  across  the  Saargemiind — Bitsch  railroad  de- 
sirable. 

Prussian  railroads  to  be  kept  intact. 


No.  109 

To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 
Kaiserslautern. 

Hq.  Mayence,  6  August  1870,  noon. 

His  Majesty  has  ordered  that  the  1st  Army  Corps  be  permanently 
attached  to  the  'First  Army,  the  VHth  to  the  Third  and  the  Hd  to  the 
Second  Army.  The  latter  will  detrain  between  the  8th  and  11th,  proba- 
bly at  Neunkirchen  and  Homburg.  To  facilitate  the  concentration 
of  the  1st  Army  Corps  it  has  also  been  ordered  that  the  trains  carry- 
ing this  corps  arriving  from  this  afternoon  on  in  Kaiserslautern,  keep 
on  through  Homburg  to  Neunkirchen  and  detrain  there. 

Headquarters  of  the  First  Army  has  received  orders  to  imme- 
diately clear  the  St.  Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen  road  and  to 
echelon  the  army  on  the  7th  on  the  Lebach — Saarlouis  and  the  lUin- 
gen — Volklingen  roads.  The  First  Army  will  then  be  ready  to  sup- 
port, as  originally  planned,  the  operations  of  the  Second  Army,  espec- 
cially  by  action  against  the  hostile  left  flank. 

If  further  development  of  conditions  do  not  require  a  different 
proceeding  with  the  Third  Army,  the  subsequent  advance  against 
the  Saar  from  the  intended  position  ordered  by  Royal  headquarters 
v^'ill  not  be  made  before  the  9th,  and  thus  the  larger  part  of  the  Sec- 
ond Army  will  have  a  day  of  rest  on  the  8th,  which  it  stands  in  need 
of. 

His  Majesty  will  probably  transfer  Royal  headquarters  from 
here  to  Homburg  on  the  8th  instant. 


General  von  Steinmetz  was  not  at  all  satisfied  with  the 
explanations  furnished  him  by  Royal  headquarters  and  on 
August  6th  he  sent  to  General  v.  Moltke  an  additional  let- 
ter stating  his  views  as  to  the  task  of  the  First  Army.  This 
letter  read : 

Hq.  Hellenhausen,  6  August  1870. 

Your  letter  of  the  5  August  reached  me  at  2:30  A.M.  today,  6 
August. 

—234— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

In  reply  I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  I  had  no  doubt  at  all  con- 
cerning the  task  of  the  First  Army  as  long  as  the  Second  Army 
endeavored  to  carry  out  its  strategic  march  against  the  Saar;  that 
task  could  only  consist  in  facilitating  the  advance  of  the  Second  Army 
by  drawing  the  hostile  troops  away  from  that  army  and  onto  the  First 
Army'^  and  when  the  Second  Army  could  no  longer  advance  without 
fighting,  the  First  Army  would  have  to  effectively  support  the  Second 
in  any  ensuing  battle.  With  this  idea  was  also  conceived  the  recon- 
naissance on  a  large  scale  which  was  frustrated  by  orders  from  Royal 
headquarters  for  the  First  Army  to  march  towards  Tholey,  and  the 
position  of  the  First  Army  behind  the  Saar — from  Saarbrucken  to 
SaarJouis — had  been  in  consonance  with  my  conception  of  the  task; 
but  now,  drawing  the  First  Army  back  to  Tholey  and  possibly  as  far 
as  Baumholder,  leaves  the  enemy  complete  freedom  of  action  behind 
the  Saar  and  will  increase  the  difficulties  of  advance  for  the  Second 
Army. 

The  enemy  has  utilized  the  opportunity  to  fortify  himself  in  his 
position  from  Saarbrucken  to  Forbach  and  appears  to  desire  us  to 
attack  him  in  that  position.  The  question  now  is,  if  and  how  we  should 
do  that. 

At  the  present  time  the  troops  of  the  First  and  Second  Army,  lit- 
erally speaking,  stand  arm  in  arm;  that  is,  should  the  Second  Army 
continue  its  march,  the  two  armies  would  become  mixed,  or  the  First 
Army  will  at  least  become  very  much  confined  in  its  freedom  of  opera- 
tion. Therefore,  and  especially  as  the  advance  of  the  Vllth  and  Vlth 
Army  Corps  needed  regulation,  I  was  not  able  to  evacuate  the  St. 
Wendel — Ottweiler — Neunkirchen  road,  as  the  troops  to  be  sent  to 
the  westward  might  already  have  reached  villages  occupied  by  other 
troops,  which  would  have  entailed  a  complete  rearrangement  of  quar- 
ters westward  and  also  southward,  considering  that  room  had  also  to 
be  made  for  the  1st  Army  Corps  and  the  1st  Cavalry  Division  placed 
under  my  command  in  the  meantime. 

The  First  Army,  which  has  had  to  make  two  marches  so  far  from 
Tholey  to  the  Saar,  is  now  within  one  day's  march  of  that  stream  and, 
if  the  First  and  Second  Army  should  make  a  combined  attack  on  the 
enemy  behind  the  Saar,  has  the  necessary  freedom  of  movement  and 
has  also  regained  sufficient  room  for  the  deployment  of  its  troops.f 

For  the  subsequent  operations  after  the  enemy  has  been  driven 
away  from  the  Saar,  it  becomes  necessary  for  me  to  know  what  direc- 
tion of  operation  is  to  be  given  to  the  Second  Army.  I  assume  that 
this  direction  will  be  toward  NancyJ  so  that  the  First  Army  will  not 
be  forced  toward  the  fortresses  along  the  Mosel. 

The  main  reason  for  my  request  to  be  furnished  this  information 
was  to  find  out  whether  His  Majesty  intended  to  order  this  or  some- 
thing else,  and  I  hereby  renew  my  request,  as  my  measures  must 
necessarily  depend  on  His  Majesty's  intentions." 


*Marginal  Note  by  Moltke: — "This  would  have  meant  defeat  for 
the  First  Army." 

Marginal  Note  by  General  Moltke: — "In  place  of  overlapping 
the  enemy  it  would  be  itself  overlapped  should  it  advance  from  Saar- 
briicken — Volklingen  on  Bolchen." 

IMarginal  Note  by  General  Moltke: — "Plans  of  operations,  when 
in  immediate  contact  with  the  enemy,  can  not  be  given  to  hold  good 
for  any  length  of  time  in  the  future." 


-235- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  110 

To  THE  Royal  Minister  for  War 
Mayence. 

Hq.  Mayence,  6  August  1 


870. 


I  have  the  honor  to  inform  the  Royal  Minister  for  War  that  H. 
M.  the  King  has  ordered  the  formation  of  a  combination  corps  of 
troops  for  special  purposes  in  and  at  Kaiserslautern,  which  v/ill  ba 
composed  of  the  following  organizations: 

1.  The  3d  Landwehr  Division,  so  far  attached  to  general  head- 
quarters of  the  lines  of  communications  of  the  Second  Army,  which 
accordingly  will  be   detrained  at  Kaiserslautern. 

2.  Infantry  Regiments  Nos.  19  and  81,  stationed  in  and  around 
Mayence,  and  the  7th  Reserve  Uhlan  regiment,  which  will  be  started 
from  here  on  the  8th  of  August  by  marching. 

3.  The  three  reserve  foot  batteries  now  marching  from  Cassel 
to  Mayence,  which  will  be  sent  from  here  without  a  stop,  by  marching. 

In  place  of  the  3d  Landwehr  Division,  the  headquarters  of  the 
lines  of  communications  of  the  Second  Army  will  receive  the  follow- 
ing troops,  sent  by  rail  to  Mosbach,  where  they  will  detrain  on  and 
after  the  10th  instant. 

Landwehr  Regiments  Nos.  53  and  56,  at  present  at  Wesel, 
the  Landwehr  Regiments  Nos.  16  and  55,  at  present  at  Minden,  and 
the  5th  Reserve  Hussar  Regiment,  at  present  at  Paderborn. 


There  being  no  exact  information  concerning  the  vic- 
tory at  Weissenburg  on  August  4,  the  following  inquiry 
was  sent: 

No.  Ill 

To  Lieut.  General  v.  Blumenthal,  Weissenburg,  or 
wherever  found. 

Hq.  Mayence,  6  August  1870,  9:10  A.M. 
Telegram. 

So  far  His  Majesty  has  not  received  the  smallest  detail  concern- 
ing the  battle  at  Weissenburg,  nor  any  information  concerning  our 
losses,  while  the  French  papers  already  contain  these  details.  This 
must  be  immediately  attended  to. 


Even  before  Royal  Headquarters  had  information  of 
the  battle  of  Spicheren  on  August  6th,  the  following  orders 
were  issued,  based  on  reports  of  General  v.  Rheinbaben, 
commanding  the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions: 


-236— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  112 
To  General  of  Infantry  v.  Steinmetz. 

SULZBACH. 

f  Hq.  Mayence,  6  August  1870,  5  :Jt5  P.M. 

Telegram. 

The  enemy  appears  to  be  retreating  from  the  Saar.  His  Majesty 
leaves  it  to  your  discretion  whether  or  not  to  cross  the  frontier.  The 
Saar  must  be  crossed  below  Saarbriicken  as  the  Saarbriicken — St. 
Avoid  road  belongs  to  the  Second  Army.  Send  reports  here  until  10 
A.M.,  to  Ludswigshafen  until  1  P.M.,  to  Kaiserslautern  until  4  P.M., 
and  after  6  P.M.  to  Homburg. 


No.  113 

To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 
Homburg. 

Hq.  Mayence,  6  August  1870,  5:45  P.M. 
Telegram. 

First  Army  crosses  below  Saarbriicken  tomorrow  to  pursue  the 
enemy.  Desirable  that  in  addition  to  cavalry  the  infantry  of  the 
Second  Army  also  keeps  at  the  enemy's  heels.  Saarbriicken — St. 
Avoid  road  belongs  to  Second  Army.  Send  reports  tomorrow  [as  in 
112]. 


No.  114 


To  Headquarters,  Third  Army, 

Hq.  Mayence,  6  August  1870,  5:^5  P.M. 
Telegram. 

Enemy  appears  to  leave  the  Saar.     First  and  Second  Army  in 
pursuit.     Send  reports  tomorrow  [as  in  112]. 


A  telegram  from  General  v.  Goeben  from  Saarbriicken 
at  6:30  P.M.  brought  the  first  information  of  the  victory  at 
Spicheren  to  Royal  Headquarters ;  General  v.  Moltke  imme- 
diately asked  by  wire : 

No.  115 

To  General  of  Infantry,  v.  Goeben. 
Saarbrucken. 

Hq.  Mayence,  6  August  1870,  7  :h5  P.M. 
Telegram. 

Please  report  approximate   strength   of  enemy,  and  numbers   of 
hostile  regiments.     Have  prisoners   been   taken? 

—237— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Concerning  the  victory  at  Worth,  6  August,  the  follow- 
ing telegram  was  sent: 

No.  116 

To  Headquarters  First  Army,  Through  General  Goeben, 
Saarbrucken. 

Hq.  Mayence  7  August  1870,  3:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Third  Army  has  gained  new  great  victory  on  the  6th  over  Mac- 
Mahon  and  parts  of  Canrobert  and  Failly.  Stand  made  there  by  the 
enemy  as  well  as  west  of  Saarbrucken  makes  it  not  improbable  that 
strong  hostile  forces  are  still  in  readiness  near  the  Saar.  Recon- 
naissance by  cavalry  necessary. 

A  copy  of  this  telegram  was  also  sent  to  Headquarters  Second 
Army  in  Homburg,  and  a  few  hours  later  the  following  orders: 

No.   117 

To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 
Homburg. 

Hq.  Mayence,  7  August  1870,  8:15  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Information  only  now  received  that  after  the  victory  of  the 
Crown  Prince  yesterday  at  Worth,  MacMahon  retreated  on  Bitsch; 
may  reach  that  place  today;  cavalry  and  left  wing  of  Second  Army 
may  gain  touch  with  him  tomorrow  possibly  at  Rohrbach. 


No.  118 
To  Headquarters,  Third  Army. 

'      SULZ. 

Hq.  Mayence,  8  Augxist  1870,  3:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

So  far  but  one  telegram  received  from  Sulz,  the  one  dated  10:15 
P.M.  Absence  of  most  important  information.  Where  was  the  battle? 
In  what  direction  did  enemy  retreat? 


No.    119 
To  Lieut. -General  v.  Blumenthal. 

SULZ. 

Hq.  Mayence,  7  August  1870,  9:30  A.M. 

Hearty  congratulations  on  your  brilliant  success. 

Your  first  telegram  of  last  night  was  not  received  here,  therefore 
we  learned  but  this  morning  that  battle  took  place  at  Worth  and  enemy 
retreats  on  Bitsch.  A  telegram  was  at  once  sent  to  Second  Army 
that  MacMahon  possibly  could  be  reached  tomorrow  in  the  vicinity  of 

—238— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Rohrbach  by  cavalry  and  by  the  left  winu'  of  the  Second  Army,  in 
case  he  keeps  the  direction  on  Saargemiind  which  is  still  held  by  the 
French. 

There  also  was  yesterday  a  very  hot  fight  at  Forbach  against 
four  divisions  under  Frossard,  in  which  finally  (at  least  the  leading 
elements  of)  the  14th,  ]6th,  5th  and  parts  of  the  6th  Divisions  took 
part.  The  main  body  of  the  Second  Army  intends  to  take  a  position 
today  on  the  line  Saarbriicken — Neu-Hornbach;  the  First  Army  will 
halt  with  its  main  body  on  the  line  Forbach — Volklingen  and  will  pur- 
sue the  enemy  with  cavalry  only. 

Concerning  intentions  of  hostile  main  force  we  have  but  rumors. 

The  most  correct  measure  undoubtedly  would  be  a  general  offen- 
sive against  our  Second  Army,  which  has  not  yet  been  able  to  con- 
centrate all  of  its  corps,  as  all  of  its  leading  elements  have  contijiued 
on  the  march  so  far.  Sti  i,  the  French  would  encounter  a  superiority 
and  such  a  step  seems  not  in  consonance  with  their  conduct  as  so  far 
displayed. 

Should  the  French  main  army  retreat  on  Metz,  it  goes  far  away 
from  MacMahon,  leaves  him  to  your  pursuit  and  exposed  to  an  even- 
tual flank  attack  by  the  Second  Army. 

Should  MacMahon  be  received,  should  the  two  French  armies 
join,  this  could  hardly  be  made  at  any  other  place  than  in  the  vicinity 
of  Saarburg,  where  we  will  arrive  about  the  same  time. 

It  is  of  importance  to  us  to  learn  wether  MacMahon  marches 
to  the  west  or  to  the  southwest. 

As  far  as  we  can  see  conditions  now,  it  appears  to  me  to  be  the 
most  correct  procedure  for  the  First  and  Second  Army  to  advance 
now  not  against  the  Mosel  above  Metz,  but  first  southward  to  join 
your  army,  as  the  next  measure  to  be  taken  by  the  French  main  force 
must  be  in  the»nature  of  reconnaissance. 

Concerning  the  parts  of  the  enemy  at  Hagenau,  possibly  these 
are  intended  for  garrisoning  Strassburg,  where  at  present  there  is 
hardly  anything  but  garde  mobile.  You  will  have  to  leave  back  suffi- 
cient force  to  guard  against  them.  It  is  very  desii'able  to  take  Hage- 
nau in  the  first  panic.  The  siege  train  will  be  mobilized  today.  Siege 
of  Strassburg  can  now  be  seriously  considered;  an  advance  as  far  as 
Vendenheim  would  secure  to  us  utilization  of  the  Strassburg — Nancy 
railroad.  What  you  will  have  to  leave  behind  will  be  relieved  even- 
tually by  a  Landwehr  division  reinforced  by  two  line  regiments  and 
one  cavalry  regiment. 

We  are  about  to  start  to  Homburg. 


No.  120 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 
Volklingen. 

Hq.  Homburg,  7  August  1870,  10:15  P.M. 
Telegram. 

His  Majesty  orders  that  the  First  Army  remain  in  position  be- 
tween Saarbriicken  and  Volkingen  tomorrow  with  the  Vllth  and 
Vlllth  Army  Corps,  holding  the  heights  of  Spicheren  against  any 
attack.  Orders  for  future  advance  can  be  given  only  after  cavalry 
has  gained  definite  information  concerning  enemy's  whereabouts.  Sec- 
ond Army  also  halts. 


-239- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  121 

To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 
Blieskastel. 

'  Hq.  Homburg,  7  August  1870,  11  P.M. 

His  Majesty  fully  approves  the  measures  to  be  taken  on  the  8th 
as  outlined  in  the  letter  brought  to  these  headquarters  by  Major  Gen- 
eral V.  Stiehle. 

Information  received  from  the  Third  Army  states  that  the  hostile 
army  retreated  in  the  utmost  confusion  after  the  battle  of  Worth. 
Artillery  tried  to  go  into  position  at  Niederbronn  but  was  captured 
by  the  Bavarians.  Enemy  retreated  on  road  to  Bitsch,  pursued  by 
the  cavalry,  which  captured  four  additional  guns.  Dead  and  wounded 
mark  the  line  of  retreat.  Third  Army  reaches  Niederbronn  today. 
No  parts  of  Failly's  corps  were  present  in  the  battle.  As  so  far  the 
cavalry  divisions  have  not  ascertained  whether  the  enemy  retreated 
from  Forbach  and  Saargemiind  on  Metz  or  in  a  southernly  direction, 
the  First  Army  has  received  orders  to  remain  in  its  position  tomor- 
row and  hold  the  heights  of  Spicheren.  Thus  the  right  flank  of  the 
Second  Army  is  perfectly  protected. 

The  telegram  sent  by  General  v.  Steinmetz  [see  No.  125]  has 
been  read  to  His  Majesty.  His  Majesty  is  now  considering  the  issue 
of  a  proclamation  or  general  order  to  the  French  Nation. 


No.  122 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army — Volklingen;  Second  Army — Blies- 
kastel; Third  Army — Sulz,  or  wherever  found. 

Hq.  Hoynhnrg,  8  August  1870. 
Telegram. 

His  Majesty  orders  that  all  military  reports,  questions,  and  re- 
ports to  army  headquarters  be  addressed  to  me. 


No.  123 

To  General  v.  Steinmetz, 

Volklingen,  or  where  found. 

Hq.  Hamburg,  8  August  1870. 
Telegram. 

As  so  far  no  report  has  been  received  as  to  whether  the  enemy 
has  evacuated  Bolchen  and  Busendorf,  the  First  Army  must  remain 
tomorrow  in  the  position  ordered  for  today.  The  Second  Army  will 
reach  the  Saar  tomorrow  with  its  last  corps.  Acknowledge  receipt 
of  this  by  wire. 


—240— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  124 

To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 
St.  Johann,  or  where  found. 

Hq.  Homhurg,  8  August  1870,  11  P.M. 
Telegram. 

Will  your  headquarters  be  in  Johann  tomorrow  ?  What  move- 
ments are  ordered  for  tomorrow  ?  The  Hid  Corps  can  not  detrain  in 
Saarbriicken.* 


No.  125 

Pencil  draft  in  v.  Moltke's  handwriting  for  a  letter 
from  H.  M.  the  King  to  General  of  Infantry  v.  Steinmetz. 

[No  date;  apparently  8  August  1870.'\ 

Replying  to  telegram  which  you  sent  on  the  7th  instant  to  head- 
quarters, Second  Army,  I  call  your  attention  to  the  orders  which 
originally  assigned  to  the  First  Army  the  direction  of  Saarlouis.  In 
order  not  to  isolate  that  army,  but  to  cause  it  to  await  the  arrival  of 
the  Second  Army  in  a  flank  position,  the  First  Army  was  held,  by 
order  of  the  29th  July  and  3d  August  on  the  line  Warden — Saarburg; 
thereafter  around  Tholey  and  Lebach.  By  the  First  Army  extending 
its  cantonments  beyond  the  last  named  line  as  far  at  Ottweiler,  it 
came  into  the  march  zone  of  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army, 
and  consequently,  by  orders  of  the  5th  instant,  it  was  confined  for  its 
further  advance  to  the  roads  towards  Volklingen  and  Saarlouis.  In 
spite  of  this  the  army  took  the  direction  via  Guichenbach  and  Fisch- 
bach  towards  Saarbriicken — Forbach,  a  further  advance  to  which  line 
would  be  flanked  by  the  enemy  forces  still  at  Bolchen. 

We  therefore  have  to  disapprove  your  views  as  expressed  in  the 
telegram  to  the  Second  Army,  and  emphatically  declare  that  the 
Second  Army  advanced  entirely  in  accordance  with  our  views,  which 
fact  we  have  communicated  to  General  of  Cavalry,  Prince  Frederick 
Charles. 


No.  126 


To  THE  General  Government  of  the  Coasts. 
Hanover. 

Hq.  Homhurg,  9  August  1970,  9:10  A.M. 
Telegram. 

After  4  P.M.  today  Royal  Headquarters  will  be  in  Saarbriicken.* 


*This  latter  is  a  reply  to  a  question  if  the  lid  Corps  could  not  be 
detrained  in  Saarbriicken  instead  of  Neunkirchen. 

*A11  telegrams  as  to  change  of  locations  of  headquarters  were 
sent  to  all  headquarters  and  general  governments. 


—241— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  127 
To  Headquarters,  First,  Second,  Third  Army. 

Hq.  Saarbrucken,  9  August  1870,  8:00  P.M. 

Reports  received  justify  the  assumption  that  the  enemy  has  re- 
treated to  behind  the  Mosel  and  eventually  Seille. 

All  three  armies  will  follow  these  movements. 

The  Third  Army  receives  for  this  the  Saarunion — Dieuze  road 
and  connections  south. 

The  Second  Army:    St.  Avoid — Nomeny  road  and  south. 

The  First  Army:     Saarlouis — Bolchen — Tennschen  road  and  south. 

To  protect  the  march  the  cavalry  should  be  sent  further  ahead 
than  usual  and  supported  by  advance  guards  thrown  far  to  the  front 
to  give  the  armies  time  for  closing  up  when  necessary. 

Any  change  in  the  above  march  direction  will  be  ordered  only 
by  His  Majesty  in  so  far  as  may  be  justified  by  the  enemy's  position 
or  movements. 

The  10th  of  August  may  be  utilized  by  the  First  and  Second  Army 
to  give  a  day  of  rest  to  the  troops  or  to  start  them  on  the  roads  as- 
signed to  them. 

As  the  left  wing  can  reach  the  Saar  only  by  the  12th,  the  corps 
of  the  right  wing  will  have  to  shorten  their  marches  accordingly. 


No.  128 

To  Headquarters,  Third  Army. 
Merzweiler,  or  where  found. 

Hq.  Saarbnlcken,  9  August  1870,  9:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

First  and  Second  Army  resume  the  advance  on  the  Mosel  on  the 
10th;  march  direction  of  Third  Army,  right  wing  on  Saarunion — 
Dieuze;  cavalry  ahead. 


No.  129 

To  Headquarters,  Baden  Division. 

Brumath.      (Same  to  Third  Army) 

Hq.  Saarbrucken,  10  August  1870,  10:45  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Please  inform  the  commander  of  the  troops  in  front  of  Strass- 
burg  that  His  Majesty  orders  him  to  prevent  any  and  all  trains  carry- 
ing troops  and  supplies  from  the  south  reaching  Strassburg.  Complete 
siegv^  desirable;  reinforcements  for  that  are  now  en  route.* 


*  Assembled  at  Hagenau:  1  Landwehr  Division  (12  bns.,  4  sqns., 
3  btrs.);  34th  Fus.  Reg.,  30th  Inf.  Reg.,  2d  Res.  Drag.  Regt.,  2 
Res.  Batteries,  3d  F.  A.  Regt. — a  total  of  18  battalions;  8  squadrons, 
5  batteries. 


—242- 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  130 

To  His  Majesty,  the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin. 
Hamburg. 

Hq.  Saarbriicken,  10  August  1870,  noon. 
Telegram. 

The  1st  Landwehr  Division  should  be  transported  within  the  next 
few  days  to  the  upper  Rhine.  You  should  as  soon  as  possible  report 
location  of  the  troops  to  the  Executive  Commission  in  Berlin,  and  the 
latter  shauld  also  be  directed  to  conform  the  travel  to  the  schedules  of 
the  Line  Commission. 

These  headquarters  should  be  continually  kept  informed  as  to  the 
location  of  the  divisions. 


No.  131 

To  Major  General  Baron  Schuler  v.  Senden. 
Kaiserslautern.* 

Hq.  Saarbriicken,  10  August  1870,  3:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

3d  Landwehr  Division  will  be  immediately  started  on  the  march 
to  Saarlouis.  Await  further  orders  there. 


No.  132 
To  Headquarters,  First,  Second,  Third  Army. 

Hq.  Saarbriicken,  10  August  1870. 

To  preserve  order  in  the  trains  it  is  necessary  for  headquarters 
of  the  line  of  communications  to  confine  itself  to  those  lines  which 
are  assigned  to  each  army,  and  to  send  to  the  rear,  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable, also  by  these  lines,  only  trains  cai'rying  wounded  and  other 
things.  All  such  trains  must  be  reported  as  early  as  practicable 
to  the  Line  Commission,  and  in  any  event  the  time  of  their  starting. 

General  Headquarters  of  lines  of  communications  must  at  all 
times  keep  Superior  Headquarters,  the  Line  Commission,  and  the 
War  Ministry  informed  of  the  location  of  their  headquarters  and  must, 
in  addition,  direct  all  commanding  officers  of  lines  of  communications 
to  stop  interfering  with  movements  of  trains. 

According  to  the  regulations  of  the  system  of  lines  of  communi- 
cations, which  regulations  must  be  strictly  complied  with,  the  Direc- 
tor of  Railroads  at  Headquarters,  Lines  of  Communications  is  the 
proper  person  to  regulate  railroad  traffic. 

The  following  was  added  to  the  letter  sent  to  Head- 
quarters, Second  Army. 


*Commander  of  3d  Landwehr  Division. 

—243— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


It  will  be  necessary  to  organize  a  special  Line  Commission  for 
the  roads  from  Neunkirchen  westward  and  the  Quartermaster  Gen- 
eral of  the  Second  Army  probably  will  have  to  supply  the  needs  of 
the  First  and  Third  Army. 


No.  133 

To  THE  General  Government  of  the  Coast  District. 
Hanover. 

Hq.  Saarbrilcken,  10  August  1870,  7 :i5  P.M. 
Telegram. 

After  5  P.M.  tomorrow  Royal  Headquarters  will  be  in  St.  Avoid. 


No.  134 


To  General  of  Infantry  v.  Steinmetz. 
Supposed  to  be  in  Volklingen. 

Hq.  Saarh-rilcken,  10  August  1870,  7:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

There  are  persistent  rumors  that  Your  Excellency  has  removed  his 
headquarters  today  from  Volklingen  to  Lauterbach.* 

So  far  no  official  report  has  been  received  here  concerning  this, 
nor  of  the  movements  of  the  First  Army  today,  nor  of  probable 
changes  in  the  position  of  the  First  Army  intended  for  tomorrow; 
this  information  should  be  furnished  without  delay. 


No.  135 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 
Lauterbach.* 

Hq.  Saarbriictcen,  10  August  1870,  8:30  P.M. 

The  following  reports  have  been  received  so  far  from  head- 
quarters Second  Armv: 

The  Hid  Army  Corps  (right  wing)  reaches  Falkenburg  tomor- 
row and  sends  out  an  advance  guard  for  the  support  of  the  indepen- 
dent cavalry. 

The  leading  elements  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  are  at  Beningen 
-^Merlenbach. 

The  main  body  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  reaches  Hallimer,  sending 
an  advance  guard  towards  Gr.  Tanchen — Landorf. 

The  Guard  Corps  proceeds  to  Insmingen,  its  advance  guard  to- 
ward Altdorf— Wirmingen — Morchingen. 


*Later  a  report  was  received  that  headquarters  had  been  trans- 
ferred there. 

—244— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The  IVth  Army  Corps  sends  its  leading  elements  as  far  as  Hars- 
kirchen,  its  advance  guard  to  the  line  Altweiler — Miinster — Mari- 
mont. 

The  leading  elements  of  the  XII  Army  Corps  will  reach  Metzin- 
gen — Dieblingen — Wustweiler. 

Headquarters  of  the   Second  Army  will  be  in   Piittlingen. 


No.  136 
To  Headquarters,  First  and  Second  Army. 

Hq.   Saarhrilcken,  10  August  1870. 

To  prevent  misunderstandings  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  in  addi- 
tion to  the  villages  situated  on  the  main  highway  from  St.  Avoid  to 
Trittlingen,  Falkenberg,  Herlingen,  Han-on-the-Nied,  Nomeny,  the 
Second  Army  will  use  for  the  purpose  of  requisitions  only  those  places 
located  within  one  [English]  mile  north  of  that  road. 


No.  137 

To  General  of  Infantry,  v.  Steinmetz. 

To  be  looked  for  starting  from  Lauterbach. 

Hq.  Saarhrilcken,  11   August  1870,  6  A.M. 

Your  Excellency's  letter  of  yesterday'*,  I  received  at  10  P.M. 

The  occupation  of  Buschborn  by  the  35th  Regiment  is  not  at  all 
in  accordance  with  orders  of  the  King  concerning  the  advance  of  the 
armies  and  must  be  changed  without  delay. 

I  shall  not  fail  to  submit  Your  Excellency's  desire  concerning 
the  trains  to  His  Majesty,  but  must  state  my  conviction,  that  it  is 
entirely  impossible  to  allow  the  trains  to  march  otherwise  than  on 
the  roads  on  which  the  respective  corps  are  marching.  How  bad  it 
is  to  deviate  from  that  rule  is  shown  by  the  confusion  which  occurred 
yesterday  on  the  road  to  Forbach,  where  the  trains  of  the  Illd  Army 
Corps  marched  in  addition  to  those  of  the  Vlllth,  Vllth  and  1st,  and 
where  the  IXth  Corps  is  to  march  today. 

Finally,  I  again  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  three  main 
highroads  assigned  to  the  three  armies  are  to  be  taken  only  until 
the  cavalry  sends  in  information  as  to  the  location  of  the  hostile  main 
force.  Then  the  three  armies  must  not  only  concentrate  within  them- 
selves, but  will  also  have  to  draw  close  to  each  other  and  at  the  pres- 
ent time  it  cannot  be  said  whether  the  First  Army  will  pass  Metz — 
which  in  any  case  is  but  to  be  observed — on  the  south  or  on  the  north. 
For  the  purpose  of  such  observation  a  Landwehr  division — already 
mobilized — will  be  brought  up. 


*In  this  letter  General  v.  Steinmetz  complained  that  parts  of 
the  Second  Army  were  met  on  roads  assigned  to  his  army.  He  further 
requested  authority  in  a  further  advance  on  Metz  to  concentrate 
the  trains  of  the  First  Army  at  St.  Avoid  and  to  let  them  follow 
from  there  on  the  highway  via  Falkenburg. 


-245- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  138 

To  Headquarters  First  Army. 

To  be  looked  for  starting  from  Lauterbach. 

Hq.  Saarbriicken,  11  August  1870,  10  A.M. 

H.  M.  the  King  has  been  in  ignorance  of  the  whereabouts  of 
army  headquarters  and  location  of  the  corps  of  the  First  Army  dur- 
ing the  entire  day  yesterday  until  10  P.M.;  and  today  it  is  so  far  not 
known  what  movements  are  intended.  H.  M.  the  King  consequently 
calls  your  attention  to  existing  orders  requiring  daily  reports  to  be 
submitted,  so  as  to  enable  His  Majesty  to  make  proper  dispositions 
of  the  corps  at  any  moment,  which  is  more  and  more  necessary  the 
closer  the  armies  get  to  the  enemy. 

Enclosed  herewith  is  a  synopsis  of  the  reports  received  here  from 
the  Second  Army  which,  in  connection  with  the  previously  furnished 
sketch  of  the  movements  of  the  Second  Army  for  today,  will  give  First 
Army  headquarters  a  base  for  its  further  movements. 

It  has  also  been  reported  that  trains  of  the  First  Army  are  on 
the  road  to  Forbach.  His  Majesty  orders  that  these  trains  be  imme- 
diately taken  off  the  road  which  was  originally  assigned  for  the  trains 
of  the  Second  Army. 

Finally  concerning  the  request  of  the  8th  instant  for  permanent 
assignment  of  railroad  trains  on  the  Rhine — Nahe  railroad  to  bring 
up  supplies  to  the  First  Army,  His  Majesty  has  decided  that  the 
First  Army  should  first  of  all  use  the  land  transportation  assigned  it 
on  the  different  routes  and  that  support  by  railroad  trains  can  only 
be  had  in  case  of  absolute  need.  Proper  i-equisition  for  rail  trans- 
portation should  in  such  case  be  submitted,  stating  actual  amounts 
to  be  transported,  to  the  Commandant  line  of  communications,  and 
to  these  headquarters  only  when  ammunition  is  required. 

Enclosure 

Synopsis  of  reports  from  the  Second  Army  up  to  the 
evening  of  August  10 : 

1.  Railroad  bridges  at  Herny  blown  up. 

2.  Small  infantry  detachments  of  MacMahon's  Corps  marching 
on  Metz. 

3.  This  morning  strong  columns  marching  out  of  Metz  towards 
Bolchen  and  Pange. 

4.  Military  trains  coming  from  Chalons  arrived  in  Metz  night  of 
9-lOth. 

5.  Camp  of  two  hostile  brigades  seen  at  Pange. 

6.  Strong  infantry  and  artillery  columns  are  marching  from 
Metz  toward  Courcelles,  Mont  and  Pange. 

No  reports  have  been  received  from  the  First  Army. 

It  can  be  assumed  with  a  degree  of  certainty  that  a 
part  of  the  French  Army  is  going  into  camp  on  the  French 
Nied. 


—246— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  139 
To  Major  General  v.  Stiehle.* 

Hq.  Saarbriicken,  11  August  1870,  10:45  A.M. 

Thanks  for  all  your  reports,  the  more  so  as  we  have  not  heard 
anything  from  the  First  Army.  I  cannot  even  tell  you  to  what  point 
the  1st,  Vlllth  and  Vllth  Corps  are  marching  today.  Proper  steps 
have  been  taken  to  correct  this  matter. 

Position  behind  Nied  undoubtedly  only  a  position  of  observation, 
main  army  evidently  behind  the  Mosel.  Leave  it  to  your  judgment  if 
the  Hid  Corps  had  not  better  halt  to  allow  others  to  close  up. 


No.  140 
To  Headquarters,  First,  Second,  Third  Army. 

Hq.  Saarbriicken,  11  August  1870,  11  A.M. 

Cases  again  have  arisen  of  absolutely  unnecessary  destruction  of 
railroads  by  our  troops,  and  it  is  consequently  necessary  to  issue 
the  strictest  orders  forbidding  the  destruction  of  railroads  and  tele- 
graphs between  the  advancing  armies  and  the  enemy  and  to  hold 
all  organizations  and  officers  to  the  strictest  account  in  this  matter. 

It  is  also  necessary  in  our  interests  to  at  once  occupy  all  tele- 
graph and  especially  railroad  stations  in  all  towns  reached  by  our 
troops,  to  prevent  their  destruction  by  the  population  or  individuals 
and  to  secure  possession  of  removable  material. 


No.  141 

To  Headquarters  First  and  Second  Army. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  11  August  1870,  7  P.M. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  a  considerable  portion  of  the  enemy  is 
this  side  of  Metz  on  the  left  bank  of  the  French  Nied.  Closer  connec- 
tion between  First  and  Second  Army  consequently  becomes  neces- 
sary. 

H.  M.  the  King  has  ordered  the  following: 

The  Illd  Army  Corps  at  Falkenberg  will  be  the  supporting  point 
for  this  junction  of  the  armies. 

The  First  Army  will  march  tomorrow  in  good  time  with  two 
corps  to  the  line  Bolchen — Mohringen,  with  one  corps  to  Buschborn. 

The  Second  Army  will  send  the  IXth  Corps  to  Lubeln,  west  of  St. 
Avoid,  at  which  place  the  lid  Army  Corps,  so  far  as  it  is  available, 
will  join.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  will  proceed  (about  via  Lellingen) 
to  the  rear  of  the  llld  Corps.  The  Guard,  IVth  and  Xllth  Corps  are 
to  be  dravv^n  up  towards  the  left  wing  of  the  above  sketched  position 
in  such  manner  that  they  can  join  that  position  if  required,  or  con- 
tinue the  march  in  the  direction  of  Nancy. 


*Aide  to  His  Majesty  and  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Sec- 
ond Army. 

—247-- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


The  outposts  of  the  First  Army  will  in  general  be  advanced  to 
the  German  Nied. 

All  army  corps  will  leave  the  second  section  of  their  trains  in 
their  today's  location,  leaving  the  roads  completely  clear. 

Tomorrow's  location  of  headquarters  of  both  armies  will  be  re- 
ported at  once. 

Additioii  to  letter  for  Second  Army:  Extract  of  above  orders  has 
been  sent  to  headquarters  Illd  Army  Corps  in  writing;  and  tele- 
graphic extract  sent  to  headquarters  IXth  Army  Corps.  [See  No. 
142.] 


No.  142 
To  Headquarters  IXth  Army  Corps. 

FORBACH. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  11  August  1870,  8  P.M. 
Telegram. 

His  Majesty  orders  that  the  corps  marches  via  St.  Avoid  to 
Lubeln  early  tomorrow.  Second  section  of  trains  to  be  left  there 
today,  clearing  roads. 


On  the  morning  of  11  August,  H.  R.  H,  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles,  Commander  of  the  Second  Army,  sent  the 
following  letter  to  General  v.  Moltke,  giving  his  views  of 
the  situation  as  then  existing: 

Hq.  Pilttlingen,  11  August  1870,  9:45  A.M. 
Your  Excellency: 

I  sent  you  a  report  from  Saargemiind  that  the  enemy  appeared 
to  have  concentrated  in  dense  masses  behind  the  French  Nied,  this 
side  of  Metz. 

It  appears  as  if  this  concentration  of  hostile  masses  will  lead  to 
a  battle.  It  does  not  seem  probable  that  the  enemy  will  advance  from 
his  excellent  position  and  attack  us,  although  this  wou'd  be  more  in 
consonance  with  the  French  character  than  their  heretofore  defensive 
attitude.  The  enemy  has  not  succeeded  very  well  in  his  defense;  it  is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  he  may  now  try  the  offensive.  Although 
it  is  not  very  probable  that  he  will  do  so  I  shall  prepare  for  that  event 
in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  him  from  attacking  my  corps  separ- 
ately before  the  Second  Army  is  concentrated,  in  so  far  as  to  preclude 
the  possibility  of  my  being  defeated. 

The  march  of  my  army  today  is  known  to  you.  At  its  conclusion 
I  shall  hold  my  leading  elements  and  will  execute  a  turn  to  the  right 
with  my  army  (Hid  Corps  the  pivot)  only  on  receipt  of  the  King's 
orders. 

I  would  suggest  that  the  First  Army  be  informed  of  this  and 
ordered  to  march  in  such  manner  that  it  keep  touch  with  my  Illd 
Corps — partly  extending  the  front,  if  necessary,  against  the  enemy, 
but  that  it  especially  endeavor  to  envelop  the  hostile  left  flank  with 
strong  forces.     I  would   not  utilize   more   troops   against  the  hostile 

—248— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

front  that  what  would  appear  necessary  to  hold  him  there — similar 
to  the  conduct  of  my  army  at  Sadowa — and  to  prevent  the  enemy's 
piercing  our  center.  I  shall  bring  the  main  pressure  to  bear  on  the 
enemy's  right  flank,  advancing  toward  there  oflTensively  and  in  strength 
and  will  have  at  least  one  corps  follow  as  reserve  in  echelon  to  my 
enveloping  movement. 

We  still  have  provisions  to  last  us  for  four  or  five  days,  thanks 
to  the  enormous  supplies  taken  in  Saargemiind  and  Forbach.  Your 
Excellency,  however,  will  do  well  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  have 
supplies  brought  up  tomorrow  by  rail  to  Falkenberg  and  also  have  the 
troops  of  the  lid  Army  Corps,  at  least  in  part,  transported  by  rail  to 
that  place  or  at  least  as  far  as  St.  Avoid,  so  as  to  be  as  strong  as  pos- 
sible in  the  battle. 


All  my  corps  are  good  and  will  do  their  full  duty.  Everybody  is 
eager  to  get  at  the  enemy.  The  King  can  have  full  confidence  in 
them  in  that  respect.  We  must  have  to  be  prepared  for  enormous 
losses  and  for  a  two  days'  battle;  although  I  do  not  entirely  believe 
the  latter  to  be  the  case,  1  shall  prepare  for  it.  We  can  go  into  posi- 
tion in  daytime  in  the  front  of  the  enemy;  the  preparatory  move- 
ments towards  the  flanks  will  have  to  be  made  at  night  on  reconnoi- 
tered  roads,  no  fires  ought  to  be  built  and  the  battle  should  be  started 
early — not  later  than  5  o'clock.     God  will  be  with  us. 

In  the  evening  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the 
Army  replied: 


No.  143 

To  H.  R.  H.,  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  11   August  1870,  8  P.M. 

Your  Royal  Highness'  letter  of  this  forenoon  was  received  by 
me  at  6  P.M.;  there  was  not  sufficient  time  to  send  a  reply  with  the 
messenger  who  carries  instructions  which  have  now  become  necessary. 
These  instructions  are  based  on  the  views  of  Your  Highness,  that 
a  new  mission  of  the  army  requires  a  forceful  and  sudden  offensive, 
which  is  the  only  correct  method,  considering  that  our  corps  are  di- 
vided in  the  area  from  Saarlouis  to  Zabern;  however  they  only  pro- 
vide the  first  measures  to  be  taken  in  case  of  the  probable  attack 
against  the  Illd  Army  Corps. 

A  full  turn  as  far  as  Verny  would  not  be  necessary  and  would 
even  be  dangerous  should,  as  is  not  impx'obable,  the  enemy's  detach- 
ment retreat  to  behind  the  Nied  and  should  his  main  force  be  south 
of  Metz  behind  the  Seille  or  Mosel.  I  hope  that  our  plans  are  in  con- 
sonance with  your  Royal  Highness'  intentions.  By  tomorrow  after- 
noon we  will  have  six  corps  assembled,  two  of  them  in  reserve,  and 
we  can  be  ten  corps  strong  by  day  after  tomorrow.*  Should  this  not 
become  necessary,  the  IVth,  XHth  and  Guard  Corps  would  not  have 


^Remark  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles:     that  means  including  the 
corps  which  have  covered  a  day's  march  and  which  are  not  fresh. 

—249—  ~""^ 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


to  be  called  up,  in  order  to  allow  us  to  continue  the  advance  against 
the  Mosel  in  as  much  breadth  as  possible.* 


As  nothwithstanding  our  haste  the  messenger  leaves  only  now,  I 
hand  him  this  letter  to  carry  along,  asking  your  Royal  Highness  to 
pardon  the  hurried  writing. 


Early  on  the  12th  a  supplement  to  the  orders  of  the 
evening  of  the  11th,  was  sent  to  Hq.  Second  Army: 

No.  144 
To  Headquarters  Second  Army. 

PtJTTLINGEN. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870,  7  A.M. 

As  up  to  this  hour  no  reports  have  been  received  which  make 
the  direct  calling  up  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  to  the  north  of  the  Illd 
necessary,  it  is  left  to  your  discretion  to  send  that  corps  farther  west- 
ward if  that  can  still  be  done. 


Presuming  that  Strassburg  would  be  invested  very 
soon,  and  supplementary  to  the  orders  of  10  August  (No. 
129)  the  following  two  queries  were  sent: 

No.  145 

To  THE  War  Ministry. 
Berlin. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870. 
Telegram. 

When  and  where  will  the  siege  train  be  mobilized  and  when  ready 
to  start? 

No.  146 

To  Headquarters  Baden  Division. 
Hagenau. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870,  7:15  A.M. 
Telegram. 

What  measures  have  you  taken  in  obedience  to  my  cipher  tele- 
gram of  the  10th  instant?     Wire  answer. f 


*Note  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles:  This  view  will  undergo  a 
change  as  soon  as  Moltke  receives  information  today  that  Nancy  is 
free  of  the  enemy  and  that  masses  have  again  been  seen  marching 
from  Metz  toward  the  Nied. 

fHeadquarters  replied,  that  two  infantry  brigades  were  placed 
on  the  north  and  west  sides  and  cavalry  on  the  south  side  for  the 
purpose  of  investing  Strassburg;  and  that  one  battalion  was  at  Kehl. 


—250- 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  147 

To  Lieut.-General  v.  Fransecky. 
Saarbruecken.* 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870,  11:50  A.M. 
Telegram. 

When  will  the  lid  Army  Corps  be  assembled  with  its  troops  at  Saar- 
briicken?     When  will  the  last  trains  reach  there ?t 


No.  148 
To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 

BOLCHEN. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870. 

The  First  Army  can  now  get  its  subsistence  supplies  until  fur- 
ther orders  from  the  railroad  depots  at  Forbach,  St.  Avoid  and  Fal- 
kenberg,  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  procured  by  requisition  or  carried 
on  the  army's  own  transportation.  But  the  wagons  sent  to  the  above 
mentioned  points  must  keep  off  the  main  highway  Falkenberg — For- 
bach as  much  as  possible. 


No.  149 

To  Headquarters  First,  Second  and  Third  Army. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870,  4:30  P.M. 

As  far  as  can  be  seen  from  reports  so  far  received,  the  enemy's 
main  force  is  retreating  through  Metz  across  the  Mosel. 

His  Majesty  the  King  orders: 

The  First  Army  tomorrow  the  13th  instant  advances  against  the 
French  Nied,  main  body  towards  line  Tennschen — Pange,  and  secures 
the  railroad  depot  of  Courcelles.  Cavalry  reconnoiters  towards  Metz 
and  crosses  the  Mosel  below  there.  Thus  First  Army  covers  right  flank 
of  Second  Army. 

Second  Army  marches  towards  line  Buchy — Chateau — Salins  and 
sends  outposts  to  the  Seille;  it  will  try,  if  possible,  to  secure  the  cross- 
ings at  Pont-a-Mousson,  Dieulouard,  Marbache,  etc.  Cavalry  recon- 
noiters to  beyond  the  Mosel. 

Third  Army  continues  advance  towards  the  line  Nancy — Luneville. 
Orders  for  its  further  utilization  will  be  issued  in  the  next  few  days. 

The  trains  can  everywhere  follow  their  ai*my  corps  as  far  as  the 
Mosel  and  Meurthe. 

After  5  P.M.  tomorrow  Royal  Headquarters  will  be  in  Herlingen. 
Send  reports  here  up  to  2  P.M. 


*Commander  of  lid  Army  Corps. 

fReply:  At  present  lid  Army  Corps  in  triangle  Neunkirchen — 
Homburg — Saarbriicken,  except  larger  part  of  trains  and  columns;  the 
latter  still  en  route  from  Berlin  to  Saarbriicken  and  will  be  assem- 
bled in  Homburg  and  Neunkirchen  only  by  the  14th. 


—251- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 
No.  150 

To  THE  General  Government,  Coast  Districts, 
Hanover. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870,  5:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

After  5  P.M.  tomorrow  Royal  Headquarters  will  be  in  Herlingen, 
west  of  Falkenberg. 


No.  151 

To  Lieut.-General  v.  Kummer. 
Mayence. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870,  5:30  P.M. 
Telegram. 

All  troops  assigned  to  your  command  have  been  started  to  Saar- 
louis  and  vicinity,  whei-e  they  will  arrive  on  the  15th  and  16th.  Writ- 
ten orders  sent  by  me  to  Saarlouis.     [See  next  number.] 


No.  152 

To  Lieut.-General  v.  Kummer. 
Saarlouis. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  12  August  1870,  11  A.M. 

His  Majesty  the  King  has  issued  the  following  orders  for  the 
utilization  of  the  detachment  of  troops  under  your  command,  who  will 
be  joined  within  the  next  few  days,  at  Saarlouis,  by  the  3d  Reserve 
Hussar  Regiment  and  the  5th  Reserve  Uhlan  Regiment — the  brigade 
of  Major  General  v.  Stranz. 

It  is  the  task  of  the  3d  Reserve  Division  to  hasten  to  Metz  and 
prepare  the  siege  of  that  fortress  by  temporary  investment.  Thion- 
ville  is  to  be  observed.  In  any  event  it  must  prevent  operations  from 
Metz  against  the  communications  of  the  armies  continuing  the  ad- 
vance. Until  arrival  of  the  3d  Reserve  Division  at  Metz,  a  detachment 
of  the  First  Army*  will  remain  in  front  of  Metz  and  it  will  orient  Your 


No.  153 

To  Lieut.-General  v.  Fransecky. 
Saarbrucken. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  13  August  1870. 
Telegram. 

Transportation  by  rail  via  Neunkirchen  or  Homburg  of  troops  and 
trains  of  the  lid  Corps  cannot  be  tolerated. 


*That  army  was  directed  to  leave  a  division  there. 
Excellency  as  to  conditions  in  and  in  front  of  that  fortress.     At  the 
present  time  it  is  not  known  of  what  the  hostile  garrison  is  composed. 


—252— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  154 

To  General  Government'  of  Coast  Districts. 
Hanover. 

Hq.  St.  Avoid,  13  August  1870,  11:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Instructions  have  been  issued  to  the  Guard  Landwehr  Division  that 
it  must  apply  to  the  Line  Commission  in  the  matter  of  rail  transport  to 
Karlsruhe. 

It  will  receive  its  orders  from  Lieut.  General  v.  Werder.* 
The  division  will  be  relieved  in  Hanover  by  Silesian  Landwehr  bat- 
talions. 


No.  155 

To  Headquarters  First  and  Second  Army. 

Hq.  Herlingen,  13  August  1870,  9  P.M. 

According  to  information  so  far  received  large  hostile  detach- 
ments have  halted  at  Servigny  and  at  Borny  on  this  side  of  Metz. 

His  Majesty  orders  that  the  First  Army  remain  tomorrow,  the 
14th  August,  in  its  position  on  the  French  Nied  and  observe  by  ad- 
vanced guards  whether  the  enemy  retreats  or  advances  to  attack. 

Should  the  latter  be  the  case,  the  Hid  Army  Corps  of  the  Second 
Army  will  be  sent  tomorrow  to  opposite  Pagny,  the  IXth  Corps  to 
Buchy  in  the  direction  of  the  Mosel  (Pont-a-Mousson),  where  they 
will,  provided  they  start  early,  be  ready  at  a  distance  of  41  [English] 
miles  to  interfere  in  a  more  serious  battle  in  front  of  Metz.  The  road 
from  Herlingen  via  Buchy  to  Pagny  is  to  be  kept  clear  of  all  trains. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  First  Army  is  in  a  situation  to  prevent 
any  advance  of  the  enemy  southward  by  a  flank  attack. 

The  remaining  corps  of  the  Second  Army  will  continue  the  ad- 
vance against  the  stretch  of  the  Mosel  from  Pont-a-Mousson  to  Mar- 
bache.     The  Xth  Corps  will  take  position  in  front  of  Pont-a-Mousson. 

The  cavalry  of  both  armies  must  be  sent  ahead  as  far  as  possible 
and  must  interrupt  a  possible  retreat  of  the  enemy  on  the  Metz — 
Verdun  road. 


No.  156 

To  Lieut.-General  v.  Werder. 
Hagenau. 

Hq.  Herlingen,  14  August  1870. 

By  orders  of  the  King  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your  Excel- 
lency that  the  following  troops  assigned  to  your  command  have  been 
brought  up,  or  will  shortly  arrive,  and  are  now  ready  at  your  dis- 
posal: 

Fusilier  Regiment  34  at  Hagenau,  for  the  present  under  the 
orders  of  Lieut.  General  v.  Beyer; 


*v.  Werder  had  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  siege  corps 
at  Strassburg,  and  the  Guard  Landwehr  Division  was  attached  to  that 
corps. 

—253— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


Regiment  No.  30  at  Hagenau; 

2d  Reserve  Dragoon  Regiment  at  Hagenau; 

Guard  Landwehr  Division  at  Karlsruhe; 

1st   Landwehr   Division   at  Karlsruhe; 

One  Reserve  battery  F.  A.  Regiment  No.  1  at  Karlsruhe; 

Two  Reserve  batteries  F.  A.  Regiment  No.  3  at  Karlsruhe. 

The  Grand  Ducal  Baden  Division  is  already  at  Strassburg.  The 
mobilization  of  the  siege  train,  as  well  as  of  the  required  fortress 
artillery  and  fortress  engineer  companies  is  completed,  and  they  will 
be  brought  by  rail  as  close  to  Strassburg  as  possible. 

It  is  Your  Excellency's  task  to  capture  this  place  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. 


No.  157 
To  Headquarters  First,  Second  and  Third  Army. 

Hq.  Herlingen,  lU  August  1870. 

The  order  of  march  of  the  artillery  and  trains,  of  themselves 
very  satisfactory,  is  greatly  interfered  with  by  the  carelessness  of 
hired   and    requisitioned    subsistence   vehicles. 

Therefore  His  Majesty  orders  that  the  following  points  be  strictly 
observed: 

1.  All  vehicles  on  the  march  will  keep  on  the  right  side  of  the 
road,  and  fully  clear  the  left  side.  Vehicles  or  columns  traveling  at 
an  increased  rate  and  overtaking  moving  vehicles  or  columns  going 
in  the  same  direction  will  pass  the  latter  on  the  right  and  close  to 
them. 

2.  Marching  two  vehicles  abreast  is  allowed  for  batteries  and  am- 
munition columns,  and  that  formation  should  be  taken  when  the  re- 
spective column  of  troops  marches  in  readiness  for  battle,  or  when 
it  can  be  ascertained  by  the  commanding  officers  that  no  other  col- 
umns travel  on  the  same  road  in  either  direction.  To  march  that 
way,  of  course  the  road  must  be  broad  enough  to  accommodate  thx'ee 
vehicles  abreast. 

3.  Each  column  halting  for  any  reason  whatever  or  for  feeding, 
must  under  all  circumstances  clear  the  road  and  park  alongside  of  it. 
This  especially  applies  to  sutler  vehicles,  which  must  be  at  once 
driven  off  the  road,  taking  care  however  not  to  illtreat  the  animals. 

4.  All  commanders  of  troops  and  all  field  gendarmes  should  again 
be  directed  to  watch  over  the  execution  of  the  above  orders  and  to 
punish  all  violators  of  same,  or  report  them  to  their  proper  authori- 
ties. 


No.  158 

To  THE  Minister  of  War,  General  of  Infantry  v.  Roon. 

Hq.  Herlingen,  lU  August  1870. 

Referring  to  your  letter  of  the  12th  instant;  I  have  the  honor  to 
inform  Your  Excellency  that  by  orders  of  His  Majesty  the  1st  Army 
Corps  and  the  1st  Cavalry  Division  have  been  attached  to  the  First 
Army,  the  lid,  IXth  and  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  to  the  Second  Army, 
the  Vlth  Army  Corps  and  the  2d  Cavalry  Division  to  the  Third  Army. 

—254— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The  Guard  Landwehr  Division  has  received  orders  also  to  pro- 
ceed to  Strassburg  to  reinforce  the  troops  there,  and  it  has  been 
started  by  rail  to  Karlsruhe.  This  division  w^ill  be  replaced  in  Han- 
over by  Landwehr  Regiments  Nos.  23,  63,  22  and  62  and  these  latter 
will  for  that  purpose  be  called  up  from  Cosel  and  Glatz  and  trans- 
ported  by  rail  from   Frankenstein. 


No.  159 
Draft  of  Operation  Orders  for  the  15th  of  August.* 

Hq.  Herlingen,  H  August  1870. 

The  First  Army  marches  off  to  the  left  tomorrow,  the  15th  Au- 
gust, and  takes  position  on  the  line  Pommerieux — Arry,  between 
Seille  and  Mosel,  south  of  Metz. 

One  division  remains  at  Courcelles.  It  will  take  over  the  ob- 
servation of  Metz,  as  long  as  only  its  proper  garrison  is  assumed  to 
be  in  and  around  that  place;  this  division  will  be  relieved  as  quickly 
as  possible  by  the  mobilized  3d  Landwehr  Division. 

For  final  support  of  the  First  Army,  the  right  wing  of  the  Second 
Army  (IX  and  Xllth  Army  Corps),  marching  on  Pont-a-Mousson, 
will  be  in  readiness  a  mile  away. 

Those  parts  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  which  are  still  near 
Metz  may  be  called  back  by  the  Second  Army  in  the  course  of  the 
forenoon. 

The  Second  Army  will  resume  the  march  to  the  Mosel.  It  is 
advisable  to  give  troops  a  day  of  rest  in  rotation  as  the  river  is 
crossed;  still  headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  must  not  fail  to  send 
cavalry,  as  strong  as  possible,  and  supported  by  infantry  detach- 
ments as  far  as  practicable,  without  delay  towards  the  Metz — Verdun 
road. 

Depending  on  reports  received  from  the  First  Army  that  Army 
can  also,  and  on  the  shortest  road,  advance  against  that  road.  Cross- 
ings are  to  be  at  once  reconnoitered  below  Pont-a-Mousson  and  pre- 
pared. 


No.  160 

DRAFT   OF   OPERATIONS 

No  date,  apparently  H  August  1870. 

If  reconnaissance  show  that  large  masses  of  troops  are  in  front 
of  and  behind  Metz — 


*These  orders  were  not  issued.  It  seems  they  were  sketched  out 
by  V.  Moltke  in  the  expectation  that  by  the  evening  of  the  14th  relia- 
ble information  would  be  received  that  the  largest  part  of  the  French 
army  had  arrived  behind  the  Mosel.  But  as  by  6  P.M.  the  situation 
as  to  the  enemy  had  not  yet  been  ascertained,  and  nothing  was  known 
at  Royal  Headquarters  of  the  battle  taking  place  in  the  meantime,  the 
orders  given  in  No.  161  came  into  force.  The  main  points  of  these 
orders,  however,  recur  in  the  orders  for  the  16th  [No.  168],  of  course 
with  due  regard  to  the  events  on  the  14th. 

—255— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

First   Anny. — Line   Courcelles — Orny — Pournoy. 

Xllth  Corps  as  support  takes  its  rest  day  in  Buchy-Solgne. 

Total 120,000  men. 

As  soon  as  lid   Corps   arrives    150,000  men. 

Xth  Corps  rests  today.  On  the  15th  August  at  Gorze  with  3d 
Cavalry  Division. 

16th  August  five  corps  behind  the  Madine,  that  is  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Mosel  towards  Metz,  also  150,000  men. 

Third  Aryny  on  the  march  to  Paris. 


No.  161 

To  Headquarters,  First,  Second  and  Third  Army,  as 
well  as  to  Headquarters  Illd,  IXth  and  Xllth  Army  Corps : 

Hq.  Herlingen,   Hih  August   1870,   6:00  P.M. 

Observations  by  the  First  Army  have  not  resulted  in  any  defin- 
ite clearing  up  of  the  situation  in  front  of  Metz.  Still  we  may  assume 
that  the  largest  part  of  the  hostile  army  is  still  this  side  of  Metz. 

Considering  that  after  exhausting  marches  the  armies  need  a 
day  of  rest,  and  because  such  a  day  of  rest  can  be  taken  by  a  part 
of  the  army  corps  with  security  against  possible  offensive  under- 
takings from  Metz,  His  Majesty  the  King  hereby  orders: 

The  leading  elements  of  the  Illd,  IXth,  and  Xlth  Army  Corps 
remain  in  their  place  tomorrow;  these  corps  will  close  up  within 
themselves  and  cook  meals. 

The  First  Army  also  remains  with  the  1st  and  Vllth  Army  Corps 
in  its  present  position;  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps,  except  that  part  de- 
tached via  Bolchen  to  Bazoncourt — Alben  for  purpose  of  closer  con- 
nection with  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army,  should  be  closed  up, 
which  at  the  same  time  will  facilitate  the  subsequent  necessary  left 
flank  movement  of  the  First  Army.  There  is  no  objection  to  the 
cavalry,  especially  the  3d  Cavalry  Division,  going  farther  to  the  front. 

To  better  clear  up  the  situation  in  the  meantime  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  advance  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mosel  with  larger  forces 
against  the  connecting  roads  of  the  enemy,  Metz — Verdun. 

This  task  the  Second  Army  will  assign  to  all  the  cavalry  now  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Mosel  and  support  that  cavalry  in  the  direction 
of  Gorze  and  Thiaucourt  by  those  corps  which  cross  the  Mosel  first. 

For  this  purpose  the  Hid  Army  Corps  must  prepare  tomorrow 
a  crossing  below  Pont-a-Mousson. 

The  lid  Army  Corps  continues  its  march  in  the  direction  it  now 
has. 


The  battle  of  August  14th  made  special  orders  neces- 
sary early  on  the  15th : 


—256— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  162 

To  Headquarters  Second  Army. 

PONT-A-MOUSSON. 

Hq.  Herlingen,  15  August  1870,  early. 
Telegram. 

1st  and  lid  Corps  have,  throuffh  heavy  fiechting,  driven  strong 
hostile  forces  into  Metz.  Parts  of  the  18th  Division  v^^ere  also  en- 
gaged. The  IXth  Corps  will  get  close  to  the  battle  today.  Disposi- 
tion as  to  the  Hid  Corps  reserved.  Pursuit  important  on  the  Metz — 
Verdun  road. 


No.  163 

To  Headquarters  First  Army. 
Varize. 

Hq.   Herlingen,  l-'y   August   1870,   early. 
Telegravi. 

His  Majesty  orders  that  the  First  Army  today  hold  the  terrain 
gained  in  yesterday's  battle,  as  far  as  it  is  not  within  range  of  the 
fortress  guns.  The  Vlllth  Corps  should  at  once  be  brought  up  to 
support  the  1st  and  Vllth.  The  IXth  Corps  which  already  was  en- 
gaged yesterday,  will  be  dravra  close  to  the  battlefield.  The  leading 
elements  of  the  Ild  Corps  will  today  reach  Han  on  the  Nied.  His 
Majesty  will  proceed  to  Pange. 


No.  164 

To  Headquarters  IXth  Army  Corps. 

Hq.  Herlinyen,  15  August  1870.* 

The  IXth  Army  Corps  will  immediately  advance  with  all  forces 
to  Peltre — Jury,  to  be  ready  for  a  hostile  advance.  His  Majesty  pro- 
ceeds to  Pange. 


No.  165 
To  General  of  Infantry,  v.  Steinmetz. 

Near  Flanville,   15th    August   1870,   10:h5   A.M. 

His  Majesty  having  convinced  himself  that  there  are  no  parts  of 
the  enemy  this  side  of  Metz,  the  advance  of  the  First  Army  is  no 
longer  required.  The  1st  and  Vllth  Corps  have  received  orders  direct 
from  these  headquarters  to  halt  and  to  send  ahead  only  cavalry  for 
observation  of  the  fortress  and  to  protect  the  wounded.  The  Vlllth 
Army  Corps,  in  so  far  as  it  has  already  started  on  the  march,  should 
proceed  to  Orny,  where  it  will  receive  orders  direct. 


*This  order  was  received  at  5  P.M.  at  corps  headquarters. 


—257- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

No.  166 
To  Headquarters  VIIIth  Army  Corps. 

Near  Flanville,   15th   Atignst   1870,   10:^5  A.M. 

His  Majesty  having  convinced  himself  that  there  are  no  parts  of 
the  enemy  this  side  of  Metz,  the  advance  of  the  VIIIth  Army  Corps 
is  no  longer  necessary.  Should  the  corps  be  now  en  route,  the  march 
should  be  directed  to  Orny,  via  Pange. 


No.  167 

To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 

Near  Flanville,  15  August  1870,  11  A.M. 
Telegram. 

French  driven  completely  into  Metz  and  now  apparently  in  re- 
treat on  Verdun.  All  three  corps  of  the  right  wing  (Illd,  Xllth,  IXth) 
are  now  at  the  complete  disposal  of  Second  Army  Headquarters;  the 
Xllth  Corps  is  already  on  the  march  to  Nomeny. 


No.  168 
To  Headquarters  First,  Second  and  Third  Army. 

Hq.  Herlingen,  15  August  1870,  6:30  P.M. 

As  long  as  it  has  not  been  ascertained  whether  more  than  the 
regular  garrison  is  in  Metz,  it  will  be  necessary  to  leave  one  army 
corps  of  the  First  Army  in  the  vicinity  of  Courcelles,  which  will  very 
shortly  be  relieved  by  the  corps  under  Lieutenant  General  v.  Rum- 
mer coming  up  from  Saarlouis.  The  other  two  corps  of  the  First 
Army  will  take  position  tomorrow,  the  16th,  between  the  Seille  and 
Mosel,  about  on  the  line  Arry — Pommerieux.  A  crossing  over  the 
last  named  stream  should  be  at  once  reconnoitered,  provided  that  it 
has  not  already  been  done  in  that  vicinity  by  the  Illd  Army  Corps, 
in  which  case  it  will  be  kept  intact  for  the  use  of  the  First  Army. 

By  telegram  of  11  A.M.  this  date,  the  Second  Army  received 
free  disposition  of  all  its  corps.  An  early  report  concerning  its  move- 
ments is  expected,  but  in  general  the  following  is  known: 

Conditions  under  which  the  1st  and  Vllth  Army  Corps  and  parts 
of  the  18th  Division  victoriously  fought  last  evening  preclude  any 
pursuit.  The  fruits  of  the  victory  can  be  gathered  only  by  a  strong 
offensive  by  the  Second  Army  against  the  roads  from  Metz  as  well  as 
via  Fresnes  and  Etain  towards  Verdun.  It  is  left  to  Headquarters 
Second  Army  to  conduct  such  an  offensive  with  all  available  means 
at  hand.  Even  if  the  Second  Army  gets  for  the  time  beihg  ahead 
of  the  First  Army,  care  will  be  exercised  at  these  headquarters  in 
arranging  for  a  further  advance  westward,  which  steps  cannot  be 
foreseen  at  present  and  steps   will  also  be  taken  to  give  the  troops 

—258— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

all  necessary  rest.  The  leading  elements  of  the  Third  Army  today 
reached  the  line  Nancy — Dombasle — Bayon;  its  cavalry  is  raiding 
towards  Toul  and  south  thereof.  After  5  P.M.  tomorrow  Royal  Head- 
quarters will  be  at  Pont-a-Mousson;  send  reports  here  until  1:00 
P.M. 


No.  169 

Unsealed  Orders  for  the  respective  detachments  of  both 
Armies. 

Hq.  Herlingen,  IS  August  1870,  7:15  A.M. 

The  IXth  Army  Corps  shall  today,  if  possible,  cross  on  the  bridge 
prepared  by  the  Illd  Army  Corps  in  the  vicinity  of  Arry,  and  in  any 
case  will  approach  close  to  the  river.  Therefore  it  is  advisable  that 
the  First  Army  let  that  corps  pass  ahead,  the  bivouac  of  the  Vlllth 
Corps  should  be  changed  accordingly. 


News  of  the  battle  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour  caused 
the  following  orders  to  be  issued  on  the  evening  of  the  16th 
of  August: 

No.  170 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 

POMMERIEUX. 

Hq.  Pont-a-Mousson,  16  August  1870,  5:00  P.M. 

The  enemy  retreating  from  Metz  has  been  attacked  today  at 
Rezonville  by  the  Illd  Army  Corps,  coming  from  Gorze.  The  Xth 
Corps  is  being  brought  up  from  the  west.  In  order  to  force  the 
enemy  into  a  northerly  direction  away  from  Chalons  and  Paris,  and 
because  he  appears  to  be  in  considerable  force.  His  Majesty  orders 
that  the  two  disposable  corps  of  the  First  Army  cross  the  Mosel  im- 
mediately after  the  troops  of  the  IXth  Corps.  Until  the  troops  have 
crossed,  the  trains  of  all  three  corps  must  remain  on  the  right  bank  of 
that  river. 

The  subsequent  direction  of  the  Vlllth  and  Vllth  Army  Corps 
will  be  regulated  by  Army  Headquarters  with  due  regard  to  bringing 
them  into  touch  with  the  enemy  as  soon  as  possible. 

These  headquarters  will  issue  the  necessary  orders  for  continu- 
ing the  march  of  both  armies  westward. 


No.  171 
To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 

Hq.  Pont-d-Mousson,  16  August,  8:00  P.M. 

Headquarters  First  Army  has  received  orders  to  cross  the  troops 
of  the  Vlllth  and  Vllth  Army  Corps  over  the  Mosel  immediately  be- 
hind the  troops  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  tomorrow,  and  send  them 
by  the  shortest  direction  against  the  enemy. 

—259— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


Proper  formation  of  the  First  and  Second  Army,  in  the  sense  of 
a  subsequent  advance  westward,  can  be  attended  to  later;  at  present 
the  most  important  point  is  to  force  as  large  a  part  of  the  hostile 
army  awav  from  Chalons  and  Paris  in  a  northerly  direction  and  to 
pursue  it  to  and  into  Luxemburg  territory. 

The  remainder  of  the  Second  Army  may  now  halt  and  rest,  and 
it  will  be  sufficient  if  the  crossings  over  the  Mass  are  occupied  by 
advanced  leading  elements. 


Before  Headquarters  Second  Army  had  sufficient  infor- 
mation concerning  the  seriousness  of  the  battle  at  Vionville 
— Mars-la-Tour,  Major  General  v.  Stiehle  wrote  the  follow- 
ing letter  to  the  Chief  of  the  Great  General  Staff,  which  be- 
fore the  departure  of  Second' Army  Headquarters  for  the 
battlefield,  he  left  in  Pont-a-Mousson  to  be  handed  to  Royal 
Headquarters  on  its  arrival. 

"Hq.  Pont-a-Monsson,  16  August  1870,  2:00  P.M. 

I  leave  behind  me  a  copy  of  Army  orders  just  issued  for  the  per- 
usal of  Your  Excellencv. 

The  report  of  the  Illd  Corps  at  Vionville,  dated  10  A.M.,  justifies 
the  assumption  that  a  strong  detachment  has  been  forced  off  and  is 
retreating  on  Thionville;  the  Hid  Corps  has  orders  to  pursue  directly, 
advancing  its  left  wing,  to  either  force  the  retreating  enemy  into  the 
fortress  of  Thionville  or  against  the  Belgian  frontier.  As  such  a 
possibility  was  foreseen,  today's  Army  orders  give  the  right  wing 
of  the  Second  Army  (Xth,  Illd,  IXth  Corps)  a  certain  independence 
and  leave  dispositions  of  that  wing  in  the  hands  of  General  v.  Voigts- 
Rhetz,  whenever  His  Royal  Highness  should  not  be  present. 

I  believe  it  is  best  to  quietly  leave  the  other  four  corps  of  the 
Second  Army  on  the  march  towards  the  Maas  from  Bannoncourt  to 
Commercy,  to  gain  possession  of  the  crossings  there  tomorrow.  After 
that  we  undoubtedly  will  have  to  halt  for  several  days  in  order  not  to 
emerge  from  the  Argonne  into  the  plain  of  Champagne  with  only 
some  of  our  leadine  elements. 

As  reports  of  the  cavalry  state  that  Toul  is  only  weakly  occupied 
and  little  prepared,  General  v.  Alvensleben  has  received  instructions 
as  to  the  importance  of  undertaking  a  raid  against  that  place  to  se- 
cure our  railroad  connections, — we  must  be  satisfied  in  merely  calling 
his  attention  to  this  fact,  we  cannot  order  anything  in  th/e  absence  of 
definite  information. 

Today  and  tomorrow  we  will  get  far  ahead  of  the  Third  Army, 
an  additional  reason  to  halt  on  the  Maas. 


Just  received,  2  P.M. 

General  v.  Kraatz  reports  from  Thiaucourt  at  11:30  A.M.  that 
the  Hid  Corps  is  fighting  with  strong  forces  at  Rezonville.  General 
V.  Rheinbaben  is  there  with  nine  regiments  of  cavalry  and  four  bat- 
teries. The  20th  Division  is  marching  to  the  sound  of  the  guns;  noti- 
fication is  being  sent  to  the  19th  Division.  We  ride  to  the  spot  via 
Gorze.  

—260— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

General  v.  Moltke  replied: 

No.  172 
To  Major  General  v.  Stiehle. 

Hq.  Pont-d-Mousson,    16  August  1870,  8:00  P.M. 

According  to  our  views  the  success  of  the  campaign  rests  in 
driving  northward  the  main  hostile  forces  retreating  from  Metz.  The 
more  the  Illd  Army  Corps  has  in  its  front,  the  greater  the  victory  will 
be  tomorrow,  when  the  Xth,  Hid,  IXth,  Vlllth  Vllth  Corps  and 
finally  the  Xllth  Corps  will  be  disposable  against  the  hostile  force. 

Only  when  this  main  object  is  obtained  will  the  First  and  Sec- 
ond Army  be  separated  for  a  continuation  of  the  march  westward.  The 
corps  of  the  Second  Army  not  now  engaged  may  halt. 

A  quick  arrival  on  the  Maas  appears  of  minor  importance,  but 
the  capture  of  Toul  would  be  of  great  value.  There  is  at  present 
no  necessity  for  the  deployment  of  the  three  corps  from  the  Second 
Army. 


The  day  before  the  battle  of  Gravelotte — St.  Privat  the 
following  orders  were  issued: 

No.  173 

To  Headquarters  First  Army. 
Coin-on-the-Seille. 

Hq.  Pont-d-Moiisson,  17  August  1870,  2:00  A.M. 

The  Hid  and  Xth  Corps  held  their  positions  yesterday.  Never- 
theless support  as  early  as  possible,  at  daybreak,  is  urgently  desirable. 

The  corps  of  the  Second  Army,  coming  up,  will  have  to  cover 
larger  distances  than  those  of  the  First  Army.  Therefore  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  corps  of  the  First  Army  start  immediately,  utilizing 
all  available  crossings    (which  probably  has  already  been  ordered). 

His  Majesty  will  very  shortly  proceed  to  Gorze.  where  he  expects 
to  receive  early  reports. 


No.  174 
To  Headquarters  First  and  Second  Army.* 

Hill  sotith  of  Flavigny,  17  August  1870,  1:^5  P.M. 

The  Second  Army  will  fall  in  at  5  A.M.  tomorrow  the  18th  and 
advance  in  echelons  [the  orders  to  First  Army  road  read — advance  in 
echelon  from  the  left  wing],  between  the  Yron  and  Gorze  creeks  (in 
general,  between  Ville-sur-Yron  and  Rezonville).  The  Vlllth  Army 
Corps  will  join  this  movement  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army. 
At  the  start  the  Vllth  Army  Corps  will  have  the  mission  of  protecting 


'Delivered  by  a  general  staff  officer  of  Royal   Headquarters. 
—261— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


the  movements  of  the  Second  Army  against  possible  operations  from 
Metz.  Further  orders  from  the  Kino:  will  depend  on  the  measures 
taken  by  the  enemy.  Send  reports  for  the  present  to  hill  south  of 
Flavigny. 


No.  175 
To  General  of  Cavalry  v.  Manteuffel.* 

COURCELLES. 

Hq.  Pont-a-Mousson,      17  August  1870,  10  P.M. 

In  the  very  probable  case  of  the  French  Army  executing  an  attack 
in  superior  forces  on  the  1st  Army  Corps,  after  the  corps  of  Fros- 
sard,  Decaen  (successor  to  Bazaine),  Ladmirault  and  the  Guarde  Im- 
periale  w^ere  defeated  yesterday  after  a  long  and  bloody  battle  by  the 
Illd,  Xth  and  parts  of  the  Vlllth  and  IXth  Army  Corps  at  Vionville, 
it  would  be  in  entire  accord  with  His  Majesty's  intentions,  should 
Your  Excellency,  for  the  purpose  of  covering  our  communications, 
fall  back  in  the  direction  of  Remilly. 


Shortly  before  Royal  Headquarters  left  Pont-a-Mous- 
son  the  following  orders  were  issued  early  on  August  18, 
1870: 

No.    176 

To  Headquarters,  First  Army. 
Ars  ON  the  Mosel. 

Hq.  Pont-d-Mousson,    18  August  1870,  U:00  A.M. 

Nothing  is  changed  in  matters  of  command  in  the  First  Army. 
Direct  orders  from  His  Majesty  may  also  today  be  expected  to  be 
received  on  the  battlefield. 

The  Vnth  Army  Corps  will  for  the  present  assume  a  defensive 
attitude.  Connection  with  the  VUIth  Army  Corps  can  be  sought  only 
towards  the  front. 

Should  it  be  ascertained  that  the  hostile  army  is  retx'eating  into 
Metz,  our  corps  will  execute  a  turn  to  the  right. 

Direct  support  for  the  First  Army,  should  that  become  neces- 
sary, will  be  given  by  the  second  line  of  the  Second  Army. 


During  the  battle  of  Gravelotte-St.  Privat  the  follow- 
ing orders  and  directions  were  issued  by  Royal  Headquar- 
ters to  the  different  headquarters : 


^Commanding  General  1st  Army  Corps. 

—262— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  177 

To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 

Hill  south  of  Flavigny,  18  August  1870,  9:20  A.M. 

There  is  an  unimportant  skirmish  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Vllth 
Army  Corps.  The  troops  visible  on  the  hills  towards  Metz  appear 
to  be  moving  northward,  possibly  toward  Briey.  It  does  not  appear 
that  the  First  Army  requires  more  extensive  support  than  can  be 
furnished  by  the  Hid  Corps  from  Vionville  or  St.  Marcel. 


No.  178 
To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 

Hill  south  of  Flavigny,  18  August  1870,  10:30  A.M. 

Reports  received  justify  assumption  that  the  enemy  intends  to 
hold  his  position  on  plateau  between  Le  Pont-du-Jour  and  Montigny- 
la-Grange. 

Four  hostile  battalions  have  advanced  into  the  Bois  des  Geni- 
vaux.  His  Majesty  considers  it  advisable  to  start  the  Xllth  and 
Guard  Corps  in  direction  of  Batilly  in  order  to  reach  the  enemy  at  St. 
Marie-aux-Chenes,  should  he  march  toward  Briey — and  in  case  he 
should  remain  on  the  heights  to  attack  him  from  direction  of  Aman- 
villers.  This  attack  would  have  to  be  made  in  conjunction  with  the 
First  Army  attacking  from  the  Bois  de  Vaux  and  Gravelotte,  the 
IXth  Corps  attacking  against  the  Bois  des  Genivaux  and  Verneville, 
and  the  left  wing  of  the  Second  Army  attacking  from  the  north. 


No.  179 

To  General  of  Infantry,  v.  Steinmetz. 

Hill  south  of  Flavigny,  18  August  1870,  12:00  noon. 

The  battle  now  being  heard  is  but  a  partial  engagement  near 
Verneville  and  does  not  make  a  general  attack  of  the  First  Army  nec- 
essary. The  First  Army  should  not  let  strong  bodies  of  troops  be 
seen,  and  in  any  case  only  its  artillery  for  purpose  of  preparing  the 
subsequent  attack. 


No.  180 
To  Headquarters,  Second  Army. 

Hill   south  of  Flavigny,     18  August  1870,  1  :i5  P.M. 

The  IXth  Corps  is  now  engaged  in  an  artillery  battle  in  front 
of  the  Bois  Doseuillons.  The  actual  general  attack  along  the  entire 
line  will  not  be  made  sooner  than  important  fighting  forces  can  ad- 
vance from  Amanvillers. 


—263- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  day  after  the  battle  (of  Gravelotte-St.  Privat)  the 
following  two  orders  were  issued: 

No.  181 
To  Headquarters  of  the  First  and  Second  Army. 

General  Hq.,  Rezonville,  19  August  1870,  8 :Jt5  A.M. 

1.  Burial  of  the  dead  and  of  dead  horses  will  be  carried  out 
by  the  troops  within  their  billet  areas;  the  southern  road  from  Metz  to 
Verdun  forming:  the  dividing  line  between  the  First  and  Second 
Army.  The  villages  situated  along  this  road  are  assigned  to  the  First 
Army,  including  the  lid  Army  Corps.  This  division  of  billet  areas 
will  hold  good  also  for  requisitions. 

2.  *The  Second  Army  is  hereby  directed  to  send  one  squadron  to 
Pont-a-Mousson  to  Headquarters  of  Lines  of  Communications  to  be  at 
the  disposal  of  the  C.  O.  thereof. 


No.  182 

To  Headquarters  of  the  First,  Second  and  Third  Army  and 
TO  H.  R.  H.  THE  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

On  the  hill  in  front  Fort  St.  Quentin,  19  August  1870,  11  A.M. 

After  the  victorious  events  of  the  last  few  da^/s  it  is  necessary 
and  permissible  to  give  complete  I'est  to  the  troops  and  to  bring  up 
replacements  to  fill  up  losses.  It  is  in  addition  required  that  the 
armies  will  continue  the  march  against  Paris  in  one  line  in  order  to 
meet  in  sufficient  strength  new  formations  that  may  eventually  as- 
semble at  Chalons.  Considering  further  that  the  French  army,  driven 
back  on  Metz,  might  make  an  attempt  to  fight  its  way  through  west- 
ward, it  will  be  to  the  point  to  leave  six  army  corps  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Moselle,  which  can  oppose  such  an  attempt  on  the  ridge  that 
has  been  captured  yesterday.  One  army  corps  and  the  Reserve  Divi- 
sion will  remain  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle  which  will  fall  back 
if  necessary  in  case  of  a  superior  hostile  attack. 

His  Majesty  designates  for  this  investment  the  II,  III,  IX,  and 
Xth  Army  Corps  in  addition  to  the  First  Army  and  3d  Reserve  Div- 
ision.! 

His  Majesty  intrusts  to  H.  R.  H.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  the 
command  of  all  troops  designated  for  the  investment  of  the  French 
main  army  and  further  directs  that  the  Guard,  IVth  and  Xllth  Corps 
and  the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  will  be  under  the  orders  of 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  so  long  until  the  original  army  organiza- 
tion can  be  readopted.  The  staff  of  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Saxony  will  be  organized  in  compliance  herewith. 

The  ridge  designated  for  the  defense  will  be  fortified  and,  for 
the  rest,  cantonments  in  rear  as  far  to  the  Orne,  can  be  occupied. 


*Par.  2  to  the  Second  Army  only. 

fThe   commanding  general   of   this   division,   Lieut.-General   von 
Kummer,  received  direct  orders   (see  next  number). 

—264— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The  three  corps,  temporarily  detached  from  the  Second  Army, 
will  go  into  quarters  on  the  other  side  of  the  Orne  and  the  Yron.  The 
Third  Army  will  halt  for  the  present  on  the  Meuse. 

Headquarters  of  His  Majesty  remains  for  the  present  in  Pont-a- 
Mousson,  where  one  battalion  of  the  lid  Corps  will  be  left. 


No.  183 

To  Lieut-General  von  Kummer. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,    20  August  1870. 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  your  Excellency  that,  since  the  French 
main  army  has  been  forced  by  the  battle  of  16  and  18  August  to 
withdraw  into  the  fortress  of  Metz,  it  became  necessary  to  designate 
a  larger  body  of  troops  to  invest  that  place. 

H.  R.  H.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  has  assumed  command  of  this 
investing  army,  and  Your  Excellency  and  your  troops  [see  No.  182], 
will  now  be  under  direct  orders  of  H.  R.  H.,  who  has  taken  his  head- 
quarters in  Doncourt. 


No.  184 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,  20  August  1870. 

1.  Corps  headquarters  of  the  mobilized  troops  in  the  coast  dis- 
tricts, the  17th  Division  (exclusive  of  ponton  train)  and  the  2d  Land- 
wehr  Division  will  be  sent  by  rail  to  Neunkirchen  and  Homburg. 

Their  place  will  be  taken  by  Landwehr  Regiments  Nos.  10  and 
50  from  Neisse  to  the  Province  Hanover,  and  it  is  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  General  Government  of  the  Coast  Districts  to  also 
draw  up  the  3d  and  43d  Landwehr  Regiments  from  Konigsberg  as 
well  as  the  45th  Landwehr  Regiment  from  Graudenz  and  Thorn  to  the 
North  Sea  coast. 

2.  A  detachment  will  be  formed  to  invest  Thionville,  to  con- 
sist of: 

Inf.  Regt.  No.  65  (two  battalions  from  the  Headquarters  of 
Lines  of  Communications  of  the  First  Army,  one  battal- 
ion from  Cologne). 

28th  and   68th  Landwehr  Regiments  from  Cologne. 

One  heavy  reserve  battery  of  the  7th  Regiment  from  Cologne. 

4th  Reserve  Hussar  Regiment  (from  Neisse,  Glatz  and  Cosel). 

Headquarters  of  Lines  of  Communications  of  the  First  Army 
receives  in  their  place  the  17th  Landwehr  Regiment  f^'om  Wesel.* 

3.  The  3d  Zieten  Hussar  Regiment  will  for  the  present  be  de- 
tached from  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  and  placed  under  the  orders  of 
H.  R.  H.  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 


*The  different  Governments,  to  which  the  above  mentioned  troops 
pertained,  received  corresponding   orders. 


-265— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  185 

To  Lieut-General  von  Werder. 

MUNDOLSHEIM  (in  front  of  Strassburg)    (in  answer  to  query 
from  General  v.  Werder). 

General  Hq.,  Pont-a-Mousson,  20  August  1870,  7 :00  A.M. 

Telegram. 

Bombardment  of  Strassburg  from  Kehl  fully  justified  if  capitu- 
lation can  be  reached  by  this  means,  which,  however,  cannot  be  de- 
termined here. 


No.  186 
To  Major  General  v.  Stiehle. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,   21  August  1870. 

Telegraphic  orders  have  been  sent  to  send  50  heavy  twelve- 
pounders.  Their  arrival  in  front  of  Metz  at  Ars-on-the-Moselle  will 
be  reported  by  wire. 

I  would  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  an  eventual  breaking 
through  of  the  invested  army  in  a  northeasterly  direction  appears  to 
us  to  be  the  least  danger,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  its  advance  south- 
ward would  cause  us  much  trouble.  Thereby  the  line  Frossard — 
Strassburg  would  be  pierced,  which  line  receives  an  especial  impor- 
tance in  an  advance  on  Chalons.  Since  the  strength  of  the  investing 
army  has  been  brought  to  11  army  corps,  a  stubborn  resistance  should 
be  made  also  on  the  right  bank,  at  least  in  that  direction. 


No.  187 
To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,    21  August  1870. 

You  will  regulate  all  Lines  of  Communications  matters  for  all 
troops  around  Metz,  adhering  as  much  as  possible  to  existing  com- 
munications. 

In  this  you  will  count  in  general  only  on  the  railroad  to  Cour- 
celles,  while  that  via  Nancy  of  the  Third  Army  Detachment  remains 
under  direction  of  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

It  is  necessary  for  that  army  detachment  to  organize  a  provisional 
Line  of  Communications  Hq.  in  connection  with  General  Hq.  of 
the  Army  Line  of  Communications,  in  which,  under  present  con- 
ditions, Colonel  V.  Bliicher  and  his  staff  may  be  available  in  assum- 
ing the  above  mentioned  arrangement  of  Lines  of  Communications 
matters  General  Hq.  of  the  L.  of  C.  of  the  Second  Army  had  probably 
best  arrange  for  its  headquarters  at  Remilly. 

Thereupon  the  Second  Army,  which  will  soon  be  reinforced  by 
four  Saxon  battalions,  will  have  to  detach  to  the  newly  organized 
Hq.  of  L.  of  C.  of  its  L.  of  C.  troops  four  battalions  and  two  squad- 
rons, and  these  as  much  as  possible  to  be  taken  from  the  troops 
in  the  first  line. 


—266- 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  188 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz,  the  First 
AND  Third  Army,  as  Well  as  to  the  Army  Detachment  of 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  and  Lieut. -General  v.  Werder. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-a-Mousson,  21   August  1870. 

The  French  Government  has  ordered  the  mobilization  of  the  mo- 
bile Guards    (inc.  the  levies  of  1869). 

These  are  to  be  concentrated  in  the  main  cities  of  their  arron- 
dissements  and  their  uniform  is  to  consist  of  blue  blouse  with  leather 
belt  and  a  red  cross  on  the  sleeve,  linen  trousers  and  caps. 

Wherever  such  men  are  found,  they  will  be  treated  as  prisoners  of 
war. 

You  will  instruct  your  subordinate  headquarters  and  line  of 
communication  authorities  accordingly. 


No.  189 


To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz,  the  First 
AND  Third  Army  and  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-a-Mousson,  21  August  1870,  11:00  A.M. 

Since  a  large  portion  of  the  French  Army  has  been  beaten  and 
invested  in  Metz  by  11  army  corps,  the  Army  Detachment  of  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  and  the  Third  Army  will  continue  the  march 
westward  in  such  manner  that  the  latter  will  remain  on  the  left  of  the 
former  and  in  general  one  day's  march  away  in  order  to  attack  the 
enemy,  wherever  he  makes  a  stand,  in  front  and  on  his  right  and 
push  him  to  the  north  of  Paris. 

According  to  reports  received  here  only  hostile  detachments  are 
said  to  be  in  Verdun,  probably  retreating  on  Chalons,  but  that  at 
the  latter  place  portions  of  the  Corps  of  MacMahon  and  Failly  are 
assembling,  as  well  as  new  formations  and  single  regiments  from 
Paris  and  the  west  and  south  of  France.  The  Army  Detachment 
under  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  and  the  Third  Army  will  con- 
centrate against  that  point  on  August  26th  on  the  line  Ste.  Mene- 
hould — Vitry-le-Francois. 

The  former  will  start  on  the  23d  instant  and  will  march  to  the 
line  Ste.  Menehould — Daucourt — Givry-en-Argonne,  where  its  ad- 
vance guards  must  arrive  on  the  26th.  Verdun  to  be  captured  by 
surprise,  or  to  be  turned  on  the  south,  leaving  an  observation  detach- 
ment. 

The  Third  Army  will  start  so  that  it  will  reach  with  its  advance 
guards  the  line  St.  Mard-sur-le-Mont — Vitry-le-Francois  on  the  26th. 

On  the  23d  General  Headquarters  proceeds  to  Commercy,  where 
the  IVth  Army  Corps  has  left  one  battalion  as  garrison. 


—267— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  190 

To  General  Headquarters  of  the  Coast  Districts. 
Hanover. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,  22  August  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  has  ordei'ed  the  formation  of  two  reserve 
army  corps,  one  of  them  to  be  concentrated  at  Berlin,  the  other  at 
Glogau. 

The  Royal  Government  should  issue  orders  as  soon  as  possible — 
for  organizing  the  former — for  the  rail  transportation  of  the  1st, 
3d,  4th,  5th,  43d  and  45th  Landwehr  Regiment  and  the  1st  Reserve 
Ulan  Regiment. 


No.  191 
To  General  Government  of  Posen. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,   22  August  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  has  ordered  the  formation  of  two  new 
reserve  army  corps  at  Berlin  and  Glogau. 

For  organizing  the  latter,  are  designated:  the  7th,  47th,  10th, 
50th,  84th  and  85th  Landwehr  Regiments  as  well  as  the  1st  Reserve 
Ulan  Regiment,  which  has  heretofore  been  placed  at  the  disposition 
of  the  Royal  Government,  and,  finally,  the  three  reserve  batteries 
of  the  Vth  Army  Corps. 

Home  Headquarters  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  will  order  the  trans- 
portation of  the  84th  and  85th  Landwehr  Regiments. 

By  leaving  to  the  discretion  of  the  Royal  General  Government  all 
details,  it  is  remarked  that,  until  complete  organization  of  the  corps, 
the  respective  troop  units  are  to  be  placed  under  orders  of  the  immo- 
bile commands  of  the  home  headquarters  of  the  Vth  Army  Corps. 


No.  192 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz,  the  First 
AND  Third  Army,  and  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,  22  August  1870. 

His  Majesty  the  King  permits  that,  deviating  from  general 
regulations,  all  troop  commanders  are  allowed  to  have  medicinal 
carts  follow  the  troops  directly  on  the  march  when  an  engagement  is 
expected. 


No.  193 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  Metz,  the  First  and 
Third  Army,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  and  to  Lieut. - 
General  v.  Werder. 

General  Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,    22  August  1870. 

Formation  of   Volunteer   Corps  has  been  started   in   all    Depart- 
ments.    Their  appellation   is  "franctireurs." 

—268— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Uniform: 

Cap,  blue,  with  narrow  red  band, 

Light  civilian  blouse. 

Red  wool  belt  (ceinture) 

Linen  trousers  with  white  leggins,  haversack. 

Armament: 

Carbine    (d   la    tabatiere) ,   bayonet. 

According  to  information  received,  the  task  of  these  men  is  to 
take  all  dispersed  soldiers  by  surprise  and  shoot  them. 

But,  as  the  franctireurs  themselves  are  no  soldiers,  they  are 
amenable — according  to  Paragraph  2  of  the  Proclamation, — to  mili- 
tary law  and  death. 


No.  194 
To  H.  R.  H.  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 

DONCOURT.* 

General  Hq.,  Pont-a-Mousson,    22  August  1870. 

I  have  the  honor  to  reply  to  Your  Royal  Highness,  that  so  far 
it  has  not  been  possible  to  assign  a  number  of  general  staff  offi- 
cers from  those  still  remaining  at  home  to  the  field  army,  nor  to 
still  more  weaken  the  working  staff  of  these  headquarters  by  detach- 
ing Captain  von  Biilow.  In  order  to  meet  the  wishes  of  Your  Royal 
Highness  as  much  as  possible.  Major  von  HoUeben  will  be  detailed  to 
the  staff  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

We  are  fully  aware  of  the  difficulties  and  bad  features  of  the 
very  important  task  that  has  fallen  to  your  lot,  but  they  may  be 
of  only  short  duration.  Should  the  enemy  succeed  in  breaking  through, 
his  attempt  will  probably  be  made  in  the  direction  of  Nancy,  then 
the  war  of  investment  will  immediately  turn  into  mobile  war.  As 
we  may  with  assurance  count  on  most  energetic  pursuit,  in  such 
a  case,  according  to  my  opinion,  the  advance  of  the  other  two  armies 
should  proceed  without  interruption. 

If  the  French  army  in  Metz  is  not  able  to  fight  its  way  through, 
it  surely  cannot  hold  out  long  there,  in  view  of  the  impossibility  of 
relief,  and  then  Your  Royal  Highness  would  achieve,  with  its  capitu- 
lation, one  of  the  most  important  successes  shown  by  military  history. 


No.  195 

To  THE  General  Government  of  the  Coast  Districts. 
Hanover. 

Hq.,  Pont-d-Mousson,     22  August  1870,  11:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Send  messages  for  His  Majesty  to  this  place  up  to  10:00  A.M. 
tomorrow,  thereafter  to  Commercy. 


*Answer    to    a   private   letter   from    the    Prince,   the   contents   of 
which  can  be  gleaned  from  this  answer. 


-269— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  196 
To  Lieutenant  General  von  Blumenthal. 

LiGNY. 

General  Hq.,  Commercy,  23  August  1870,  3:00  A.M. 

In  reply  to  your  letter  of  the  22d  instant  enclosing  the  march 
tables  for  the  Third  Army  for  the  next  succeeding  days,  I  have  the 
honor  to  state  that  it  would  correspond  with  His  Majesty's  inten- 
tions, if,  in  general,  and  on  the  26th,  the  cavalry  divisions  would 
remain  in  front  of  the  army.  According  to  reports  we  have  here  it 
is  not  impossible  that  the  hostile  army,  assembled  to  Chalons,  is 
about  to  march  off.  In  that  case  it  would  be  desirable  to  ascertain 
the  correct  march  direction  of  the  enemy  through  cavalry  sent  far 
out  and  also  sent  south  of  Chalons,  and  in  which  case  these  headquar- 
ters will  reserve  the  right  to  change  the  marches  to  be  made  by  the 
entire  Third  Army  on  the  26th.  For  the  same  reasons,  and  in  order 
to  secure  more  roads  for  further  advance,  it  is  left  to  your  discre- 
tion, whether  it  is  possible  to  send  the  Vlth  Corps  towards  Join- 
ville  as  early  as  tomorrow,  as  it,  if  necessary,  could  then  be  drawn 
the  day  after  tomorrow  to  St.  Dizier. 


No.  197 

To  Headquarters,  Army  Detachment  of  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony. 
Jeandelize. 

General  Hq.,  Commercy,  23  August  1870. 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  these  headquarters  will  be 
in-Bar-le-Duc  tomorrow.     Send  messages  to  this  place  until  10  o'clock. 

You  are  also  requested  to  submit  the  march  tables  of  your  detach- 
ment for  the  next  few  days  as  soon  as  possible. 


No.  198 


To  Headquarters  of  the  First  Army. 
Ars-on-the-Moselle. 

General  Hq.,  Commercy,  2h  August  1870,  7:00  A.M. 

His  Majesty  permits  that,  considering  the  great  distance  from 
your  headquarters  to  headquarters  of  the  First  Army,  that  the  two 
daily  reports  may  be  omitted.  However,  these  headquarters  expect 
that,  in  so  far  as  telegraphic  communication  exists,  you  will  im- 
mediately report  everything  important. 


—270- 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  199 
To  H.  R.  H.,  THE  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Commercy,  2U  August  1870,  7 :00  A.M. 

According  to  a  report  received  here,  Emperor  Napoleon  is  said 
to  be  in  Reims  with  a  portion  of  the  fighting  forces.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  letter  from  a  high  ranking  French  officer  in  Metz,  intercepted 
by  the  Second  Army,  indicates  that  Metz  counts  with  certainty  on 
relief  by  the  troops  concentrated  at  Chalons.  This  attaches  an  in- 
creased importance  to  the  Reims — Longuyon— Thionville  railroad. 
Thorough  interruption  of  that  road  at  several  points  is  desirable, 
as  well  as  observation  by  the  cavalry  towards  Reims. 


No.  200 
To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 

General  Hq.,  Commercy,  2U  August  1870,  7 :00  A.M. 

According  to  a  report  received  here.  Emperor  Napoleon  is  said 
to  be  in  Reims  with  a  portion  of  his  fighting  forces,  while  Metz  is 
counting  on  relief  from  the  troops  concentrated  at  Chalons.  This 
attaches  increased  importance  to  the  Reims — Longuyon — Thionville 
railroad.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  has  been  directed  to  have 
thorough  destruction  of  that  road  made  in  his  zone,  and  it  is  left  to 
your  discretion  to  take  similar  steps. 

At  the  same  time  you  are  informed  that  a  detachment  consisting 
of: 

The  65th   Infantry  Regiment 
The  28th  and  68th  Landwehr  Regiments 
One   reserve  battery  from   Cologne 
The  4th   Reserve   Hussar  Regiment* 
will  be  concentrated  in  the  next  few  days  at  Saarburgf  under  com- 
mand  of    Major    General    von    Bothmer    (heretofore    commandant    in 
Cologne). 

General  von  Bothmer  has  been  directed  to  await  orders  from 
your  headquarters  in  Saarburg.  In  so  far  as  a  mere  observation  of 
Thionville  from  there  is  considered  sufficient,  the  above  troops  can 
be  utilized  in  front  of  Metz,  in  which  case,  according  to  our  views, 
reinforcement  of  the  position  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle  above 
Metz  seems  advisable. 


No.  201 

To  ALL  Armies  and  the  Army  Detachment  Under  H.  R.  H.  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Commercy,  2U  August  1870. 

The  case  has  arisen  that  French  surgeons  released  from  hospitals 
have  been  sent  from  the  rear  through  another  army  directly  towards 


*Major  General  von  Bothmer  and  the  4th  Reserve  Hussar  Regi- 
ment in  Neisse  received  orders  direct, 
fin  the  Rhine  Province,  near  Trier. 

—271— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


the  enemy.  On  this  it  is  remarked  that  it  is  not  permissible  to  ar- 
range for  the  return  of  surgeons,  guaranteed  them  by  the  Geneva 
Convention,  to  their  army,  in  such  manner  that  thereby  the  secrecy 
of  our  movements  is  endangered.  Consequently  surgeons,  etc.,  will 
be  sent  back  by  a  detour,  for  instance,  across  neutral  ground,  or  only 
after  a  phase  of  the  operations  has  been  completed. 


No.  202 


To  Headquarters,  Third  Army. 

LiGNY. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Diic,    2^  August  1870. 

Replying  to  your  letter  of  today,  your  headquarters  is  requested, 
to  transmit  to  these  headquarters  and  to  the  Army  Detachment  of 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  the  parole  and  counter-sign  given  out 
today  by  your  headquarters. 

The  above  named  detachment  has  been  directed  that  the  parole 
and  counter-sign  of  the  Third  Army  will  be  in  force  there  also.* 


Reports  received  at  General  Headquarters  up  to  the 
evening  of  August  24th,  concerning  the  Army  under  Mac- 
Mahon,  stated  that  that  army  was  marching  from  Chalons 
towards  Reims,  but  left  doubt  as  to  the  purpose  of  that 
movement.  Therefore  General  von  Moltke  decided  to  give 
to  the  further  march  of  the  German  armies  such  a  direction 
that  a  turn  could  be  made  against  Reims,  but  at  the  same 
time  adhering  to  the  general  direction  on  Paris  without 
material  loss  of  time.  For  this  purpose  he  composed  the 
following  orders,  which  however  were  not  issued  on  account 
of  reports  coming  in  during  the  night  of  August  24-25th: 

No.  203 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  Detachment  Under  H.  R.  H. 
THE  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  Monthairon,  and  Third  Army 
at  Ligny. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,     2h  August  1870,  7:00  A.M. 

As  it  has  been  ascertained  that  Chalons  also  has  been  evacuated 
by  the  French,  His  Majesty  the  King  desires  that  a  day  of  rest  be 
granted  the  troops  at  suitable  points  on  the  26th  or  27th. 


*In  front  of  Paris,  General  Headquarters  issued  the  parole  and 
counter-sign  in  common  for  the  Third  Army  and  Army  of  the  Meuse, 
and  from  and  after  November  24th,  in  consequence  of  the  close  touch, 
in  which  both  armies  found  themselves,  the  same  for  all  (i.  e.  also 
for  the  First  and  Second  Army). 

—272— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The  trains  will  be  brought  up,  and  provisions  should  be  brought 
up  in  sufficient  quantities  so  that  barren  portion  of  the  Champagne 
can  be  traversed  without  delay. 

Advance  guards  must,  on  August  28th,  be  on  the  line  Suippes 
— Chalons — Coole,  or  south  thereof. 

For  this  advance,  the  left  wing  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R. 
H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  is  assigned  to  the  Laheycourt — Out- 
rieviere  Ferme — Poix — Chalons  road;  and  the  Third  Army,  as  right 
wing  is  assigned  the  Nettancourt — Possesse — Togny-aux-Boeufs  road. 

The  Army  Detachment  camps  (quarters)  and  requisitions  right 
of  the  two  designated  roads  and  in  their  vicinity  (2  km)  ;  the  Third 
Army  on   the  left  thereof. 

Conditions  will  decide  thereafter  if  and  in  what  force  our  fight- 
ing forces  will  execute  a  right  turn  against  Reims,  or  continue  the 
march  against  Paris  in  full  force. 

The  cavalry  will  reconnoiter  far  to  the  front,  that  of  the  right 
wing  especially  early  tomorrow  into  the  terrain  toward  the  Bel- 
gian frontier,  with  early  observation  against  Montmedy  and  Sedan, 
and  thereafter  reconnoiter  towards  Reims,  Rethel  and  Mezieres,  in 
which,  if  possible,  the  Reims — Laon  railroad  is  to  be  interrupted. 


No.  204 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,    2U  August  1870,  8:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Chalons  evacuated  by  the  enemy.    We  continue  the  advance,  secur- 
ing our  right  wing. 


Reports  received  at  General  Headquarters  during  the 
night  of  August  24-25th  confirmed  anew  the  march  of  the 
French  Army  towards  Reims  and  indicated  the  enemy's 
intention — heretofore  believed  improbable — to  march  along 
the  Belgian  frontier  to  the  relief  of  Metz.  But  as  there 
was  no  assurance  as  yet  that  this  was  an  actual  fact,  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  decided  to  turn  for  the  present  more 
northwestward  and  to  observe  with  more  vigor  conditions 
on  the  right  flank.  For  this  General  von  Moltke  issued  the 
following  orders : 

No.  205 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army,  Alliancelles,  and  Army 
Detachment  Under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 
Fleury. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,  25th  August  1870,  11:00  A.M. 

All  reports  received  here  confirm  that  the  enemy  has  evacuated 
Chalons  and   is  marching  on   Reims. 

—273— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  the  Army  Detachment  under 
H.  R.  H.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  and  the  Third  Army  follow 
this  movement  by  continuing  the  march  in  a  northwesterly  direction. 

The  former  will  start  tomorrow  with  its  Xllth  Army  Corps  to- 
wards Vienne  (advance  guards  Autry  and  Servon),  with  its  Guard 
Corps  towards  Ste.  Menehould  (advance  guards  Vienne-la-Ville  and 
towards  Berzieux),  with  its  IVth  Army  Corps  towards  Villers-en- 
Argonne  (advance  guard  towards  Dommartin).  The  cavalry  will 
be  sent  far  ahead  to  reconnoiter  the  front  and  right  flank  and  will 
especially  reach  Vouziers  and  Buzancy. 

The  Third  Army  proceeds  tomorrow  with  its  leading  elements 
as  far  as  the  line  Givry-en-Argonne — Chagny  northeast  of  Vitry. 

The  latter  place  will  be  observed. 

If  very  important  information  is  not  received,  the  armies  will  be 
granted  a  day  of  rest  on  the  27th.  This  may  be  used  to  bring  up  the 
trains  and  for  regulating  subsistence  matters,  so  that  no  difficulties 
will  be  encountered  in  the  subsequent  crossing  of  the  barren  Cham- 
pagne. 

General  Headquarters  proceeds  tomorrow  to  Ste.  Menehould. 
Send  reports  here  until  10:00  A.M. 


As  the  left  wing  of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  came  into  very- 
close  touch  in  its  advance  with  the  Bavarian  lid  Corps,  which 
led  to  disputes  as  to  the  occupation  of  villages,  General  von 
Alvensleben,  commanding  the  IVth  Army  Corps,  asked  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  for  instruction  direct,  as  the  dis- 
tance to  the  Headquarters  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony 
was  too  great  for  speedy  decision. 

General  von  Moltke  sent  his  inquiry  by  the  following 
indorsement  to  the  lid  Bavarian  Corps: 

No.  206 

To  THE  Bavarian  IId  Army  Corps. 
Charmont. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,    25  August  1870. 

To  the  Royal  Corps  Headquarters  requesting  a  line  of  march  be 
left  free  to  the  IVth  Royal  Prussian  Army  Corps. 

That  army  corps  will  march  tomorrow  to  Villers-en-Argonne, 
and  to  avoid  further  collision,  the  Royal  Bavarian  II.  Army,  which 
presumably  will  tomorrow  continue  the  march  to  Givry  en  Argonne, 
will  extend  to  the  right  not  farther  than  the  line  Noyers — Sommeeille 
— Le  Chatelier. 


-274— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  207 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 

DONCOURT. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,    25  August  1870,  7 :10  A.M. 
Telegram. 

We  have  no  reports  from  you  since  day  before  yesterday.  Re- 
quest telegraphic  report  of  anything  new  there.  Desire  written  re- 
port in  detail  of  your  positions. 

General  von  Stiehle  replied  that  telegraphic  reports 
had  been  sent  daily  and  that  a  mounted  messenger  was  then 
enroute  with  a  written  report. 

Awaiting  receipt  of  certain  information  as  to  the  direc- 
tion of  march  of  the  Army  of  Chalons,  General  von  Moltke 
utilized  the  time  in  sketching  out  the  following  march  table 
for  concentrating  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  the  two  Bavarian 
Corps  of  the  Third  Army  and  two  corps  of  the  Army  invest- 
ing Metz  in  the  vicinity  of  Damvillers  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Meuse,  by  which  MacMahon's  advance  on  Metz  could  be 
prevented. 


No.  208 

DRAFT 

General  Hq.,  Bar  le  Due,  25  August  1870. 

If  by  evening  the  25th  information  is  received  that  the  envelop- 
ment has  started  on  the  23d  and  has  progressed  by  that  time  to 
Vouziers,  then: 

Corps  26th  27th  28th  29th 


Marville 
Longuyon 


Seven   army   corps — 150,000   infantry. 

The  preceding  draft  was  at  the  same  time  to  serve  as 
basis  for  the  subsequent  movements  of  the  German  armies. 
For  as  early  as  the  evening  of  August  25,  1870  General 
Headquarters  received  further  reports — among  others  a 
telegram  from  London  with  the  information  taking  from 
the  Temps  of  the  23d  of  the  sudden  decision  of  MacMahon 


XII. 

Varennes 

Dun 

sventual  retreat  on 

Guard 

Dombasle 

Montfaucon 

Damvillers 

IV. 

Fleury 

west  of  Verdun 

Damvillers 

HI. 

. 

Etain 

Damvillers 

IX. 

Land  res 

Damvillers 

Bavarian 

Chaumont 

Nixeville 

Mangiennes 

oo 

do 

Dombasle 

Azannes 

-27&— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

to  hasten  to  the  help  of  Bazaine — which  indicated  a  prob- 
able advance  of  the  French  army  on  Vouziers.  It  is  true 
that  all  doubts  about  this  were  not  yet  dispersed  and  es- 
pecially there  were  as  yet  no  reports  at  hand  from  the  Ger- 
man cavalry  as  to  being  in  touch  with  the  enemy,  but  the 
question  was  to  act  so  as  not  to  lose  the  right  moment  to  get 
ahead  of  MacMahon's  army.  And  thus,  in  the  course  of 
the  night  all  initial  orders  were  issued  so  as  to  be  able  to 
start  off  as  early  as  possible  on  the  26th  northward  with 
the  Army  Detachment  and  the  two  Bavarian  Corps — pre- 
supposing that  the  cavalry  sent  towards  Vouziers  and  Buz- 
ancy  would  confirm  the  approach  of  the  enemy  toward  Metz. 


No.  209 


To  Headquarters  Army  Detachment  Under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony. 
Fleury.* 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,    25  August  1870,  11:00  AM. 

A  report  just  received  makes  it  appear  not  improbable  that 
Marshal  MacMahon  has  arrived  at  the  decision  to  attempt  the  relief 
of  the  hostile  main  army  in  Metz.  He  would  consequently  have 
been  on  the  march  from  Reims  since  the  23d  instant;  and  in  that 
case  his  leading  elements  might  reach  Vouziers  today. 

In  that  case  it  becomes  necessary  to  concentrate  the  Army 
Detachment  under  H.  R.  H.,  The  Crovi^n  Prince  of  Saxony  toward  the 
right  wing  and  probably  in  such  manner  that  the  Xllth  Corps  marches 
on  Varennes  while  the  Guard  and  IVth  Corpg  approach  the  Varennes 
— Verdun  road.  The  Bavarian  1st  and  lid  Corps  will  eventually  fol- 
low that  movement. 

However,  the  start  for  this  movement  depends  on  the  reports 
which  H.  R.  H.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  may  have  by  this 
time  and  for  which  we  can  not  wait  here.f 

The  Guard  and  the  IVth  Corps  have  received  orders  from  these 
Headquarters  not  to  start  the  march  ordered  today  for  tomorrow 
morning,  but  to  cook  meals  and  await  further  orders  for  the  march. 


*  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  received  a  copy  of  this  with 
the  note  that  the  Bavarian  1st  and  lid  Corps  had  received  orders 
direct  to  halt;  that  the  Vth,  Vlth  and  Xlth  Corps  continue  on  the 
march  as  directed  heretofore;  that  General  Headquarters  reserved 
the  right  to  draw  these  corps  subsequently  up  in  the  direction  of  Ste. 
Menehould. 

fLieut. -Colonel  von  Verdy  of  the  general  staff  was  sent  to  Fleury 
during  the  night  to  explain  the  views  held  at  General  Headquarters 
and  consequent  intentions. 


—276- 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

No.  210 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Guard  Corps,  Thiaucourt,  Headquar- 
ters OF  the  IVth  Army  Corps,  Laheycourt,  and  Headquar- 
ters 1st*  and  IId  Army  Corps. 
Charmont. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Diic,    25  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

The  corps  will  not  start  the  march  as  ordered  for  tomorrow,  but 
will  cook  meals  early  and  wait: 

Guard  Corps  and  IVth  Corps  for  orders  from  H.  R.  H.,  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony;  Bavarian  1st  and  lid  Corps,  for  further  orders  to 
commence  the  march. 


Although  on  the  morning  of  August  26th  there  was  no 
confirmation  of  the  supposed  march  of  the  French  army  on 
Metz,  that  fact  appeared  to  be  very  probable.  Therefore, 
in  consultation  between  General  Headquarters  and  Head- 
quarters of  the  Third  Army  in  Bar-le-Duc  it  was  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  latter  whether  to  now  start  the  march  to 
the  right  with  the  Third  Army,  in  so  far  as  the  following 
orders,  issued  in  the  meantime,  would  permit: 

No.  211 

To  Headquarters  of  the  IVth,  Guard,  and  Bavarian  1st  and 
IId  Army  Corps. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,  .  26  August  1870,  12:00  noon. 

Reports  received  make  it  appear  very  probable  that  the  army 
under  Marshal  MacMahon  is  concentrating  at  Vouziers. 

His  Majesty  directs  that  the  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H., 
The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  and  the  1st  and  IId  Bavarian  Army 
Corps  start  immediately  on  the  march  in  that  direction. 

The  Xllth  Army  Corps  and  the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  are 
already  on  the  march.  The  Guard  Corps  marches  towards  Dombasle; 
one  battalion  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  remain  in  Clermont  as  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  guard.  The  IVth  Army  Corps  marches  to  Fleury. 
The  Bavarian  1st  Army  marches  to  Erize-la-Petite,  the  IId  Bavarian 
Army  Corps  to  Thiaucourt. 

The  troops  will  start  after  finishing  cooking,  will  carry  provi- 
sions for  three  days,  and  will  leave  trains  that  are  not  immediately 
required   behind   under   a  sufficient    guard. 

General  Headquarters  proceeds  this  afternoon  to  Clermont. 


*  Headquarters  1st  Bavarian  Army  Corps  was  also  in  Bar-le-Duc, 
and  consequently  received  these  orders  verbally. 


—277- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  above  orders  were  sent  to  Headquarters  Army  De- 
tachment, and  Headquarters  Third  Army  for  their  informa- 
tion; Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  front  of  Metz  receiving 
a  copy  with  the  following  addition : 

No.  212 
To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,    26  August,  12:00  noon. 

It  is  our  intention  to  send  the  Xllth  Corps  tomorrow,  the  27th, 
from  Verennes  by  way  of  Dun  to  behind  the  Meuse;  on  the  28th 
the  Guard  and  the  IVth  Army  Corps,  followed  by  the  two  Bavarian 
army  corps,  will  reach  the  vicinity  of  Damvillers.  His  Majesty  di- 
rects that  the  investing  army  detach  two  army  corps  and  send  them 
so  that  they  also  will,  without  fail,  reach  the  vicinity  of  Damvillers 
— Mangiennes,  for  which  they  will  probably  not  have  to  start  until 
the  27th. 

It  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  your  Headquarters  to  make  all  ar- 
rangements so  that,  even  if  the  investment  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle  has  to  be  temporarily  abandoned,  the  enemy's  breaking  through 
towards  the  west  will  be  prevented. 

The  5th,  6th  and  12th  Cavalry  Divisions,  sent  today  towards 
Vouziers,  should  bring  exhaustive  and  sui'e  information  of  condi- 
tions there. 

Telegraphic  connection  with  General  Headquarters  will  be 
established  today  as  far  as  Erize-la-Petite  (Fork  of  Clermont — Bar- 
le-Duc  and  Clermont— St.  Mihiel  roads). 

From  that  point  runs  a  relay  line. 


The  following  orders  were  issued  to  the  Corps  under 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg,  the  leading  elements  of 
which  reached,  on  August  26th,  Homburg — Neunkirchen: 

No.  213 

To  H.  R.  H.  THE  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg. 
Saarbrucken. 

General  Hq.,  Bar-le-Duc,    23  August  1870,  10:00  A.M. 
Telegravi. 

The  corps  will  immediately  start  by  echelons  for  Metz  and  will 
report  for  orders  to  General  Steinmetz,  Headquarters  Jouy-aux-Ar- 
ches  at  Ars-on-the-Moselle.  Acknowledge  receipt  of  these  orders  by 
wire.* 


*Prince   Frederick   Charles   and   General   von    Steinmetz  received 
copies  of  these  orders. 


—278— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

To  secure  the  railroad  communications  to  the  rear 
the  commandant  of  the  Field  Railway  Service  received  the 
following  orders : 

No.  214 

To  Director  Weishaupt,  Pont-A-Mousson  or  Nancy  R.  R.  De- 
pot. 

Hq.  Bar-le-Duc,   26  August  1870,  11:30  A.M. 
Telegravi. 

Expectations  for  taking  Toul  increase.  Vitry  is  ours.  Construc- 
tion this  side  of  Toul  more  and  more  important  and  should  be  has- 
tened. We  proceed  today  to  Clermont;  R.  R.  station  Bar-le-Duc  very 
large  and  in  excellent  shape.  General  Stosch  will  give  full  authori- 
zation for  removal  of  interruptions  in  rear. 


General  Headquarters  proceeded  to  Clermont  in  the 
afternoon  of  26  August.  As  in  the  meantime  communica- 
tions had  been  established  by  wire  between  Headquarters 
of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  in  Doncourt  and  General  Head- 
quarters as  far  as  Erize-la-Petite,  General  von  Moltke  was 
enabled  to  send  in  the  evening  the  following  orders  by  re- 
lay and  wire: 

No.  215 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 
Doncourt. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  26  August  1870,  7:00  P.M. 
Telegram. 

General  Headquarters  now  in  Clermont.  Orders  enroute  by 
mounted  messenger  [see  No.  212].  Troop  movements  orders  will  not 
be  started  before  Saturday  noon  (August  27th).  By  then  we  will 
probably    have    better    information.     Acknowledge    receipt    by    wire. 


Finally,  in  the  course  of  the  evening  reports  were  re- 
ceived from  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  Detachment,  accord- 
ing to  which  hostile  troops  of  all  arms  had  reached  Grandpre 
but  had  not  yet  reached  the  Meuse  line.  Thus,  it  became 
absolutely  certain  that  MacMahon  was  marching  on  Metz. 
Therefore,  by  direction  of  His  Majesty,  General  von  Moltke 
issued  verbal  orders  at  11:00  P.M.  to  Major  General  von 
Schlotheim,  chief  of  staff  of  the  Army  Detachment,  Head- 
quarters of  which  was  also  in  Clermont,  to  continue  the 

—279— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

march  on  Damvillers  the  next  day,  to  take  possession  of 
the  Meuse  crossings  at  Dun  and  Stenay,  and  to  have  his 
cavah'y  attack  the  enemy's  right  flank.  The  following 
orders  were  issued  in  writing: 

No.  216 

To  THE  Bavarian  I.  Army  Corps. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  26  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  the  1st  Bavarian  Corps  march 
tomorrow  to  ISiixeville;  start  to  be  made  after  cooking  meals  and 
not  before  11:00  A.M.     The  corps  will  protect  itself  against  Verdun. 


No.  217 
To  THE  Bavarian  II.  Army  Corps. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  26  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  the  lid  Bavarian  Army  Corps 
march  tomorrow   (Saturday)   to  Dombasle. 


No.  218 
To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Arm\ 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  26  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

The  cavalry  sent  ahead  in  a  northerly  direction,  has  ascertained 
the  presence  of  hostile  troops  of  all  arms  near  Grandpre. 

His  Majesty  has  issued  orders  that  the  Xllth,  IVth  and  Guard 
Corps  continue  the  march  in  direction  of  Damvillers.  The  1st  Bavar- 
ian Army  Corps  proceeds  tomorrow  (Saturday)  to  Nixeville,  the  lid 
to  Dombasle. 

The  Prussian  corps  of  the  Third  Army  (including  the  Wiirt- 
temburg  Division)  are  to  continue  the  march  in  the  direction  of  Ste. 
Menehould.  The  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  at  Somme  Py  and 
Autry  have  orders  to  follow  the  enemy  to  Grandpre  and  Vouziers. 


No.  219 
To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 

DONCOURT. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  26th  August,  11:00  P.M. 
Telegram.* 

Hostile  troops  of  all  arms  at  Grandpre. 

According  to  written  ordersf  two  corps  of  the  army  will  start 
tomorrow  (Saturday)  for  Damvillers  and  reach  there  on  Sunday  the 
28th. 


*By  relay  to  Erize-la-Petite,  from  there  by  wire.     Copy  on  Aug- 
ust 27th  by  mounted  messenger. 
fNo.  212. 

—280— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

The  remarkably  slow  advance  of  the  French  Army, 
which  had  not  gotten  by  the  evening  of  August  26th  with 
its  leading  infantry  elements  to  beyond  Grandpre — Buz- 
ancy — Le  Chesne,  made  it  possible  to  reach  the  hostile 
fighting  forces  while  they  were  still  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse  and  bring  them  to  a  stand.  A  concentration  at  Dam- 
villers  could  therefore  be  abandoned,  and  the  advance  of 
the  German  army  corps  could  be  continued  in  the  direction 
of  Vouziers,  Buzancy  and  Beaumont.  In  this  movement 
there  was  no  necessity  for  participation  of  the  portions  of 
the  army  investing  Metz.  The  orders  issued,  based  on 
these  views,  were  as  follows : 

No.  220 
To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 

DONCOURT. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  27  August  1870,  8:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

According  to  report  just  received  a  large  portion  of  the  hostile 
fighting  forces  was  last  evening  still  at  Vouziers.  Therefore  the 
troop  movements  you  w^ere  directed  to  make  need  not  start  until 
further  orders  from  here.  A  relay  line  to  be  established  as  far  as 
Etain ;  steps  will  be  taken  for  wire  communication  from  there.  An- 
swer by  wire  at  once. 


No.  221 
To  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  27  August  1870,  8:00  A.M. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  establishes  a  relay  line  from  Doncourt 
to  Etain.  Your  H.  R.  H.  will  continue  that  line  from  there  to  these 
headquarters. 


No.  222 
To  Headquarters  Bavarian  II.  Army  Corps. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  27th  August  1870,  8:00  A.M. 

The  lid   Bavarian  Army  Corps  will  send  one  infantry   brigade 
today  to  Clermont,  which  will  remain  there. 


—281— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  223 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 
DoNCOURT.     By  Relay  to  Erize  la  Petite. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  27  August  1870,  7:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

As  now  sufficient  fis:hting  forces  are  concentrated  here,  no  more 
detachments  will  be  made  by  you.    Acknowledge  receipt  by  wire. 


No.   224 

To  Headquarters  Third  Army. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  27  August  1870,  7:30  A.M. 
Telegram. 

If  possible  leading  elements  of  the  Prussian  corps  of  the  Third 
Army  must  reach  Malmy  and  Laval  on  the  28th.  Written  orders  en 
route  [see  No.  225.]. 


No.  225 

To   Headquarters   Army   Detachment   Under   H.    R.    H.   the 
Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  and  Headquarters  Third  Army.* 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  27  August  1870,  7:30  A.M. 

According  to  reports  received  the  main  fighting  forces  under 
Marshal  MacMahon  are  still  at  Vouziers;  strong  cavalry  has  advanced 
as  far  as  Beaumont  and  Buzancy. 

His  Majesty  the  King  directs  that  the  Army  Detachment  under 
H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  and  the  Third  Army  continue 
the  advance  in  that  direction. 

This  advance  will  be  made  by  the  Army  Detachment  and  both 
Bavarian  Army  Corps  according  to  attached  march  tables  [see  No. 
226],  which  had  to  be  arranged  in  detail  from  considering  the  condi- 
tions here  and  has  consequently  been  transmitted  direct  to  both  Ba- 
varian  corps. 

The  Third  Army  (Vth,  Vlth,  Xlth  Corps  and  Wiirttemberg  Di- 
vision) must  reach  with  its  leading  elements  on  the  28th  the  line  Mal- 
my— Laval,  on  the  29th  the  line  Sechault — Somme  Py  and  concen- 
trate closely. 

The  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  (Autry  and  Monthois)  will 
in  the  next  few  days  receive  their  orders  from  headquarters  of  the 
Third  Army,  and  also  will  report  direct  to  these  headquarters. 


*To  former  via  staff  officer,  to  Third  Army  via  headquarters  of 
the  Vth  Army  Corps  for  transmission;  in  addition  copy  by  mounted 
messenger  to  both  Bavarian  corps  and  to  the  lid  Bavarian  Corps 
with  additional  note:   "One  battalion  remains  in  Clermont." 


—282— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 
No.  226 

MARCH  TABLES  FOR  AUGUST  28th  and  29th,  1870. 

28th  29th 

Bavarian  lid   Corps                Vienne*  Grandpre 

and  in  rear  thereof 

Bavarian  1st  Corps                 Varennes  and  Grandpre 

in  rear  thereof 

Guard  Corps                               Bantheville  Buzancy 

Xllth  Corps  remains  a'-         Dun  Nouart 

IVth  Corps                                  Montfaucon  Bantheville 


No.  227 
OUTLINE  OF  MARCH  FOR  AUGUST  29th  and  30. 

Without  date,  apparently  sketched  August  28tJi. 


29th 
Xllth  Corps  Buzancy — Nouart 

Guard  Corps  by  Rem-   Themorgues,  Champ- 

onville  and  Landres         igneulles 
IVth  Corps  St.  Julian 

1st  Bavarian  Corps         Autry 
lid  Bavarian  Corps        Servon — Sechault 


30th 


Ballay 
Longwy 


Falaise 

Savigny-sur-Aisne 

Savigny-sur-Aisne 


No.  228 
OUTLINE  FOR  AN  ATTACK  ON  VOUZIERS 

G.  Hq.,  Clermont,  28th  August  1870. 

One  to  two  army  corps  of  the  enemy  w^ere  still  at  Vouziers 
last  evening.  It  is  probable  that  the  enemy's  remaining  fighting 
forces  are  at  Le  Chesne. 

In  an  attack  on  Vouziers  our  right  flank  must  be  secured  against 
these  forces.     For  that  purpose  are  available: 

Xllth    Corps    Buzancy 

Guard  Corps Themorgues 

IVth  Corps Grandpre 

From  there  the  latter,  if  necessary,  moves  on  Briquenay  {%  mile  by 
road).  If  on  the  other  hand  considerations  of  flank  protection  permit, 
these  three  corps  will  support  the  attack  on  Vouziers  each  with  one 
division  on  Ballay,  Longwy  and  Falaise. 

For  the  direct  attack  on  Vouziers  are  designated: 

Bavarian  lid  Corps — Termes  on  Falaise. 

Bavarian  1st  Corps  by  Chatel — Autry  on  Chambre-aux-Loups. 

Vth   Corps  by  Monthois  on   Chambre-aux-Loups. 

The  course  of  the  attack  will  show  if  it  is  desirable  to  also  bring 
up  the  Xlth  Corps  for  direct  attack  or  to  cut  off  enemy's  retreat  with 
our  Vlth  Corps. 

*Marginal  note:  "From  Dombasle  to  Clermont  the  corps  will 
take  the  road   via   Brabant-en-Argonne  and   Vraincourt." 


—283- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

Reports  received  at  General  Headquarters  in  Clermont 
up  to  7:00  P.M.,  August  28th,  justified  the  assumption  that 
the  enemy  was  marching  northward  and  caused  the  follow- 
ing measures  to  be  ordered : 

No.  229 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  and  Army  Detachment 
Under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  28  August  1870,  7:00  P.M. 

The  enemy  evacuated  Vouziers  early  this  morning  and  is  march- 
ing off  northward.  It  remains  uncertain  whether  he  intends  to  con- 
centrate more  towards  Le  Chesne  or  towards  Rethel. 

His  Majesty  directs  the  continuation  of  the  march  as  follows: 

The  Xllth  Corps  marches  tomorrow  towards  Nouart;  one  brigade 
remaining  at  Stenay. 

The  Guard  Corps  marches  toward  Buzancy. 

The  IVth  Army  Corps  follows  as  far  as  Remonville. 

H.  R.  H.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  will  reckon  with  the  possi- 
bility of  a  hostile  attack  from  the  direction  of  Le  Chesne  and  will  have 
the  terrain  south  of  Nouart  and  Buzancy  reconnoitered  for  that  pos- 
sibility. 

The  1st  Bavarian  Army  Corps  proceeds  to  Champigneulles,  the 
lid  Corps  to  Grandpre,  both  corps  will  be  in  readiness  there  to  support 
the  Crown   Prince  of  Saxony. 

The  three  Prussian  corps  of  the  Third  Army  (including  the  Wiirt- 
temberg  Division)  move  in  the  direction  of  Vouziers  and  west  thereof. 
One  cavalry  division  of  the  Third  Army  will  be  sent  in  the  direction  of 
Reims. 

General  Headquarters  proceeds  to   Grandpre  tomorrow. 

Reports  to  this  point  till  8:00  A.M. 
Addition  to  the  Third  Army: 

Direct  orders  have  been  sent  from  here  to  the  Bavarian  1st  Corps. 


No.  230 

To   Headquarters   Army   Detachment   Under   H.    R.   H.   the 
Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 
Malancourt. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  28  August  1870,  7 :00  P.M. 

In  reply  to  your  letter  of  today*  you  are  informed  that  headquar- 
ters of  the  Army  in  front  of  Metz  received  orders  last  evening  to  call 
back  the  Hid  and  lid  Army  Corps  to  Metz.  Therefore  you  need  not 
count  on  support  from  these  army  corps  tomorrow. 


*That  headquarters  had  requested  information  as  to  whether  the 
lid  Army  Corps,  detached  from  the  Army  in  front  of  Metz  and  started 
from  Damvillers  would  be  under  orders  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Sax- 
ony and  had  at  the  same  time  expressed  the  wish  that  in  place  of  the 
Guard  Corps  the  IVth  Army  Corps,  which  was  numerically  stronger, 
be  sent  into  the  first  line  and  the  Guard  Corps  follow  in  second  line. 

—284— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

As  will  be  seen  from  today's  orders,  it  has  not  been  possible  to 
exchange  the  IVth  for  the  Guard  Corps,  but  this  matter  will  be  kept 
in  mind  here. 


New  reports  were  received  at  General  Headquarters 
around  9:00  P.M.,  according  to  which  the  enemy  had  not 
marched  off  northward,  but  was  doubtlessly  continuing  his 
march  eastward.  Orders,  becoming  necessary  because  of 
of  this  fact,  were  as  follows : 

No.  231 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  and  Army  Detachment 
Under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.  Clermon%  28  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

The  appearance  of  strona:  hostile  infantry  at  Nar  near  Buzancy 
indicates  that  the  enemy  will  make  an  attempt  to  relieve  Metz.  It 
may  be  assumed  that  for  this  purpose  one  or  two  corps  will  take 
the  Vouziers — Buzancy — Stenay  road,  while  the  rest  of  the  army 
marches  north  via  Beaumont. 

So  as  not  to  lead  the  enemy  to  an  attack  before  we  have  assem- 
bled sufficient  fighting-  forces,  it  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  H.  R.  H. 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  to  concentrate  in  time  the  Xllth,  Guara, 
and  IVth  Corps  at  first  in  a  defensive  position  about  on  the  line  Lan- 
dres — Ancreville. 

The  line  Dun — Stenay  will  be  observed  by  the  detached  brigade. 

Both  Bavarian  army  corps  will  start  at  5:00  A.M.  The  1st  Corps 
which  will  receive  orders  from  these  headquarters  direct,  marches  by 
Fleville  to  Sommerance,  reaching  there  not  later  than  10:00  A.M. 
The  lid  Corps  marches  via  Binarville,  Chatel  and  Cornay  to  St.  Juvin. 

The  Vth  Army  Corps  will  march  via  Bouconville,  Montcheutin  and 
Senuc  to  Grandpre. 

These  headquarters  will  issue  further  orders  concerning  the  attack 
against  the  Vouziers — Buzancy — Stenay  road. 

The  remaining  two  corps  of  the  Third  Army  are  to  be  started  so 
that  they  can  be  brought  up  for  the  decision  in  case  of  need. 

His  Majesty  will  proceed  at  9:00  A.M.  to  Varennes. 

Moltke's  personal  addition  to  orders  for  the  Meuse 
Army  Detachment : 

"This  does  not  preclude  an  advance  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the 
Buzancy  road  against  weaker  hostile  forces." 


No.  232 

To  Headquarters  Bavarian  I.  Army  Corps. 

General  Hq.,  Clermont,  28  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

The   Corps  will   start   at   5:00    A.M.   and   march  via    Fleville  on 
Sommerance,  where  it  will  go  into  position  for  the  present  in  rear  of 

—285— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


the  left  wing  of  the  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony  at  Landres. 

The  lid  Bavarian  Corps  will  be  drawn  up  via  Cornay  to  St.  Juvin 
while  the  Vth  Prussian  Corps  debouches  via  Grandpre. 

At  9:00  A.M.  His  Majesty  proceeded  to  Varennes. 

The  Corps  will  establish  a  relay  line  from  Varennes  to  Clermont 
and  from  Varennes  to  Grandpre. 


On  the  road  from  Clermont  via  Varennes  to  Grandpre, 
General  von  Moltke  sent  direct  orders,  changing  previous 
orders  in  some  details,  during  the  course  of  August  29th,  to 
the  leading  army  corps  of  the  Third  Army.* 


No.  233 

To  Headquarters  1st  Bavarian  Army  Corps. 

Near  Fleville^  29  August  1870,  11:30  A.M. 

As  it  is  very  probable  that  operations  tomorrow  will  be  proceed 
in  a  westerly  direction,  the  1st  Division  of  the  1st  Bavarian  Corps  may 
bivouac  at  St.  Juvin  and  will  send  one  battalion  to  Grandpre  to  these 
headquarters. 


No.  234 

To  Headquarters  IId  Bavarian  Army  Corps. 

Near  Fleville,  29  August  1870,  11:30  A.M. 

The  Bavarian  lid  Corps  will  bivouac  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Aire 
at  Cornay  and  Chevieres. 


No.  235 

To  Headquarters  V.  Army  Corps. 

General  Hq.,  Grandpre,  29  August  1870,  12:30  Noon. 

The  Vth  Army  Corps  will  halt  at  Grandpre  and  go  into  bivouac. 
The  9th  Division  has  received  direct  orders  from  here  to  that  effect. 


*The  Vlth  Army  Corps,  that  started  from  Ste.  Menehould  towards 
Verennes,  received  orders  enroute  through  Captain  Zingler  of  the 
general  staff  of  General  Headquarters,  to  turn  off  towards  Vienne- 
le-Chateau;  it  went  into  bivouac  there. 

fBetween  Varennes  and  Grandpre. 


—286— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Reports  received  up  to  the  evening  of  August  29th  in 
Grandpre  from  the  cavah'y,  together  with  the  personal  re- 
ports of  observations  made  by  Lieutenant  Colonels  von 
Brandenstein  and  von  Bronsart,  of  the  general  staff  of  Gen- 
eral Headquarters,  clearly  indicated  that  the  enemy  was 
moving  in  northeasterly  direction  towards  the  Meuse  and 
that  his  main  forces  could  be  assumed  to  be  between  Le 
Chesne  and  Beaumont  and  that  strong  flank  detachments 
were  farther  south.  Papers  captured  from  a  French  staff 
officer  in  Buzancy  carrying  orders  for  August  29th  con- 
firmed the  above  assumption.  Therefore  His  Majesty  the 
King  decided  to  attack  the  enemy  the  following  day  with 
both  armies  before  he  could  reach  the  Meuse  and  to  threat- 
en at  the  same  time  his  communications  leading  westward. 


No.  236 


To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army,  Senuc,  and  Headquar- 
ters Army  Detachment  Under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince 
OF  Saxony. 
Bayonville. 

General  Hq.,  Grandpre,  29  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

All  reports  received  today  coincide  in  the  fact  that  the  hostile 
army  will  be  tomorrow  forenoon  with  its  main  forces  between  Beau- 
mont and  Le  Chesne,  or  south  of  that  line. 

His  Majesty  directs  that  the  enemy  be  attacked. 

On  the  right,  the  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony  will  advance  at  10:00  A.M.  across  the  line  Beau- 
clair — Fosse  in  direction  of  Beaumont.  It  will  use  the  roads  east  of 
the  main  Buzancy — Beaumont  road.  The  Guard  Corps,  being  in  re- 
serve at  the  start,  must  evacuate  that  road  by  8:00  A.M. 

The  Third  Army,  starting  early,  marches  with  its  right  wing  via 
Buzancy  on  Beaumont  and  is  in  readiness  to  support  the  attack  of 
H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  with  two  army  corps,  while  the 
remaining  corps  will  keep  the  direction  on  Le  Chesne. 

One  battalion  of  the  Third  Corps  will  hold  Grandpre. 

His  Majesty  proceeds  at  10:00  A.M.  from  here  to  Buzancy. 


The  evening  after  the  battle  of  Beaumont  the  follow 
ing  orders  were  issued: 


—287- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

No.  237 

To  H.  R.  H.  THE  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  Beaumont,  and  H. 
R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia. 
At  St.  Pierremont. 

Hill  or  Sommaiithe,    30  August  1870,  6:00  P.M. 

General  Headquarters  proceeds  to  Buzancy.     Please  report  loca- 
tion of  the  corps  as  soon  as  that  can  be  done. 


No.  238 

To  Headquarters  Third  Army  at  St.  Pierremont  and  H.  R.  H. 
THE  Prince  of  Saxony. 
Beaumont. 

General  Hq.,  Buzancy,  30  August  1870,  11:00  P.M. 

Though  no  report  has  been  received  up  to  this  hour  as  to  where 
the  engagements  of  the  different  corps  ended,  it  is  clear  that  the  enemy 
has  fallen  back  at  all  points  or  been  defeated. 

Therefore  the  forward  movement  will  be  continued  very  early 
tomorrow,  the  enemy  energetically  attacked  everywhere  where  he 
makes  a  stand  this  side  of  the  Meuse,  and  pressed  together  in  as  small 
a  space  as  possible  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Belgian  frontier. 

The  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Sax- 
ony will  have  the  special  task  of  preventing  the  hostile  left  wing  from 
escaping  eastward.  For  this  it  will  be  advisable  that  at  least  two 
corps  advance  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse  and  attack  any  pro- 
bable position  opposite  Mouzon  in  flank  and  rear. 

Similarly,  the  Third  Army  must  turn  against  the  enemy's  front 
and  right  flank.  Artillery  positions,  as  strong  as  possible,  will  be 
taken  up  on  this  side  of  the  river  in  such  manner  that  they  will  ha- 
rass the  march  and  camps  of  hostile  columns  in  the  valley  bottom  of 
the  right  bank  from  Mouzon  downstream. 

Should  the  enemy  enter  Belgian  terrain,  without  being  immediate- 
ly disarmed,  he  will  immediately  be  followed  into  that  country. 

At  8:30  A.M.  His  Majesty  will  proceed  from  here  to  Sommauthe. 

All  orders  issued  by  the  different  army  headquarters  will  be 
sent  here  up  to  that  hour. 

ADDITION 

For  the  Third  Army: 

The  IVth  Corps,  having  driven,  in  conjunction  vi^ith  the  Xllth 
Corps,  the  enemy  on  Mouzon,  has  its  outposts  on  the  north  edge  of  the 
Bois  de  Givodeau  [Bois  Givedeau],  the  main  body  north  of  Beaumont. 
The  Guard  Corps  is  south  of  Beaumont,  the  Xllth  Corps  at  Letanne  and 
Pouilly  (on  the  Meuse),  holding  both  places.  The  IVth  Corps  has  cap- 
tured 11  guns  and  2000  prisoners,  also  two  large  ammunition  parks 
and  the  camp  of  one  division. 

To  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony: 

In  accordance  with  a  report  just  received  the  corps  are  located 
as  follows: 

—288— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Vlth  Army  Corps  at  Vouziers. 

Xlth  Army  Corps  and  Wiirttemberg  Division  at  Stonne. 
Vth  Army  Corps  at  La  Besace. 
Bavarian  1st  Corps  probably  at  Raucourt. 
Bavarian  lid  Corps  probably  at  Sommauthe  w^ith  its  leading 
elements. 


No.  239 
To  Headqharters  Third  Army  at  St.  Pierremont. 

General  Hq.,  Buzancy,  30  August  1870,  11:80  P.M. 

His  Majesty  has  observed  w^ith  displeasure  that  the  lid  Bavarian 
Corps  which  w^as  to  follow  as  reserve  immediately  in  rear  of  the  1st 
Corps  according  to  orders,  was  not  in  position  in  rear  of  that  corps 
at  4  mile  distance  at  Sommauthe,  but  was  in  march  column  after 
9:00  P.M.  with  its  rear  elements  at  Buzancy.  Thus,  the  corps  would 
have  been  entirely  unable  to  offer  support  had  that  been  required. 

In  addition,  the  corps  increased  the  difficulties  of  bringing  up 
the  trains  of  the  rest  of  the  corps,  and  it  reached  its  bivouac  by  an 
unnecessary  night  march. 


Headquarters  of  the  aiTny  in  front  of  Metz  was  in- 
formed of  the  events  of  the  past  few  days  and  as  to  fur- 
ther intentions  and  received  corresponding  orders : 

No.  240 

To  Headquarters  in  Front  of  Metz. 
Malancourt. 

General  Hq.,  Buzancy,  31  August  1870,  8:00  A.M. 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  as  follows: 

After  it  had  been  ascertained  in  the  past  few  days  that  the  army 
under  MacMahon  was  moving  in  the  terrain  between  the  Meuse  and 
the  Aisne,  the  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Saxony  and  the  Third  Army  were  sent  to  the  front  in  the  direction  of 
the  Beaumont — Le  Chesne  road. 

Yesterday  strong  hostile  troops  were  encountered  at  Beaumont 
and  Stonne.  The  Corps  of  Failly,  at  Beaumont  was  attacked  by  the 
lyth.  and  Xllth  Corps  and  driven  past  Mouzon  with  great  loss  (11  guns 
and  2000  prisoners,  two  large  artillery  parks,  as  ascertained  last 
night).    Mouzon  was  taken  by  the  IVth  Corps  last  evening. 

The  hostile  army  corps  at  Stonne  evaded  complete  annihilation 
by  a  timely  retreat  via  Raucourt  towards  Sedan.  Only  its  rear  guard 
was  attacked  and  defeated  by  the  1st  Bavarian  Corps  in  the  afternoon. 

The  advance  will  be  continued  today. 

At  5:00  A.M.  the  Xllth  and  the  Guard  Corps,  which  are  in  bivouac 
close  to  Beaumont,  cross  the  Meuse  at  Letanne  and  Pouilly  to  the  right 
bank  and  start  for  Douzy  and  Carignan — Sachy  respectively.  The  IVth 
Corps  follows  them  via  Mouzon. 

—289— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


The  Third  Army  also  proceeds  via  the  Mezieres — Remilly  stretch 
to  eventually  beyond  the  Meuse. 

The  intention  is  to  crowd  the  hostile  army  into  as  small  a  space 
as  possible  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Belgian  frontier  and  eventually 
throw  it  into  Belgium,  into  which  country  our  armies  will  follow  un- 
less the  French  army  is  immediately  disarmed. 

It  is  not  impossible  that  single  portions  of  the  hostile  army  have 
turned  eastward  after  yesterday's  fights  at  Mouzon.  It  will  be  well 
for  you  to  keep  this  in  mind  and  keep  closer  investment  of  Metz. 


No.  241 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 
Malancourt. 

Sommauthe*  31  August  1870,  11:00  A.M. 
Telegram. 

Enemy  was  driven  yesterday  from  Beaumont  to  beyond  Mouzon. 
Possible,  that  single  detachments  may  have  turned  eastward  via 
Carignan,  which  should  be  observed.  Care  to  be  taken  for  the  securi- 
ty of  the  depot  in  Etain.     General  attack  to  be  continued  today. 


No.  242 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 
Malancourt. 

General  Hq.,  Vendresse,  81  August  1870,  10:00  P.M. 

In  continuation  of  my  letter  of  today  (See  No.  240),  you  are  in- 
formed that  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H.  The  Crown  Prince  of 
Saxony  and  the  Third  Army  have  continued  today  their  advance  with 
good  success. 

As  has  been  ascertained  today,  the  result  of  yesterday's  battle  is 
materially  greater  than  heretofore  assumed.  The  Corps  of  Failly  and 
Douay  and  a  portion  of  the  Corps  of  Lebrun  appear  to  be  in  complete 
dissolution.  More  than  20  guns  and  several  thousand  prisoners  were 
taken.  Our  leading  elements  today  reached  the  Meuse  at  several 
points,  and  even  crossed  that  river.  The  hostile  army  is  attempting 
to  march  along  the  right  bank  from  Sedan  to  Mezieres.'  An  advance 
on  Donchery,  which  is  already  in  our  hands,  will  be  made  early  to- 
morrow. Dismounted  Hussars  and  Uhlans  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion have  cleaned  out  the  villages  of  Frenois  and  Wedelincourt  of  hos- 
tile infantry. 

Under  these  conditions  it  is  improbable  that  the  army  in  front 
of  Metz  will  be  interfered  with  seriously  by  portions  of  MacMahon's 
army. 


*His  Majesty,  accompanied  by  the  general  staff,  had  proceeded 
at  8:30  A.M.  from  Buzancy  to  the  hill  near  Sommauthe  and  proceeded 
in  the  afternoon  by  way  of  Beaumont,  Roncourt  and  Chemery  to  Ven- 
dresse. 

—290— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  to  the  interests  of  the  combined  ar- 
mies here,  if  your  troops  could  completely  invest  the  fortress  of  Ver- 
dun. Forces  for  that  purpose  can  be  easier  spared  by  your  command 
because  the  leading  elements  of  the  corps  under  command  of  H..  R.  H. 
the  Grandduke  of  Mecklenburg-  have  arrived  at  Metz. 

Thus,  everything  in  this  matter  is  left  to  your  discretion. 


No  army  orders  were  issued  by  General  Headquarters 
for  the  1st  of  September,  as  the  orders  issued  the  evening 
of  August  30th  (see  No.  238)  contained  the  general  points 
for  the  conduct  of  both  armies  and  especially  as  everything 
material  concerning  the  movements  of  the  Third  Army  had 
been  verbally  discussed  by  Generals  von  Moltke,  von  Pod- 
bielski  and  von  Blumenthal  on  August  31st  at  Headquar- 
ters of  the  Third  Army,  Chemery,  and  enroute  of  the  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  from  Sommauthe  to  Vendresse  (see  note 
to  No.  241).  However,  the  observations  made  by  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  von  Brandenstein,  chief  of  section,  general 
staff  of  General  Headquarters,  in  the  vicinity  of  Remilly 
caused  General  von  Moltke  to  address  a  letter  the  evening 
of  August  31st  to  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  Third  Army: 

No.  243 

To  Lieutenant  General  von  Blumenthal. 
Chemery. 

General  Hq.,  Vendresse,  31  August  1870,  7  :i5  P.M. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  von  Brandenstein,  returned  from  Remilly 
just  now,  confirms  that  the  French,  leaving  all  impedimenta  behind, 
have  marched  off  westward  and  probably  continue  their  march  dur- 
ing theliight.  Attainment  of  large  results  may  be  made  impossible 
thereby.  Your  Excellency  will  consider  whether  it  would  not  be  well 
to  cross  the  Meuse  with  the  Xlth  Corps  and  the  Wiirttemberg  Divi- 
sion still  during  the  night,  so  that  the  attack  can  be  continued  very 
early  in  the  morning  in  .the,  direction  of  the  Sedan — Mezieres  road  on 
a_deployed  front. 


No  written  orders  were  required  during  the  battle  of 
Sedan,  and  only  the  start  of  negotiations  caused  the  issue 
of  the  following  army  orders: 


—  L-Oi- 


Moltke's  Correspondence 


No.  244 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  and  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony. 

On  the  Hill  near  Sedan,  1  September  1870,  7:15  P.M. 

Negotiations  have  been  started;  therefore  no  offensive  move- 
ments must  be  made  by  us  duiing;  the  night.  On  the  other  hand, 
any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  pierce  our  lines  must  be  de- 
feated by  force  of  arms.  If  negotiations  should  be  resultless,  then 
hostilities  will  be  resumed,  but  not  before  orders  therefor  are  re- 
ceived from  these  Headquarters.  Opening  of  artillery  fire  from  the 
heights  east  of.  Frenois  will  be  the  signal  to  resume  hostilities. 


No.  245 

To  H.  R.  H.  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
Malancourt. 

General  Hq.,  Frenois,  1  Setember  1870,   7:15  P.M. 
Telegram. 

French  army  was  attacked  today  enveloped  in  front  of  Sedan,  and 
completely  beaten.  About  20,000  prisoners,  many  cannon  and  eagles 
taken.  Napoleon,  in  Sedan,  has  offered  his  sword  to  the  King.  Capitu- 
lation negotiations  are  going  on. 

Based  thereon  demand  surrender  of  Marshal  Bazaine — this  in  your 
discretion. 


No.  246 

NEGOTIATIONS 

The  following  agreement  has  been  arrived  at  between  the  under- 
signed, the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia, Commander-in-Chief  of  the  German  Armies,  and  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  French  Army,  both  having  plenipotentiary  powers  from 
King  William  and  Emperor  Napoleon: 

Article  1 : 

The  French  army  under  command  of  General  von  Wimpffen,  at  this 
moment  invested  in  Sedan  by  superior  forces,  is  considered  prisoners 
of  war. 

Article  2: 

Considering  the  brave  defense  of  this  army,  all  generals  and  offi- 
cers are  excepted  therefrom,  as  well  as  higher  officials  with  commis- 
sioned rank,  who  give  their  word  of  honor  in  writing  not  to  carry 
arms  again  against  Germany  until  the  completion  of  the  present  war, 
and  not  to  act  in  any  manner  injurious  to  the  interests  of  Germany. 
Officers  and  officials,  accepting  these  conditions,  will  retain  their  arms 
and  personal  property. 

—292— 


1    <i 


■^m 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Article  3: 

All  other  arms,  as  well  as  all  army  materiel,  such  as  eagles, 
colors,  standards,  guns,  horses,  moneys,  army  vehicles,  ammunition, 
etc.,  will  be  delivered  to  some  authority  in  Sedan,  appointed  by  the 
French  Commander-in-Chief,  to  be  immediately  transferred  to  a  Ger- 
man Plenipotentiary. 

Article  4: 

Thereupon  the  fortress  of  Sedan,  in  its  present  condition,  will  be 
delivered,  and  not  later  than  the  evening  of  September  2d,  into  the 
hands  of  His  Majesty,  the  King  of  Prussia. 

Article  5: 

Those  officers  who  refuse  the  conditions  mentioned  in  Article  2, 
as  well  as  the  disarmed  men,  will  be  conducted  off  by  regiments  and  in 
military  order.  This  measure  will  commence  September  2d  and  must  be 
finished  by  September  3d.  The  detachments  will  be  brought  to  the 
terrain  at  Iges  surrounded  by  the  Meuse,  to  be  delivered  by  their 
officers  to  the  German  Plenipotentiaries,  which  latter  will  then  issue 
orders  to  the  noncommissioned  officers.  *" 

Article  6: 

Military  surgeons,  without  exception,  remain  behind,  to  take  over 
the  care  of  the  wounded. 

Agreed  to  at  Frenois,  on  2  September,  1870. 

VON   MOLTKE  VON    WiMPFFEN. 


No.   247 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  and  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Frenois,  2  September  1870,  12:00  Noon. 

The  French  army,  today  still  in  and  around  Sedan,  has  capitulated. 
Officers  dismissed  on  their  word  of  honor.  Noncommissioned  officers 
and  privates  are  prisoners  of  war.  Arms  and  army  materiel  to  be 
surrendered.     Copy  of  the  convention  enclosed. 

The  prisoners  of  war,  the  strength 'of  which  cannot  yet  be  ascer- 
tained, will  be  assembled  in  the  arc  of  the  Meuse  at  Vilette  and  Iges 
and  then  conducted  off  in  echelons.  As  first  guard,  the  Xlth  and  the 
lid  Bavarian  Corps  are  designated,  both  under  command  of  General 
von  der  Tann. 

General  von  der  Tann  will  regulate  the  subsistence  of  the  prison- 
ers of  war,  for  which,  according  to  the  promise  of  the  French  command- 
ing general,  supplies  will  be  brought  by  rail  from  Mezieres  to  near 
Donchery.  Great  care  is  to  be  exercised  that  no  obstructions  are  made 
for  any  train. 

The  Xlth  Army  Corps  will  detach  one  infantry  regiment  during 
the  course  of  tomorrow,  after  Sedan  has  been  evacuated  by  the  French 
troops,  to  serve  as  garrison  for  the  fortress. 

For  the  rest,  the  Third  Army  and  Army  Detachment  under  H.R.H. 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  will  withdraw  from  Sedan  tomorrow  to 
the  west  and  south;  the  Remilly — La  Besace — Le  Chesne  road  being 
assigned  as  western  boundary  to  the  Army  Detachment.  Trains  of 
the  Bavarian  Army  Corps  will  evacuate  that  road  in  good  time. 

•      —293— 


Operations  July  18  to  September  2,  1870 

Article  3: 

All  other  arms,  as  well  as  all  army  materiel,  such  as  eagles, 
colors,  standards,  guns,  horses,  moneys,  army  vehicles,  ammunition, 
etc.,  will  be  delivered  to  some  authority  in  Sedan,  appointed  by  the 
French  Commander-in-Chief,  to  be  immediately  transferred  to  a  Ger- 
man Plenipotentiary. 

Article  It'. 

Thereupon  the  fortress  of  Sedan,  in  its  present  condition,  will  be 
delivered,  and  not  later  than  the  evening  of  September  2d,  into  the 
hands  of  His  Majesty,  the  King  of  Prussia. 

Article  5: 

Those  officers  who  refuse  the  conditions  mentioned  in  Article  2, 
as  well  as  the  disarmed  men,  will  be  conducted  off  by  regiments  and  in 
military  order.  This  measure  will  commence  September  2d  and  must  be 
finished  by  September  3d.  The  detachments  will  be  brought  to  the 
terrain  at  Iges  surrounded  by  the  Meuse,  to  be  delivered  by  their 
officers  to  the  German  Plenipotentiaries,  which  latter  will  then  issue 
orders  to  the  noncommissioned  officers.  *" 

Article  6: 

Military  surgeons,  without  exception,  remain  behind,  to  take  over 
the  care  of  the  wounded. 

Agreed  to  at  Frenois,  on  2  September,  1870. 

VON    MOLTKE  VON    WiMPFFEN. 


No.  247 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  and  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony. 

General  Hq.,  Frenois,  2  September  1870,  12:00  Noon. 

The  French  army,  today  still  in  and  around  Sedan,  has  capitulated. 
Officers  dismissed  on  their  word  of  honor.  Noncommissioned  officers 
and  privates  are  prisoners  of  war.  Arms  and  army  materiel  to  be 
surrendered.     Copy  of  the  convention  enclosed. 

The  prisoners  of  war,  the  strength 'of  which  cannot  yet  be  ascer- 
tained, will  be  assembled  in  the  arc  of  the  Meuse  at  Vilette  and  Iges 
and  then  conducted  off  in  echelons.  As  first  guard,  the  Xlth  and  the 
lid  Bavarian  Corps  are  designated,  both  under  command  of  General 
von  der  Tann. 

General  von  der  Tann  will  regulate  the  subsistence  of  the  prison- 
ers of  war,  for  which,  according  to  the  promise  of  the  French  command- 
ing general,  supplies  will  be  brought  by  rail  from  Mezieres  to  near 
Donchery.  Great  care  is  to  be  exercised  that  no  obstructions  are  made 
for  any  train. 

The  Xlth  Army  Corps  will  detach  one  infantry  regiment  during 
the  course  of  tomorrow,  after  Sedan  has  been  evacuated  by  the  French 
troops,  to  serve  as  garrison  for  the  fortress. 

For  the  rest,  the  Third  Army  and  Army  Detachment  under  H.R.H. 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  will  withdraw  from  Sedan  tomorrow  to 
the  west  and  south;  the  Remilly — La  Besace — Le  Chesne  road  being 
assigned  as  western  boundary  to  the  Army  Detachment.  Trains  of 
the  Bavarian  Army  Corps  will  evacuate  that  road  in  good  time. 

•      —293— 


Moltke's  Correspondence 

The  prisoners  of  war  will  be  sent  in  two  columns  via  Stenay — 
Etain — Gorze  to  Remilly  and  via  Buzancy — Clermont — St.  Mihiel  to 
Pont-a-Mousson  respectively  by  the  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H. 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  and  headquarters  of  the  Third  Army  re- 
spectively. 

To  prevent  all  doubt,  it  is  ordered  that  the  French  officers  cap- 
tured in  battle  yesterday  and  today  prior  to  completion  of  negotia- 
tions at  11:00  A.M.  are  to  be  treated  according  to  existing  regulations. 

The  Third  Army  will  immediately  designate  a  commandant  for 
Sedan  and  also  one  general  officer  to  be  charged  with  taking  over  the 
arms,  etc.,  to  be  laid  down  in  Sedan.  It  is  left  to  your  discretion  to 
assign  to  him  a  sufficient  number  of  officers  and  officials  as  assis- 
tants. Both  officers  will  report  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  Quartermas- 
ter General  of  the  Army. 

The  horses  to  be  delivered  by  the  French  army  are  to  ba  distri- 
buted, in  compliance  with  directions  of  His  Majesty  the  King,  among 
the  entire  German  forces;  and  the  different  army  headquarters  will 
receive  information  later  as  to  their  quota. 

Police  of  the  battlefield  is  the  duty  of  the  Headquarters,  Lines  of 
Communications  of  the  Army  Detachment  under  H.  R.  H.  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony.  Burial  of  the  dead  is  to  be  hastened  by  means  of 
requisitions  on  civil  authorities. 


No.  248 

To  Headquarters  of  the  Army  in  Front  of  Metz. 
Malancourt. 

General  Hq.,  Frenois,  x:  September  1870,  12:00  Noon. 
Telegram. 

Capitulation  of  MacMahon's  army  signed.  Army  is  prisoner  of 
war.  Today  commence  transportation  of  prisoners  in  two  columns — 
Stenay — Etain — Gorze — Remilly  and  Buzancy — Clermont — St.  Mihiel 
— Pont-a-Mousson. 

Daily  echelons  of  10,000  men  each  on  each  line;  first  echelons 
reach  entraining  points  on  the  5th.  The  army  in  front  of  Metz  will 
take  over  the  columns  at  Etain  from  the  3d  on,  at  Pont-a-Mousson 
from  the  5th  on,  subsist  them  and  continue  them  on.  In  case  delays 
occur  in  rail  transportation,  the  columns  will  continue  the  march  on 
foot  along  the  railroads. 


—294- 


EXTRACT  FROM 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1870-71 

The  Operations  of  the  Second  Army 

From  the  Commencement  of  the  Campaign  to  the 
Capitulation  of  Metz 

Compiled  from  the  Official  Reports  of  Headquarters  of  the 
Secoyid  Army 


BY 
VON  DER  GOLTZ 

Captain,  General  Staff 


Berlin,  1873 

Ernest  Siegfried  Mittler    and  Son 


Translated   by 
HARRY  BELL 


FOREWORD 

This  work  has  been  compiled  from  the  official  reports  of 
Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  and  the  events  have  been 
narrated  as  they  were  seen  from  the  viewpoint  of  those 
headquarters.  It  has  been  more  the  endeavor  to  pursue  the 
course  of  developments  on  which  the  decisions  of  those  head- 
quarters were  based,  than  to  go  into  all  the  minor  details 
connected  therewith. 

The  Compiler. 
Berlin,  November,  1873. 


—296— 


Chapter  II 


TO  THE  SAAR 
THE  4th  AND  5th  OF  AUGUST 

A  new  epoch  opened  for  the  Second  Army  on  August 
4th ;  for  its  corps,  after  executing  the  orders  of  August  3d, 
stood  fully  concentrated  with  their  fighting  units  closed  up 
within  themselves,  and  nothing  serious  was  to  be  expected 
of  the  enemy. 

On  the  4th  the  First  Army  was  concentrating  in  the 
triangle  Lebach — Tholey — Ottweiler;  that  day  the  Third 
Army  crossed  the  frontier  in  four  columns  to  drive  the 
enemy  opposite  it  back  onto  Strassburg  and  then  to  march 
off  to  the  right  through  the  Vosges. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles,  who  transferred  his  head- 
quarters in  the  morning  of  the  4th  to  Winnweiler,  received 
information  from  both  the  other  armies  direct. 

This  day  gave  the  Second  Army  complete  freedom 
of  action  according  to  its  own  missions.  After  having  exe- 
cuted the  task  set  for  the  third,  it  could  start  an  offensive 
against  the  Saar  line  early  on  the  5th. 

The  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  terrain  which  army 
headquarters  had  gained  made  it  appear  correct  to  send  four 
corps,  i.e.,  the  main  body  of  the  army,  along  the  good 
southern  road  through  the  depression  of  the  Landstuhl, 
"badlands,"  and  to  march  with  only  two  corps  along  the 
worse  northern  road  via  Kusel.  Difficult  marches  along 
rocky  roads,  devoid  of  shade,  were  to  be  expected,  and  ma- 
terial' casualties  on  account  of  heat  exhaustion  could  proba- 
bly not  be  avoided. 

However,  an  attack  against  the  central  Saar,  executed 
by  all  the  forces  of  the  Second  Army,  appeared  to  promise 
important  results.  The  French  Army  still  stood  with  its 
forces  dispersed  along  the  long  frontier  line  from  Hagenau 
to  opposite  Saarlouis.  Should  the  Second  Army  be  success- 
ful in  piercing  the  center  of  this  line,  around  Saargemiind, 

—297— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

the  enemy,  not  yet  fully  mobilized,  would  be  cut  in  two, 
his  lines  of  communications  to  the  rear  threatened,  and 
he  would  be  brought  to  a  critical  situation.  It  could  be 
assumed  that  he  had  so  far  no  reliable  information  of  the 
approach  of  the  Second  Army  via  Kusel  and  Kaiserslautern, 
as  only  cavalry  had  been  shown  on  the  German  side  so  far. 

This  penetrating  operation  was  consequently  considered 
as  the  next  objective  of  the  Second  Army.  Therefore  the 
commanding  general  issued  his  orders  for  the  concentra- 
tion on  the  line  Zweibriicken — Neunkirchen  the  evening  of 
August  4th. 

According  to  these  orders  the  Illd  Army  Corps  wa.s  \o 
march  on  the  right  by  St.  Wendel  to  Neunkirchen,  to  reach 
that  place  with  its  main  body  on  the  6th  and  to  send  an  ad- 
vance guard  on  the  7th  as  far  as  Sulzbach.  The  Xth  Army 
Corps  was  to  follow  on  the  3d  via  Kusel  and  Wladmohr  with 
orders  to  concentrate  on  the  7th  along  the  railroad  at  Bex- 
bach  and  to  send  its  advance  guard  on  the  8th  to  St.  Ing- 
bert. 

The  other  four  corps  received  as  march  direction  the 
road  Kaiserslautern — Landstuhl — Hotnburg. 

On  August  5th  and  6th  the  IVth  Corps,  from  Homburg, 
was  to  debouch  with  its  two  divisions  on  Zweibriicken  and 
to  send  an  advance  guard  as  early  as  the  6th  to  New  Horn- 
bach,  while  the  Guard  Corps  was  to  advance  from  Homburg 
to  Bliescastel,  to  be  with  its  main  body  there  on  the  7th  and 
to  send  two  advance  guards  the  next  day,  one  along  the  Blies 
valley,  the  other  towards  Assweiler.  The  IXth  Corps  to 
follow  in  rear  of  the  Guard  Corps  with  orders  to  march  on 
the  5th  and  6th  by  Otterberg,  if  possible  north  of  the  Reich- 
wald  and  Landstuhl  badlands  to  Waldmohr,  to  reach 
there  on  the  7th.  The  main  highway  was  placed  at  its  dis- 
posal for  the  6th  of  August.  Along  this  road  also  the  XHth 
Army  Corps  was  to  reach  Kaiserslautern  on  the  6th,  Land- 
stuhl on  the  7th  and  Homburg  on  the  8th. 

As  the  Guard  Corps,  the  IXth  and  the  Xllth  Army 
Corps  followed  each  other  without  interval  in  the  20  miles 
long  defile  from  Kaiserslautern  to  Homburg,  these  three 
corps  received  orders  to  leave  the  2d  Section  of  their  trains, 

—298— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

as  well  as  all  field  trains,  in  the  terrain  they  occupied  on  Au- 
gust 4th  in  order  to  avoid  any  unnecessary  intervals  in  the 
march  column.  This  difficult  march  of  an  army  of  more 
than  80,000  men  through  a  single  defile  could  be  accom- 
plished without  interruption  only  by  adhering  to  the  most 
minute  order  and  precision.* 

The  trains  that  had  been  left  behind  started  their  march 
on  August  8th  in  the  same  sequence  as  their  army  corps,  and 
it  took  hours  to  properly  regulate  their  march  through  the 
comparatively  narrow  streets  of  Kaiserslauternf  and  the 
field  military  police  was  charged  with  supervision  of  the 
road  as  its  first  task  and  trial  of  its  achievements  during 
this  war. 

The  outpost  service  was  performed  throughout  these 
important  days  by  the  cavalry  divisions.  No  relief  was  to 
be  made  by  the  corps  arriving  on  the  first  line  without  ex- 
press orders  from  the  army  commander,  as  the  main 
point  was  to  hide  knowledge  of  the  presence  of  the  army 
from  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible. 

According  to  reports  sent  in  by  General  von  Rheinbaben 
the  main  body  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  had  reached 
Klein-Ottweiler  on  August  3d,  and  the  left  column  of  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division  Homburg — Blieskastel,  while  the  right 
column  had  passed  on  August  2d  the  line  Assweiler — St. 
Wendel — Werschweiler  and  had  continued  its  march  from 
there  on  the  3rd.  Along  the  entire  front  squadrons  had 
been  sent  out  towards  the  enemy. 

However,  for  the  solution  of  the  task  now  confronting 
it,  the  location  of  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  appeared  to 
be  still  too  far  away  from  the  frontier.  If  those  detach- 
ments that  were  charged  with  keeping  close  touch  with  the 
enemy,  were  to  appear  rapidly,  by  surprise,  and  effectively, 


*Delays  could  not  be  totally  avoided  in  those  days — especially 
as  the  Guard  Corps  was  brought  forward  simultaneously — but  no 
blockades  occurred  which  would  have  prevented  the  corps  from  reach- 
ing their  march  objectives. 

fOf  course  not  a\\  the  trains  adhered  to  their  proper  sequence; 
imbued  by  the  quite  natural  impulse  to  follow  their  proper  organi- 
zations as  soon  as  possible,  some  endeavored  to  get  ahead  through  the 
march  columns  and  greatly  interfered  thereby  with  the  march  on  the 
7th. 

—299— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

they  should  not  have  to  make  very  long  marches  from  the 
bivouac  places  of  the  main  bodies  to  the  hostile  outposts. 
Therefore  the  main  bodies  received  instructions  to  move 
farther  forward  and  orders  v^ere  also  issued — as  it  v^as 
very  important  to  send  messages  as  rapidly  as  possible  by 
relays, — for  both  divisions  to  report  direct  to  army  head- 
quarters. 

The  cavalry  had  its  first  brush  with  the  enemy  as  early 
as  August  3d.  One  squadron  of  the  3d  Uhlan  Regiment  had 
entered  St.  Johann,  opposite  Saarbriicken,  and  had  suc- 
ceeded in  capturing  the  first  prisoners — 7 — there.  The 
statements  of  these  prisoners  confirmed  the  reports  that  the 
hostile  2d  Corps  stood  in  front  of  Saarbriicken  and  that  the 
3d  Corps  had  been  in  readiness  behind  the  2d  in  the  engage- 
ment on  August  2d. 

General  von  Rheinbaben  had  reported  that  larger  op- 
erations would  be  carried  out  on  the  4th.  Thus,  detailed  re- 
ports concerning  the  defenses  and  dispositions  of  the 
hostile  fighting  forces  could  be  counted  on.  General  head- 
quarters had  oriented  army  headquarters  along  general 
lines  as  to  the  enemy's  positions. 

According  to  them,  the  French  1st  Corps  (MacMahon) 
was  at  Hagenau,  the  5th  (Failly)  at  Bitsch,  one  division 
or  brigade  was  at  Saargemtind — this  had  been  ascertained  to 
belong  to  the  hostile  5th  Corps  by  the  cavalry  of  the  Sec- 
ond Army.  The  2d  Corps  (Frossard)  was  still  at  Saar- 
briicken, the  3d  (Bazaine)  at  Boulay,  the  4th  (Ladmirault) 
in  the  vicinity  of  Bouzonville  and  in  front  thereof.  It  had 
been  learned  that  the  Guard  Corps  had  been  brought  from 
Nancy  to  Metz ;  and  only  of  the  6th  Corps  we  had  no  definite 
information.  A  regiment  belonging  to  that  corps  had  been 
seen  in  the  Camp  of  Chalons  and  it  \yas  possible  that  the 
entire  corps  could  be  looked  for  there.  The  7th  Corps  was 
being  concentrated  at  Belfort,  but  there  was  no  reliable  in- 
formation concerning  its  destination. 

The  Third  Army,  after  having  completed  its  task  in 
Lower  Alsace,  was  to  proceed  against  the  hostile  main  posi- 
tion in  such  manner  as  to  reach  on  the  9th  the  river  line 
above  Saargemiind.    That  day  ought  also  to  have  been  desig- 

—300— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

nated  for  the  attack  of  the  Second  Army.  The  dispositions 
made  for  the  4th  for  the  advance,  would  have  brought  that 
army  in  the  situation  to  be  able  to  force  the  Saar  with  all 
units  on  the  9th, 

The  assumptions  on  which  army  headquarters  based 
hopes  for  the  success  of  such  an  offensive,  were  confirmed 
by  the  information  received  (mentioned  above)  of  conditions 
with  the  enemy.  But  nevertheless  conditions  were  to  change 
very  soon  and  the  entire  war  situation  unexpectedly  assume 
a  new  shape. 

If  touch  with  the  enemy  has  once  been  gained,  that 
toucli  becomes  the  normal  form  for  all  actions.  Decisions 
arrived  at  in  advance  have  to  be  sacrificed  to  momentary 
requirements  and  new  dispositions  must  be  adapted  to  new 
conditions. 

During  August  4th  the  thunder  of  cannon  had  been 
heard  several  times  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Second  Army.  At 
6:00  A.M.  August  5th  information  of  the  victory  of  Weis- 
sembourg  was  received  at  army  headquarters  in  Winnweiler. 
The  first  action  on  a  large  scale  had  been  fought  and  had  re- 
sulted in  a  brilliant  victory.  The  prestige  of  the  enemy — 
who  had  astonished  the  world  by  the  confident  manner  of 
his  declaration — had  been  materially  damaged  by  a  defeat 
within  fourteen  days  after  his  declaration  of  war  in 
the  midst  of  peace,  by  a  defeat  in  which  he  lost  not  only  a 
number  of  trophies  but  also  an  unusual  number  of  un- 
wounded  prisoners  seldom  found  in  military  history. 

The  Second  Army  had  now  to  pay  its  utmost  attention 
to  find  what  eff'ect  this  event  had  on  the  enemy  in  front  of 
the  Second  Army.  The  cavalry  was  directed  to  increase  its 
efforts  in  closing  with  the  enemy  and  to  lose  no  opportunity 
that  might  furnish  some  clue  as  to  the  enemy's  intentions. 
The  main  body  of  the  cavalry  was  on  the  line  Biittlingen — 
Dudweiler — St.  Ingbert — Bliescastel — Zvv'eibriicken  and  Pir- 
masenz.  It  had  taken  this  position  independently  on  receipt 
of  orders  from  Army  Headquarters  on  the  4th.  Its  advanced 
troops  on  the  Blies  and  Saar  reported — and  the  reports  from 
the  right  wing  and  center  corresponded — that  it  appeared 
that  the  enemy  was  marching  off.    It  was  believed  that  mov- 

—301— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

ing  troops  could  be  seen  between  Saarbriicken  and  Forbach 
and  that  hostile  camps,  abandoned  by  troops,  were  seen  at 
the  frontier. 

These  reports  did  not  come  singly,  but  were  repeated 
during  the  course  of  the  5th  of  August.*  Therefore  the 
cavalry  received  information  at  7:00  P.M.  of  the  events  at 
Weissembourg  and  instructions  to  remain  close  to  the  enemy 
to  ascertain  his  route  of  retreat  and  to  push  forward  in 
strength  especially  in  the  direction  of  Rohrbach.  The  corps 
were  left  to  the  execution  of  the  dispositions  of  August  4th. 

During  the  forenoon  of  August  5th  Prince  Freder- 
ick Charles  transferred  his  headquarters  to  Kaiserslau- 
tern.t 

THE  6th  OF  AUGUST 

Early  reports  of  August  6th  were  awaited  with  great 
tension  in  Kaiserslautern.  These  reports  still  stated,  com- 
ing from  the  vicinity  of  Saarbriicken,  that  it  appeared  as  if 
the  enemy  was  getting  ready  to  march  off.  It  was  said 
that  troops  were  entraining  for  St.  Avoid  at  the  Forbach 
station. 

Therefore  the  Prince  wired  at  8:05  A.M.  from  Kaisers- 
lautern to  General  von  Alvensleben  II,  "the  5th  Infantry 
Division  will  march  to  Saarbriicken  during  the  6th,  as  the 
cavalry  divisions  are  closely  following  the  retreating  en- 
emy.t 

Thereupon  Army  Headquarters  proceeded  to  Homburg. 

A  wire  from  General  von  Alvensleben  arriving  in  Hom- 
burg at  noon  was  already  dated  from  Saarbriicken.     The 


*  Subsequently    proved    to    be    erroneous. 

fDuring  the  course  of  August  .5th  the  corps  of  the  Second  Army 
reached  the  following  points  in  executing  their  tasks  as  directed  on 
the   4th: 

1.  The  Illd  Army  Corps,  St.  Wendel — Neunkirchen. 

2.  The  IVth   Army    Corps,    Homburg — Einod. 

3.  The  Xth   Army  Corps,  Kusel — Altenglau. 

4.  The  Guard    Corps,   Landstuhl — Kindsbach. 

5.  The   IXth   Army   Corps,  Otterberg — Otterbach. 

6.  The    Xllth    Army    Corps,    Miinchweiler — Enkenbach     (be- 

tween   Winnweiler    and    Kaiserslautern). 

JAt  the  same  time  the  IVth  Army  Corps  sent  an  advance  guard 
on   the   6th    to    Neu-Hornbach. 

—302— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

enemy  had  actually  evacuated  that  place  and  a  portion  of 
the  cavalry  of  the  Second  Army  occupied  it.*  Infantry  and 
artillery,  apparently  covering  the  retreat  of  the  French  still 
were  on  the  hills  at  Spicheren, 

Events  now  took  a  rapid  course  and  quite  unexpectedly 
drew  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army  into  a  bloody  battle. 

General  von  Rheinbaben  reported  at  1 :30  P.M.  that  the 
enemy  was  deploying  against  his  advancing  leading  elements 
and  that  at  that  time  the  leading  elements  of  the  14th  Infan- 
try Division  of  the  First  Army  were  arriving  in  Saar- 
briicken. 

As  was  soon  learned,  headquarters  of  the  Hid  Army 
Corps  had  already  arrived  at  the  decision  to  occupy  Saar- 
briicken  and  did  so,  when  the  orders  of  the  Prince  of  the 
morning  of  that  day  were  received.  At  3:30  P.M.  the  fol- 
lowing telegram  was  received  at  Homburg  from  Neunkir- 
chen: 

"5th  Division  reports  from  Saarbriicken  that  the  14th  Divi- 
sion is  engaged  in  battle.  Colonel  Doring  advances  in  support 
with  the  9th  Brigade. f  I  am  proceeding  to  that  place.  All  avail- 
able troops  march  or  proceed  by  rail  to  Saarbriicken." 

Report  from  Saarbriicken : 

"Engagement  proceeding  victoriously. 

VON  Alvensleben." 

Thus  troops  of  the  First  and  Second  Army  became 
mixed  at  Saarbriicken.  It  could  be  seen  as  early  as  August 
4th  that  blockades  in  the  march  columns  could  easily  occur 
because  of  the  orders  for  the  march  to  the  left  of  the  First 
Army,  directed  by  Army  Headquarters,  into  the  triangle  Le- 
bach — Tholey — Ottweiler.  For  instance,  the  First  Army 
had  occupied  the  village  of  Ottweiler,  while  the  St.  Wendel 
— Neunkirchen — Saarbriicken  road  leading  through  Ott- 
weiler, had  been  assigned  to  the  right  wing  of  the  Second 
Army.  Therefore  Army  Headquarters  at  once  communi- 
cated with  General  von  Steinmetz,  Regulating  conditions 
on  the  left  wing  of  the  First  and  the  right  wing  of  the 


*In    evacuating    Saarbriicken,    the    French    left    the    bridges    un- 
damaged.— C.H.L. 

fAdvance  guard  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division. 

—303— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Second  Army  appeared  the  more  necessary  as  the  1st  Army 
Corps  was  also  drawn  into  the  same  terrain  in  which  they 
moved.  This  corps  detrained  on  August  3d  and  4th  at  Bir- 
kenfeld  and  Kaiserslautern  and  marched  into  the  triangle 
Tiirkismiihle — St.  Wendel — Tholey.  There  it  was  to  hold 
itself  in  readiness  at  the  start  to  serve  as  support  for  either 
the  First  or  Second  Army  as  conditions  might  require.  Thus 
we  might  expect  overcrowding  in  the  direction  of  Birken- 
feld  toward  Saarbriicken  similar  to  that  between  Kaisers- 
lautern and  Saargemiind. 

Regulation  cf  the  march  direction  of  the  two  armies — 
which  could  of  course  be  accomplished  only  by  direct  or- 
ders from  General  Headquarters — was  not  yet  completed  on 
August  6th.  And  the  engagement  at  Saarbriicken  now 
made  regulation  impossible.  The  thunder  of  cannon  had  to 
exert  its  influence  on  the  troops  marching  on  the  adjoining 
flanks,  and  we  had  waited  to  see  how  many  troops  of  the 
two  armies  the  tactical  decision  would  mix,  as  is  the  case  in 
every  action.  Only  after  the  close  of  the  action  could  steps 
be  taken  to  bring  the  troops  back  to  their  proper  roads  for 
a  continuation  of  the  operations. 

Let  us  now  turn  briefly  to  the  development  of  the  ac- 
tion at  Saarbriicken : 

The  Illd  Army  Corps,  foreseeing  the  approaching  pri- 
mary tactical  decisions  had  accomplished  more  than  had 
been  ordered  by  material  marches  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  6th,  it  with  the  5th  Infantry  Division  was  in  and  south 
of  Neunkirchen,  with  the  6th  Division  and  the  corps  ar- 
tillery between  there  and  St.  Wendel. 

According  to  the  orders  of  its  commanding  general  the 
corps  should,  on  the  6th,  march  with  its  leading  elements 
as  far  as  Dudweiler,  with  the  remainder  as  far  as  the  vicin- 
ity of  Neunkirchen.  These  orders  soon  were  enlarged,  in 
consequence  of  reports  received  direct  from  the  cavalry  that 
Saarbriicken  also  should  be  reached.  When  in  addition  Gen- 
eral von  Alvensleben  received  at  11:00  A.M.  the  wire  of  the 
Prince  from  Kaiserslautern,  dated  8:05  A.M.,  he  directed 
the  5th  Infantry  Division  to  occupy  the  city  and  to  concen- 
trate north  thereof  with  a  depth  of  four  miles.    When  then 

—304— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

the  thunder  of  cannon  was  heard  at  Saarbriicken  at  noon 
and  as  the  advance  guard  of  that  division  was  already 
marching  to  the  sound  of  cannon,  the  Illd  Corps  Headquar- 
ters decided  to  march  to  the  battlefield  with  all  troops  that 
could  be  reached,  or  to  send  them  there  by  rail.  The  bat- 
talions in  Neunkirchen  and  St.  Wendel  were  at  once  en- 
trained and  started  for  Saarbriicken.  Thus  it  happened  that 
not  only  the  5th  Infantry  Division  but  also  portions  of  the 
6th  and  the  corps  artillery  reached  the  battlefield. 

By  3:00  P.M.  the  action  had  spread  to  the  line  Stifts- 
wald  of  St.  Arnual  to  Stiring  and  by  that  hour  assumed  such 
a  serious  aspect  that  it  appeared  desirable  to  support  the 
troops  engaged  as  soon  as  possible.  Therefore  troops  of 
the  5th  Infantry  Division  participated  on  all  portions  of  the 
battlefield  as  a  very  welcome  support  in  the  battle. 

The  action  proper,  as  well  as  reports  thereof,  are  within 
the  province  of  the  battles  of  the  First  Army  (see  v.  Schell, 
Operations  of  the  First  Army). 

The  loss  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division  in  the  short  but 
heavy  engagement  was  in  dead  and  wounded:  72  officers, 
1921  men,  that  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division,  2  officers,  32 
men. 

In  the  evening  the  6th  Infantry  Division  concentrated 
around  Neunkirchen  between  eight  and  nine  o'clock.  A  por- 
tion of  that  division  and  of  the  corps  artillery  reached  the 
battlefield  during  the  course  of  August  6th,  formed  in  re- 
serve there,  but  did  not  have  a  chance  to  participate  to 
any  extent  in  the  action.* 

This  action  did  not  only  involve  the  Hid  Corps,  but  also 
the  cavalry  of  the  Second  Army,  though  the  latter  did  not 
succeed  in  gaining  a  tactical  success.! 

During  the  night  General  von  Rheinbaben  issued  orders 
not  only  to  those  portions  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  that 
were  close  at  hand,  but  also  to  the  entire  6th  Cavalry  Divi- 


*One  battalion  of  the  20th  Infantry  Regiment,  which  had  been 
entrained  in  St.  Wendel,  participated  in  outpost  service  during  the 
night;   it  had  some  losses  during  the  day. 

fThe  Brunswick  Hussar  Regiment  suffered  not  immaterial  los- 
ses in  its  attempt  to  support  the  infantry,  undertaken  with  the 
greatest    bravery. 

—305— 


Campaign  of  1870-71  j'. 

sion   to  march   immediately  toward   the   battlefield.     This      ^ 
movement  was  made  use  of  at  the  same  time  to  transfer  the 
6th  Cavalry  Division  to  the  right  wing  of  the  entire  cavalry 
line  and  to  do  away  with  the  separation  of  the  5th  Division 
by  regiments  of  the  6th. 

The  development  of  an  action  at  Saarbriicken  did  not 
contradict  the  opinion  held  at  Headquarters  of  the  Second 
Army  that  the  enemy  was  retreating  from  the  frontier,  as 
had  been  several  times  reported  by  the  cavalry.  It  is  hkely 
that  at  Saarbriicken  only  the  rear  elem,ents  of  Frossard's 
Corps  had  been  overtaken  and  that  the  enemy  had 
brought  back  stronger  bodies  of  troops  only  to  disengage 
those  troops.  Therefore  the  army  orders  issued  the  after- 
noon of  the  Gth — while  the  action  was  progressing — started 
with  that  assumption.  It  contained  the  additions  that  had 
now  become  necessary  to  the  orders  issued  on  the  4th  to 
advance  to  the  line  Neunkirchen — Zweibriicken,  It  was 
known  that  the  main  forces  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  were  al- 
ready at  Saarbriicken,  that  is,  a  day's  march  farther  to  the 
front  than  they  ought  to  have  been  originally  on  the  6th.* 

If  we  therefore  intended  to  keep  up  close  connection 
permanently  between  the  different  units  of  the  armies  and 
be  ready  for  a  possible  rapid  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  the  rest 
of  the  corps  would  have  to  increase  their  marches  on  Au- 
gust 7th,  which,  of  course,  would  mean  increased  efforts  and 
fatigue. 

Consequently,  on  that  day  the  corps  were  to  reach: 

The  Xth  Army  Corps — designated  to  support  the  Hid 
Corps — St.  Ingbert; 

The  Guard  Corps,  Assweiler  with  one  infantry  division, 
rear  elements  closed  up  if  possible  opposite  Bliescastel. 

The  IVth  Army  Corps,  Neu-Hornbach,  advance  guards 
towards  Bitsch  and  Rorbach. 

The  IXth  Army  Corps  with  leading  elements  ready  for 
action  at  Bexbach. 

The  Xllth  Army  Corps  Homburg. 

Army  headquarters,  Blieskastel. 


*According-  to  army  orders  of  August  4th,  the  corps  was  to  be 
at  Neunkirchen  on  the  6th  of  August. 

—306— 


Plan  of  the  Battle-field   of  Spicheren 


'.ipe.irtlont  ol  the  I'Army  under  GeneraJ  voji  SUmmefa 


X 
O 

a 

CO 


X     3 

H    CO 

z< 


^    -^ 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  Second  Army  received  at  that  very  time  reinforce- 
ment through  the  lid  Army  Corps  which  had  been  brought 
by  rail  from  the  interior  of  the  monarchy,  and  which  was  to 
arrive  in  Homburg  and  Neunkirchen  during  the  8th  to  the 
11th  of  August.  An  area  around  Neunkirchen  was  assigned 
to  this  army  corps  for  its  concentration.  That  corps  num- 
bered: 25  battalions,  8  squadrons,  14  batteries,  25,000  in- 
fantry, 1200  horses  and  84  guns. 

Thus,  the  strength  of  the  army  now  was:  181  battal- 
ions, 156  squadrons,  105  batteries  with  181,000  infantry,  23,- 
400  horses,  630  guns.* 

The  1st  Army  Corps  now  definitely  joined  the  First 
Army,  the  Vlth  Army  Corps  the  Third  Army. 

It  is  known  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  that  it  had  been 
transferred  to  the  zone  between  Tiirkismiihle — St.  Wendel — 
Tholey.  The  Vlth  Army  Corps  had  detrained  at  Landau. 
The  12th  Infantry  Division  belonging  to  that  corps  was  to 
reach  the  vicinity  of  Pirmasenz  on  August  7th,  and  there- 
fore the  IVth  Army  Corps  today  received  orders  to  make 
connection  with  it. 

Prior  to  that  on  August  3d,  the  1st  Cavalry  Division 
had  been  assigned  to  the  First  Army,  the  2d  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion to  the  Third  Army. 

THE   7th   AND   8th   OF   AUGUST 

General  von  Alvensleben  II  reported  the  victorious 
finish  of  the  action  at  Saarbriicken  by  wire  at  3 :  15  A.M.  Au- 
gust 7th.  He  added  that  the  fight  had  been  heavy  and  bloody. 
Thus  it  had  been  a  question  of  a  decision  of  tactical  impor- 
tance. The  commander-in-chief  of  the  Second  Army  also 
received  in  Bliescastel,  the  news  of  the  decisive  victory  of 
the  Third  Army  at  Worth.  Thus,  on  the  6th  of  August  the 
enemy  had  been  beaten  on  both  of  his  wings. 

Under  these  circumstances  some  reports  became  of 
great  importance,  as  they  opened  an  expectation  of  partici- 


*The  losses  during  the  action  of  Spicheren  and  the  march  losses 
up  to  then  should  be  deducted  from  the  above  numbers. 


—307— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

pating  in  the  defeat  of  the  hostile  troops  beaten  at  Worth 
or  to  capture  the  French  troops  still  remaining  on  the  Saar. 

General  von  Moltke  added  to  his  telegram  of  the  vic- 
tory the  notation  that  it  could  be  concluded  from  the  fact 
that  the  enemy  held  out  at  Worth  and  Saarbriicken,  that 
strong  hostile  forces  were  still  near  the  Saar  and  that  cav- 
alry reconnaissance  was  necessary.  Then  followed  a  report 
from  the  IVth  Army  Corps  which  had  received  information 
of  events  at  Worth  from  the  12th  Division  (which  was  at 
Dahn  on  August  6th)  and  had  learned  that  during  the  ac- 
tion portions  of  the  enemy  had  retreated  on  Bitsch.  The 
12th  Division  was  about  to  pursue.  Army  headquarters  also 
received  information  from  General  Headquarters  by  wire 
that  those  hostile  masses  that  had  turned  towards  Bitsch 
would  reach  that  place  by  August  7th  and  could  probably  be 
reached  on  the  8th  in  the  vicinity  of  Rohrbach  by  the  left 
wing  and  by  the  cavalry  of  the  Second  Army. 

In  order  to  clearly  estimate  the  situation  of  things  it 
will  be  necessary  here  to  go  back  to  the  events  of  the  past 
few  days. 

On  August  4th  touch  had  been  gained  in  the  terrain 
between  Bitsch  and  Saargemiind  between  the  left  wing  col- 
umn of  the  cavalry  and  the  enemy.  At  Habkirchen  and 
Bliesbriicken  French  infantry  detachments  were  encoun- 
tered, French  cavalry  at  Klein-Rederching,  and  stronger 
detachments  of  all  arms  at  Holbach.  The  Scheide  woods 
were  also  found  occupied  by  French  and  at  Opperdingen 
hostile  cavalry  and  infantry  was  encountered.  All  these  re- 
ports were  received  by  army  headquarters  on  August  5th. 

In  consequence  of  the  orders  issued  on  August  5th  to 
the  cavalry,  to  follow  the  enemy  who,  as  stated,  was  reported 
to  be  marching  from  the  Blies  to  the  Saar,  and  to  push  for- 
ward in  force  especially  in  the  direction  of  Rohrbach,  fur- 
ther reports  were  received  from  that  vicinity. 

It  was  reported  that  strong  columns  were  marching  on 
the  6th  from  Bitsch  toward  Saargemiind  and  that  the  camp 
at  Saargemiind  had  greatly  increased.  On  the  other  hand, 
movements  of  the  enemy  in  the  opposite  direction  from 

—308— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Rohrbach  to  Bitsch  were  reported,  as  well  as  that  material 
French  forces  were  at  Bitsch.* 

Second  Army  Headquarters  had  all  these  reports  when- 
it  took  measures  for  the  left  wing  of  the  army,  in  order  to 
concentrate  as  many  troops  as  possible  against  Rohrbach  by 
the  8th  of  August.  There  were  disposable  for  this  princi- 
pally the  IVth  Army  Corps,  which  received  orders  to  con- 
tinue its  march  the  afternoon  of  August  7th  to  south  of  Vol- 
miinster  and  to  send  its  advance  guard  as  far  as  Rohrbach. 

By  the  forenoon  of  August  8th  the  entire  Army  Corps 
was  to  be  at  Rohrbach,  and  the  left  column  of  the  cav- 
alry,! which  was  attached  to  that  corps,  was  to  be  sent 
against  Lemberg  and  Lorenzen.J 

The  Guard  Corps  was  designated  to  support  any  action 
that  might  occur  probably  at  Rohrbach.  Accordingly  the  2d 
Guard  Infantry  Division  and  the  Guard  Cavalry  Division 
were  to  be  started  on  the  march  on  the  8th  in  the  Blies  val- 
ley early  so  as  to  be  in  readiness  between  10  and  11  o'clock 
at  a  suitable  point  north  of  Gross  Rederching.  It  was  left 
to  the  discretion  of  the  commanding  general  of  the  Guard 
Corps  to  send  the  remainder  of  his  corps  so  that  it  could 
support  the  units  ahead. 

The  hostile  fighting  forces  observed  on  the  6th  at  Saar- 
gemiind  had  to  be  held  there.  For  that  purpose  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  was  to  reach  Saargemiind  with  its  leading  elements 
at  10:00  A.M.  August  8th  and  there  engage  in  a  containing 
action. 


*At  7:00  P.M.  patrols  of  General  von  Bredow's  command  had 
struck  a  hostile  squadron  marching  from  Saargemiind;  it  was  re- 
ported that  Rorbach  was  occupied  by  the  French;  at  Frohmiihle 
a  picket  was  encountered,  while  hostile  infantry,  estimated  to  be 
one  regiment,  held  the  crest  of  the  ridge  at  Freudenberg  and  that  a 
column  of  wagons  was  seen  in  rear  of  it  near  Bitsch,  apparently  artil- 
lery. The  strength  of  the  enemy  at  Bitsch  was  said  to  be  20,000 
men. 

fGeneral  von  Bredow  with  his  four  cavalry  regiments  and  one 
horse  battery. 

JOrders  had  been  sent  as  early  as  the  morning  of  the  7th  to 
General  von  Bredow  to  prolong  his  outposts  then  extending  from 
Schweix  to  Bliesbriicken,  to  the  right  via  Bliesbolgen  and  beyond 
to  cover  the  IVth  and  the  Guard  Corps,  as  the  right  column  of 
the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  was  pursuing  the  enemy.  The$e 
orders  were  sent  to  the  IVth  Army  Corps  for  transmission  to  General 
von   Bredow. 

—309— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

In  this  it  was  not  the  intention  to  force  a  crossing  of 
the  Saar  should  the  enemy  deploy  stronger  forces  there, 
for  it  appeared  in  that  case  far  better  to  send  the  Illd  Army 
Corps,  which  was  then  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Saar  upstream 
and  thus  open  the  defile  for  the  Xth  Army  Corps.  Both 
corps  received  directions  to  communicate  with  each  other 
regarding  this  point. 

In  addition,  the  leading  division  of  the  Vlth  Army 
Corps,  the  12th,  of  the  Third  Army,  which  was  marching 
from  Landau  on  Pirmasenz,  could  reach  Rorbach  on  Au- 
gust 8th.  Therefore  this  division  received  information  of 
the  measures  taken  and  was  requested  to  cooperate.  It 
already  had  received  instructions  from  headquarters  of  the 
Third  Army  to  make  a  demonstration  against  Bitsch. 

On  the  other  hand,  on  the  right  wing  of  the  army  the 
Illd  Army  Corps  received  orders  to  remain  for  the  present  at 
Saarbriicken  in  view  of  the  hardships  it  had  so  far  under- 
gone. The  pursuit  of  the  enemy  beaten  there  was  left,  in 
addition  to  the  First  Army,  to  the  four  cavalry  brigades 
that  had  been  brought  up  to  the  battlefield  by  General  von 
Rheinbaben. 

The  IXth  and  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  received  orders  to 
close  up  and  rest  at  Bexbach  and  Homburg  respectively. 

Now,  during  the  afternoon  hours  of  August  7th  reports 
were  received  from  Saarbriicken  from  the  Illd  Army  Corps, 
which  made  it  appear  that  the  victory  gained  on  the  6th  was 
far  more  important  than  expected.  General  von  Alvens- 
leben  wired  at  2:45  P.M.  that  600  to  700  unwounded  prison- 
ers had  been  brought  in*  and  that  many  arms  and  materiel 
as  v/ell  as  portions  of  the  camps  had  been  captured.  The 
enemy  had  left  the  Saar  and  the  Blies  line  during  the  night. 
It  was  found  that  the  enemy  only  held  Saargemiind  the 
morning  of  the  7th.  And  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  (17th 
Brunswick  Hussar  Regiment)  found  that  place  evacuated  in 
the  afternoon. 

Information  of  this  fact  reached  headquarters  in  Blies- 
castel  in  the  evening;  it  lessened  the  chances  of  any  action 


*Later  on  the  numbers  were  ascertained  to  be  more  than   1000. 

—310— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

at  Rohrbach,  but  did  not  preclude  the  possibility  that  the 
enemy's  columns  marching  farthest  to  the  north,  retreating 
from  Alsace,  might  be  struck  the  following  morning  at  Ror- 
bach  or  south  thereof. 

Therefore  the  orders  already  issued  remained  un- 
changed. 

On  the  morning  of  August  8th  the  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  Second  Army  proceeded  to  the  IVth  Army  Corps, 
which  stood  in  readiness  in  the  vicinity  of  Klein  Rederch- 
ing.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  with  all  its  units  had  started  its 
march  towards  Saargemiind.  It  was  left  on  the  march  toward 
that  point,  and  only  its  advance  guard  received  orders  to  ad- 
vance farther  towards  Puttelange  and  Metzing.  The  Guard 
Corps  had  taken  measures  in  such  manner  that  it  reached 
in  its  entire  strength  the  terrain  north  of  Gross-Rederching 
between  10  and  11  o'clock  and  could  send  its  cavalry,  fol- 
lowed by  advance  guards  in  support,  to  beyond  the  line 
Achen — Rohrbach.  Portions  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  had 
been  brought  forward  through  Saargemiind,  to  find  and  keep 
close  to  the  enemy,  and  to  gain  definite  knowledge  of  his 
whereabouts. 

Thus,  suflficient  forces  were  in  readiness  for  action  at 
Rohrbach,  but  the  advanced  cavalry  found  the  vicinity  as 
far  as  Lemberg  and  Lorenzen  free  of  the  enemy.* 

The  troops  beaten  at  Worth  appeared  to  have  taken 
their  line  of  retreat  farther  south,  and  there  was  no  hope 
of  reaching  them.  But  the  cavalry  received  instructions 
to  extend  its  reconnaissances  as  far  as  Drtilingen  (la  Petite 
Pierre — Fenetrange  road).  Prince  Frederick  Charles  then 
transferred  his  headquarters  to  Saargemiind  and  the  troops 
went  into  close  cantonment  and  bivouacs. 

Immense  supplies  were  captured  in  Saargemiind  and 
also  one  railroad  train  loaded  with  subsistence  stores  that 
could  not  be  moved  by  the  French  in  their  retreat.  This 
indicates  the  haste  with  which  the  enemy  executed  his  re- 
treat. Only  single  prisoners  of  the  French  2d,  3d  and  5th 
Corps  were  brought  in ;  otherwise  nothing  was  seen  of  the 


*The   fortress   of   Bitsch    was   called    on    to    surrender,    but    de- 
clined. 

—311— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

enemy  between  Puttelange  and  Saaralbe.  The  brigades  of 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  that  had  ridden  in  that  direction, 
the  11th  and  the  13th,  estabhshed  themselves  on  the  line 
Puttelange — Saaralbe  with  their  outposts. 

The  enemy  stood  in  force  only  on  the  right  wing  of  the 
Army,  opposite  the  Illd  Army  Corps,  on  the  heights  this 
side  of  St.  Avoid.  He  was  observed  there  by  the  6th  Cav- 
alry Division.  It  was  possible  that  the  French  2d,  3d  and 
4th  Corps  had  concentrated  there.  There  were  many  rumors 
among  the  rural  population  of  the  approach  of  the  French 
Guard  Corps  to  that  vicinity  and  it  appeared  possible  that 
the  enemy  intended  to  concentrate  all  available  forces  on  his 
left  wing  to  offer  a  decisive  resistance  this  side  of  the 
Moselle. 

This  possibility  was  taken  into  account  in  the  orders 
issued  the  afternoon  of  the  8th,  while  at  the  same  time  pre- 
paratory steps  were  taken  for  an  advance  on  the  Moselle  on 
as  large  a  breadth  as  possible. 

It  was  desirable  for  reconnaissance  or  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  to  make  each  column  of  marching  troops  of  the 
army  as  strong  in  cavalry  as  possible.  The  different  por- 
tions of  both  cavalry  divisions  were  therefore  from  now  on 
placed  under  tlje  orders  of  that  army  corps,  in  front  of  which 
they  found  themselves  in  the  course  of  their  operations ; 
that  is,  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  under  orders  of  the  Hid 
Army  Corps,  General  von  Rheinbaben  with  the  11th  and 
13th  Cavalry  Brigade  under  the  Xth  Corps,  and  General 
von  Bredow  with  the  12th  Cavalry  Brigade  under  orders  of 
the  IVth  Army  Corps.*  But  the  cavalry  commanders  nearest 
the  enemy  had  also  orders  to  report  everything  important 
direct  to  army  headquarters.  The  Prince  also  retained 
control  over  the  dispositions  of  the  cavalry  divisions  for 
battle. t 


*The  Guard  Corps,  which  also  was  in  the  first  line,  had  the  dis- 
posal of  its  own  cavalry  division. 

fBy  army  orders  of  July  31st,  which  regulated  the  conduct  of 
the  artillery  in  a  tactical  sense,  H.  R.  H.,  the  commander-in-chief 
had  retained,  on  the  battlefield,  the  disposition  of  the  horse  batteries 
with  the  corps  artillery. 

—  312— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

In  accordance  with  army  orders  the  corps  in  the  first 
line  were  to  be  on  the  9th  as  follows : 

The  Illd  Army  Corps  in  a  selected  position  at  Forbach ; 

The  Xth  Army  Corps  at  Saargemiind,  all  its  troops  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Saar. 

The  Guard  Corps  in  the  vicinity  of  Gross-Rederching 
and  Rimeling,  in  readiness  to  be  called  up  to  Saargemiind. 

The  IVth  Army  Corps  echeloned  on  the  Saarunion— 
Rohrbach  road,  its  patrols  as  far  to  the  south  as  practicable 
to  obtain  connection  with  the  Third  Army. 

In  the  second  line,  the  IXth  Army  Corps  was  to  reach 
St.  Ingbert,  the  Xllth  Habkirchen ;  this  latter  corps  was  to 
keep  its  cavalry  divisions  out  in  front.* 

The  8th  of  August  also  brought  the  opportunity  to 
regulate  conditions  with  the  First  Army  on  the  right  wing. 

The  First  Army  took  the  Volklingen — Ludweiler — Car- 
ling  road. 


Chapter  III 


FROM  THE  SAAR  TO  THE  MOSELLE 
THE  9th  AND  10th  OF  AUGUST 

At  the  same  hour  when  at  General  Headquarters  in 
Saargemiind  on  August  8th  the  army  orders  for  August 
9th  were  sketched  out,  conditions  with  the  enemy  had  again 
changed.  The  6th  Cavalry  Division  on  August  8th  found  St. 
Avoid  evacuated.!  A  hostile  rear  guard  that  had  been 
observed  in  the  forenoon  on  the  hills  of  St.  Avoid,  in  the 
afternoon  followed  its  corps  which  marched  towards  Metz 
and  halted,  only  when  darkness  fell,  on  the  other  side  of 
Longeville.  Troops  of  Bazaine's  Corps  were  recognized  in  this 
rear  guard,  which  undoubtedly  had  the  duty  to  cover  the 


*As  a  matter  of  fact  the  corps  had  its  cavalry  division  out  in 
front  on  the  morning  of  August  8th. 

fThe  15th  Ulan  Regiment,  one  squadron  of  which  went  as  far  as 
Longeville. 

—313— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

enemy's  retreat.  General  von  Alvensleben  II,  who  received 
information  of  this  during  the  night,  immediately  decided 
to  reach  St.  Avoid  by  a  forced  march  on  the  9th,  and  to  push 
ahead  his  advance  guard  to  the  fork  of  the  St.  Avoid — Faul- 
quemont  and  the  St.  Avoid — Metz  roads.  These  events  and 
details,  which  cleared  up  the  situation  with  the  enemy,  were 
reported  to  army  headquarters  during  August  9th. 

The  day  before  Marshal  Bazaine  had  been  in  the  city  of 
St.  Avoid ;  his  entire  corps  had  been  there.  In  the  hospital 
of  that  city  were  found  sick  men  from  the  2d  and  4th  Corps. 
The  supposition  that  the  main  hostile  force  was  marching 
from  the  vicinity  of  St.  Avoid  towards  Metz  in  front  of  the 
right  wing  of  the  Second  Army,  thus  became  a  certainty,* 
Therefore  the  next  succeeding  orders  had  to  reckon  with 
the  security  and  sufficient  strength  of  this  wing.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  front  of  the  left  wing  of  the  Second  Army 
at  Saarunion  and  Saaralbe  nothing  was  seen  of  the  enemy 
on  August  9th.  Here,  considerations  of  connections  and  co- 
operation with  the  Third  Army  remained  the  only  thing  to 
be  considered ;  patrols  of  both  armies  had  already  met  in 
Lemberg  on  August  8th. 

Thus  it  quite  naturally  resulted  that  for  the  10th  of 
August  the  four  corps  of  the  Second  Army  in  front  (the 
Illd,  Xth,  Guard  and  IVth  Corps)  were  to  come  up  to  the 
line  St.  Avoid — Puttelange — Sarralbe — Saarunion,  while  the 
IXth  Corps  was  to  remain  at  Saarunion,  and  the  Xllth, 
closed  up  at  Habkirchen,  The  lid  Army  Corps  also  soon 
took  position  in  this  second  line,  and  it  received  orders  to 
echelon  itself  for  the  present  from  Saarbriicken  up  the  Dud- 
weiler  valley. 

The  10th  of  August  brought  orders  from  General  Head- 
quarters for  operations  to  commence  against  the  Seille  and 
Moselle. 

The  enemy  continued  his  retreat  toward  these  two 
stream  lines  and  all  three  German  armies  were  to  follow 
him.       The  Second  Army  received  the  zone  between  the 


*The  outcome  of  the  battle  of  Spicheren  had  induced  the  French 
2d  Corps  to  retreat  south  by  way  of  Saargemiind. 

—314— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

St.  Avoid — Nomeny  roads*  and  the  Saarunion — Dieuze 
roads. t  North  of  this  zone,  about  opposite  the  Second 
Army,  the  First  Army  advanced.  The  Third  Army  could 
only  reach  the  upper  Saar  on  August  12th;  and  the  corps 
of  the  right  wing  consequently  had  to  make  but  short  daily 
marches  in  order  to  make  it  easier  for  the  corps  of  the  Third 
Army  which  were  marching  along  a  large  arc. 

The  Second  Army  found  itself  for  this  advance  in  the 
favorable  situation  of  being  able  to  march  with  four  army 
corps  in  the  first  line  line  along  parallel  roads.  The  other 
three  corps  had  to  remain  in  the  second  line ;  the  IXth  and 
the  lid — on  account  of  news  of  the  enemy — behind  the 
right  wing,  the  Xllth  Corps  on  a  more  extended  front  in 
rear  of  the  center. 

The  following  roads  were  assigned  to  the  corps : 

1.  To  the  Hid  Corps  the  St.  Avoid — Faulquemont — 
Han-sur-Nied — Buchy — ^Cheminot  road; 

2.  To  the  Xth  Army  Corps  the  Puttelange — Gros  Ten- 
quin — Brulange — Delme^ — ^Nomeny  road  ; 

3.  To  the  Guard  Corps  the  Saaralbe — Altroff — Virming 
Munster — Marimont — Chateau  Salins — Manhoue  road. 

4.  To  the  IVth  Army  Corps  the  Saarunion — Altweiler — 
Munster — Marimont — Chateau    Salins — Manhoue   road. 

Directions,  as  to  how  far  the  different  corps  were  to 
proceed  along  these  roads  each  day,  were  to  be  contained 
in  daily  orders,  as  that  matter  would  depend  mainly  on  in- 
formation received  of  the  enemy. 

The  prolongation  of  the  direction  of  the  four  march 
routes  led  to  the  Moselle  crossings  at  Pont-a-Mousson,  Dieu- 
louard  and  Marbache.  In  the  advance  to  those  points  the 
cavalry  of  all  four  corps  was  to  hasten  on  ahead,  followed 
by  the  advance  guards  designated  for  their  support.  The 
right  and  left  wings  were  directed  to  keep  connection  with 
the  other  two  armies. 


*This  road  inclusive.  Under  the  general  expression  St.  Avoid — 
Nomeny,  headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  is  understood  to  be  meant 
the  Forbach — St.  Avoid — Tritteling — Faulquemont — Herny — Han-sur- 
Nied — Buchy — Cheminot  road. 

fThis  road  exclusive. 

—315— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  Hid  Corps  was  to  be  followed  at  a  day's  march  by 
the  IXth  Corps,  the  IXth  Corps,  at  a  greater  distance  by  the 
lid  Corps  as  soon  as  it  was  assembled  at  Saarbriicken.  The 
Xllth  Corps  was  to  use  as  its  main  route  the  Metzing — Barst 
— Val  Ebersing — Lixing — Lelling — Vahl  les  Faulquemont — 
Chemery — Thonville — Brulange — Vatimont — Baudrecourt — 
Morville-sur-Nied — Soigne  road. 

These  lines  of  communications,  which  correspond  but 
little  with  the  course  of  the  main  roads,  were  in  many 
cases  supplemented  by  cross  and  communicating  roads  which 
had  been  drawn  on  so  that  with  the  exception  of  the  IXth 
and  the  lid  Corps  each  army  corps  had  free  control  of  its 
roads  of  communications  to  the  rear. 

Considerations  of  subsistence  made  it  necessary  to  re- 
move each  and  every  obstacle  that  could  interfere  with  the 
movement  of  the  trains.  It  could  be  foreseen  that  in  any 
case  the  troops  would  have  to  live  during  the  next  few  days 
by  requisition.  In  order  to  avoid  collisions  in  this,  the  corps 
were  assigned  definite  sectors.  A  start  had  been  made  in  es- 
tablishing an  army  reserve  depot  in  Saargemlind  since  that 
place  had  been  occupied,  and  the  headquarters  of  the  field 
bakeries  was  also  brought  to  that  place.  And  by  orders  of 
General  Headquarters  a  depot  had  been  established  in  Saar- 
albe  for  the  right  wing  of  the  Third  Army.*  But  in  the 
rapid  advance  that  was  to  be  expected,  there  was  danger 
that  the  communication  of  the  troops  with  those  points 
would  be  very  slight  and  irregular. 

THE   11th  OF  AUGUST 

Early  the  11th  of  August  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
moved  his  headquarters  from  Saargemlind  to  Puttelange. 
That  day  the  troops  were  to  reach  : 

The  lid  Army  Corps  (by  rail)  Neunkirchen  with  the  3d 
Infantry  Division  and  Corps  artillery,  Homburg  with  the 
4th  Infantry  Division  and  headquarters. 


*August  lOth  100  wagons,  loaded  from  the  depot  in  Saargemiind, 
of  the  provisional  wagon  park  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  were  brought 
to  the  Third  Army  under  escort  of  one  squadron  of  the  17th  Ulans 
to  Saarunion,  and  returned  empty  on  the  11th  of  August. 

—316— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  Illd  Army  Corps,  Faulquemont; 

The  IVth  Army  Corps,  Saarunion ; 

The  Guard  Corps,  Guebelange; 

The  Xllth  Army  Corps,  Saargemtind ; 

The  Xth  Army  Corps,  HelHmer  (advance  guard,  Gross- 
Tenquin)  ; 

The  IXth  Army  Corps,  Forbach. 

But  in  the  morning  of  that  day  new  reports  indicated 
a  sudden  change  in  the  enemy's  decision. 

The  cavah-y  of  the  right  wing  and  center  had  closely 
stuck  to  the  retreating  corps  of  Bazaine,  and  it  reached  the 
French  Nied  towards  evening.  It  found  that  sector  strong- 
ly occupied,  and  perceived  in  rear  strong  hostile  forces 
in  an  excellent  position.  It  observed  bivouacs,  camps  and 
outposts,  and  also  observed  the  march  of  columns  from 
the  direction  of  Metz  towards  Cqurcelles,  Pange  and  Mont. 
Inhabitants,  coming  from  the  direction  of  Metz,  confirmed 
the  report  that  troops  had  arrived  there  coming  from  the 
camp  at  Chalons*  and  that  other  troops  had  marched  off 
toward  the  Nied.  They  also  stated  that  they  had  heard 
that  the  army  was  expecting  orders  for  an  advance  east- 
ward. Traces  of  the  2d  and  5th  Corpsf  found  in  Landroff 
and  pursued  via  Herny  to  Remilly  also  led  to  the  Nied  posi- 
tion. Farther  south  the  terrain  was  free  of  the  enemy  and 
Chateau  Salins  had  been  found  to  be  free  of  the  enemy.  All 
this  indicated  the  possibility  that  the  enemy  intended  to 
seek  a  tactical  decision  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle  and 
that  he  was  concentrating  his  fighting  forces  for  that  pur- 
pose in  rear  of  the  Nied.  In  that  case  we  ought  not  to  attack 
him  with  single  units,  but  rather  with  all  of  the  corps  of 
the  Second  Army  combined  and  to  execute  that  attack  in 
conjunction  with  the  First  Army.  Therefore  Second  Army 
headquarters  decided,  as  soon  as  these  reports  were  con- 
firmed, to  execute  a  right  turn  with  the  entire  Second  Army 
and  to  deploy  for  an  offensive  battle  on  the  line  Faulque- 
mont— Verny.     This  movement  could  be  completed  by  the 


*The  first  echelons  of  the  French  6th  Army  Corps. 
fBrigade   Lapasset,  that  had  been  in   Saargemiind. 

—317— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

14th  of  August  by  calling  for  the  utmost  exertion  of  the 
troops  and  by  leaving  all  unnecessary  impedimenta  in  the 
zone  occupied  on  August  11th.  The  15th  would  remain 
for  the  approach,  and  the  battle  could  be  waged  on  the  16th 
or  17th.  It  would  then  be  the  intention  to  hold  the  enemy 
on  the  Nied  in  front,  but  to  utilize  the  main  forces  of  the 
army  on  the  left  of  the  Nied  against  his  right  flank.  In  or- 
der to  deprive  the  enemy  at  the  same  time  of  his  communi- 
cations in  the  Moselle  valley,  the  enveloping  left  wing  would 
send  detachments  toward  Pont-a-Mousson. 

Up  to  the  15th  of  August,  of  course,  the  situation  of 
fhe  Illd  Army  Corps  would  be  difficult.  That  corps  formed 
the  pivot  of  the  movement.  It  was  closest  to  the  enemy, 
and  if  he  decided  to  use  the  advantage  still  remaining  to  him 
for  three  days  for  an  active  defense,  it  could  easily  become 
engaged  in  a  battle  against  superior  hostile  forces.  On  Au- 
gust 12tii  the  Hid  Corps  could  be  supported  only  by  the 
IXth  Corps  starting  early  from  Forbach,  and  leading  ele- 
ments of  the  Xth  Corps,  which  could  be  sent  towards  Che- 
mery,'"'' 

We  could  of  course  not  count  on  the  rest  of  the  corps 
on  that  day ;  as  shown  by  the  just  explained  position  of  the 
corps  on  August  11th  (see  page  317).  It  was  presumed  in 
this  that  the  First  Army  would  be  about  on  the  line  Boulay 
— Marange. 

As  long  as  there  was  no  absolute  certainty  of  the  ene- 
my's intentions,  the  initial  steps  of  an  offensive  against  the 
Nied  had  to  be  combined  with  an  exceedingly  rapid  advance 
against  the  Seille.  Otherwise  valuable  time  might  be  lost 
by  useless  movements  which  would  much  favor  the  enemy 
if  he  decided  on  retreat  and  if  he  intended  to  hide  his  true 
intentions  by  a  halt  on  the  Nied. 

An  advance  in  echelons  from  the  left  wing,  which  could 
be  started  on  August  12th,  would  best  correspond  with  these 
intentions  for  the  next  few  days.     The  IVth  Corps — on  the 


*According'  to  the  dispositions  received  at  midnight  August  11th 
in  Puttelange  from  General  Headquarters,  the  Xth  Army  Corps  was 
to  be  brought  up  behind  the  Illd  Corps   (probably  via  Lelling). 


—318- 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

left  of  the  Army — would  then,  as  could  be  foreseen,  also 
come  into  second  line. 

However,  caution  made  it  necessary  in  any  case  to  have 
the  Illd  Army  Corps  halt  at  Faulquemont  and  prepare  a 
selected  position  for  defense  there.  As  early  as  the  fore- 
noon of  August  11th  General  von  Alvensleben  II  received 
orders  for  this.  At  the  same  time  a  report  was  sent  to  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  stating  that  Second  Army  Headquarters 
would  take  no  further  measures  for  a  combined  battle  of  the 
First  and  Second  Army  this  side  of  Metz  on  August  16th 
or  17th  until  the  situation  had  cleared  and  orders  had  been 
received  from  General   Headquarters. 

General  Headquarters  still  beheved  the  position  of  the 
French  behind  the  Nied  to  be  a  mere  observation  position. 
This  view  was  expressed  in  a  note  from  General  von  Moltke 
dated  at  10:45  A.M.,  received  in  Puttelange  at  2:00  P.M.* 
This  note  left  it  to  the  discretion  of  the  Second  Army  Head- 
quarters as  to  whether  the  Illd  Corps  should  halt  to  let  the 
remaining  corps  come  up.     This  had  already  been  ordered. 

There  was,  by  5 :00  P.M.,  no  definite  answer  to  the  let- 
ter of  Second  Army  Headquarters  of  that  forenoon,  at 
which  time  the  Army  Commander  issued  his  orders  for  the 
remaining  corps  of  the  army.  These  orders  therefore,  as 
the  situation  was  still  in  doubt,  had  to  reckon  with  a  fur- 
ther advance  westward  as  well  as  with  a  turn  to  the  right 
by  the  Army. 

The  IXth  Army  Corps  was  to  concentrate  at  St.  Avoid 
on  the  12th  and  to  advance  its  leading  elements  to  Longe- 
ville.  There  it  would  be  ready  to  support  the  Illd  Army 
Corps. 

In  addition,  on  that  day  corps  were  to  reach : 

the  Xth  Corps,  Landroff ; 

the  Guard  Corps,  Morhange; 

the  IVth  Corps,  Munster,  its  leading  elements  Bourg 
Altroff ; 

the  Xllth  Corps,  Barst,  its  leading  elements  Lixing; 

the  lid  Corps,  Saarbriicken. 


*See  No.  139,  von  Moltke's  Correspondence,  page  247. 

—319— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Through  this  movement  the  corps  of  the  army  would 
approach  the  right  wing  and  the  line  of  concentration  Faul- 
quemont — Verny,  while  at  the  same  time  ground  would  be 
gained  toward  the  front. 

THE  12th  OF  AUGUST 

At  midnight  of  August  11th,  the  answer  to  the  letter 
from  Army  Headquarters  of  the  forenoon  of  the  11th  was 
received  from  General  Headquarters  in  Puttelange.  This 
answer  was  dated  St.  Avoid  7:00  P.M.,  August  11th.* 

General  Headquarters  believed  it  not  improbable  that 
a  material  part  of  the  hostile  fighting  forces  still  were  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  French  Nied  in  front  of  Metz.  It  was 
the  intention  to  bring  about  closer  connection  between  the 
First  and  the  Second  Army  and  therefore  His  Majesty  or- 
dered the  following: 

"The  lid  Army  Corps  in  Faulquemont  will  be  the  supporting 
point  for  the  junction  of  both  armies. 

"The  First  Army  will  march  early  tomorrow  with  two  corps 
to  the  line  Boulay — Marhange,  with  one  corps  to  Boucheborn. 

"The  Second  Army  sends  the  IXth  Corps  to  Longeville,  west 
of  St.  Avoid,  toward  which  latter  place  the  lid  Army  Corps,  as 
far  as  it  is  available,  will  close  up.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  pro- 
ceeds (about  via  Lelling)  to  in  rear  of  the  Hid  Corps.  The 
Guard,  IVth,  and  Xllth  Army  Corps  are  to  be  drawn  up  towards 
the  left  of  the  above  designated  position  in  such  manner  that  they 
can  join  that  position  if  required,  or  continue  the  march  in  the 
direction  of  Nancy. 

"The  outposts  of  the  First  Army  will  in  general  be  advanced 
to  the   German   Nied. 

"All  army  corps  will  leave  the  second  section  of  their  trains 
in  the  districts  occupied  today,  leaving  the  roads  completely  clear." 

The  orders  issued  by  Second  Army  Headquarters  at 
5:00  P.M.,  August  11th,  corresponded  almost  completely 
with  these  orders  from  General  Headquarters.  Both  Head- 
quarters started  with  the  same  point  of  view  and  this  fact 
saved  the  troops  hard  marches  which  otherwise  could  not 
have  been  avoided  as  the  situation  was  precarious. 

Only  the  lid  Army  Corps  received  orders  by  telegraph 
on  the  morning  of  August  12th  to  march,  in  so  far  as  it  was 
ready  therefor,  on  the  same  day  and  on  August  13th  to  St. 


*See  No.  141,  von  Moltke's  Correspondence,  page  247. 

—320— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Avoid.  As  was  ascertained  later  on,  these  orders  did  not 
reach  the  corps,  but  a  duplicate  thereof,  dated  at  noon,  did 
reach  the  corps.  Therefore  the  army  corps  was  only  able 
on  the  12th  to  send  one  infantry  regiment  by  rail  to  St. 
Avoid. 

On  the  morning  of  August  12th  the  Prince  moved  his 
headquarters  to  Gross-Tenquin.  There  new  reports  arrived 
in  the  course  of  the  day  which  showed  that,  even  if  the  en- 
emy had  drawn  all  his  available  forces  on  the  Moselle  to 
Metz,  he  was  nevertheless  about  to  withdraw  across  that 
river  through  Metz.*  The  position  on  the  Nied  had  been 
evacuated  on  August  11th,  and  the  French  army  camped  un- 
der the  guns  of  the  fortress ;  officers'  patrols  of  both  cavalry 
divisions  had  observed  bivouac  fires  there  the  evening  be- 
fore. In  the  morning  of  August  12th  detachments  of  both 
cavalry  divisions  had  followed  the  French  to  across  the 
Nied  as  far  as  the  line  Coincy — Ars-Laquenexy — Peltre 
and  had  there  seen  large  tent  camps  close  to  Metz  and  north- 
east of  that  city.  The  terrain  behind  the  Nied  was  found  to 
be  fortified  as  a  battlefield.  Walls  had  been  loopholed, 
trenches  and  gun  emplacements  constructed.  Some  shots 
were  exchanged,  until  the  enemy  pushed  the  cavalry  back 
with  his  infantry. 

The  thought  arose  that  the  enemy  would  cross  the  river, 
take  position  on  the  left  of  the  Moselle  and  utilize  Metz  as 
a  bridge  head. 

However,  on  the  11th  the  leading  elements  of  the  cav- 
alry of  the  Second  Army  had  ridden  as  far  as  the  Moselle 
and  the  Meurthe  towards  Pont-a-Mousson,  Dieulouard, 
Nancyt  and  St.  Nicholas-du-Port,  without  seeing  anything 
whatever  of  the  enemy.  It  was  found  that  the  bridges 
across  the  Moselle  at  Dieulouard  were  intact  and  our 
cavalry  then  destroyed  there  the  telegraph  line  be- 
tween   Metz    and    Nancy.      These    reports    contradicted 


*With  due  regard  to  the  intended  concentration  on  the  line  Faul- 
quement — Verny,  Headquarters  in  Gross-Tenquin  had  outlined  or- 
ders for  the  13th  of  August,  but  which  now,  as  the  situation  had 
changed,  could  not  be  published  to  the  troops. 

fNancy  itself  was  found  by  one  squadron  of  the  10th "Hussars 
free  of  the  enemy  on  August  12th. 

—321— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

the  views  held.  In  order  to  determine  matters,  it 
appeared  necessary  to  send  larger  bodies  of  cavalry 
as  rapidly  as  possible  across  the  river  to  the  pla- 
teau between  the  Moselle  and  Meuse.  Therefore  General  von 
Voights-Rhetz  received  orders  at  2:00  P.M.,  August  12th, 
to  charge  General  von  Rheinbaben  with  that  important 
task.  It  was  intended  to  again  assemble  the  entire  5th 
Cavalry  Division  into  one  body.  The  IVth  Army  Corps  was 
instructed  to  bring  Bredow's  Brigade,  so  far  under  its  or- 
ders, to  the  front  on  August  13th  and  have  it  join  the  divi- 
sion. August  12th  General  von  Rheinbaben  was  to  march 
on  Pont-a-Mousson  and  Dieulouard  and  his  command  was 
to  be  followed  early  on  the  13th  by  one  infantry  division  of 
the  Xth  Army  Corps  with  the  light  field  bridge  train  via 
Delme  to  Pont-a-Mousson.  The  advance  guard  of  that  divi- 
sion was  to  be  sent  out  as  soon  as  possible.  Thus  it  was  in- 
tended to  take  possession  of  the  important  point  of  Pont-a- 
Mousson  and  keep  up  permanent  connection  with  the  cav- 
alry; and  the  cavalry  now  received  orders  to  advance  along 
the  plateau  between  the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse  in  a  nor- 
therly direction  against  the  Metz — Verdun  road  and  to  as- 
certain as  soon  as  practicable  if  the  enemy  was  retreating 
from  Metz  along  that  road. 

The  Illd  Army  Corps  was  to  instruct  the  6th  Cavalry 
Division  to  extend  its  left  as  rapidly  as  possible  across 
the  Seille  towards  the  Moselle  above  Metz,  so  as  to  keep 
an  eye  from  there  on  the  roads  leading  west  and  to  screen 
the  entire  intended  movement  against  the  fortress.  The 
orders  therefore  called  special  attention  to  the  prominently 
situated  Chateau  St.  Blaise  east  of  Jouy-aux-Arches  from 
which  place  a  good  view  could  be  had  on  the  important 
roads  and  on  the  fortress  of  Metz.  The  6th  Cavalry  Divi- 
vision  also  was  instructed  to  seek  connection  with  General 
von  Rheinbaben. 

The  First  Army  was  informed  of  these  orders.  It  was 
presumed  that  the  First  Army  would  direct  a  similar  opera- 
tion of  its  cavalry  below  Metz  and  it  was  hoped  to  thus  gain 
a  clear  insight  into  the  enemy's  intentions. 

—322— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Before  the  army  corps  received  their  orders  for  the 
march  on  the  13th,  orders  from  General  Headquarters 
had  to  be  awaited.  These  latter  were  received  in  Gross-Ten- 
quin  at  5:15  P.M.*  According  to  them  all  three  armies  were 
to  continue  the  advance  towards  the  Moselle,  the  First  Army- 
was  to  start  on  the  13th  for  the  line  Les  Etangs — Pange,  its 
cavalry  to  proceed  toward  Metz  and  cross  the  Moselle  below 
that  place.  This  move  would  at  the  same  time  secure  the 
right  flank  of  the  Second  Army.  The  Second  Army  received 
orders  to  reach  the  line  Buchy — Chateau  Salins  on  August 
13th,  to  push  outposts  to  the  Seille,  to  gain  if  possible  the 
crossings  over  the  Moselle  at  Pont-a-Mousson,  Dieulouard, 
Marbache,  etc.,  and  to  have  its  cavalry  reconnoiter  to  be- 
yond the  Moselle. 

The  Third  Army  received  orders  to  continue  its  advance 
towards  the  line  Nancy — Luneville. 

As  far  as  the  Moselle  and  the  Meurthe  it  was  permitted 
to  have  the  trains  follow  their  respective  army  corps. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles,  while  in  Puttelange,  had  es- 
tablished connection  with  the  Third  Army  and  telegraphic 
communication  had  been  established  into  the  district  of  that 
army  by  way  of  Saargemlind — Saaralbe — Saarunion.  It 
was  then  known  that  that  army  would  reach  on  August  13th 
the  line  Loudresing — Bisping — Azoudange — Avricourt — Re- 
paix  (near  Blamont). 

The  corps  of  the  Second  Army  now  received  the  fol- 
lowing march  objectives  for  August  13th : 

the  Hid  Army  Corps,  Bechy,  leading  elements,  Buchy; 

the  IXth  Army  Corps,  Many,  leading  elements,  Herny; 

the  Xllth  Army  Corps,  Chemery,  leading  elements, 
Thonville ; 

the  Xth  Army  Corps,  in  so  far  as  not  already  started 
toward  the  Moselle,  Lucy ; 

the  Guard  Corps,  Oron,  leading  elements,  Lemoncourt ; 

the  IVth  Army  Corps,  Chateau-Salins ; 

the  lid  Army  Corps,  St.  Avoid. 


*See  No.  149,  von  Moltke's  Correspondence,  page  251. 

—323— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

On  receipt  of  the  orders  dated  ^t  2:00  P.M.  General  von 
Voigts-Rhetz  had  sent  not  only  the  cavalry  under  General 
von  Rheinbaben  but  also  the  19th  Infantry  Division  to- 
wards Pont-a-Mousson,  and  the  latter  division  had  reached 
Delme  by  August  12th.  The  cavalry  scouted  as  far  as  the 
Moselle,  one  squadron  of  the  17th  Brunswick  Hussars  even 
going  beyond  the  river  to  the  railroad  depot  at  Frouard  and 
there  destroying  the  telegraph  line  and  the  roadbed  by 
removing  some  rails.  The  squadron  became  engaged  with 
the  enemy  there.  A  train  had  just  arrived  at  that  depot 
carrying  hostile  infantry.  That  infantry  left  the  cars  and 
opened  fire  on  the  squadron,  which  then  retreated  but 
taking  along  its  wounded  and  some  prisoners.*  At  Cham- 
pigneulles  patrols  also  encountered  French  infantry. 

An  officer's  patrol  that  had  been  sent  to  Pont-a-Mous- 
son  had  been  attacked  in  the  evening  by  hostile  cavalry  and 
it  appeared  that  Pont-a-Mousson  had  been  reoccupied  by 
the  French  with  all  arms. 

THE  13th  OF  AUGUST 

After  Pont-a-Mousson  had  been  reoccupied  by  the  ene- 
my it  was  believed  that  the  defile  would  have  to  be  forced  by 
fighting.  In  the  course  of  the  forenoon  however  the  cavalry 
found  that  that  place  had  again  been  evacuated,  that  the 
bridge  there  was  intact,  and  General  von  Rheinbaben  imme- 
diately proceeded  across  the  river  (the  17th  Brunswick  Hus- 
sars proceeded  as  far  as  Regneville).  The  19th  Infantry 
Division  had  also  continued  its  march  during  the  forenoon  of 
the  13th,  reached  Pont-a-Mousson  with  its  advance  guard, 
and  brought  the  main  body  also  up  to  that  place.  Thereafter 
General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  brought  the  rest  of  his  command 
up  to  Delme  so  as  not  to  let  the  march  column  of  his  corps 
get  too  long  and  took  his  headquarters  to  Aulnois-sur-Seille. 

Thus,  the  Xth  Army  Corps  had  executed  far  more  than 
it  was  charged  with  by  orders  from  army  headquarters  and 


*The  prisoners  belonged  to  the  26th  and  68th  Line  Regiments, 
the  1st  Regiment  Algerian  Tirailleurs,  the  16th  Battalion  Chasseurs 
a  pied  and  also  to  the  French  6th,  5th  and  1st  Corps.  They  stated 
in  general  that  that  train  came  from  Metz  and  its  destination  had  been 
Chalons. 

—324— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

had  gained  the  advantage  for  that  army  of  being,  on  August 
13th,  in  secure  possession  of  the  most  important  Moselle 
crossings. 

In  the  morning  the  commanding  general  of  the  Second 
Army  had  transferred  his  headquarters  to  Delme  and  there 
received  the  first  reports  in  the  afternoon  from  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  concerning  the  occupation  of  Pont-a-Mousson.  It  ap- 
peared important  to  have  a  second  crossing  at  that  point 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  therefore  the  chief  engineer  officer 
of  the  army  received  immediate  orders  to  start  the  construc- 
tion of  a  ponton  bridge  there. 

The  task  of  the  Second  Army  was  now  a  double  one. 
It  was  known  for  certain  that  there  was  at  Metz,  or  march- 
ing through  that  place  towards  the  Meuse,  the  French  2d, 
3d,  4th  and  portions  of  the  5th  Corps  (Brigade  of  Lapasset) , 
which  had  been  opposite  the  German  armies  on  the  frontier. 
In  addition,  the  presence  of  the  French  Guards  had  been 
ascertained  by  sick  of  that  corps  found  in  the  hospital  at 
Courcelles — Chaussy.  The  5th  Cavalry  Division  had  taken 
some  prisoners  at  Frouard  belonging  to  the  French  6th 
Corps.  The  forces  which  the  enemy  had  concentrated  at 
Metz  were  therefore  so  strong  that  they  would  require  the 
entire  attention  of  the  German  First  and  Second  Army.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  was  necessary  to  keep  ahead  of  the  enemy 
for  subsequent  operations  into  the  enemy's  country  and  to 
utilize  the  advantages  so  far  gained. 

For  this  it  was  necessary  to  cross  the  Moselle  as  rap- 
idly as  possible  and  gain  a  firm  foothold  in  full  force  on  the 
plateau  between  the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse. 

To  correctly  estimate  the  events  now  starting  it  is  nec- 
essary to  remember  that  the  fortress  of  Metz  dominated 
with  the  guns  of  its  forts  on  both  banks  of  the  Moselle  an 
area  of  about  six  [English]  miles  square. 

In  this  space  sides  on  both  the  banks  of  the  river  are 
covered  with  woods,  vineyards,  orchards,  villages  and  sin- 
gle farm  houses  making  a  view  difficult.  Only  from  some 
of  the  higher  points  along  the  banks  of  the  Moselle,  as  for 
instance  from  the  Chateau  St.  Blaise,  can  a  clear  view  be 

—325— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

had  into  the  terrain  between  the  forts.  If  these  points  were 
not  immediately  located,  patrols  could  nevertheless  ascer- 
tain that  hostile  troops  were  camped  in  that  terrain;  but 
it  would  remain  difficult  to  estimate  the  strength  of  those 
troops,  even  if  only  approximately.  The  question  whether 
the  main  body  of  the  French  army  still  was  between  the 
forts  and  the  fortress,  or  had  already  started  for  the  Meuse 
could  be  definitely  answered  only  after  the  roads  to  Ver- 
dun and  north  thereof  had  been  occupied  by  the  German 
cavalry.  Until  that  happened,  the  dispositions  of  the  Second 
Army  had  to  be  based  on  a  double  task.  The  army  orders 
issued  from  Delme  on  the  13th,  at  8 :00  P.M.,  were  also  based 
on  that  view. 

These  orders  contained  the  following  directions  for 
August  14th : 

"Tomorrow  (the  14th)  the  Second  Army  will  approach 
closer  to  the  Moselle  and  in  doing  so  keep  a  sharp  eye  on 
developments  around  Metz. 

"1.  Tomorrow  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  will  proceed  to 
the  plateau  betvv'een  the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse  toward 
Thiaucourt  and  will  send  its  leading  elements  in  a  northerly 
direction  to  observe  the  Metz — Verdun  road.  The  point  Les 
Baraques  east  of  Chambley  and  the  plateau  northwest  of 
Gorze  permit  a  good  view  along  that  road. 

"2.  In  rear  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  will  concentrate  in  and  around  Pont-a-Mousson  along 
both  banks  of  the  Moselle.  It  will  occupy  with  infantry  de- 
tachments the  roads  leading  to  Metz  in  the  valley  of  the 
Moselle  on  both  banks  and  to  the  point  where  the  Pont-a- 
Mousson — Flirey  and  Pont-a-Mousson — Thiaucourt  roads 
diverge.  Connection  with  the  advance  guard  of  the  Guard 
Corps  on  the  left  bank  is  to  be  sought. 

"The  Xth  Army  Corps  will  construct  a  crossing  over  the 
Mosel  at  about  Atton  on  the  14th  and  may  use  for  that  pur- 
pose, if  necessary,  the  light  field  bridge  train  of  the  Hid 
Army  Corps.  That  portion  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  still  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Seille  will  not  start  until  after  3:00 
A.M." 


—326- 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Thus,  the  Xth  Army  Corps  now  assumed  the  role  of 
advance  guard  to  the  Army. 

"3.  The  Illd  Army  Corps  will  tomorrow  reach  with  its 
leading  elements  and  headquarters  Cheminot  by  way  of 
Louvigny-sur-Seille,  rear  elements  closing  up  to  Vigny.  A 
few  squadrons  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  will  tomorrow 
take  over  the  security  of  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army 
against  Metz. 

"4.  On  the  14th  the  IXth  Army  Corps  will  reach  Buchy 
with  its  leading  elements  and  its  headquarters  will  take 
station  there.    Rear  elements  closed  up  as  far  as  Many.* 

"5.  The  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps  marches  via 
Brulange,  Vatimont,  Vaudrecourt,  Morville-sur-Nied,  Trag- 
ny  and  Moncheu  with  its  leading  elements  to  opposite 
Soigne,  where  its  headquarters  will  be,  and  its  rear  ele- 
ments will  close  up  to  Vatimont.  The  cavalry  division  will 
march  with  the  leading  elements,  as  the  commanding  general 
of  the  Second  Army  intends  to  employ  the  cavalry  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Moselle. 

"6.  The  Guard  Corps  will  tomorrow  send  two  cavalry 
brigades  with  horse  artillery  and  the  advance  guard  (which 
must  have  crossed  the  Seille  by  9  o'clock)  to  Dieulouard. 
Rear  elements  to  close  up  on  the  Seille.  Headquarters  Ar- 
raye. 

"7.  The  IVth  Army  Corps  will  march  tomorrow  towards 
the  Seille  in  the  direction  of  the  Moselle  crossing  at  Mar- 
bache,  headquarters  in  Manhoue-on-the-Seille.  Rear  ele- 
ments closing  up  as  far  as  Chateau  Salins. 

"8.  Army  Headquarters  goes  to  Pont-a-Mousson." 

Thus,  it  was  the  intention  on  the  right  wing  of  the 
Army  to  free  the  Hid  Army  Corps  for  further  operations 
against  and  beyond  the  Moselle. 

On  August  14th  the  IXth  Army  Corps,  in  readiness 
at  Buchy,  resumed  its  prior  role  of  supporting  the  First 
Army.  The  lid  Army  Corps,  which  again  had  orders  to 
follow  the  IX  Corps  in  a  similar  manner,  could  not  bring 


*The  Corps  was  to  leave  infantry  at  Herny  as  long  as  General 
Headquarters    remained   there. 

—327— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

its  main  body  on  the  14th  to  beyond  St.  Avoid.  Orders 
from  army  headquarters  reached  it  too  late,  as  stated  above. 
Material  loss  of  time  had  occurred  in  the  transportation  by 
rail  of  its  last  echelons.  It  was  impossible  to  transport 
these  echelons  by  rail  direct  via  Homburg  and  Neunkirchen 
and  thus  the  corps  could  only  be  concentrated  at  St.  Avoid 
by  August  14th.* 

After  orders  had  been  issued  a  report  arrived  at  Head- 
quarters in  Delme  on  the  evening  of  the  13th  that  the  ad- 
vance guard  cavalry  of  the  Guard  Corps  had  reached  the 
bridge  at  Dieulouard.  One  horse  battery  was  with  the  cav- 
alry (the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade)  ;  one  company  of  the  Fus- 
ilier battalion  of  the  Kaiser  Alexander  Guard  Grenadier 
regiment  was  sent  there  in  the  afternoon  by  wagons  to 
guard  that  bridge,  and  for  the  same  purpose  the  19th  In- 
fantry Division  detached  two  battalions  from  Pont-a-Mous- 
son  to  Dieulouard  (these  battalions  belonged  to  the  57th 
Infantry).  During  the  afternoon  four  trains  loaded  with 
French  infantry  came  from  Frouard  towards  Dieulouard 
as  far  as  the  interruption  of  the  road.  Three  of  them  im- 
mediately went  back,  while  the  fourth  was  fired  on  by  the 
horse  battery  that  just  then  arrived;  it.  then  also  went 
back.f 

As  the  river  crossing  at  Dieulouard  was  now  also  in 
secure  possession  of  the  Second  Army,  its  cavalry  hav- 
ing made  use  of  it  twice  before  on  the  11th  and  12th,  the 
Moselle  could  now  be  crossed  at  several  points  without  loss 
of  time.  The  rapidity  with  which  the  Second  Army  ad- 
vanced to  the  other  side  of  the  Moselle  now  depended  only 
on  conditions  at  Metz.  These  were  to  take  such  shape  that 
as  a  matter  of  fact  a  delay  had  to  occur  on  the  14th  on  the 
part  of  the  right  wing  of  the  Army. 

THE  14th  OF  AUGUST 

Large  hostile  bodies  had  been  on  the  13th  at  Borny 
and  Servigny  east  of  Metz.     In  the  afternoon  of  that  day 


*  Leading  elements  and  headquarters  marched  on  the  14th  to  Faul- 
quemont,  the  rest  closed  up  to  St.  Avoid. 

fThus  the  trains  of  the  French  6th  Corps  were  definitely  stopped. 

—328— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

General  Headquarters  had  been  moved  to  Herny.  From 
there,  at  1 :30  A.M.,  the  14th  of  August,  the  following  orders 
were  received  in  Delme,  dated  9:00  P.M.,  August  13th:* 

"The  First  Army  remains  tomorrow,  the  14th  August, 
in  its  positions  on  the  French  Nied  and  observes  by  ad- 
vanced advance  guards  if  the  enemy  withdraws  or  if  he 
advances  to  attack. 

"Should  the  latter  be  the  case  the  Hid  Corps  of  the  Sec- 
ond Army  will  be  sent  tomorrow  to  opposite  the  heights  of 
Pagny,  the  IXth  to  Buchy  in  the  direction  of  the  Moselle 
(Pont-a-Mousson),  where,  by  starting  early,  they  will  be 
in  readiness  at  a  distance  of  4J  [English]  miles  to  par- 
ticipate in  any  serious  action  in  front  of  Metz.  The  road 
from  Herny  via  Buchy  to  Pagny  is  to  be  kept  clear  of  all 
trains. 

"On  the  other  hand,  the  First  Army  is  in  a  situation  to 
prevent  any  advance  of  the  enemy  southward  by  a  flank  at- 
tack. 

"The  other  corps  of  the  Second  Army  will  continue  their 
advance  toward  the  Moselle  stretch  Pont-a-Mousson — Mar- 
bache. 

"The  Xth  Corps  will  take  position  in  front  of  Pont-a- 
Mousson. 

"The  cavalry  of  both  armies  will  be  sent  ahead  as  far 
as  possible  and  must  interrupt  a  possible  retreat  of  the 
enemy  along  the  Metz — Verdun  road." 

Thus,  the  masses  which  the  enemy  had  assembled 
at  Metz  appeared  to  be  important  enough  to  keep  two 
corps  in  readiness  to  cooperate  with  the  First  Army. 

Both  corps  had  received  instructions  as  to  their  task 
direct  from  General  Headquarters. 

Still  they  received  special  orders  from  the  Prince  at 
6:00  A.M.  on  the  14th — the  Hid  to  concentrate  at  Pagny-les- 
Coin,  the  IXth  to  close  up  towards  Buchy. 

Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  no  longer  thought 
it  possible  that  a  hostile  offense  would  take  place  from  Metz 
along  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle,  but  still  reckoned  with 


*See  No.  155,  von  Moltke's  correspondence,  page  253. 

—329— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

that  possibility.  It  was  the  intention  at  that  time,  if  the 
French  Army  did  not  advance,  to  concentrate  the  IXth  and 
the  Illd  Corps  in  first  hne,  the  Xllth  in  rear  of  the  right, 
the  Xth,  which  in  the  meantime  was  still  to  occupy  Pont-a- 
Mousson,  in  rear  of  the  left  wing  in  a  defensive  position, 
say  at  Soigne.  These  corps  were  to  participate  in  any  case 
in  any  action  that  might  start.  For  August  15th  the  line 
Pont-a-Mousson — Delme  appeared  to  be  advantageous  for 
deployment. 

To  that  point  the  enemy  would  have  to  cover  a  longer 
distance  and  it  could  well  become  possible  that  other  por- 
tions of  the  Third  Army  might  be  brought  up  for  the  decis- 
ion.* 

In  the  forenoon  of  August  14th  Army  Headquarters 
was  transferred  to  Pont-a-Mousson. 

There  reports  were  received  in  the  afternoon  from  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division,  dated  12 :45  noon,  which  stated  that 
the  division  had  entered  Thiaucourt  and  Beney  and  would 
send  forward  detachments  toward  the  Metz — Verdun  road 
in  the  afternoon. 

Nothing  had  been  seen  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  the 
division  nor  in  the  vicinity  of  Pagny  in  the  Moselle  valley  ;t 
connection  with  the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade  had  been  estab- 
lished. 

The  Xth  Army  Corps  completed  its  concentration 
around  Pont-a-Mousson  on  both  banks  of  the  Moselle. 

The  Guard  Cavalry  Division^  arrived  at  Rogeville  and 
sent  detachments  toward  Flirey,  Toul  and  Gondreville.  The 
enemy  was  encountered  only  in  the  outskirts  of  Toul,  other- 
wise the  entire  terrain  west  of  the  Moselle  was  found  free  of 
the  enemy.  The  Guard  Corps  increased  on  that  day  the 
marches  of  the  troops  of  its  main  body  to  beyond  the  objec- 
tive originally  set  it.    Its  first  infantry  division  marched  as 


*But  these  measures  did  not  come  up  for  execution,  as  the  enemy 
remained   on   the   defensive. 

fin  the  course  of  the  day  the  Brunswick  Hussars  encountered 
Chasseurs    d'Afrique. 

|The  Guard  Dragoon  and  Guard  Ulan  Brigade  with  two 
horse  batteries,  the  Guard  Cuirassier  Brigade  remaining  at  Jean- 
delaincourt. 

—330— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

far  as  Dieulouard  from  where  an  advance  guard  was  sent 
still  further  west;  the  remainder  of  the  corps  marched  to 
the  vicinity  of  Sivry.* 

The  plateau  on  the  other  side  of  the  Moselle  was  now 
covered  with  German  cavalry  and  there  was  no  longer  any 
possibility  of  the  enemy's  marching  southwestward  from 
Metz.  Only  to  the  west  and  northwest  was  there  a  way  open 
to  him. 

The  IVth  and  the  Xllth  Corps  completed  the  marches 
ordered. 

On  the  right  wing  of  the  army  was  the  Illdf  and  the 
IXth  Army  Corps  at  the  points  assigned  them  ready  to  sup- 
port the  First  Army.  However  by  3 :30  P.M.  no  reports  had 
arrived  at  Headquarters  in  Pont-a-Mousson  that  an  engage- 
ment was  developing  at  Metz  and  the  army  commander 
thought  the  time  had  arrived  to  leave  it  to  the  discretion 
of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  to  today  still  fulfill  its  task  and  to 
march  to  Cheminot. 

When  by  6:00  P.M.  no  reports  had  been  received  from 
the  district  occupied  by  the  right  wing,  the  army  orders  for 
the  15th  were  issued.  The  intention  was  to  bring  the  en- 
tire army  to  the  Moselle  on  that  day,  to  have  all  corps 
cross  the  river,  and  to  start  operations  with  all  forces  con- 
centrated toward  the  northwest.  These  orders  contained 
the  following  principal  points: 

1.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  will  concentrate  in  Pont-a- 
Mousson  and  on  the  left  bank,  will  cover  the  Moselle  valley 
downstream  towards  Metz  and  will  reinforce  its  advance 
guard,  t 


*The  other  infantry  division  of  the  corps  was  between  Moivrons 
and  Arraye,  the  corps  artillery  between  the  two  infantry  divisions  at 
Belleau,  with  headquarters  at  Sivry. 

fThe  Illd  Corps  was  located  as  follows:  The  5th  Inf.  Div.  with 
Louvigny  in  its  front,  the  6th  Inf.  Div.  with  Pagny  in  its  front, 
right  at  Vigny,  behind  the  hills.  The  corps  artillery  was  in  the 
valley  north  of  Allemont,  the  6th  Cavalry  Div.  ahead  on  the  line 
Corny — Coin-les-Cuvry — Cuvry — Chesny,  its  main  body  at  Orny, 
Cheresey,  Pournoy  and  Verny.  Headquarters  in  Allemont.  The 
IXth  Corps  went  into  bivouacs  at  Buchy,  Bechy  and  Luppy.  Details 
concerning  these  corps  will  be  found  below   (see  page  332). 

JThe  advance  guard  was  at  the  fork  of  the  Pont-a-Mousson — 
Flirey  and  Pont-a-Mousson — Thiaucourt  roads. 

—331— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

2.  The  Guard  Corps  will  close  up  toward  Dieulouard, 
its  advance  guard  to  be  sent  as  far  as  les  Quatre  Vents ;  its 
cavalry  now  at  Rogeville  to  move  out  still  farther  in  close 
connection  with  the  5th  Cavalry  Division. 

3.  The  IVth  Army  Corps  will  march  to  Custines — ad- 
vance guard  and  cavalry  to  Marbache — and  will  connect  to- 
ward the  left  in  the  direction  of  Nancy  with  the  Third  Army. 

4.  The  Illd  Corps,  on  the  right  wing  of  the  army, 
marches  with  the  6th  Cavalry  Division*  on  the  15th  to 
Cheminot,  in  so  far  as  that  march  has  not  been  made  on  the 
15th. 

5.  The  IXth  Army  Corps  remains  at  Buchy  to  be  on 
hand  on  the  15th  in  casa  of  an  engagement  in  front  of  the 
works  of  Metz. 

6.  The  lid  Army  Corps  marches  with  its  leading  ele- 
ments to  Han-sur-Nied  and  in  echelon  if  conditions  re- 
quire as  far  as  to  beyond  Faulquemont.f 

7.  The  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps  will  reach 
Nomeny  with  its  leading  elements,  its  headquarters  taking 
station  there,  its  rear  elements  brought  up  in  line  with 
Soigne. 

8.  Headquarters  remains  in  Pont-a-Mousson  on  the 
15th. 

The  basis  of  the  directions  sent  at  3:30  P.M.  to  the 
Illd  Corps  and  also  for  these  army  orders  was  that  no  change 
had  occurred  in  the  situation  at  Metz.  But  at  8:15  P.M. 
th<i  Prince  received  a  report  from  the  observation  post  at 
Chauteau  Mousson  that  extensive  lines  of  powder  smoke 
were  seen  since  7  o'clock  east  of  Metz,  apparently  the  re- 
sults of  a  hot  fight. 

The  6th  Cavalry  Division  had  heard  the  thunder  of 
cannon  at  5  :00  P.M.  coming  from  west  of  the  French  Nied. 
The  division  reconnoitered  in  that  direction,  and  General 
von  Alvensleben  II  with  the  5th  Infantry  Division  and  the 
corps  artillery  remained  in  readiness  for  starting  at  Verny 


*When  these  orders  were  issued  it  was  not  known  at  head- 
quarters what  General  von  Alvensleben  had  done  in  pursuance  to 
orders  of  3:30   P.M. 

fGeneral  Headquarters  at  Herny  was  to  receive  an  infantry 
guard  from  this  corps. 

—332— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

for  the  battlefield,  the  more  so  as  he  learned  that  portions 
of  the  IXth  Corps  had  already  been  alarmed.  Therefore  the 
march  to  Cheminot  was  not  made  on  the  14th. 

These  events  were  known  at  Headquarters  at  Pont-a- 
Mousson,  when  toward  midnight  orders  were  received  from 
General  Headquarters  directing  for  the  15th  that,  on  the 
right  wing  of  the  Second  Army,  the  Hid,  IXth,  and  Xllth 
Corps  were  to  halt  with  their  leading  elements,  close  up  and 
cook  meals.  The  First  Army  also  received  directions  to  re- 
main in  general  in  its  positions  as  held  on  the  14th.  The 
Vlllth  Army  Corps  was  to  be  brought  into  line  at  Bazon- 
court — Aube,  thus  approaching  the  right  wing  of  the  Second 
Army,  and  the  shifting  to  the  left,  becoming  necessary  later, 
was  thus  inaugurated.  The  cavalry  of  that  army,  especially 
the  3d  Cavalry  Division,  did  not  receive  any  limits  as  to  its 
forward  movements. 

It  was  emphasized  that  it  was  necessary  to  advance  with 
stronger  forces  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle  against  the 
enemy's  lines  of  communication  from  Metz  to  Verdun. 

"For  that  purpose,"  read  the  orders,  "the  Second  Army 
will  send  all  cavalry  available  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Moselle  and  support  it  in  the  direction  of  Gorze  and 
Thiaucourt  by  those  corps  that  cross  the  Moselle  first.  There- 
fore the  Hid  Army  Corps  must  prepare  a  crossing  tomorrow 
below  Pont-a-Mousson.  The  Ild  Army  Corps  will  continue 
its  march  in  its  present  direction," 

Concerning  the  start  of  operations  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Moselle,  the  measures  taken  by  Second  Army  headquar- 
ters were  a  proper  basis  for  the  execution  of  the  orders 
from  General  Headquarters.  They  diverged  from  those  or- 
ders only  in  regard  to  the  three  corps  of  the  right  wing.  But 
these  three  corps  had  received  orders  direct  from  General 
Headquarters.*  And  the  letter  from  General  Headquarters 
was  dated  at  Herny  at  6:00  P.M.  the  14th,  that  is,  at  an 


*In  regard  to  this  H.R.H.  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  re- 
ported at  10:30  P.M.,  August  14th,  that  the  Xllth  Army  Corps, 
in  accordance  with  orders  from  General  Headquarters  received  by 
it  at  9:00  P.M.,  would  be  concentrated  at  7:00  A.M.  on  the  road  from 
Delme  to  Soigne  and  would  there  await  further  orders. 

—333— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

hour  when  the  development  and  result  of  the  action  in  front 
of  Metz  could  have  had  no  bearing  on  the  decisions  arrived 
at.  It  remained  therefore  possible  that  the  orders  issued 
would  be  modified  in  accordance  with  the  changed  conditions, 
and  that  event  was  then  awaited. 

THE  MORNING  OF  AUGUST  15th 

Concerning  the  engagement  of  the  First  Army  on  the 
14th  of  August  Second  Army  Headquarters  learned  at  4:15 
A.M.,  August  15th,  from  General  von  Alvensleben  II,  that 
it  had  been  victoriously  finished  through  the  effective  inter- 
ference of  the  18th  Infantry  Division.  Two  hours  later  Gen- 
eral von  Moltke  wired  that  the  1st  and  Vllth  Corps  had,  after 
a  heavy  fight  on  the  evening  of  the  14th  thrown  strong  hos- 
tile forces  into  Metz,  that  portions  of  the  18th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion had  participated,  that  the  IXth  Corps  would  march  to 
the  battlefield  today,  and  that  General  Headquarters  would 
retain  disposition  of  the  Hid  Corps  for  the  present.  He 
added  that  pursuit  along  the  Metz — Verdun  road  was  im- 
portant. 

Details  had  become  known  in  the  meantime  through 
reports  from  the  IXth  Army  Corps.  From  these  it  was 
learned  that  portions  of  the  18th  Infantry  Division  advanc- 
ing along  the  Buchy — Metz  road,  had  become  active  in  the 
battle  during  the  final  phases  thereof. 

Prior  to  the  battle  the  IXth  Corps  was  camped  with  the 
18th  Infantry  Division  at  Buchy,  the  25th  Division  at  Bechy 
with  the  corps  artillery  at  Luppy,  where  also  corps  head- 
quarters was.  The  outposts  had  been  advanced  as  far  as 
Orny  and  Remilly.  From  5:00  P.M.  on  the  thunder  of  cannon 
was  heard  at  Orny  and  it  was  seen  from  the  hills  there  that 
an  engagement  was  in  progress  at  Colombey.  Reports  re- 
ceived from  the  battlefield  caused  the  commander  of  the 
18th  Infantry  Division  (General  von  Wrangel)  to  assume 
that  an  advance  against  the  enemy's  right  flank  would  be 
very  advantageous  for  the  course  of  the  battle.  He  there- 
fore alarmed  his  division  and  at  once  started  (at  6:00  P.M.) 
with  the  advance  guard.    The  enemy  was  seen  at  Peltre  and 

—334— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Mercy-le-Haut  and  the  march  was  directed  on  those  points. 
Both  places  were  taken  at  dark  with  little  loss  and  then, 
especially  through  the  artillery  effect  at  Mercy-le-Haut,  the 
operation  was  continued  against  the  enemy's  right  flank. 
Only  during  the  night  did  the  troops  that  had  been  engaged 
return  to  their  bivouacs ;  their  loss  being  about  36  men. 

In  the  meantime  the  corps  artillery  of  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  had  been  moved  to  Buchy,  and  the  25th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion to  Luppy,  to  be  in  readiness  there  on  the  15th  for  either 
employment  towards  the  north  or  for  marching  westward. 

Guarding  all  the  roads  leading  west  from  Metz,  and 
rapid  pursuit  if  the  enemy  should  turn  westward,  were  now 
the  two  important  missions.  Of  great  importance  were 
now  two  reports  from  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  which  were 
received  by  Second  Army  Headquarters  about  midnight 
August  14th  and  which  contained  information  of  the  results 
of  reconnaissances  carried  on  on  the  14th.  The  first  report 
came  from  an  officer's  patrol  that  had  been  sent  towards 
Les  Baraques  and  which  stated  that  at  11:30  A.M.  nothing 
had  been  seen  of  the  enemy  either  on  the  Metz — Verdun 
road  or  anywhere  west  of  Metz. 

General  von  Rheinbaben  had  added  to  this  message 
that — according  to  the  statements  of  a  reliable  inhabitant 
— Marshal  Bazaine  had  been  appointed  commander-in-chief 
of  the  French  army  at  Metz  and  that  that  army  would  ac- 
cept a  decision  there. 

The  second  report  came  from  an  officer  sent  to  the 
heights  near  Jouy-aux-Arches.  According  to  this,  only  un- 
important bivouacs  were  in  front  of  Metz  and  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Moselle.  The  Forts  gave  the  impression  of  being 
unfinished,  the  entire  country  seemed  deserted  and  indica- 
tions were  that  strong  columns  had  marched  early  the  14th 
from  Metz  westward.  But  the  engagement  on  the  14th  con- 
tradicted in  part  this  second  report,  nevertheless  Head- 
quarters at  Pont-a-Mousson  was  justified  in  assuming  it 
possible — according  to  the  reports  it  had  on  the  forenoon  of 
the  15th  concerning  the  battle — that  only  strong  rear  guards 
of  the  hostile  army  had  made  a  stand  there.     The  contra- 

—335— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

diction  between  the  two  reports  remained  unsolved ;  it  w^as 
very  important  to  fully  clear  up  this  matter. 

The  commander-in-chief  now  decided,  to  make  the  en- 
tire Xth  Army  Corps  and  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  available 
for  operations  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle,  and  to  rein- 
force the  corps  by  the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade  at  Rogeville. 
The  Guard  Corps  received  orders  to  send  that  brigade  on 
the  15th  to  Thiaucourt.  It  placed  a  second  cavalry  brigade 
in  readiness  (the  1st  Guard  Cavalry  Brigade)  at  Vernecourt. 
General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  was  to  send  his  thus  reinforced 
cavalry  with  horse  artillery  to  the  Metz — Verdun  road  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  and  he  then  was  to  march  along  that 
road  towards  Metz  until  a  clear  view  was  gained  as  to  condi- 
tions there,  connection  to  be  made  in  this  movement  with 
the  cavalry  of  the  First  Army  to  the  west  of  Metz.  The 
general  was  to  dispose  of  his  infantry  divisions  so  that  they 
could  serve  as  a  support  for  his  cavalry,  and  so  as  to  cer- 
tainly determine  in  the  Moselle  valley  and  on  its  left  bank 
the  conditions  with  regard  to  the  enemy. 

It  was  the  intention  to  relieve  the  Xth  Corps  from  the 
duty  of  securing  Pont-a-Mousson  and  to  bring  to  that  place 
one  division  of  the  Guard  Corps ;  but  General  von  Voigts- 
Rhetz  sent  instead  the  19th  Infantry  Division  to  Thiaucourt 
and  one  detachment  of  that  division  down  the  Moselle  val- 
ley to  Noveant  and  remained  with  the  20th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion in  bivouac  at  Pont-a-Mousson,  so  that  that  place  was 
covered  thereby.  His  cavalry  marched  on  Fresnes-en-Woe- 
vre,  and  was  now  to  debouch  towards  Metz  and  solve  its 
task  in  that  manner. 

As  the  measures  which  General  Headquarters  had  taken 
on  the  14th,  prior  to  its  knowledge  of  the  battle  east  of  Metz 
still  remained  in  force  after  the  battle,  to  the  effect  that 
the  Hid,  IXth  and  Xllth  Corps  had  to  be  in  readiness  on  the 
15th  for  carrying  on  any  engagement  on  the  15th  east  of 
Metz,  General  von  Alvensleben  II  received  orders  at  7:00 
A.M.  the  15th  not  to  continue  his  march  on  Cheminot.  He 
was  to  halt  with  his  corps,  rest,  cook  meals,  and  await  orders 
direct  from  General  Headquarters. 

—336— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

However,  these  orders  crossed  with  a  report  of  the 
General  sent  to  Pont-a-Mousson  that  he  had  decided  not  to 
execute  the  army  orders  of  the  14th,  but  to  march  to  the 
Moselle  and  still  cross  that  river  today  if  possible.  He  had 
arrived  at  that  decision  as  the  result  of  the  battle  of  the 
14th. 

In  addition,  the  Hid  Army  Corps  was  able  to  perform 
material  marches  on  the  15th  and  there  was  a  wish  to  act 
as  rapidly  as  possible  in  the  very  tense  situation  now  ob- 
taining. The  commander  of  the  Second  Army  did  not  with- 
hold his  approval  of  this  striving  for  independent  action, 
but  repeated  his  orders  to  halt,  as  the  General  could  not 
know  the  contents  of  the  last  telegram  from  General  Head- 
quarters to  Second  Army  Headquarters. 

But  the  preparations  for  the  crossing  of  the  Moselle 
were  to  be  continued. 

It  could  be  only  a  question  of  hours  until  the  intentions 
of  the  enemy  became  known  for  certain  and  until  the  Second 
Army  received  full  freedom  again  as  to  disposing  of  its 
corps.  Then  all  doubts  would  be  raised  and  operations  to 
the  west  could  be  continued  with  greater  energy. 

No  further  orders  were  issued  to  the  IXth  and  Xllth 
Corps ;  for  army  orders  of  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  con- 
tained important  directions  for  the  IXth  Corps.  The  Xllth 
Corps  had  reported  that,  according  to  orders  from  army 
headquarters,  it  would  ba  echeloned  on  the  Delme — Soigne 
road  and  it  was  certain  that  it  would  receive  necessary  or- 
ders direct  from  General  Headquarters. 


Chapter  IV 


THE  SUPPLY  AND  COMMUNICATIONS  OF  THE 

SECOND  ARMY  DURING  THE  ADVANCE 

TO  THE  MOSELLE 

It  may  be  well  here  to  briefly  recount  how  the  supply 
matters  of  the  army  were  regulated  during  the  rapid  ad- 

—337— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

vance  to  the  Saar  and  from  there  to  the  Moselle.  The  meas- 
ures that  were  taken  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  to  pro- 
vide subsistence  for  the  army  have  been  mentioned.  The 
difficulties  that  were  foreseen  during  the  advance  through 
the  mountains  of  the  Palatinate — so  poor  in  animals  and 
grain — had  caused  Second  Army  Headquarters  to  recom- 
mend as  early  as  August  1st  in  Alzey  that  provision  trains 
be  inserted  among  the  field  trains.  In  consequence  there- 
of three  provision  trains  were  sent  daily  after  August  3d 
to  the  army  by  way  of  Bingen.  When  the  cavalry  started 
for  the  frontier  the  supplies  stored  along  the  Rhine  were  also 
sent  forward  along  the  Ludwigshafen — Kaiserslautern — 
Homburg  railroad.  Thus,  there  had  been  plenty  of  subsis- 
tence stores  for  the  army  until  it  reached  the  Saar.  In  the 
subsequent  operations  to  the  Moselle,  during  which  the  army 
traversed  a  relatively  rich  district  in  its  rapid  advance,  re- 
quisitions were  found  to  be  an  excellent  auxiliary  means, 
so  that  supplies  carried  on  the  trains  could  be  saved  for 
more  difficult  times.  The  supplies  captured  from  the  ene- 
my in  Saargemiind  and  Forbach  also  came  in  very  handily 
for  the  troops.  Starting  on  August  13th  all  available  sup- 
plies in  Neunkirchen,  where  the  supplies  brought  by  way 
of  Bingen  had  been  stored,  were  brought  to  Forbach,  St. 
Avoid,  Faulquemont  and  Herny.  But  the  army  corps  re- 
ceived instructions  to  replenish  their  trains,  as  soon  as 
necessary,  from  the  supplies  at  Neunkirchen.  When  the 
army  arrived  at  the  Moselle  it  still  had  from  four  to  five 
days'  provisions  on  hand,  so  that  steps  could  then  be  taken 
without  danger  directing  that  all  provisions  not  of  the  best 
quality  could  be  left  behind  by  the  trains,  which  could  then 
send  their  empty  wagons  to  the  stations  along  the  Saar- 
briicken — Remilly  railroad  to  reload  new  supplies.  In  the 
meantime  the  station  of  Remilly  had  become  headquarters 
nf  the  lines  of  communications. 

It  is  known  that  the  regulation  of  the  lines  of  com- 
munications to  the  rear  of  the  army  at  the  opening  of 
the  campaign  was  in  the  hands  of  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion headquarters  of  the  army.  These  headquarters  had 
under  their  orders  difi'erent  units  for  construction  and  traf- 

—338— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

fie  of  railroads  the  telegraph  lines  in  the  enemy's  country, 
that  is.  one  fortress  company  and  the  personnel  for  estab- 
lishing lines  of  communication  stations  and  depots,  etc. 

L.  of  C.  headquarters  followed  Second  Army  Head- 
quarters by  way  of  Saargemiind  and  Delme  to  Pont-a-Mous- 
son. 

To  secure  the  connections,  occupation  of  L.  of  C.  depots 
and  stations  and  the  points  becoming  of  importance  in  the 
rear  of  the  army,  the  3d  Landwehr  Division  had  originally 
been  assigned  to  the  L.  of  C.  But  as  early  as  August  8th 
Second  Army  Headquarters  received  a  letter  from  General 
Headquarters  informing  them  that  this  Landwehr  Division 
had  received  other  orders.  It  was  to  be  detrained  at  Kaisers- 
lautern  and  remain  in  readiness  there  for  other  employment. 
In  its  place  the  L.  of  C.  of  the  Second  Army  received  eight 
battalions  and  four  squadrons  of  occupation  troops  and  these 
were:  the  53d,  56th,  16th  and  55th  Landwehr  Regiments 
and  the  5th  Hussar  Regiment.  But  of  these  infantry  regi- 
ments the  first  two  were  located  in  Wesel,  the  other  two  in 
Minden  and  the  Hussars  in  Paderborn.  From  these  places 
they  were  to  be  transported  by  rail  to  Mosbach,  and  to  be 
disposable  there  on  and  after  August  10th.  The  fact  that 
great  delays  occurred  in  the  transportation  of  troops  from 
the  home  districts  to  the  frontier  has  been  explained  when 
discussing  the  bringing  up  of  the  II  Corps  to  the  Army.  Con- 
sidering the  very  rapid  advance  of  the  Second  Army  to- 
wards the  Mosel,  which  had  started  in  the  meantime,  the 
difficulties  of  bringing  these  occupation  troops  up  became 
greater  and  greater  and  when  on  August  12th  General 
Headquarters  assigned  railroad  lines  A  and  C  to  the  Second 
Army  as  well  as  the  French  railroads  west  of  Saar- 
briicken  for  supply  purposes.  Headquarters  of  the  L.  of 
C.  as  a  matter  of  fact  had  no  troops  at  all.  Even  the  fortress 
pioneers  assigned  for  duty  to  it  had  not  yet  arrived.  And 
the  Second  Army  could  make  no  detachments  for  L.  of  C. 
purposes  now  nor  in  the  next  few  days,  considering  the 
very  tense  tactical  situation. 

However,  as  the  single  railroad  line  in  question, 
the    Saarbriicken — Remilly    railroad,    was    secured    by    the 

—339— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

advance  of  the  Second  Army,  this  bad  feature  of  having  no 
L.  of  C.  troops  was  the  less  felt.  That  line  could  resume 
operation  at  once,  and  as  early  as  the  13th  provision  trains 
were  running  on  it  to  the  troops.  August  15th  traffic  was 
extended  to  Remilly  and  immediately  thereafter  to  Cour- 
celles.  Thus  Remilly  became  the  headquarters  of  the  L.  of  C. 
of  the  Second  Army,  Courcelles  of  the  First  Army. 

In  addition,  on  August  13th  construction  was  started 
on  the  Remilly — Pont-a-Mousson  railroad  (for  passing 
around  Metz). 

We  should  not  forget  to  mention  here  that  the  army  had 
so  far  been  in  uninterrupted  telegraphic  communication  with 
home  and  with  General  Headquarters.  The  construction 
and  repair  of  the  French  telegraph  lines  kept  step  with  the 
advance  of  the  troops.  The  great  advantage  accruing  by 
this  to  the  leadership  of  the  army,  is  of  course  seen  in  the 
rapid  exchange  of  reports  and  orders  which  made  it  re- 
peatedly possible  to  dominate  the  situation  without  causing 
the  troops  to  make  detours. 


Chapter  V 


THE  BATTLES  OF  VIONVILLE  AND 
IN  FRONT  OF  METZ 

FURTHER   EVENTS   ON  AUGUST   15th 

The  situation  of  the  Second  Army  during  the  forenoon 
of  August  15th  was,  briefly  repeated,  as  follows : 

On  the  right  was  the  Hid  AiTny  Corps,  stopped  in  its 
march  (which  had  been  commenced  early  that  morning 
towards  Cheminot)  by  direct  orders  of  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  between  the  Seille  and  Moselle;*  the  IXth  Corps 


*The  5th  Infantry  Division  from  Pournoy-la-Chetive  to  Sillegny, 
the  6th  at  Bouxieres-sous-Froidemont,  the  corps  artillery  south  of 
that  place,  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  on  the  line  Marly-sur-Seille— 
Jouy-aux-Arches    covering    against    Metz,    headquarters    in    Sillegny. 

—340— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

by  direct  order  from  General  Headquarters  at  Mercy-le- 
Haut  and  Grugy;  the  Xllth  Corps  on  the  Delme — Soigne 
road  waiting  further  orders  from  General  Headquarters. 

The  other  corps  of  the  army  were  carrying  out  the 
army  orders  of  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  which  had  not  been 
changed  as  far  as  those  corps  were  concerned. 

The  Xth  Corps  was  with  one  division  on  the  march  to 
Thiaucourt*  and  had  the  other  assembled  at  Pont-a-Mous- 
son ;  its  attached  cavalry  was  far  in  front  towards  the  Metz 
— Verdun  road. 

The  Guard  Corps  was  closing  up  towards  Dieulouard, 
its  advance  guard  advancing  on  Les  Quatre  Vents.  The 
Guard  Dragoon  Brigade  had  been  started  towards  Thiau- 
court to  effect  a  junction  with  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  the 
Guard  Ulan  Brigade  scouted  in  the  direct  western  direction 
along  the  plateau  between  Moselle  and  Meuse. 

The  IVth  Army  Corps  was  approaching  Marbache. 

The  lid  Army  Corps  was  approaching  Han-sur-Nied. 

The  fact  that  the  battle  east  of  Metz  was  not  renewed 
on  the  15th  was  known  at  army  headquarters  at  Pont-a- 
Mousson  during  the  early  forenoon  hours.  Otherwise  in- 
formation would  have  been  received  from  General  Headquar- 
ters in  Herny,  with  which  telegraphic  communication  ex- 
isted, and  from  the  Mousson  observation  post. 

The  reports  that  were  received  in  the  course  of  August 
15th  on  the  other  hand  called  the  attention  of  army  head- 
quarters more  and  more  to  the  west  of  Metz.  The  first 
report  came  from  the  Xth  Army  Corps : 

"Corps  Headquarters  informs  Army  Headquarters  that 
the  following  message  has  just  been  received: 

Corny,  6:00  A.M. 

'Corny  is  occupied  by  a  squadron  of  the  3d  Ulan  Regi- 
ment   [here  followed  statements  concerning  the  bat- 
tle of  the  14th] Since  11:00  P.M.  we  heard  much  noise 

of  moving  vehicles.  An  officer's  patrol,  which  almost  reached 


*One  detachment  of  two  battalions,  2  squadrons,  1  battery  under 
Colonel  von  Lynker  had  been  sent  along  the  Moselle  valley  towards 
Metz. 

—341— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Gravelotte,  at  2:00  A.M.  encountered  outposts  there,  and 
the  officer  heard  the  movement  of  troops  marching  in  the 
direction  of  Verdun. 

'One  patrol  was  heavily  fired  on  at  4:30  A.M.  north  of 
Ancy  by  one  platoon  of  French  infantry.  The  3d  Ulan  Regi- 
ment is  just  now  reconnoitering  by  way  of  Augny  towards 
Metz.     (signed)  von  Willich,  1st  Lieut  and  Adjt.'  "* 

Thus,  the  first  contact  with  the  enemy  west  of  Metz 
had  taken  place. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  15th  detachments  of  the 
6th  Cavalry  Division  (3d  Ulans,  6th  Cuirassiers)  had  rid- 
den towards  Montigny  and  le  Sablon,  each  detachment  con- 
sisting of  three  squadrons  and  two  horse  artillery  guns. 

These  detachments  found  the  fort  of  St.  Privat,  which 
was  then  under  construction,  and  the  camp  of  the  enemy  in 
rear  of  it  unoccupied.  The  advance  guard  platoon  of  the  de- 
tachment that  proceeded  towards  Montigny,  rode  through 
that  village,  and  was  fired  on  by  hostile  infantry  only  when 
it  came  to  the  fortifications  at  that  place.  Four  French 
soldiers  were  taken  prisoners  in  the  outskirts  and  one  pro- 
vision wagon  was  also  captured.f  Le  Sablon  also  was  found 
unoccupied,  but  inhabitants  there  fired  on  the  patrols  en- 
tering the  place. 

From  the  railroad  junction  south  of  Montigny  a  rather 
large  hostile  camp  was  discovered  between  Moulins-les- 
Metz  and  Longeville,  which  could  be  clearly  seen  despite  the 
morning  fog. 

The  detachment  that  had  proceeded  towards  Montigny 
brought  its  guns  into  position  at  Bradin  Ferme  and  fired 
some  shells  into  that  camp.  The  result  was  visible.  The 
enemy  was  alarmed,  in  the  utmost  hurry  and  confusion,  and 
had  been  apparently  taken  entirely  by  surprise. 

Only  after  quite  a  while  did  fort  St.  Quentin  reply 
to  that  fire.  The  fog  lifted,  and  after  destroying  telegraph 
and  railroad,  both  detachments  retreated.    At  10:00  A.M., 


♦Adjutant  of  the  X   Army  Corps. 

tFrom  the  baggage  train  of  French  Imperial  headquarters. 

—342— 


•     Operations  Second  German  Army 

when  this  retreat  had  already  started,  the  enemy  blew  up 
the  railroad  bridge  at  Lon^eville. 

According  to  statements  of  inhabitants  the  entire 
French  army  was  about  to  march  off.  It  was  said  that 
troops  had  been  entrained*  and  that  large  bodies  of  troops 
were  marching  on  the  Metz — Verdun  road. 

The  mere  fact  that  the  cavalry  of  the  Second  Army  had 
been  able  to  push  through  Montigny  as  far  as  the  principal 
walls  of  the  fortress,  indicated  the  departure  of  the  French 
army.  If  that  army  had  intended  to  remain  in  the  camp  at 
Metz,  it  ought  not  to  have  completely  evacuated  the  ter- 
rain on  the  south  side  of  that  fortress  and  ought  not  to  have 
given  up  the  works  then  under  construction  without  a  light. 

Therefore  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Second  Army 
at  about  noon  asked  permission  from  General  Headquarters 
to  be  still  allowed  to  cross  the  Moselle  on  the  16th  of  August 
with  the  Hid,  Xllth,  and  IVth  Corps  and  to  let  the  IXth  and 
the  lid  Corps  march  to  that  river. 

Now,  this  telegram  crossed  a  telegram  sent  by  General 
von  Moltke  at  2:00  P.M.,  which  road: 

"Courcelles,  August  15th,  12:30  P.M.f 

"The  French  completely  driven  into  Metz  and  probably 
now  in  full  retreat  on  Verdun.  All  three  corps  of  the  right 
wing  (the  Illd,  Xllth  and  IXth)  are  now  again  at  the  com- 
plete disposal  of  the  Second  Army;  the  Xllth  Corps  is  al- 
ready on  the  march  to  Nomeny."$ 

VON  Moltke. 

General  Headquarters  at  Pont-a-Mousson  started  as  a 
matter  of  course  with  the  assumption  that  the  enemy  would 
have  utilized  the  night  for  his  retreat.    He  had  at  his  dis- 


*This    subsequently   was    proven    to   be   erroneous. 

fSee  No.  167,  von  Moltke's  correspondence  on  page  258,  w^hich 
does  not  correspond  exactly  with  the  message  as  here  given. — C.H.L. 

JH.R.H.,  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  had  sent  an  officer  to 
General  Headquarters  early  the  15th,  who  received  from  General 
von  Moltke  at  8:00  A.M.  at  Coligny  the  following  orders:  "The  Xllth 
Army  Corps  remains  stationary  until  12  noon  and — if  the  situation 
remains  unchanged — can  then  start  for  Nomeny  in  accordance  with 
orders  from  headquarters  of  the  Second  Army." 

—343— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

posal  three  principal  parallel  roads  from  Metz  westward.*  It 
was  therefore  assumed  that  he  w.ould  already  have  left  the 
fortified  camp  of  the  fortress  in  the  early  afternoon  hours 
with  three  army  corps,  and-  that  he  was  now  about  ready 
to  do  the  same  with  the  remainder.  The  Second  Army 
still  had  to  cross  the  river  with  the  main  part  of  its  troops 
and  ascend  the  steep  slope  on  the  other  side.  Therefore 
haste  was  necessary. t 

Therefore  the  Illd  Army  Corps  received  orders  at  2:00 
P.M.  to  march  off  again  the  evening  of  the  15th  for  the  pur- 
pose of  reconnaissance  and  an  intended  river  crossing,  and  to 
reach  on  the  16th  by  way  of  Gorze,  the  Metz — Verdun  road 
at  Mars-la-Tour.  A  note  was  added  that  the  Xth  Army  Corps 
with  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  in  its  front,  would  march  to- 
morrow from  Thiaucourt  toward  St.  Hilaire. 

As  stated  in  the  wire  from  General  Headquarters,  the 
Xllth  Corps  was  already  on  the  march  to  Nomeny,  its 
march  objective.  The  IXth  Corps  had  of  course  also  re- 
ceived orders  direct  from  General  Headquarters. $ 

In  the  course  of  the  next  few  hours  numerous  reports 
arrived,  confirming  the  army  commander  in  the  correctness 
of  his  estimate  of  the  situation. 

The  Xth  Army  Corps  sent  in  a  notice  of  the  expedition 
of  a  squadron  belonging  to  the  5th  Cavalry  Division :  "The 
squadron  bivouacked  at  Chambley  and  early  this  morning 
started  towards  the  Metz — Verdun  road,  in  the  direction  of 
Mars-la-Tour.  In  Rezonville  the  squadron  received  infantry 
fire.  "One  platoon  went  to  Bruville,  which  was  found  oc- 
cupied by  chasseurs.  That  platoon  observed  hostile  infan- 
try detachments  on  the  Metz — Etain  road,  between  which 


*From  Metz  via:     1  Ste.   Marie — Briey. 

2  Amanvillers    to    Jarny — Conflans. 

3  Gravelotte — Mars-la-Tour. 

fAs  a  matter  of  fact  the  French  army  utilized  only  the  two  roads 
from  Metz  via  Mars-la-Tour  and  via  Conflans,  and  its  departure 
was  delayed  materially  as  will  be  shown   below. 

JAt  12  noon  the  corps  was  relieved  from  the  duty  of  remaining  in 
readiness  and  it  started  in  the  afternoon  to  the  vicinity  of  Verny  and 
Sillegny;  strong  hostile  columns  were  observed  during  that  march 
on   the  left  bank  moving  from   Metz  westward. 

—344— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

were  many  cavalry  patrols.  Forced  by  the  chasseurs,  the 
squadron  fell  back  on  Mars-la-Tour  and  then  found  that 
place  occupied "* 

Headquarters  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  then  sent  a  mes- 
sage from  Thiaucourt,  dated  3 :30  P.M.,  that  a  staff  officer 
of  that  headquarters  had  made  a  reconnaissance  early  that 
morning  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle  towards  Metz.  This 
officer  had  seen  no  enemy  on  this  side  of  the  fortress.  Con- 
cerning events  on  the  left  of  the  Moselle,  the  message  from 
General  von  Rheinbaben  concerning  the  march  of  the  5th 
Cavalry  Division  on  the  forenoon  of  the  15th  gave  all  infor- 
mation. This  notice,  sent  to  the  Xth  Corps,  was  submitted  to 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Second  Army  with  the  above 
report  and  read: 

"Arrived  with  five  regiments  and  one  battery  at  12 
noon  at  Tronville;  encountered  hostile  cavalry  and  superior 
artillery  which  at  the  present  moment  are  falling  back  on 
Metz.  The  light  cavalry  is  now  going  closer  to  Metz. 
Bredow'sf  Brigade  will  also  soon  follow.  I  intend  to  remain 
in  Tronville  or  nearer  Metz.  Communication  with  First 
Army  not  yet  established.J  Tronville,  1 :00  P.M.  (signed) 
von  Rheinbaben." 


*One  brigade  of  the  French  Cavalry  Division  of  Forton  had 
reached  and  passed  Mars-la-Tour  in  the  course  of  the  forenoon. 

tl2th  Cavalry  Brigade  and  10th  Hussar  Regiment. 

{Concerning  events  on  August  12th  it  has  already  been  stated 
that  headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  were  convinced  that  the 
First  Army  would  be  able  to  send  its  cavalry  across  the  Moselle 
below  Metz  and  thus  envelop  the  fortress  and  the  hostile  army 
from  the  north.  At  4:30  P.M.  the  afternoon  of  August  12th  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  had  directed  the  First  Army  to  have  its  cavalry 
reconnoiter  towards  Metz  and  have  it  cross  the  river  below  the 
city.  Thereupon  headquarters  of  the  First  Army  issued  orders  to 
the  3d  Cavalry  Division  at  9:00  P.M.  August  12th  for  August  13th 
as  follows:  "The  3d  Cavalry  Division  will  go  as  far  as  Avancy, 
send  detachments  towards  Metz  and  Vigny  and  attempt  to 
send  detachments  across  the  Moselle  to  find  out  what  is  there." 
In  pursuance  thereof  the  3d  Cavalry  Division  started  on 
the  13th  along  the  Metz — Bouzonville  road  towards  Metz.  On  the 
plateau  of  Ste.  Barbe  its  advance  guard,  the  7th  Ulan  Regiment, 
struck  the  enemy;  its  point  received  fire  from  Vremy  from  hostile 
pickets.  At  Servigny  a  large  French  camp  was  seen.  With  three 
regiments  and  one  horse  battery  the  division  then  went  into  bivouac 
at  Vry.  The  advance  guard  placed  videttes  on  the  line  Sanry  les 
Vigy  to  Ste.   Barbe   and  camped   at   Avancy,   sending  one   squadron 

—345— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  evening  of  August  15th  the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade 
and  one  battery  arrived  at  Thiaucourt ;  the  Brigade  of  Bre- 
dow  was  also  on  the  15th  in  march  with  one  battery.  This  bri- 
gade, coming  from  the  IVth  Army  Corps,  reached  Hannon- 
ville-au-Passage  and  Suzemont  in  the  afternoon.  The  two 
horse  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps 
had  already  been  started  to  Thiaucourt  to  join  the  advance 
guard  and  were  to  join  the  cavalry  also  the  following  morn- 
ing. Thus,  on  August  16th,  the  Xth  Army  Corps  would  have 
at  its  disposal  four  cavalry  brigades  with  five  horse  bat- 
teries to  delay  the  hostile  retreat.* 

to  Vigy  to  secure  against  Thionville.  From  this  squadron  an  of- 
ficers' patrol  went  as  far  as  the  open  gate  of  Thionville  before  it 
was  fired  on,  and  another  one — there  being  no  permanent  bridges 
available,  went  across  the  river  on  a  ferry  found  at  Hauconcourt  to 
the  left  bank  to  reconnoiter  on  that  bank.  It  did  not  encounter  any 
enemy  there.  Connection  west  around  Metz  could  not  be  gained 
considering  the  long  distance  still  obtaining  between  the  points 
of  the  First  and  Second  Armies.  The  iiostile  masses  discovered  on 
August  13th  by  the  3d  Cavalry  Division  in  its  front  absorbed  the  en- 
tire attention  of  that  division  until  the  battle  of  August  14th  brought 
a  different  course  to  events. 

*Many  interesting  details  in  the  movements  of  the  cavalry 
during  those  days  did  not  come  to  the  knowledge  of  army  head- 
quarters. As  above  we  could  count  only  on  what  was  learned  at 
Pont-a-Mousson  from  the  reports  received  and  we  will  here  briefly  re- 
count what  actually  happened  with  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  on 
August  14th  and  15th. 

According  to  its  general  instructions  "to  advance  against  the 
Metz — Verdun  road  and  reconnoiter  beyond  it"  the  5th  Cavalry  Di- 
vision marched  on  the  14th  with  the  13th  Brigade  to  Beney,  outposts 
at  St.  Benoit,  with  the  11th  Brigade  to  Thiaucourt,  while  the  12th 
Brigade  coming  from  the  left  wing  of  the  army — the  IV  Army 
Corps — reached  Pont-a-Mousson.  To  give  some  stability  to  the 
cavalry,  the  Xth  Army  Corps  sent  on  the  14th,  as  already  stated,  its 
advance  guard  to  Pont-a-Mousson.  Of  the  13th  Brigade  two  squad- 
rons of  the  11th  Hussar  Regiment  rode  via  Pagny  and  Onville  to 
the  hills  of  Buxieres,  from  where  they  reported  at  1:30  P.M.  that 
the  Metz — Verdun  road  was  completely  free  of  the  enemy.  One 
military  "fourgon"  remaining  on  that  road  was  the  only  sign  that 
troops  had  passed.  The  11th  Brigade  sent  one  squadron  of  the  13th 
Ulans  down  the  Moselle  valley  towards  Ancy;  there  it  received  fire. 
Two  other  squadrons  of  that  brigade,  also  from  the  13th  Uhlan  Regi- 
ment, v/ere  sent  south  towards  Flirey  and  established  communica- 
tion  with  the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade. 

As  has  been  stated,  August  15th  the  5th  Cavalry  Division 
had  at  the  start  marched  toward  Fresnes-en-Woevre  and  as  is 
known,  the  19th  Infantry  Division  marched  to  its  support  to  Thiau- 
court. Now  General  von  Rheinbaben  sent  the  13th  Brigade — leav- 
ing one  regiment  in  Beney,  but  taking  along  the  battery  of  the 
brigade — to    Lachaussee    and   one    regiment   of   the   brigade   to   Dom- 

—346— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

After  these  reports  had  been  received,  at  7:00  P.M., 
headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  received  the  following 
instructions  for  August  16th : 

"Last  evening  the  enemy  was  attacked  by  portions  of 
the  First  Army  and  the  18th  Infantry  Division  in  front  of 
Metz  and  driven  back  into  the  fortress. 

"The  hostile  army  is  on  the  retreat  towards  the  Meuse. 

"The  Second  Army  will  pursue  the  enemy  without  delay 
towards  the  Meuse. 

"The  Illd  Army  Corps  will  cross  the  Moselle  below  Pont- 
a-Mousson,  as  it  has  started,  and  will,  by  way  of  Noveant 
and  Gorze  reach  the  main  Metz — Verdun  road  tomorrow 
near  Mars-la-Tour  and  Vionville  respectively.  If  possible 
headquarters  to  be  moved  to  Mars-la-Tour.  The  6th  Cavalry 
Division  can  be  sent  on  ahead  from  Pagny  via  Preny  and 
Thiaucourt  to  that  road.  If  it  is  impracticable  for  the 
trains  to  cross  on  the  bridge  that  is  to  be  constructed,  they 

martin.  The  12th  Brigade  marched  from  Pont-a-Mousson  towards 
Thiaucourt.  The  detachment  at  Lachaussee  did  send  on  the  morn- 
ing- of  August  15th  single  squadrons  to  Latour-en-V/oevre  and 
to  beyond  Sponville,  but  these  found  no  trace  of  the  enemy.  On 
the  other  hand,  shots  were  fired  on  the  right  in  the  direction  of  Metz 
and  the  rest  of  the  detachment  (four  squadrons  and  the  battery) 
rode  towards  the  sound  thereof.  When  Xonville  was  reached  two 
French  cavalry  regiments  were  seen  approaching  on  the  heights  of 
Puxieux.  The  battery  went  into  position  and  by  a  few  rounds  in- 
duced these  regiments  to  face  about;  the  four  squadrons  followed. 
From  a  hill  near  Puxieux  could  then  be  seen  larger  hostile  masses 
of  cavalry  in  the  depression  at  Mars-la-Tour  (five  to  six  cavalry 
regiments).  One  of  these  regiments  was  fired  on  with  shells  by 
the  battery  and  it  then  disappeared  behind  the  buildings  of  Mars-la- 
Tour.  But  now  hostile  artillery,  three  batteries  strong,  returned 
the  fire. 

The  two  squadrons  of  the  13th  Brigade,  that  had  been  in  that 
vicinity  the  day  before,  had  in  the  meantime  joined  the  brigade. 
They  had  renewed  their  reconnaissance  attempts  in  the  morning 
towards  Rezonville  but  had,  at  that  place  encountered  strong  French 
cavalry  with  two  batteries  and  had  been  forced  to  fall  back  on 
Vionville  and  Tronville — carrying  along  9  captured  French  dra- 
goons. In  conjunction  with  one  squadron  of  the  11th  Brigade  they 
had  then  observed  the  enemy  until  the  detachment  came  up  from 
Lachaussee.  The  squadron  of  the  11th  Brigade  belonged  to  the  regi- 
ment that  had  been  sent  to  Dommartin,  which  latter  now  also  was 
called  up. 

In  the  meantime  the  artillery  fight  continued,  but  the  com- 
mander of  the  13th  Brigade,  who  was  there,  broke  it  off  and  took 
the  regiments  assembled  around  him  back  to  a  fold  in  the  terrain 

—347— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

can  use  up  to  7:00  A.M.  tomorrow — but  no  longer — the 
stone  bridge  at  Pont-a-Mousson  and  from  there  take  the  road 
to  Noveant-sur-Moselle  downstream.  The  field  bridge  of 
the  Illd  Army  Corps  will  remain  for  the  present  available 
for  the  IXth  Corps  for  the  investment  of  Metz  or  other  duty ; 
a  sufficient  guard  will  be  left  there  for  its  security. 

"The  Xth  Army  Corps,  which  today  has  been  started 
partially,  with  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  ahead,  towards 
Thiaucourt,  will  continue  the  march  tomorrow  on  the  road 
towards  Verdun,  say  to  opposite  St.  Hillaire — Maizeray  and 
will  as  far  as  possible  bring  up  those  portions  of  the  corps 
that  are  still  at  Pont-a-Mousson  and  in  the  Moselle  valley. 
Headquarters,  if  practicable,  at  St.  Hillaire.  The  cavalry 
will  reconnoiter  beyond  Haudiomont  and  Vigneulles. 

"The  XHth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps  will  march  to- 
morrow from  Nomeny  via  Pont-a-Mousson  with  its  advance 
guard  as  far  as  Regneville-en-Haye,  and  close  up  with  its 
rear  elements  as  far  as  Pont-a-Mousson,  which  is  to  be  fully 
utilized  for  night  shelter  and  where  headquarters  will  take 


some  distance  oflP.  The  enemy  pursued  this  movement  only  with  a 
few  rounds  from  his  batteries  which  thereupon  disappeared  in  the 
direction  of  Metz.  Called  up  by  the  thunder  of  cannon,  the  3d  Regi- 
ment of  the  13th  Brigade  came  along  from  Beney  (about  at  11  A. 
M.),  and  the  brigade — now  fully  assembled — rode  ahead  west  of 
Bois  la  Dame  to  attack  the  enemy  who  had  again  become  visible 
east  of  Mars-la-Tour.  The  division  commander,  who  arrived  on 
the  scene  in  the  meantime  prohibited  that  attack— in  the  face  of 
the  apparent  superiority  of  the  enemy.  The  thunder  of  cannon  also 
drew  the  rest  of  the  11th  Brigade  to  the  spot;  soon  thereafter  also 
the  12th  Brigade  arrived,  so  that  by  2:00  P.M.  34  squadrons  (about 
4200  troopers)  with  their  two  horse  batteries  were  assembled. 
General  von  Rheinbaben  caused  all  three  brigades  to  go  into  biv- 
ouac opposite  the  enemy;  the  11th  at  Puxieux,  the  13th  at  Xonville, 
the    12th   at   Suzemont   on    both    sides   of   the    main    road. 

In  order  to  seek,  as  directed,  communication  with  the  First 
Army  to  the  west  of  Metz,  one  squadron  of  the  12th  Brigade  (the 
16th  Ulan  Regiment)  was  sent  northward.  This  squadron  en- 
countered a  strong  body  of  French  cavalry  at  Jarny  and  one  bat- 
talion of  infantry;  it  had  to  retreat  and  had  some  losses  during  the 
retreat  at  Mars-la-Tour,  because  of  an  ambush  prepared  by  Chas- 
seurs d'Afrique.  The  French  flankers  swarmed  around  the  Prus- 
sian outposts  so  audaciously  that  several  squadrons  had  to  go  out 
to  chase  them  off.  With  their  long  range  carbines  the  chasseurs 
fired,  for  instance,  continually  into  the  bivouac  of  the  11th  Brigade, 
so  that  that  bivouac  had  to  be  moved  to  the  rear.  One  squadron 
of  the  13th  Brigade,  which  rode  in  the  evening  towards  Vionville, 
observed  in  rear  of  that  place  camps  of  large  bodies  of  troops  of  all 
arms. 

—348— 


operations  Second  German  Army 

station.  The  cavalry  division  will  be  detached  towards  Vig- 
neulles  and  to  the  south  boundary  as  far  as  Buxieres  toward 
the  Meuse  and  will  secure  communication  on  the  right  with 
the  5th  and  on  the  left  with  the  Guard  Cavalry  Division. 

"The  Xllth  Army  Corps  can  cross  on  the  stone  bridge  at 
Pont-a-Mousson  from  and  after  7 :00  A.M.  or  even  earlier. 

"The  Guard  Corps  will  reach  with  its  advance  guard 
Rambucourt  tomorrow,  with  the  main  body  and  headquar- 
ters (which  are  to  take  the  road  via  Villers-en-Haye  and 
Rogeville)  in  the  vicinity  of  Bemecourt.  The  cavalry, 
sent  on  ahead,  will  secure  communication  on  the  right  by 
way  of  Buxeriulles  with  the  Royal  Saxon  Cavalry  Division. 

"The  IVth  Army  Corps  will  advance  its  advance  guard 
from  Marbache  by  way  of  Les  Saizerais  to  Jaillon.  The 
army  corps  will  close  up  its  rear  elements  to  Marbache  and 
will  make  its  headquarters  in  Les  Saizerais. 

"Connection  with  the  right  wing  of  the  Third  Army  will 
be  made  towards  Nancy. 

"The  IXth  Army  Corps  will  march  tomorrow  to  the 
vicinity  of  Sillegny,  where  headquarters  will  be,  in  order  to 
follow  the  next  day  the  Illd  Army  Corps,  across  the  field 
bridge  constructed  by  that  corps,  by  way  of  Noveant-sur- 
Moselle  to  Gorze. 

"The  lid  Army  Corps  will  with  its  leading  elements 
reach  Buchy  near  Logne  tomorrow  and,  leaving  a  sufficient 
guard  for  General  Headquarters  in  Herny,  will  close  up  suffi- 
ciently to  be  able  to  commence  crossing  on  the  next  day  the 
Moselle  at  Pont-a-Mousson.     Headquarters  in  Buchy. 

"The  cavalry  divisions  out  in  front  will  reconnoiter  as 
the  advance  proceeds  the  roads  leading  to  the  Meuse  and  the 
crossings  there,  keeping  in  mind  that  the  6th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion will  reconnoiter  the  crossings  for  the  Xth,  Hid,  IXth, 
Corps  at  Dieuse-sur-Meuse  and  Genicourt ;  that  the  Royal 
Saxon  Cavalry  Division  will  reconnoiter  for  the  Xllth  Corps 
the  Meuse  crossing  at  Bannoncourt,  and  that  the  crossings  at 
St.  Mihiel,  Pont-sur-Meuse  and  Commercy  are  to  be  recon- 
noitered  for  the  Guard,  IVth  and  lid  Army  Corps  by  the 
Guard  Cavalry  Division.     All  reports  to  be  sent  to  these 

—349— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Headquarters  by  the  respective  corps  headquarters  as  soon 
as  practicable. 

"Second  Army  Headquarters  remains  in  Pont-a-Mous- 
son  tomorrow. 

"Considering  the  long  marches  which  the  situation  de- 
mands, I  leave  it  to  the  discretion  of  the  corps  to  form  all 
men  temporarily  unable  to  march  into  provisional  com- 
panies, attaching  sufficient  officers  and  noncommissioned  offi- 
cers, and  station  these  as  garrisons  in  the  principal  places 
along  the  route  of  march  and  to  report  these  facts  to  head- 
quarters of  the  Line  of  Communications — which  is  now  in 
Delme,  but  will  be  in  Pont-a-Mousson  from  the  17th  on. 

"Those  headquarters  will  then  take  the  necessary  steps 
to  relieve  these  garrisons  and  send  them  to  join  their  respec- 
tive organizations.  All  horses  unable  to  march  will  be  left 
with  caretakers  with  these  garrisons. 

Prince  Frederick   Charles, 

General  of  Cavalry." 

These  orders  w^ere  changed  only  in  some  minor  points 
when  Army  Headquarters  received  orders  from  General 
Headquarters  at  10:30  P.M. 

According  to  those  orders  two  corps  of  the  First  Army 
were  to  take  position  on  the  16th  of  August  in  the  terrain 
between  the  Seille  and  Moselle  on  the  line  Pommerieux — 
Arry,  to  follow  across  the  Moselle.  One  corps  of  that  army 
had  to  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  Courcelles  as  long  as  it  was 
not  absolutely  certain  whether  more  than  a  regular  garri- 
son had  remained  in  Metz. 

Thus,  the  IXth  Army  Corps  of  the  Second  Army  had  to 
be  kept  on  the  march  on  the  16th  and  had  to  evacuate  the 
right  bank  of  the  Moselle  as  much  as  possible.  It  therefore 
received  special  orders  to  cross  the  Moselle  directly  in  rear 
of  the  Hid  Army  Corps. 

For  the  subsequent  operations  the  letter  from  General 
Headquarters  cited  the  following  viewpoints:* 

"Conditions  under  which  the  1st  and  VHth  Army  Corps 
and   portions   of   the    18th   Infantry    Division    victoriously 


*See  No.  168,  von  Moltke's  Correspondence,  page  258. 

—350— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

fought  on  the  evening  of  the  14th,  precluded  any  pursuit. 
The  fruits  of  the  victory  can  be  gathered  only  by  a  forcible 
offensive  of  the  Second  Army  against  the  roads  from  Metz, 
as  well  as  via  Fresnes  and  Etain  toward  Verdun.  It  is  left 
to  the  Second  Army  headquarters  to  conduct  such  an  offen- 
sive with  all  available  means  at  hand.  Even  if,  through  this, 
the  Second  Army  will  find  itself  temporarily  ahead  of  the 
First  Army,  care  will  be  exercised  at  these  headquarters  in 
arranging  the  further  advance  westward,  which  steps  can- 
not be  foreseen  at  present,  and  steps  will  also  be  taken  to 
give  the  troops  the  necessary  rest." 

The  movements  directed  by  Headquarters  of  the  Sec- 
ond Army  were  in  accordance  with  what  was  now  necessary 
and  no  new  orders  were  required. 

THE  16th  OF  AUGUST 

During  the  night  of  August  15th-16th  extensive  bivouac 
fires  had  been  observed  west  of  Metz  and  this  fact  was  re- 
ported from  different  points  to  Pont-a-Mousson  by  9 :30 
A.M. 

There  could  be  no  longer  any  doubt  but  what  the  ene- 
my was  about  to  march  off  from  Metz.  How  far  he  had  pro- 
ceeded and  where  he  would  be  met  could  of  course  be  ascer- 
tained only  during  the  course  of  the  16th  of  August  from 
direct  contact. 

The  attention  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  had  been  called  as 
early  as  8  o'clock  to  the  great  importance  of  the  road  leading 
through  Etain. 

The  first  report  bringing  details  of  the  enemy  came 
from  the  Hid  Army  Corps  from  the  vicinity  south  of  Vion- 
ville.  It,  dated  at  10:30  A.M.,  reached  Army  Headquar- 
ters at  noon  and  stated: 

"Hostile  camps  at  Vionville  and  Rezonville.  The  Illd 
Army  Corps  is  advancing  as  a  unit ;  left  wing  towards  Jarny, 
to  eventually  cross  at  Confians.  5th  Cavalry  Division  at 
Mars-la-To  ir,  the  6th  at  Rezonville." 


-351— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

It  was  added  that  the  enemy  was  withdrawing  north- 
ward.* 

The  following  was  dictated  to  the  Adjutant  who  brought 
this  report,  which  in  accordance  with  directions  from  Gen- 
eral Headquarters,  lay  near  to  the  intentions  of  the  Prince: 

"As  long  as  the  enemy  retreats  in  front  of  the  Illd  Army 
Corps,  that  corps  must  pursue  him  vigorously,  pushing  its 
left  wing  forward. t  Continued  communication  with  the  Xth 
Army  Corps. 

"The  IXth  Army  Corps,  which  will  be  at  Mars-la-Tour 
tomorrow  noon,  will  secure  the  right  flank  against  Metz  and, 
if  necessary,  will  act  in  support." 

The  Prince  designated  the  objective  of  the  entire  opera- 
tion for  the  Hid  Army  Corps  as  being  to  drive  the  enemy  in 
a  northerly  direction. 

In  a  similar  manner  General  von  Manstein  was  sent  in- 
formation— through  the  officer  that  had  been  sent  from  the 
IXth  Corps  to  headquarters  to  receive  orders — that  the  Illd 
Army  Corps  was  pursuing  since  10  o'clock  hostile  masses 
of  troops,  which  apparently  were  falling  back  towards  the 
north. 

The  Prince  added — concerning  the  IXth  Corps,  itself: 

"It  is  important  that  the  IX  Corps  occupy  Mars-la- 
Tour  as  soon  as  possible  and  that  it  cover  today  the  right 
flank  of  the  Illd  Corps  against  Metz  and  serve  as  support 
for  that  corps." 

About  the  same  time  as  the  first  report  arrived  from 
the  Hid  Army  Corps,  Headquarters  in  Pont-a-Mousson  was 
engaged  in  drafting  the  army  orders  for  the  17th  of  August. 

These  army  orders — issued  during  a  situation  the  im- 
portance of  which  to  the  Second  Army  was  clear  to  every 
one — shows  the  views  held  at  that  time  at  Second  Army 
Headquarters.  It  appears  to  be  well  therefore  for  the  study 
of  military  history  to  go  more  into  the  details  of  these  or- 


*This  soon  proved  to  be  erroneous,  as  only  the  hostile  advanced 
troops  made  a  retrograde  movement. 

fThese  instructions  were  based  on  information  in  the  report 
from  the  Hid  Army  Corps  that  the  enemy  was  retreating  northward. 

—352— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

ders,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  they  were  overtaken  by 
events  and  were  executed  actually  only  by  the  lid  and  IVth 
Army  Corps. 

Since  the  intact  bridge  across  the  Moselle  at  Pont-a- 
Mousson  had  fallen  into  Prussian  hands  on  the  13th  of 
August,  Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  had  gained  the 
view  that  the  commander  of  the  French  Army  of  the  Rhine 
did  not  have  any  intention  to  accept  a  battle  in  rear  of  the 
Moselle  at  Metz.  It  was  believed  just  as  improbable  that  the 
French  had  selected  the  plateau  between  the  Moselle  and 
the  Meuse  for  the  decisive  battle. 

It  would  have  been  far  better  to  credit  the  hostile  gen- 
eral with  the  intention — the  best  that  he  could  do — to  bring 
the  Army  of  the  Rhine  as  rapidly  and  as  intact  as  possible 
to  behind  the  Meuse.  Once  there  it  would  have  plenty  of 
roads  to  safety  reach  the  west  of  France  and  effect 
a  junction  with  the  rest  of  the  French  fighting  forces.  This 
had  to  be  prevented.  We  must  not  allow  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine  to  reach  the  Argonne  passes ;  we  had  to  force  it  to 
the  north  and  thus  separate  it  from  portions  of  the  army 
that  had  retreated  directly  westward. 

The  plans,  which  we  thought  the  enemy  did  have,  could 
be  best  frustrated  by  the  Second  Army  if  as  early  as  possi- 
ble it  secured  the  crossings  of  the  Meuse  and  forced  the 
enemy  by  a  parallel  march  toward  the  Meuse  to  remain  on 
the  move  without  rest.  As  a  matter  of  course  steps  had  to  be 
taken  for  harassing  and  delaying  the  French  march  columns. 
This  was  to  be  the  task  of  the  right  wing  which  was  strong 
and  supplied  with  numerous  cavalry  and  under  one  com- 
mander. It  was  of  course  supposed  that  the  enemy  had  two 
days'  start.  The  northern  roads  from  Metz. westward  had 
not  been  reached  nor  reconnoitered  by  the  German  cavalry. 
The  enemy  might  have  utilized  the  14th  and  15th  of  August 
to  start  the  execution  of  his  intentions. 

The  dispositions  taken  in  those  days  were  based  on 
these  views,  as  was  also  the  army  order  of  August  16th, 
noon,  which  read : 


—353- 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

"Headquarters  Pont-a-Mousson,  16  August,  1870, 

12:00  Noon. 

"The  Second  Army  will  continue  its  forward  movement 
tomorrow  toward  the  Meuse. 

"During  the  next  few  days  the  First  Army  will  be  in 
rear  of  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army. 

"The  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army  will  be  governed 
in  its  movements  by  the  direction  of  the  hostile  retreat,  and 
so  that  later  on  the  Xth  Army  Corps  will  cross  the  Meuse 
below  Verdun.  Detachments  will  be  made  against  the  for- 
tress of  Verdun. 

"Should  the  Xth  Corps  be  drawn  far  to  the  north  in  the 
pursuit,  Clermont-en-Argonne  and  St.  Menehould  are  desig- 
nated as  the  points  on  which  the  present  right  wing  of  the 
army  will  march. 

"The  Illd  Army  Corps  will  march  on  Etain,  which  its 
advance  guard  will  occupy  unless  conditions  regarding  the 
enemy  require  something  else.  The  detachment  left  to 
guard  the  field  bridge  across  the  Moselle  will  be  withdrawn 
as  soon  as  the  IXth  Army  Corps  sends  a  relief,  which  will 
be  done  today. 

"The  IXth  Army  Corps  will  reach  Mars-la-Tour  tomor- 
row. 

"If  practicable  the  IXth  Corps  will  replace  the  field 
bridge  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  tomorrow  by  a  ponton  bridge 
constructed  from  Moselle  river  boats  and,  after  that  has 
been  accomplished,  will  send  the  light  field  bridge  train  to 
join  the  Hid  Corps. 

"The  three  corps  of  the  right  wing,  enumerated  in  the 
preceding  paragraphs  (and  which  will  report  their  where- 
abouts daily  to  these  headquarters),  will  keep  in  touch  with 
each  other  and  in  case  of  a  large  engagement  with  the 
enemy  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  will  assume  command  at 
first  of  the  Hid  and  later  also  of  the  IXth  Corps. 

"If  such  an  engagement  does  not  take  place,  as  is  ex- 
pected, on  August  18th  the  Hid  Corps  will  march  in  the 
direction  of  Dieuse-sur-Meuse,  the  IXth  Corps  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Fresnes — Genicourt-sur-Meuse  and  secure  the  Meuse 


—354- 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

crossing  there  as  early  as  possible.  In  case  the  IXth  Corps 
is  the  first  to  arrive,  it  will  secure  both  crossings. 

"The  Xllth  Army  Corps  will  march  tomorrow  with  its 
leading  elements  to  Vigneulles,  with  the  main  body  to  St. 
Benoit-en-Woevre,  where  headquarters  will  be.  The  cav- 
alry will  be  sent  to  and  beyond  the  Meuse.  On  the  18th  the 
Xllth  Corps  will  direct  its  march  on  Bannoncourt  and  secure 
the  Meuse  crossing  there. 

"The  Guard  Corps  will  march  tomorrow  to  St.  Mihiel, 
will  send  a  strong  advance  guard  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse  to  secure  important  crossings;  its  headquarters  will 
be  in  St.  Mihiel.  The  cavalry  will  proceed  toward  Bar-le- 
Duc. 

"The  IVth  Army  Corps  will  move  in  the  direction  of 
Jaillon — Sancey — Boucq  toward  Commercy  during  the  next 
few  days,  in  so  far  as  the  fortress  Toul  may  not  demand  a 
delay  in  this  advance. 

"The  lid  Army  Corps  will  reach  Pont-a-Mousson  tomor- 
row and  will  send  its  point  in  the  direction  of  Limey,  Flirey, 
St.  Mihiel.     Headquarters  Pont-a-Mousson. 

"Second  Army  Headquarters  will  be  in  Thiaucourt  from 
and  after  5  P.M.  today,  from  noon  tomorrow  and  until  fur- 
ther orders  in  St.  Mihiel. 

"After  the  Second  Army  has  reached  the  Meuse  and 
secured  the  crossings  there,  a  halt  will  probably  be  made  for 
several  days  until  the  flank  armies  have  arrived  on  the 
same  line. 

"All  corps  will  send  liaison  officers  to  these  headquar- 
ters daily.  These  officers  may  use  wagons,  tying  their 
horses  to  them,  and  take  along  infantry  orderlies  as  guards. 

Frederick   Charles, 
General    of   Cavalry." 

Transfer  of  Second  Army  Headquarters  to  Thiaucourt 
had  been  directed  to  be  made  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  be- 
cause General  Headquarters  was  to  come  to  Pont-a-Mousson 
and  there  was  not  enough  room  there  for  both  headquarters. 

H.R.H.  the  Prince  himself  decided  to  proceed  with  a  por- 
tion of  his  staff  in  the  afternoon  to  the  HI  Army  Corps  in 
the  vicinity  of  Vionville. 

—355— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Shortly  before  he  mounted  at  Pont-a-Mousson  a  report 
arrived  which  showed  that  conditions  were  changing  from 
what  had  been  up  to  then  assumed.  At  2:05  P.M.  General 
von  Kraatz,  commanding  the  20th  Infantry  Division,  re- 
ported "that  the  Hid  Army  Corps  were  engaged  north  of 
Gorze  in  a  heavy  fight  against  superior  forces." 

To  this  report  was  added  "that  the  20th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion is  about  to  march  via  Xammes  to  the  battlefield  to  sup- 
port the  Illd  Corps  and  information  has  been  sent  to  the 
19th  Division."  There  was  no  doubt  now  but  that  the  ques- 
tion was  one  of  an  important  tactical  decision  and  it  became 
clear  that  only  from  the  battlefield  could  it  be  determined 
what  measures  the  Second  Army  would  now  have  to  take. 

Before  we  continue  the  further  narrative  of  events  as 
they  developed  at  army  headquarters,  it  is  necessary  to  re- 
turn briefly  to  the  events  of  the  morning  concerning  the  de- 
tached portions  of  the  Second  Army. 

The  Illd.  Army  Corps  had  crossed  the  Moselle  early  the 
evening  of  the  15th  with  the  5th  Infantry  Division  via  the 
permanent  bridge  at  Noveant,  and  with  the  6th  Infantry 
Division  via  the  ponton  bridge  at  La  Lobe.  The  corps  artil- 
lery was  brought  up  by  way  of  Pont-a-Mousson.  Only  the 
6th  Cavalry  Division  remained  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle  in  position  from  Frescaty  to  the  Moselle,  observing 
towards  Metz. 

During  the  night  both  infantry  divisions  sent  detach- 
ments from  Noveant  to  Gorze  and  from  La  Lobe  via  Pagny 
and  Arnaville  to  Onville  respectively. 

For  the  16th  of  August  the  army  corps  had,  as  stated, 
the  following  orders  from  army  headquarters :  "To  reach 
the  Metz — Verdun  road  via  Gorze  at  Mars-la-Tour." 

General  von  Alvensleben  II  ordered  as  follows  in  order 
to  carry  out  these  orders : 

1.  The  6th  Infantry  Division  will  march  at  5  :00  A.M. 
via  Onville  to  Mars-la-Tour  and  the  corps  artillery  will  fol- 
low it. 


—356— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

2.  The  6th  Cavah-y  Division  will  have  crossed  the 
Noveant  bridge  by  5  :30  A.M.  and  will  march  via  Gorze  to 
Vionville;  the  5th  Infantry  Division  following  it.* 

This  march  was  started  early  the  16th  as  ordered. 

The  Illd  Army  Corps  ascended  in  two  columns  through 
the  deep-cut  valleys  of  Gorze  and  Onville  to  the  top  of  the 
plateau  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle.  Though  still  early 
it  was  extremely  hot  and  the  march  exceedingly  difficult, 
as  the  corps  had  either  been  up  half,  or  the  whole  night, 
and  had  undergone  great  fatigue  the  day  before. 

On  the  plateau  itself,  in  the  vicinity  of  Mars-la-Tour — 
the  march  objective  of  the  Illd  Army  Corps — General  von 
Rheinbaben  scouted  vv'ith  his  cavalry.  This  cavalry,  as 
stated  above,  had  stopped  hostile  troops  on  the  15th  coming 
from  Metz  via  Gravelotte  towards  Mars  -la-Tour  and  induced 
them  to  halt  for  the  night  at  Vionville. 

How  strong  the  hostile  forces  opposite  the  Hid  Corps 
were,  was  not  known  either  the  evening  of  the  15th  nor 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  Though  French  bi- 
vouac fires  had  been  seen  during  the  night  immediately  west 
of  Metz,  that  was  not  indication  enough  to  estimate  closely 
the  place  and  strength  of  the  camping  troops,  and  thus  gain 
the  desired  certainty. 

It  remained  probable  that  the  hostile  fighting  forces 
on  the  Metz — Mars-la-Tour  road  were  merely  a  flank  or  a 
rear  guard  of  the  army  marching  off  to  the  west;  for  the 
enemy  no  doubt  had  full  information  that  the  Second  Army 
had  already  crossed  the  Moselle  above  Metz  and  he  had 
therefore  no  choice  but  to  utilize  the  northern  roads  for  his 
retreat.  Only  those  roads  offered  him  some  kind  of  secur- 
ity. But,  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  still  had  the  entire  hostile 
army  in  our  front  immediately  west  of  Metz,  for  the  depar- 
ture of  that  army  had  been  delayed  by  the  battle  of  August 
14th  and  by  the  blockades  in  the  march  columns  on  the 
15th  so  much  that  the  leading  elements  had  not  gotten  to 


*The  crossing  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  was  delayed  on  the 
16th  until  6:15  A.M.,  and  this  in  turn  delayed  the  start  of  the  5th 
Infantry  Division. 

—357— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

beyond  Vionville  and  St.  Marcel  respectively  by  the  evening 
oi  August  15th.* 

On  August  15th  Forton's  French  Cavalry  Division 
marched  along  the  southern  road  by  way  of  Mars-la-Tour, 
ahead  of  its  army ;  it  was  followed  by  the  French  2d,  6th, 
and  Guard  Corps.  The  2d  Corps  was  to  reach  Mars-la-Tour 
on  the  15th,  but  remained  at  Rezonville  when  the  Division 
of  Forton  halted  at  the  sight  of  the  cavalry  under  General 
von  Rheinbaben  appearing  at  Mars-la-Tour  and  fell  back 
on  Vionville.  The  French  6th  Corps  also  arrived  at  Rezon- 
ville and  both  corps  camped  alongside  the  road  to  Vionville, 
the  6th  north  of  it,  the  2d  south  of  it.  The  Guard  Corps 
came  as  far  as  Gravelotte  in  rear  of  the  two  corps. 

Du  Barail's  French  cavalry  division  scouted  ahead 
along  the  northern  road  by  way  of  Doncourt  and  Conflans 
and  reached  the  vicinity  of  Jarny,  its  march  objective.  The 
4th  Corps,  which  was  to  follow  it  to  Doncourt,  was  over- 
taken by  the  3d  Corps  however,  which  latter  corps,  accord- 
ing to  orders  received,  marched  to  the  line  Verneville — St. 
Marcel.  It  left  the  4th  Corps  in  its  rear.  That  corps  re- 
mained with  both  the  divisions  of  Grenier  and  de  Cissey  at 
Woippy ;  Lorencez'  division  was  still  further  in  rear  at  the 
Moselle  defiles.  The  battle  of  the  14th  had  caused  this  latter 
corps  to  be  late. 

Thus  it  happened  that  on  August  16th  Marshal  Bazaine, 
who  actually  had  taken  supreme  command  on  August  12th 
of  the  hostile  army  at  Metz,  had  available  all  five  corps  of 
his  armyt  in  the  confined  space  between  Vionville,  St.  Mar- 
cel, Verneville  and  Gravelotte. 

Marshal  Bazaine  had  issued  orders  on  the  evening  of 
August  15th  that  the  army  was  to  be  in  readiness  very  early 
the  morning  of  August  16th  to  start  westward — these  or- 


*Along  the  northern  road  only  the  Cavalry  Division  of  du  Barail 
which  had  been  sent  ahead  reached  the  vicinity  between  Doncourt 
and  Jarny. 

fWith  exception  of  Lorencez'  Division  of  the  4th,  and  Met- 
mann's  Division  of  the  3d  Corps.  Laveaucoupet's  Division  of  the 
French  2d  Corps  had  remained  in  Metz  as  garrison,  and  the  2d  Corps 
had  received  in  its  place  Lapasset's  Brigade  of  the  5th  Corps  which 
had  retreated  from  Saargemiind. 

—358— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

ders  were  in  consonance  with  the  assumption  held  at  Head- 
quarters in  Pont-a-Mousson.  But  the  Marshal  changed 
these  orders ;  the  army  remained  in  its  camps. 

A  portion  of  the  plateau  on  which  the  French  army 
stood  on  the  16th  is  rolling,  covered  by  clumps  of  woods, 
the  balance  generally  open  and  affording  good  views.  The 
terrain  slopes  down  to  many  ravines  in  long,  irregular  slopes. 
These  ravines  become  deeper  towards  the  south  and  finally 
run  into  the  deeply  cut,  wooded  slopes  of  the  Gorze  valley, 
hard  to  ascend,  and  which  has  a  real  mountain  character. 
The  Gorze  valley  bounds  the  entire  portion  of  the  plateau 
in  question  from  Noveant  on  the  Moselle  as  far  as  Tronville, 
4.^  [English]  miles  northwest.  South  of  that  valley  the  left 
bank  of  the  Moselle  is  cut  into  ravines  running  deep  into 
the  country  "and  covered  with  forests — a  close  irregular 
terrain. 

If  we  ascend  towards  the  north  the  steep  slope  from 
Gorze,  where  the  ravines  dividing  the  northern  plateau  join 
concentrically,  the  picture  takes  an  entirely  different  aspect. 
Out  of  a  wooded,  romantic  mountain  country  we  step  onto 
a  flat,  regular  hilly  country.  In  the  east  we  see  the  village 
of  Gravelotte  high  up  on  the  plateau ;  Rezonville  and  Vion- 
ville  are  partly  hidden  deep  in  depressions.  None  of  these 
villages  are  surrounded  by  gardens  or  orchards,  but  rise  as 
cold  stone  masses  between  cultivated  lands.  A  very  similar 
view  is  offered  by  the  smaller  village  of  Flavigny  southeast 
of  Vionville. 

After  ascending  the  ravine  at  Gorze  it  is  at  first  believed 
that  all  difficulties  have  been  overcome.  Now  the  ter- 
rain dominates  the  country  northward  and  also  the  Metz — 
Mars-la-Tour  road,  which  runs  through  Gravelotte,  Rezon- 
ville and  Vionville.  But  this  is  in  part  erroneous.  No  mat- 
ter Vv'here  we  advance  toward  that  road  and  the  villages 
along  it,  we  must  pass  one  of  many  cross  ravines  and  climb 
up  the  steep  slope  on  the  other  side,  which,  glacis  like,  at  no 
point  offer  protection  nor  cover.  North  of  the  Metz — Mars- 
la-Tour  road  the  terrain  cannot  be  seen  from  the  Roman  road 
on.  Clumps  of  woods  hide  it  and  reserves  may  be  brought 

—359— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

up  here  against  the  Metz — Mars-la-Tour  road  without  an 
attacker  coming  from  the  south  being  able  to  see  them  or 
estimate  their  strength. 

When  now  at  8 :00  A.M.  August  16th  the  cavalry  points 
of  the  Illd  Army  Corps  ascended  the  southern  slope  of  the 
plateau,  they  perceived  hostile  outposts  at  Vionville  and 
behind  them,  towards  Rezonville,  large  camps. 

It  remained  doubtful  if  the  entire  French  army  was 
still  immediately  west  of  Metz,  or  if  only  one  corps  was 
camped  here  covering  the  departure  of  the  main  forces 
westward.  It  is  certain  that  the  entire  hostile  army  was 
not  seen,  but  only  portions  thereof.  In  order  to  hold  these 
at  all  events.  General  von  Alvensleben  II  decided  to  attack. 

He  first  caused  the  6th  Infantry  Division  to  deploy  be- 
hind the  hills  of  Buxieres.*  But  before  this-  was  accom- 
plished the  appearance  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division  at  the 
upper  end  of  the  Gorze  defile  had  to  be  awaited.  Then  he 
ordered  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  to  march  off  to  the  left, 
through  the  ravine  to  the  Anconville  farm  and  the  Bois 
de  Gaumont  and  to  ascend  the  plateau  from  there.  But  by 
orders  of  General  von  Voigts-Rhets  General  von  Rheinba- 
ben  came  with  his  cavalry  from  the  bivouacs  at  Xonville 
and  reported  to  the  Illd  Army  Corps  for  orders.  As  has  been 
stated,  Bredow's  Brigade  with  its  battery  had  rejoined 
that  division,  so  that  it  had  at  its  disposal  its  three  bri- 
gades and  four  horse  batteries ;  besides  early  in  the  morn- 
ing the  two  horse  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  X 
Army  Corps  also  arrived.! 

The  6th  Cavalry  Division  proceeded,  as  ordered,  from 
about  the  point  Tantelainville  on  the  plateau  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Flavigny  and  on  its  left  advanced  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division  towards  Vionville. 

The  enemy  was  still  at  rest,  little  dreaming  of  the  ap- 
proach of  the  two  hostile  columns  of  the  Illd  Corps  and  cav- 
alry. The  two  cavalry  divisions  brought  their  artillery  to 
the  front,  threw  some  shells  into  the  camp  and  the  5th 


*The  corps  artillery  had  been  brought  to  the  front. 
fUnder  guard  of  one  squadron  of  the  2d  Guard  Dragoon  Regi- 
ment. 

—360— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Division  rapidly  drove  off  Murat's  French  Cavalry  Brigade 
which,  at  Vionville,  covered  the  front  of  the  troops 
in  camp  towards  Rezonville.*  In  the  confusion  the  French 
troops  rode  through  the  infantry  of  the  French  2d  Corps 
and  in  that  manner  alarmed  the  corps.  The  corps  took  arms 
at  once  and  took  position,  Batailles'  Division  on  the  line 
Vionville — Flavigny,  the  Verge's  Division  on  its  left  on  the 
plateau  and  Lapasset's  Brigade  to  the  left  of  the  latter 
division. 

On  the  right  of  the  French  2d  Corps  north  of  the  road 
the  6th  Corps  went  into  position ;  in  rear  of  it  the  Guard 
Corps,  at  Gravelotte. 

Thus,  a  French  army  of  about  80,000t  men  with  more 
than  300J  guns  was  in  readiness  to  take  up  battle,  while 
30,000§  men  with  only  114  guns  on  the  Prussian  side  ad- 
vanced from  difficult  mountain  ravines  against  this  num- 
erically superior  force  which  awaited  the  attack  in  advan- 
tageous defensive  positions. 

But  the  inequality  of  numbers  could  not  be  perceived 
at  once ;  it  made  itself  felt  in  its  entire  importance  only  dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  battle. 

In  the  meantime  the  action  had  commenced,  for  the 
enemy  prevented  the  5th  Infantry  Division  from  deploying 
from  the  valley  of  Gorze. 

It  will  be  well  here  to  take  a  short  view  of  the  situation 
of  the  other  corps  of  the  Army. 

Of  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  the  5th  Cavalry  Division 
under  Rheinbaben  had  passed  the  night  at  Xonville,  the 


*As   a  matter  of  fact  artillery  here  executed  a  surprise  attack 
against  cavalry.     This  happened  at  about  9:45  A.M. 

fMetz,    Campagne    et   negociations    par    un    officier    superieur    de 
I'armee  du  Rhin,  page  68. 

JThe  French   2d  Corps   12  batteries — 72  guns. 

The    French    6th    Corps    9  batteries — 54  guns. 

The    French    Guard    Corps    12  batteries — 72  guns. 

Forton's   Cavalry  Division ' 2  batteries — 12  guns. 

The  reserve  artillery 

camping    between    Rezonville 

and    Gravelotte     16  batteries — 96  guns. 

306  guns. 
§The  Hid  Army  Corps  had  only  23  battalions  there. 

_361— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

19th  Infantry  Division  with  the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade  at 
Thiaucourt  and  in  rear  of  that  place — one  detachment 
(Lyncker)  was  in  the  Moselle  valley  at  Noveant;  the  20th 
Infantry  Division  with  the  foot  batteries  of  the  corps  ar- 
tillery in  and  near  Pont-a-Mousson. 

On  the  16th  the  Xth  Army  Corps  had  had  St.  Hillaire 
as  its  objective.  It  issued  the  following  orders  for  that 
day: 

1.  The  5th  Cavalry  Division  will  advance  reconnoiter- 
ing  towards  the  enemy  at  Rezonville  (this  had  been  done,  as 
stated  above)  ; 

2.  6  battalions,  4  squadrons,  2  batteries  of  the  19th 
Infantry  Division  will  march  to  Chambley  and  there,  under 
orders  of  Colonel  Lehmann,  will  form  the  support  for  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division  ;* 

3.  The  rest  of  the  19th  Infantry  Division  and  the 
Guard  Dragoon  Brigade  marched  to  St.  Hilaire  under  com- 
mand of  Lieut.-General  von  Schwartzkoppen. 

4.  The  20th  Infantry  Division  and  the  corps  artillery 
followed  to  north  of  Thiaucourt. 

But  from  the  dispositions  made  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps 
it  is  seen  that  in  the  course  of  the  16th  all  portions  thereof 
could  reach  the  vicinity  of  Vionville,  some  of  them  of  course 
only  after  a  march  of  some  twenty  miles. 

Undoubtedly  the  Xth  Army  Corps  considered  the  possi- 
bility of  more  serious  engagements  in  the  vicinity  of  Mars- 
la-Tour  and  that  the  different  columns  would  have  to  ex- 
pect to  have  to  deploy  to  the  right  of  that  point. 

The  remaining  corps  of  the  Second  Army  were  engaged 
in  executing  the  army  orders  of  the  afternoon  of  August 
15th.  Therefore  of  these  corps  only  the  leading  elements 
of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  could  reach  the  vicinity  of  Vion- 
ville. 


*For  this  duty  were  selected:  the  37th  Infantry  Brigade  (Leh- 
mann), the  9th  Hannoverian  Dragoon  Regiment  (1st  squadron),  2 
batteries  of  the  19th  Infantry  Division.  From  these  had  been  sent  out 
during  the  night:  (1)  Lehmann's  detachment  4  battalions,  2  squad- 
rons, 1  battery  to  and  around  Thiaucourt;  (2)  Lyncker's  detachment 
2  battalions.  2  squadrons,  1  battery  at  Noveant  to  the  Moselle  valley. 
Both  detachments  were  to  concentrate  at  Chambley  early  on  August 
16th. 

—362-^ 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Let  us  now  turn  back  to  that  point. 

The  battle  in  which  the  Hid  Army  Corps  was  engaged 
became  very  serious  within  a  very  short  time.  The  numeri- 
cal superiority  of  the  enemy  soon  drew  the  entire  forces  of 
the  corps  into  action. 

At  9 :30  o'clock  General  von  Stiilpnagel  (commander  of 
the  5th  Infantry  Division)  had  received  a  report  in  Gorze 
that  the  enemy  was  on  the  plateau  of  Vionville.  He  im- 
mediately directed  his  advance  guard  (9th  Infantry  Brigade 
under  General  von  Boring)  to  take  possession  of  the  pro- 
jecting ridge  at  the  Bois  de  Vionville,  which  dominated  the 
ascent  from  the  ravine  of  Gorze. 

The  advance  guard  succeeded  in  quickly  gaining  a  firm 
foothold  in  the  Bois  de  Vionville  with  those  troops  which 
had  passed  the  night  in  Gorze. 

However,  the  enemy,  alarmed  by  the  Prussian  cavalry, 
advanced  different  columns  to  Vionville,  Flavigny  and 
against  the  exit  of  the  Gorze  ravine,  and  disputed  the  pos- 
session of  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and  of  the  heights  west 
thereof.  An  engagement  also  ensued  in  the  Bois  de  St. 
Arnould. 

In  the  meantime  the  right  wing  of  the  Division  held  its 
own  in  the  wooded  terrain  it  had  taken,  and  this  wing  be- 
came the  supporting  point  for  the  deployment  of  the  divi- 
sion. Ba'ttalions  coming  one  after  the  other  out  of  the  Gorze 
ravine  prolonged  the  front  to  the  left,  these  battalions 
soon  reaching  to  beyond  Anconville  farm.  The  batteries 
also  succeeded  in  gaining  a  firm  foothold  on  top  of  the  pla- 
teau. 

These  engagements  were  from  the  very  start  very  hot 
and  bloody,  but  by  1:00  P.M.  the  hill  had  been  completely 
taken.  The  5th  Infantry  was  by  now  on  the  plateau  and  had 
driven  the  enemy  across  the  first  deep  depression  towards 
the  hill  of  Rezonville. 

At  10:15  o'clock  General  von  Buddenbrock*  had  re- 
ceived orders  through  General  von  Alvensleben  II  to  also 


*  Commander   of   the    6th    Infantry    Division. 

—363— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

advance  to  the  attack.  The  general  idea  of  operations  in 
those  days — "to  push  the  enemy  away  from  his  route  of 
retreat  on  Verdun" — ^was  firmly  adhered  to.  In  accordance 
therewith  the  6th  Infantry  Division  executed  a  turn  to  the 
right  in  its  advance,  and  marched  on  Flavigny,  Vionville 
and  the  woods  situated  northwest  of  Vionville  (Tronville 
woods).* 

In  the  execution  of  this  movement  it  came  square 
across  the  Metz — Verdun  road  in  front  of  the  enemy.  The 
attack  succeeded.  Vionville  and  Flavigny  were  taken.  In 
the  fights  around  the  latter  village  portions  of  the  left  wing 
of  the  5th  Infantry  Division  participated. f  But  in  the  Tron- 
ville woods  the  extreme  left  wing  of  the  Division  completed 
its  right  turn,  emerged  from  the  northeastern  edge  of  the 
woods,  passed  the  ravine  running  parallel  with  the  edge  of 
the  woods,  and  held  its  own  on  the  other  edge  opposite  the 
masses  of  the  French  6th  Corps. 

Strong  artillery  prepared  and  supported  this  attack. 
West  of  Vionville  42  guns  went  into  action  ;J  south  of  Vion- 
ville on  the  plateau  from  about  behind  the  left  wing  of  the 
5th  Infantry  Division,  and  on  a  line  with  the  batteries  of  that 
division§  were  48  guns  from  about  10  :45  A.M.  to  about  1 :00 
P.M.  The  cavalry  also  participated  as  early  as  1:00  P.M.  in 
the  fighting  around  Vionville  and  Flavigny,  as  the  enemy 
there  attempted  to  relieve  his  hard  pressed  troops  by  cav- 


*The  11th  Infantry  Brigade  (von  Rothmaler)  advanced  against 
the  position  at  Flavigny — Vionville,  the  12th  Infantry  Brigade  (von 
Bismarck)    against  Vionville   and   the   Tronville   woods. 

fit  is  said  that  Flavigny  was  twice  occupied  by  the  French  and 
twice  captured  from  them,  the  first  time  by  the  5th  Infantry  Division, 
which  abandoned  it  again  in  its  advance,  and  the  second  time  by 
the  6th  Division,  which  captured  it  again.  The  details  concerning 
this  interesting  phase  of  the  action  will  have  to  be  left  to  the  spe- 
cial reports  of  the  Battle  of  Vionville,  which  will  be  issued  soon, 
and  we  can  therefore  pass  them  over  here. 

|4  batteries  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division,  3  batteries  of  the  6th 
Infantry   Division. 

§The  corps  artillery  of  the  Illd  Corps  with  its  6  batteries,  1 
battery  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division,  1  battery  of  the  6th  Cavalry 
Division. 


564— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

airy  charges.*  By  1 :30  P.M.  these  actions  came  to  an 
end. 

The  task  of  the  Illd  Army  Corps  had  been  solved;  it 
had  deprived  the  enemy  of  his  direct  route  of  retreat  on 
Verdun,  had  battled  for  and  gained  a  position  on  the  pla- 
teau and  extended  that  position  square  across  the  Metz — 
Mars-la-Tour  road. 

From  now  on  the  main  point  was  to  maintain  the  advan- 
tages gained.  And  thus  commenced  the  defensive  portion 
of  the  battle. 

For  the  execution  of  the  defense  there  were  in  readi- 
ness: 

1.  The  main  body  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division  in  the 
Bois  de  St.  Arnould,  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and  on  the  heights 
west  of  this  wood. 

2.  On  the  hill  in  front  of  the  Gorze — Vionville  road 
were  78  guns  in  one  long  artillery  line.t 

3.  The  6th  Infantry  Division  in  the  vicinity  of  Fla- 
vigny — Vionville  and  in  front  of  the  eastern  edge  of  the 
Tronville  woods  as  far  as  the  Roman  road  (in  addition  at 
Flavigny  were  some  portions  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division) 
supported  by  the  42  guns  that  had  gone  into  position  in  the 
center  west  of  Vionville. $ 


*  These  cavalry  fights  were  started  by  a  charge  of  the  hostile 
3d  Lancers  and  Guard  Cuirassiers  against  Prussian  infantry  de- 
tachments emerging  from  Flavigny.  The  17th  Brunswick  Hus- 
sars and  the  11th  Hussars  of  Redern's  Brigade  of  the  5th  Cav- 
alry Division  answered  by  a  counter-attack;  one  dragoon  squadron 
participated.  The  hostile  cavalry  was  defeated  and  pursued  towards 
Rezonville.  There  the  Hussars  perceived  a  French  battery  in  front 
of  Rezonville  and  south  of  the  road,  charged  that  battery,  and  dis- 
persed Bazaine's  staff,  who  had  brought  the  battery  up  in  person. 
But  the  Marshal's  personal  escort  came  up  from  Rezonville,  disen- 
gaged the  French  commander-in-chief  and  the  battery,  which  the 
hussars  just  then  endeavored  to  bring  to  the  rear.  After  these 
events  the  entire  6th  Cavalry  Division  and  some  squadrons  of  the 
12th  and  9th  Regiments  started  to  attack;  portions  actually  did 
attack,  but  encountered  intact  hostile  infantry  that  had  by  then  come 
up. 

t4  batteries  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division,  6  batteries  of  the 
corps  artillery  of  the  Hid  Corps,  1  battery  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division, 
and  1  battery  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division,  and  1  battery  of  Lyncker's 
detachment  which  had  also  come  up. 

J4  horse  batteries  which  were  at  the  disposal  of  General  von 
Rheinbaben  and  3  batteries  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division. 

—365— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

All  these  troops  had  already  been  engaged  and  some  of 
them  had  suffered  severe  losses.* 

There  were  available  in  reserve:  two  cavalry  divisions, 
the  6th  in  rear  of  Flavigny,  the  5th  with  its  three  brigades 
divided  on  the  left  wing. 

Redern's  Brigade  was  in  rear  of  Flavigny,  the  Bri- 
gades of  Bredow  and  Barby  between  Vionville  and  Mars-la- 
Tour.  Barby's  Brigade  at  the  same  time  covered  the  ex- 
treme left  through  detachments. 

But  by  then  portions  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  were  ap- 
proaching the  battlefield  or  had  already  become  engaged 
there. 

During  the  afternoon  hours  the  detachment  of  Lyncker 
of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  had  reached  Gorze  coming  from 
Noveant,  reported  for  orders  to  the  5th  Infantry  Division, 
prolonged  with  its  battery  the  long  artillery  line  of  the 
right  wing  of  that  division  at  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and 
participated  in  the  subsequent  engagements  around  the 
wooded  terrain  on  the  right  wing. 

The  detachment  of  Lehmann  had  reached  Chambley  and 
had  received  orders  from  General  von  Alvensleben  II  to  re- 
inforce the  Prussian  left  wing. 

General  von  Voigts-Rhetz,  who  had  wanted  to  reach 
St.  Hilaire  with  his  headquarters  on  the  I6th,  marched 
that  morning  to  Xonville  where  he  received  the  reports  of 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division.  The  thunder  of  cannon  induced 
him  to  send  orders  to  all  portions  of  his  command  to  march 
to  the  battlefield. 

But  there  the  counter-attack  was  not  delayed.  For 
that  purpose  the  enemy  brought  up  the  mass  of  his  Guard 
Corps  to  the  front  of  the  fighting  troops  and  directed  his 
3d  Corps  toward  the  right  of  the  battle  line.  The  4th 
Corps  followed.  The  French  army  threatened  to  employ  its 
masses  and  to  bring  about  a  decision  by  its  greatly  super- 
ior numbers. 


*One   intact  battalion    (the  2d  of  the   20th   Infantry   Regiment) 
was   still   disposable   with   the   6th   Infantry   Division. 

—306— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Numerous  artillery  prepared  this  offensive.*  By  1:45 
P.M.  this  offensive  commenced  carried  out  by  the  full  force 
of  the  French  Guardf  and  the  6th  Corps.|  This  general 
attack  of  the  enemy  was  however  defeated. § 

However,  in  spite  of  the  successful  resistance  the  situa- 
tion became  very  grave.  On  the  left  wing,  which  vainly  en- 
deavored to  free  itself  by  a  counter-attack,  the  French  super- 
iority over  the  Prussian  left  made  itself  felt. 

It  is  true  that  at  this  time  the  battalions  of  the  Leh- 
mann  detachment  arrived  in  rear  of  the  Tronville  woods, 
but  it  appeared  that  participation  in  the  battle  was  so  neces- 
sary that  only  cavalry  could  do  it.  Therefore,  by  orders  of 
General  von  Alvensleben  II  Bredow's  Brigade  of  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division  made  a  charge.  This  charge 
was  directed  against  the  hostile  infantry  in  front  of 
Rezonville  and  the  batteries  on  the  Roman  road.  It  pierced 
the  hostile  infantry  and  artillery  lines,  and  ended  deep  in 
the  French  center  and  brought  about  the  desired  pause  in 
the  battle,  which  lasted  longer  than  one  hour.  The  hostile 
batteries  kept  almost  completely  silent  and  the  infantry 
fight  proceeded  very  slowly.  The  battalions  of  the  Lehmann 
detachment  reached  in  the  meantime  the  edge  of  the  Tron- 
ville woods  facing  the  enemy';  and  these  woods  remained  in 
Prussian  hands  up  to  3:30  P.M.  Only  then  did  the  fight 
take  another  turn;  the  enemy,  reaching  farther  around** 
pushed  back  the  decimated  battalions,  by  then  greatly  fatig- 
ued and  which  had  lost  the  larger  portion  of  their  officers. 


*About    224    French    against    114    Prussian    guns. 

t6  battalions  Guard  Grenadiers  under  General  Picard,  com- 
manding the  Guard  Grenadier  Division.  The  Guard  Voltigeurs  un- 
der General  Deligny  remained  in   reserve  in  rear  at  Rezonville. 

JLafont's  Division  and  one  brigade  of  the  Division  of  Levassor- 
Sorval. 

§In  the  6th  Infantry  Division,  the  leading  elements  of  Leh- 
mann's  detachment  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  participated  at  the  cis- 
tern of  Flavigny. 

]The  7th  Cuirassiers  and  16th  Uhlans  charged;  each  regiment 
detached  a  squadron  to  the  left  flank,  so  that  6  squadrons  partici- 
pated in  the  charge. 

IJThe  east,  northeast,  and  north  edges. 

**The  French  3d  Corps,  Leboeuf. 

—367— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

fighting  in  and  near  the  Tronville  woods.  But  that  French 
offensive  was  soon  stopped  by  the  Prussian  batteries 
in  position  west  of  Vionville.  At  the  same  time  the  leading 
elements  of  the  20th  Infantry  Division  arrived  at  Tronville. 
There  was  now  additional  support  available. 

Here  the  battle  came  momentarily  to  a  pause. 

In  Stiilpnagel's  Division  the  fire  fight,  carried  on  at 
longer  range,  continued. 

In  the  meantime  Prince  Frederick  Charles  and  his  staff 
had  reached  the  battlefield. 

During  his  ride  from  Pont-a-Mousson  to  the  battlefield 
the  Prince  encountered  a  battery  of  the  16th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion in  Noveant.  Infantry  columns  were  seen  marching 
along  the  right  of  the  Moselle  valley,  and  these  were  be- 
lieved to  be  columns  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  hastening 
up.  When  the  Gorze  valley  was  entered  all  indications  of 
a  hot,  bloody  struggle  were  seen.  Lines  of  French  pris- 
oners came  down  the  plateau.  Trains  under  guard  were 
along  the  roads ;  everywhere  hospitals  were  seen.  Wounded 
— in  masses — such  as  the  commander-in-chief  never  had 
seen  before — greeted  him  with  endless  hurrahs.  Afoot  and 
on  wagons  in  a  continuous  stream  these  wounded  gave  the 
best  proof  that  an  enormous  crisis  was  impending.  But 
they  also  gave  a  clear  picture  of  the  morale  of  the  troops 
and  the  confidence  in  victory  which  took  possession  of  them 
on  the  appearance  of  their  commanding  general. 

The  thunder  of  cannon,  only  weakly  heard  in  the  Mo- 
selle valley,  now  became  louder  and  louder.  On  the  right, 
over  the  woods,  French  shells  were  seen  exploding. 

At  St.  Catherine  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Gorze  brook 
was  the  cavalry  of  the  16th  Infantry  Division,*  whose  com- 
mander reported  to  H.R.H.  that  the  leading  elements  of  the 
infantry  of  the  division  would  arrive  in  about  one  hour, 
that  is,  between  4:00  and  5:00  P.M.  Though  late,  these 
supports  could  still  effectively  participate  and  would  be 
very  welcome  to  the  fighting  troops. 


''One  squadron  of  the  9th  Rhenish  Hussar  Regiment. 
—368— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  little  town  of  Gorze  was  in  dead  stillness — the  main 
street  was  empty.  It  appeared  that  the  wounded  had  all 
been  sheltered  in  the  houses. 

Arrived  on  the  plateau,  H.R.H.  the  Prince  proceeded 
first  to  the  northwest  corner  of  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and 
met  the  1st  Battalion  of  the  Body  Grenadier  Regiment 
there.  He  had  covered  the  4  [English]  miles  from  Pont- 
a-Mousson  to  that  point,  from  which  a  good  view  could  be 
had  of  the  battlefield,  in  the  short  time  of  55  minutes. 

From  there  a  clear  picture  was  had  of  the  situation  on 
the  eastern  portion  of  the  battlefield. 

Over  the  treetops  of  the  lowlying  corner  of  the  forest 
to  the  front  could  be  seen  the  hills,  the  village  and  the  post 
ofllice  building  of  Gravelotte,  and  even  the  Gravelotte — Ver- 
neville  road  as  far  as  the  hill  of  the  Bois  de  la  Juree.  Re- 
zonville  and  its  surrounding  hills,  as  well  as  the  terrain  to 
the  rear  as  far  as  the  Roman  road,  could  also  be  seen. 

A  view  of  this  battlefield  showed  how  serious  the  battle 
was  and  that  still  great  demands  would  have  to  be  made 
on  the  fighting  troops.  At  the  point  occupied  by  the  Prince 
very  soon  arrived  the  commander  of  the  5th  Infantry  Di- 
vision, Lieutenant-General  von  Stiilpnagel,  who  oriented 
the  commander-in-chief  on  the  course  of  the  battle  so  far. 
At  that  moment  the  infantry  fighting  seemed  to  have  slowed 
up,  and  only  the  heavy  batteries  were  firing.  From  where 
the  Prince  stood  it  could  be  plainly  seen  that  the  enemy  was 
far  superior  in  numbers  to  the  available  Prussian  troops. 
On  the  French  side  we  could  still  see  intact  troops ;  on  our 
side  were  none. 

The  long  French  artillery  line  was  in  action  along  the 
Roman  road.  However  the  fusilade  that  could  be  heard 
in  the  Tronville  woods  proved  that  this  artillery  did  not 
form  the  French  right  wing,  but  that  that  wing  reached 
still  far  beyond.  It  was  seen  from  the  clouds  of  powder 
smoke  that  enveloped  Rezonville  and  the  west  and  south 
that  the  enemy  was  also  deploying  strong  forces  there. 
His  fighting  line  ran  east  from  there  as  far  as  the  Bois  des 
Ognons.     Reserves  were  halted  in  rear  between  Gravelotte 

—369— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

and  Rezonville,  and  also  in  Gravelotte  itself.  The  main 
highroad  and  the  Verneville — Gravelotte  road*  were  cov- 
ered with  marching  troops. 

The  French  positions  still  had  sufficient  depth  for  stub- 
born fighting.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Prussian  troops 
were  fighting  in  a  single  thin  battle  line.  On  our  side  there 
were  no  more  reserves,  the  losses  were  very  great,  many  bat- 
talions had  no  officers,  the  guns  had  insufficient  comple- 
ments and  teams.  After  a  hot  fight  lasting  more  than  six 
hours  the  fatigue  of  the  troops  made  itself  felt.  But  at 
that  very  moment  an  offensive  by  Prussian  infantry  was 
starting  against  Rezonville.  Of  course  success  was  not  at- 
tained in  capturing  that  village.! 

Before  we  recount  the  activity  of  army  headquarters 
during  the  further  course  of  the  battle,  we  will  call  to 
mind  that  this  account  is  strictly  from  the  standpoint  of 
army  headquarters.  Strictly  speaking,  in  the  narrative 
here  we  should  mention  only  that  which  army  headquarters 
saw,  learned  of  and  performed  on  the  battlefield.  But  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  a  complete  picture,  a  short  synopsis  of 
what  happened  on  the  battlefield  prior  to  the  arrival  of 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  has  been  given  above.  The  scenes 
of  the  last  hours  of  the  battle  are  of  course  more  vivid  in 


*At  this  time  the  French  position  was  about  as  follows: 

1.  The  French  4th  Corps  on  the  right  approaching  by  way 
way  of  Bruville  in  the  direction  of  Mars-la-Tour ; 

2.  Two  divisions  of  the  French  3d  Corps  in  ano  at  the 
Tronville  woods; 

3.  The  French  6th  Corps  and  the  Guard  Grenadiers  west 
and  south  of  Rezonville; 

4.  On  the  left  wing  the  Brigade  of  Lapasset,  the  Guard  Vol- 
tigeurs  and  one  division  of  the  3d  Corps.  In  rear,  in  reserve, 
two  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps,  reassembled,  at  Gravelotte  for 
security  against  the  exits  from  Ars-sur-Moselle. 

fOf  the  20th  Infantry  Division,  the  leading  elements  of  which 
arrived  at  Tronville  at  3:30  P.M.,  two  battalions  of  the  56th  In- 
fantry Regiment,  one  battalion  of  the  79th  Infantry  Regiment  and 
two  batteries,  which  were  joined  by  two  batteries  of  the  corps  ar- 
tillery had  been  detached,  on  the  march  to  Tronville,  to  join  the  5th 
Infantry  Division  and  the  arrival  of  these  fresh  troops  on  the  bat- 
tlefield of  the  Division,  which  happened  at  about  4:00  P.M.,  started 
this  offensive.  One  battery  accompanied  the  battalions  advancing 
on  Rezonville.  The  advance  became  general  without  orders  there- 
for having  been  issued  by  higher  authority,  and  even  in  the  forest 
terrain  on  the  right  wing  the  Prussian  infantry  renewed  the  offen- 
sive. 

—370— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

this  narrative  in  relation  to  the  first  hours  of  the  battle. 
Therefore  the  former  should  not  be  compared  with  the  lat- 
ter as  to  their  value  and  importance  of  this  narrative.  For 
such  a  comparison  the  detailed  reports  of  the  first  part 
of  the  battle  should  also  be  consulted. 

The  offensive  of  the  Prussian  left  against  the  hostile 
right  entirely  corresponded  tactically  to  the  thought  on 
which  the  operations  of  the  last  few  days  were  based,  as 
has  been  stated  before. 

On  the  Prussian  right  reinforcements  could  only  ar- 
rive in  driblets  from  the  Gorze  ravine  while  large  masses 
could  arrive  complete  on  the  left,  where  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  became  effectively  engaged.  There  lay  the  field  for 
the  Prussian  offensive.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  adhered 
to  this  view,  as  it  appeared  more  dangerous  to  leave  to  the 
plainly  visible  superior  hostile  force  the  time  and  oppor- 
tunity for  using  their  available  fighting  forces  for  a  crush- 
ing attack,  than  to  decisively  oppose  them  with  inferior 
forces. 

Of  course  the  real  amount  of  the  great  preponderance 
of  the  enemy  could  not  be  perceived  at  that  moment. 

The  arrival  of  the  20th  Infantry  Division  had  been  re- 
ported to  the  Prince.  He  explained  his  views  to  General 
von  Stiilpnagel  and  also  to  General  von  Barnekow*  who 
had  just  arrived,  and  added  to  what  he  said  to  General  von 
Stiilpnagel  that  the  16th  and  25th  Infantry  Divisions  were 
approaching  and  this  general  then  promised  that  he  would 
hold  his  positions  under  any  and  all  circumstances. 

Thereupon  H.R.H.  the  Prince  proceeded  to  the  hill  south 
of  Flavigny.  From  that  hill  a  portion  of  the  battlefield 
toward  the  left  could  be  seen,  Flavigny  in  the  foreground, 
lying  low,  in  its  rear  the  rolling  terrain  ascending  toward 
the  Roman  road  and  the  clumps  of  woods  on  that  road,  as 
well  as  Vionville  and  the  Tronville  woods.  On  the  left  Tron- 
ville  was  seen.  The  village  of  Mars-la-Tour  on  the  other 
hand  was  hidden  by  the  Tronville  hills. 


*Commander    of    the    16th    Infantry    Division. 

—371— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  infantry  fire  was  still  heard  raging  in  the  Tron- 
ville  woods.  West  of  Vionville  and  in  front  of  Tronville 
Prussian  batteries*  were  in  action  against  the  hostile  artil- 
lery positions  along  the  Roman  road.  The  reserve  of  the 
6th  Cavalry  Division  to  in  rear  of  the  Vionville — Flavigny 
position,  to  the  right  front  thereof  were  a  few  battalions 
of  the  6th  Infantry  Division  that  had  reestablished  order 
after  a  hot  fight. t 

It  was  now  about  5  :00  P.M.  and  time  to  commence  the 
counter-attacks  if  these  were  still  to  be  brought  to  a  success- 
ful conclusion.  Therefore  Prince  Frederick  Charles  sent 
orders  to  the  20th  Infantry  Division  at  Tronville  "to  ad- 
vance with  all  available  troops,  drums  beating,  against  the 
hostile  right." 

These  orders  reached  the  division  commander,  General 
von  Kraatz,  shortly  after  5:00  P.M.  on  the  road  to  Mars-la- 
Tour,  6  to  800  paces  west  of  Vionville.  At  that  time  the 
general  had  only  a  total  of  eight  battalions. $  Of  these  sev- 
eral battalions  were  engaged  in  the  Tronville  woods,  which, 
as  stated,  had  to  be  evacuated  about  3 :30  P.M.  and  which 
could  not  be  permitted  to  fall  into  the  enemy's  possession 
as  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  Prussian  battle  line  would 
be  seriously  endangered. 

The  general  caused  the  commander-in-chief  to  be  in- 
formed of  this  situation  and  promised  to  start  the  offensive 
as  soon  as  he  would  have  sufficient  forces  assembled  at  one 
point. 

In  the  meantime  the  battle  again  became  hotter  on  the 
right  wing. 

The  heavy  batteries  in  the  center  fired  at  shorter  inter- 
vals.   This  indicated  the  arrival  of  the  leading  elements  of 


*2  batteries  of  the  20th  Infantry  Division,  2  batteries  of  the 
corps  artillery  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  hastening  ahead  of  the  20th 
Infantry  Division,  had  gone  into  position  there. 

t64th  Infantry  Regiment. 

JOf  the  13  battalions  of  the  division  three  battalions  were  in 
action  on  the  battlefield  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division,  one  battalion 
had  remained  in  Pont-a-Mousson,  one  battalion  was  still  on  the 
march   via   Thiaucourt. 


-372— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

the  IXth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps.*  It  now  appeared  advan- 
tageous under  all  conditions  to  combine  the  offensive  at- 
tacks against  the  enemy's  right  wing  and  flank  with  those 
against  his  left  wing. 

That  portion  of  the  19th  Infantry  Division,  approach- 
ing from  St.  Hilaire,  could  be  expected  to  arrive  on  the  left 
of  the  20th  Infantry  Division.  Definite  information  how 
near  these  were  now  was  at  hand,  but  towards  5  o'clock 
rifle  fire  had  commenced  also  in  the  vicinity  of  Mars-la- 
Tour  and  rising  smoke  clouds  indicated  that  the  village  was 
in  flames.  Any  battle  there  could  be  fought  only  by  the 
19th  Division. 

Therefore  the  commander-in-chief  sent  orders  there 
and  also  to  the  commanding  general  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps 
for  the  intended  offensive. 

In  the  meantime  events  took  a  rapid  course. 


*By  4:00  P.M.,  of  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps  (16th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion) there  had  arrived  at  Gorze  the  32d  Infantry  Brigade  (Colonel 
Rex),  72d  and  40th  Regiments,  as  well  as  the  11th  Grenadier  Regi- 
ment of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  (18th  Infantry  Division)  which  here 
turned  through  the  Bois  de  St.  Arnould  in  the  direction  of  Rezonville 
against  the  French  Brigade  of  Lapasset,  which  had  as  its  first  reserve 
the  od  Guard  Grenadier  Regiment.  Farther  in  rear,  on  the  hostile 
side,  stood  one  brigade  of  the  French  6th  Corps.  The  Bois  des 
Ognons  was  held  by  French  Guard  Chasseurs.  In  addition.  Marshal 
Bazaine  had  between  Gravelotte  and  Rezonville  the  Guard  Zouaves, 
the  Division  of  Montaudon  of  the  3d  Corps  and  the  Divisions  of  Ba- 
taille  and  Verge  of  the  2d  Corps.  The  slopes  from  the  forest  ter- 
rain down  was  well  covered  with  guns  and  machine  guns. 

Three  batteries  of  the  16th  Infantry  Division  hastened  ahead 
of  Rex's  Brigade  of  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps  and  reinforced  the  long 
artillery  line  between  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and  Flavigny;  in  this 
line  were  then  the  following  batteries: 

4  batteries   of   the   5th    Infantry    Division. 

1  battery  of  Lyncker's  detachment. 

6  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the   Illd   Army   Corps. 

1  battery   of   the    6th    Infantry    Division. 

1  battery   of   the   6th    Cavalry    Division. 

2  batteries   of    the    20th    Infantry    Division. 

2  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps. 

3  batteries  of  the  16th   Infantry   Division. 

20  batteries  with   120   guns. 

In  addition  single  batteries  of  the  artillery  in  position  west  of 
Vionville  were  in  action  here  from  time  to  time,  changing  their  po- 
sition as  required. 

—373— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

For  immediately  a  very  heavy  fire,  artillery  and  ma- 
chine gun  fire,  was  heard  in  the  vicinity  of  Mars-la-Tour.  It 
was  clear  that  a  hot  fight  had  started  there. 

The  Brigade  of  Wedell  and  the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade 
had  deployed,  under  command  of  General  von  Schwartz- 
koppen  (commanding  the  19th  Infantry  Division)  towards 
4:00  P.M.  at  Suzemont  and  without  delay  whatever 
started  a  combined  ofi'ensive  to  beyond  Mars-la-Tour.  The 
attack  was  directed  against  the  hills  between  the  Tronville 
wood  and  Grey  ere  farm.*  It  was  executed  with  great 
spirit  in  the  diflftcult  terrain,  passed  under  a  murderous 
fire  the  two  ravines  north  of  Mars-la-Tour  leading  from  the 
Tronville  woods  to  the  ravine  of  the  Jarny  brook,  and  as- 
cended the  steep  slope  of  the  Greyere  hill.t  Hostile  batter- 
ies had  been  seen  on  this  hill  and  these  batteries  were  taken 
as  the  objective  of  the  attack.  However,  this  attack  was  exe- 
cuted about  the  time  that  the  entire  division  of  CisseyJ  of 


*Wedeirs  Brigade  had  five  battalions  present  (3  battalions  of  the 
16th  and  2  battalions  of  the  57th  Infantry  Regiments),  2  pioneer 
companies  and  2  batteries;  one  battalion  had  remained  in  St.  Hillaire. 
The  five  battalions  and  two  companies  w^ere  deployed  in  one  line 
alongside  each  other  and  led  forward  simultaneously,  on  the  right 
the  57th,  on  the  left  the  16th  Regiment,  on  the  extreme  right  wing 
the  pioneer  companies. 

Of  the  Guard  Dragoon  Brigade  the  1st  Dragoon  Regiment  ar- 
rived in  a  body;  of  the  2d  Dragoon  Regiment  one  squadron  had 
started  for  the  battlefield  that  morning  from  Thiaucourt  with  the 
two  horse  batteries  of  the  Xth  Corps  that  had  been  sent  to  join  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division,  one  squadron  was  with  the  commanding  gen- 
eral, one  with  the  1st  Guard  Dragoon  Regiment  and  the  battery, 
and  one  was  with  Wedell's  Brigade. 

fWhen  the  16th  Infantry  Regiment  arrived  at  the  second  ra- 
vine it  found  itself  unexpectedly  at  the  edge  of  a  difficult  ravine,  but 
nevertheless  the  men  slid  down  the  steep  slope  thereof  and  passd  the 
ravine.  This  was  performed  within  effective  range  of  hostile  massed 
fire. 

JThis  division  prolonged  the  right  wing  from  the  forest  terrain 
of  Tronville  to  Greyere  farm.  It  received,  in  a  good  position  and 
supported  by  strong  artillery  Wedell's  Brigade.  The  attack  of  this 
brigade  went  to  pieces  in  spite  of  the  bravery  of  the  troops.  The  bat- 
talions, decimated  by  the  hostile  fire,  had  to  fall  back.  There  was 
no  reserve  that  could  have  received  them  and  there  was  no  stability 
for  renewed  resistance.  The  16th  Regiment  alone  lost  its  commander, 
49  officers  and  1863  men  out  of  a  total  of  62  officers  and  2721  men. 
Thus  the  regiment  lost  more  than  66  per  cent  of  its  strength  with 
which  it  had  arrived  an  hour  and  a  half  before  at  Mars-la-Tour.  The 
two  battalions  of  the  57th  Regiment  lost  15  officers  and  768  men  out 

—374— 


Operations  Second  Geiman  Army 

the  French  4th  Corps  deployed  alongside  Grenier's  Division 
and  went  to  pieces. 

The  masses  of  the  enemy  now  commenced  to  move  and 
advance.  The  moment  was  critical.  Through  the  initia- 
tive of  Cissey's  division  the  other  hostile  divisions  which 
were  available  opposite  the  Tronville  woods  and  in  rear 
(Grenier's  division  of  the  4th,  and  Aymard's  and  Castag- 
ny's  divisions*  of  the  French  3d  Corps)  could  be  drawn  into 
the  movement  and  thus  a  general  offensive  by  the  French 
right  wing  could  be  started  against  which  we  could  not  op- 
pose a  single  fresh  battalion  at  Mars-la-Tour.  Though  this 
fact  could  not  be  seen  at  that  time  and  place  in  the  midst 
of  the  action,  still  the  advance  of  the  hostile  infantry  led 
to  the  knowledge  that  the  danger  was  great  and  that  we 
would  have  to  stop  the  enemy's  intention  of  undertaking 
an  offensive.  The  necessity  for  rapid  action  along  this  line 
was  clear. 

For  that  purpose  there  was  only  the  1st  Guard  Dragoon 
Regiment  available  at  Mars-la-Tour.  This  regiment  now 
charged  the  French  infantry,  brought  them  to  a  stand  and 
caused  them  to  crowd  around  their  eagles  so  that  they 
offered  an  excellent  target  to  the  Prussian  batteries  in 
front  of  Tronville  which  had  kept  their  position  unshaken, 
and  the  fire  from  which  batteries  compelled  the  French  in- 
fantry to  desist  from  advancing  further. 

The  Guard  Dragoons  suffered  extraordinary  losses,  but 
the  result  of  the  charge  was  of  the  utmost  importance.  The 
enemy  was  driven  back  onto  the  defensive  and  thus  a  crisis 
was  overcome  which  might  have  been  fatal.  The  enemy 
again  took  position  on  the  hills  at  Greyere  and  remained 
there  to  the  end  of  the  battle. t 

The  retrogade  movement  of  the  left  wing  had  been  seen 
from  the  place  where  the  commander-in-chief  and  his  staff 

of  a  total  of  33  officers  and  1825  men.  Of  these  losses  only  about 
350  men  were  captured  unwounded  by  the  French.  The  4th  French 
Corps  that  had  fought  at  Greyere  farm  and  which  had  deployed  26 
battalions  against  oh  battalions,  lost  200  officers  and  2350  men. 

*At  that  time  commanded  by  General  Nayral. 

fTwo  squadrons  of  the  4th  Cuirassier  Regiment  also  partici- 
pated in  these  actions. 

—375— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

stood.  The  officers  sent  to  the  separate  detachments  brought 
back  information  of  the  events  that  had  just  taken  place 
and  it  became  clear  that  the  intended  attack  against  the 
enemy's  right  wing  and  flank  had  turned  into  a  most  diffi- 
cult frontal  attack,  as  the  enemy  took  immediate  advantage 
of  his  numerical  superiority  in  numbers  to  prolong  his  front 
line. 

By  this  time  the  battle  line  had  extended  from  the  Bois 
des  Ognons  to  the  Jarny  brook,  a  distance  of  about  7  [Eng- 
lish] miles  and  along  this  long  line  now  fought  on  the  Prus- 
sian side  hardly  more  than  35  to  40,000  men. 

For  the  further  envelopment  of  the  hostile  right  wing 
by  infantry  there  were  not  sufficient  forces  available.  Only 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  could  be  used  therefor. 

Accordingly,  the  views  concerning  the  battle  changed. 
The  battle  had  to  be  carried  on  by  separate  offensive  at- 
tacks against  all  portions  of  the  French  front  and  the  meas- 
ures of  the  commander-in-chief  were  now  directed  with 
that  end  in  view. 

Wedell's  Brigade  had  been  reassembled  on  the  Mars- 
la-Tour — Buzieres  road,  the  20th  Infantry  Division,  sup- 
ported by  the  artillery  of  the  Xth  Corps,  occupied  the  vil- 
lage of  Tronville  in  strong  force.  Repeated  reports  came 
from  there  to  the  commander-in-chief  that  the  place  would 
be  held  under  any  and  all  conditions. 

On  the  Prussian  right  the  firing  line  was  carried  for- 
ward decisively  in  spite  of  the  hostile  partial  counter-at- 
tacks which  were  noticed  through  rolling  rifle  fire  lasting 
for  minutes  at  a  time.  On  that  wing  arriving  reinforce- 
ments made  themselves  felt.* 


*The  40th,  11th  and  72d  Regiments.  The  regiments  commenced 
a  series  of  successful  counter-attacks  from  the  edge  of  the  Bois  de 
St.  Arnould  against  the  heights  of  Rezonville  and  those  between 
Rezonville  and  Gravelotte.  Though  in  these  counter-attacks  the  edge 
of  the  plateau  rising  from  the  woods  could  not  be  permanently  held, 
these  intrepid  attacks  held  the  hostile  forces  on  that  portion  of  the 
battlefield.  These  offensive  attacks  undoubtedly  increased  the  fears 
which  Marshal  Bazaine  had  held  for  his  left  from  the  beginning  of 
the  action  and  prevented  him  from  freely  using  his  fighting  forces. 
With  due  regard  to  the  supposed  danger  he  held  strong  forces  back 
in  rear  of  his  left;  namely  two  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps,  the  Division 
of  Montaudon  of  the  3d  Corps  and  material  portions  of  the  Guard. 

—376— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

If  it  would  now  be  possible  to  gain  terrain  on  other  por- 
tions of  the  battlefield,  the  enemy  might  be  induced  to  start 
a  general  retreat. 

The  woods  of  Tronville  were  held  even  after  the  offen- 
sive of  Wedell's  Brigade  had  gone  to  pieces,  and  they  thus 
remained  a  supporting  point  for  a  repetition  of  attacks  on 
the  left  wing.  The. conviction  that  no  offensive  movements 
could  be  made  by  the  Prussian  infantry  on  this  flank  had 
not  yet  arisen. 

Up  to  then  army  headquarters  believed  it  would  have 
to  abandon  all  intentions  of  enveloping  the  enemy. 

Almost  complete  silence  followed  the  hot  fighting  at 
Greyere  farm.  It  was  seen  from  the  hill  near  Flavigny 
that  the  enemy  made  no  effort  to  take  advantage  of  his  suc- 
cess in  spite  of  the  momentary  advantages  he  had  gained. 
Neither  hostile  batteries,  nor  skirmishers,  nor  cavalry  were 
seen  advancing.  It  appeared  as  if  the  enemy,  shaken  by  the 
bloody  fighting,  fell  back  on  his  part,  and  that  it  probably 
would  be  a  question  now  of  occupying  the  portion  of  the 
battlefield  he  had  left,  in  order  to  secure  to  ourselves  all 
the  advantages  of  victory.  The  Prince  had  sent  requests  for 
a  renewed  advance  to  those  portions  of  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  around  Tronville,  and  he  added  thereto  that  the  battle 
went  well  on  the  right  wing.  He  also  ordered  the  battal- 
ions of  the  6th  Infantry  Division  that  were  not  at  the  mo- 
ment engaged  and  which  were  in  a  fold  of  the  terrain  south- 
west of  Flavigny  to  march  to  the  battlefield  on  the  left 
flank,  leaving  Tronville  on  the  left,  and  to  occupy  the  battle- 
field as  far  as  possible.  Those  battalions  started  this  move- 
ment at  once. 

The  day  now  declined.  The  last  decisive  moments  ar- 
rived; whatever  was  intended  to  be  done  would  have  to 
be  done  now.  It  is  clear  that  there  were  insufficient  forces 
for  a  far  reaching  offensive  and  pursuit  if  the  enemy  were 
defeated. 

After  the  long  and  bloody  battle  fatigue  had  become 
general.  Physical  strength  was  at  the  lowest  ebb  on  both 
sides.  Under  these  conditions  however  the  final  attack  gains 

—377— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

in  importance,  even  if  only  executed  by  exhausted  troops.  It 
has  frequently  been  the  decisive  factor  which  of  the  com- 
manders-in-chief immediately  after  a  battle  possessed 
enough  moral  force  to  attack  the  enemy  at  the  final  close 
of  the  battle  by  utilizing  the  very  last  man  and  animal. 

However,  the  thought  that  the  enemy  would  be  imbued 
with  the  same  conviction  and  could  justas  well  do  the  same 
as  was  intended  on  the  Prussian  side,  had  to  be  considered. 
And  the  enemy's  situation  was  far  more  favorable,  be- 
cause as  we  well  knew,  he  still  possessed  the  means  of  obtain- 
ing not  only  moral  but  material  successes.  Repeated  par- 
tial offensive  shock  by  the  French  along  the  entire  battle 
front  proved  that  the  enemy,  though  greatly  shaken,  still 
had  fresh  troops  at  his  command.  We  could  not  expect  to 
find  him  inactive  at  the  last  moment  of  the  battle  and  in 
that  there  was  positive  danger,  which  we  had  to  consider 
and  overcome.  It  was  absolutely  necessary  to  get  ahead  of 
the  enemy. 

Therefore  Prince  Frederick  Charles  took  his  measures 
to  have  the  last  shock  in  the  battle  of  this  day  start  from 
the  Prussian  side. 

He  now  sent  the  battalions  of  the  6th  Infantry  Divis- 
ion that  had  assembled  at  Vionville,  into  the  ditches  of  the 
road  leading  to  Rezonville  against  the  French  batteries  on 
the  Roman  road.  The  fire  of  these  batteries,  which  up  to 
then  had  precluded  an  advance,  soon  ceased.  Thereafter 
the  long  artillery  line  in  the  center  received  orders  to  ad- 
vance, commencing  with  its  left  in  position  at  Flavigny. 
Of  course  these  batteries  could  not  move  very  rapidly  for 
lack  of  teams.  They  left  positions,  where  in  addition  they 
had  the  exact  range.  The  small  amount  of  ammunition 
on  hand  and  the  approach  of  darkness  however  offset  this 
bad  feature.  The  main  thing,  for  the  reasons  above  dis- 
cussed was  that  the  batteries  did  advance.  Moral  impres- 
sion was  of  far  greater  value  now  than  increased  material 
effect.* 


*While  this  movement  was  being  executed,  a  new  hostile  counter 
offensive  had  to  be  defeated  at  about  7:00  P.M. 


-378— 


operations  Second  German  Army 

The  fire  of  the  long  artillery  line  once  more  increased  in 
volume,  especially  as  fresh  batteries  of  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  arrived  at  the  right  wing.* 

The  Prince  now  decided  to  again  have  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  with  all  troops  available  at  Tronville  and  in  front 
thereof,  attack  the  French  right. 

But  these  orders  reached  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz 
only  after  dark  and  in  the  meantime  the  battle  on  the  ex- 
treme left  of  the  Prussian  fighting  line  had  ended. 

When  the  attack  of  Wedell's  Brigade  went  to  pieces, 
General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  issued  orders  not  only  to  the 
Guard  Dragoons  but  also  to  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  to 
charge  the  enemy  regardless  of  everything.  The  5th  Cav- 
alry Division  for  this  purpose  sent  the  11th  Cavalry  Brigade 
to  the  left  together  with  all  other  regiments  and  squadrons 
of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  that  could  be  reached.! 

Besides  the  French  infantry  that  commenced  to  pursue 
the  debris  of  Wedell's  Brigade  on  the  extreme  hostile  right 
strong  cavalry  masses  also  appeared  which  were  seen  plainly 
and  of  which  we  expected  would  charge  at  any  moment 
and  turn  the  scale  of  victory  decisively  to  the  French  side. 

Informed  that  it  was  impossible  to  get  forward  on  the 
right  of  Mars-la-Tour  after  the  infantry  fighting  had  ended 
there.  General  von  Rheinbaben  rode  around  the  village  on 
the  south  and  brought  his  regiments  by  that  road  onto  the 
plateau  between  the  Jarny  and  Yron  brooks,  which  were 
then  held  by  the  French  cavalry. 

A  heavy  cavalry  fight  now  ensued  here  which  ended  at 
dark  with  the  defeat  and  retreat  of  the  hostile  cavalry. 


*0f  the  25th  (Hessian)  Division  four  battalions  of  the  49th  In- 
fantry Brigade,  the  1st  Cavalry  Regiment  and  3  batteries  had  crossed 
the  Moselle  at  Noveant  and  kept  on  the  march  to  Gorze;  two  of  the 
batteries,  covered  by  the  1st  Cavalry  Regiment,  participated  effec- 
tively on  the  right  wing  of  the  long  artillery  line;  that  artillery 
line  then  numbered  132  guns. 

fBesides  Barby's  Brigade  (19th  Dragoons;  3  squadrons,  13th 
Uhlans;  2  squadrons,  4th  Cuirassiers)  there  were  the  13th  and  16th 
Dragoon  Regiments,  the  10th  Hussar  Regiment  (3  squadrons;  one 
squadron  having  been  detached  by  way  of  Nancy  to  the  upper  Mo- 
selle and  Meuse),  one  squadron  of  the  2d  Guard  Dragoons  and  the 
horse  battery.  Later  also  another  squadron  of  the  Guard  Dra- 
goons. 

—379— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  6th  Infantry  Division  in  the  center  also  received 
orders  from  Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  advance  with  ev- 
erything that  could  be  gathered  together  along  the  road 
from  Vionville  towards  Rezonville. 

On  the  right  the  firing  line  was  being  carried  forward 
by  that  time,  and  the  offensive  appeared  to  have  started 
there. 

Portions  of  the  25th  (Hessian)  Division*  had  in  the 
meantime  entered  the  Bois  des  Ognons  and  there  encoun- 
tered the  French  Guard  Chasseurs. 

When  thus  at  7  :30  P.M.,  the  advance  became  general, 
it  appeared  as  if  the  enemy  was  making  another  attack 
against  the  long  artillery  line  in  the  center  and  against  the 
5th  Infantry  Division,  at  least  the  artillery,  rifle  and  ma- 
chine gun  fire  was  resumed  with  great  intensity.  But  it 
soon  died  out  again — it  was  assumed  that  the  last  efforts 
of  the  French  had  been  defeated.  The  approach  of  dark- 
ness and  the  clouds  of  powder  smoke  made  a  clear  view  im- 
possible and  darkness  in  any  case  very  soon  brought  the 
battle  to  a  close.  The  expected  and  awaited  for  moment 
had  arrived. 

The  6th  Cavalry  Division  was  in  readiness  and  closed 
up  in  rear  of  the  firing  line  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps.  It  had 
been  designated  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  play  a  con- 
spicuous role  during  the  last  and  general  advance. 

In  spite  of  the  critical  moments  which  had  one  after 
the  other  arisen  in  the  last  few  hours,  His  Royal  Highness 
kept  this  closed  up  division  at  his  disposition. 

He  now  gave  to  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  verbal 
orders  for  the  attack.  That  attack  was  to  be  made  in  the 
general  direction  of  Rezonville,  the  brigades  drawing  apart 
during  the  advance.  The  14th  Cavalry  Brigade  had  for 
this  resaon  been  placed  in  the  right  rear  of  the  long  artil- 
lery  line,   the    15th   on   the   left   towards    Flavigny.     This 


*The  49th  Infantry  Brigade,  four  battalions  (one  battalion 
having  become  separated  from  the  brigade  on  the  march  during  the 
afternoon).  Of  these  four  battalions  only  about  one-third  came 
actually  under  fire,  as  darkness  setting  in  meanwhile  prevented  the 
deployment  and  employment  of  the  available  forces. 

—380— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

latter  brigade  was  to  protect,  on  the  right,  the  advance  of 
the  6th  Infantry  Division. 

When  darkness  fell  both  brigades  started  the  charge. 
The  evening  fog  and  the  powder  smoke  soon  hid  them  from 
view  but  the  rifle  fire  just  then  starting  up  again  enabled 
army  headquarters  to  follow  the  course  of  the  attack. 

South  of  Rezonville  the  14th  Brigade  encountered  hos- 
tile infantry  and,  received  by  an  irregular  but  heavy  mass 
fire,  rode  into  the  midst  of  that  infantry,  through  it,  rallied 
in  rear,  and  then  returned  to  behind  the  long  artillery  line. 

Of  the  15th  Brigade  (which  the  9th  Dragoons  followed) 
the  Zieten  Hussars  made  an  especially  brilliant  charge  on 
the  west  towards  Rezonville.  They  drove  off  hostile  cav- 
alry and  rode  down  masses  of  infantry.  Single  troopers 
rode  to  beyond  Rezonville  and  struck  the  last  French  re- 
serve between  Rezonville  and  Gravelotte.  Thereupon  the 
brigade  rallied  and  took  position  in  the  vicinity  of  Fla- 
vigny 

Ihe  advancing  portions  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division 
ascended,  during  these  charges,  from  Vionville  along  the 
road  up  to  the  edge  of  the  heights  west  of  Rezonville  ;*  the 
batteries  of  the  long  artillery  line  had  gradually  continued 
their  advance  and  had  reached  to  near  the  hostile  infantry. f 
Darkness  made  it  impossible  to  reach  and  take  Rezonville, 
as  the  enemy  still  had  strong  forces  there. 

With  this  offensive  by  the  German  army  the  battle 
ended,  which  because  of  its  duration,  tenacity  and  bitter- 
ness may  be  classed  as  one  of  the  bloodiest  of  modern  his- 
tory. 

Together  with  the  portions  of  the  16th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion that  had  participated,  the  Second  Army  suffered  a 
loss  of  581  officers  and"  14,239  men.  In  Prussian  hands  were 
as  trophies :  1  gun  and  about  2000  prisoners. 

Totally  exhausted,  the  troops  bivouacked  at  the  spots 
where  they  were.     Outposts  were  placed  toward  the  enemy 


*They  were  joined  by   portions   of  the   20th   Infantry   Division. 

fOne  battery  on  the  left  was  suddenly  surrounded  by  swarms 
of  hostile  infantry,  was  entirely  taken  by  surprise,  but  freed  itself 
by  firing  canister. 

—381— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

establishing  connection  with  each  other.  In  general,  these 
outposts  extended  from  the  Bois  des  Ognons  along  the  edge 
of  the  woods  of  the  Bois  de  St.  Arnould  and  the  Bois  de 
Vionville  up  to  the  hill  between  Vionville  and  Rezonville 
— the  farthest  portion  of  the  battlefield — thence  to  the  woods 
of  Tronville  and  from  there,  bending  back  at  a  right  angle, 
towards  Mars-la-Tour.  Over  near  Rezonville  French  bivouac 
fires  were  seen. 

Between  8:00  and  9:00  P.M.  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
proceeded  to  the  right  wing  to  Stopnagel's  Division  which, 
as  its  commander  had  promised,  had  actually  held  all  its  po- 
sitions. 

Only  towards  10:00  P.M.,  after  the  last  shots  had  been 
fired  in  the  Bois  des  Ognons  and  everything  was  tranquil, 
did  the  commander-in-chief  ride  with  his  staff  to  Gorze  from 
where  the  orders  for  August  17th  were  to  be  issued. 

The  principal  point  was  to  secure  the  results  attained 
by  the  heavy  fighting.  The  direct  Metz — Verdun  road  had 
been  blocked  to  the  enemy  and  the  battle  against  a  large 
numerical  superiority  was  fortunately  and  at  the  very  end 
finished  by  an  offensive.  This  success  could  well  be  regarded 
as  a  considerable  one.  The  Second  Army  had  been  engaged 
only  with  the  Illd,  Xth  and  minor  portions  of  the  IXth  Army 
Corps,  supported  by  parts  of  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps.* 

But  the  supports  from  the  Vlllth  and  IXth  Corps  ar- 
rived singly  on  the  battlefield  and  some  of  them  only  late 
in  the  afternoon.  Opposed  to  them,  the  enemy  had  his 
troops  massed  together  in  a  confined  space.  It  was  by  now 
known  that  the  French  2d  and  4th  Corps,  the  Guard  and  the 
independent  cavalry  divisions  had  without  doubt  been  en- 
gaged and  that  the  remainder  of  the  army  possibly  had  been 
in  the  direct  vicinity  of  the  battlefield  and  possibly  had  been 
engaged  in  the  battle. f 


*A11  in  all  a  little  more  than  60,000  men  against  about  125,000 
men  of  the  enemy. 

fThe  presence  of  the  French  6th  Corps  had  not  been  reported 
to  army  headquarters  during  the  action.  It  is  probable  that  divi- 
sions of  this  corps  were  thought  to  be  portions  of  the  2d  Corps,  which 
was  the  first  to  become  engaged. 

—382— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

This  fact  then  brought  u^  the  question  as  to  what  the 
next  morning  might  bring.  The  crisis  confronting  us  was 
not  yet  overcome,  notwithstanding  that  the  situation  of  the 
hostile  army,  held  at  Metz,  had  become  so  unfavorable  that 
it  could  not  long  evade  final  defeat.  It  could  not  be  seen  at 
the  moment  how  many  intact  brigades  or  divisions  the  en- 
emy still  had.  It  was  possible  that  the  battle  would  be  re- 
newed in  the  morning  and  in  the  case  we  could  count  only  on 
the  support  of  the  entire  IXth  Army  Corps.  Whether  those 
fighting  forces  that  could  be  ordered  up  during  the  night 
would  arrive  in  time  on  the  battlefield  .for  a  final  decision  re- 
mained very  doubtful. 

The  condition  of  the  troops  that  had  been  engaged  on 
August  16th  called  for  absolute  rest. 

The  actual  numbers  of  losses  which  those  troops  had 
suffered  could  of  course  not  be  ascertained  that  evening. 
But  all  indications  were  that  they  would  go  far  beyond  all 
expectation.  And  such  losses  have  a  decided  effect  on  any 
army.  All  commands  had  lost  materially,  many  battalions, 
squadrons  and  batteries  were  almost  without  officers. 

In  the  extension  of  the  battlefield,  part  of  which  con- 
sisted of  wooded  and  mountainous  terrain,  tactical  units  had 
been  disrupted.  The  night  would  be  passed  without  doubt 
in  trying  to  assemble  troops  and  in  reorganizing  them. 

The  fatigue  of  men  and  animals  after  a  battle  lasting 
10  to  11  hours  was  extreme.  No  troop  unit  had  been  able 
to  cook  on  the  16th.  The  absence  of  water  made  itself  felt 
on  the  plateau. 

There  was  a  shortage  of  ammunition  for  infantry  and 
artillery  even  during  the  battle,  but  the  commander-in-chief 
had  immediately  sent  orders  direct  to  the  artillery  comman- 
der to  have  the  amounts  replenished  during  the  night. 

There  was  no  doubt  but  that  we  could  not  demand  much 
the  next  morning  from  the  exhausted  men. 

Orders  issued  during  the  night  had  to  consider,  however, 
that  at  least  some  fresh  troops  would  reach  the  plateau  at 
daybreak. 


—383- 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  corps  of  the  army  that  had  not  been  engaged,  or 
which  Hke  the  IXth  had  been  only  partially  engaged,  were 
at  that  time  at  the  following  points  : 

1.  The  IXth  Army  Corps  with  the  18th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion at  Onville  and  Arnaville,  with  the  corps  artillery  in 
the  valley  below  Gorze,  the  Hessian  division  in  the  Bois  des 
Ognons. 

2.  The  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps  in  and  near 
Pont-a-Mousson,*  the  advance  guard  at  Regneville-en-Haye, 
the  cavalry  at  Vigneulles. 

3.  The  Guard  Corps  at  Bernecourt,  advance  guard  at 
Rambecourt. 

4.  The  IVth  Army  Corps  at  Les  Saizerais — Marbache, 
advance  guard  at  Jaillon. 

5.  The  lid  Corps  at  Buchy  and  in  rear  thereof. 
Therefore,  as  stated,  only  the  IXth  Corps  could  reach 

the  battlefield  by  daybreak. 

To  reach  the  battlefield  the  Guard  Corps  would  have 
to  march  20  miles,  the  Xllth  Corps,  which  could  hardly  be 
brought  forward  on  the  Noveant — Gorze  road  as  it  was 
blocked  by  trains,  but  would  have  to  march  by  way  of  Thiau- 
court,  would  have  to  cover  about  22  miles  with  most  of  its 
troops.  The  Ild  and  IVth  Corps,  which  were  still  further 
off,  could  not  be  counted  on  for  the  17th. 


*Army  Headquarters  had  directed  the  Xllth  Corps  on  August 
16th  to  determine  the  exact  time  which  the  different  units  of  the  corps 
would  require  to  cross  the  bridges  at  Pont-a-Mousson.  This  ap- 
pears to  be  of  military-historical  value. ' 

The  crossing  took: 

the  12th    Cavalry    Division    over   the    stone    bridge,    1    hour, 

20  minutes; 
the  23d  Infantry  Division  over  the  military  bridge,  2  hours, 

30  minutes; 
the  corps   artillery   over   the   stone   bridge,   2   hours. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  the  24th  Infantry  Division  used 
both  bridges  to  cross  and  part  of  it  remained  on  the  right  bank  in 
the   city. 

The  trains  of  the  army  corps  crossed  late  in  the  evening  and 
during  the  night. 

In  stating  the  time  required  by  the  23d  Infantry  Division,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  during  the  crossing  a  leaking  ponton 
had  to  be  replaced  by  the  pioneer  platoons  of  the  102d  Infantry 
Regiment. 

—384— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

In  accordance  with  this  situation  the  following  orders 
were  issued  in  Gorze  at  11:00  P.M.: 

1.  To  the  IXth  Army  Corps: 

"The  Hid  and  the  Xth  Army  Corps  have  today  held 
superior  hostile  forces,  which  came  from  Metz,  at  Mars-la- 
Tour  and  Vionville  in  a  heavy  but  victorious  engagement; 
these  corps  have  held  all  their  positions,  and  have  gained 
ground  on  the  right.  As  it  is  probable  that  the  battle 
will  be  continued  tomorrow,  I  hereby  order  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  to  come  up  with  ammunition  columns  via  Gorze. 

"The  Hessian  Division,  which  arrived  today,  is  to  be 
assembled  and  will  follow  the  division  of  Wrangle  (18th) 
by  way  of  Gorze.* 

"The  corps  will  take  a  position  in  readiness  by  daylight, 
if  possible,  two  miles  northwest  of  Gorze  on  the  plateau  and 
will  await  further  orders.  The  trains  will  be  left  behind 
under  sufficient  guard. 

Frederick   Charles." 

2.  To  the  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps: 

"The  Hid  and  Xth  Army  Corps  have  today  blocked  a 
superior  hostile  force  on  the  road  through  Mars-la-Tour, 
Vionville  and  in  the  direction  of  Gorze  and  have  held  their 
positions  against  the  heaviest  attacks.  Darkness  ended  the 
battle.  Both  corps  bivouac  in  their  positions.  In  order  to 
meet  renewed  attacks  by  the  enemy  early  tomorrow,  it  is 
necessary  to  bring  the  Xllth  Corps  during  the  night  by 
way  of  Thiaucourt  at  Mars-la-Tour,  where  the  corps  (if  pos- 
sible at  sunrise)  will  go  into  a  position  in  readiness  in  rear 
of  the  Xth  Army  Corps. 

Frederick    Charles." 

A  note  was  added  that  the  corps  should  bring  along 
all  ammunition  trains  but  leave  the  remaining  trains  be- 
hind. 

3.  To  the  Guard  Corps  after  giving  the  same  informa- 
tion as  to  the  IXth  Corps : 


*It   was    assumed   that   the    18th    Infantry    Division    was    not   at 
Arnaville — Onville   but    at    Noveant   or    Sillegny. 

—385— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

"In  view  of  this  I  hereby  order  the  Guard  Corps  to 
march  via  Beney,  St.  Benoit,  and  Chambley  to  Mars-la-Tour. 
There  the  corps  will  take  a  position  in  readiness  on  the  left 
of  the  Royal  Saxon  Corps.  Ammunition  trains  should  be 
brought  along  as  far  as  possible,  and  other  trains  left  be- 
hind under  guard ;  the  cavalry  continues  execution  of  the 
task  set  for  tomorrow :  advance  against  the  Meuse. 

Frederick    Charles." 

The  lid  and  the  IVth  Army  Corps  could  continue  to 
carry  out  the  army  order  issued  at  noon  the  16th,  which 
was,  as  known : 

1.  For  the  lid  Army  Corps: 

"The  corps  will  reach  Pont-a-Mousson  tomorrow  (the 
17th  of  August)  and  sends  its  leading  elements  toward 
Limey — Flirey — St.  Mihiel.  Headquarters,  Pont-a-Mous- 
son." 

2.  For  the  IVth  Army  Corps: 

"The  corps  will,  in  the  next  few  days,  move  in  the 
direction  of  Jaillon,  Sanzey  and  Boucq  towards  Commercy, 
in  so  far  the  fortress  of  Toul  does  not  demand  a  partial 
delay  of  this  march." 

By  special  orders  from  Pont-a-Mousson  the  attention 
of  the  IVth  Army  Corps  had  been  directed  to  the  fact  that, 
according  to  reports  from  the  Guard  cavalry,  it  would  be 
possible  to  surprise  Toul. 

This  operation  still  remained  of  importance  in  spite 
of  the  events  of  August  16th  in  consideration  of  the  pro- 
posed subsequent  advance  westward. 

Therefore  the  orders  for  that  corps  were  not  changed. 

The  execution  of  the  intentions  of  the  Prince,  as  far  as 
concerned  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  had  already  been  started 
before  this  by  direct  orders  from  General  Headquarters. 
That  army  corps  reported  during  the  night  that  it  had  re- 
ceived direct  orders  from  General  Headquarters  to  march  at 
3:00  A.M.  the  17th  via  Thiaucourt  to  Mars-la-Tour.*  The 


*In  addition  the  23d  Infantry  Division  in  Regneville  had  re- 
ceived the  following  notice  from  an  officer's  patrol  of  the  12th  Cav- 
alry Division  (one  squadron  of  the  Guard  Cavalry  Regiment),  which 
had   reached   the   battlefield  between   6   and   7   o'clock   in   the  evening 

—386— 


Operations  Second  Geiman  Army 

corps  at  the  same  time  added  its  march  dispositions,  which 
contained  the  M'elcome  order  that  the  cavalry  division 
should  proceed  to  the  Metz — Etain  road  provided  it  did  not 
encounter  the  enemy  on  the  Mars-la-tour  road.  The  recon- 
naissance of  the  Metz — Etain  road  was  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. It  was  a  question  if  the  enemy,  in  spite  of  the 
battle  just  finished  would  not  attempt  to  accomplish  his 
march  westward  with  at  least  some  portions  of  his  troops. 

The  cavalry  on  the  left  wing,  that  would  have  had  to 
make  that  reconnaissance  on  August  17th,  had  fought  that 
evening  up  to  dark  stubbornly,  continually,  and  had  suffered 
great  loss.  To  bring  still  other  regiments  there  during  the 
night  appeared  impossible.  This  will  be  clear  if  we  try  to 
imagine  the  condition  in  which  any  army  will  find  itself 
after  a  battle  like  the  one  at  Vionville. 

The  battle  had  been  participated  in  by  the  entire  cav- 
alry of  the  Second  Army.  The  appearance  of  fresh  regi- 
ments would  be  very  welcome  if  only  in  consideration  of 
the  necessary  reconnaissances  to  learn  the  intentions  of  the 
enemy. 

During  the  battle  the  Saxon  Cavalry  Division  had  re- 
ported by  a  staff  officer  for  orders  for  participation.*  Of 
course  this  offer  was  not  accepted  considering  the  late  hour 
and  the  distance. 

As  had  been  done  by  the  Xllth  Corps,  the  Guard  Corps 
had  worked  ahead  of  the  orders  from  army  headquarters. 
It  received  news  on  the  16th  through  the  Xllth  Corps  of  the 
battle.    The  commanding  general,  Prince  August  of  Wiirt- 

while  seeking  connection  with  the  5th  Cavalry  Division,  and  had  re- 
turned  from   that  battlefield  between   9:30    and   10:00   P.M.: 

"It  is  desirable  that  tomorrow    (August  17th)    at  daybreak 

everything  available  be   at  Tronville,  provided  Prince   Frederick 

Charles  issues  no  different  orders." 

(Sgd.)   v.  Voigts-Rhetz, 
Commanding  X  Army   Corps. 
Prince  Frederick  Charles. 

In  consequence  the  division  was  immediately  alarmed,  and  word 
sent  to  General  Headquarters  in  Pont-a-Mousson  and  to  the  Guard 
Corps.  For  others,  General  Headquarters  adhered  to  the  starting 
time  at  3:00  A.M. 

—387— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

temberg,  therefore  immediately  decided  to  continue  the 
march  to  the  Meuse  and  to  concentrate  the  corps  early  on  the 
17th  at  Richecourt  and  Fliery  so  that  it  would  be  in  readi- 
ness at  those  points  at  5 :00  A.M.  Cavalry  was  to  continue 
in  observation  toward  the  Meuse.  Consequently  the  orders 
from  Prince  Frederick  Charles  found  the  corps  in  complete 
readiness. 

These  were  the  measures  taken  by  Headquarters  of 
the  Second  Army  to  insure  an  energetic  continuation  of  the 
battle  on  August  17th. 

General  Headquarters  sent  written  information  con- 
cerning the  measures  of  the  First  Army,  dated  Pont-a- 
Mousson  8:00  P.M.  The  First  Army  had  been  directed  to 
cross  the  Moselle  with  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps 
directly  in  rear  of  the  troops  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  and 
to  march  both  corps  by  the  shortest  route  against  the  enemy. 
The  regulation  for  the  route  of  march  of  both  armies  for 
subsequent  operations  west  was  retained  by  General  Head- 
quarters until  further  orders  at  its  discretion.* 

A  second  letter,  dated  Pont-a-Mousson  August  16th  at 
8:15  P.M.,  explained  in  brief  the  conception  of  the  situation 
as  gained  at  General  Headquarters: 

"According  to  our  views  the  decision  of  the  campaign 
rests  in  driving  northward  the  main  hostile  forces,  retreat- 
ing from  Metz.  The  more  the  Hid  Army  Corps  has  in  its 
front  today,  the  larger  the  victory  will  be  tomorrow,  when 
the  Xth,  Illd,  IXth,  VHIth  and  Vllth  Corps  and  also  the 
Xllth  Corps  will  be  available  against  these  forces. "f 

And  a  note  was  added : 

"The  corps  of  the  lid  Army  that  will  not  participate 
can  halt  today. 

"It  appears  that  an  early  arrival  at  the  Meuse  is  of 
lesser  value,  but  the  capture  of  Toul  of  greatest  value. 

VON    MOLTKE." 


*In  this  letter  emphasis  was  further  laid  on  the  fact  that  the 
most  important  thing  was  to  force  as  large  a  portion  as  possible  of 
the  hostile  main  fighting  force  from  Chalons  and  Paris  to  the  north. 

fSee  No.  172,  von  Moltke's  Correspondence,  page  261. 

—388— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  approach  of  the  Guard  Corps,  which  will  not  be 
considered  in  this  narrative,  v/ould  only  increase  the  chances 
of  the  above  plan,  though  an  interference  by  that  corps 
could  not  be  counted  on  at  an  early  hour. 

If  then  the  expectations  for  the  afternoon  of  August 
17th  were  very  favorable,  there  were  many  critical  hours 
to  overcome  between  sunrise  and  the  afternoon. 

Prior  to  the  complete  arrival  of  the  entire  IXth  Army 
Corps,  the  results  of  August  16th  had  to  be  maintained  by 
the  troops  that  had  gained  them. 

THE  17th  OF  AUGUST 

Those  portions  of  the  Second  Arm^y  that  had  fought  on 
August  16th,  passed  the  night  at  the  following  points : 

1.  The  25th  (Hessian)  Division,  in  readiness  for  battle 
in  the  Bois  des  Ognons,  opposite  the  French  Chasseurs  a 
pied. 

2.  The  regiments  of  the  16th  Division  and  the  IXth 
Army  Corps,  that  had  fought  on  the  right  wing,  in  rear  of 
the  Bois  de  St.  Arnould. 

3.  The  5th  Infantry  Division  on  the  hills  near  the  Bois 
de  Vionville. 

4.  The  6th  Infantry  Division  at  Vionville. 

5.  The  corps  artillery  of  the  Illd  Army  Corps  on  the 
right  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division  at  Flavigny. 

6.  The  6th  Cavalry  Division  in  rear  of  the  Flavigny — 
Vionville  position. 

7.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  at  Tronville — 5  battalions,  5 
batteries  of  the  corps,  which  had  been  engaged  on  the  battle- 
field of  the  5th  Infantry  Division,  mixed  with  portions  of 
the  Illd  Army  Corps. 

8.  The  5th  Cavalry  Division  also  at  Tronville  in  rear 
of  the  Xth  Army  Corps. 

Before  sunrise  August  17th  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
proceeded  to  the  bivouac  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division. 

What  sacrifices  the  battle  of  the  16th  had  cost  could 
now  be  plainly  seen,  more  so  than  the  evening  before,  when 
weak  cadres,  and  batteries  almost  devoid  of  their  comple- 

—389— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

ment  were  encountered.  But  all  troops  had  taken  their 
position  and  were  in  readiness  for  battle. 

The  night  had  passed  tranquilly.  The  outposts  were 
still  at  the  points  they  had  taken  after  the  close  of  the 
battle ;  the  outposts  of  the  enemy  were  a  short  distance  ap- 
posite them. 

Immediately  south  of  Rezonville  and  at  Gravelotte  ex- 
tensive bivouac  fires  and  troops  camping  were  seen. 

The  French  army  still  was  in  front  of  the  Prussian 
army  and  the  resumption  of  the  battle  was  very  possible. 

At  present  deep  silence  reigned.  After  5 :30  A.M.  a 
report  was  however  received  from  the  outposts  that  the 
enemy  was  massing  at  Gravelotte.  Shortly  thereafter  num- 
erous calls  were  heard  at  Rezonville  and  movements  became 
visible  around  the  fires. 

The  air  was  extraordinarily  clear.  Up  to  the  line  that 
was  formed  by  the  smoke  of  the  foremost  hostile  bivouacs 
the  battlefield  could  be  plainly  seen.  The  indefinite  move- 
ments around  the  fires  changed  into  dense  skirmish  swarms 
advancing  against  the  Prussian  lines.  These  might  be  skir- 
mishers of  an  advancing  column  and  an  attack  might  com- 
mence. In  spite  of  the  excellent  morale  that  was  noticeable 
in  the  German  bivouacs  at  the  appearance  of  the  comman- 
der-in-chief, every  hour  that  passed  before  the  battle  com- 
menced could  be  considered  a  distinct  gain. 

The  further  the  day  advanced,  the  more  favorable 
would  be  the  situation  of  the  Second  Army,  as  its  reinforce- 
ments came  closer  and  more  numerous.  The  Second  Army 
had  no  interest  whatever  in  starting  a  battle.  Therefore 
the  enemy  was  merely  to  be  observed.  For  that  observation 
the  cavalry  on  outpost  immediately  in  front  of  the  enemy 
was  sufficient;  for  the  space  was  limited,  and  there  was 
nowheres  any  extensive  stretch  of  terrain  to  be  covered  by 
detachments  sent  ahead. 

But  the  scene  soon  changed.  The  French  skirmishers 
halted  at  rifle  range  in  front  of  the  Prussian  position.  All 
calls  and  signals  ceased.  Life  was  seen  only  in  the  large 
camps  opposite.  Soon  the  enemy  was  seen  commencing  to 
retreat.  The  skirmishers  evacuated  the  heights  they  had 

—390— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

held*  and  march  columns  were  seen  forming  on  all  roads 
from  the  battlefield,  mainly  in  the  direction  towards  Grave- 
lotte  and  from  there  towards  Malmaison.  Prussian  cavalry 
with  flankers  had  advanced  from  Vionville  towards  Rezon- 
ville  and  followed  the  enemy  without  being  fired  on.  Shortly 
after  6 :00  A.M.  it  reached  the  village  and  found  therein  only 
v/ounded,  v/ho  stated  that  the  enemy  had  marched  off  in 
haste.  At  6 :00  A.M.  the  leading  elements  of  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  arrived  on  the  plateau  and  this  corps  took  a  position 
in  readiness  under  cover  west  of  the  Bois  de  Vionville  south 
of  the  Gorze — Vionville  road. 

Shortly  after  6:00  A.M.  His  Majesty  the  King  arrived 
on  the  battlefield  at  the  bivouac  of  Stiilpnagel's  Division, 
received  there  the  report  of  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Second  Army  and  then  selected  his  command  post  on  the 
plateau  southwest  of  Flavigny.  Later  on  His  Majesty,  ac- 
companied by  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  proceeded  to  the 
hill  at  Flavigny  to  reconnoiter  from  there  the  hostile  posi- 
tions. 

The  enemy's  movements  continued.  The  roads  from 
Gravelotte  to  Metz  and  also  to  Malmaison  and  Verneville 
were  densely  covered  with  troops.  Between  those  roads  and 
alongside  of  them  strong  detachments  were  seen  marching. 
It  was  impossible  to  gain  a  clear  idea  of  the  purposes  and 
objectives  of  these  masses  moving  hither  and  thither.  Sim- 
ultaneously with  these  movements  it  was  also  perceived 
that  French  fighting  forces  were  marching  towards  Grave- 
lotte. 

A  report  received  by  the  army  commander  from  the 
outposts  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  even  stated : 

"The  French  have  massed  across  the  Gravelotte — Con- 
flans  road,  west  of  the  former  place.  Strong  columns  of  all 
arms  are  drawing  up  to  that  point  from  the  northwest.  It 
appears  a  new  corps  is  coming  up  and  intends  to  break  forth 
on  that  road.  A  few  companies  have  advanced  to  the  left 
front  and  have  skirmishers  out,  evidently  awaiting  orders 
to  advance. 


*It    is    very    probable    that    these    were    the    last    troops    of    the 
enemy,  who  had  commenced  to  evacuate  the  battlefield  at  daybreak. 

—391— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

"New  detachments  are  appearing  from  Vionville  on  the 
hill  marching  towards  Gravelotte.  At  present  one  cavalry- 
brigade  is  in  position  there." 

Ascending  smoke,  apparently  from  new  bivouac  fires, 
hid  many  things  from  view. 

During  the  morning  hours  troops  ready  for  battle  were 
reported  as  seen  west  and  south  of  Gravelotte,  apparently 
for  the  purpose  of  covering  hostile  measures.  Departing 
columns  in  rear  still  occupied  the  roads.  A  general  staff 
officer  from  army  headquarters  was  sent  there  for  recon- 
naissance. About  that  time  it  still  appeared  quite  possible 
that  the  enemy  might  start  a  battle  again. 

The  officer  soon  reported: 

■     17  August  1870,  11:30  A.M. 

"According  to  all  appearances  no  attack  by  the  enemy 
is  to  be  expected.  He  has  taken  up  a  rearguard  position  at 
Gravelotte.  To  judge  by  the  smoke,  he  is  cooking.  A  few 
trains  are  departing  for  Metz  just  now." 

A  sketch  of  the  hostile  position  at  Gravelotte  was  added. 

The  outposts  reported  about  the  same,  for  instance: 

"The  enemy  has  occupied  Gravelotte  with  infantry,  is 
foraging,  and  is  attempting  to  carry  away  the  supplies 
nearby.  On  the  heights  of  the  Bois  de  Vaux  [Le  Point  du 
Jou7'']  he  has  skirmishers  and  his  last  artillery  is  leaving 
by  the  road  to  Metz. 

"Columns,  infantry  and  trains,  are  withdrawing  on  the 
road  to  Verneville. 

"Much  infantry  is  withdrawing  from  the  road  leading 
to  Metz,  towards  the  road  leading  from  Gravelotte  to  Don- 
court  ;  as  this  move  is  taking  place  behind  the  village  and  be- 
hind a  ridge  its  strength  cannot  be  exactly  stated.  Hostile 
trumpet  calls  can  be  heard  in  the  direction  of  Metz  and  are 
getting  fainter,  they  can  also  be  heard  on  the  left  flank, 
where  they  are  louder."* 

Though  these  incoming  reports  gave  no  absolute  cer- 
tainty as  to  details,  and  did  not  agree  with  each  other  in  all 


*These  reports  came  from  the  6th   Cavalry  Division,  w^hich  fur- 
nished the  outposts  for  the  Hid  Army  Corps. 

—392— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

parts,  the  general  conclusion  could  be  arrived  at  however 
that  the  enemy  was  withdrawing  on  this  flank  and  that  his 
withdrawal  was  covered  by  a  rear  guard  position  in  Grave- 
lotte. 

During  the  afternoon  hours  hostile  masses  became  visi- 
ble on  the  heights  at  Leipzig  and  Moscou  Farm  and  when 
Prussian  staff  officers  showed  themselves  reconnoitering 
south  of  Gravelotte*,  the  enemy  immediately  greeted  them 
with  machine  gun  fire.  A  slight  skirmish  opened  up  in  the 
Bois  de  Vaux  between  the  leading  elements  of  the  Vllth 
Army  Corps  and  French  advanced  troops. 

Thus  the  enemy  had  a  firm  foothold  immediately  west 
of  Metz  and  was  in  readiness  to  enegetically  dispute  any  ap- 
proach to  his  position. 

Hovvever,  what  was  seen  there  was  not  the  whole 
French  army  but  only  its  left  wing.  The  masses  that  could 
be  seen  had  a  strength  of  about  3-4  divisions. 

The  question  remained,  where  had  the  right  wing 
which  had  been  engaged  in  battle  on  August  16th  west  of 
the  Tronville  woods  and  the  other  side  thereof  gone  to? 
The  supposition  that  a  partition  had  occurred  in  Bazaine's 
army  during  the  night  of  the  16-17th,  had  to  be  reckoned 
with. 

In  this  regard  we  could  arrive  at  no  conclusion  from 
the  standpoint  of  Sacond  Army  Headquarters  based  on  our 
own  knowledge.  From  the  hills  of  Flavigny  the  terrain 
around  Bruville  where  the  hostile  right  wing  had  operated 
the  day  before  could  not  be  seen.  This  second  part  of  the 
question  to  be  solved  this  day,  could  be  cleared  up  only  by 
reports  from  the  patrols  sent  out. 

Many  of  these  reports  came  in  and  all  stated,  agreeing 
with  each  other,  that  the  enemy's  right  wing  was  withdraw- 
ing westward. 

One  of  these  reports  stated: 

"Columns  can  be  seen  at  St.  Marcel  marching  towards 
Verdun.       At  Bruville  is  an  extensive  camp.       At  Farm 


*His    Royal    Highness    Prince    Adalbert    and    later    on    General 

von  Zastrow,  with  their  staffs. 

—393— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

la  Greyere  are  hostile  pickets  (infantry  and  cavalry).  At 
Bruville,  on  the  road  to  Jarny,  are  hostile  infantry  columns." 

This  report  was  dated  9:30  A.M.  and  came  from  the 
advanced  troops  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division.*  The  ad- 
vanced troops  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  also  reported : 
"Strong  French  cavalry  detachments  are  marching  west  on 
the  road  to  Jarny." 

No  reports  were  received  contradicting  these.  Even 
clouds  of  dust  were  seen  from  St.  Marcel  westward  and 
this  appeared  to  confirm  the  observations  made  by  the  out- 
post cavalry. 

There  was  no  reason  to  doubt  the  correctness  of  the  re- 
ports, everything  spoke  for  their  truth. 

The  possibility  that  the  enemy  would  take  a  position 
with  his  rear  towards  Metz  and  the  steep,  wooded  ravines 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle  and  there  accept  a  second 
battle,  was  not  entertained  at  headquarters  of  the  Second 
Army.  Such  a  decision  had  to  be  considered  as  fatal  to  the 
enemy,  considering  the  German  numerical  superiority  and 
the  views  held  in  those  days.  That  superiority  in  numbers 
the  enemy  was  doubtlessly  cognizant  of,  and  he  also  knew 
that  the  German  troops  were  in  the  immediate  vicinity. 

It  could  not  on  August  17th,  be  guessed  that  besides 
interior  reasons,  the  condition  of  the  troops  after  the 
battle  of  the  16th — lack  of  ammunition  and  subsistence, 
confusion  in  administration — chained  Bazaine's  army  to 
the  vicinity  of  Metz.  It  was  believed,  for  instance,  that 
that  army  was  plentifully  supplied  with  everything  as  it 
had  been  for  several  days  in  close  connection  with  the  abun- 
dant supplies  of  the  fortress. 

According  to  the  view  held  by  headquarters  of  the  Sec- 
ond Army  the  march  westward,  though  combined  with  dan- 
ger, offered  the  enemy  a  good  chance  of  ending  fortunately. 
If  he  remained  at  Metz,  his  complete  destruction  was  merely 
a  matter  of  time. 


*The  13th  Cavalry  Brigade  at  Puxieux  had  addressed  that  re- 
port to  headquarters  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  which  latter  transmitted 
it  to  army  headquarters. 

—394— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

But  what  we  considered  a  grave  error,  we  had  no  right 
to  assume  would  be  the  intention  of  the  enemy.  Normal 
conditions  and  correct  decision  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  are 
always  the  correct  basis  on  which  to  base  our  own  actions. 

For  that  reason  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  convinced 
that  that  portion  of  the  hostile  army  seen  east  of  Grave- 
lotte  and  on  the  hills  of  Le  Point  du  Jour,  Moscou  and 
Leipsig,  was  the  minor  part  of  the  army  and  that  the  prin- 
cipal part  of  the  French  army  had  started  a  retreat  west- 
ward at  dark  August  16th,  or  was  marching  directly  north 
by  way  of  Briey.  Under  the  latter  assumption  it  remained 
quite  probable  that  he  would  have  reached  Briey  by  this 
time.  On  the  morning  of  August  17th  weak  flank  columns 
might  have  been  seen  on  the  Conflans  road. 

As  stated,  army  headquarters  had  reports  from  that 
direction  of  movements  of  the  French.  Of  course  these 
reports  were  unconfirmed  and  there  was  doubt  as  to  their 
correctness.  A  more  decided  attack  against  the  enemy 
would  have  furnished  better  results  for  the  reconnaissance, 
but  at  that  time  everything  that  could  have  led  to  a  prema- 
ture resumption  of  the  battle  was  avoided. 

Before  we  explain  why  a  more  serious  engagement 
wa3  agai.nst  the  best  interests  of  the  Second  Army,  we  will 
give  a  short  view  of  conditions  on  the  extreme  left  of  the 
Second  Army. 

The  Royal  Saxon  cavalry  was  active  on  that  flank  on 
August  17th.  On  the  morning  of  that  day  in  accordance 
with  orders  issued  by  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  it  started 
from  Vigneulles  at  a  rapid  gait,  passed  the  Metz — Mars-la- 
Tour — Verdun  road  at  Harville,  7  miles  west  of  Mars-la- 
Tour,  and  as  early  at  9  :00  A.M.  reached,  at  St.  Jean-les- 
Buzy,  the  northern  road  leading  from  Metz  via  Conflans  to 
Verdun.  Only  a  few  train-troops  were  encountered  during 
that  ride.  Etain  also  was  found  unoccupied  in  the  after- 
noon.* 


*The  division  learned  from  inhabitants  in  St.  Jean-les-Buzy 
that  Emperor  Napoleon  with  a  numerous  escort — about  5000  men 
— coming  from  Metz,  had  passed  along  the  road  to  Conflans. 

—395— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

These  events  were  then  known  to  army  headquarters.* 

While  the  different  assumptions  concerning  the  inten- 
tions of  the  enemy  were  thoroughly  discussed  on  the  bat- 
tlefield of  Vionville  and  while  definite  ideas  were  formed, 
the  army  corps  that  had  been  designated  for  support  ar- 
rived. 

Early  in  the  afternoon  the  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army 
Corps  arrived  in  bivouacs  between  Mars-la-Tour  and  Pux- 
ieux.f 

At  1:00  P.M.  the  Guard  Corps  also  reported  that  it  had 
arrived  at  Puxieux  and  was  resting  there. 

Thus  the  corps  that  could  have  been  available  for  the 
continuation  of  the  battle  on  August  17th  had  arrived.  The 
First  Army  was  in  close  communication  with  the  Second. 
Since  6:00  A.M.  the  columns  of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Corps 
had  been  crossing  the  Moselle.  The  first  touch  of  the  leading 
elements  of  the  Vllth  Corps  with  the  enemy  occurred  in  the 
Bois  de  Vaux.  Thus  the  battle  could  now  be  renewed  with 
fresh  forces.  This  intention  General  Headquarters  held 
also  and  mentioned  to  the  Prince,  but  the  latter  and  some 
of  the  corps  commanders  that  were  present  held  an  oppo- 
site view. 

The  troops  that  did  arrive  this  day  had  had  a  fatig- 
uing march.  It  would  be  necessary  to  continue  the  march 
to  attack  the  enemy.  Therefore,  a  serious  battle  could 
start  only  in  the  afternoon  and  might  end  in  victory,  but 
only  with  a  partial  decision.  Darkness  would  have  ended 
the  battle  prematurely  and  would  have  doubtlessly  pre- 
vented pursuit.  Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  did  not 
feel  inclined  to  do  this,  but  now  wanted  to  finish  things 
with  one  stroke. 

No  apprehension  whatever  was  entertained  but  that 
the  enemy  would  be  found  on  August  18th.     Prince  Fred- 


*The  Saxon  cavalry  division  had  sent  a  I'eport  to  corps  head- 
quarters as  early  as  7:30  A.M.  fi'om  the  direction  of  Mars-la-Tour. 
That  report  reached  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  while  he  was  with 
the  advance  guard  of  the  corps  coming  from  Thiaucourt  at  1:00  P.M. 
only,  that  is,  at  the  time  when  army  headquarters  at  Flavigny  issued 
its  orders  for  that  day. 

fOne  battalion  remained  with  General  Headquarters  at  Pont-a- 
Mousson. 

—396— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

erick  Charles  had  no  doubt  at  all  about  that.  At  the  time 
he  still  believed  that  the  enemy  intended  to  evade  the 
German  armies  by  withdrawing  westward.  He  rather  reck- 
oned with  certainty  on  being  able  to  overtake  the  enemy  the 
next  day ;  for  he  had  to  make  quite  a  detour  before  reaching 
the  protection  of  the  Meuse  line.  In  addition  the  French 
army  was  confined  to  a  very  few  roads  with  its  clumsy 
masses,  which  up  to  then  had  not  proved  they  could  march. 
These  facts  increased  the  difficulties  of  escaping. 

If  the  battle  could  be  waged  on  August  18th,  the  lid 
Army  Corps  could  be  brought  up  for  participation. 

Therefore  the  intentions  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
were  not  to  attack  the  enemy  before  the  18th,  to  start  on 
that  day  as  early  as  possible  so  that  the  sun  would  still  be 
high  by  the  time  a  final  decision  was  reached.  However, 
prior  to  that  the  sanction  of  General  Headquarters  had  to 
be  obtained  before  army  headquarters  could  issue  its  or- 
ders. This  was  done,  and  after  General  Headquarters  had 
sent  its  approval,  the  Prince  issued  the  following  army 
orders : 

"On  the  Battlefield,  Vionville,  August  17,  1870,  1:00 
P.M. 

"The  enemy  appears  to  be  withdrawing  partly  north- 
westward and  partly  towards  Metz. 

"The  Second  Army,  and  the  Vlllth  and  Vllth  Army 
Corps,  will  tomorrow  seek  in  a  northerly  direction  the 
marching  enemy  and  beat  him. 

"Today  the  corps  are  bivouacking  by  corps  on  the  bat- 
tlefield of  Vionville,  the  IXth  Corps  on  the  right.  Its 
outposts  will  seek  connection  in  the  woods  in  their  front  with 
the  outposts  of  the  Vlllth  Corps  which  is  bivouacking  at 
Gorze,  and  they  will  extend  their  line  to  the  left  to  the  Metz 
— Verdun  road  in  front  of  Flavigny. 

"The  Illd  Army  Corps  is  camping  at  Vionville  and  Fla- 
vigny, its  outposts,  connecting  with  those  of  the  IXth  Corps 
will  extend  to  the  left  to  the  west  edge  of  the  woods  north 
of  Vionville. 

"The  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps  will  today 
go  into  bivouac  at  Mars-la-Tour  and  place  outposts  as  far  as 

—397— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

the  Yron  brook,  sending  a  cavalry  detachment  to  beyond 
Hannonville  to  observe  the  road  to  Verdun. 

"The  corps  that  are  posting  outposts,  will  so  far  as  the 
enemy  allows,  have  officers  reconnoiter  the  terrain  in  their 
front  as  to  its  passibility  for  marching, 

"The  Xth  Army  Corps  remains  in  its  camp  at  Tronville. 

"The  Guard  Corps  goes  into  camp  at  Puxieux, 

"The  lid  Army  Corps  will  leave  Pont-a-Mousson  at  4  :00 
A.M.  tomorrow  and  march  via  Arnaville,  Bayonville  and 
Onville  to  Buxieres,  will  mass  north  of  that  place  and  cook 
meals, 

"Army  headquarters  today  in  Buxieres. 

Frederick    Charles." 

The  following  was  added  to  the  orders  for  the  IVth 
Army  Corps : 

"On  the  right  of  the  IVth  Corps  only  the  Guard  Uhlan 
Brigade  remains  with  directions  to  scout  along  the  Meuse  to 
St.  Mihiel. 

"The  IVth  Army  Corps  takes  position  on  the  line  Boucq 
— Sanzey — Jaillon." 

The  orders  of  General  Headquarters,  though  given  ver- 
bally, were  written  down  by  General  Moltke  briefly,  and 
read :  * 

"The  Second  Army  will  fall  in  at  5 :00  A.M.  tomorrow 
the  18th  and  advance  in  echelons  between  the  Yron  and  the 
Gorze  creeks  (in  general  between  Ville-sur-Yron  and  Rezon- 
ville). 

"The  Vlllth  Army  Corps  will  join  this  movement  on 
the  right  wing  of  the  Second  Army.  At  the  start  the  Vllth 
Army  Corps  will  have  the  task  to  protect  the  movements  of 
the  Second  Army  against  possible  operations  from  Metz. 

"Further  orders  from  His  Majesty  the  King  will  de- 
pend on  the  measures  taken  by  the  enemy. 

"Send  reports  for  the  present  for  His  Majesty  the  King 
to  hill  south  of  Flavigny. 

VON   Moltke." 
17  August  1870,  1:45  P.M.   (dictated  on  the  battlefield  of  Vionville). 

*See  von  Moltke's  Correspondence,  No.  174,  page  261. 

—398— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

This  gave  the  general  instructions  for  the  task  of  the 
Second  Army  for  August  18th.  Special  orders  could  be  is- 
sued— possibly  changed —  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  Au- 
gust based  on  the  then  existing  situation. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  directed  the  commanding 
generals  of  the  Guard,  Xth  and  Xllth  Army  Corps  to  report 
to  him  at  the  bivouac  of  the  Saxon  Corps  at  Mars-la-Tour 
by  5  :00  A.M. ;  and  those  of  the  Illd  and  IXth  Corps  at  5  :30 
A.M.  at  the  bivouac  of  the  Illd  Corps  west  of  Vionville,  to 
receive  verbal  orders. 

As  there  was  no  reason  to  expect  any  engagement  to- 
day and  as  His  Majesty  the  King  had  returned  to  his  head- 
quarters at  Pont-a-Mousson,  Prince  Frederick  Charles  now 
left  the  battlefield  and  dismounted  at  the  small  village  of 
Buxieres  at  4:00  P.M. 

The  orders  from  Army  Headquarters  had  not  been  car- 
ried out  in  full.  As  the  Guard  Corps  reported  at  about  1:00 
P.M.  that  it  was  resting  at  Puxieux,  while  at  the  same  time 
the  Xllth  Army  Corps  was  already  approaching  the  village 
of  Mars-la-Tour,  army  headquarters  had  thought  it  best  to 
assign  to  the  Guard  Corps  a  bivouac  at  Puxieux,  that  is, 
in  rear  of  the  Saxons.  This  had  been  done  in  the  orders 
just  mentioned. 

However,  the  Guard  Corps  proceeded  to  its  bivouac 
at  Hannonville-au-Passage  assigned  to  it  by  prior  orders, 
which  it  had  received  during  the  night  of  August  16th,  and 
reported  that  fact  to  army  headquarters.  This  report  crossed 
on  its  way  with  the  army  orders  just  then  being  sent  to 
the  Guard  Corps. 

The  Guard  Corps,  even  after  it  had  received  the  orders, 
remained  in  the  bivouac  it  had  taken  so  as  not  to  again  in- 
terrupt the  rest  of  the  greatly  fatigued  troops. 

THE  18th  OF  AUGUST 

On  the  morning  of  August  18th,  the  different  parts 
of  the  Second  Army  were  at  the  following  points: 

1,  The  IXth  Army  Corps  on  the  plateau  west  of  Bois  de 
Vionville. 

—399— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

2.  The  Hid  Army  Corps  with  the  6th  Cavalry  Division 
at  Vionville — Flavigny ;  a  portion  of  the  corps  at  Buxieres 
— Chambley.* 

3.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  at  Tronville,  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division  in  its  rear. 

4.  The  Xllth  Army  Corps  south  of  Mars-la-Tour  and 
Puxieux.f 

5.  The  Guard  Corps  south  of  Hannonville-au-Passage. 

6.  The  lid  Army  Corps  approaching  Buxieres  from 
Pont-a-Mousson  where  it  had  arrived  on  the  17th. 

7.  The  IVth  Army  Corps  at  Boucq  (not  far  from  Toul) . 
Shortly  before  5:00  A.M.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  ar- 
rived at  the  bivouac  of  the  Xllth  Corps  at  Mars-la-Tour. 

The  verbal  orders  issued  to  the  corps  commanders  here 
and  later  to  the  corps  commanders  at  Vionville  could  of 
course  rest  only  on  the  knowledge  of  the  situation  of  the 
enemy  known  at  that  time. 

Reports  received  by  the  army  commander  stated  that 
the  enemy  had  been  on  the  march  towards  evening  of  the 
17th  of  August  on  both  roads  to  the  west  in  front  of  the 
Second  Army.  For  that  reason  the  estimate  of  the  situa- 
tion remained  the  same  as  it  had  been  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th. 

The  commander-in-chief  personally  believed  it  probable 
that  the  French  bivouacs  east  of  Gravelotte,  observed  the 
day  before,  would  have  disappeared  by  now. 

He  believed,  as  stated,  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  as- 
sume that  the  army  under  Bazaine  would  take  a  position 
and  accept  battle  against  a  German  superiority,  with  its 
rear  against  Metz  and  the  steep  Moselle  valley.     He  far 


*To  that  place  the  5th  Infantry  Division  had  moved  on  August 
17th,  as  there  was  no  water  in  its  bivouac  en  the  plateau. 

fThe  12th  Cavalry  Division  had  passed  the  night  at  Parfon- 
drupt  with  outposts  on  the  Metz- — Conflans — Etain  road.  At  St. 
Jean-les-Buzy  on  this  road  three  persons  (one  of  them  a  certain  Mar- 
quis de  Margerie,  said  to  be  a  higher  supply  official)  had  been 
stopped  the  night  of  the  17th  and  had  been  sent  by  a  staff  officer 
as  suspicious  persons  first  to  corps  headquarters  of  the  Xllth  Corps, 
then  to  Army  Headquarters.  The  latter  sent  them  to  General 
Headquarters.  Patrols  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  had  scouted  up  to 
Jarny  on   the  17th  without  seeing  anything  of  the  enemy. 

—400— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

rather  held  it  probable  that  on  the  18th  of  August  the 
Second  Army  would  strike  the  enemy's  left  flank  to  the 
north  of  its  front.     Certainly  this  was  only  a  hypothesis. 

Certainty  would  be  attained  about  this  matter  by  a 
short  march  to  the  front  in  the  early  morning  hours.  During 
the  advance  march  however  it  had  to  be  especially  remem- 
bered that  the  enemy  was  doubtlessly  very  close  and  that 
a  battle  might  ensue  at  any  moment.  This  required  that 
the  march  should  not  be  in  long  march  columns  but  with 
large  masses  ready  for  battle.  According  to  conceptions  of 
the  terrain,  which  could  be  gleaned  from  maps,  this  appeared 
to  offer  no  material  diflflculties.  Army  orders  of  August  17th 
had  in  addition,  charged  the  corps  in  the  first  line  to  recon- 
noiter  the  foreground.  For  these  reasons  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  considered  it  proper  to  have  the  Saxon  Army  Corps 
start  first  and  to  have  the  Guard  Corps  follow  it,  though 
the  march  directions  of  both  corps  would  cross  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Mars-la-Tour. 

Therefore  the  verbal  orders  issued  by  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  contained  the  following: 

"The  Second  Army  will  this  morning  continue  the 
march  to  the  front.  Its  task  remains  as  heretofore  to 
push  the  enemy  away  from  his  route  of  retreat  on  Verdun 
— Chalons,  and  to  beat  him  wherever  found. 

"The  Xllth  Army  Corps  will  start  as  leading  echelon 
of  the  left  wing  at  once  ;*  in  its  right  rear  the  Guard  Corps  ; 
and  the  IXth  Army  Corps  (at  6:00  A.M.)  to  the  right  rear 
of  the  Guard  Corps. 

"The  Xllth  Army  Corps  will  march  on  Jarny,  the  Guard 
Corps  on  Doncourt.  The  IXth  Corps,  after  it  has  marched 
between  Vionville  and  Rezonville,  will  advance,  leaving  St. 
Marcel  close  to  its  left. 

"In  second  line  follow,  opposite  the  intervals,  on  the 
right  the  Hid,  and  on  the  left  the  Xth  Army  Corps.  The  6th 
Cavalry  Division  will  be  under  the  orders  of  the  Illd  Corps, 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  under  the  orders  of  the  Xth  Corps. 


*These  orders   were  issued  at  5:00   A.M. 

—401— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

"The  corps  artillery  of  the  Illd  Corps  remains  at  the 
disposition  of  Army  Headquarters  as  army  reserve  artil- 
lery, 

"On  the  right  of  the  Second  Army  the  two  corps  of  fhe 
First  Army  will  advance,  the  Vlllth  Corps  in  rear  of  the 
IXth  Corps,  the  Vllth  Corps  farther  toward  Metz.* 

"The  trains  remain  where  they  have  passed  the  night, 
those  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  between  Vionville  and  Rezon- 
ville,  where  water  can  be  found. 

"The  advance  will  be  made,  not  in  long  march  columns, 
but  by  massed  divisions,  the  corps  artillery  marching  be- 
tween its  two  divisions.  The  question  at  the  start  is  only 
one  of  an  advance  of  less  than  four  miles,  so  as  to  occupy 
the  northern  road  to  Verdun.  Rest  will  be  taken  during 
the  noon  hour." 

In  a  few  words  the  Prince  finally  explained  to  the  corps 
commanders  his  estimate  of  the  situation  concerning  the 
enemy,  so  as  to  assure  thorough  and  correct  cooperation  be- 
tween all  portions  of  the  army.  This  same  estimate  was  the 
basis  for  the  instructions  already  issued  which  formed  the 
entire  Second  Army  into  one  unit,  the  several  units  of  which 
were  in  close  liaison.  The  Army  was  to  push  forward  as 
a  mass  of  brigades  of  enormous  dimensions,  and  marching 
continually  in  such  manner  would  be  prepared  to  turn  either 
to  the  right  or  to  the  left  according  as  to  how  and  where  the 
left  flank  corps  would  be  the  first  to  become  engaged. 

The  Prince  himself  intended  to  keep  with  the  leading 
elements  of  the  Illd  Army  Corps  at  the  start  of  the  march. 

The  corps  that  were  to  start  the  first  at  once  made  all 
preparations  therefor.  The  leading  elements  of  the  Xllth 
Army  Corpsf  which  defiled  in  march  columns  through  the 
village  of  Mars-la-Tour,  reached  the  main  Metz — Harville 
— Verdun  road  with  its  first  sections  at  5  :40  A.M. 


*For  the  short  march  the  cavalry  then  with  the  corps  in  the 
first  line  sufficed  for  reconnaissance;  there  were  no  large  plains  be- 
tween the  Second  Army  and  the  enemy.  Therefore  the  5th  and  6th 
Cavalry  Divisions  were  kept  back.  The  Saxon  Cavalry  Division  was 
in  front,  the  Cuirassier  Brigade  of  the  Guard  Corps,  the  Grand  Ducal 
Hessian  Cavalry  Brigade  as  well  as  the  cavalry  division  regiments 
of  the  5th  Infantry  Division  were  also  out  in  front. 

flOSth  Rifle  Regiment. 

—402— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

From  the  place  west  of  Vionville,  where  the  comman- 
der-in-chief had  issued  his  orders  to  the  commanding  gen- 
erals of  the  Illd  and  IXth  Corps,  St.  Marcel,  Doncourt,  Bru- 
ville,  Jarny  and  their  surroundings  could  plainly  be  seen. 
It  was  definitely  ascertained  by  field  glasses  that  the  entire 
country  around  there  was  free  of  the  enemy. 

When  now  Prince  Frederick  Charles  sent  his  report  of 
the  commencement  of  the  advance  of  the  Second  Army  as 
indicated  by  the  start  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  towards 
Jarny  to  General  Headquarters  on  the  hill  at  Flavigny,  he 
added  thereto : 

"No  hostile  troops  whatever  are  marching  on  the  road 
from  St.  Marcel  to  Doncourt.  The  camp  at  St.  Marcel  is 
empty.    During  the  night  troops  did  march  on  that  road." 

The  enemy,  who  had  been  north  in  front  of  the  Second 
Army,  had  thus  disappeared.  The  question,  in  addition, 
was  what  had  become  of  those  hostile  fighting  forces  that 
had  been  observed  yesterday  to  the  east  in  front  of  the 
right  wing  of  the  Second  Army. 

The  first  information  which  was  sent  in  by  a  picket 
opposite  Gravelotte,  also  appeared  to  indicate  the  departure 
of  the  French.  The  officer  in  charge  of  that  picket  re- 
ported: "I  have  been  to  within  400  paces  of  the  hostile 
camp.  The  enemy  has  taken  no  security  measures  there. 
His  strength  is  about  6  to  9  divisions  of  infantry.* 

"As  far  as  can  be  seen  the  artillery  has  driven  off ;  cav- 
alry: one  to  2  regiments  in  white  tunics.  The  entire  thing 
creates  the  impression  of  a  hasty  departure  for  Metz;  at 
this  time  there  are  about  6  to  8000  infantry  still  east  of 
Gravelotte.— August  18,  1870,  4:50  A.M." 

Very  soon  thereafter  a  report  was  received  from  the 
advanced  troops  of  the  18th  Division,  as  follows : 


*There  is  no  doubt  but  what  he  meant  French  half-battalions, 
as  otherwise  the  statement  of  the  strength  made  below  as  6  to 
8000  men  infantry  could  not  be  explained.  And  the  sight  of  6  to 
8  infantry  divisions  would  probably  have  caused  that  officer  to  re- 
port that  he  had  seen  the  entire  French  army.  In  any  case,  ho 
viewed  entirely  too  small  a  space  to  be  able  to  gain  the  impression 
that  he  had  three  army  corps  in  his  front.  His  statement  also  indi- 
cated in  connection  with  his  statement  in  regard  to  cavalry  and  ar- 
tillery, that  he  meant  weaker  troop  units. 

—403— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

1.  Gravelotte  unoccupied  this  morning.* 

2.  According  to  a  report  from  the  dragoon  picket  the 
"general"  was  beaten  in  the  camp,  and  that  picket  says  it 
observed  movements  of  the  enemy  toward  the  northwest. 

3.  The  two  companies  in  Rezonville  report  hostile  in- 
fantry patrols  in  the  woods  north  of  Rezonville. — August  18, 
1870;  5:15  A.M. 

Of  the  very  great  interest  at  that  very  time  was  the  sen- 
tence in  the  first  report:  "the  entire  thing  creates  the  im- 
pression of  a  hasty  departure  for  Metz." 

According  to  the  estimate  of  the  situation  the  com- 
mander-in-chief had  formed,  this  was  not  only  not  impos-  * 
sible  but  rather  probable.  If  only  a  portion  of  the  enemy's 
army  was  immediately  west  of  Metz,  it  appeared  correct 
if  the  enemy,  in  the  face  of  the  very  great  German  numeri- 
cal superiority  in  readiness  to  advance,  retreated  to  under 
the  cannon  of  Metz. 

Furthermore  the  statement  in  the  second  report  to  the 
effect  that  the  enemy  was  alarming  his  camp  became  of 
importance,  also  that  movements  were  occurring  toward  the 
northwest.  In  order  to  gain  rapid  information  of  condi- 
tions on  that  flank,  and  as  could  not  be  seen  from  the  place 
where  the  Prince  was.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  sent  an 
engineer  oflficer  of  his  staff  to  the  vicinity  of  Gravelotte  to 
gain  more  definite  information. 

This  officer  first  sent  a  message  from  the  outposts 
in  the  north  edge  of  the  Bois  des  Ognons,  which  mentioned 
the  marching  off  of  the  enemy  in  a  northerly  and  northeas- 
terly direction  and  stated  that  this  information  was  entirely 
reliable.  But  soon  thereafter  his  personal  observations 
led  him  to  an  entirely  different  opinion.  The  first  message 
(dated  6:40  A.M.)  was  received  at  army  headquarters  at 
7  :30  A.M.  Three-quarters  of  an  hour  later  a  second  mes- 
sage followed,  stating  that  the  camp  was  still  intact  and 
that  no  troops  had  left  it.  These  latter  messages  were  results 
of    personal    reconnaissance,    not  statements  of  outposts. 


*As  early  as  the  17th  patrols  had  visited  that  place.  Up  to 
very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  18th  however  numerous  French 
soldiers    were    seen    around    there    carrying   water. 

—404— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Movements,  the  report  continued,  had  been  seen  of  course 
since  3 :00  A.M. 

The  next  report  from  that  engineer  officer  (dated  8:45 
A.M.)  confirmed  the  last  report.     It  read: 

"Movements  throughout  the  camp,  it  appears  infan- 
try is  being  concentrated  farther  to  the  rear;  the  edge  of 
the  hills  still  occupied  by  artillery. 

"The  movements  in  the  camp  during  the  night  were 
caused  by  trains  coming  in ;  new  bivouac  fires  being  lighted. 
At  present  hour  but  slight  firing  by  outposts." 

The  enemy  still  held  his  positions  on  the  heights  east 
of  Gravelotte  and  made  no  attempt  whatever  to  leave  them. 
Of  this  fact  there  was  now  no  doubt. 

There  was  no  definite  information  as  yet  from  the  left 
wing  of  the  army,  no  message  of  any  importance  had  been 
received.* 

The  first  report  from  that  flank  came  from  the  Guard 
Cavalry  and  reached  the  commander-in-chief  at  8:30  A.M.: 

"Inhabitants  of  Bruville  state  that  the  French  left 
Doncourt  yesterday  at  9:00  A.M.  They  do  not  know  the 
direction  in  which  they  left.  Some  state  to  Verdun,  others 
to  Briey,  and  still  others  to  Metz." 

Thus,  nothing  certain  was  gleaned  from  that  report,  it 
only  proved  that  last  night  no  column  of  importance  marched 
on  the  road  to  Jarny.  ■'   "^^   *   * 

About  this  time — at  8 :30  A.M. — General  Headquarters 
held  the  view  that  the  hostile  main  forces  were  in  front  of 
Metz  and  that  their  position  reached  to  Amanvillers.f 


*Concerning  the  importance  attached  to  the  road  from  Verdun, 
the  Xllth  Army  Corps  received  orders  about  7:45  A.M.:  "to  direct  the 
cavalry  detachment  scouting  on  its  left  flank  to  also  send  all  reports 
direct  to  army  headquarters." 

fAs  is  now  known  the  French  army  occupied  the  following  posi- 
tions  on   August   18: 

1.  The  6th  Corps:  Roncourt— St.  Privat  to  the  small  swamp 

east  of  St.   Ail; 

2.  The  4th  Corps:  Amanvillers — Montigny-la-Grange;  Cham- 

penois  occupied  in  front; 

3.  The    3d    Corps:    La    Folie — Leipzig — Moscou    towards    Le 

Point  du  Jour,   advanced  troops   in   the   Bois   des   Geni- 
vaux ; 

—405— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

An  officer  of  the  general  staff  brought  this  information. 
It  was  still  considered  desirable  that  the  Second  Army 
continue  its  march  in  the  direction  heretofore  held  to. 
"Should  the  northern  road  to  Verdun  be  free  of  the  enemy, 
the  Xllth  and  the  Guard  Corps  ought  not  to  be  sent  far  to 
the  left."  If  the  assumption  which  had  been  made  should  be 
confirmed,  then  the  First  Army  was  designated  to  attack  in 
front,  the  IXth  Corps  to  envelop  the  hostile  right  wing,  the 
Guard  Corps  to  form  the  reserve.  The  rest  of  the  corps 
were  to  halt  for  the  present. 

The  dispositions  made  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had 
already  arranged  for  such  a  halt  with  a  view  to  the  neces- 
sity of  preserving  the  strength  of  the  troops.  It  only  re- 
mained to  issue  special  orders  to  the  IXth  Corps  which  was 
to  receive  a  definite  battle  task.  It  therefore  received  the 
following  orders : 

"VioNviLLE,  8:35  A.M.,   18  August  1870. 

"As  soon  as  its  infantry  of  the  main  body  reaches 
Caulre  Farm,  northeast  of  St.  Marcel,  the  IXth  Corps  will 
halt,  will  send  cavalry  points  towards  Leipzig,  St.  Privat- 
la-Montagne  and  to  connect  with  the  Guard  Corps  which 
will  also  halt  at  Doncourt.  Reports  of  the  cavalry  sent 
west  will,  in  addition  to  being  sent  to  me,  be  also  sent  to 
General  von  Moltke. 

Frederick   Charles."* 

Corresponding  orders  were  sent  to  the  Guard  Corps  to 
halt  at  Doncourt,  to  the  Xllth  Corps  to  halt  at  Jarny. 

Other  instructions  could  not  be  sent  at  this  time  to 
those  two  corps,  as  the  strength  of  the  enemy  on  our  right 


4.  The  2d  Corps:   Le  Point  du  Jour,  Rozerieulles;   Ste.  Ruf- 

fine  occupied  on  the  left  flank; 

5.  The  Cavalry  Division  of  Forton  at  the  mill  of  Longeau; 

6.  The  Cavalry  Division  of  Barail    (of  which  two  regiments 

had  escorted  the  Emperor  and  were  absent)    in  the  po- 
sitions of  the   6th   Corps; 

7.  The  Guard    in    reserve    on    the    heights    of    the    Mont    St. 

Quentin    and    near    Plappeville. 

The  right  flank  of  this  position  could  not  be  seen  from  the  heights 
at  Flavigny. 

*Copies  of  this  order  were  sent  to  General  Headquarters  with 
the  addition  that  the  Xllth  Corps  would  halt  at  Jarny,  the  Xth  at 
Bruville. 

—406— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

flank  was  not  yet  known,  so  that  we  could  not  form  a  clear 
judgment  as  to  whether  besides  the  IXth  Corps,  other  por- 
tions of  the  Second  Army  could  also  be  employed  against 
him. 

The  Xth  Army  Corps  also  received  orders  to  remain 
near  Bruville  when  it  reached  there.*  The  Illd  Corps  had 
not  yet  started  its  march. 

These  were  the  measures  taken  by  headquarters  of  the 
Second  Army  in  consequence  of  the  first  information  re- 
ceived from  General  Headquarters.  Before  it  took  further 
measures,  more  definite  information  and  results  of  recon- 
naissances had  to  be  awaited,  which  could  not  be  very  far 
off. 

First,  at  8:50  A.M.  came  a  report  from  the  extreme 
left  wing  of  the  Army,  the  Xllth  Corps,  which  had  arrived 
at  Jarny  in  the  meantime,  without  encountering  the  enemy. 
It  stated : 

"North  of  Labry,  8 :50  A.M.f 

"It  appears  hostile  artillery  is  in  position  west  of  Val- 
leroy,  also  columns  west  of  Valleroy,  also  columns  north  of 
Doncourt." 

This  report  corresponded  to  the  assumption  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  that  the  enemy  had  separated  his  forces. 

On  the  right,  on  the  heights  of  Point  du  Jour  (the  ene- 
my was  in  position,  to  the  left,  according  to  that  report, 
he  now  also  showed  himself.  It  appeared  that  the  Second 
Army  was  now  in  touch  with  the  enemy  also  on  its  left 
wing,  just  as  the  right  wing  had  hostile  forces  in  its  prox- 
imity. It  remained  to  await  detailed  information  which 
both  flank  corps  were  without  doubt  seeking. 

The  report  from  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  was  now 
shown  to  be  erroneous  by  a  second  report  arriving  at  head- 
quarters of  the  Second  Army  at  about  9:30  A.M.  It  was 
stated  that  minute  reconnaissance  had  shown  that  Valleroy 


*At  this  time  the  Xth  Corps  was  still  at  its  bivouac  places,  but 
this  could  not  be  seen  from  the  place  where  army  headquarters 
was. 

fThe  fact  that  the  date  of  this  report  was  the  same  as  the  date 
of  its  arrival  at  army  headquarters  may  be  explained  by  difference 
in  watches. 

—407— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

was  not  occupied  by  the  enemy.  It  was  added  that  the  Xllth 
Corps  would  remain  at  Jarny  awaiting  further  orders  and 
that  the  Saxon  cavalry  would  in  the  meantime  reconnoiter 
the  Briey  road. 

Thus,  there  was  no  touch  as  yet  with  the  enemy  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  army. 

As  stated  several  times  above,  the  commander-in-chief 
thought  it  very  probable  that  the  enemy  would  be  found 
there,  and  he  did  not  believe  that  the  report  was  erroneous, 
he  remained  convinced  that  similar  reports  like  the  first, 
now  contradicted,  from  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  would  prob- 
ably be  received  in  the  further  advance  of  that  corps.  It 
might  be  true  that  hostile  troops  had  been  at  Valleroy,  and 
had  disappeared  again.* 

To  this  came,  that  during  the  time  between  the  arrival 
of  the  first  and  second  report,  the  IXth  Army  Corps  re- 
ported from  Caulre :  "Our  patrols  sent  out  north  and  north- 
eastward have  seen  nothing  of  the  enemy. "f  This,  like  ear- 
lier reports,  appeared  to  indicate  that  the  deployment  of 
troops  by  the  enemy  immediately  west  of  Metz  were  not  on 
an  extensive  scale. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  now  more  than  ever  believed 
that  the  further  advance  of  the  reconnoitering  detach- 
ments on  the  extreme  left  of  the  army  ought  to  be  waited 
for,  before  finally  deciding  on  the  right  turn  of  the  army. 

Very  soon  thereafter  a  further  order  was  received 
from  General  Headquarters: 

"An  unimportant  skirmish  engagement  on  the  right 
wing  of  the  Vllth  Corps.  The  troops  visible  on  the  heights 
towards  Metz  appear  to  move  northward,  probably  towards 
Briey.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  First  Army  requires 
much  more  support  than  can  be  rendered  by  the  Hid  Corps 
from  Vionville  or  from  St.  Marcel. 

"Hill  south  of  Flavigny,  9 :20  AM. 

VON    MOLTKE." 


*In  regard  to  this  we  may  remark,  getting  ahead  of  our  nar- 
rative, that  as  a  matter  of  fact  patrols  of  the  enemey  were  later  on 
chased   away   from    the   vicinity   of    Moineville    and   Valleroy. 

fThe  report  from  General  von  Manstein  concerning  his  arrival 
at   Caulre   contains   that   information. 

—408— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  support  by  the  Illd  Army  Corps  here  directed 
could  be  easily  arranged  as  that  corps  was  in  readiness  at 
Vionville. 

In  the  meantime,  about  9:00  A.M.,  General  von  Man- 
stein  (commanding  the  IXth  Army  Corps)  reported  under 
date  of  8:30  A.M.,  Caulre  Farm,  that  he  had  arrived  with 
the  IXth  Army  Corps  at  Caulre  and  would  remain  assembled 
there  according  to  orders. 

This  halt  had  been  ordered  by  General  von  Manstein 
even  prior  to  the  receipt  of  the  last  orders  from  army  head- 
quarters, based  on  the  general  march  orders  issued  that 
morning. 

As  has  been  stated,  the  IXth  Army  Corps  had  been  des- 
ignated for  the  support  of  the  First  Army  by  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles.  General  Headquarters  received  information 
thereof  later  on,  at  10:10  A.M. 

Three,  and  four  respectively,  of  the  corps  present  of 
the  Second  Army  still  remained  at  the  disposal  of  army 
headquarters. 

They  were  in  readiness  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his  left 
flank,  should  he  actually  attempt  to  march  off  from  his  pres- 
ent positions  at  Metz. 

The  interval  between  9:30  and  10:00  A.M.  had  now 
passed  without  any  further  report  coming  from  the  Xllth 
Army  Corps,  while  still  the  cavalry  points  of  that  division, 
as  was  known,  scouted  beyond  Valleroy.  This  contradicted 
the  assumptions  held  up  to  then  that  portions  of  Bazaine's 
army  would  have  to  be  sought  there ;  and  now  the  situation 
commenced  to  clear  up. 

Before  we  will  recount  the  further  measures  taken  by 
army  headquarters,  which  from  now  on  had  for  their  ob- 
jective the  attack  against  the  enemy  in  position  immediately 
west  of  Metz,  we  must  picture  to  ourselves  how  the  situa- 
tion was  perceived  in  those  days. 

We  are  much  inclined  to  picture  today  as  having  been 
actually  known,  things  which  were  in  fact  then  unknown. 
It  is  far  better  for  understanding  the  events  and  far  truer 
historically,  so  see  only  that  what  could  be  seen  then. 

—409— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  French  army  extended  from  le  Point  du  Jour  as  far 
as  the  heights  of  Roncourt  and  St.  Privat  in  a  prepared  po- 
sition, waiting  for  the  attack. 

But  so  far  only  the  left  wing  of  that  position  had  ac- 
tually been  located.  On  August  17th  a  French  camp  of 
several  divisions,  that  is  a  portion  of  and  not  the  entire  army 
of  Bazaine,  had  been  seen  immediately  east  of  Gravelotte. 
The  results  of  the  reconnaissances  early  on  the  morning  of 
August  18th  brought  no  more  than  that.  They  confirmed 
the  report  that  a  few  French  divisions  stood  on  the  heights 
of  le  Point  du  Jour.  The  first  report  from  General  Head- 
quarters stated  that  it  believed  the  hostile  right  extended  as 
far  as  Amanvillers.  The  patrols  sent  from  Caulre  Farm 
northeastward  had,  as  stated,  found  no  enemy.  Thus,  it 
appeared  that  the  French  position  did  not  reach  far  to  the 
north. 

Therefore  Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  believed 
it  to  be  the  most  probable  that  the  enemy's  right  was  at  La 
Folie. 

Thus,  a  French  battle  position  on  the  ridge  from  le 
Point-du-Jour  as  far  as  La  Folie  now  formed  the  objective 
for  the  measures  to  be  taken. 

As  stated,  the  lid  Army  Corps  had  orders  to  envelop  the 
French  right  wing  with  its  IXth  Army  Corps  and  to  have 
the  Guard  serve  as  reserve. 

It  therefore  appeared  to  the  point  to  send  these  two 
corps,  to  turn  to  the  right,  so  far  north  as  to  come  opposite 
the  assumed  right  point  of  the  French  position.  They  were 
to  march  to  Verneville.  From  there  they  could  attack  the 
French  right,  should  that  be  at  La  Folie,  in  front  and  flank 
with  superior  forces. 

Of  course  arrangements  had  to  be  made  in  the  move- 
ment about  to  commence  for  reconnaissance  far  towards 
the  north. 

Therefore  Prince  Frederick  Charles  issued  the  follow- 
ing orders : 

1.  To  the  IXth  Army  Corps,  at  10:00  A.M.: 


—410- 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

"The  corps  will  start  and  advance  in  the  direction  of 
Verneville  and  La  Folie.  If  the  enemy  has  his  right  wing 
there,  the  battle  will  be  opened  at  the  start  by  deploying  con- 
siderable artillery, 

Frederick  Charles." 

2.  To  the  Guard  Corps,  at  10:15  A.M.: 
"The  Guard  Corps  will  continue  its  march  via  Don- 
court  to  Verneville  and  there  take  position  for  the  support 
of  the  IXth  Corps,  which  is  advancing  on  La  Folie  against 
the  hostile  right, 

"Reconnaissance  left  via  Amanvillers  and  St.  Privat- 
la-Montagne ;  early  reports  desirable. 

Frederick  Charles." 

Copies  of  these  orders  were  sent  to  the  Xllth  Army 
Corps.*  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  had  added  to  his  re- 
port in  the  morning,  as  stated  above,  that  he  would  remain 
at  Jarny  until  further  orders.  The  corps  could  be  held  there 
for  the  present  at  the  disposition  of  army  headquarters,  as 
there  was  no  room  on  the  plateau  of  La  Folie  for  anything 
else  besides  the  IXth  and  Guard  Corps,  At  Jarny  the  Xllth 
Corps  was  in  a  good  position  in  case  that  it  became  necessary 
to  send  detachments  from  the  Second  Army  to  the  north  or 
northwest. 

The  IXth  Corps,  in  addition,  in  regard  to  its  conduct 
in  battle,  was  restricted  at  first  to  opening  the  battle  with 
an  artillery  fight;  but  this  restriction  was  to  be  governed 
by  the  situation.  The  IXth  Corps  was  closest  to  the  ene- 
my ;  it  formed  the  pivot  of  the  movement  about  to  com- 
mence. According  to  the  nature  of  things  it  would  come  on 
the  enemy  not  only  alone,  but  also  materially  earlier'  than 
the  Guard  Corps.  It  had  to  be  consequently  prevented 
from  becoming  engaged  with  a  hostile  superiority  in  a  fron- 
tal battle  before  the  hostile  right  wing  could  be  enveloped. 

At  this  moment,  when  the  Second  Army  enters  on  this 
day  a  new  phase  of  activity,  it  is  well  to  follow  the  events 
of  the  different  corps  during  the  early  morning  hours. 

*Copies  also  to  General  Headquarters,  in  which  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles  also  requested  permission  to  bring  the  Hid  Army  Corps 
which  still  was  at  Vionville  to  Caulre  Farm. 

—411— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  advance  of  the  army  during  the  early  morning 
hours  that  day  had  not  been  made  without  difficulties  and 
unforeseen  obstacles. 

First,  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  encountered  such  mater- 
ial obstacles  in  the  terrain  around  Mars-la-Tour  for  deploy- 
ment of  its  divisions  in  masses,  as  to  be  forced  to  defile 
through  Mars-la-Tour  in  march  columns,  and  it  was  able  to 
assume  the  formation  directed  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
only  when  north  of  the  village.* 

Only  after  the  corps  had  passed  through  Mars-la-Tour 
could  the  Guard  Corps  commence  its  march.  This  corps, 
because  of  the  difficult  terrain  which  it  had  to  pass  on  the 
route  laid  down  for  it  in  orders  in  going  to  Doncourt,  re- 
mained in  march  columns.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  followed 
at  10:00  A.M.  and  conducted  its  march  in  massed  divisions. 

The  army  did  not  gain  ground  under  these  conditions 
as  rapidly  as  was  the  intention  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

At  that  time,  about  10  :00  A.M.,  the  corps  were  at  the 
following  points : 

1.  The  Xllth  Army  Corps  at  Jarny.f 

2.  The  Guard  Corps  on  the  march  to  Doncourt. 

3.  The  IXth  Army  Corps  at  Caulre  Farm,  outposts  to 
the  line  Bois  des  Genivaux — Verneville — Bois  Doseuillons. 

4.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  and  the  5th  Cavalry  Division 
at  Mars-la-Tour — Tronville. 

5.  The  Hid  Army  Corps  and  the  8th  Cavalry  Division 
at  Vionville. 

6.  The  lid  Army  Corps  on  the  march  from  Pont-a- 
Mousson  to  Buxieres. 

From  these  positions  commenced  the  turn  to  the  right 
of  the  army,  executed  for  the  present  by  the  IXth  and  the 
Guard  Corps. 

At  the  same  time,  knowledge  of  the  situation  and  in- 
tentions of  the  enemy  made  rapid  progress. 


*The  Corps  artillery  had  to  go  around  west  of  Mars-la-Tour. 

fThe  advance  guard  on  the  march  along  both  banks  of  the  Orne, 
the  cavalry  division  was  on  the  march  from  Parfondrupt  to  Puxe, 
having  left  back  one  regiment  to  scout  west  and  towards  Verdun. 

—412— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Slightly  wounded  of  the  16th  Infantry  Regiment  had 
arrived  from  Doncourt  sent  by  the  Xth  Army  Corps ;  these 
wounded  had  been  taken  prisoner  by  the  French  on  Au- 
gust 16th  and  brought  to  Doncourt.  They  stated  that  en 
the  morning  of  August  17th  the  French  had  evacuated 
Doncourt  in  haste,  leaving  them  behind,  and  had  departed 
for  Metz.  Shortly  thereafter  another  report  arrived  from 
the  army  headquarters  officer  observing  the  enemy  at  the 
Bois  des  Ognons,  reading: 

"Point  of  forest  opposite  Gravelotte,  10  :20  A.M.  The 
camp  entirely  changed  by  now.  The  largest  portion  of 
the  troops  has  withdrawn  towards  both  sides  without  my 
being  able  to  determine  the  definite  march  directions.  Half- 
way up  the  slope  where  headquarters  was,  a  defensive 
position  has  been  taken.  The  right  wing  of  that  position 
cannot  be  seen  because  covered  by  woods.  At  this  time 
much  troop  movement  toward  the  north  and  some  fire  by 
outposts." 

For  better  explanation  a  sketch  of  the  French  posi- 
tion on  the  heights  of  le  Point-du-Jour  was  appended. 

Soon  followed  reports  from  the  advancing  corps,  the 
first  coming  from  the  Guard  Corps  at  Doncourt,  dated 
10:20  A.M.: 

"The  leading  elements  of  the  Guard  Corps  just  now- 
arrived  at  Doncourt ;  the  corps  will  take  position  there  and 
await  further  orders.*  Our  patrols  sent  out  in  direction 
of  Ste.  Marie  on  the  road  to  Briey,  have  not  reported  any- 
thing of  the  enemy." 

Almost  the  same  time  a  report  came  from  the  IXth 
Army  Corps  which  had  reached  that  corps  from  the  ad- 
vanced troops  of  the  25th  Infantry  Division  and  read : 

"Hill  near  Batilly,  10  :25  A.M.  Hostile  patrols  on  the 
heights  Ste.  Marie — Amanvillers,  troops  marching  on  main 
read,  camp  at  St.  Privat — hostile  patrols  advancing  at  the 
trot." 

Headquarters  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  sent  this  report 
to  Caulre  Farm  at  11:00  A.M. 


*In  the  meantime,  as  we  know,  at  10:15  A.M.,  orders  had  been 
sent  to  the  corps  to  continue  the  march  on  Verneville. 

—413— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Almost  simultaneously  with  these  important  messages 
came  another  order  from  General  Headquarters,  reading : 

"According  to  reports  received  we  are  justified  in  as- 
suming that  the  enemy  intends  to  make  a  stand  on  the  pla- 
teau  between   Le   Point-du-Jour   and   Montigny-la-Grange. 

"4  hostile  battalions  advanced  into  the  Genivaux  woods. 

"His  Majesty  holds  the  view  that  it  would  be  well  to 
start  the  Xllth  and  the  Guard  Corps  in  the  direction  of 
Batilly  so  as  to  strike  the  enemy  at  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes 
in  case  he  marches  on  Briey,  and  to  attack  him  from  Aman- 
villers  if  he  remains  on  the  heights. 

"The  attack  should  be  made  simultaneously  with  the 
First  Army  from  the  Bois  de  Vaux  and  Gravelotte,  by  the 
IXth  Corps  against  the  Bois  des  Genivaux  and  Verneville, 
by  the  left  wing  of  the  Second  Army  from  the  north. — 
10:30  A.M. 

VON   MOLTKE." 

The  assumptions  of  General  Headquarters  in  these 
orders  concerning  the  enemy,  were  in  complete  consonance 
with  the  views  held  by  army  headquarters.  The  patrols 
sent  out  by  the  Guard  Corps  towards  the  main  road  from 
Briey  had  not  found  any  enemy.  The  XHth  Corps,  which 
we  knew  still  had  its  main  body  at  Jarny,  would  undoubt- 
edly have  detected,  through  its  cavalry,  those  portions  of 
the  French  forces  that  had  marched  off  on  the  17th  to- 
wards the  northwest  or  west  and  would  have  reported 
that  fact. 

Now  all  the  instructions  concerning  the  Second  Army 
could  be  carried  out,  even  more  decisively  than  those  issued 
at  10:00  and  10:15  A.M.,  against  one  objective — the  enemy 
on  the  heights  immediately  west  of  Metz — with  all  forces 
to  beat  that  enemy  decisively.  All  doubts  had  been  dis- 
persed. It  now  also  appeared  no  longer  necessary  to  keep 
forces  in  readiness  towards  other  directions  as  had  been 
done  heretofore. 

The  general  conception  we  now  had  of  the  French  posi- 
tion, on  which  the  new  dispositions  were  based,  was  but 
little  changed  from  the  one  previously  held. 

—414— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Orders  from  General  Headquarters  assumed  Montigny- 
la-Grange  to  be  the  right  wing  of  the  French  position.  The 
possibihty  that  the  enemy  would  even  now  attempt  to 
march  from  that  position  to  Briey  had  been  considered. 

The  IXth  Army  Corps  had  reported  that  a  hostile  camp 
was  also  at  St.  Privat.  Of  course,  this  report  had  not 
yet  been  confirmed  by  other  reports,*  and  it  contained  no 
intimation  whether  the  troops  discovered  there  formed  a 
body  of  some  tactical  importance  or  were  merely  a  detach- 
ment. 

Because  of  these  conditions  the  commander-in-chief 
decided  to  send  now  the  Xllth  Corps,  following  the  right 
turn  of  the  Second  Army,  as  far  north  on  the  Metz — 
Woippy — Briey  road  as  practicable.  He  combined  here- 
with his  intention  to  extend  the  envelopment  of  the  hostile 
right  wing  with  detachments  at  least  to  within  the  Mo- 
selle valley.  They  lay  at  that  time  the  last  assured  con- 
nection of  Bazaine's  army  with  France. 

Complying  with  orders  from  General  Headquarters, 
the  Guard  Corps  was  to  march  with  the  Xllth  Army  Corps 
toward  Batilly.  But  as  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had,  by 
his  orders  of  10:15  A.M.,  sent  the  corps  in  the  meantime 
at  first  against  Verneville,  he  now  directed  that  it  should 
march  from  there,  by  making  a  left  turn  while  on  the  march, 
without  delay  to  Amanvillers  and  to  then  execute  in  a  south- 
erly direction  its  enveloping  attack  against  the  hostile  flank. 
In  order  to  support  this  attack  if  necessary, — for  which 
there  was  little  room  left  on  the  narrow  plateau  of  Montigny 
— the  Xllth  Army  Corps  w^as  near  enough,  even  if  it  was 
assigned  to  the  Metz — Briey  road  towards  Ste.  Marie.f 

*The  IXth  Corps  reported  between  11:00  and  12:00  o'clock: 

At  Caulre  Farm,  10:45  A.M. 

"A  French  laborer,  living  in  Saargemiind  and  coming  from  Con- 
flans  states:  Last  Monday  and  Tuesday  some  French  cavalry  regi- 
ments, some  infantry  and  artillery  coming  from  Metz  reached  Con- 
flans,  and  marched  off  Wednesday  in  direction  of  Briey. 

"Our  patrols  report:  Jouaville  is  not  occupied,  according  to  state- 
ments of  inhabitants;  masses  of  troops  are  north  thereof.  Have  sent 
reconnoitering  patrols  to  St.  Frivat-la-Montagne  and  Ste.  Marie-aux- 
Chenes.  It  has  been  further  reported  that  cavalry  and  artillery  is 
northeast  of  Verneville." 

fThe  shortest  distance  from  Ste.  Marie  to  Amanvillers  was  5500 
paces. 

—415— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

It  now  appeared  high  time  to  bring  the  corps  of  the 
second  line,  the  Xth,  Illd  and  lid  nearer  to  the  corps  that 
were  to  make  the  attack  and  to  so  place  them  that  they 
would  be  at  hand  to  support  the  advance  in  front,  the  same 
as  the  Xllth  Corps  was  available  to  support  the  flank  at- 
tack. 

At  11:30  o'clock  Prince  Frederick  Charles  then  issued 
the  following  orders : 

1.  To  the  Xllth  Royal  Saxon  Army  Corps : 

"The  Xllth  Army  Corps  is  hereby  directed  to  march 
on  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes,  to  secure  by  cavalry  against 
Briey  and  beyond  Conflans,  and  to  send  cavalry  into  the 
Moselle  valley  to  interrupt  the  telegraph  and  railroad  lead- 
ing to  Thionville. 

'The  Vllth,  Vlllth,  IXth  and  Guard  Corps  will  within 
2  hours  attack  the  enemy,  who  is  in  position  on  the  heights 
of  Leipzig  as  far  as  the  Bois  de  Vaux,  rear  towards  Metz.* 

'The  Illd,  Xth  and  Xllth,  and  also  the  lid  Corps  will 
follow  in  second  line  in  support." 

2.  To  the  Guard  Corps : 

'The  enemy  appears  to  be  in  position  for  battle  on  the 
ridge  from  the  Bois  de  Vaux  to  beyond  Leipzig.  The  Guard 
Corps  will  hasten  its  advance  via  Verneville,  proceed  as  far 
as  Amanvillers  and  from  there  make  a  serious  attack  against 
the  hostile  right  wing. 

"The  IXth  Corps  will  simultaneously  attack  La  Folie. 

"The  Guard  Corps  may  take  the  road  via  Habonville. 
The  Xllth  Corps  proceeds  to  Ste,  Marie," 

3.  To  the  IXth  Army  Corps: 

'The  Guard  Corps  has  now  been  directed  to  march  via 
Verneville  to  Amanvillers  and  from  there  eventually  to 
attack  the  hostile  right  wing.  A  serious  engagement  of 
the  IXth  Corps,  in  case  the  hostile  right  wing  extends  far- 
ther north,  should  be  delayed  until  the  Guard  Corps  attacks 
from  Amanvillers.  The  troops  will  probably  have  sufficient 
time  to  cook  coffee." 


*At  9:30  A.M.  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  First  Army  had  arrived 
at  the  place  where  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  and  had  oriented 
him  concerning  conditions  of  the  First  Army. 

—416— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

In  addition,  at  12  noon  orders  were  issued  to  the  Xth 
and  lid  Corps : 

4.  To  the  Xth  Army  Corps : 

"The  enemy  is  in  position  from  Leipzic  to  the  Bois  de 
Vaux.     He  will  be  attacked  there  today — 

by  the  Guard   Corps  from  Amanvillers, 

by  the  IXth  Corps  from  La  Folie, 

by  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Corps  in  front. 

"In  second  line  follow  in  support: 

the  Xlllth   Corps  on   Ste.   Marie, 
the  Xth  Corps  on  St.  Ail, 
the  Illd  Corps  on  Verneville, 
the  lid  Corps  on  Rezonville." 

5.  To  the  Ild  Army  Corps : 

"The  lid  Army  Corps  will  march  from  Buxieres  on 
Rezonville,  as  reserve  for  the  right  wing.  The  First  and 
Second  Army  will  today  attack  the  enemy  in  his  positions 
this  side  of  Metz. 

"There  will  be  time  to  cook  meals,  special  haste  to 
reach  Rezonville  is  not  necessary.  The  Saxon  cavalry  covers 
toward  Verdun." 

Events  took  a  rapid  course  shortly  after  these  orders 
were  issued. 

The  first  cannon  shots  were  fired  about  noon  in  the 
vicinity  of  Verneville.  There  the  IXth  Army  Corps  en- 
tered the  battle.  It  had  started  from  Caulre  Farm  at  about 
10 :30  A.M.  Its  advance  guard,  directed  by  way  of  Verne- 
ville towards  La  Folie,  became  engaged  at  Chantrenne.  The 
mass  of  its  artillery*  deployed  northeast  of  Verneville 
against  advancing  French  infantry  and  troops  camping  on 
the  heights  of  Amanvillers  and  Montigny-la-Grange ;  the 
farm  buildings  of  Champenois,  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
was  in  front.  The  commanding  general  pushed  the  left 
wing  of  the  fighting  line  almost  to  the  foremost  corner  of 
the  Bois  de  la  Cusse.  The  German  shells  hit  the  French 
camp  by  surprise.     However,  the  enemy  soon  replied  to  that 


*The  artillery  of  the  18th  Infantry  Division  and  the  corps 
artillery.  The  artillery  of  the  25th  (Grand  Ducal  Hessian)  Division 
soon  thereafter  entered  the  battle. 


—417- 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

fire  not  only  from  the  hills  of  Amanvillers — Montigny-la- 
Grange,  but  also  from  the  line  St.  Privat — Amanvillers.  A 
further  extension  of  the  hostile  front  via  Amanvillers  north- 
ward could  then  be  seen. 

The  French  infantry  opened  fire  simultaneously  with 
guns  and  machine  guns  at  long  range  and  rained  a  hail 
of  projectiles  on  the  batteries  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps.  This 
corps,  to  protect  its  artillery,  brought  up  its  main  body 
(infantry)   which  thus  became  engaged  in  the  battle. 

Thus,  the  course  of  events  took  on  a  far  more  serious 
aspect  than  had  originally  been  intended. 

After  the  opening  of  the  battle —  about  12 :30  noon — 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  issued  orders  also  to  the  Illd 
Army  Corps  to  start  and  then  proceed  to  the  vicinity  of 
Verneville,  where  he  took  his  position  at  1 :45  on  the  hill  west 
of  the  village.  Events  with  the  IXth  Army  Corps  became 
important  to  Second  Army  headquarters. 

Even  before  the  receipt  of  the  orders  issued  by  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  at  11:30  A.M.,  the  Guard  and  the  Xllth 
Army  Corps  had  arrived  at  independent  decisions  that  were 
entirely  in  consonance  with  those  orders.  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles  received  information  thereof  during  his  ride 
to  Verneville.     The  Guard  Corps  reported: 

"Doncourt,  18  August  1870;  11:30  A.M.  According 
to  a  report  from  the  cavalry  sent  ahead,  from  the  Hill  at 
Batilly,  10:50  A.M.,  people  just  coming  from  Ste.  Marie 
bring  the  information  that  French  Infantry  is  there,  and 
that  many  French  troops  are  at  St.  Privat-la-Montagne. 
Consequently  the  Guard  Corps  will,  according  to  orders 
received,*  start  immediately  for  Doncourt,  but  the  corps 
commander  believes,  under  these  conditions,  it  is  best  to 
march  not  to  Verneville,  but  to  Habonville. 

"Notification  hereof  has  been  sent  to  the  Xllth  Army 
Corps." 

The  report  from  the  Xllth  Corps  read : 


*  Which  means,  the  orders  issued  by  army  headquarters  at  10:15 
A.M.,  for  the  orders  of  11:30  A.M.  had  not  yet  been  received  by  the 
Guard  Corps  at  the  time  this  report  was  sent. 

—418— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

"Jarny,  August  18,  1870,  11:45  A.M.  The  enemy  is 
reported  to  be  at  Moineville  and  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes. 
Therefore  the  Xllth  Corps  will  proceed  towards  both  points. 
Flank  guard  towards  Valleroy." 

In  the  orders  of  11 :30  A.M.  the  Guard  Corps  had  been 
given  discretion  as  to  marching  via  Habonville* — and  Ste. 
Marie  had  been  assigned  to  the  Xllth  Army  Corps.  There- 
fore no  new  orders  were  required  from  army  headquarters. 

The  Guard  Corps  sent  additional  reports  from  Don- 
court  at  12:00  noon  as  to  its  further  observations  of  the 
enemy.  It  transmitted  a  report  received  from  one  of  its 
cavalry  patrols  reading: 

"One  Saxon  cavalry  patrol  encountered  French  cavalry 
— 10  troopers — at  St.  Ail.  Just  now  some  shots  were  fired 
on  the  road  from  Amanvillers  to  Verneville.f  It  appears 
that  cavalry  is  being  sent  forward  from  St.  Privat,  about 
two  squadrons,  and  about  1^  companies  of  infantry  in 
smaller  detachments  against  Habonville  and  St.  Ail 

"2  companies  of  French  infantry  are  marching  on  Ste. 
Marie.  A  camp  is  between  Ste.  Marie  and  St.  Privat  which 
appears  now  to  be  taken  down." 

This  report  was  dated  "Hill  at  Batilly,  11:30  A.M." 

Through  one  of  his  staff  officers,  who  rode  around 
the  village  of  Verneville,  the  commander-in-chief  learned 
that  French  batteries  were  in  action  immediately  north  of 
Amanvillers  but  that  a  further  view  north  towards  St.  Pri- 
vat was  cut  off  by  the  Bois  de  la  Cusse.  Only  a  church 
steeple  could  be  seen  of  Amanvillers  which  was  behind  a 
ridge. 


*The  Guard  Corps  had  marched  on  Habonville  only  with  the  1st 
Guard  Infantry  Division  and  the  corps  artillery.  The  2d  Guard  In- 
fantry Division,  which  debouched  from  the  first  northern  march  direc- 
tion at  Bruville,  marched  from  there  via  St.  Marcel  and  Caulre  Farm 
on  Verneville.  During  this  march  the  commander-in-chief  saw  it;  he 
was  just  then  riding  to  Verneville  and  he  gave  it  the  march  direction 
to  Habonville. 

fSaxon  cavalry  patrols  had  encountered  weak  hostile  detach- 
ments at  Batilly,  Moineville  and  Valleroy,  which  departed  in  haste. 
Later,  at  12:30  P.M.  Ste.  Marie  was  found  unoccupied  and  it  was 
observed  from  that  place  that  strong  hostile  forces  stood  on  the  heights 
of  St.  Privat.     Briey  was  found  free  of  the  enemy  at  11:00  A.M. 

—419— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

In  the  meantime,  at  about  2:00  P.M.  the  commander- 
in-chief  had  sent  orders  to  the  Guard  Corps  artillery  to  ad- 
vance at  the  trot*  and  to  go  into  position  alongside  of,  but 
not  in  direct  prolongation  of,  the  artillery  line  of  the  IXth 
Army  Corps. 

At  2:05  P.M.  the  Xth  Army  Corps  reported  that  it  had 
arrived  at  Jouaville,  and  in  reply  thereto  it  received  direc- 
tions to  march  on  St.  Privat,  its  artillery  in  front. 

Thus,  sufficient  forces  could  be  deployed  against  the 
French  wing  extending  to  beyond  Amanvillers. 

Three  corps  of  the  Second  Army — the  Guard,  Xth  and 
Xllth,  were  available  therefor  and  were  on  the  advance, 
while  the  entire  Illd  Army  Corps  was  still  available  as  re- 
serve for  the  IXth  Corps — where  the  battle  had  increased 
in  intensity  by  now. 

Shortly  after  2:00  P.M.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  pro- 
ceeded via  Anoux-la-Grange  to  the  vicinity  west  of  Habon- 
ville,  to  be  closer  to  the  important,  and  not  yet  solved,  ques- 
tion in  regard  to  the  location  of  the  French  right  wing. 
From  the  hill  at  Habonville  the  strong  French  positions 
at  St.  Privat  could  be  seen.  The  picture  of  the  French 
battle  position  changed  materially. 

At  his  second  location  Prince  Frederick  Charles  re- 
ceived new  orders  from  General  Headquarters.  These 
orders,  dated  on  the  hill  south  of  Flavigny,  1 :45  P.M.  con- 
tained the  following  directions: 

"The  IXth  Army  Corps  is  already  engaged  in  an  artil- 
lery fight  in  front  of  the  Bois  Doseuillons.  The  actual  gen- 
eral attack  along  the  entire  line  will  not  be  started  until 
material  fighting  forces  can   advance  from  Amanvillers." 

It  was  clear  that  at  that  moment  events  at  the  IXth 
Army  Corps  had  developed  so  far  that  that  corps  could 
no  longer  be  instructed  to  maintain  a  waiting  attitude.  In 
that  corps  only,  contact  with  the  enemy  could  regulate 
the  conduct  of  the  troops. 


''The  same  orders  were  sent  to  that  artillery  by  the  Guard  Corps. 


—420— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Guard  Corps,  which  reached 
the  vicinity  of  Habonville  at  1 :00  P.M.,*  was  completely 
free  and  not  bound  by  any  engagement.  It  now  received 
orders: — "to  conduct  the  fight  only  by  artillery  and  to  in- 
sert the  infantry  only  when  the  Xllth  Corps  could  par- 
ticipate in  the  action  effectively." 

Now,  when  it  was  seen  that  the  French  position  ex- 
tended to  beyond  St.  Privatf  and  when  its  extraordinary 
strength  was  also  noted,  it  appeared  important  that  the 
attack  of  the  Guard  and  the  Xllth  Corps,  as  well  also  as 
that  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  if  necessary,  be  made  simul- 
taneously; there  was  room  here  therefor  and  large  masses 
could  be  employed. 

Of  course  with  the  greater  frontal  extension  of  the  ene- 
my, the  instructions  to  the  different  corps  changed. 

The  Guard  Corps,  heretofore  designated  to  envelop 
the  hostile  right  wing,  had  now  to  prolong  the  German 
front  opposite  the  French.  Only  the  Xllth  Corps  remained 
for  the  enveloping  movement.  By  inserting  the  Xth  Corps 
between  these  two  corps  the  movement  of  course  could  be 
made  easier  and  supported. 

A  meeting  between  Prince  Frederick  Charles  and  the 
commanding  general  of  the  Guard  Corps  gave  an  oppor- 
tunity to  make  the  latter  acquainted  with  the  intentions 
of  General  Headquarters  and  those  of  army  headquarters. 

Before  we  narrate  the  further  course  of  events,  it  ap- 
pears well  to  briefly  repeat  in  what  situation  the  different 
corps  found  themselves  between  2  and  3  o'clock. 

1.  The  IXth  Army  Corps  was  engaged  in  battle  against 
the  hostile  center  at  Amanvillers — La  Folie.J 

2.  The  Guard  Corps  assembled  at  St.  Ail  and  Habon- 
ville (the  2d  Guard  Infantry  Division  there  rejoined  the 
corps  by  2:45  P.M.). 


*The  advance  guard  had  arrived  there  between  12  and  1  o'clock. 

fAs  is  now  known,  that  position  extended  even  farther,  to  Don- 
court,  but  that  fact  could  not  be  perceived  from   Habonville. 

Jin  the  front  of  the  artillery  line  of  that  corps  the  enemy  held 
out  until  about  3:00  P.M.  at  the  Champenois  Farm.  That  place  was 
stormed  at  3:00  P.M. 

—421— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

The  mass  of  the  artillery  of  that  corps  was  in  action 
southwest  of  St.  Ail,  its  left  wing  at  that  village,  and  firing 
at  effective  range  on  the  hostile  positions  at  St.  Privat. 
The  hostile  fighting  line,  clearly  marked  by  powder  smoke, 
had  prolonged  itself  up  to  this  point. 

St.  Ail  was  held  by  the  corps,  and  the  advance  guard 
of  the  1st  Guard  Infantry  Division  turned  against  Ste. 
Marie-aux-Chenes  to  which  point  the  enemy  had  pushed 
portions  of  his  right  wing  at  about  12 :00  noon. 

3.  The  Xllth  (Royal  Saxon)  Army  Corps  was  on  the 
march  against  the  line  Ste.  Marie — Moineville.  Its  columns 
could  be  seen  north  of  Batilly. 

4.  The  Illd  Army  Corps  had  arrived  at  Verneville. 

5.  The  Xth  Army  Corps  commenced  to  arrive  at  Batilly 
at  2 :00  P.M.  and  for  the  present  halted  there. 

6.  Since  the  same  hour  the  lid  Corps  was  marching 
with  the  3d  Infantry  Division  and  the  corps  artillery  from 
Buxieres,  with  the  4th  Infantry  Division  from  Onville* 
towards  Rezonville. 

Now,  in  the  start,  a  fight  ensued  around  the  village  of 
Ste.  Marie,  which  the  enemy,  as  just  stated,  held  in  his 
front.  There  the  left  wing  of  the  Guard  Corps  was  seen 
engaged ;  this  could  plainly  be  seen  from  the  location  of 
the  commander-in-chief.  In  addition,  Saxon  batteries  were 
seen  firing  on  Ste.  Marie  from  the  edge  of  the  ravine  run- 
ning from  Habonville  down  to  Auboue.f 

Both  corps  reported  the  measures  they  were  about 
to  take.  The  Guard  Corps  reported : — "In  rear  of  St.  Ail, 
18  August  1870,  2:00  P.M.— The  infantry  of  the  advance 
guard  of  the  Guard  Corps  is  engaged  in  and  around  St. 


*The  division  had  halted  at  Onville,  as  at  Buxieres,  as  orders 
from  Second  Army  Headquarters  directed  it,  but  there  was  no  water 
for  cooking.  But  the  4th  Infantry  Division  was  not  able  to  cook  at 
all,  as  it  soon  had  to  resume  the  march. 

fSince  2:30  P.M.  the  Saxon  artillery  had  prepared  the  attack 
on  Ste.  Marie.  West  of  the  ravine  stood  nine,  east  thereof  4  bat- 
teries with  the  right  wing  on  the  St.  Ail — Ste.  Marie  road.  At 
Headquarters  of  the  Second  Army  doubt  reigned  for  a  long  time  con- 
cerning the  fire  of  those  batteries  and  whether  or  not  it  would  not 
endanger  the  Guard  Corps,  which  appeared  to  have  already  entered 
the  village.     Officers  sent  out  cleared  up  the  situation. 

—422— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Ail  towards  Ste.  Marie,  which  is  strongly  held  by  French 
infantry.  The  corps  artillery  on  the  right  is  firing  on  St. 
Privat.  The  main  body  of  the  1st  Guard  Division  also 
advances  on  St.  Ail.  The  2d  Guard  Division,  now  arrived 
at  Habonville,  will  advance.  The  Xllth  Corps  is  approach- 
ing Ste.  Marie,  but  is  not  yet  close  to  it."* 
The  report  from  the  Xllth  Corps  read : 
"Batilly,  18  August  1870,  2:30  P.M.— The  Saxon  Army 
Corps  is  advancing  with  the  24th  Infantry  Division  on  Ste. 
Marie-aux-Chenes,  and  with  the  23d  Infantry  Division  en- 
velops the  French  right  wing  at  Joinville  and  the  woods  sit- 
uated between  there  and  Roncourt. 

Albert." 

The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  arrived  at  Batilly,  had 
observed  the  extension  of  the  hostile  position  north  of  St. 
Privat  to  Roncourt,  and  had  also  observed  its  strength  in 
front,  and  he  had  consequently  taken  his  measures  indepen- 
dently. From  the  location  of  the  commander-in-chief  at 
Habonville  only  the  French  lines  as  far  as  St.  Privat  could 
be  seen.  There,  as  stated,  it  was  believed  the  French  right 
wing  would  be  found.  The  measures  taken  by  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony  were  the  first  intimation  army  head- 
quarters had  that  that  wing  extended  farther  to  the  north. 

The  report  from  the  Xllth  Corps  reached  army  head- 
quarters about  3:30  P.M. 

In  the  meantime  the  fight  around  Ste.  Marie  had  taken 
a  rapid  course ;  the  village  was  soon  taken  by  troops  of  both 
the  corps  engaged. f 

Army  headquarters  received  the  following  short  re- 
port thereof: 

"Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes  has  been  taken,  3 :30  P.M. 
Losses  immaterial.  18-8-70. 

VON  Pape.J 


*This   had   happened   however  by   the   time   the   report   was   re- 
ceived. 

t48th  Infantry  Brigade  and  advance  guard  of  the  Guard  Corps. 
Jvon  Pape  was  commander  of  the  1st  Guard  Infantry  Division. 

—423— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

As  soon  as  this  report  reached  Army  Headquarters, 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  wrote  to  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Saxony : 

"18  August,  3:45  P.M.,  at  Habonville.  I  call  the  at- 
tention of  Your  Royal  Highness  to  the  fact  that  the  only 
connection  of  the  French  field  army  with  Paris  lies  in 
the  Moselle  valley  on  the  left  bank. 

"It  is  therefore  of  the  utmost  importance  for  the  de- 
cision of  the  campaign  that  you  send  cavalry  as  soon  as 
possible  to  thoroughly  destroy  the  telegraph  line  and  rail- 
road from  Metz  to  Thionville  and,  if  possible,  occupy  the 
Moselle  valley. 

Frederick  Charles." 

"P.S.  Everything  goes  well  so  far,  thanks  to  the  Lord." 
The  capture  of  Ste.  Marie  was  a  single  phase,  preced- 
ing the  decision  on  the  hostile  right  wing.*  For  the  pres- 
ent the  artillery  continued  the  battle  there.  The  Saxon 
batteries  appeared  in  a  second  position  north,  of  Ste.  Marie- 
aux-Chenes  and  reopened  fire  there. f 

The  long  artillery  line  of  the  Guard  Corps,  by  that 
time  reinforced  to  72  pieces, J  advanced  at  4:00  P.M.  from 
its  position  at  Habonville — St.  Ail  towards  St.  Privat-la- 
Montagne.  In  a  heavy  cannonade  the  hostile  batteries  suc- 
cumbed after  a  short  time.  The  French  artillery  was  not 
able  to  hold  its  position  either  opposite  the  Guard  or  the 
IXth  Corps.  Between  4:00  and  5:00  P.M.  the  hostile  artil- 
lery was  silent  along  the  entire  line  from  St.  Privat  to  Mon- 
tigny-la-Grange.§ 


*At  11:30  A.M.  Ste.  Marie  had  been  found  unoccupied  by  a  staff 
office!'  from  Xllth  Army  Corps  headquarters.  Shortly  thereafter  the 
6th  French  Corps  sent  the  94th  Regiment  of  the  line  to  that  point. 

t66  guns  went  into  position  there,  6  others  also  participated  in 
the  action  there  temporarily. 

JFive  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery,  4  of  the  1st  Guard  Infantry 
Division,  3  of  the  2d  Guard  Infantry  Division.  2  of  the  Guard 
Cavalry  Division  arrived  later,  so  that  then  84  pieces  were  in  action. 

§As  has  been  stated,  the  extreme  right  of  the  French  artillery 
line  that  was  then  still  in  action  at  Roncourt  could  not  be  seen  from 
the  position  of  Second  Army  Headquarters. 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  decisive  hours  of  the  battle  appeared  to  have 
arrived  and  a  general  attack  seemed  to  be  well  prepared. 

Corresponding  to  the  intentions  of  His  Majesty  the 
King,  the  commanding  general  of  the  Guard  Corps,  Prince 
August  of  Wiirttemberg,  had  halted  with  a  further  in- 
fantry attack  after  having  taken  Ste.  Marie.  The  envelop- 
ment of  the  hostile  right  wing  by  the  Xllth  Army  Corps 
was  to  first  become  effective.  Now,  however,  he  changed  his 
estimate  of  the  situation  very  decidedly. 

The  Xllth  Army  Corps  had  not  only  learned  through 
its  reconnaissance  that  the  extension  of  the  hostile  position 
reached  to  north  of  Roncourt,  but  it  had  even  been  re- 
ported* that  Montois-la-Montagne  was  also  occupied  by 
the  French.  Consequently  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony 
reinforced  the  23d  Infantry  Division  which  enveloped  the 
French  right  wing  with  an  infantry  brigade  and  the  avail- 
able cavalry. t  If  that  envelopment  was  to  be  made  as  un- 
observed by  the  enemy  as  possible  and  with  assured  ex- 
pectation of  success,  it  had  to  be  made  under  protection  of 
the  steep  ridge  west  of  Montois,  in  the  Orne  valley,  passing 
Joeuf .  By  this  route,  H.R.H.  Prince  George  of  Saxony  pro- 
ceeded with  the  23d  Infantry  Division,  and  the  above  men- 
tioned reenforcements. 

Thus,  it  of  course  took  a  longer  time  than  had'  been 
assumed  before  the  envelopment  could  become  effective. 
About  at  5:00  P.M.,  that  is,  after  the  fire  of  the  hostile 
batteries  between  St.  Privat  and  Amanvillers  had  already 
been  silenced,  the  enveloping  columns  of  the  Xllth  Army 
Corps  found  themselves  with  their  leading  elements  in  line 
with  Hautmecourt.J 


*By  cavalry  patrols  of  the  Guard  Corps. 

fThe  48th  Infantry  Brigade  and  the  2d  Cavalry  Regiment  of  the 
24th  Infantry  Division,  Guard  and  3d  Cavalry  Regiment  with  the 
1st  Horse  Battery  of  the  12th  Cavalry  Division.  The  commander  of 
the  23d  Infantry  Division  (Prince  George  of  Saxony)  assigned  that 
road  to  the  reinforcements  sent  him. 

JThe  different  units  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  were  at  5:30  P.M. 
at  the  following  points: 

1.  The  47th  Infantry  Brigade,  which  formed  the  pivot  of  the 
movement,  at  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes.  After  the  capture  of  that 
place  this  brigade  had  pushed  to  beyond  the  place  but  had  then  to 
be  taken  back. 

—425— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Three  hours  could  yet  be  counted  on  for  the  action  until 
darkness  set  in.  It  therefore  became  questionable  if  it 
would  still  be  possible  to  carry  out  the  intended  combined 
attack.  Any  attack  commencing  too  late  might  eas- 
ily be  without  success.  The  approach  of  darkness  would 
undoubtedly  increase  the  defender's  energy,  and  it  precluded 
any  pursuit.  The  silence  of  the  hostile  batteries  appeared 
to  indicate  a  most  favorable  opportunity  for  the  attack;  in 
an  hour  and  a  half  to  two  hours  the  situation  could  easily  be 
an  entirely  different  one.  The  condition  of  the  battle  on 
the  other  portions  of  the  battlefield  made  it  very  desirable 
to  commence  the  attack  against  the  hostile  right  wing. 
Troops  could  be  seen  moving  on  the  heights  of  St.  Privat. 
It  appeared  as  if  new  masses  were  marching  to  the  vicinity 
of  Amanvillers — Montigny-la-Grange.  And  still  the  com- 
mander-in-chief had  to  send  the  3d  Guard  Infantry  Bri- 
gade* to  the  support  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps,  which  bri- 
gade he  had  held  at  his  disposal  for  special  purposes.  And 
the  corps  artillery  of  the  Hid  Corps  was  already  supporting 
the  battle  there,  by  orders  of  the  Prince.  It  had  gone  into 
position  between  Vemeville  and  the  Bois  des  Genivaux.  But 
in  spite  of  all  this  the  situation  was  precarious. 

But  there  was  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  interference 
of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  would  become  effective  in  the 
course  of  the  attack  against  St.  Privat,  even  if  not  at  the 
opening  of  that  attack.  Therefore  in  executing  an  attack 
now  all  ready  on  St.  Privat,  participation  of  the  Xllth  Corps 
was  assuredly  reckoned  with. 

2.  The  45th  Infantry  Brigade  was  in  the  woods  west  of  Roncourt, 
engaged  against  the  French  advance  troops  of  the  right  wing,  and 
also  in  rear  of  those  woods. 

3.  The  48th  Infantry  Brigade  and  the  available  cavalry  (13 
squadrons)  and  four  batteries  on  the  march  to  Montois,  at  that  time 
their  leading  elements  were  south  of  Hautmecourt. 

4.  The  46th  Infantry  Brigade  with  one  battery  marching  from 
Moineville  to  Coinville. 

5.  The  corps  artillery,  reinforced  by  the  2d  Foot  battalion  (11 
batteries)  under  protection  of  one  squadron  north  of  Ste.  Marie  in 
action   against    Roncourt. 

6.  1  battalion,   10  squadrons  detached  on  different  duties. 
*7  battalions,  1  pioneer  company,  1  battery. 


-426- 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  commanding  general  of  the  Guard  Corps  decided 
to  attack  St.  Privat,  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  gave  his 
consent. 

At  that  time  the  Prince  could  not  see  what  forced  the 
Xllth  Army  Corps  to  n?ake  such  an  extended  turn.  The  Sax- 
on batteries  were  in  their  positions  north  of  Ste.  Marie- 
aux-Chenes,  without  army  headquarters  being  able  to  dis- 
cern the  target  they  fired  on.*  It  almost  appeared  as 
if  the  corps  had  become  engaged  with  a  new  enemy  ap- 
pearing on  its  left  flank,  who  prevented  it  from  getting  to 
the  enemy's  right  flank. 

However,  His  Royal  Highness  held  the  opinion  that  the 
battle  \vould  have  to  be  decided  in  any  case  on  August  18. 
It  appeared  impossible,  after  such  enormous  sacrifices, 
as  had  been  bought,  to  delay  the  decision  till  the  fol- 
lowing day.  If  we  left  the  enemy  in  his  positions  this 
evening,  he  would  have  had  it  in  his  power  to  get  to  under- 
neath the  guns  of  Metz  by  a  very  short  march  during  the 
night.  In  that  fortress  was  an  army  that  was  almost  in- 
tact and  that  could  greatly  increase  the  difficulties  of  the 
German  leadership. 

Regard  of  our  own  troops  came  also  into  the  fore- 
ground. The  series  of  bloody  battles  commenced  on  Au- 
gust 14th,  simply  had  to  come  to  an  end. 

About  5:30  P.M.  the  Guard  Corps  started  the  attack 
on  St.  Privat-la-Montagne  with  the  1st  Guard  Infantry 
Division  across  the  Ste.  Marie — St.  Privat  road,  with  the 
4th  Guard  Infantry  Brigadef  from  the  vicinity  of  Habon- 
ville.  The  village,  situated  on  a  bare  hill  and  composed 
of  large  buildings,  formed  the  attack  objective  for  the  ad- 
vancing masses. 


*These  were  the  66  Saxon  guns  which  fired  on  Roncourt  and 
from  their  right  wing  also  on   St.   Privat. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Saxon  artillery  (11  batteries)  ad- 
vanced at  that  time  by  echelons  toward  Roncourt,  a  movement  which, 
under  continuous  fire,  could  not  be  seen  from  Habonville.  5  bat- 
teries of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  participated  in  the  envelopment. 

fThe  4th  Guard  Infantry  Brigade  started  about  fifteen  min- 
utes earlier  than  the  1st  Guard  Infantry  Division. 


—427— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Under  a  murderous  fire  the  battalions  ascended  the 
gradual  slope  up  the  height,  which  fell  like  a  glacis  down 
toward  the  line  Ste.  Marie — St.  Ail  and  Habonville.  Only 
here  and  there  a  few  depressions  in  the  terrain  offered  some 
minor  protection. 

The  closer  the  position  was  approached  the  plainer  its 
great  strength  was  seen.  In  regard  to  utilizing  the  fire 
effect,  the  enemy  was  in  a  situation  that  could  not  have 
been  more  favorable  in  any  campaign.  He  had  arranged 
his  position  in  haste  and  with  the  usual  adeptness  that  he 
had  showed  throughout  the  last  campaign.  The  walls  were 
loop-holed  and  the  ridge  covered  with  trenches.  And  the 
defending  troops  were  found  to  be  far  less  shaken  than 
had  been  assumed.  The  preparatory  fire  of  the  Guard  bat- 
teries had  taken  the  French  batteries  for  their  objective 
and  that  artillery  duel  had  taken  the  entire  attention  of 
our  batteries.  The  village  of  St.  Privat  itself  and  its  de- 
fenders had  suffered  but  little  from  that  artillery  fire.  The 
garrison  was  still  in  its  positions  with  fresh  forces. 

The  losses  of  the  bravely  attacking  Guards  soon  be- 
came enormous.  The  roads  the  attackers  took  were  marked 
by  numerous  dead  and  wounded. 

The  attack  became  bloodier  and  more  dangerous,  until 
it  finally  came  to  a  halt.  But  with  the  excellent  discipline 
inherent  in  these  troops,  it  became  possible  to  hold  them 
opposite  the  enemy. 

Thus  the  way  was  shortened  for  the  next  shock. 

During  this  bloody  fighting  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  con- 
tinued its  route.  After  very  heavy  marching  its  left 
(the  48th  Infantry  Brigade)  acended  the  ridge  at  Mon- 
tois-la-Montagne  at  about  6:00  P.M.  This  village  was 
found  to  be  free  of  the  enemy.*  Now  started  the  envelop- 
ing attack  on  Roncourt. 

During  the  course  of  the  envelopment  the  45th  In- 
fantry Brigade,   in  the  front  line,   had  driven  hostile  ad- 


*One  battalion  of  the  23d  Infantry  Division  posted  at  the  north- 
east corner  of  the  woods  between  Auboue  and  Montois  had  conducted 
a  firefight  at  long  range  with  French  troops  in  Montagne  between 
5:00  and   6:00   P.M. 

—428— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

vanced  troops  from  the  woods  between  Auboue  and  Ron- 
court  and  awaited  the  appearance  of  the  48th  Infantry 
Brigade  at  Montois.  It  now  also  marched  out  into  the 
open  and  pushed  back  in  a  continuous  advance  the  hostile 
skirmish  lines  that  were  in  front  of  Roncourt.  In  the  vil- 
lage itself,  where  the  leading  elements  of  both  brigades 
met,  no  fighting  ensued.*  The  fire  of  the  artillery  ad- 
vancing simultaneously  with  the  infantry  had  already  had 
such  an  effect  on  the  enemy's  troops  as  to  cause  them  to 
leave  the  village.  Shortly  before  6:30  P.M.  the  village 
was  occupied  by  the  Xllth  Corps  which  now  deployed  strong 
forces  from  the  north  against  St.  Privat.f  The  moment 
for  the  decision  had  arrived. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  issued  instructions  to 
the  Xth  Army  Corps,  whose  commanding  general  had  ar- 
rived at  Habonville  between  4 :45  and  5  :00  P.M.  to  receive 
verbal  orders,  to  support  the  advance- of  the  Guard  Corps. 

The  Xth  Army  Corps  now  started  from  Batilly  towards 
St.  Ail  and  first  sent  the  horse  batteries  of  its  corps  artil- 
lery to  the  first  support  of  the  Guard  Corps.  The  com- 
bined attack  of  portions  of  all  three  corps  of  the  German 
left  wing  on  St.  Privat  was  now  carried  out,  materially  pre- 
pared by  the  earlier  advance  of  the  Guard  Corps. $ 

The  artillery  of  the  Guard  Corps,  that  had,  as  narrated, 
been  entirely  employed  up  to  the  first  charge  in  fight- 
ing the  hostile  batteries,  now  directed  its  full  activity 
against  St.  Privat. 

From  the  place  where  the  commander-in-chief  was 
it  could  be  plainly  seen  that  the  4th  Guard  Infantry  Bri- 


*The  45th  and  48th  Infantry  Brigades  and  the  entire  artillery 
approached  the  village  to  within  1200  paces. 

fEven  before  reaching  the  ridge  of  Roncourt,  single  infantry 
regiments  had  executed  the  turn  to  the  right  and  as  Roncourt  was 
being  attacked,  advanced  at  the  same  time,  independently  against  St. 
Privat. 

{The  attack  of  the  Guard  had  simultaneously  the  effect  on  the 
attack  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  in  that  it  induced  the  French  6th 
Corps,  Canrobert,  in  position  on  the  French  right,  to  concentrate 
its  forces  at  St.  Privat  for  defense,  and  to  thereby  weaken  its  troops 
at  Roncourt  and  thus  it  materially  facilitated  the  attack  of  the 
Xllth  Corps  in  its  decisive  chai'ge  against  the  enemy's  flank. 

—429— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

gade  had  started  another  attack.  On  the  ridge  south  of  the 
village  runs  a  road  fringed  on  one  side  with  a  high  hedge. 
Viewed  from  Habonville,  and  judging  the  terrain  from 
the  map,  this  hedge  gives  the  impression  as  if  we  had  the 
edge  of  the  woods  of  the  high  left  edge  of  the  Moselle  val- 
ley in  our  front.  There  the  charging  battalions  now  dis- 
appeared, while  it  was  at  the  same  time  seen  that  the  right 
wing  of  the  1st  Guard  Infantry  Division  also  commenced 
to  ascend  the  hill  immediately  at  the  village.  Then  a  dense 
powder  smoke  hid  the  battle  scene.  But  the  fire  of  a  strong 
artillery  line  between  Roncourt  and  St.  Privat  shortly  there- 
after indicated  the  arrival  and  interference  of  the  Xllth 
Army  Corps, 

The  victory  appeared  to  have  been  gained  there.  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  now  again  considered  the  extension  of 
the  envelopment  of  the  hostile  right  wing  as  far  as  the  Mo- 
selle valley. 

At  6:40  P.M.  he  wrote  to  the  Crown  Prince  of  Sax- 
ony from  the  Bois  de  la  Cusse : 

"In  spite  of  the  separate  charges  of  the  hostile  in- 
fantry* it  appears  the  battle  has  been  gained.  It  is  of 
the  utmost  importance,  in  spite  of  the  great  fatigue  of  the 
troops,  to  still  advance  today  with  at  least  one  infantry 
brigade  of  the  Xllth  Corps  to  Woippy  and  there  thoroughly 
interrupt  the  telegraph  and  railroad  line. 

Frederick  Charles." 

If  the  occupation  of  Woippy  could  have  been  accom- 
plished it  would  have  been  of  the  greatest  importance,  as 
this  would  have  greatly  endangered  the  retreat  of  the 
French  troops  fighting  on  the  heights  of  Amanvillers.  The 
charge  against  and  capture  of  one  of  the  hills  crowned  by 
a  hedge  south  of  St,  Privat  had  been  an  act  preceding 
the  capture  of  the  village. 

The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  reported  to  the  comman- 
der-in-chief : 


*These   charges  took   place   especially   at   the   Bois   de   la    Cusse 
opposite  the  IXth  Army  Corps. 

—430— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

"Sent  the  18th,  7:10  P.M.  The  cavalry  already  has 
received  orders  to  interrupt  the  railroad  at  Hagondange  and 
Richemont.  In  addition,  cavalry  and  pioneers  on  wagons 
have  been  sent  for  that  same  purpose  via  Briey.* 

"As  St.  Privat  has  not  yet  been  taken  and  as  conse- 
quently the  road  is  not  yet  clear,  the  brigade  will  be  sent 
by  way  of  Roncourt  and  Marange  to  Mezieres. 

Albert, 
Crown  Prince,  General  of  Infantry.'''\ 

In  the  meantime  it  had  become  dark  and  with  darkness 
the  moment  for  using  the  last  reserves  for  the  decision. 

Already  toward  7:00  P.M.  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
had  offered  one  infantry  brigade  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps 
to  General  von  Manstein  as  support.  At  7:10  P.M.  he  per- 
mitted the  commanding  general  of  that  corps,  on  his  re- 
peated requests,  to  participate  with  the  other  three  of  his 
brigades  in  the  battle  on  the  right  of  the  Bois  de  la  Cusse. 

At  7:15  P.M.  he  sent  orders  to  the  commanding  gen- 
eral of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  to  advance  according  to  his 
own  views,  the  Prince  adding  that  he  considered  it  best  if 
one  division  went  into  action  between  the  Guard  and  the 
Xllth  Corps,  the  other  proceeding  as  reserve  to  in  rear  of 
the  left  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps. 

The  Xth  Army  Corps  had  in  the  meantime  gotten 
ahead  of  these  orders  by  participating  in  the  fight  around 
St.  Privat. 


*At  about  4:00  P.M.  two  squadrons  of  the  12th  Cavalry  Division 
started  from  Auboue,  following  the  Orne  valley,  towards  Richemont 
and  the  R.R.  station  at  Uckange,  about  four  miles  south  of  Thionville, 
and  there  late  in  the  evening  destroyed  the  Metz — Thionville  railroad 
without  having  seen  anything  of  the  enemy  during  the  march.  Many 
obstacles  (felled  trees)  delayed  the  march  and  made  the  advance 
difficult;  the  troops  having  to  dismount  and  walk  in  single  file.  The 
pioneer  detachment  sent  between  4:00  and  5:00  P.M.  to  Mercy-le-Bas 
reached  the  Thionville — Longuyon  railroad  there  at  2:30  in  the  morn- 
ing after  a  march  of  moi'e  than  17  miles.  Destruction  was  has- 
tened as  signals  indicated  the  near  approach  of  a  military  train.  All 
villages  passed  on  the  march  were  free  of  the  enemy.  Details  con- 
cerning these  expeditions  became  known  to  army  headquarters  of 
course  only  on  the  next  day.     See  farther  below. 

fAs  a  matter  of  fact  the  Xllth  Corps  could  not  start  that  brigade 
till  early  in  the  morning  of  August  19th. 

—431— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

In  addition,  at  6:30  P.M.,  the  lid  Army  Corps  had  re- 
ported that  its  3d  Infantry  Division  had  been  ready  for  par- 
ticipation since  4:00  P.M.  and  its  4th  Division  since  6:00 
P.M.,  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  directed  the  corps 
commander  to  report  for  orders  direct  to  General  Headquar- 
ters. Now,  at  7 :20  P.M.  the  army  commander  left  it  to  the 
discretion  of  the  corps  commander  as  to  also  participating 
in  the  attack  according  to  his  views,  reporting  the  fact  to 
General  Headquarters. 

By  this  time  events  had  started  also  in  the  lid  Army 
Corps. 

By  this  time  the  army  commander  had  turned  his  at- 
tention to  the  IXth  Corps  engaged  in  the  center,  where  the 
battle  raged  variably,  and  had  proceeded  to  the  Bois  de  la 
Cusse.  And  at  about  the  same  time  the  last  report  from  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  was  dated,  he  returned  to  his  prior 
standpoint  at  Habonville.  The  powder  smoke  still  hid  the 
hill  of  St.  Privat.  But  the  decisive  victory  was  soon  marked 
by  the  right  turn  of  the  long  artillery  line  of  the  Guard 
Corps  and  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps, 
alongside  which  Saxon  batteries  then  appeared  between 
St.  Privat  and  the  woods.  The  flash  of  some  shots  gave 
a  clear  indication  of  the  firing  line  which  now  ran  almost 
at  a  right  angle  to  the  previous  line  of  batteries.  The  fire 
was  directed  against  the  flank  of  the  French  center  at  Aman- 
villers. 

The  French  right  wing  had  not  been  able  to  with- 
stand this  concentric  attack.  After  a  bloody  battle  the 
Guard  and  the  Xllth  Corps  entered  St.  Privat  from  the 
west,  north  and  south  sides.  In  addition  to  the  corps  artil- 
lery of  the  Xth  Corps  also  the  20th  Infantry  Division  of 
that  corps  had  followed  the  Guard  Corps  in  support  and  por- 
tions of  that  division  participated  in  the  fighting  in  the 
village.  Between  7 :30  and  8 :00  P.M.  the  last  resistance 
in  the  houses  and  yards  was  overcome.  The  columns  of  the 
enemy  fled  towards  Metz  pursued  by  the  fire  of  the  Ger- 


—432— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

man  batteries.*  The  left  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corpsf 
had  in  the  meantime  succeeded  in  taking  the  edge  of  the 
woods  and  also  the  quarry  of  Jaumont  and  pursued  the 
enemy  to  Bronvaux.  But  the  enemy  held  the  edge  of  the 
forest  square  across  the  St.  Privat — Saulny  road  with 
strong  forces.  French  batteries  fired  from  here  long  after 
dark. 

When  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  firmly  convinced 
from  the  movements  of  the  artillery  that  the  envelopment 
and  destruction  of  the  hostile  right  wing  was  an  accom- 
plished fact,  he  returned  to  the  IXth  Army  Corps  once 
more. 

If  success  could  now  be  attained  by  overthrowing  the 
center  of  the  enemy  at  Amanvillers,  the  results  of  the  day 
would  be  enormous  in  spite  of  the  approaching  darkness. 

The  start  of  the  Guard  Corps  against  St.  Privat  had 
been  the  signal  for  the  IXth  Corps  to  start  its  offensive.  At 
that  time,  as  has  been  stated,  the  French  artillery  was  al- 
most completely  silenced,  even  opposite  the  IXth  Army 
Corps.  The  corps  commander  reported  this  fact  to  the  army 
commander  and  also  reported  that  the  battle  was  going  well 
and  that  ground  was  being  gained. J  In  conjunction  with  the 
3d  Guard  Infantry  Brigade  attached  to  General  von  Man- 
stein's  corps,  the  corps  now  started  to  charge  the  heights 
of  Amanvillers.  But  the  enemy  offered  a  stubborn  resis- 
tance there  and  even  carried  on  counter-attacks.  At  the 
same  time  when  Prince  Frederick  Charles  returned  for  the 
second  time  to  the  battlefield  of  the  IXth  Corps,  the  rifle 
fire  was  very  heavy.  Only  when  it  was  completely  dark 
were  the  folds  in  the  terrain  west  of  Amanvillers  taken  by 
a  bloody  charge.  On  the  other  hand,  at  the  Bois  de  Geni- 
vaux  the  right  wing  of  the  IXth  Corps  did  not  succeea  in 
completely  defeating  the  enemy.     There  the  fight  raged  at 


*The  batteries  of  the  19th  Infantry  Division  also  found  oppor- 
tunity here  to  participate  in  the  fight. 

fBattalions  of  the  48th  Infantry  Brigade. 

{Delivered  by  a  staff  officer  of  army  headquarters  who  just 
then  was  at  IXth  Corps  headquarters. 


—433— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

a  broad  clearing  in  front  of  Chantrenne.  Here  also  the 
enemy  executed  counter-attacks,  but  each  one  of  them  was 
defeated. 

As  stated,  the  fight  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  had  been 
supported  by  the  artillery  of  the  Illd  Army  Corps.* 

After  he  had  received  permission  to  insert  the  infantry 
of  his  corps  in  support.  General  von  Alvensleben  was  about 
to  bring  forward  the  rest  of  his  corps,  to  bring  the  offen- 
sive to  a  decision  with  as  strong  forces  as  possible.  But 
reports  reaching  him  from  his  right  flank  caused  him  to 
change  his  mind.  Farther  to  the  right,  in  front  of  the 
First  Army,  the  battle  had  increased  in  intensity.  The 
reports  received  from  there  by  the  Illd  Corps,  showed  that 
the  enemy  w^as  making  counter-attacks  on  his  left  wing, 
for  instance  at  Moscou — Le  Point  du  Jour,  where  he  di- 
rected his  attack  also  against  the  Bois  des  Genivaux. 
Therefore  General  von  Alvensleben  stopped  the  movement 
his  corps  was  then  starting  in  order  to  save  his  forces  for 
the  defense  against  that  attack,  if  necessary.  Before  the- 
situation  cleared  up,  the  short  time  remaining  before  dark- 
ness passed,  and  the  battle  ended  also  in  the  center. 

On  the  right  wing  of  the  German  battle  front,  where 
the  First  Army  fought  since  noon  against  the  French 
positions  at  Le  Point  du  Jour,  Moscou  and  Leipzic,  the  lid 
Corps  had  now  also  entered  the  battle. 

As  it  had  reported,  this  corps  reached  Rezonville  in 
the  afternoon  after  a  march  of  twenty  miles  and  had  there 
received  orders  direct  from  General  Headquarters  to  push 
forward  as  far  as  Gravelotte  and  there  support  the  First 
Army.  At  the  start  a  portion  of  its  artillery  became  en- 
gaged there;  at  the  fall  of  dusk  the  corps  started  its  in- 
fantry attack  against  the  heights  of  Point  du  Jour,  after 
having  received  permission  from  General  Headquarters. 
Thus,  the  action  of  this  corps  falls  within  the  domain  of 
events  of  the  First  Army. 


*The  corps  artillery  of  the  Hid  Corps,  first  brought  forward,  had 
been  increased  in  the  course  of  the  battle  to  ten  batteries. 


-434 


AMONTAGNE, 
gade  at  7  00P.M. 


BATTLE  AT  GRAVELOTTL-ST  PRIVAT  LAMONTAGNE 

on  Ausust  18,1870. 
Situation  of  fhe  IX Corps  ond  the  3 '^'^  Guard  Infantry  Drigade  at  700P.M. 


LEGEND: 

oil     J  rrf  Guar  a  InTontry  brigade 
A    ;X  Corpa 
C±)  ///   Corps 

■^     Front,  French  Line 


Scale    1:25000 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  participation  of  the  lid  Army  Corps  had  given 
the  battle  there  increased  intensity  in  the  last  moments, 
which  was  perceived  by  the  Illd  Army  Corps,  and  which 
increased  in  that  corps  the  expectation  of  a  hostile  offen- 
sive and  consequently  led  to  the  change  of  decision  arrived 
at. 

The  battle  died  down  in  the  Second  Army  by  8 :30  P.M., 
only  a  few  shots  were  fired  here  and  there.  Dense  dark- 
ness, pierced  only  by  the  glare  of  burning  villages,  reigned 
over  the  battlefield. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  now  issued  the  following 
orders : 

"On  the  battlefield,  8  :30  P.M.,  18  August  1870. 

"The  army  corps  will  bivouac  on  the  terrai'n  they  were 
at  at  the  conclusion  of  the  battle ;  they  will  send  out  infantry 
outposts  which  will  connect  with  neighboring  corps,  and 
must  expect  that  a  desperate  enemy  may  attempt  to  break 
through. 

"Tomorrow  morning  at  5  o'clock,  the  chiefs  of  staff  of 
all  five  corps  will  be  in  Caulre  on  the  road  to  report  to  the 
commander-in-chief  where  their  corps  are  and  to  receive 
further  orders. 

"The  attention  of  the  Xllth  Corps  is  again  called  to  the 
importance  of  reaching  Woippy. 

"Army  headquarters  goes  to  Doncourt  for  the  night. 

Frederick  Charles." 

After  having  issued  these  orders,  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  and  his  staff  rode  to  Doncourt. 

The  losses  of  the  Second  Army  in  the  battle  of  Au- 
gust 18th  amounted  to  818  oflficers  and  19,759  men  killed, 
wounded  and  missing  (1  oflficer,  939  men).  Only  a  small 
portion  of  the  latter  had  been  taken  prisoners.  Of  this 
loss  the  Second  Army  had  617  officers  and  15,711  men — 
the  lid  Army  Corps  included,  whose  losses  on  the  battle- 
field of  the  First  Army  were  45  oflflcers  and  1311  men.  The 
Guard  lost  about  one-half  of  the  total,  288  ofllicers  and  7831 
men.     2  guns  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  had  fallen  into  the 

—435— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

The  participation  of  the  lid  Army  Corps  had  given 
the  battle  there  increased  intensity  in  the  last  moments, 
which  was  perceived  by  the  Hid  Army  Corps,  and  which 
increased  in  that  corps  the  expectation  of  a  hostile  offen- 
sive and  consequently  led  to  the  change  of  decision  arrived 
at. 

The  battle  died  down  in  the  Second  Army  by  8 :30  P.M., 
only  a  few  shots  were  fired  here  and  there.  Dense  dark- 
ness, pierced  only  by  the  glare  of  burning  villages,  reigned 
over  the  battlefield. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  now  issued  the  following 
orders : 

"On  the  battlefield,  8  :30  P.M.,  18  August  1870. 

"The  army  corps  will  bivouac  on  the  terrain  they  were 
at  at  the  conclusion  of  the  battle ;  they  will  send  out  infantry 
outposts  which  will  connect  with  neighboring  corps,  and 
must  expect  that  a  desperate  enemy  may  attempt  to  break 
through. 

"Tomorrow  morning  at  5  o'clock,  the  chiefs  of  staff  of 
all  five  corps  will  be  in  Caulre  on  the  road  to  report  to  the 
commander-in-chief  where  their  corps  are  and  to  receive 
further  orders. 

"The  attention  of  the  Xllth  Corps  is  again  called  to  the 
importance  of  reaching  Woippy. 

"Army  headquarters  goes  to  Doncourt  for  the  night. 

Frederick  Charles." 

After  having  issued  these  orders.  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  and  his  staff  rode  to  Doncourt. 

The  losses  of  the  Second  Army  in  the  battle  of  Au- 
gust 18th  amounted  to  818  officers  and  19,759  men  killed, 
wounded  and  missing  (1  officer,  939  men).  Only  a  small 
portion  of  the  latter  had  been  taken  prisoners.  Of  this 
loss  the  Second  Army  had  617  oflficers  and  15,711  men — 
the  lid  Army  Corps  included,  whose  losses  on  the  battle- 
field of  the  First  Army  were  45  officers  and  1311  men.  The 
Guard  lost  about  one-half  of  the  total,  288  ofllicers  and  7831 
men.     2  guns  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  had  fallen  into  the 

—435— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

hands  of  the  enemy  when  the  artillery  made  its  advance 
on  the  Bois  de  la  Cusse. 

But  a  great  success  had  been  attained  with  these  sac- 
rifices, which  could  be  judged  as  early  as  the  evening  of 
August  18th  from  the  unfavorable  strategical  situation  in 
which  the  hostile  army  found  itself  when  it  was  beaten. 
Concerning  the  estimate  of  the  importance  which  this  vic- 
tory possessed,  we  shall  discuss  this  matter  later. 


The  Situation  as  to  Supplies  and  Communications 
IN  Rear  of  the  Second  Army  at  the  Be- 
ginning OF  THE  Investment  of  Metz 

More  and  more  did  considerations  of  sanitary  con- 
ditions and  the  material  well-being  of  the  investing  troops 
come  into  the  foreground.  Care  had  to  be  taken  that  the 
favorable  tactical  situation  would  not  be  endangered  by  any 
epidemic.  That  chances  thereof  were  good,  has  already 
been  mentioned.  In  the  orders  issued  on  the  2d,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief touched  on  this  matter  in  his  special  orders. 
It  was  directed  first  of  all  that  all  corps  within  their  dis- 
tricts, employ  all  men  off  duty  to  throw  earth  on  the  very 
numerous  graves.  This  matter  appeared  to  be  specially 
important  as  since  the  21st  a  change  in  the  weather 
had  set  in,  which  became  worse  and  worse  by  continuous 
rain,  which  washed  away  the  earth  covering  the  corpses. 
The  use  of  disinfectants,  especially  within  the  villages,  was 
directed  and  arrangements  made  for  a  sufficient  supply. 
The  autumn  was  very  cold  and  steps  had  to  be  taken  to 
protect  the  troops  from  the  influence  of  the  cold  weather 
by  suitable  rations  and  clothing.  Generous  subsistence 
supplies  are  always  the  best  means  against  the  spread  of 
typhus  and  similar  diseases ;  but  it  is  clear  that  at  this  time, 
immediately  after  the  battles,  the  supplies  from  home  could 
be  brought  up  only  in  small  quantities.  A  single  railroad 
line  was  at  the  disposition  of  the  army,  all  roads  w^ere 
completely  filled  with  transports  of  wounded,  all  available 
vehicles  had  to  be  used  for  that  purpose.  The  supplies  in 

—436— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

the  columns  did  not  reach  far ;  the  system  of  requisition 
had  to  help  out  and  the  investment  measures  had  started  to 
regulate  this  matter.  Definite  districts  were  assigned  the 
different  corps.  However,  the  results  attained  soon  proved 
very  unfavorable,  as  can  easily  be  imagined,  if  we  consider 
that  since  August  14th  probably  more  than  400,000  men  of 
both  armies  had  operated  in  the  vicinity  of  Metz.  In  addi- 
tion the  lack  of  drinking  water  was  sorely  felt,  especially 
on  the  plateau  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle.  Orders  had 
been  placed  for  300  Abissynian  pumps,  but  the  arrival  of 
these  could  not  be  counted  on  with  certainty.*  The  troops 
still  saw  themselves  forced  to  bring  their  drinking  water 
from  far  off.  That  the  quality  of  the  water  suffered  ma- 
terially thereby  is  self-evident  and  extensive  police  regula- 
tions had  to  resorted  to  to  avoid  blockades  and  collisions. 
Just  as  important  as  subsistence  became  the  matter 
of  arrangements  for  shelter.  The  tents  captured  from  the 
French  came  in  very  handy  in  many  cases,  but  still  that 
was  only  an  exception.  Huts  constructed  from  branches 
and  straw  were  insufficient  during  the  raw  weather  and 
there  was  no  construction  material  to  build  regular  bar- 
racks; there  was  an  especial  lack  of  roofing  material.  The 
small  supplies  of  cut  boards  found  in  the  village  were  soon 
used  up.f  Thus  many  difficulties  were  encountered  here 
though  the  troops  tried  to  make  makeshifts  out  of  sod  and 
stones  bound  with  slats.  The  nature  of  the  ground  was  very 
unfavorable.  The  rocky  sub-soil  in  the  vicinity  of  Metz  did 
not  permit  water  to  seep  through  and  the  water  remained 
in  the  upper  layer  of  earth.  The  crust  then,  during  the 
continuous  rains,  soon  turned  into  morass  in  the  camps 
which,  after  good  weather  set  in  again,  held  the  dampness 

^September    23d    the    army    had    170    Abissynian    pumps;    dis- 
tributed as  follows: 

lid  Army  Corps 45 

Illd  Army  Corps 42 

Xth  Army  Corps 8 

IXth  Army  Corps 75 

fLater  on  army  headquarters  attempted  to  help  out  in  this  mat- 
ter by  requisitioning  on  the  Lorraine   Government. 


-437— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

for  a  considerable  time.  As  far  as  room  was  found  in  the 
villages,  the  troops  were  of  course  sheltered  there.  Vil- 
lages and  farm  buildings,  however,  were  still  crowded  with 
wounded.     Shelter  was  consequently  very  scant  there. 

The  evacuation  of  the  provisional  field  hospitals  in  the 
district  of  the  battlefields  had  been  energetically  started 
immediately.  For  this  purpose  also  separate  districts  were 
designated  under  special  authorities  and  each  district  re- 
ceived its  own  route  of  evacuation.  Special  places  of  as- 
sembly were  assigned  the  wagon  parks  for  transportation 
to  the  evacuation  points,  Pont-a-Mousson  and  Remilly,  at 
which  places  they  were  instructed  to  hold  a  certain  number 
of  vehicles.  Considering  the  difficulties  of  connection,  especi- 
ally down  into  the  Moselle  valley  and  from  down  there  up, 
considering  the  shortage  and  insufficiency  of  the  wagon 
material  assembled  in  all  haste  at  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  considering  the  extraordinarily  large  number  of 
wounded,  all  these  measures  could  become  effective  only 
after  a  longer  lapse  of  time. 

The  influence  of  the  passivity,  to  which  the  troops 
were  relegated  in  a  certain  way,  was  also  far  from  favor- 
able. Employing  the  men  by  labor  and  fatigue  became  a 
material  requirement  for  maintaining  health.  Shifting  of 
investing  troops  from  large  distances,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  to  be  avoided.  Due  regard  to  the  economic  measures 
demanded  that  troops  be  left  as  long  as  possible  within  a 
district  once  assigned  them.  If  we  interfered  with  their 
arrangements  once  commenced,  it  could  be  foreseen  that 
these  arrangements  would  never  be  completed.  In  the  re- 
lief of  one  unit  by  another,  difference  in  strengths  certainly 
required  new  detailed  dispositions.  Frequent  changes  also 
always  weakens  the  men's  interest  in  the  proper  arrange- 
ment of  shelter  in  the  different  localities. 

After  the  very  material  losses  sustained  in  the  battles 
around  Metz,  the  bringing  up  and  replenishment  of  supplies 
became  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  difficuties  of  com- 
munication with  home,  as  existing  at  that  time,  were  of 
great  disadvantage. 

— 438— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

Information  had  been  received  from  General  Head- 
quarters that  steps  were  being  taken  on  a  large  scale  to  re- 
plenish the  loss  in  officers. 

Army  headquarters  independently  took  the  necessary 
steps  without  delay  to  arrange  for  the  replenishment  of 
animals  from  home.  In  order  to  also  make  use  in  future 
of  the  temporarily  disabled  animals,  a  depot  was  constructed 
in  Pont-a-Mousson  and  one  in  Blenod,  in  which  horses 
could  be  delivered  for  rest  and  cure  and  recuperation  from 
the  entire  army. 

To  properly  estimate  all  these  conditions  it  appears 
well  to  show  what  shape  the  communications  to  the  rear 
of  the  army  had  taken  since  August  15th  and  in  what  con- 
ditions these  were  at  the  commencement  of  the  investment 
of  Metz.  Though  we  can  consider  here  only  the  condi- 
tions of  the  Second  Army  from  the  time  of  August  15th 
to.  19th,  during  which  time  the  First  and  Second  armies 
were  separated,  it  must  nevertheless  be  assumed  that  those 
conditions  were  just  about  the  same  in  the  First  Army. 
The  armies  had  the  same  difficulties  and  had  to  overcome 
the  same  difficulties. 

Much  of  course  had  been  gained  by  opening  the  Saar- 
briicken — Remilly  railroad.  But,  as  the  Rhine — Nahe  rail- 
road connecting  in  rear  is  a  single-track  road  (from  Bin- 
gerbriick  to  Neunkirchen),  the  army  profited  on  the  whole 
only  from  a  single  track  road,  which,  besides  complicating 
conditions,  possessed  but  small  capacity.  The  difficulties 
of  connection  between  the  army  and  that  railroad  line  are 
easily  seen,  when  considering  that  each  and  every  road  was 
covered  with  the  marching  columns  of  the  army.  And  now, 
in  addition,  commenced  the  transportation  of  the  wounded, 
which  completely  took  up  all  available  means.  As  early 
as  August  15th,  foreseeing  such  conditions,  it  had  been  di- 
rected that  all  requisitioned  vehicles  that  became  available 
on  the  arrival  of  the  wagon  parks  and  trains  at  the 
troops,  were  to  be  sent  under  guard  to  Remilly.  There 
they  were  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Lines  of  Com- 
munications authorities,  to  augment  their  means  of  trans- 

—439— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

portation.  However,  it  is  self  evident  that  under  condi- 
tions existing  in  those  days  even  among  the  troops,  this 
measure  could  become  effective  only  gradually.  To  this 
came,  that  the  construction  of  the  connecting  line  from 
Remilly  to  Pont-a-Mousson,  commenced  simultaneously 
(on  August  14th)  and  which  was  to  be  carried  on  energeti- 
cally, fully  required  all  available  vehicles  and  labor  forces, 
as  had  been  directed  by  General  Headquarters. 

.Into  the  midst  of  these  increasing  demands  now  stepped 
the  matter  of  creating  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  the  lines  of 
communications  conditions  of  which  had  to  be  completely 
separated  from  those  of  the  Second  Army.  As  early  as 
August  20th  a  start  was  made  in  creating  a  provisional 
but  completely  independent  Line  of  Communications 
Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  for  which  four 
battalions,  2  squadrons  of  the  Line  of  Communications 
troops  were  detached,  so  that  Headquarters  of  the  Lines  of 
Communications  of  the  Second  Army  kept  only  four  bat- 
talions and  two  squadrons  of  L.  of  C.  troops.  Of  course, 
four  Saxon  Landwehr  battalions  had  been  promised  the 
Second  Army  in  their  stead. 

The  orders  for  the  investment  of  Metz  in  addition  pro- 
vided for  a  detachment  of  1  Landwehr  battalion  and  1 
squadron  of  Nummer's  Division  to  Pont-a-Mousson  as  a 
Line  of  Communications  garrison. 

The  wagon  parks  were  divided  between  the  two  Lines 
of  Communications  Headquarters  and  thus  the  necessary 
and  consequent  decrease  of  means  of  transportation  coin- 
cided momentarily  with  the  increase  in  the  demand  made 
on  the  same.  As  only  a  very  small  number  of  troops  were 
then  at  the  disposal  of  the  Lines  of  Communications  head- 
quarters, it  was  deprived  thereby  of  the  possibility  of  gain- 
ing sufficient  means  of  transportation  by  requisitions. 
Though  the  supply  of  the  army  was  not  seriously  endan- 
gered by  these  conditions,  this  was  entirely  due  to  the  ex- 
traordinary activity  of  all  officials. 

The  troops,  on  their  part,  did  everything  possible  to 
help  out  these  bad  conditions,  by  forming,  from  vehicles 

—440— 


Operations  Second  German  Army 

that  had  become  superfluous  and  from  army  corps  parks, 
sections  which  travelled  regularly  between  the  army  and 
the  principal  depot  established  on  the  railroad.  Those  por- 
tions of  the  First  Army  that  were  east  of  Metz  in  many 
instances  arranged  direct  communication  with  Saarlouis. 
They  had  the  longer  road  to  go  there,  but  that  road  was  not 
then  taken  up  by  other  troops.  With  the  separation  of 
the  new  operations  starting  westward  and  against  the  army 
invested  in  Metz,  it  resulted  that  the  First  and  the  Second 
Army  were  confined  completely  to  the  Saarbriicken — Cour- 
celles  railroad,  and  the  Third  Army  and  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse  to  the  Weissembourg  —  Vendenheim  —  Luneville  — 
— Nancy — Frouard  railroad,*  which  made  it  necessary 
to  transfer  the  location  of  the  General  Headquarters  of 
the  Lines  of  Communications  to  Remilly.  It  had  of  course 
been  ascertained  that  the  railroad  depot  there  was  less 
suited  for  that  purpose,  because  in  Remilly,  which  was  a 
minor  railroad  station  without  importance,  there  were  but 
few  buildings  near  the  station  suitable  for  depots  and  be- 
cause there  was  a  lack  of  sidings.  But  no  change  could 
be  made,  as  the  Courcelles  station  had  to  be  left  to  the 
First  Army  and  as  Faulquemont,  where  conditions  were 
far  more  favorable,  was  too  far  from  the  investing  army. 
As  a  line  of  communications  within  the  district  in  which 
both  armies  in  front  of  Metz  found  themselves,  the  Cour- 
celles— Ars-sur-Moselle  road  was  first  assigned  to  the  First 
Army  and  the  road  between  Remilly,  Corny  and  Gorze  to 
the  Second  Army.  Subsequently  all  corps  stationed  on 
the  north  side  of  Metz  utilized  the  bridge  at  Hauconcourt 
and  the  road  via  Ennery,  Vigy  and  Colligny  for  traflSc  with 
Remilly. 

The  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  also  was  felt 
in  the  matter  of  telegraphic  communication,  as  the  detach- 
ment up  to  then  attached  to  army  headquarters  was  now  as- 
signed to  the  Army  of  the  Meuse. 


*The   opening    of    this   railroad    as    a    matter    of   fact   occurred 
on  August  23d. 


-441— 


Campaign  of  1870-71 

Until  the  arrival  of  the  newly  organized  5th  Telegraph 
detachment  (battalion)  only  the  telegraph  battalion  of  the 
First  Army  remained  in  front  of  Metz.  But,  as  stated, 
this  fact  did  not  interfere  with  the  rapid  construction  of 
necessary  lines. 


-442— 


Military  Monographs 

BY  THE  GREAT  GENERAL  STAFF 
No.  18 


The  Command  of  the  Third  Army  Corps  at  Spich- 
eren  and  Vionville 

Berlin,  1895 


Translated  by 

Harry  Bell, 

Master  Signal  Electrician, 
Army  Service   Schools 


Fort  Leavenworth,   Kansas 
March,   1912 


Military  Monographs 

BY  THE  GREAT  GENERAL  STAFF 

No.  18 


The  Command  of  the  Third  Army  Corps  at  Spich- 
eren  and  Vionville 

Berlin,  1895 


Translated   by 

Harry  Bell, 

Master  Signal  Electrician, 
Army  Service  Schools 


Fort  Leiavenworth,   Kansas 
March,   1912 


EXTRACT 

Headquarters,  Third  Army  Corps,  at  the 
Battle  of  Vionville— Mars-Ia-Tour 

At  Noon,  August  15th,  Prince  Frederick  Charles 

Seeks  Permission  of  Royal  Headquarters  for 

Crossing  the  Moselle  With  the  Larger 

Part  of  His  Forces  on  August  16th 

The  following  information  had  been  received  at  Sec- 
ond Army  Headquarters  by  noon,  August  15th: 

1.  A  report  of  the  2d  Dragoon  Regiment  (belonging  to  the  6th 
Infantry  Division)  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  had  drawn  his  forces 
in  part  from  Metz  and  that  for  the  past  two  days  strong  move- 
ments of  troops  were  taking  place  toward  Paris. 

2.  Report  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division:  "The  field  fortifications 
south  of  Metz  have  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy;  a  hostile  camp 
at  Longville  and  Moulins-les-Metz  (southwest  of  Metz  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river — the  6th  Cavalry  Division  still  being  on  the  right 
bank)  was  bombarded  with  40  shells,  upon  which  the  enemy  fled 
from  the  camp  in  all  haste." 

3.  From  the  5th  Cavalry  Division:  "Early  this  morning  one 
squadron  went  from  Chambley  to  Mars-la-Tour,  received  infantry 
fire  from  Rezonville,  and  detached  one  platoon  toward  Bruville.  On 
its  return  it  found  Mars-la-Tour  occupied,  which  had  not  been  the 
case  on  its  advance.  Hostile  infantry  detachments,  covered  by  cav- 
alry, were  perceived  still  on  the  Metz-Etain  road.  Corny  found  oc- 
cupied early  this  morning.  Our  patrols  encountered  hostile  outposts 
at  Gravelotte;  much  noise  of  moving  wagons  on  the  road  to  Verdun, 
especially  at  night." 

This  report  led  Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  the  con- 
viction that  the  hostile  army  was  evacuating  Metz,  and  he 
therefore  asked  permission  by  wire  from  Royal  Headquar- 
ters to  have  the  Illd,  Xllth,  Guard  and  IVth  Army  Corps 
cross  the  Moselle  on  the  16th,  the  IXth  and  lid  Army  Corps 
to  close  up  on  them. 

This  request  crossed  on  its  way  an  order  from  Royal 
Headquarters,  in  which  order  dispositions  were  made  en- 
tirely in  accordance  with  Prince  Frederick  William's  inten- 
tions. 


-445- 


Military  Monographs 

Early  on  August  15th  His  Majesty  the  King  had  pro- 
ceeded with  his  staff  to  the  battlefields  of  the  14th.  The  im- 
pression was  soon  gained  that  no  hostile  troops  were  in 
force  east  of  Metz.  Large  clouds  of  dust  were  seen  rising 
at  different  points  beyond  the  fortress,  which  indicated,  or 
seemed  to  indicate,  that  the  French  were  marching  off 
toward  the  west.  In  consequence  of  this  a  wire  was  sent 
from  the  hill  at  Flavigny  at  11:00  a.m.  to  Headquarters 
Second  Army  that  it  was  very  probable  that  the  French 
were  marching  in  full  retreat  toward  Verdun.  All  three 
army  corps  of  the  right  wing  (Hd,  IXth  and  Xllth)  were 
now  placed  at  the  complete  disposition  of  the  Second- Army. 

The  IIId  Army  Corps  Receives  Permission  to  Con- 
tinue THE  March  and  Crosses  the  Moselle  Dur- 
ing the  Night  of  August  15-16th. 

Based  on  the  above  mentioned  information  and  on  the 
urgent  request  of  the  lid  Army  Corps,  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  issued  orders  at  2:00  p.m.  in  Pont-a-Mousson  di- 
recting that  army  corps  to  resume  its  advance. 

The  army  corps  was  to  start  on  the  15th  in  order 
to  locate  and  prepare  a  crossing  over  the  Moselle,  in  order 
to  reach  the  main  Metz-Verdun  road  at  Mars-la-Tour  on 
the  following  day  via  the  road  through  Gorze. 

Concerning  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  the  orders  contained 
a  note  that  that  corps,  with  its  headquarters  and  one  in- 
fantry division,  was  now  in  Thiaucourt  and  would  advance 
on  the  16th  toward  Saint  Hilaire,  that  the  5th  Cavalry 
corps  commander  to  have  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  now 
march  behind  the  IIId  Army  Corps,  and  the  corps  comman- 
der finally  was  informed  that  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
would  visit  the  corps  between  5:30  and  7 :00  p.m.  that  night. 

Thus  General  v.  Alvensleben  received  a  free  hand  and 
he  issued  orders  at  3 :25  p.m.,  in  Sillegny  for  the  army 
corps  to  resume  its  march  across  the  Moselle  immediately. 
The  5th  Infantry  Division  was  to  march  via  Corny  and 
across  the  bridge  at  Noveant  and  reach  Gorze  and  Dornot 
with  its  leading  elements  on  the  15th.       The  6th  Infantry 

—446— 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

Division  was  assigned  to  the  crossings  at  Champey  and 
Pont-a-Mousson  and  was  told  to  reach  Pagny,  Preny,  Ar- 
naville  and  Bayonville.  The  6th  Cavahy  Division  received 
orders  to  proceed  to  Pournoy-la-Chetive  and  vicinity ;  the 
corps  artillery  was  to  cross  the  Moselle  after  the  6th  In- 
fantry Division  and  remain  at  Vandieres.  Pagny  was  de- 
signated as  corps  headquarters. 

Pursuant  to  these  orders  the  army  corps,  without  hav- 
ing fully  completed  cooking,  started  towards  6:00  p.m.  The 
5th  Infantry  Division  crossed  the  Moselle  on  the  bridge  at 
Noveant  which  had  not  been  destroyed  by  the  French, 
where  it  encountered  the  detachment  of  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  under  Colonel  v.  Lyncker  (2  battalions,  2  squadrons, 
1  battery) .  The  infantry  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division  used 
the  foot  bridge  at  Champey,  which  had  been  repaired,  while 
the  2d  Dragoon  Regiment,  the  artillery  and  all  vehicles  had 
to  cross  at  Pont-a-Mousson. 

In  accordance  with  his  promise  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  had  sought  out  his  old  Brandenburg  corps  and, 
greeted  with  cheers  by  the  troops,  had  arrived  at  the  6th 
Infantry  Division  just  when  it  crossed  the  bridge  at  Cham- 
pey. At  this  opportunity  his  Royal  Highness  directed  the 
division  commander  Lieut-General  v.  Ruddenbrock  to  start 
in  good  time  the  next  day  via  Gorze,  so  as  to  reach  the 
trains  of  the  fleeing  enemy.  The  commander  in  chief  of 
the  Second  Army  gave  the  enemy  greater  credit  for  activity 
than  the  enemy  actually  displayed  and,  as  no  messages 
w^ere  received  from  the  Xth  Army  Corps  or  from  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division  in  the  course  of  the  day,  which  might 
have  divulged  the  actual  situation,  he  arrived  at  the  not 
entirely  unjustified  belief  that  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  was 
engaged  in  a  hurried  retreat  from  Metz  toward  the  Meuse. 

Orders  of  Headquarters  Second  Army  for 
August  16th 

In  consequence  of  this  estimate  the  orders  issued  in 
Pont-a-Mousson  at  7 :00  p.m.,  governing  the  movements 
for  the  16th  of  August  directed  the  movements  of  the  Second 
Army  toward  the  Meuse.     It  was  hoped  that,  considering 

—447— 


Military  Monographs 

the  achievements  in  marching  by  the  German  troops,  the 
enemy  would  be  encountered  on  that  stream. 

It  is  stated  in  those  orders:  "The  Illd  Army  Corps, 
as  has  been  heretofore  arranged,  will  cross  the  Moselle 
below  Pont-a-Mousson  and,  marching  via  Noveant  and 
Gorze,  will  tomorrow  reach  the  main  Metz-Verdun  road 
at  Mars-la-Tour,  or  Vionville  respectively.  If  possible,  its 
headquarters  will  be  established  in  Mars-la-Tour.  The  6th 
Cavalry  Division  may  be  sent  ahead  from  Pagny  via  Preny 
and  Thiaucourt  to  that  road." 

In  addition  the  Xth  Army  Corps  was  directed  to  con- 
tinue its  march  to  the  front  on  the  road  toward  Verdun 
about  as  far  as  St.  Hilaire-Maizeray  and  to  bring  up  those 
parts  of  the  corps  which  were  still  in  the  valley  of  the 
Moselle. 

The  remaining  army  corps,  which  had  arrived  at  their 
designated  march  objectives  on  the  15th,  received  orders 
to  start  on  the  16th  as  follows :  The  IXth  Army  Corps  was 
to  reach  Sillegny,  the  Xllth  Rezonville-en-Haye,  the  Guard 
Corps  Rambucourt  and  Vernecourt,  the  IVth  Les  Saizer- 
ais,  the  lid  Buchy. 

Measures  Taken  by  the  Xth  Army  Corps 

In  pursuance  of  the  above  directions  the  Xth  Army 
Corps  issued  the  following  orders: 

"Headquarters   Thiaucourt,   15th   August,   1870;   11:30  p.m. 

"The   hostile  army  is  marching  towards  the  Meuse. 

"The  Xth  Army  Corps  will  continue  its  march  toward  Verdun. 

"Lieut-General  v.  Rheinbaben,  in  front  of  whom  a  hostile  cav- 
alry division  retreated  today  toward  Metz  and  opposite  whom  a  hos- 
tile camp  of  all  arms  is  at  Rezonville,  will  advance  against  the  camp 
early  tomorrow  morning  and  will  at  the  same  time  attempt  to  gain 
a  view  of  the  Metz-Conflans  road.  He  will  utilize  every  opportunity 
to  attack  the  enemy 

"Colonel  Lehmann  will  march  at  4:30  a.m.  tomorrow  from  Thiau- 
court via  Dommartin  to  Chambley,  thereafter  into  a  bivouac  at  Don- 
court;  Colonel  V.  Lyncker  will  start  at  4:30  a.m.  from  Noveant  via 
Gorze  to  the  vicinity  of  Chambley 

"Lieut-General  v.  Schwartzkoppen  will  start  from  Thiaucourt 
at  5  a.m.  with  the  Dragoon  Brigade  of  the  Guards  and  the  rest  of 
this  division   and  march  via  Benoit  to  St.  Hilaire 

"Major  General  v.  Kraatz  will  start  at  4:30  a.m.  with  the  20th 
Division  and  the  corps  artillery,  will  cross  the  Moselle  on  both  bridges 
and  will  go  into  a  bivouac  between  Beney  and  Thiaucourt " 

—448— 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

General  Alvensleben's  Orders  for  August  16th 

General  v.  Alvensleben,  who  in  his  impetuosity  had 
acted  ahead  of  orders  by  conducting  his  entire  corps  across 
the  Mor  'le  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  had  sent  his  ad- 
vance guard  during  the  night  to  opposite  Gorze  and  On- 
ville. 

Though  the  last  troops,  in  consequence  of  the  difficul- 
ties encountered  in  crossing  the  Moselle,  had  only  gotten  to 
rest  at  2:00  A.M.,  and  though  great  fatigue  stared  them 
in  the  face  for  the  succeeding  day,  General  v.  Alvensleben 
fixed  the  time  of  start  on  the  16th  at  5:00  A.M.,  and  even 
earlier  for  the  cavalry  division.  It  is  true  that  no  more 
detailed  information  of  the  enemy  had  been  received  at 
headquarters  Hid  Army  Corps  up  to  the  evening,  still  that 
headquarters  entertained  the  hope  that  the  French  army 
would  arrive  west  of  Metz,  and  therefore  reckoned  in  its 
orders  for  the  16th  with  an  encounter  with  the  enemy. 

Should  the  enemy  be  just  west  of  Metz,  he  could  be 
opposed  straight  across  the  Metz-Verdun  road ;  should  he 
be  on  the  march  to  Verdun,  he  could  be  attacked  in  flank; 
should  he,  against  all  expectation,  have  made  unusual  pro- 
gress in  the  direction  of  the  last  named  place,  he  could  be 
engaged  in  battle  and  contained  until  the  other  army  corps 
of  the  Second  Army  could  come  up. 

In  order  to  be  able  to  march  in  two  columns.  General 
V.  Alvensleben  on  his  own  responsibility  selected  the  addi- 
tional difficult  mountain  roads  from  Onville  to  Les  Bara- 
ques  and  through  these  obtained  increased  facility  for  de- 
ployment, as  well  as  the  possibility  of  getting  ahead  faster. 
His  orders  for  the  16th  read : 

Pagny,  15  August,  1870;  10:30  p.m. 

"Pursuant  to  orders  from  higher  headquarters  the  lid  Army 
Corps  will  start  at  daybi-eak  for  both  sides  of  the  Metz-Verdun  road. 
For  this  purpose  the  start  will  be: 

"The  6th  Infantry  at  5:00  A.M.,  marching  via  Arnaville-Onville 
toward  Mars-la-Tour.  The  division  will  orient  itself  in  good  time 
through  officers  sent  ahead  to  observe  the  roads  of  which  nothing  is 
known  except  through  the  maps. 

"The  corps  artillery  follows  the  division  at  7:00  A.M. 

"The  6th  Cavalry  Division  must  have  cleared  the  bridge  at  Nov- 
eant  by  5:30  A.M.,  without  fail,  and  will  then  continue  the  march  via 
Gorze  toward  Vionville. 

—449— 


Military  Monographs 

"The  5th  Infantry  Division  will  follow  the  6th  Cavalry  Division. 
All  troops  arriving  on  the  Metz-Verdun  road  will  for  the  present 
face  toward  the  fortress " 

Additional  Orders  from  Royal  Headquarters  are 

Received  at  Headquarters  Second  Army, 

Evening  of  August  15th 

In  the  meantime  additional  orders  from  Royal  Head- 
quarters relating  to  the  16th  had  been  received  at  Head- 
quarters Second  Army  in  Pont-a-Mousson  about  10:30 
P.M.,  August  15th,  which  stated  that  the  fruits  of  the  vic- 
tory of  the  14th  of  August  could  be  fully  gathered  only  by 
an  advance  in  force  by  the  Second  Army  towards  the  roads 
from  Metz  via  Fresnes  and  Etain  to  Verdun. 

It  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  that  headquarters  to  act, 
with  the  means  at  its  disposal. 

As  no  reports  had  been  received  at  that  headquarters 
from  the  5th  Cavalry  Division,  which  might  have  cleared  up 
the  actual  situation,  it  was  justifiable  to  assume  that  the 
wishes  of  Royal  Headquarters  would  be  fully  met  by  send- 
ing out  two  army  corps  and  two  cavalry  divisions  in  the 
designated  direction. 

The  following  orders  were  therefore  sent  at  8  :00  A.M. 
on  the  16th  to  the  Xth  and  IXth  Army  Corps. 

1)  To  the  Xth  Army  Corps:  "His  Majesty  will  transfer  his 
headquarters  today  to  Pont-a-Mousson.  According  to  information 
received  the  enemy  is  mainly  retreating  on  the  road  leading  from 
Metz  via  Etain  to  Verdun.  Therefore  your  Excellency  will  send  the 
cavalry  toward  that  road." 

2)  To  the  IXth  Army  Corps:  "It  is  necessary  that  the  IXth 
Army  Corps  cross  the  Moselle  in  connection  with  the  Hid  Army  Corps 
on  the  bridge  thrown  by  that  corps  in  the  vicinity  of  Pagny-sur-Mo- 
selle.  You  will  remain  on  the  march  with  the  IXth  Corps  and  bring 
that  corps  close  to  the  Moselle,  as  well  as  .  . 

"If  possible,  the  corps  will  cross  the  Moselle  with  parts  of  its 
forces  today  and  will  tomorrow  follow  up  the  Illd  Corps  toward  Mars- 
la-Tour " 

Headquarters  Illd  Army  Corps  received  no  additional 
orders. 

Movements  of  the  French  August  15th 

The  marching  off  of  the  French  was  carried  out  but 
slowly  on  account  of  the  battle  of  the   14th   of  August. 

—450— ' 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

The  troops  which  had  crossed  the  river  were  closely 
crowded  together  as  far  as  the  fork  of  the  road  at  Grave- 
lotte.  Rations  were  to  be  drawn  en  route,  in  addition.  The 
roads  west  of  Gravelotte  had  not  been  clearly  enough  as- 
signed to  the  different  corps ;  there  had  been  no  consulta- 
tion between  the  different  generals  as  to  what  roads  they 
would  take ;  delays  in  the  march  occurred  everywhere. 

In  consequence  of  all  this,  by  the  evening  of  the  15th 
only  the  Guard  and  the  6th  Army  Corps  had  reached  their 
assigned  positions  at  Gravelotte  and  Rezonville  respective- 
ly; the  2d  Army  Corps  was  still  at  Rezonville  instead  of 
being  at  Vionville. 

The  3d  Army  Corps,  which  had  been  directed  to  St. 
Marcel,  encountered  unusual  difficulties  in  the  defiles  and 
reached  that  vicinity  with  three  divisions  only  during  the 
night  of  the  15-16th.  On  account  of  finding  the  roads 
blocked  the  4th  Corps  had  been  forced  to  halt  most  of  its 
troops  at  Woippy  and  Devant-les-Ponts  and  could  resume 
its  march  to  Doncourt  only  on  the  16th. 

Decision  of  General  v.  Alvensleben  to  Engage  in 

Battle — Introductory  Movements  and  Course 

OF  THE  Battle  up  to  12:30  P.M. 

Adva7ice  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division 

The  6th  Infantry  Division,  followed  by  the  corps  ar- 
tillery, started  at  5:00  A.M.;  but  the  5th  Infantry  Divis- 
ion started  only  at  7:30  A.M.,  because  the  6th  Cavalry  Di- 
vision, contrary  to  the  wording  of  the  orders,  had  not 
cleared  the  bridge  at  Noveant  before  then. 

Very  soon  after  5:00  A.M.  the  chief  of  staff  of  the 
Hid  Army  Corps,  Colonel  v.  Voigts-Rhetz,  met  in  the 
streets  of  Pagny  an  officer  coming  from  headquarters  of 
the  Second  Army,  who  informed  him  that  Prince  Freder- 
ick Charles  desired  to  review  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  on 
that  day.  The  colonel  thereupon  sent  the  following  letter 
to  army  headquarters  at  5 :30  A.M. : 

"Lieutenant  v.  Ardenne,  whom  I  saw  here  just  now, 
informs  me  that  His  Royal  Highness  intends  to  inspect  the 

—451— 


Military  Monographs 

6th  Cavalry  Division  today.  In  consideration  of  orders 
issued  to  that  division  to  gain  the  Metz-Verdun  road  today 
and  to  attack  detachments  leaving  Metz,  it  has  become 
necessary  to  start  the  Cavalry  Division  in  such  manner  that 
it  will  reach  the  road  simultaneously  with  the  infantry.  It 
has  therefore  been  forced  to  clear  the  bridge  at  Noveant 
with  its  last  troops  by  5 :30  A.M.,  and  is  now  about  between 
Noveant  and  Gorze.  If  His  Royal  Highness  desires  to  still 
see  that  division  today,  it  can  probably  be  done  after  10  :00 
A.M.  at  Vionville  or  vicinity." 

General  v.  Alvensleben  left  Pagny  at  6:30  A.M.  to 
take  his  place  at  the  head  of  the  main  body  of  the  6th  In- 
fantry Division,  whose  march  had  to  be  made  first  in  a 
close  valley  and  then  along  rather  steep  roads  and  was  con- 
nected with  great  difficulties.  In  spite  of  having  had  but 
a  very  short  rest  during  the  preceding  night  the  troops 
marched  with  spirit.  Had  not  the  Prince  said  to  the  troops 
yesterday  in  the  bivouac  at  Buxieres:  "If  you  march 
bravely  today  and  tomorrow,  you  may  still  be  able  to  catch 
the  French." 

The  first  reliable  reports  concerning  the  presence  of 
strong  hostile  forces  west  of  Metz  were  received  at  6  :30 
A.M.  by  General  v.  Buddenbrock,  commanding  the  6th  In- 
fantry Division.  Lieutenant  v.  Czettritz  Neuhaus,  of  the 
1st  Brandenburg  Dragoon  Regiment  No.  2,  reported  from 
Tronville  (5:15  A.M.)  that  hostile  outposts — infantry  and 
cavalry — were  on  the  line  Tronville-Vionville,  toward  the 
woods  of  Vionville.  This  report  was  at  once  transmitted 
to  the  commanding  general,  who  was  then  farther  behind, 
and  was  received  with  joy  by  those  headquarters,  being  an 
indication  that  a  decisive  success  would  be  attained  if  the 
march  be  kept  up  with  energy. 

As  the  main  thing  appeared  to  be  to  hold  the  reported 
hostile  troops  in  their  places.  General  v.  Alvensleben  de- 
cided to  attack  the  enemy,  but  to  hold  the  attack  until 
the  6th  Cavalry  Division  and  the  5th  Infantry  Division 
which  were  marching  on  Gorze,  had  left  the  woods  (moun- 
tains). He  therefore  sent  the  following  written  orders  to 
the  6th  Infantry  Division: 

—452— 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

"On  the  march,  near  Pagny,  16  August  1870,  7:15  A.M. 
"Because  of  a  report  received  that  hostile  outposts  are  in  posi- 
tion at  Vionville,  I  order  that  the  6th  Infantry  Division  does  not 
allow  itself  to  become  engaged  and  that  it  not  show  itself  before  the 
6th  Cavalry  Division  has  reached  the  plateau  and  is  ready  to  inter- 
vene in  the  battle." 

The  6th  Infantry  Division  had  commenced  to  deploy  at 
Les  Baraques,  where  the  commanding  general  himself  ar- 
rived very  soon,  and  the  deployment  was  thereupon  con- 
tinued. 

Preliminary  Estimate  of  the  Situation  by  Gen- 
eral Alvensleben  and  Decision  to  Continue 
THE  March  in  a  Northerly  Direction 

The  extent  of  the  hostile  camp,  in  the  meantime  re- 
ported to  be  at  Rezonville,  could  not  be  seen  from  the 
heights  of  Les  Baraques.  After  two  squadrons  of  the  2d 
Dragoons  had  been  sent  ahead  for  further  reconnaissance, 
General  v.  Alvensleben,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  rode  to- 
ward the  statue  of  Ste.  Marie  for  a  personal  reconnaissance. 

"Two  hills  and  bushes,"  he  wrote  in  his  notes,  "obstructed  the  view 
from  Les  Baraques  toward  Rezonville  and  the  terrain  lying  be- 
tween. I  therefore  rode  with  corps  headquarters  through  the  woods 
on  the  right  to  the  hills  in  front  of  the  Statue  Ste.  Marie.  From  those 
hills  I  then  saw  in  my  front  a  terrain  in  the  shape  of  a  flat  depression 
with  green  edges.  I  gained  two  impressions,  as  I  clearly  recollect. 
First,  that  the  terrain  was  entirely  devoid  of  any  marked  feature 
(in  a  tactical  sense),  and  second,  that  I  could  see  no  trace  of  a 
camp  of  troops,  or  anything  else  of  military  interest,  except  a  col- 
umn of  cavalry  riding  in  the  direction  of  St.  Marcel  through  a  clearing 
in  the  woods  (without  doubt  a  detachment  of  Gramont's  Brigade)." 

In  the  meantime  a  report  sent  by  Headquarters  5th 
Infantry  Division  at  8:35  A.M.,  had  arrived  at  corps  head- 
quarters stating:  "Hostile  columns  marching  from  Rezon- 
ville toward  Verdun;  a  detachment  of  all  arms  has  taken 
a  position  about  half  a  mile  southeast  of  Tronville,  pro- 
bably to  cover  the  retreat;  this  division  remains  on  the 
march  and  will  attack  the  enemy." 

The  hostile  cavalry  column,  observed  by  the  command- 
ing general  himself  as  marching  toward  St.  Marcel,  as  well 
as  the  above  report  from  the  5th  Infantry  Division  ap- 
peared proof  positive  to  Corps  Headquarters  that  the  enemy 

—453— 


Military  Monographs 

intended  to  march  off.  In  order  to  prevent  the  enemy's 
marching  off  on  the  northern  roads  and  to  block  the  road 
for  him  toward  the  west,  at  9  :30  A.M.,  General  v.  Alvensle- 
ben  directed  that  the  6th  Infantry  Division — which  had  de- 
ployed in  the  meantime — advance  northward  via  Mars-la- 
Tour  toward  Jarny. 

In  the  meantime,  toward  9:00  A.M.,  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division,  in  carrying  out  its  task  of  reconnoitering  in 
force  the  camp  observed  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  had 
become  engaged  in  an  action.  The  activity  of  that  divis- 
ion however  confined  itself  to  firing  suddenly  on  the  hostile 
camp  with  the  four  batteries  accompanying  the  division  (un- 
der command  of  Major  Korber)  ;  these  four  batteries  first 
went  into  position  northeast  of  Tronville,  later  west  and 
south  of  Vionville. 

General  v.  Rheinbaben  did  not  attack  the  surprised 
enemy  and  when  the  enemy  occupied  Vionville  toward  10 
o'clock  he  led  his  division  back  to  between  the  Tronville 
woods  and  Tronville. 

General  v.  Alvensleben  has  written  about  that  fight 
as  follows :  "I  learned  of  the  reconnaissance  in  force  by 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  through  the  thunder  of  its  can- 
nons. These  cannons  alarmed  the  enemy.  What  he  had 
not  learned  through  his  patrols  he  learned  through  the 
measures  we  took.     Unfortunately." 

The  General  then  points  out  the  serious  consequences 
of  that  bombardment,  which  was  threatening  the  advancing 
5th  Infantry  Division,  considering  the  very  strong  occupa- 
tion of  Vionville — Flavigny  and  a  probable  offensive  ad- 
vance of  that  force. 

Simultaneously  with  the  fire  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Di- 
vision thunder  of  cannon  was  heard  from  the  6th  Cavalry 
Division,  which  latter  division  had  encountered  hostile 
troops  of  all  arms  in  its  advance  from  Gorze  on  Vionville, 
north  of  the  first  named  place.  Touch  with  the  enemy 
had  been  gained. 

In  his  subsequent  ride  forward  General  v.  Alvensleben, 
from  the  top  of  the  ridge  in  front  of  the  Statue  Ste.  Marie, 

—454— 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

and  looking  over  the  depression  running  toward  Flavigny, 
perceived  the  tents  of  the  hostile  camp.  There  was  not  the 
least  possibility  of  even  approximately  judging  the  strength 
of  the  enemy  at  that  moment.  It  has  been  stated  before 
this  that  corps  headquarters  had  been  of  the  opinion  since 
the  15th  of  August  that  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  was 
still  in  Metz  and  on  the  plateau  to  the  west  thereof.  But 
certainty  of  this  assumption  was  brought  only  later  by  the 
different  phases  of  the  battle. 

The  principal  thing  now  was  not  to  be  deceived  as  to 
the  actual  state  of  affairs.  Reports  so  far  received  indi- 
cated that  the  enemy  was  marching  off.  It  appeared  very 
improbable  that  the  enemy,  supposing  he  had  decided  on 
and  actually  commenced  his  retreat,  would  accept  battle 
after  the  defeats  already  suffered  and  with  inverted  front; 
it  was  far  rather  to  be  assumed  that  he  would  try  to  con- 
tinue his  march  and  make  a  defensiye  stand  with  but  a 
minor  part  of  his  force.  To  pierce  that  defense,  to  force 
the  departing  enemy  to  make  a  stand  and  fight,  appeared 
to  be  the  main  task  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps,  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  which  every  unit  had  to  be  utilized. 

The  first  question  was  to  gain  time  for  the  6th  Infan- 
try Division  to  get  ahead  and  to  cover  its  flank  march. 
Therefore  the  commanding  general,  at  about  9:45  A.M., 
brought  the  artillery  (5th,  6th  light;  5th,  6th  heavy  bat- 
teries) of  that  division  under  the  guard  of  its  cavalry  regi- 
ment (1st  Brandenburg  Dragoon  Regiment  No.  2)  as  rap- 
idly as  possible  from  its  flank.  At  the  same  time  orders 
were  sent  to  the  corps  artillery  farther  in  rear  to  trot 
ahead.  This  use  of  the  artillery  was  the  first  hazardous, 
but  necessary,  decision  arrived  at  by  General  Alvensleben. 

The  commander  of  the  artillery.  General  v.  Bulow, 
personally  rode  to  the  front  to  reconnoiter  suitable  posi- 
tions. Toward  10 :00  A.M.,  the  first  batteries  went  into 
action,  partly  in  connection  with  the  position  of  Major 
Korber,  and  partly  on  the  hill  north  of  the  Statue  Ste. 
Marie,  and  so  the  battle  opened. 

Based  on  the  impression  so  far  gained  the  following 
report  was  sent  to  Headquarters  Second  Army: 

—455— 


Military  Monographs 

"Vicinity  south  Vionville,  16  August  1870,  10:30  A.M. 
"Hostile    camp    at    Vionville    and    Rezonville.       The    Illd    Army 
Corps   advances    en    masse,    left    wing    toward    Jarny,    to    eventually 
cross  at  Conflans.       5th  Cavalry  Division  at  Mars-la-Tour,       6th  Cav- 
alry Division  at  Rezonville.     Enemy  falling  back  on  Thionville." 

The  last  sentence  of  this  report  was  based  on  the  re- 
trograde movements  of  the  enemy  observed  by  corps  head- 
quarters itself,  as  v^ell  as  on  the  report  of  the  5th  Infantry 
Division  of  8:35  A.M.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  measures 
taken  by  the  enemy  were  entirely  different,  as  General  v, 
Alvensleben  very  soon  thereafter  found. 

Events  on  the  French  Side 

In  consequence  of  the  bombardment  of  the  camp — the 
troops  were  just  then  proceeding  to  water  the  horses,  great 
confusion  ensued  in  the  French  Cavalry  Division  of  Forton, 
especially  in  Murat's  Brigade.  The  infantry  of  the  2d  Corps, 
on  the  other  hand,  very  quickly  prepared  for  battle.  (The  2d 
Army  Corps  had  but  two  divisions  present,  the  Division  of 
Laveaucoupet  having  remained  in  Metz.)  By  orders  of 
General  Frossard  General  Bataille  advanced  at  about  9  :45 
A.M.  with  Pouget's  Brigade,  commanded  on  that  day  by 
General  Mangin,  to  occupy  Vionville  and  Flavigny,  while  the 
Brigade  of  Fauvart  Bastoul  was  for  the  present  kept  back 
east  of  Flavigny.  South  and  ahead  of  the  latter,  the  Divi- 
sion of  Verge  had  advanced  against  the  heights  northwest 
of  Gorze  and  against  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and  Lapasset's 
Brigade  of  the  5th  Corps,  which  had  joined  the  2d  Corps 
at  Saarbriicken  on  August  7th,  proceeded  to  the  front 
through  the  Bois  de  St.  Arnould.  The  French  6th  Corps 
also  deployed  with  great  rapidity. 

Marshal  Canrobert  caused  the  Division  of  Villiers  to 
take  a  position  in  readiness  northeast  of  Vionville,  east  of 
the  Flavigny — St.  Marcel  road.  This  division  was  joined 
on  the  north  and  extending  as  far  as  the  Roman  road  by 
the  9th  Regiment  of  the  Line,  the  only  regiment  of  Bisson's 
Division  which  had  gotten  to  Metz.  The  Divisions  of  Sorval 
and  Tixier  remained  for  the  present  at  east  of  Rezonville 
and  St.  Marcel,  respectively. 


-456- 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

The  batteries  of  the  2d  and  6th  French  Corps  went  in- 
to position  and  opened  fire.  In  the  meantime  Marshal 
Bazaine  had  proceeded  to  the  hill  southwest  of  Rezonville 
and  assumed  command. 

After  he  had  approved  the  means  taken  by  the  leaders 
of  the  2d  and  6th  Corps,  he  also  posted,  in  addition  to  Sor- 
val's  Division  east  of  Rezonville,  the  Guard  Corps  at  Grave- 
lotte  and  Malmaison  facing  south;  this  under  the  belief, 
which  appears  to  have  guided  all  of  his  dispositions  that 
day,  that  the  hostile  attack  was  being  directed  against  his 
left  and  that  the  intention  was  to  force  him  away  from 
Metz. 

He  sent  orders  to  the  3d  Corps,  camping  in  the  vicin- 
ity between  Verneville  and  St.  Marcel,  to  direct  its  offen- 
sive attention  against  the  hostile  left;  the  Marshal  hoping 
that  General  Ladmirault  would  hasten  to  the  battlefield  on 
his  own  initiative. 

It  should  be  definitely  mentioned  that  only  the  Bri- 
gade of  Puget  occupied  Vionville  and  Flavigny  and  that 
with  the  12th  Chasseur  Battalion  and  parts  of  the  23d  Line 
Regiment.  The  first  line  of  the  8th  Line  Regiment  deployed 
along  the  slope  southeast  of  Vionville.  At  this  time,  about 
10:00  A.M.,  no  parts  of  the  French  6th  Corps  were  up  to 
occupy  the  above  named  positions.  The  second  lines  of 
the  above  mentioned  regiments  were  in  readiness  west  of  the 
group  of  trees  and  in  the  hollow  south  thereof  toward  Fla- 
vigny. 

French  accounts  and  reports  differ  greatly  as  to  the 
first  position  of  Villiers'  Division,  But  there  appears  no 
doubt  but  that  the  brigade  of  de  Sonnay,  in  the  first  line 
of  the  division,  was  with  its  left  closer  to  the  main  high- 
road than  is  indicated  in  the  plan  of  the  battle  furnished 
in  the  General  Staff  Account  (Plan  5Q).  Behind  it,  in 
second  line,  the  Colin's  Brigade  had  taken  position  with  the 
93d  Line  Regiment  north,  and  the  94th  Line  Regiment  south 
of  the  main  highroad. 

Thus,  at  the  start,  only  the  infantry  of  the  French  2d 
Army  Corps  came  into  conflict  with  the  approaching  Ger- 
man Illd  Corps. 

—457— 


Military  Monographs 

General  von  Alvensleben  Decides  to  Attack  in 
Spite  of  the  Hostile  Superiority 

Without  having  any  knowledge  of  the  French  move- 
ments and  after  having  sent  off  the  orders  to  the  artillery 
of  the  6th  Infantry  Division,  General  v.  Alvensleben  con- 
tinued his  ride  in  the  direction  of  Tronville  and  about  half- 
ways  between  that  place  and  the  Statue  of  Ste.  Marie  he  met 
General  v.  Rheinbaben,  commander  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Di- 
vision. The  report  of  the  latter  made  it  clear  that  very 
material  French  forces,  possibly  the  entire  French  army, 
were  still  west  of  Metz.  Concerning  this  meeting.  Gen- 
eral V.  Alvensleben  writes : 

"Returning  from  the  above  mentioned  hill  (Statue  Ste.  Marie), 
I  rode  slowly  in  the  direction  of  Tronville,  i.e.,  in  the  same  march  direc- 
tion as  that  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division  on  Jarny.  At  the  foot  of  the 
hill,  halfways  between  the  Statue  and  Tronville  the  task  for  the  day 
was  decided.  There  I  met  General  v.  Rheinbaben,  commander  of  the  5th 
Cavalry  Division,  who  was,  I  believe,  accompanied  only  by  an  adju- 
tant. He  approached  me  with  the  words:  'I  do  not  know  if  I  am 
more  stupid  than  other  people,  but  I  have  always  maintained 
that  we  still  have  the  entire  hostile  army  in  our  front,  and  now  1 
know  that  for  certain.'  The  general  could  know  this  for  certain, 
for  since  the  14th  and  throughout  the  15th  he  had  been  on  the  roads 
which  the  enemy  must  have  taken  had  he  marched  off.  Under  such 
conditions  we  think  faster  than  at  any  other  time.  Even  if  the 
entire  army  were  not  there,  strong  forces  were  in  my  front,  this  was 
proved  by  Rheinbaben's  words  and  also  by  the  hot  artillery  fight  which 
had  now  taken  place  along  the  entire  line. 

"As  on  the  15th,  so  now  again  the  entire  strategical  aspect  of 
the  campaign  came  before  my  eyes  with  full  clearness  and  I  was  cer- 
tain that  the  situation  justified  me  in  engaging  my  entire  army  corps. 
Of  the  Xth  Corps  I  thought  only  in  so  far  as  offering  me  a  support- 
ing point  to  fall  back  on,  if  I  hazarded  a  battle  with  superior  hostile 
forces  and  that  with  an  inverted  front.  I  did  not  know  if  the  Xth 
Corps  could  or  would  give  me  any  support,  but  I  knew  that,  consid- 
ering the  direction  of  the  French  retreat,  it  was  immaterial  to  us  if 
our  object  should  be  attained  eight  miles  farther  to  the  front  or  to 
the  rear;  and  I  also  knew  that  with  each  step  backward  I  gained 
the  time  and  power  the  enemy  lost.  The  hazard,  viewed  in  more 
detail,  was  consequently  not  too  large  or  too  dangerous.  It  would 
have  been  very,  very  unfortunate  and  bitter,  to  have  left  the  battle- 
field with  our  wounded  to  the  enemy,  but  this  was  of  no  influence  at 
all  on  the  objective  of  our  day's  task. 

"The  6th  Infantry  Division  received  orders  to  abandon  its  march 
on  Jarny  and  to  turn  against  Vionville,  not  because  my  views  had 
changed  concerning  the  position  I  desired  to  reach  and  which  even 
to-day  I  consider  as  the  only  strategically  and  tactically  correct  one 
— i.e.,  the  ridge  from  Mars-la-Tour  to  Conflans — but  because  I  did 
not  dare  to  spread  out  my  forces  under  existing  circumstances  so 
far,  for  the  5th  Infantry  Division  had  in  the  meantime  become 
engaged  in  the  battle  and  all  maneuvering  was  at  an  end.     I  had 

—458— 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

to  accept  the  battlefield  forced  on  me  nolens  volens  and  had  to  make 
the  most  of  it.  The  latter  phase  required  in  order  to  offset  the  physical 
disproportion  of  the  forces  the  moral  force  of  the  offensive  (attack). 
For  that  the  troops  under  my  command  were  exactly  the  right  ones, 
and  in  addition  I  had  18  cavalry  regiments,  as  General  v.  Rhein- 
baben  had  placed  his  division  at  my  disposal.  This  gave  me  great 
freedom  of  action.  But  still  a  'but'  had  to  reckoned  with.  I  had 
the  disposal  of  about  9,000  troopers  of  first  quality,  but  no  correspond- 
ing cavalry  organizations. 

■'I  now  took  the  road  to  Vionville." 

Occupation  of  Vionville  and  Flavigny,  Bois  de 
Vionville  and  Bois  de  St.  Arnould 

Colonel  V.  Voigts-Rhetz  personally  carried  order  to  Gen- 
eral V.  Buddenbrock  for  the  advance  on  Vionville;  he  met 
that  general  at  10 :15  A.M.  at  Tronville  and  oriented  him  con- 
cerning the  changed  situation. 

The  general,  a  very  tranquil  and  decisive  man,  made 
his  dispositions  at  once,  but  demanded  the  return  of  his 
batteries  which  were  at  this  time  in  action  on  another  part 
of  the  battlefield.  This  justified  demand,  again  made 
through  an  adjutant  some  time  later,  made  it  necessary 
to  draw  the  batteries  from  their  position — not  an  easy 
matter  by  any  means,  as  they  had  by  then  lost  quite  a  num- 
ber of  horses.  Only  after  these  losses  had  been  replaced 
could  the  batteries  be  sent  off.  Only  the  6th  light  battery 
was  retained  permanently  south  of  Vionville. 

The  1st  and  2d  Battalions,  20th  Regiment  (the  2d 
battalion  having  but  3  companies,  as  the  6th  company  was 
guarding  trains)  were  kept  for  the  present  at  Tronville  by 
corps  headquarters. 

Corps  headquarters  now  took  position  on  the  ridge 
southwest  of  Vionville,  adhering  to  that  place  almost  dur- 
ing the  entire  battle.  This  ridge  is  southwest  of  hill  938; 
from  there  General  v.  Alvensleben  rode  from  time  to  time 
to  hills  923  and  901  for  better  observation  and  for  over- 
seeing the  execution  of  his  directions. 

Arrived  on  the  ridge  southwest  of  Vionville,  General 
V.  Alvensleben  observed  that  the  enemy  had  occupied  Vion- 
ville and  Flavigny  and  that  he  was  seriously  engaged  with 
the  5th  Infantry  Division. 

—459— 


Military  Monographs 

Toward  11 :00  a.m.  while  the  6th  Infantry  Division 
was  still  marching  from  Tronville,  the  French  Brigade  of 
Valaze  started  an  attack  against  the  left  wing  of  the  5th 
Infantry  Division.  The  danger  threatening  General  v. 
Stulpnagel  was  at  once  perceived  by  corps  headquarters.  In 
haste  the  following  written  orders  were  sent  to  the  ap- 
proaching 6th  Infantry  Division. 

"The  enemy  appears  to  be  attacking  General  v.  Stulpnagel  in 
great  force.  General  v.  Buddenbrock  will  advance  with  all  of  his 
forces  along  the  entire  line." 

In  the  meantime  the  three  battalions  of  the  52d  Regi- 
ment of  the  5th  Infantry  Division,  later  supported  by 
the  2d  Battalion,  12th  Regiment,  had  not  only  defeated 
that  attack,  but  had  also  taken  possession  of  the  ridge 
southeast  of  Flavigny  (Ridge  998  on  map).  Through  this 
the  artillery  of  the  5th  Infantry  Division  in  position  on  the 
hill  west  of  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and  the  artillery  in  posi- 
tion in  the  Bois  de  Vionville  and  Bois  de  St.  Arnould  (the 
batteries  of  the  9th  Infantry  Brigade)  were  relieved  from 
the  pressure  on  their  left  flank  and  secured  from  danger. 
The  2d  Battalion,  52d  Regiment,  on  the  left  wing,  pursued 
the  retreating  enemy  in  the  direction  of  Flavigny;  the  Fu- 
silier Battalion,  12th  Regiment,  also  turned  in  that  direc- 
tion, it  having  previously  advanced  farther  to  the  west  and 
through  the  northern  part  of  the  Bois  de  Gaumont.  Both 
battalions  eagerly  pressed  forward  and  soon  after  11 :00  A.M. 
entered  a  hot  and  costly  fight  south  of  Flavigny  with  the 
retreating  Brigade  of  Valaze  and  the  columns  of  Bastoul's 
Brigade  coming  up  to  the  support  of  the  former. 

In  the  meantime  the  6th  Infantry  Division  had  made 
all  haste  forward  and  had  attacked  Vionville.  During  its 
advance  the  three  horse  batteries  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion, which  had  returned,  had  again  trotted  to  the  hill  west 
of  Vionville  from  where  they  effectively  enfiladed  the  bri- 
gade at  Bastoul. 

As  also  the  6th  light  battery  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps 
from  its  position  farther  south,  as  well  as  the  batteries  at 
the  Statue  Ste.  Marie  directed  their  fire  across  the  open  field 

—460— 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

on  the  oncoming  brigade,  that  brigade  had  to  fall  back 
under  heavy  losses.  Parts  of  that  brigade  threw  them- 
selves into  Flavigny.  But  as  that  place  offered  less  and 
less  security  under  the  increasing  fire  of  our  batteries,  the 
French  hastily  evacuated  the  village  in  the  face  of  the 
charging  12th  and  52d  Regiments.  The  9th,  10th  and  11th 
Companies,  12th  Regiment  and  the  5th  and  8th  Companies 
52d  Regiment,  entered  Flavigny  about  11 :45  A.M.  This 
was  the  first  capture  of  the  village. 

These  troops  remained  within  the  place  but  a  short 
time,  because  they  had  to  procure  drinking  water  and  be- 
cause the  houses  were  in  flames  and  our  artillery  was  still 
firing  on  it. 

Captain  Hildebrand,  who  had  taken  command  of  the 
2d  battalion  after  Major  Bunau  was  wounded,  and  his  half 
battalion,  6th  and  7th  companies,  52d  Regiment  and  the  12th 
Company,  12th  Regiment,  did  not  participate  in  the  attack 
on  Flavigny.  When  he  saw  that  the  enemy  evacuated  the 
place  he  immediately  turned  off  in  the  direction  of  Rezon- 
ville  and  pursued  the  fleeing  enemy  with  effective  fire.  There- 
after he  pressed  after  the  enemy  with  the  6th  and  7th  Com- 
pany in  the  first,  the  5th  and  8th  Company  (just  coming 
out  of  Flavigny)  in  the  second  line  to  within  the  hollow  lead- 
ing toward  Rezonville. 

Lieutenant  v.  Zawadsky  with  the  rest  of  the  Fusilier 
Battalion,  12th  Regiment,  joined  this  intrepid  advance. 
This  was  at  about  12  :00  noon. 

During  these  events  at  Flavigny  the  6th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion had  succeeded,  after  a  very  bitter  fight,  in  taking 
Vionville  and  driving  back  the  2d  line  of  Pouget's  Brigade 
in  position  east  of  that  place. 

The  French  6th  Corps  Inserts  Its  First  Line 

As  now  the  94th  Line  Regiment  of  Colin's  Brigade 
was  sent  to  Flavigny  to  support  the  left  of  Pouget's  Bri- 
gade and  as  in  addition  parts  of  the  Brigade  of  Becquet  de 
Sonnay  attacked  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  troops  emerging 
from  Vionville  along  the  road  and  advancing  toward  the 

—461— 


Military  Monographs 

group  of  trees,  the  forward  movement  of  the  Germans  came 
to  a  halt  for  the  present  and  a  bloody  battle  ensued  east  and 
southeast  of  Vionville.  After  being  effectively  supported  by 
the  constantly  reinforced  artillery  line  south  of  the  church- 
yard and  at  Statue  Ste.  Marie,  the  11th  Infantry  Brigade, 
entirely  engaged  (5  battalions)  and  the  64th  Regiment  suc- 
ceeded at  12:30  p.m.  in  capturing  the  hostile  position,  group 
of  trees — Flavigny.  This  was  the  second  capture  of  Flav- 
igny,  succeeding  the  first  capture  by  about  45  minutes. 

In  the  meantime,  the  24th  Regiment,  in  conjunction 
with  the  2d  Battalion,  20th  Regiment,  and  well  supported 
by  our  batteries  in  position  on  the  main  road  west  of  Vion- 
ville, had  driven  back  the  French  9th  and  75th  Line  Regi- 
ments opposing  it  north  of  Vionville  and  had  gained  a  firm 
foothold  east  of  the  hollow  leading  from  Vionville  to  St. 
Marcel. 


During  the  fights  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division  at  Vion- 
ville and  Flavigny  the  9th  Infantry  Brigade  had  captured 
by  about  noon,  the  northern  edges  of  the  forest  of  Vion- 
ville and  the  forest  of  St.  Arnould  but  was  unable  to  ad- 
vance beyond  against  the  plateau  occupied  by  the  French 
Brigades  of  Jolivet  and  Lapasset. 

To  the  northwest  of  the  artillery  of  the  5th  Infantry 
Division  General  v.  Schwerin  assembled  the  nucleus  of  his 
brigade,  the  two  battalions  of  the  52d  Regiment  which  had 
suffered  severely,  near  the  2d  Battalion,  12th  Regiment, 
which  up  to  then  had  suffered  but  little,  and  held  the  cap- 
tured hill. 

General  v.  Stulpnagel,  to  whom  Colonel  v.  Lyncker 
with  his  2  battalions,  78th  Regiment,  2  squadrons  9th 
Dragoons,  and  1st  light  Battery,  had  reported,  directed  the 
battle  of  his  division  from  the  right  wing  of  the  artillery; 
this  battle  now  had  to  be  confined  to  holding  the  line  cap- 
tured. Major  V.  Lewinski,  chief  of  staff  of  the  5th  Infantry 
Division,  had  been  sent  to  the  commanding  general  to  re- 
port what  had  happened  up  to  then  and  from  the  command- 

—462— 


1 


—463— 


Battle  of  Vionville-Mars  la  tour 

August  16. 1870.  between  4.00and  5.00  P.M. 


LEGEND 
Ba^^       A  Corpi  w^imiim   French 

1^1^      ///   VIII  'nd  IX  Corfu 

Tnt/o/c        9    •^"/i    of  ">'    \   Corfsi     t^<r      ahsc' 
19  th  Division  20*  Diviiii>n 

n/sj  or  Sr  Hi'o  rt  Jl/n  M  •*-"■  "  /*""<" 

nt  SMi  Co«.l :,  D'Sion  on  Auf  16  *>  A'm^  M,^iu.  «r. 

ma  wi>s  o/rt<li^  k  Hit  XCorps  lond*/siit1hi. 

Guard  Oroffn  Brigade  myfi  1  r  8  of  Suard  Carpt 
Tht.  ofAKhtd  Troops  art    under/irtad 


Scale      1:25000. 

"•  7  ~  T 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

ing  general  received  the  following  orders :  "I  have  seen 
everything;  tell  General  v.  Stulpnagel  to  hold  what  he  has 
gained,  but  not  to  advance  farther  under  any  considera- 
tion." 

As  already  stated,  General  v.  Alvensleben  remained 
on  the  left  wing  throughout  the  battle.  Asked  why  he  had 
not  joined  the  5th  Infantry  Division,  he  replied :  "You 
knew  what  you  had  to  do  and  I  could  rely  on  your  doing  it. 
The  physician's  place  is  at  the  bedside  of  the  patient  and  the 
patient  in  this  case  was  the  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour  road." 


-463- 


— 462— 


Ill  Corps  at  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour 

ing  general  received  the  following  orders:  "I  have  seen 
everything;  tell  General  v.  Stulpnagel  to  hold  M^hat  he  has 
gained,  but  not  to  advance  farther  under  any  considera- 
tion." 

As  already  stated,  General  v.  Alvensleben  remained 
on  the  left  v^ing  throughout  the  battle.  Asked  v^hy  he  had 
not  joined  the  5th  Infantry  Division,  he  replied:  "You 
knew  what  you  had  to  do  and  I  could  rely  on  your  doing  it. 
The  physician's  place  is  at  the  bedside  of  the  patient  and  the 
patient  in  this  case  was  the  Vionville — Mars-la-Tour  road." 


—463— 


Extract  From  Personal  Memoirs 
P.  H.  Sheridan 


At  4  o'clock  the  next  morning,  the  18th,  I  repaired  to 
the  Chancellor's  quarters.  The  carriage  was  at  the  door, 
also  the  saddlehorse,  but  as  no  spare  mount  could  be  pro- 
cured for  General  Forsyth  he  had  to  seek  other  means  to 
reach  the  battle-field.  The  carriage  was  an  open  one  with 
two  double  seats,  and  in  front  a  single  one  for  a  messenger ; 
it  had  also  a  hand-brake  attached.  Count  Bismarck  and  I 
occupied  the  rear  seat,  and  Count  Bismarck-Bohlen — the 
nephew  and  aide-de-camp  to  the  Chancellor — and  Doctor 
Busch  were  seated  facing  us.  The  conveyance  was  strong, 
serviceable,  and  comfortable,  but  not  specially  preposess- 
ing,  and  hitched  to  it  were  four  stout  horses — logy,  un- 
gainly animals,  whose  clumsy  harness  indicated  that  the 
whole  equipment  was  meant  for  heavy  work.  Two  postil- 
ions in  uniform,  in  high  military  saddles  on  the  nigh  horse 
of  each  span,  completed  the  establishment. 

All  being  ready,  we  took  one  of  the  roads  from  Pont- 
a-Mousson  to  Rezonville,  which  is  on  the  direct  road  from 
Metz  to  Chalons,  and  near  the  central  point  of  the  field 
where,  on  the  16th  of  August,  the  battle  of  Mars-la-Tour 
had  been  fought.  It  was  by  this  road  that  the  Pomeran- 
ians, numbering  about  30,000  men,  had  been  ordered  to 
march  to  Gravelotte,  and  after  proceeding  a  short  dis- 
tance we  overtook  the  column.  As  this  contingent  came 
from  Count  Bismarck's  own  section  of  Germany,  there 
greeted  us  as  we  passed  along,  first  in  the  dim  light  of  the 
morning,  and  later  in  the  glow  of  the  rising  sun,  continu- 
ous and  most  enthusiastic  cheering  for  the  German  Chan- 
cellor. 

On  the  way  Count  Bismarck  again  recurred  to  the 
state  of  public  opinion  in  America  with  reference  to  the 
war.    He  also  talked  much  about  our  form  of  government, 

—465— 


Extract 

and  said  that  in  early  life  his  tendencies  were  all  toward  re- 
publicanism, but  that  family  influence  had  overcome  his 
preferences,  and  intimated  that,  after  adopting  a  political 
career,  he  found  that  Germany  was  not  sufiiciently  ad- 
vanced for  republicanism.  He  said,  further,  that  he  had 
been  reluctant  to  enter  upon  this  public  career,  that  he  had 
always  longed  to  be  a  soldier,  but  that  here  again  family 
opposition  had  turned  him  from  the  field  of  his  choice  into 
the  sphere  of  diplomacy. 

Not  far  from  Mars-la-Tour  we  alighted,  and  in  a  little 
while  an  aide-de-camp  was  introduced,  who  informed  me 
that  he  was  there  to  conduct  and  present  me  to  his  Majesty, 
the  King  of  Prussia.  As  we  were  walking  along  together, 
I  inquired  whether  at  the  meeting  I  should  remove  my  cap, 
and  he  said  no;  that  in  an  out-of-door  presentation  it  was 
not  etiquette  to  uncover  if  in  uniform.  We  were  soon  in 
the  presence  of  the  King,  where,  under  the  shade  of  a 
clump  of  second-growth  poplar-trees,  with  which  nearly  all 
the  farms  in  the  north  of  France  are  here  and  there  dot- 
ted— the  presentation  was  made  in  the  simplest  and  most 
agreeable  manner. 

His  majesty,  taking  my  hand  in  both  of  his  gave  me  a 
thorough  welcome,  expressing,  like  Count  Bismarck,  though 
through  an  interpreter,  much  interest  as  to  the  sentiment 
in  my  own  country  about  the  war.  At  this  time  William 
the  First  of  Prussia  was  seventy-three  years  of  age,  and, 
dressed  in  the  uniform  of  the  Guards,  he  seemed  to  be  the 
very  ideal  soldier,  and  graced  with  most  gentle  and  cour- 
teous manners.  The  conversation,  which  was  brief,  as 
neither  of  us  spoke  the  other's  native  tongue,  concluded 
by  his  Majesty's  requesting  me  in  the  most  cordial  way  to 
accompany  his  headquarters  during  the  campaign.  Thank- 
ing him  for  his  kindness,  I  rejoined  Count  Bismarck's 
party,  and  our  horses  having  arrived  meantime,  we 
mounted  and  moved  off  to  the  position  selected  for  the  King 
to  witness  the  opening  of  the  battle. 

This  place  was  on  some  high  ground  overlooking  the 
villages  of  Rezonville  and  Gravelotte,  about  the  centre  of 
the  battle-field    of  Mars-la-Tour,  and  from  it  most  of  the 

—466— 


Memoirs  P.  H.  Sheridan 

country  to  the  east  toward  Metz  could  also  be  seen.  The 
point  chosen  was  an  excellent  one  for  the  purpose,  though 
in  one  respect  disagreeable,  since  the  dead  bodies  of  many 
poor  fellows  killed  there  two  days  before  were  yet  unburied. 
In  a  little  while  the  King's  escort  began  to  remove  these 
dead,  however,  bearing  them  away  on  stretchers  impro- 
vised with  their  rifles,  and  the  spot  thus  cleared  was  much 
more  acceptable.  Then,  when  such  unexploded  shells  as 
were  lying  around  loose  had  been  cautiously  carried  away, 
the  King,  his  brother.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  Alexander, 
the  chief -of-staff.  General  von  Moltke,  the  Minister  of  War, 
General  von  Roon,  and  Count  von  Bismarck  assembled  on 
the  highest  point,  and  I  being  asked  to  join  the  group  was 
there  presented  to  General  von  Moltke.  He  spoke  our  lan- 
guage fluently,  and  Bismarck  having  left  the  party  for  a 
time  to  go  to  a  neighboring  house  to  see  his  son,  who  had 
been  wounded  at  Mars-la-Tour,  and  about  whom  he  was 
naturally  very  anxious.  General  von  Moltke  entertained 
me  by  explaining  the  position  of  the  different  corps,  the 
nature  and  object  of  their  movements  then  taking  place, 
and  so  on. 

Before  us,  and  covering  Metz,  lay  the  French  army, 
posted  on  the  crest  of  a  ridge  extending  north,  and  about 
its  centre  curving  slightly  westward  toward  the  German 
forces.  The  left  of  the  French  position  was  but  a  short 
distance  from  the  Moselle,  and  this  part  of  the  line  was 
separated  from  the  Germans  by  a  ravine,  the  slopes,  fairly 
well  wooded,  rising  quite  sharply;  farther  north,  near  the 
centre,  this  depression  disappeared,  merged  in  the  general 
swell  of  the  ground,  and  thence  on  toward  the  right  the 
ground  over  which  an  approach  to  the  French  line  must 
be  made  was  essentially  a  natural  open  glacis,  that  could 
be  thoroughly  swept  by  the  fire  of  the  defenders. 

The  line  extended  some  seven  or  eight  miles.  To  at- 
tack this  position,  formidable  everywhere,  except  perhaps 
on  the  right  flank,  the  Germans  were  bringing  up  the  com- 
bined forces  of  the  First  and  Second  armies,  troops  that 
within  the  past  fortnight  had  already  successfully  met  the 
French   in  three  pitched   battles.     On  the   right  was   the 

—467— 


Extract 

First  Army,  under  command  of  General  Von  Steinmetz, 
the  victors,  August  6,  of  Spicheren,  near  Saar,  and,  eight 
days  later,  of  Colombey,  to  the  east  of  Metz ;  while  the  cen- 
tre and  left  were  composed  of  the  several  corps  of  the 
Second  Army,  commanded  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
of  Prussia,  a  part  of  whose  troops  had  just  been  engaged 
in  the  sanguinary  battle  of  Mars-la-Tour,  by  which  Ba- 
zaine  was  cut  off  from  the  Verdun  road,  and  forced  back 
toward  Metz. 

At  first  the  German  plan  was  simply  to  threaten  with 
their  right,  while  the  corps  of  the  Second  Army  advanced 
toward  the  north,  to  prevent  the  French,  of  whose  inten- 
tions there  was  much  doubt,  from  escaping  toward  Chalons ; 
then,  as  the  purposes  of  the  French  might  be  developed, 
these  corps  were  to  change  direction  toward  the  enemy 
successively,  and  seek  to  turn  his  right  flank.  But  the 
location  of  this  vital  turning-point  was  very  uncertain,  and 
until  it  was  ascertained  and  carried,  late  in  the  afternoon, 
the  action  raged  with  more  or  less  intensity  along  the  en- 
tire line. 

But  as  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  describe  in  detail  the 
battle  of  Gravelotte,  nor  any  other,  I  will  speak  of  some 
of  its  incidents  merely.  About  noon,  after  many  prelimin- 
ary skirmishes,  the  action  was  begun  according  to  the  plan 
I  have  already  outlined,  the  Germans  advancing  their  left 
while  holding  on  strongly  with  their  right,  and  it  was  this 
wing  (the  First  Army)  that  came  under  my  observation 
from  the  place  where  the  King's  headquarters  were  located. 
From  here  we  could  see,  as  I  have  said,  the  village  of  Grave- 
lotte. Before  it  lay  the  German  troops,  concealed  to  some 
extent,  especially  to  the  left,  by  clumps  of  timber  here  and 
there.  Immediately  in  front  of  us,  however,  the  ground 
was  open,  and  the  day  being  clear  and  sunny,  with  a  fresh 
breeze  blowing  (else  the  smoke  from  a  battle  between  four 
hundred  thousand  men  would  have  obstructed  the  view 
altogether),  the  spectacle  presented  was  of  unsurpassed 
magnificence  and  sublimity.  The  German  artillery  opened 
the  battle,  and  while  the  air  was  filled  with  shot  and 
shell  from  hundreds  of  guns  along  their  entire  line,  the 

—468— 


Memoirs  P.  H.  Sheridan 

German  centre  and  left,  in  rather  open  order,  moved  out 
to  the  attack,  and  as  they  went  forward  the  reserves,  in 
close  column,  took  up  positions  within  supporting  distances, 
yet  far  enough  back  to  be  out  of  range. 

The  French  artillery  and  mitrailleuses  responded  vig- 
orously to  the  Krupps,  and  with  deadly  effect,  but  as  far 
as  we  could  see  the  German  left  continued  its  advance,  and 
staff-officers  came  up  frequently  to  report  that  all  was  go- 
ing on  well  at  points  hidden  from  our  view.  These  reports 
were  always  made  to  the  King  first,  and  whenever  any- 
body arrived  with  tidings  of  the  fight  we  clustered  around 
to  hear  the  news.  General  Von  Moltke  unfolding  a  map 
meanwhile,  and  explaining  the  situation.  This  done,  the 
chief  of  the  staff,  while  awaiting  the  next  report,  would 
either  return  to  a  seat  that  had  been  made  for  him  with 
some  knapsacks,  or  would  occupy  the  time  walking  about, 
kicking  clods  of  dirt  or  small  stones  here  and  there,  his 
hands  clasped  behind  his  back,  his  face  pale  and  thoughtful. 
He  was  then  nearly  seventy  years  old,  but  because  of  his 
emaciated  figure,  the  deep  wrinkles  in  his  face,  and  the 
crow's-feet  about  his  eyes,  he  looked  even  older,  his  ap- 
pearance being  suggestive  of  the  practice  of  church  asce- 
ticisms rather  than  of  his  well-known  ardent  devotion  to 
the  military  profession. 

By  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  the  steady  progress  of 
the  German  left  and  centre  had  driven  the  French  from 
their  more  advanced  positions  from  behind  stone  walls  and 
hedges,  through  valleys  and  hamlets,  in  the  direction  of 
Metz,  but  as  yet  the  German  right  had  accomplished  little 
except  to  get  possession  of  the  village  of  Gravelotte,  forc- 
ing the  French  across  the  deep  ravine  I  have  mentioned, 
which  runs  north  and  south  a  little  distance  east  of  the 
town. 

But  it  was  now  time  for  the  German  right  to  move  in 
earnest  to  carry  the  Rozerieulles  ridge,  on  which  crest  the 
French  had  evidently  decided  to  make  an  obstinate  fight 
to  cover  their  withdrawal  to  Metz.  As  the  Germans  moved 
to  the  attack  here,  the  French  fire  became  heavy  and  de- 
structive,  so   much  so,   indeed,   as   to   cause   General   Von 

—469— 


Extract 

Steinmetz  to  order  some  cavalry  belonging  to  the  right 
wing  to  make  a  charge.  Crossing  the  ravine  before  des- 
cribed, this  body  of  horse  swept  up  the  slope  beyond,  the 
front  ranks  urged  forward  by  the  momentum  from  behind. 
The  French  were  posted  along  a  sunken  road,  behind  stone 
walls  and  houses,  and  as  the  German  cavalry  neared  these 
obstructions  it  received  a  dreadful  fire  without  the  least 
chance  of  returning  to  it,  though  still  pushed  on  till  the  front 
ranks  were  crowded  into  the  deep  cut  of  the  road.  Here 
the  slaughter  was  terrible,  for  the  horsemen  could  make 
no  further  headway;  and  because  of  the  blockade  behind, 
of  dead  and  wounded  men  and  animals,  an  orderly  retreat 
was  impossible,  and  disaster  inevitable. 

About  the  time  the  charge  was  ordered,  the  phase  of 
the  battle  was  such  that  the  King  concluded  to  move  his 
headquarters  into  the  village  of  Gravelotte ;  and  just  after 
getting  there,  we  first  learned  fully  of  the  disastrous  re- 
sult of  the  charge  which  had  been  entered  upon  with  such 
spirit;  and  so  much  indignation  was  expressed  against. 
Steinmetz,  who,  it  was  claimed,  had  made  an  unnecessary 
sacrifice  of  his  cavalry,  that  I  thought  he  would  be  relieved 
on  the  spot;  though  this  was  not  done. 

Followed  by  a  large  staff.  General  Steinmetz  appeared 
in  the  village  presently,  and  approached  the  King.  When 
near,  he  bowed  with  great  respect,  and  I  then  saw  that  he 
was  a  very  old  man,  though  his  soldierly  figure,  bronzed 
face,  and  short-cropped  hair  gave  some  evidence  of  vigor 
still.  When  the  King  spoke  to  him  I  was  not  close  enough 
to  learn  what  was  said ;  but  his  Majesty's  manner  was  ex- 
pressive of  kindly  feeling,  and  the  fact  that  in  a  few  mo- 
ments the  veteran  general  returned  to  the  command  of  his 
troops,  indicated  that,  for  the  present  at  least,  his  fault 
had  been  overlooked. 

The  King  then  moved  out  of  the  village,  and  just  a 
little  to  the  east  and  north  of  it  the  headquarters  were  lo- 
cated on  high  open  ground,  whence  we  could  observe  the 
right  of  the  German  infantry  advancing  up  the  eastern  face 
of  the  ravine.  The  advance,  though  slow  and  irregular, 
resulted  in  gradually  gaining  ground,  the  French  resisting 

—470— 


Memoirs  P.  H.  Sheridan 

stoutly  with  a  stubborn  musketry  fire  all  along  the  slopes. 
Their  artillery  was  silent,  however;  and  from  this  fact  the 
German  artillery  officers  grew  jubilant,  confidently  assert- 
ing that  their  Krupp  guns  had  dismounted  the  French  bat- 
teries and  knocked  their  machine  guns  to  pieces.  I  did  not 
indulge  in  this  confidence,  however;  for,  with  the  excellent 
field-glass  I  had,  I  could  distinctly  see  long  columns  of 
French  troops  moving  to  their  right,  for  the  apparent  pur- 
pose of  making  a  vigorous  "fight  on  that  flank;  and  I 
thought  it  more  than  likely  that  their  artillery  would  be 
heard  from  before  the  Germans  could  gain  the  coveted 
ridge. 

The  Germans  labored  up  the  glacis  slowly  at  the  most 
exposed  places ;  now  crawling  on  their  bellies,  now  creeping 
on  hands  and  knees,  but,  in  the  main,  moving  with  erect 
and  steady  bearing.  As  they  approached  within  short 
range,  they  suddenly  found  that  the  French  artillery  and 
machine  guns  had  by  no  means  been  silenced — about  two 
hundred  pieces  opening  on  them  with  fearful  effect,  while 
at  the  same  time  the  whole  crest  blazed  with  a  deadly  fire 
from  the  Chassepot  rifles.  Resistance  like  this  was  so  un- 
expected by  the  Germans  that  it  dismayed  them,  and  first 
wavering  a  moment,  then  becoming  panic-stricken,  they 
broke  and  fled,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  coming  down 
the  slope  without  any  pretence  of  formation,  the  French 
hotly  following  and  pouring  in  a  heavy  and  constant  fire 
as  the  fugitives  fled  back  across  the  ravine  toward  Grave- 
lotte.  With  this  the  battle  on  the  right  had  now  assumed 
a  most  serious  aspect,  and  the  indications  were  that  the 
French  would  attack  the  heights  of  Gravelotte;  but  the 
Pomeranian  corps  coming  on  the  field  at  this  crisis,  was 
led  into  action  by  Von  Moltke  himself,  and  shortly  after 
the  day  was  decided  in  favor  of  the  Germans. 

When  the  French  guns  opened  fire,  it  was  discovered 
that  the  King's  position  was  within  easy  range,  many  of 
the  shells  falling  near  enough  to  make  the  place  extremely 
uncomfortable ;  so  it  was  suggested  that  he  go  to  a  less 
exposed  point.  At  first  he  refused  to  listen  to  this  wise 
counsel,  but  yielded  finally — leaving  the  ground  with  reluc- 

—471— 


Extract 

tance,  however  —  and  went  back  toward  Rezonville.  I 
waited  for  Count  Bismarck,  who  did  not  go  immediately 
with  the  King,  but  remained  at  Gravelotte,  looking  after 
some  of  the  escort  who  had  been  wounded.  When  he  had 
arranged  for  their  care,  we  set  out  to  rejoin  the  King,  and 
before  going  far,  overtook  his  Majesty,  who  had  stopped 
on  the  Chalons  road,  and  was  surrounded  by  a  throng  of 
fugitives,  whom  he  was  berating  in  German  so  energetic 
as  to  remind  me  forcibly  of  the  "Dutch"  swearing  that  I 
used  to  hear  in  my  boyhood  in  Ohio.  The  dressing  down 
finished  to  his  satisfaction,  the  King  resumed  his  course 
toward  Rezonville,  halting,  however,  to  rebuke  in  the  same 
emphatic  style  every  group  of  runaways  he  overtook. 

Passing  through  Rezonville,  we  halted  just  beyond 
the  village ;  there  a  fire  was  built,  and  the  King,  his  brother, 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  Von  Roon  were  provided 
with  rather  uncomfortable  seats  about  it,  made  by  resting 
the  ends  of  a  short  ladder  on  a  couple  of  boxes.  With  much 
anxiety  and  not  a  little  depression  of  spirits  news  from 
the  battle-field  was  now  awaited,  but  the  suspense  did  not 
last  long,  for  presently  came  the  cheering  intelligence  that 
the  French  were  retiring,  being  forced  back  by  the  Pom- 
eranian corps,  and  some  of  the  lately  broken  right  wing 
organizations,  that  had  been  rallied  on  the  heights  of 
Gravelotte.  The  lost  ground  being  thus  regained,  and  the 
French  having  been  beaten  on  their  right,  it  was  not  long 
before  word  came  that  Bazaine's  army  was  falling  back  to 
Metz,  leaving  the  entire  battle-field  in  possession  of  the 
Germans. 


—472— 


«»* 


p^ 


Battle  at  Gravelotte  -  StPrivat  la  montagne 

Ausust  18 ,  1870. 
Positions  of  the  Infantry  and  Artillery .VnondVIIlCorpsatS.ooPM 


Scale  1:25000 


11 


GERMAN  ORDERS 

AND 

MESSAGES 


From 

August  lU  to  16,  1870. 


Translated   By 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza, 

Field  Artillery. 


Message  Colombey,  5:30  P.M. 

(August  H-th) 

The  enemy  has  attacked   the   1st   Corps   outposts  with   superior 
forces. 

Zastrow. 


Second  Army 
Orders:  6:30  P.M.  August  Hth. 

The  Xth  Corps  will  assemble  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mosel,  and 
will  provide  for  the  security  of  the  Mosel  valley  in  the  direction  of 
Metz. 

The  Guard  will  assemble  at  Dieulouard  pushing  its  advance  guard 
as  far  as  Quatre-Vents  (on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mosel)  ;  its  cavalry, 
now  at  Rogeville,  will  advance  still  further,  maintaining  liaison  with 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division. 

The  IVth  Corps  will  march  to  Custines,  pushing  its  advance 
guard  and  cavalry  to  Marbache,  maintaining  connection  on  the  left 
with  the  Third  Army. 

On  the  right  flank  of  the  army,  the  Illd  Corps,  with  the  6th 
Cavalry  Division  will  march  on  the  15th  to  Cheminot  (on  the  Seille), 
in  so  far  as  this  has  not  already  been  done  on  the  14th. 

The  IXth  Corps  will  remain  at  Buchy,  so  as  to  be  also  at  the 
disposition  of  the  C  in  C*  on  the  15th  in  case  of  a  battle  on  this 
side  of  the  Mosel. 

The  Hid  Corps  will  have  its  head  as  far  as  Han-sur-Nied. 

The  Xllth  Corps  (Royal  Saxon)  will  have  its  head  reach  Nomeny 
(on  the  Seille)   and  its  tail  near  the  high  ground  near  Soigne. 


*Note:  The  C-in-C  referred  to  is  the  Army  Commander — C.  H.  L. 


—473— 


GERMAN  ORDERS 
AND 

MESSAGES 


From 

Augitsft  IJf  to  16,  1870. 


Translated   By 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza, 

Field  Artillery. 


Message  Colombey,  5:30  P.M. 

{August  l^th) 

The   enemy  has  attacked  the   1st   Corps   outposts  with   superior 
forces. 

Zastrow. 


Second  Army 
Orders:  6:30  P.M.  August  Hth. 

The  Xth  Corps  will  assemble  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mosel,  and 
will  provide  for  the  security  of  the  Mosel  valley  in  the  direction  of 
Metz. 

The  Guard  will  assemble  at  Dieulouard  pushing  its  advance  guard 
as  far  as  Quatre-Vents  (on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mosel)  ;  its  cavalry, 
now  at  Rogeville,  will  advance  still  further,  maintaining  liaison  with 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division. 

The  IVth  Corps  will  march  to  Custines,  pushing  its  advance 
guard  and  cavalry  to  Marbache,  maintaining  connection  on  the  left 
with  the  Third  Army. 

On  the  right  flank  of  the  army,  the  Hid  Corps,  with  the  6th 
Cavalry  Division  will  march  on  the  15th  to  Cheminot  (on  the  Seille), 
in  so  far  as  this  has  not  already  been  done  on  the  14th. 

The  IXth  Corps  will  remain  at  Buchy,  so  as  to  be  also  at  the 
disposition  of  the  C  in  C*  on  the  15th  in  case  of  a  battle  on  this 
side  of  the  Mosel. 

The  Hid  Corps  will  have  its  head  as  far  as  Han-sur-Nied. 

The  Xllth  Corps  (Royal  Saxon)  will  have  its  head  reach  Nomeny 
(on  the  Seille)    and  its  tail  near  the  high  ground  near  Soigne. 

*Note:  The  C-in-C  referred  to  is  the  Army  Commander — C.  H.  L. 


-473— 


German  Orders  and  Messages 

Message  Near    Tronville 

To  IlD  Army.  1:00  P.M.,  August  15th. 

Having  arrived  at  Tronville  at  noon  today  I  encountered  superior 
hostile  cavalry  and  artillery,  who  are  now  retiring  towards  Metz. 
Our  light  cavalry  is  moving  still  closer  to  Metz.  Bredow's  brigade 
will  according  to  all  information  follow  me.  I  intend  to  remain  at 
Tronville,  or  beyond  it  towards  Metz.  I  have  no  connection  yet  with 
the  First  Army. 

Rheinbaben, 


Second  Army 
Orders:  7:00  P.M.,  August  15th. 

Yesterday  evening,  part  of  the  First  Army  and  the  18th  In- 
fantry Division  attacked  the  enemy  before  Metz,  and  threw  him 
back  on  that  place. 

The  French  Army  has  commenced  its  retreat  towards  the  Meuse. 
The  Second  Army  will  consequently  follow  the  enemy  v/ithout  delay 
towards  that  river. 

The  Hid  Corps,  in  compliance  with  instructions  already  given 
will  cross  the  Mosel  below  Pont-a-Mousson,  so  as  to  reach  tomorrow, 
via  Noveant-sur-Mosel  either  Mars-la-Tour  or  Vionville.  Its  head- 
quarters will  be  at  Mars-la-Tour.  The  6th  Cavalry  Division  will 
proceed  from  Pagny  via  Pi'egny  and  Thiaucourt  towards  the  road 
in  question.  If  the  Trains  can  not  cross  over  the  suspension  bridge*, 
they  are  authorized  to  cross  over  the  stone  bridge  at  Pont-a-Mousson 
until  7:00  A.M.  tomorrow  but  no  later,  and  then  proceed  down  the 
Mosel  by  the  river  road.  The  Hid  Corps  ponton  bridge  is  reserved 
until  further  orders,  and  with  the  usual  security  measures,  to  the 
IXth  Corps,  so  as  to  enclose  Metz. 

The  Xth  Corps,  which  preceded  by  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  has 
today  in  part  reached  Thiaucourt,  will  tomorrow  continue  its  march 
by  the  Verdun  road,  to  about  Saint  Hilaire;  Maizeray,  and  will  recall 
as  promptly  as  possible  its  detachments  in  rear  at  Pont-a-Mousson 
and  in  the  Mosel  valley.  Its  headquarters  will  if  possible  be  at  Saint 
Hilaire.  The  cavalry  will  reconnoiter  beyond  Haudiomont  and 
Vigneulles. 

The  Xllth  Corps  (Royal  Saxon)  will  march  tomorrow  from 
Nomeny  to  Pont-a-Mousson,  pushing  its  advance  guard  as  far  as 
Regnieville-en-Haye,  its  tail  closing  up  to  Pont-a-Mousson,  where 
the  corps  will  be  billeted  in  mass,  and  where  its  headquarters  will  be. 
The  cavalry  division  will  advance  toward  the  Meuse  towards  Vig- 
neulles and  to  the  south  as  far  as  Buxerulles;  it  will  connect  on  the 
right  with  the  5th  Cavalry  Division,  and  on  the  left  with  the  Guard 
Cavalry  Division. 

The  Xllth  Corps  may  cross  the  Mosel  at  Pont-a-Mousson  after 
7:00  A.M.  using  the  stone  bridge,  and  earlier  than  this  hour  over  the 
military  bridge. 

The  Guard  Corps  will  push  its  advance  guard  tomorrow  as  far 
as  Hambucourt;  main  body  and  headquarters  (which  will  follow  the 
route  Villers-en-Haye  and  Rogeville— will  be  billeted  in  the  vicinity 
of  Bernecourt.  The  cavalry  which  will  be  pushed  in  advance  will 
connect  on  the  right  through  Buxerulles  with  the  Royal  Saxon  Cav- 
alry Division. 


*This  bridge  unites  Corny  and  Noveant.— C.   H.  L. 

__474— 


August  14  to  16,  1870 

The  IVth  Corps  will  push  its  advance  guard  from  Marbache  to 
Jaillon,  via  Saizerais.  The  tail  of  the  corps  will  close  up  on  Mar- 
bache; headquarters  will  be  billeted  at  Saizerais.  Effort  will  be  made 
to  obtain  communication  towards  Nancy  with  the  right  of  the  Third 
Army. 

The  IXth  Corps  will  proceed  tomorrow  to  the  vicinity  of  Sillegny 
where  its  headquarters  will  be;  it  will  cross  the  Mosel  the  day  after 
tomorrow  at  Noveant  on  the  Illd  Corps  ponton  bridge,*  and  follow 
this  corps  towards  Gorze. 

The  lid  Corps  will  have  tomorrow  the  head  of  its  column  near 
Soigne;  and  will  close  up  its  infantry  as  much  as  possible,  except 
that  Soigne  will  be  occupied  by  G.H.Q.  of  His  Majesty  the  King, 
which  at  present  is  at  Henry,  with  a  view  to  crossing  the  Mosel  at 
Pont-a-Mousson   on   the   following   day.      Headquarters:    Buchy. 

Cavalry  divisions  preceding  the  army  should  reconnoiter  as 
they  advance  the  approaches  and  exits  of  the  Meuse.  The  5th  Cav- 
alry Division  will  reconnoiter  for  the  Xth,  Illd  and  IXth  Corps  the 
crossings  at  Dieu-sur-Meuse  and  at  Genicourt;  the  Royal  Saxon  Cav- 
alry Division  will  reconnoiter  for  the  Xllth  Corps  the  crossing  at  Ban- 
oncourt;  finally  the  Guard  Cavalry  Division  will  reconnoiter  for  the 
Guard  Corps  the  crossings  at  Saint  Mihiel;  Pont-sur-Meuse  and 
Commercy.     Reports  will  be  sent  to  me  as  soon  as  possible. 

My  headquarters  will  remain  tomorrow  at  Pont-a-Mousson. 

On  account  of  the  long  marches  required  by  the  military  situa- 
tion, I  recommend  to  the  Corps  to  form  provisional  companies  out  of 
the  men  incapable  of  marching  further,  adding  thereto  such  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  as  are  necessary,  and  to  leave  these  in 
rear  to  garrison  the  principal  points  on  the  line  of  march,  reporting 
to  the  commander  of  the  Line  of  Communications — who  is  at  present 
at  Delme,  and  will  be  from  the  17th  instant  at  Pont-a-Mousson. 

The  commander  Line  of  Communications  will  be  directed  to 
relieve  these  garrison  troops  and  order  them  to  rejoin.  Horses  unfit 
to  march  will  also  be  left  with  these  garrisons,  with  such  men  to  take 
care  of  them  as  may  be  necessary. 

Frederick-Charles. 
General  of  Cavalry. 


Illd  Corps 
Orders:  August  15,  1870. 

1.  The  6th  Division  will  march  at  5:00  a.m.,  via  Onville  to  Mars- 
la-Tour,  and  will  be  followed  by  the  Corps  Artillery   (Left  Column). 

2.  The  6th  Cavalry  Division  will  clear  the  bridge  at  Noveant  by 
5:30  A.M.  and  will  march  via  Gorze  on  Vionville;  it  will  be  followed 
by  the  5th  Division  (Right  Column). 

Von  Alvensleben. 

Note:  The  6th  Cavalry  Division  having  found  it  necessary 
to  cross  the  Noveant  bridge  in  column  of  troopers,  dismounted,  failed 
to  clear  the  bridge  until  7:30  a.m. — C.H.L. 


*Note:  There  was  also  a  permanent  bridge  available  at  Noveant. 
Army  headquarters  appears  to  have  erroneously  assumed  that  this 
bridge  was  interrupted. — C.  H.  L. 


—475— 


German  Orders  and  Messages 

Message  South    of    Vionville, 

To   IId  Army:  10:00  A.M.,  August  15,  1870. 

Hostile  camps  are  at  Vionville  and  at  Rezonville;  the  left  of  the 
Illd  Corps  is  advancing  on  Jarny,  with  a  view^  to  proceeding  to  Con- 
flans.  The  5th  Cavalry  Division  is  at  Mars-la-Tour ;  the  6th  at 
Rezonville.     The  enemy  is  in  full  retreat  to  the  north. 

Von  Alvensleben. 

Note:  The  above  message  w^as  carried  by  an  aide,  v^^ho  upon 
delivering  it  at  the  lid  Army  PC,  dictated  the  following  memorandum: 

"As  the  enemy  is  retreating  in  front  of  the  Illd  Corps,  the  corps 
will  pursue  rapidly,  engaging  its  left  wing  first.  It  will  maintain 
liaison  with  the  Xth  Corps. 

"The  Xth  Corps,  which  at  noon  tomorrow  will  be  at  Mars-la-Tour 
should  cover  our  right  flank  towards  Metz,  and  in  a  general  v/ay 
assist  where  necessary  troops   engaged." 


Message  PC  lid  Army 

To  C.  G.  IXth  Corps.  August  16,  1870. 

The  Illd  Corps  since  10:00  a.m.  is  pursuing  the  enemy,  who  ap- 
pears to  be  retreating  towards  the  north.  Important  that  the  IXth 
Corps  occupy  Mars-la-Tour  early,  and  from  today  cover  the  right 
flank  of  the  Illd  Corps  towards  Metz,  and  be  in  a  general  way 
ready  to  support  that  corps. 

Frederick-Charles. 


—476— 


EXTRACT  FROM 


The  Siege  Operations  in  the  Campaign 
Against  France  1870-71 


By 

B.  von  Tiedemann 


Translated  by 

Major  Tyler,  R.E. 


London,   1877. 

^  ^  :\i  ^  ^  ii:  :>^ 

Strasburg 

(Plate  VII) 

Strasburg,  the  capital'  of  Alsace,  with  85,000  inhabi- 
tants, lies  about  half  a  league  from  the  Rhine  on  the  River 
111,  which  has  abundance  of  water,  is  navigable,  and  divides 
itself  into  five  •  streams.  It  is  a  fortress  of  the  highest 
military  importance.  It  commands  the  passage  over  the 
Rhine  into  Germany,  and  has  on  that  account  been  connected 
with  Metz  and  Paris  on  the  one  side,  and  with  Lyons  on 
the  other  side,  by  railways,  roads  and  canals.  It  is,  more- 
over, an  important  cavalry  depot  and  contains  a  gun-fac- 
tory, and  an  arsenal  for  the  manufacture  of  carriages  and 
artillery  stores. 

The  nucleus  of  the  defences  is  the  citadel,  with  its  five 
bastioned  fronts,  built  by  Marshal  Vauban  in  1685 ;  and  this 
is  further  strengthened  by  two  advanced  hornworks,  and 
a  number  of  smaller  works  down  to  the  Rhine,  which  is 
here  500  yards  in  width.  These  command  the  enceinte.  On 
the  north  and  south  the   town  is  enclosed  by  an  enceinte 

—477— 


Siege  Operations 

with  long  curtain  and  spacious  bastions,  on  the  system  of 
Specie,  which  terminate  on  the  parade-ground  outside  the 
citadel.  At  the  places  where  the  National  gate  and  the 
Stone  gate  are  situated,  the  defences  project  further  out  into 
the  country,  so  as  to  cover  the  roads  from  Wasselonne  and 
Mclsheim,  and  particularly  that  from  Weissenburg,  by  means 
of  advanced  earthworks  among  which  are  the  lunettes  52 
and  53,  often  mentioned  in  the  siege.  The  main  enceinte  of 
the  west  front  is  of  the  same  character  as  the  line  already 
described,  except  that  bastions  Nos.  10,  11,  and  12,  at  the 
north-west  angle,  have  counterguards  for  additional  secur- 
ity. Two  spacious  hornworks  are  placed  outside  the  west 
front  so  as  to  give  it  greater  defensive  strength.  These 
and  the  two  lunettes  52  and  53  are  connected  by  a  glacis 
common  to  both,  which  encloses  the  north  and  south  fronts 
in  a  suitable  manner.  The  profiles  are  designed  with  regard 
to  the  objects  of  the  works.  The  escarps  are  18  to  30  feet 
in  height,  according  to  the  importance  of  the  work.  On 
this  account,  and  as  the  ditches  are  provided  with  cunettes, 
and  can  be  filled  with  sufficient  water,  the  fortress  is  to  be 
accounted  everywhere  proof  against  assault.  The  greater 
number  of  the  traverses  required  are  in  existence,  but  the 
quantity  of  bombproof  cover  for  troops,  warlike  stores,  and 
provisions  is  insufficient.    There  are  no  detached  forts. 

Strasburg  possesses  an  additional  means  of  defence  in 
the  power  of  making  use  of  the  111  for  partial  but  effective 
inundation.  For  this  purpose,  at  the  spot  where  the  111 
enters  the  town,  a  large  sluice  is  fixed.  This,  and  the  num- 
erous other  works  for  the  proper  management  and  control 
of  the  water,  are  in  good  condition,  and  in  situations  so  well 
covered,  that  they  cannot  easily  be  destroyed  by  distant 
fire.  The  ground  in  front  of  the  south  side  of  the  fortress 
consists  for  the  most  part  of  low-lying  meadows  intersected 
by  numerous  watercourses.  It  can  be  placed  under  water 
for  a  considerable  distance  beyond  the  road,  and  the  artil- 
lery practice  ground.  This  is  also  practicable  with  the  low 
ground  along  the  foot  of  the  glacis  of  the  north  front,  and 
with  the  glacis  of  the  enceinte  of  the  north-west  front. 


—478- 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

The  ground  in  front  of  the  fortress  is  flat,  and  here 
and  there  the  view  is  interrupted  by  numerous  buildings, 
and  by  plantations. 

On  the  west  front,  however,  the  ground  rises,  at  a 
slope  scarcely  perceptible,  to  the  spurs  of  the  Vosges  moun- 
tains, about  a  league  and  a  half  from  the  town. 

The  railway  which  encircles  the  town  on  the  south 
and  west  has  two  stations — a  terminus  inside  the  town,  and 
a  stopping  place  outside,  at  the  Austerlitz  gate.  There  is 
a  third  station  outside  the  town  to  the  westward.  Fre- 
quent mention  will  be  made  of  it  during  the  siege.  The  rail- 
way crosses  several  streams  running  into  the  Rhine  and 
passes  over  the  river  itself  by  a  lattice-bridge,  309  metres 
(338  yards)  long,  built  in  1858-61.  The  two  banks  are  also 
connected  by  a  bridge  of  boats. 

The  interior  of  the  town  shows  plainly  its  German  orig- 
in and  past  history.  Both  are  as  evident  in  its  architecture 
as  in  the  manners  and  customs,  both  public  and  private, 
of  its  inhabitants.  The  magnificent  cathedral  is  especially 
interesting,  and  is  famous  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
monuments  of  German  architecture.  It  was  founded  in  510 
by  Clovis,  destroyed  by  lightning  in  1007,  restored  upon 
the  plans  of  Erwin  von  Steinbach,  and  completed  in  1489 
by  Hans  Hultz,  of  Cologne. 

Commerce  is  flourishing,  owing  to  the  advantages  of 
the  situation  of  the  place.  The  junction  of  four  lines  of 
railway,  and  of  the  roads  from  Paris,  Lyons,  and  Basle,  the 
water-carriage  by  the  Rhone,  Rhine  and  Marne  canal  and 
the  proximity  of  the  Rhine,  are  of  great  value  for  com- 
mercial  intercourse. 

Immediately  after  the  sudden  and  groundless  declara- 
tion of  war  with  Prussia  by  France,  it  seemed  as  if  Stras- 
burg  was  to  be  left  untouched  by  the  war,  for  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  French  invasion  of  Germany  and  attack  on 
Cologne  must  be  begun  with  the  right  flank  turned  towards 
Rhenish  Bavaria.  But  when  Southern  Germany  ranged  it- 
self on  the  Prussian  side,  the  situation  of  affairs  was  changed. 
It  became  necessary  for  the  French  armies  to  march 
off  hastily  in  a  new  direction,  and  it  became  more  probable 

—479— 


Siege  Operations 

that  Strasburg  might  be  seriously  threatened.  All  the  ac- 
counts state  that  before  the  battle  of  Worth,  the  6th  Corps, 
under  the  command  of  Marshal  Canrobert,  was  in  and  around 
Strasburg.  After  the  battle  was  lost  the  corps  marched 
off  in  the  direction  of  Metz,  and  the  garrison  of  Strasburg 
was  thus  so  reduced  that  the  place  was  left  in  a  bad  plight. 
Not  even  one  company  of  engineers  was  left  in  the  now- 
threatened  fortress,  and  its  garrison  consisted  chiefly  of 
national  guards.  A  great  number  of  stragglers  from  the 
battle  of  Worth  found  accordingly  a  welcome  reception  at 
Strasburg,  and  its  gates  also  opened  for  the  reception  of 
many  thousands  of  fugitive  country-people.  The  bridge 
of  boats  was  broken  up,  and  on  the  22nd  of  July  the  railway 
lattice-bridge  was  blown  up,  and  on  the  Baden  side  of  the 
river.  On  the  French  side  they  only  brought  the  swing- 
bridge  on  to  the  landward  piers,  and,  in  addition,  destroyed 
several  railway-bridges  over  the  Little  Rhine,  at  Neuhof 
and  elsewhere.  The  preparations  for  putting  the  works  and 
armaments  in  a  state  of  siege  were  just  commenced,  when 
the  enemy  appeared  in  the  vicinity  of  the  fortress. 

After  the  battle  fought  by  the  Illd  Army  on  the  6th 
August,  at  Worth,  the  pursuit  of  the  retreating  French  was 
the  first  object.  The  division  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Ba- 
den, which  stood  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  army,  and  had 
not  been  actually  engaged  in  the  fight,  received  orders  to 
advance  into  Alsace,  and  in  the  first  instance  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Strasburg. 

On  the  8th  August  the  head  of  the  division  arrived  be- 
fore Strasburg.  It  was  believed  that  the  fortress  was  oc- 
cupied almost  exclusively  by  national  guards,  and  it  was 
well  known  that  the  preparation  of  the  works  for  a  siege 
was  incomplete.  Lieutenant-General  von  Beyer,  command- 
ing the  division,  remained  with  the  main  body  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  a  league  and  a  half  from  Strasburg,  and  sent 
Major  von  Amerongen  into  the  fortress,  in  order  to  repre- 
sent to  the  commandant  the  serious  disasters  of  the  French 
army  in  the  field,  and  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  place. 
The  commandant,  however,  roughly  refused  the  demand, 
and  after  this  the  advance  guard  employed  upon  this  re- 

—480— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

connaissance  withdrew  to  Brumath.  The  garrison  permit- 
ted the  enemy  to  advance  undisturbed  up  to  the  glacis,  and 
made  no  attempt  to  destroy  the  railways  or  telegraphs  to 
Muhlhaus  and  Lyons,  and  this  was  now  effected  by  us.  A 
cavalry  detachment  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden,  under 
the  command  of  Lieutenant  Winsloe,  on  the  10th  August 
destroyed  the  railway  at  Geispoldsheim,  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  [three-and-a-half  English  miles]  south  of  Strasburg. 
Meanwhile  the  main  body  of  the  division  approached,  so  that 
on  the  12th  August  the  troops  had  taken  up  their  positions 
for  the  investment.  These  extended  round  the  whole  of 
the  ground  outside  the  fortress,  except  on  the  south  side, 
where  the  work  was  done  by  some  bodies  of  troops  from 
Rastatt,  who  had  crossed  the  Rhine  to  the  south  of  Stras- 
burg. Kehl  was  occupied,  and  the  communication  with  Col- 
mar  broken.  The  French  did  not  allo^y  themselves  to  be  dis- 
turbed in  their  preparations  for  a  siege,  on  the  glacis  and 
the  ground  beyond.  They  worked  on  at  the  construction 
of  traverses,  the  preparation  of  the  ramparts  for  defense, 
and  the  removal  of  the  plantations  on  the  glacis,  as  well 
as  at  palisades  and  barricades  for  the  approaches.  For  the 
purpose  of  interrupting  these  works  three  slight  engage- 
ments took  place  on  the  13th  August. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  some  selected  marksmen 
were  sent  up  to  the  glacis,  and  materially  interrupted  the 
works  there,  without  being  disturbed  by  the  heavy  fire  of 
artillery  from  the  ramparts.  About  1  a.  m.,  a  company  of 
the  2nd  Baden  grenadiers  (the  King  of  Prussia's)  advanced 
in  the  same  direction,  in  order  to  drive  back  some  parties 
of  infantry,  who  had  meanwhile  come  out  from  the  fortress 
to  the  foot  of  the  glacis.  A  musketry  fight  commenced,  and 
by  this  means  the  object  was  successfully  accomplished. 
The  company,  after  the  performances  of  their  duty,  were, 
in  returning,  followed  by  a  heavy  fire  of  case  and  musketry, 
and  had  three  killed  and  eleven  wounded — among  the  latter 
one  ofiicer. 

In  another  direction  two  small  detachments  of  the  body 
guard  grenadiers  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  each  led 
by  a  lieutenant,  and  provided  with  combustibles,  advanced 

—481— 


Siege  Operations 

at  9  o'clock  in  the  evening  against  the  railway-station  out- 
side the  western  gate,  and  set  fire  to  a  loaded  railway-train 
that  was  standing  there.  Two  sections  of  infantry  followed 
quickly  up  to  the  counterscarp  of  the  ditch,  delivered  their 
fire  at  the  troops  who  appeared  on  the  ramparts  and  at  the 
guns  standing  there,  and  quickly  retired  again.  A  field- 
battery  meanwhile  was  brought  up  to  2,500  paces  from  the 
fortress,  and  fired  upon  the  works  which  were  lighted  up  by 
the  flaming  railway-trucks.  The  enemy  upon  this  com- 
menced a  persistent  but  perfectly  useless  fire.  At  a  third 
place,  as  early  as  11  o'clock  in  the  forenoon,  a  company  of 
the  5th  (Baden)  regiment  had  been  for  an  hour  under  fire 
employed  in  the  demolition  of  the  enemy's  works  without 
experiencing  any  loss. 

On  the  14th  August  intelligence  was  received  of  the 
issue,  on  the  10th  of  that  month,  of  the  following  procla- 
mation by  the  Commandant-in-Chief,  Divisional-General 
Uhrich : — 

"To  the  Inhabitants    of  Strasburg! 

"Disquieting  rumors,  and  fearful  reports,  have  been,  intention- 
ally or  unintentionally,  spread  through  our  brave  city.  Some  people 
have  even  ventured  to  assert  that  it  will  surrender  without  resis- 
tance. 

"We  therefore  protest,  in  the  name  of  the  courageous  French 
population,  against  such  cowardly  and  criminal  weakness.  The  ram- 
parts are  furnished  with  400  guns;  the  garrison  counts  11,000  men, 
besides  national  guards.  If  Strasburg  be  attacked,  Strasburg  will  be 
defended  so  long  as  it  contains  a  soldier,  a  loaf,  and  a  cartridge. 
Let  the  well-disposed  be  calm;  let  the  others  go  where  they  will. 

"Strasburg,  August  10,  1870. 
"The  Divisional  General  and  Commander-in-chief , 

"Ehrich. 

"The  Prefect  of  the  Lower  Rhine, 

Baron  Pron." 

On  the  14th  August,  at  5  o'clock  in  the  morning,  a 
company  of  the  5th  (Baden)  regiment  attacked  the  railway- 
station,  and  opened  fire  from  the  railway  embankment  up- 
on the  workmen  on  the  glacis.  The  fire  was  answered  by 
some  of  the  guns  of  the  place,  and  the  company  suffered  a 
loss  of  three  severely  and  two  slightly  wounded. 

In  the  course  of  the  day  General  von  Beyer  gave  over 
the  command  of  the  (Baden)  division  to  General  the  Baron 

—482— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

von  La  Roche,  commanding  the  cavalry  brigade.  The  di- 
vision was  placed  under  the  orders  of  Lieutenant-General 
von  Werder,  of  the  Prussian  Army,  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  army  corps  about  to  be  formed  for  the  siege. 

In  the  evening  the  garrison  attempted  a  sortie  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  English  country-house  near  Hohn- 
heim. 

On  the  15th  August,  at  4  a.  m.,  the  Baden  pioneers 
blew  up  the  iron  bridge  which  leads  over  the  Rhine-Marne 
canal  to  Robertsaue,  below  the  orangery.  Field  artillery 
fired  from  covered  positions  at  the  works  of  defence  that 
had  been  thrown  up,  in  order  to  destroy  them,  while  under 
cover  of  the  darkness  riflemen  swaiTned  close  up  to  the 
ramparts,  causing  frequent  alarms  to  the  garrison.  Lingolf- 
sheim,  Wolfsheim,  Schiltigheim,  and  Robertsaue  were  al- 
ready occupied  by  the  besiegers,  so  that  the  place  was 
closely  invested  on  the  west  and  north,  and  on  the  south 
as  far  as  to  Ostwald.  In  their  possession  were  the  railway 
stations  of  Brumath  (to  Nancy  and  Metz),  Mutzig,  and 
Colmar,  and  the  highroads  to  Sels,  Hagenau,  Zabern,  Barre, 
Colmar,  and  Basle.  The  communications  of  Strasburg  with 
the  country  were  as  good  as  cut  off.  It  was  suspected  that 
an  underground  telegraph  line  existed  to  Schlettstadt,  7^ 
miles  (35  English  miles)  distant. 

August  16. — Headquarters  transferred  to  Mundols- 
heim. 

About  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  French  attempted 
a  sortie  in  greater  force,  with  about  1,500  men,  in  order  to 
drive  back  the  enemy  near  Illkirch,  a  league  southeast  of 
Strasburg.  The  8th  company  of  the  3rd  (Baden)  regiment, 
under  Captain  Kappler,  had  pushed  forward  a  picket  from 
Illkirch  over  the  bridge  of  the  Rhone  canal  at  that  place. 
About  2  p.  m.  a  French  squadron  attacked  them  but  were 
repulsed.  Immediately  the  enemy's  infantry  showed  them- 
selves, while  a  heavy  fire  was  opened  against  the  bridge  over 
the  canal ;  and  a  detachment  of  the  enemy's  artillery  shelled 
Illkirch  from  a  position  in  rear,  and  set  fire  to  some  of  the 
buildings  there.  At  the  commencement  of  this  attack  Cap- 
tain Kappler  had  posted  his  whole  company  on  the  bridge 

—483— 


Siege  Operations 

of  the  canal,  and  sent  forward  two  strong  non-commissioned 
officers'  patrols  by  Grafensteden,  and  by  the  locks  to  the 
northward  at  Ostwald  respectively,  to  take  the  enemy  in 
flank.  Major  Steinwachs,  commanding  the  battalion,  sent 
immediately  out  of  Ostwald  the  5th  and  6th  companies, 
under  Captains  Nagel  and  Selteneck,  as  well  as  Gobel's 
battery.  Kappler's  company  had  for  half-an-hour  answered 
the  enemy's  fire  with  great  coolness  and  steadiness,  when 
the  enemy's  artillery  advanced  to  within  250  paces  of  the 
bridge  over  the  canal,  and  came  into  action.  The  comman- 
der of  the  company  then  caused  a  short  and  rapid,  but  ef- 
fective, fire  to  be  delivered,  and,  as  the  supports  had  by  this 
time  come  up,  attacked  with  the  bayonet.  The  enemy  did 
not  stand  to  receive  this  attack,  but  took  to  flight,  leaving 
behind  3  guns,  8  wounded  and  3  unwounded  prisoners,  and 
20  killed,  as  well  as  several  articles  of  their  equipment. 
This  brilliant  success  cost  the  brave  company  but  2  wound- 
ed. A  subdivision  of  Gobel's  battery  now  crossed  the  bridge 
over  the  canal  and  shelled  Weghausel,  in  which  place  the 
enemy  had  rallied  on  his  retreat.  The  5th  and  6th  com- 
panies, who  then  undertook  the  pursuit  could  not  again 
come  up  with  the  enemy,  who  were  estimated  to  amount  to 
about  1,500  men— zouaves,  turcos,  chasseurs,  and  artillery. 

August  17. — The  French  attempted  a  second  sortie 
against  the  Robertsaue,  but  were  beaten  back.  On  the  Ger- 
man side  the  most  exposed  parts  of  the  besiegers'  positions 
were  prepared  for  defense  in  a  proper  and  suitable  manner, 
and  the  approaches  were  barricaded.  Field-hospitals  were 
established  in  Brumath,  Vendenheim,  Oberhausbergen,  and 
Hohnheim.  Prussian  railway  and  Baden  telegraph  officials 
took  over  the  duties  of  their  respective  branches.  The  neigh- 
bourhood was  requisitioned  for  labourers  and  intrenching 
tools,  and  in  some  places  resistance  was  made  and  illwill 
was  shown.  This  was  the  case  in  the  rich  towns  of  Ernstein 
and  Morstein,  which  had  in  consequence  to  pay  a  contribu- 
tion, first  of  150,000  francs  (£6,000),  and  in  the  end  of 
300,000  francs  (£12,000). 

In  the  forenoon  fire  was  opened  from  the  Baden  field- 
batteries,  which  had  taken  up  a  position  in  a  line  with  Kehl. 

—484— 


Campaign  Against  Fiance  1870-71 

The  fire  continued  all  day,  and  was  briskly  answered  by  the 
garrison.  During  the  previous  night  a  sharp  action  of 
artillery  and  infantry  took  place  between  Konigshofen  and 
Strasburg,  and  outside  the  west  front.  Several  houses  were 
set  on  fire  there  by  the  shells. 

August  18. — Konigshofen  was  consequently  brought 
within  the  line  of  investment,  after  a  short  action  of  ar- 
tillery. The  fire  from  Kehl  was  continued.  On  the  night  of 
the  18th-19th  August  the  Baden  artillery  took  up  a  posi- 
tion close  to  the  road  from  Lingolfsheim  to  Strasburg 
and  set  on  fire  some  of  the  houses  at  Strasburg  at  the  first 
shot,  and  the  flames  spread  rapidly.  The  enemy  answered 
with   24-pounder  solid  shot. 

August  19. — The  fire  was  kept  up  from  16  field-guns, 
chiefly  against  the  citadel  and  the  adjoining  fronts.  It  was 
opened  at  7  a.  m.,  stopped  from  12  till  2  o'clock,  and  con- 
tinued again  till  evening. 

The  fire  was  of  course  answered  by  the  artillery  of  the 
garrison,  who  however,  shelled  not  only  the  batteries,  but 
also  the  town  of  Kehl,  which  lay  exposed,  beyond  the  line  of 
fire.  Lieutenant-General  von  Werder,  commanding  the 
siege  corps,  remonstrated  against  this  conduct  in  a  letter, 
in  which  he  said:  "Such  a  mode  of  warfare,  which  is  un- 
heard of  among  civilized  nations,  compels  me  to  make  you 
personally  responsible  for  the  consequences  of  this  action. 
I  shall,  moveover,  cause  the  damage  to  be  estimated,  and 
obtain  compensation  by  a  contribution  levied  in  Alsace." 

These  valuations  were,  in  fact,  made  in  Kehl,  and  Gen- 
eral Uhrich  is  said  to  have  replied  that  he  regarded  the  bom- 
bardment of  the  city  of  Kehl  as  reprisals,  on  account  of  the 
city  of  Strasburg  having  been  shelled  by  the  besiegers'  ar- 
tillery without  the  usual  notice  being  sent  beforehand.  Ac- 
cording to  other  accounts,  however  (and  this  should  be 
noted),  Lieutenant-General  von  Werder,  on  the  contrary, 
threatened  to  bombard  the  place  fourteen  days  beforehand, 
and  caused  the  proper  notice  to  be  sent  24  hours  before  the 
firing  began.  It  was  clearly,  therefore,  the  business  of  the 
French  authorities  to  pass  this  notice  on  to  the  citizens,  and 
it  was  their  fault  that  the  inhabitants  had  not  sufficient  time 

—485— 


Siege  Operations 

to  prepare  for  the  bombardment,  and  were  therefore  taken 
by  surprise. 

It  should,  moreover,  be  observed,  that  in  the  absence  of 
any  detached  forts  round  Strasburg,  the  besieger  was  able 
to  place  his  batteries  comparatively  close  to  the  fortress, 
and  that,  if  he  wanted  to  fire  upon  the  works  at  all;  it  was 
quite  inevitable  that  the  town  should  also  be  struck,  and 
should  suffer  terribly. 

On  the  19th  of  August  fourteen  houses  were  burnt  down 
in  the  city  of  Kehl  (Stadt  Kehl) ,  and  the  fire  did  still  greater 
damage,  comparatively,  in  the  adjoining  village  of  Kehl 
(Dorf  Kehl).  In  the  former  place  the  church  was  turned 
into  a  hospital.  Several  shells  fell  close  to  the  Baden  tem- 
porary hospital  constructed  in  Dorf  Kehl. 

In  the  part  of  Kehl  near  the  Rhine,  especially  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Fingach  brewery,  the  brewery  itself, 
the  Palmen  brewery,  and  several  houses  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  upper  classes,  were  destroyed.  The  Manner-Hilfs- 
verein  (Humane  Society)  of  Kehl  worked  with  great  self- 
sacrifice  at  extinguishing  the  flames,  and  those  of  the  in- 
habitants who  could  sought  refuge  in  the  neighboring  vil- 
lages. 

The  bombardment  of  Strasburg  from  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine  continued,  and  the  result  was  that  a  more  serious 
fire  broke  out  in  the  Weisse  Thurstrasse  (White  Tower 
street) .  The  desire,  on  this  account,  of  the  inhabitants  for 
a  surrender  was  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  commandant, 
but  without  effect.  As  it  had  become  necessary  to  obtain 
French  surgeons  for  the  French  wounded,  a  flag  of  truce 
with  a  trumpeter  was  sent  into  the  fortress ;  but  as  they  were 
both  fired  at,  and  the  latter  wounded,  the  design  had  to  be 
abandoned. 

A  company  of  the  2nd  Baden  grenadiers,  under  the 
command  of  Captain  Hilpert,  had  prepared  for  defence  the 
outskirts  of  the  village  of  Schiltigheim,  on  the  side  next 
the  fortress. 

Towards  evening  the  French  made  a  sortie  with  two 
companies  against  the  outskirts  of  the  village,  but  were  re- 
pulsed.   The  enemy  lost  three  men  killed  and  eight  wounded, 

—486— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

and  Ruth's  company  of  the  4th  Baden  regiment,  posted  in 
reserve  on  the  Kirch-platz,  pursued  them  as  far  as  the 
glacis.  The  bursting  of  one  of  the  sluices  in  the  place  caused 
temporary  damage  to  the  inundation-works  of  the  fortress, 
but  it  was  soon  repaired. 

August  20. — The  investing  force  began  to  make  more 
extended  arrangements  for  defence  at  Schiltigheim,  as  be- 
ing a  point  d'appui  lying  close  to  the  fortress,  and  of  great 
importance  to  the  investment,  having  regard  to  the  later 
operations  of  the  siege.  The  approaches  to  the  village  in 
the  direction  of  the  fortress  were  barricaded.  Shelter- 
trenches  and  covered  positions  for  outposts  were  laid  out. 
On  the  side  of  the  enemy  the  works  were  masked  by  the 
plantations,  which  had  been  unaccountably  left  standing,  in 
consequence  of  the  hasty  manner  in  which  preparations  for 
the  siege  had  been  made.  The  brewery  in  Schiltigheim  and 
the  glue  manufactory  in  front  of  the  Spital  gate  had  al- 
ready been  set  on  fire  from  the  fortress,  in  order  not  to 
afford  cover  to  the  besiegers. 

Fire  was  kept  up  against  the  fortress  from  both  banks 
of  the  Rhine. 

August  21. — The  head  of  the  siege-train  reached  Ven- 
denheim.  The  train  consisted  of  200  guns  rifled  on  the 
Prussian  system,  and  100  smoothbore  mortars;  40  of  these 
guns  were  at  once  brought  into  action  against  the  fortress. 
Lieutenant-General  von  Werder  asked  the  commandant,  in 
vain,  to  remove  the  observatory  erected  on  tne  tower  of  the 
cathedral,  in  order  that  it  might  be  possible  to  save  this 
magnificent  work  of  architecture  from  destruction.  With 
similar  results  he  endeavored  to  have  the  military  hospital 
moved  out  of  the  line  of  fire. 

The  commandant  sent  out  of  the  fortress,  in  detach- 
ments of  ten  men  each,  100  Germans,  who  belonged  to  the 
foreign  legion.  Upon  this,  great  dissatisfaction  against  the 
Germans  showed  itself  among  the  population  who  broke  out 
into  many  acts  of  violence  against  them. 

August  22. — The  commandant  asked  to  send  the  wo- 
men and  children  out  of  the  besieged  place.     As  this  pro- 

—487— 


Siege  Operations 

posal  would  have  led  to  a  great  demand  for  transport  and 
other  inconvenient  results,  it  had  to  be  refused. 

August  23. — The  Kehl  batteries,  which  had  been  armed 
since  the  18th  August  with  garrison  guns  from  Rastatt, 
kept  up  an  effective  fire  day  and  night  against  the  citadel, 
and  produced  a  conflagration  there. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  the  town  and  fortress 
of  Strasburg  were  fired  into  from  all  sides.  The  cannonade 
became  heavier  towards  evening.  The  infantry  kept  con- 
tinually drawing  nearer  to  the  fortress.  The  pickets  and 
outposts  were  obliged  to  entrench  themselves  in  shelter- 
trenches  and  rifle-pits,  to  get  cover  from  the  fire  of  the 
enemy. 

August  24.— On  the  night  of  the  23d-24th  August  the 
Baden  infantry  advanced  against  the  railway-station  on  the 
west  front,  and  thus  approached  within  1000  paces  of  the 
fortress.    The  station  was  taken  without  any  loss. 

In  the  evening  the  bombardment  of  the  west  front  with 
siege  artillery  was  begun.  For  this  purpose  the  Prussian 
siege  artillery  had  built  13  siege  batteries  (Nos.  1-13)  dur- 
ing the  preceding  night,  and  had  armed  them  partly  with 
rifled  24-pounders,  and  partly  with  heavy  mortars.  The 
result  was  that  two  large  fires  broke  out  in  the  town,  and 
a  third  in  the  citadel ;  and  the  arsenal,  containing  the  work- 
shops for  the  manufacture  of  artillery  stores,  carriages  etc., 
was  destroyed.  The  explosion  of  a  small  powder-magazine 
was  also  observed.  One  of  the  two  mortar-batteries  erected 
by  the  French  on  the  island  of  Sporen  was  silenced  by 
the  Baden  artillery. 

The  same  day  there  were  twenty  houses  burnt  in  Kehl, 
and  others  were  very  much  damaged. 

August  25. — On  the  night  of  the  24th-25th  an  exceed- 
ingly heavy  fire  was  directed  on  the  town  and  fortress  from 
the  whole  of  the  batteries;  ten  rounds  were  fired  per  min- 
ute. 

It  was  determined  to  destroy  a  mortar-battery  which 
was  placed  above  the  Rhine  baths  on  the  other  side  of  the 
railway  embankment,  and  had  seriously  injured  the  Kehl 
batteries.    For  this  purpose,  on  the  night  above  mentioned 

—488— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

one  officer  and  forty-five  men  of  the  6th  Baden  regiment, 
and  three  gunners  crossed  the  Rhine  in  perfect  silence,  but 
were  unable  to  effect  their  object,  because  the  French  had 
already  withdrawn  the  pieces  of  ordnance  to  the  fortress. 
The  detachment  accordingly  set  the  bath-house  in  flames, 
and  they  were,  in  retreating,  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire. 

The  greater  part  of  the  inhabitants  fled  from  Kehl.  In 
order  to  diminish  the  danger  from  the  falling  shells  the 
streets  of  the  town  were  strewn  with  litter.  Workmen  were 
brought  in  from  the  neighbourhood,  for  three  or  four 
leagues  round,  to  work  at  the  batteries. 

The  bishop  of  Strasburg  appeared  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  beseigers  to  beg  for  a  cessation  of  the  fire.  There 
was  the  less  chance  of  his  wish  being  granted,  since  it  ap- 
peared to  be  uttered  more  as  a  matter  of  form  than  as  a 
serious  request. 

About  11  a.  m.,  the  garrison  made  a  sortie  from  the 
White  Tower  gate,  with  a  small  detachment  and  two  guns, 
against  the  7th  and  8th  companies  of  the  3rd  Baden  regi- 
ment. 

August  26. — Eight  additional  24-pounder  garrison  guns 
arrived  at  Kehl  from  Rastatt,  and  were  immediately  placed 
in  battery,  and  fired  during  the  day  and  the  night  until 
4  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

The  bombardment  against  Strasburg  was  continued, 
chiefly  from  the  battery  of  the  Robertsaue,  after  a  pause 
from  4  a.  m.  till  12  noon,  for  the  purpose  of  awaiting  the 
result  of  the  efforts  of  the  bishop  to  influence  the  inhabi- 
tants. Four  several  great  conflagrations  were  observed, 
including  the  magazines  and  other  buildings  in  the  citadel, 
which  were  in  flames.  The  fire  from  the  fortress  became 
comparatively  weak.  It  had,  however,  destroyed  utterly 
the  greater  part  of  the  town  of  Kehl  between  the  railway- 
station  and  the  Rathhaus  (town-hall),  while  the  village  of 
Kehl,  south  of  the  town  of  that  name,  had  suffered  but  lit- 
tle. 

August  27.— On  the  night  of  the  26th-27th  the  num- 
ber of  batteries  on  the  Kehl  side  was  increased  by  a  mor- 

—489— 


Siege  Operations 

tar-battery,  which  was  armed  with  eight  50-pounder  mor- 
tars. 

During  the  past  night  five  Baden  pioneers  succeeded  in 
destroying  some  dams  which  were  intended  to  raise  the  level 
of  the  water  in  the  ditches  of  the  fortress.  On  account  of 
the  importance  of  the  object  and  the  danger  of  the  opera- 
tion they  were  awarded  a  gratuity  of  1000  thalers  (about 
£150). 

Today,  again,  the  fire  was  but  slack  from  the  fortress, 
while  that  of  the  besiegers  was  maintained  with  unabated 
vigour.  A  flag  of  truce  was  sent  to  the  besiegers  to  ask  for 
some  surgical  appliances  for  the  citizens.  This  showed  the 
great  effect  of  the  batteries  of  the  attack,  but  also  the  lit- 
tle foresight  that  had  been  displayed  in  the  town  in  prepar- 
ing for  the  event  of  a  siege.  The  surgical  appliances  were 
given  most  willingly,  and  in  return  some  ice  was  obtained, 
which  was  required  in  the  hospitals.  The  mayor  of  Stras- 
burg  in  vain  represented  to  the  governor  the  desirability 
of  surrendering  the  fortress.  In  consequence  many  persons 
began  to  abandon  the  city ;  the  greater  part  betaking  them- 
selves to  Switzerland. 

On  the  previous  night  the  advanced  posts  had  been 
pushed  forward  to  within  400  paces  of  the  fortress,  and 
had  there  entrenched  themselves.  The  object  of  this  was 
to  cover  and  conceal  the  construction  of  the  first  parallel. 
The  artillery  at  the  same  time  built  ten  batteries,  which 
were  numbered  14,  15,  16,  17,  19,  20,  21,  22,  23,  25. 

August  28. — The  bishop  of  Strasburg  made  proposals 
for  mediation.  He  came  out  to  Schiltigheim  where  Lieuten- 
ant-General  von  Lescinsky  the  chief  of  the  staff  of  the 
Baden  army,  conferred  with  him  on  behalf  of  Lieutenant- 
General  von  Werder.  The  bishop  considered  the  bombard- 
ment was  contrary  to  international  law.  His  views  were 
refuted.  He  begged  permission  for  the  inhabitants  to  de- 
part, and  this  request  was  refused.  The  request  of  the 
bishop  for  an  armistice  of  twenty-four  hours  was  granted, 
on  condition  that  an  assurance  should  be  received  within  an 
hour  that  the  governor  would  commence  negotiations.  He 
was  also  invited  to  come  out  and  make  himself  acquainted 

—490— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

with  the  preparations  for  the  attack  or  to  do  this  by  depu- 
ty. On  his  return  a  regular  platoon-fire  was  commenced  up- 
on Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Lescinsky,  although  he  bore  the 
flag  of  truce  in  his  own  hand.  The  flag  was  riddled  with 
bullets.     The  attempt  at  mediation  was  thus  quite  useless. 

Meanwhile  the  bombardment  on  both  sides  was  con- 
tinued. Captain  von  Faber,  of  the  Baden  garrison  artil- 
lery, sank  under  his  severe  wounds  at  Korck. 

Both  towards  evening  and  during  the  night  a  brisk  fire 
was  kept  up  between  the  outposts  on  our  side  and  the  rifle- 
men of  the  garrison,  who  were  posted  in  the  covered  way. 

August  29.— In  the  night  of  the  28th-29th,  the  shelter- 
trenches  of  the  advanced  posts  of  the  besiegers  between 
Konigshofen  and  the  fortress  were  pushed  on  to  within  500 
or  600  paces  of  the  town ;  a  small  sortie  in  that  quarter  was 
repulsed,  and  the  fire  of  the  guns  continued  as  before.  At 
noon  a  sortie  took  place,  which  was  repulsed  by  detachments 
of  the  34th  Prussian  regiment. 

It  may  be  well  to  mention  here  that  the  bombardment 
proper  began  on  the  24th  August,  and  lasted,  with  some 
intervals,  three  days.  On  the  Strasburg  side  the  bombard- 
ing batteries,  thirteen  in  number,  were  all  situated  on  the 
front  that  was  subsequently  attacked,  and  fire  was  opened 
from  26  rifled  24-pounders  and  28  heavy  mortars.  On  the 
side  of  Kehl  there  were  six  batteries  in  action,  armed  with 
32  heavy  rifled  guns  and  heavy  mortars.  The  other  side 
of  the  town  and  fortress  was  cannonaded  with  field-guns. 

The  effect  of  the  artillery  of  the  defence  was  not  in- 
considerable ;  the  villages  of  Konigshofen  and  Schiltigheim, 
which  were  within  range  of  the  guns,  were  completely  de- 
stroyed; the  Galgenschzl  had  suffered  severely,  and  the 
railway-station  at  Kehl  was  set  on  fire  by  shells  and  com- 
pletely burnt  down,  after  the  inhabitants  of  that  part  had 
succeeded  with  difficulty  in  saving  it  from  a  fire  that  broke 
out  only  a  few  days  before.  Of  the  destruction  caused  in 
Strasburg  by  the  bombardment  only  the  most  important 
instances  will  be  noticed  here.  The  Krothenaue,  the  street 
leading  to  the  gate  of  Austerlitz,  the  quarters  De  Pierre  and 
of  the  national  gate,  the  railway-station,  the  corn-exchange, 

—491— 


Siege  Operations 

the  artillery  school,  the  cannon-foundry,  the  large  building 
of  the  garrison  staff  on  the  Kleberplatz,  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  cathedral,  all  suffered  severely  and  many  treasures 
of  art  and  science  were  destroyed :  for  example,  the  ancient 
and  famous  library,  with  its  400,000  volumes,  and  valuable 
documents  and  manuscripts,  the  museum  of  art,  the  col- 
lection of  pictures,  and  the  Neukirche,  with  its  famous  fres- 
co paintings.  The  damage  done  to  the  cathedral,  that  mem- 
orial of  early  German  architecture,  was  happily  not  very 
great.  Although  the  upper  part  of  the  roof  above  the  arch 
was  burnt,  the  interior  was  uninjured,  with  the  exception 
of  one  glass  window.  The  celebrated  astronomical  clock  re- 
mained  unharmed. 

The  siege  artillery  were  directed  to  spare  the  cathedral, 
and  previous  notice  was  given  of  the  few  shots  that  were 
fired,  chiefly  against  the  tower,  in  consequence  of  the  ene- 
my having  erected  an  observatory  there,  with  telegraphic 
communication,  whence  the  besiegers'  works  were  com- 
pletely seen  into. 

Serious  injury  had  been  done  to  the  private  property 
of  the  citizens  by  the  inundation  around  the  fortress,  which 
was,  however,  a  most  efficient  measure  of  defence.  The  in- 
undation placed  the  surrounding  low  ground  and  many  of 
the  cellars  in  the  town  under  water.  In  the  greater  num- 
ber of  the  latter  no  provision  had  been  made  for  such  an 
event,  and  the  entry  of  the  water,  therefore,  caused  great 
inconvenience,  and  prevented  the  buildings  from  being  used, 
either  as  shelter  for  the  people,  or  as  stores  for  provisions. 
An  attempt  had,  indeed,  been  made  at  Erstein,  about  2h 
miles  [11|  English  miles]  south  of  Strasburg,  between  the 
road  leading  to  Schlettstadt  and  the  Rhine  canal,  to  divert 
the  waters  of  the  111,  which  there  flows  through  low  ground 
intersected  by  many  watercourses,  and  is  connected  by 
channels  with  the  Rhine.  An  attempt  had  been  also  made 
to  lead  off  the  water  at  the  discharging  sluices  of  the  inun- 
dation close  to  the  fortress  on  the  south  front,  at  the  point 
where  the  Aar,  a  branch  of  the  111,  the  111  itself,  and  the 
Rhine-Marne  canal,  are  united;  and  the  destruction  of  the 
sluices  Nos.  87  and  88  in  the  Rhine-Ill  canal  had  been  under- 

—492— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

taken,  and  had  resulted  in  a  perceptible  reduction  of  the 
level  of  the  water  in  the  inundation  and  in  the  ditches. 

The  opinion  of  the  inhabitants,  headed  by  the  clergy, 
was  decidedly  against  a  vigorous  defence  of  the  fortress; 
several  unavailing  memorials  were  sent  by  them  to  the 
commandant,  to  induce  him  to  surrender  the  place.  The 
prices  of  most  kinds  of  provisions  for  the  inhabitants  were 
raised  to  exorbitant  amounts,  and  as  the  supply  of  beef  was 
long  since  exhausted,  people  ate  horse-flesh.  A  hundred- 
weight of  potatoes  cost  12  francs ;  and  in  this  populous 
town  there  was  neither  butter  nor  fresh  vegetables. 

The  strength  and  composition  of  the  garrison  were 
ascertained.  It  consisted  chiefly  of  fugitives  from  the  bat- 
tle of  Worth  of  the  21st,  23d,  28th,  33d,  and  74th  regiments, 
besides  turcos,  zouaves,  spahis.  and  cavalry  of  every  de- 
scription, and  this  peculiarity  of  composition  rendered  the 
maintenance  of  discipline  difficult.  There  was  among  them 
none  of  that  steadiness  which  belongs  to  well-disciplined 
troops,  as  might  be  seen  from  the  way  in  which  attacks 
were  executed.  By  the  burning  of  the  military  establish- 
ments great  quantities  of  warlike  stores  had  been  destroyed, 
and  by  the  vigorous  bombardment  the  defensibility  of  the 
place  had  been  very  materially  reduced. 

Although  it  was  well  known  that  General  Barral,  of 
the  artillery  who  succeeded  in  entering  the  fortress  in  dis- 
guise during  the  investment,  must  have,  in  fact,  had  the 
actual  direction  of  the  defence,  still  the  Governor  (General 
of  Division  Uhrich)  was  acknowledged  to  be  a  man  of  hon- 
our; and  it  was  not  probable  that  this  meritorious  officer 
would  be  brought  to  capitulate  easily,  after  having  repeat- 
edly refused  the  summons  to  surrender. 

In  this  state  of  affairs  it  became  certain,  by  the  26th 
of  August,  that  the  object  in  view  was  only  to  be  attained 
by  a  regular  siege,  and  that  thus  also  the  sufferings  of  the 
unhappy  city  would  be  abbreviated  as  much  as  possible.  The 
preparatory  measures,  to  which  attention  had  prudently 
been  paid  at  the  very  commencement  of  the  campaign,  were 
now  rapidly  carried  into,  effect. 


Siege  Operations 

Accordingly,  in  order  to  be  prepared  for  all  events,  the 
siege-train  was  despatched  from  Magdeburg,  Coblenz,  and 
Wesel.  Its  composition  and  the  numbers  of  guns  of  each 
description  were  in  every  respect  carefully  considered.  Ex- 
periments had  been  made  by  the  Prussian  Artillery  Experi- 
mental committee  with  rifled  siege  artillery,  especially  with 
15-centimetre  (6-inch)  guns,  and  21-centimetre  (8.27-inch) 
mortars  both  of  which  fire  an  elongated  shell.  The  results 
of  these  trials,  and  the  use  of  demolition  batteries  {demoli- 
tions hatterien) ,  by  which,  with  suitable  guns  fired  at  ap- 
propriate elevations,  hidden  escarps  can  be  breached  at 
great  distances,  were  to  be  tested  in  actual  warfare  for  the 
first  time  at  Strasburg. 

In  deciding  upon  the  place  for  the  artillery  attack,  it 
was  contemplated  that  the  batteries  already  existing  on 
the  front  attacked  would  be  maintained  for  the  purposes  of 
the  bombardment,  and  especially  that,  from  the  Kehl  bat- 
teries, which  came  into  play  about  this  time,  fire  would  be 
kept  up,  because  they  were  best  adapted  for  operating 
against  the  citadel,  and  for  rendering  it  impossible  to  de- 
fend the  fortress  in  that  quarter. 

For  the  engineer  attack  an  engineer  siege-park,  which 
had  recently  been  formed  for  the  first  time,  was  brought  up 
before  the  place. 

Lieutenant-General  von  Werder,  of  the  Prussian  Army, 
was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  siege  corps,  with  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  von  Lescinski  of  the  general  staff  of  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Baden,  as  chief  of  the  staff.  Lieutenant- 
General  von  Decker  was  appointed  to  command  the  siege 
artillery,  and  Major  General  von  Mertens  was  appointed 
Engineer-in-Chief. 

The  siege  corps  was  composed  as  follows : 

1.     Infantry: — 

(a)  The  Landwehr  Division  of  the  Guard. 

(b)  First  reserve  division,  to  which  vv^ere  attached  the  30th 

regiment  from  Mainz,  and  the  34th  (Pomeranian)  Fus- 
iliers, which  latter  regiment,  immediately  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  had  been  brought  up  from  Frank- 
fort to  Rastatt,  and  had  already  been  employed  during 
the  investment  before  Strasburg. 

—494— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

(c)    The  Baden   Division. 

2.  Cavalry: — The  2nd  reserve  regiment  of  Prussian  dragoons; 
the  2nd  reserve  regiment  of  Prussian  ulans;  and  the  Baden  cavalry, 
consisting  of  three  regiments  of  dragoons. 

3.  the  Siege  Artillery,  altogether  6,000  or  7,000  strong,  was 
composed  of  29  companies  of  garrison  artillery  belonging  to  the 
guard,  and  to  the  4th,  5th,  6th,  7th,  and  10th  regiments,  4  Bavarian 
garrison  batteries,  4  Wurtemberg  garrison  batteries,  and  2  Baden 
garrison  companies. 

4.  Pioneers,  (Engineers),  altogether  2,200  strong,  two  com- 
bined battalions  of  garrison  pioneers,  which  were  composed  of  12  com- 
panies of  garrison  pioneers  from  the  districts  of  the  1st,  2nd,  5th, 
6th,  7th,  8th,  10th,  and  11th  army  corps,  in  addition  to  two  com- 
panies of  Baden  field  pioneers,  and  a  company  of  Bavarian  garrison 
pioneers,  which,  however,  only  arrived  towards  the  end  of  the  siege. 
Colonel  Klotz,  of  the  royal  Prussian  engineers,  was  in  command  of 
the  whole  of  the  pioneers. 

When  the  formation  of  the  corps  was  completed,  the  staffs  for 
the  siege  artillery  and  engineers  were  appointed.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
von  Scheliha,  of  the  general  staff,  formerly  of  the  artillery,  acted  as 
chief  of  the  staff  for  the  former;  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Wau- 
genheim,  from  the  War  Office,  for  the  latter.  Six  field  officers  of  the 
artillery  were  appointed  commanders  of  sections,  and  20  engineer 
officers  were  told  off  for  duty  in  their  own  department  before  Stras- 
burg. 

The  siege  army  was,  altogether,  nearly  60,000  strong. 
The  headquarters  (Lieutenant-General  von  Werder)  were 
fixed  in  Mundolsheim  for  the  siege  artillery,  and  for  the 
business  of  the  engineers.  The  division  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Baden  had  its  headquarters  in  Obershaffelsheim  and  in 
Lampertsheim,  where  was  the  residence  of  H.R.H.  the 
Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  who  followed  the  progress  of  the 
siege  with  great  interest. 

From  the  accurate  knowledge  the  besiegers  possessed 
of  the  whole  of  the  fortress,  the  selection  of  the  front  of 
attack  was  not  difficult.  The  north-west  angle  of  the  en- 
ciente  was  decided  upon  for  the  purpose.  Its  position  was 
so  salient  that  a  comparatively  narrow  front  of  attack  was 
admissible,  and  this  front  could  be  developed  on  ground  al- 
most entirely  clear  of  inundations.  The  parks  were  placed 
near  excellent  roads  and  other  means  of  communication  with 
the  depots  in  rear.  Thus  all  movements  of  the  siege  stores 
to  a  flank,  which  would  have  caused  waste  of  time,  were 
avoided.  The  citadel  had  already  been  terribly  injured,  dur- 
ing the  investment  and  bombardment,  hy  the  batteries  at 
Kehl,  and,  moreover,  was  of  little  use  on  the  front  selected 

—495— 


Siege  Operations 

for  attack,  so  that  enfilade-fire  on  the  attack  from  thence, 
or  from  the  adjoining  works,  was  little  to  be  dreaded.  The 
difficulties  to  be  met  with  in  gaining  possession  of  the  ram- 
parts, or  in  entering  the  fortress,  on  the  front  in  question, 
would  also  have  been  experienced  in  a  greater  or  less  de- 
gree on  all  the  other  fronts. 

The  siege  park  was  situated  on  the  right,  the  powder 
magazine  on  the  left,  of  the  highroad,  north  of  Mundols- 
heim ;  the  engineer  park  was  in  Suff  elsweierheim. 

On  the  night  of  the  29th-30th  August,  the  first  parallel 
was  opened,  and  at  the  same  time  the  approaches  to  it  from 
the  rear  were  made. 

The  working  party  was  furnished  by  the  1st  and  2nd 
landwehr  regim.ents  of  the  guard  and  the  pioneer  battalions, 
so  far  as  the  latter  were  not  required  for  supervision  and 
other  technical  duties. 

The  parallel  rested  with  its  left  flank  on  the  111,  crossed 
the  road  leading  from  Strasburg  to  Schiltigheim  and  Weis- 
senburg,  and  the  railways  to  Paris  and  Basle — the  latter 
line,  as  it  happened,  by  the  over-bridge  to  Wasselonne — and 
was  thence  continued  to  the  south-western  outlet  of  Konigs- 
hofen.  It  extended,  therefore,  beyond  the  ground  covered 
by  the  attack,  by  almost  half  its  total  length,  which  amount- 
ed to  5,700  paces.* 

The  distance  of  the  parallel  from  the  fortress  was,  on 
the  average,  800  paces ;  and  this  was  a  very  favourable  cir- 
cumstance, in  comparison  with  the  siege  of  Sebastopol, 
where  the  besiegers  were  obliged  to  execute  the  same  work 
at  a  distance  of  over  1,600  paces  from  the  works. 

The  communications  in  rear,  from  the  principal  depot, 
were  constructed  in  a  zigzag  form,  with  five  returns,  and 
occupied  the  ground  between  the  highroad  to  Weissenburg 
and  the  railway  to  Paris.  They  were  nearly  in  the  centre 
of  the  attack. 

Some  short  trenches  of  communication  were  also  made 
on  the  left  flank,  to  connect  with  the  village  of  Schiltigheim, 
which  was  very  conveniently  situated  for  the  approach  on 
this  side. 


About  4,700  yards. 

—496— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

The  covering  troops  were  posted,  and  the  working  par- 
ties marched  to  and  fro,  in  accordance  with  instructions 
given  for  these  purposs  so  far  as  local  circumstances  did 
not  require  a  departure  from  the  instructions. 

During  the  first  night  the  parallel  and  the  communica- 
tions from  the  rear  were  excavated  to  a  depth  of  4  feet  and 
a  breadth  of  3  feet  at  the  battom,  and  this  section  was  wid- 
ened, in  the  course  of  the  30th  August,  to  8  or  9  feet  at  the 
bottom.  Thus  the  breadth  required  for  the  trenches,  as 
communications,  was  obtained,  and  sufficient  thickness  was 
also  given  to  the  parapet.  The  parallel  was  in  many  places 
cut  into  steps  for  offensive  movements. 

Three  engineer  depots  were  also  formed,  one  for  the 
centre  and  one  for  each  flank,  as  shown  in  the  plan. 

The  enemy  permitted  all  the  works  to  be  executed  with- 
out interruption.  It  was  not  till  6  a.m.  on  the  morning  of 
the  30th  August,  that  some  unusual  movements  were  ob- 
served on  the  ramparts,  but  at  this  time  there  were  already 
ten  new  batteries,  with  46  additional  siege-guns  in  action. 
These  were  batteries  Nos.  14  to  17,  Nos.  19,  20,  21,  22,  23, 
and  25.  The  bombarding  batteries  Nos.  1  to  13  also  contin- 
ued in  action,  so  that  there  were  firing  at  this  time 

30   long  rifled   24-pounders, 
42  rifled   12-pounders, 
28  heavy  mortars, 

altogether  100  pieces  of  siege  ordnance. 

The  enemy  was  evidently  taken  by  surprise  at  the  exe- 
cution of  the  siege-works  mentioned,  and  was  unprepared 
for  them.  This  was  apparent  from  the  batteries  of  the  at- 
tack being  slackly  answered.  These  were,  however,  in  a 
position  to  enfilade  and  counter-batter  the  principal  lines 
of  the  front  attacked  and  of  the  adjoining  fronts,  and  to  do 
serious  damage  to  the  enemy  in  the  temporary  works  thrown 
up  before  the  siege. 

By  their  united  efforts  the  batteries  of  the  besiegers 
succeeded  in  silencing  the  artillery  of  the  garrison  in  a  very 
short  time.  On  account  of  their  great  distance  from  the 
works,   however,   some  of  the   bombarding  batteries  con- 

—497— 


Siege  Operations 

structed  early  in  the  siege  (Nos.  1,  2,  3,  6,  9,  10,  11,  12) 
ceased  fire  in  the  course  of  the  day. 

During  the  fore  and  afternoon  of  the  30th  August,  the 
artillery  of  the  garrison,  after  completing  the  armament  of 
the  front  of  attack,  were  able  to  renew  the  fight  for  a  cou- 
ple of  hours.  Both  times,  however,  they  were  quickly  si- 
lenced. 

On  this  day  and  on  the  31st  August,  the  parallels  and 
approaches  were  first  brought  to  the  section  necessary  for 
efficiency,  and  were  completed.  It  became  necessary,  on  this 
and  on  the  following  days,  to  drive  out  the  French  posted 
in  some  rifle-pits  on  Wacken,  an  island  covered  with  bushes 
formed  by  the  Aar,  a  branch  of  the  111,  and  by  the  111. 

September  1. — During  the  night  between  the  31st  Au- 
gust and  the  1st  September,  the  approaches  to  the  second 
parallel  were  commenced.  They  consisted  of  only  a  simple 
trench  on  the  left  wing,  and  three  zigzags  directed  on  the 
capitals  of  the  bastions  attacked.  In  consequence  of  this 
the  outposts  were  proportionately  advanced.  At  the  same 
time  batteries  Nos.  27  and  28  were  built  and  armed.  The 
enemy  displayed  great  activity  during  the  night,  and  to- 
wards morning  commenced  a  vigorous  fire  of  artillery.  The 
fire  was  particularly  heavy  on  the  north  front. 

The  engineer  headquarters  were  transferred  from 
Mundelsheim  to  Schiltigheim.  The  batteries  of  attack,  we 
may  here  mention,  were  placed  partly  inside  and  partly  out- 
side the  parallels  and  communications.  In  both  cases,  how- 
ever, they  were  so  covered  that  they  were  either  not  at  all, 
or  only  slightly,  visible  from  the  fortress  itself.  Those  for 
guns  were  provided  for  the  most  part  with  flat  or  trough- 
shaped  embrasures. 

September  2. — During  the  night  of  September  lst-2nd, 
the  zigzag  approaches  to  the  second  parallel  were  executed, 
and  were  made  in  two  separate  parts,  because  it  was  de- 
sired to  spare  the  churchyard  of  St.  Helene,  with  its  monu- 
ments. Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Gayl  and  Captain  Hertz- 
berg,  both  of  the  engineers,  were  killed  as  they  were  in  the 
act  of  endeavouring  to  improve  the  defective  position  of  a 
part  of  the  second  parallel,  which  was  too  close  to  the  ene- 

—498— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

my's  works.  The  former  was  on  duty  as  major  of  the 
trenches.  The  work  was  not  quite  completed  when,  on  the 
night  of  September  2nd-3rd,  about  12  o'clock,  a  brisk  fire 
of  artillery  and  infantry  commenced  from  the  fortress,  and 
was  followed  immediately  by  two  sorties  against  both  flanks 
of  the  parallel.  The  French  advanced  with  three  columns 
against  the  right  wing  in  the  direction  of  Vendenheim,  and 
attacked  the  company  of  the  2nd  Baden  Grenadiers  (King 
of  Prussia's),  who  were  holding  the  outer  buildings  of  the 
railway-station.  A  severe  engagement  ensued,  so  that  the 
commandant  of  the  trenches.  Colonel  von  Renz,  had  to 
bring  up  the  1st  Battalion  of  the  regiment  above  named, 
who  were  on  trench-duty,  and  drive  back  the  enemy,  who 
was  superior  in  numbers,  into  the  fortress.  Captain  Graeff 
was  killed,  and  the  troops  lost  50  killed  and  wounded,  chiefly 
in  retreating  into  the  trenches.  The  2nd  company  distin- 
guished itself  very  much  in  this  engagement. 

In  the  sortie  delivered  against  the  left  flank  of  the  par- 
allel at  half-past  3  in  the  morning,  the  French  sent  three 
columns  over  the  islands  of  Jars  and  Wacken,  where  out- 
houses and  plantations  afforded  much  cover,  and  then  fell 
upon  the  2nd  battalion  of  the  30th  Prussian  regiment,  by 
whom  they  were  repulsed.  The  loss  of  the  Prussians 
amounted  to  one  oflJicer  (Lieutenant  von  Versen)  wounded 
and  taken  prisoner,  and  thirty  men.  A  French  officer  and 
four  chasseurs  were  taken  prisoners.  In  these  sorties  the 
want  of  a  greater  number  of  steps  over  the  parapet  for 
counter-attacks  was  experienced.  Rain  coming  on  made  the 
work  in  the  trenches  exceedingly  heavy.  The  besiegers 
had  now  got  so  near. the  fortress  that  wall-pieces  could  be 
used  with  advantage,  for  which  purpose  wall  piece  detach- 
ments were  formed  of  both  Prussian  and  Baden  troops,  and 
were  employed  to  keep  up  a  fire  on  the  enemy's  gunners. 
The  French  fired  for  a  similar  purpose  with  wall-pieces, 
chasse-pots,  and  minie-rifles. 

September  3. — Extension  of  parallels,  and  construction 
and  completion  of  batteries,  16  A,  17  A,  19  A,  21  A,  29,  and 
30.  In  the  early  morning  there  was  a  slight  engagement 
at  the  outposts,  in  which  the  besiegers  lost  eight  wounded. 

—499— 


Siege  Operations 

In  the  forenoon  there  was  a  cessation  of  hostilities  for  an 
hour,  for  burying  the  dead  in  the  fortress. 

At  Schiltigheim  the  castle-Hke  monastery  was  con- 
verted into  a  hospital.  Two  new  kinds  of  siege  ordnance 
arrived  at  the  park — namely,  twelve  short-rifled  24-pound- 
ers,  and  two  rifled  25-pounder  mortars.  They  threw  pro- 
jectiles of  enormous  power  with  great  accuracy. 

September  4. — The  engineer  headquarters  were  trans- 
ferred back  again  to  Mundolsheim  for  official  reasons.  In- 
telligence arrived  of  the  capitulation  of  Sedan,  which  was 
communicated  to  the  governor  of  the  fortress,  in  order  to 
make  him  aware  of  the  military  and  political  condition  of 
France  resulting  from  that  event.  A  thanksgiving  service 
was  held  by  the  siege  corps,  and  three  saluting  rounds  per 
gun  were  fired  by  the  artillery,  in  honor  of  the  occasion. 

September  5. — The  siege  continued  its  course  without 
any  events  worthy  of  remark.  During  the  previous  night, 
as  well  as  in  the  course  of  the  day,  the  enemy  attacked 
with  small  detachments,  to  interrupt  the  progress  of  battery 
No.  33,  the  mortar  batteries  31  and  32,  and  the  other  trench 
works. 

September  6. — At  Schiltigheim  a  line  of  telegraph, 
serving  apparently  for  communication  with  Metz,  was  dis- 
covered and  destroyed.  Subsequently,  however,  it  was  be- 
lieved that  it  had  served  for  private  and  local  uses.  The 
batteries  of  the  attack  kept  up  a  very  heavy  fire,  and  the 
fine  'Finkmatt'  barracks,  behind  the  bastion  of  the  same 
name,  where  Napoleon  III.  had  made  an  attempt  at  insur- 
rection in  1839,  were  set  on  fire  by  shells.  In  Bischheim, 
also  a  conflagration  was  caused  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery 
of  the  garrison.  The  Kehl  batteries  kept  up  a  heavy  fire 
on  the  citadel  and  destroyed  the  city  gate  there,  and  by  this 
means  communication  with  the  town  and  with  its  defenses 
was  rendered  exceedingly  difficult. 

September  7. — In  the  morning  there  was  an  engage- 
ment of  the  patrols  on  the  Rhine,  in  which  a  detachment 
of  the  3rd  (Baden)  regiment  took  part.  Another  detach- 
ment captured  at  Machern,  one-and-a-half  leagues  above 
Kehl,  two  vessels  coming  from  Neu-Breisach  with  stores 

—500— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

for  the  supply  of  the  artillery,  including  30,000  fuzes.  The 
boatmen  in  charge  of  the  vessels  were  compelled  to  discharge 
their  cargoes,  on  account  of  the  low  level  of  the  water  in  the 
Rhine,  and  had  set  to  work  to  do  this  without  precaution. 

September  8. — During  the  past  night,  battery  No.  35 
had  been  armed  with  two  21-centimetre  (8.27-inch)  mortars, 
which  was  a  work  of  much  difficulty,  as  they  weighed  150 
cwt. — namely,  the  piece  itself  about  66  cwt.,  and  the  plat- 
form about  84  cwt.  These  experimental  mortars  throw  a 
shell  weighing  160  pounds,  shaped  like  a  sugarloaf,  and  20 
inches  in  length,  with  a  15-pound  bursting  charge,  which 
forms  by  its  explosion  a  crater  6  feet  deep  and  20  feet  across. 
They  are,  therefore,  very  effective  against  bombproof  case- 
mates. They  were  used  in  combination  with  battery  No. 
5  against  the  redoubt  in  lunette  No.  44,  which  work  was  in 
consequence  soon  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  At  the  same 
time  batteries  39  and  38,  and  two  emplacements  for  field- 
guns  to  fire  over  the  ground  in  front,  were  built ;  and  a  bat- 
tery (No.  40),  for  firing  at  high  angles  near  the  churchyard 
of  St.  Helene,  was  constructed,  and  armed  with  six  25- 
pounder  mortars. 

September  9. — The  birthday  of  H.R.H.  the  Grand  Duke 
of  Baden,  kept  in  time  of  peace  with  a  grand  reveille, 
thanksgiving,  and  tattoo,  was  celebrated  by  an  unusually 
heavy  cannonade,  on  the  part  of  the  besiegers,  from  both 
sides  of  the  Rhine.  Besides  the  32  rifled  guns  and  8  mortars 
in  the  Kehl  batteries,  there  were  in  the  principal  attack  98 
rifled  guns  and  40  mortars  in  action.  By  the  admirable 
arrangement  of  the  artillery  attack,  for  the  mutual  sup- 
port and  concentration  of  fire  the  various  batteries,  that  of 
the  enemy  was  almost  silenced.  It  slackened  perceptibly, 
and  on  the  fronts  and  lines  directly  attacked,  a  rapid  mortar- 
fire  only  was  maintained. 

In  Paris  a  despatch  was  published,  ostensibly  from  the 
governor  of  the  fortress,  according  to  which  the  condition 
of  the  place  had  in  the  last  few  days  become  very  seriously 
worse,  owing  to  the  incessant  bombardment;  it  has  not 
transpired  how  the  despatch  in  question  found  its  way  to 
Paris  under  the  circumstances  then  existing. 

—501— 


Siege  Operations 

September  10. — During  the  night  of  the  9th-10th,  work 
was  begun  in  three  places  at  the  communications  to  the 
third  parallel,  and  a  sortie  of  the  French  from  the  porte  Na- 
tionale  was  repulsed  by  the  2nd  (Baden)  regiment.  The  use 
of  the  Stein  Thor  (porte  de  la  Pierre),  which  lay  so  close  to 
the  attack,  was  rendered  altogether  unavailable  for  making 
sorties,  because  it,  as  well  as  the  bridges  at  that  place, 
had  been  entirely  destroyed  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery.  In 
the  town  several  large  conflagrations  were  observed. 

September  11. — During  the  preceding  night  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  third  parallel,  on  the  three  openings  that 
had  been  made,  were  pushed  forward  about  300  paces.  The 
artillery  fire  on  both  sides  was  heavy.  There  was  a  fire 
at  the  artillery  school,  and  also  in  Konigshofen.  Breaching 
battery  No.  8  was  constructed  against  lunette  No.  53,  and 
was  armed  with  four  short  24-pounders. 

September  12. — During  the  previous  night  the  third 
parallel  was  added,  700  paces  in  length,  which  was  executed 
by  means  of  the  common  sap,*  without  using  gabions,  as 
had  been  all  the  earlier  works  of  this  description.  It  de- 
serves to  be  prominently  noticed  that  the  establishment  of 
the  third  parallel  and  the  communications  between  the  sec- 
ond and  third  parallels  by  the  common  sap,  instead  of  the 
full  sap  prescribed  for  their  execution  in  the  regulations, 
shortened  the  attack  by  many  days ;  and  this  arrangement, 
previously  unrecorded  in  military  history,  was  due  entirely 
to  the  Engineer-in-Chief,  General  von  Mertens.  The  gar- 
rison attempted  a  sortie,  which  produced  no  effect,  and  was 
of  no  importance.  At  the  same  time  battery  8A  was  con- 
structed, and  armed  with  four  50-pounder  mortars,  against 
bastion  No.  11,  on  the  front  of  the  attack  which  was  also 
shelled  by  battery  35.  At  break  of  day  the  fire  of  the  ar- 
tillery was  resumed,  and  kept  up  most  vigorously.  The 
position  of  the  third  parallel  was  such  that  it  skirted  the 
foot  of  the  glacis  of  lunette  53,  while  it  was  some  60  paces 
distant  from  the  foot  of  lunette  52.    A  kind  of  demi-paral- 


*The  'common  sap'  is  not  what  is  so  called  in  the  English  Ser- 
vice, but  the  mode  of  execution  adopted  by  us  for  the  first   parallel. 

—502— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

lei  was  required  to  connect  the  two  glacis,  at  their  feet,  for 
which  purpose  a  sap  had  to  be  driven  forward  from  the 
third  parallel  towards  lunette  52.  Further  approaches 
could  no  longer  be  made  by  zigzags.  The  double  sap  (Tra- 
ersensappe)  was  necessary  to  give  the  additional  cover  re- 
quired on  both  sides. 

Breaching  battery  No.  42  was  erected,  for  six  short  24- 
pounders,  against  the  right  face  of  bastion  No.  11. 

The  Swiss,  with  the  consent  of  the  governor  of  the 
fortress,  and  of  the  commander  of  the  siege  corps,  made  ar- 
rangements for  the  departure  of  distressed  families.  Nearly 
800  persons  left  the  fortress,  with  the  greatest  goodwill  on 
the  part  of  the  besiegers. 

September  13. — During  the  previous  bright  moonlight 
night,  the  work  at  the  double  sap  was  continued  with  sap- 
rollers  (Erdwalze).  The  fire  of  the  fortress  reached  as  far 
as  Mittelhausbergen,  more  than  a  league  (about  4,600 
yards)  from  the  place,  and  set  that  village  on  fire.  In  the 
course  of  the  day  an  exchange  was  effected  of  an  unwounded 
French  officer,  who  was  a  prisoner,  for  a  wounded  Prus- 
sian officer,  who  was  also  a  prisoner — Lieutenant  von  Ver- 
sen,  of  the  30th  regiment.  Detachments  of  Baden  infantry 
occupied  the  island  of  Sporen,  at  the  south-east  of  the  for- 
tress ;  they  made  rifle-pits  there,  and  endeavoured  to  estab- 
lish communication  with  the  Prussian  troops  posted  at 
their  right  on  the  Roberstaue,  for  which  purpose  a  bridge 
was  thrown  over  the  branch  of  the  Rhine. 

September  14. — On  the  night  of  September  13th-14th 
the  demiparallel  was  completed,  and  was  broken  through 
for  a  return  to  the  front ;  this  could  only  be  made  by  a  dou- 
ble sap,  executed  by  means  of  sap-rollers.  At  the  same 
time  batteries  41  and  43  were  built,  and  manned  by  the 
Wurtemberg  artillery.  The  former  was  armed  with  four 
12-pounders,  and  the  latter  with  eight  24-pounders,  for 
firing  against  the  adjoining  fronts.  Then  followed  the  es- 
tablishment of  mortar-emplacements  Nos.  45  and  46,  against 
the  outworks  lying  near  them,  as  well  as  the  construction 
of  'dismounting  battery'  No.  44.  An  indirect  breaching  bat- 
tery. No.  42,  was  built  to  operate  'against  the  right  face  of 

—508— 


Siege  Operations 

bastion  11,  and  armed  with  four  short  24-pounders.  A  de- 
tachment of  Baden  troops,  consisting  of  4  battalions,  8 
squadrons,  and  3  batteries,  under  the  command  of  General 
Keller,  was  sent  from  the  siege  corps  to  Upper  Alsace.  It 
marched  by  Coimar  to  Muhlhausen,  was  attacked  by  the  gar- 
rison of  Neu-Breisach  and  some  gardes  mobiles,  and,  in 
compliance  with  orders,  effected  the  disarmament  of  the 
district,  in  which  signs  of  a  popular  rising  had  appeared, 

September  15. — During  the  previous  night  the  glacis 
was  crowned  by  the  flying  sap  for  50  paces  along  each  face 
of  lunette  No.  53.  A  second  time  the  French  made  an  at- 
tempt to  occupy  the  island  of  Sporen  in  force.  This  day 
they  endeavoured  to  effect  this  object  by  a  sortie  in  force, 
apparently  with  1,600  men,  accompanied  by  artillery,  who, 
after  a  combat  of  some  duration,  were  driven  back. 

At  first  there  were  only  two  Baden  companies  opposed 
to  the  French,  but  these,  during  the  fight,  were  reinforced 
by  Prussian  detachments,  and  drove  back  the  enemy,  who 
left  behind  them  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners. 

In  Strasburg  the  want  of  provisions,  especially  among 
the  poorer  classes  of  the  population,  began  to  be  felt  seri- 
ously, and  arrangements  were  made  for  sheltering  those 
whose  houses  had  been  burnt  in  sheds  built  for  horses.  At 
the  pressing  instance  of  the  clergy  of  both  persuasions  there 
was  an  armistice  from  9  until  12  in  the  forenoon,  to  allow 
500  or  600  women  and  children  to  depart  from  the  be- 
sieged city. 

September  16.— On  the  night  of  the  15th-16th  the 
crowning  of  the  glacis  by  flying  sap,  in  front  of  lunette  52, 
was  begun.  At  Appenweier,  a  railway-station,  2  miles  (9^ 
English  miles)  from  Kehl,  preparations  were  made  for  the 
repair  of  the  lattice-bridge  over  the  Rhine,  which  had  been 
destroyed,  restoring  it,  in  the  first  instance,  for  one  line 
only.  The  flying-bridge  at  Ichenheim,  about  2^  leagues 
above  Kehl,  was  also  kept  ready  to  be  brought  down  to  that 
place. 

September  17. — On  this  night  the  crownings  in  front 
of  lunettes  52  and  53  were  prepared  for  action,  and  the  ar- 
tillery displayed,   on  this  occasion,  extraordinary  activity. 

—504— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

Batteries  17A,  19A,  21A  were  made  in  front  of  the  second 
parallel,  and  Nos.  17B,  19B,  21B  were  made  in  connection 
with  them.  Batteries  Nos.  46,  47,  48,  %5A  (all  batteries 
for  firing  at  high  angles)  were  built,  and  armed  with  light 
and  heavy  mortars.  Captain  Dedebur,  of  the  Engineers, 
with  two  resolute  pioneers  (sappers),  had  on  the  night  of 
the  8th-9th  September  reconnoitered  lunette  53.  Letting 
themselves  down  by  ropes  into  the  ditch,  they  discovered 
three  mining-galleries  of  the  enemy,  of  which  the  entrances 
were  just  above  the  surface  of  the  water  in  the  ditch.  One 
principal  gallery  was  found  on  the  centre  line  of  the  work, 
and  one  gallery  on  each  side  of  it.  All  three  were  connected  by 
parallel  galleries,  and  formed  in  the  customary  manner. 
This  system  of  mines  being  discovered,  was  given  up  by  the 
enemy.  Only  one  mine  had  been  loaded,  and  that  was  now 
unloaded.  The  gallery,  on  the  right  of  the  capital,  was 
converted  by  working  from  the  third  parallel  into  an  under- 
ground communication  with  the  ditch  of  the  work,  and  by 
the  14th  September  was  made  use  of  as  a  secure  place  of 
observation  for  watching  the  effect  of  the  indirect  breach- 
ing batteries  on  the  right  face.  Information  was  thus  ob- 
tained that  the  breach  was  quite  practicable  on  the  16th 
September.  This  was  not  the  only  application  of  Indirect 
fire  to  the  formation  of  a  breach,  for  it  had,  as  we  have 
seen,  been  attended  by  the  best  results  from  battery  33, 
against  the  redoubt  of  lunette  44,  and  against  a  covered  dam 
at  the  Fischerthor,  between  bastion  15  and  ravelin  63. 

In  the  evening  detachments  of  the  3rd  and  6th  regi- 
ments of  Baden  infantry  repulsed  an  attack  attempted  by 
the  French  on  the  island  of  Sporen. 

September  18. — On  the  previous  night  the  fortress  was 
bombarded  with  increased  vigour.  An  advance  was  made 
into  the  covered  way  of  lunette  52,  and  the  redoubt  in  the 
place  d'armes  was  found  to  be  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  The 
descent  into  the  ditch  in  front  of  lunette  53  was  excavated 
during  the  night,  and  at  intervals  by  day,  and  the  timber- 
work  was  then  commenced.  The  field  telegraph  was  brought 
up  to  the  third  parallel,  and  the  whole  of  the  siege-works 

—505— 


Siege  Operations 

put  in  connection  with  it.  This  was  its  first  appHcation  in 
siege  operations. 

September  19. — In  the  night  progress  was  made  with 
the  construction  of  the  descent  into  the  ditch  in  front  of 
lunette  52. 

Lieutenant  Kirchgessner,  of  the  engineers  of  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Baden,  was  killed.  The  theatre  in  Stras- 
burg  became  a  prey  to  the  flames.  The  bombardment 
reached  all  parts  of  the  city,  and  destroyed  a  timber-yard 
in  the  citadel,  and  two  of  the  largest  and  finest  houses  on 
the  Steinstrasse,  by  fire.  Immediately  on  completion  of 
the  crownings  in  front  of  the  two  lunettes,  the  artillery 
went  on  with  the  construction  of  counter-batteries,  Nos. 
51,  53,  54,  and  armed  them  each  with  two  6-pounder  guns. 

September  20.- — In  front  of  lunette  53  the  descent  of 
the  ditch  was  finished,  and  the  foot  of  the  counterscarp  was 
blown  in  by  a  mine.  The  breach  thus  caused  was  widened 
to  12  feet,  and  made  practicable.  The  debris  of  the  wall, 
however,  only  filled  up  part  of  the  ditch,  and  about  3  rods 
(36  feet)  of  its  breadth  remained  to  be  filled  up  to  complete 
the  passage  of  the  ditch.  This  was  done  by  throwing  in 
filled  sandbags  and  earth,  and  fascines  and  gabions  loaded 
with  stones.  Towards  5  p.m.  this  task  was  completed,  and 
a  passage  to  the  work  was  made  practicable,  about  60  feet 
long,  18  feet  wide,  and  4  feet  to  8  feet  deep  in  water.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  guard  of  the  trenches  that  happened  to  be  at 
hand  consisting  of  some  men  of  the  Cottbus  landwehr  bat- 
talion of  the  guard,  under  Lieutenant  von  MuUer,  of  the  fus- 
iliers of  the  guard,  advanced,  ascended  the  breach  that  had 
been  made  in  the  18-foot  escarp,  and  effected  a  lodgment  on 
it.  The  work  was  abandoned  by  the  enemy,  but  the  interior 
was  seen  from  the  works  lying  behind  it.  Lieutenant  Fro- 
benius,  of  the  engineers,  reconnoitered  the  interior  of  the 
lunette.  He  found  the  gorge  open,  a  great  traverse,  with 
two  vaulted  passages,  erected  on  the  centre  line  or  capital 
of  the  work,  and  some  guns.  The  abandoned  guns  were 
spiked  by  the  artillery;  and  the  pioneers  (engineers)  hav- 
ing found  nowhere  any  mines  for  its  demolition,  the  interior 
of  the  lunette  was  occupied.     The  enemy  hereupon  opened 

—506— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

a  brisk  musketry  fire,  from  which  the  new  garrison  endeav- 
oured to  cover  themselves  as  best  they  could.  At  night  the 
3rd  company  of  the  34th  fusiliers  formed  the  garrison.  A 
pioneer  company,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Ledebur, 
effectually  closed  in  the  work  by  the  construction  of  covered 
communications  to  the  lodgment  in  the  gorge,  with  a  para- 
pet facing  the  enceinte.  Mortar-batteries  49  and  50,  against 
the  adjoining  works,  as  well  as  gun-battery  55,  were  built. 
In  the  captured  lunette.  No.  53  a  7-pounder  mortar-battery, 
No.  56,  was  erected. 

September  21. — General  Keller's  detachment,  that  had 
been  sent  to  Upper  Alsace,  rejoined  the  siege  corps  before 
Strasburg.  Night  and  day  work  was  carried  on  at  the  de- 
scent of  the  ditch  in  front  of  lunette  52,  from  the  entrance 
down  to  the  bottom,  and  many  reliefs  were  employed  so  as 
to  finish  the  work  as  quickly  as  possible.  The  slopes  were 
revetted  with  gabions,  and  iron  rails,  properly  supported  at 
the  ends,  were  used  in  its  construction.  The  breach  through 
the  earthen  counterscarp  to  the  wet  ditch  was  filled  up  dur- 
ing the  day  with  gabions,  sandbags,  etc.  At  8  o'clock  in  the 
evening  preparations  were  commenced  for  the  passage  of 
the  ditch.  This  was  to  be  effected  by  means  of  a  bridge  ot 
casks,  120  feet  long,  constructed  under  the  charge  of  Cap- 
tain Andraie,  of  the  engineers.  To  prevent  noise  the  bridge 
was  covered  with  straw,  and  its  construction  was  completed 
about  half-past  10  o'clock.  A  working  party  of  100  men, 
under  the  command  of  First-Lieutenant  von  Reiser  I.,  of 
the  engineers,  followed  by  two  companies  of  the  34th  fusil- 
iers, crossed  over,  and  found  the  lunette  armed  with  some 
guns,  but  unoccupied.  Fire  was  opened  upon  them,  however, 
from  the  line  of  works  in  rear,  namely,  the  counter-guard, 
and  the  hornwork  47-49 ;  but,  though  they  suffered  much 
loss,  the  work  w^as  pushed  on  with  great  energy,  and  the 
contemplated  lodgment  in  the  works  was  effected.  Major 
von  Quitzow,  of  the  staff  of  the  engineers  (major  of  the 
trenches  on  duty),  was  killed.  Captain  Roese,  of  the  engi- 
neers, had  charge  of  the  works  for  closing  the  lunette,  which 
consisted  of  a  lodgment  behind  the  palisades  at  the  gorge, 
and  a  communication  leading  into  it.     Inside  the  lunette 

—507— 


Siege  Operations 

four  7-pounder  mortars  were  subsequently  placed,  and  it 
was  called  battery  57.  The  loss  amounted  on  this  night  to 
10  killed  and  38  wounded.  During  the  day  the  bombard- 
ment was  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  town.  The  prefec- 
ture was  burnt  down,  and  the  fire  in  the  Steinstrasse  con- 
tinued its  ravages. 

September  22. — During  the  past  night  the  cannonade 
never  stopped,  and  the  bursting  of  shells  in  the  city  was  in- 
cessant, causing  much  loss  of  life,  and  making  everywhere 
sad  havoc. 

Lunette  52  was  captured ;  with  it  six  12-pounders, 
with  their  proportion  of  ammunition,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  besiegers.  On  the  crowning  a  6-pounder  was  placed  op- 
posite the  left  face  of  the  work.  The  losses  of  the  last  few 
days  had  made  it  necessary  to  advance  the  field  hospitals 
(Verband  platze).  They  were  made  bombproof  by  the  use 
of  railway  metals,  and  for  some  of  them  Abyssinian  wells 
were  sunk. 

September  23. — During  the  past  night  the  besiegers, 
making  use  of  a  dam  that  happened  to  be  there,  debouched 
from  the  gorge  of  lunette  52,  by  means  of  the  double  sap, 
towards  the  summit  of  the  glacis  of  counterguard  51.  At 
this  point  Captain  Ledebur,  of  the  Prussian  Engineers,  was 
wounded ;  he  died  of  this  wound  some  weeks  later.  All 
honour  and  respect  is  due  to  this  officer  for  his  gallant  con- 
duct. He  it  was  who,  by  a  bold  advance,  discovered  the 
mines  in  front  of  lunette  53,  and  who  swam  through  the 
ditch  in  front  of  lunette  52  to  reconnoitre  the  gorge  of  that 
work. 

On  the  same  night  a  powder-magazine,  which  had  been 
struck  simultaneously  by  two  French  shells,  blew  up  in 
battery  No.  35.  In  another  battery  (No.  32),  the  roof  of 
the  magazine  was  broken  through.  In  the  former  case  5 
cwt.  of  powder  went  off,  and  blew  to  pieces  the  gunner  who 
was  employed  in  the  magazine.  It  was  evident  from  this, 
that  the  bridge  of  casks  leading  to  lunette  52,  built  on  the 
night  of  the  21st  and  22nd,  would  not  last  long.  In  the 
course  of  the  day  it  was  disabled  by  the  shells  of  the  enemy. 
It  was  accordingly  sunk  on  the  following  night  to  the  bottom 

—508— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

of  the  ditch,  filled  up  with  fascines,  sandbags,  and  gabions, 
and  remained  thus  a  secure  means  of  crossing  the  ditch.  As 
it  was  exposed  to  an  uninterrupted  flanking  fire  from  lun- 
ettes 54  and  55,  a  parapet  was  made  on  the  left  side,  of 
gabions  in  two  rows,  one  above  the  other,  filled  with  sand- 
bags. Breaching  battery  No.  42  commenced  firing  against 
the  right  face  of  bastion  11. 

September  24. — During  the  previous  night,  breaching 
batter  No.  58,  for  four  short  24-pounders,  was  built  oppo- 
site the  left  face  of  bastion  12,  and  opened  fire  in  the  morn- 
ing. The  double  sap,  which  had  been  commenced  inside  the 
dam  leading  to  lunette  52  from  the  rear,  was  pushed  for- 
ward as  far  as  the  crest  of  the  glacis  of  bastion  11,  where 
it  terminated  in  a  traverse  that  was  met  with,  and  which 
was  prepared  for  defense  by  infantry,  by  cutting  a  ban- 
quette in  it.  Destruction  by  fire  and  ruin  of  every  descrip- 
tion continually  increased  in  the  city;  the  citizens  were 
wounded  and  killed,  by  shrapnel  and  shells,  in  the  streets, 
in  their  houses,  at  any  business  they  undertook.  One  of 
the  21-centimetre  (8.27)  shells  passed  through  three  storys 
into  the  cellar  of  a  house,  destroying  everything  in  its  way. 

September  25. — In  lunette  53,  battery  No.  60  was 
erected,  for  three  rifled  6-pounders.  A  complete  breach  was 
formed  in  bastion  11. 

September  26. — A  complete  breach  was  formed  in  bas- 
tion No.  12.  Bastions  11  and  12  were  reduced  to  shapeless 
ruins  by  the  fire  directed  on  them,  and  at  the  salient  of  the 
later  bastion  an  arched  gun-casemate  was  entirely  destroyed. 
The  arch  of  the  Steinthor  was  shot  to  pieces.  The  con- 
struction of  the  crowning  in  front  of  the  counter-guard  of 
bastion  11  was  continued  by  the  engineers. 

So  remarkable  were  the  exertions  of  the  artillery,  that 
it  is  only  right  to  make  special  mention  of  the  energy  and 
endurance  which  these  troops  this  day  displayed  before 
Strasburg,  and  to  which  alone  it  is  due,  not  only  that  the 
artillery  of  the  defenders  was  so  held  in  check,  that  at  last 
they  only  ventured  to  come  out  at  night,  but  also  that  the 
engineer  attack,  conducted  with  measures  as  well  considered 

—509— 


Siege  Operations 

as  they  were  excellent  and  vigourous,  attained  its  object  in 
so  short  a  time. 

The  various  descriptions  of  guns  which  the  artillery  had 
in  use  before  Strasburg  were  long  24-pounder,  short  24- 
pounder,  12-pounder  and  6-pounder  guns ;  21-centimetre, 
50-pounder,  25-pounder,  and  7-pounder  mortars.  Altogether 
193,722  shot  and  shell  were  fired,  of  which  162,600  were  fired 
from  197  Prussian  pieces  of  artillery,  and  31,112  from  Ba- 
den artillery.  Every  day  a  train  of  thirty-two  wagons  was 
required  to  bring  up  ammunition.  During  the  bombardment 
and  siege,  on  the  average  1,200  cwt.  of  metal  (iron  and  lead) 
was  thrown  into  the  fortress  daily.  At  the  time  that  most 
of  the  artillery  w^ere  in  action — that  is  to  say,  approximately, 
during  the  last  three  weeks  of  the  siege — the  fortress  re- 
ceived, at  the  ordinary  rate  of  fire,  some  6,000  projectiles 
during  the  24  hours,  and  of  these  each  one  exploded  separ- 
ately. Wall-pieces,  served  by  some  particularly  good  marks- 
men of  the  Baden  division  were  made  use  of  from  the  be- 
ginning of  the  siege.  Wall-piece  detachments  were  formed, 
and  posted  in  the  most  advanced  trenches,  in  order  that  they 
might  operate  against  particular  guns  of  the  enemy. 

September  27. — On  this  day  the  defence  was  almost 
entirely  silent,  and  only  now  and  then  gave  signs  of  life. 
But,  though  this  was  the  case,  all  were  surprised  and  aston- 
ished when,  at  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  white  flags  were 
seen  to  wave  on  the  cathedral,  and  on  bastions  11  and  12. 
At  the  same  time,  a  flag  of  truce  announced  that  the  gover- 
nor wished  to  treat  for  the  surrender  of  the  fortress. 

September  28. — At  2  a.m.  the  terms  of  capitulation 
were  agreed  upon  at  Konigshofen,  and  the  principal  points 
were  as  follows: 

"Article  1. — At  8  a.m.  on  the  28th  September,  1870, 
Lieutenant  General  Uhrich  evacuates  the  citadel,  the  Aus- 
terlitz,  Fischer,  and  National  gates.  At  the  same  time  the 
German  troops  occupy  these  places. 

"Article  2. — At  11  o'clock  on  the  same  day  the  French 
garrison  including  mobiles  and  national  guards,  evacuate 
the  fortress  and  lay  down  their  arms. 

—510— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

"Article  3. — The  troops  of  the  line  and  gardes  mobiles 
become  prisoners  of  war,  and  march  off  with  their  baggage. 
The  national  guards  and  the  franc-tireurs  are  free  on  speci- 
fied conditions,  and  give  up  their  arms  at  the  mayoralty. 

"Article  4. — The  officers  and  officials  ranking  as  non- 
commissioned officers  depart  to  such  residences  as  they  may 
select,  on  a  written  engagement  'upon  honour,'  Those  who 
do  not  do  so,  go  with  the  garrison  as  prisoners  of  war  to 
Germany. 

"Article  5. — Lieutenant-General  Uhrich  undertakes,  im- 
mediately after  the  arms  are  laid  down,  to  hand  over  all  mil- 
itary property,  and  the  public  chest." 

This  capitulation  was  signed,  on  the  part  of  the  Ger- 
mans, by  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Lescinsky,  chief  of  the 
general  staff,  and  Captain  and  Adjutant  Count  Henckel  von 
Donnersmarck ;  and  on  the  part  of  the  French  by  the  com- 
mandant of  Strasburg,  Colonel  Ducasse,  and  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Mangin,  sub-director  of  artillery.  It  was  ratified  by 
Lt.  Gen.  von  Werder. 

The  Germans  received  into  their  hands,  in  consequence 
of  this  capitulation,  451  officers,  17,111  men  (including 
7,000  national  guards),  and  some  2,000  sick,  1,843  horses, 
more  than  1,200  pieces  of  bronze  ordnance,  3,000  cwt.  of  pow- 
der, 12,000  chassepot  rifles,  50  locomotives,  and  great  quan- 
tities of  other  warlike  stores.  The  prisoners  of  war  were 
sent  to  Rastatt. 

In  accordance  with  Article  2  of  the  capitulation,  de- 
tachments of  the  siege  corps  of  all  arms  were  posted  during 
the  morning  between  the  roads  leading  to  Zabern  and  to 
Konigshofen,  while  the  French  marched  out  between  lunette 
44  and  redoubt  37.  The  march-past  of  the  latter  was  com- 
menced by  Lieutenant-General  Uhrich,  followed  by  General 
Barral,  of  the  artillery,  and  Admiral  Exelmann,  who  was 
to  have  commanded  the  Rhine  flotilla.  The  troops  marched 
at  first  in  their  ranks,  but  afterwards  in  disorder.  They  de- 
filed past  Lieutenant-General  von  Werder,  in  the  presence 
of  H.R.H.  the  Grand  Duke   of  Baden. 


-511— 


Siege  Operations 

In  Strasburg  both  Lieutenant-General  Uhrich  and  the 
prefect  had  issued  proclamations  to  the  citizens,  in  which 
they  expressed  their  sympathy  with  the  hard  lot  of  the 
inhabitants  during  the  siege,  and  their  confidence  that  they 
would  accept  the  new  state  of  affairs  worthily  and  peace- 
ably. 

September  29. — The  taking  over  of  the  property,  bar- 
racks, etc.,  continued.  The  communications  destroyed  were 
repaired  and  opened,  especially  the  bridges  and  gateways 
of  the  fortress. 

September  30. — Being  the  birthday  of  Her  Majesty  the 
Queen,  and  a  day  to  be  remembered  after  the  occupation  of 
Strasburg  for  200  years  by  the  French  troops — the  entry 
of  the  siege  army  corps  took  place,  with  Lieutenant-General 
von  Werder  at  its  head.  This  event  was  celebrated  by  a 
thanksgiving  service  in  the  church  of  St.  Thomas.  The  siege 
cost  the  garrison  some  2,000  men  killed  and  wounded,  the 
civil  population  some  400  or  500  persons,  and  the  besieging 
army  43  officers  and  863  men  killed  and  wounded. 

Without  making  any  imputation  on  the  military  honour 
of  the  brave  and  worthy  governor,  but  looking  at  the  mat- 
ter in  a  purely  military  aspect,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  time  for 
capitulation  had  not  arrived.  More  light  will  probably 
be  thrown  on  this  point  hereafter.  The  want  of  discipline 
was  no  doubt  one  cause  of  disaster  for  the  defence,  but  it 
is  nevertheless  certain  that  even  a  better  garrison  could  not 
have  held  out  much  longer.  For  to  remain  on  the  ramparts 
under  the  incessant  cannonade  was  almost  impossible ;  a 
breach  had  been  effected,  the  citadel  was  almost  destroyed, 
the  entrance  gateway  of  the  city  was  shot  to  pieces.  Under 
these  circumstances,  and  as  there  was  no  flanking  fire  along 
the  bottom  of  the  ditches,  an  attempt  to  storm  the  fortress 
was  almost  sure  of  success.  The  capitulation,  at  all  events, 
had  the  effect  of  preventing  one  or  more  assaults,  which 
would  have  entailed  rfiore  bloodshed  and  serious  loss  of  life. 
The  capture  of  Strasburg  was  of  decided  military  importance 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  but  it  was  of  far  greater  mo- 
ment politically.  The  German  city  of  Strasburg  had  sur- 
rendered to  us,  had  again  become  German,  and   would,  it 

—512— 


resistance.    Nor  does  the  place  possess  sufficient  bombproof 
casements  for  the  garrison  and  the  provisions.     Moreover 


—513— 


Plate  VH 


/■'V.' ■»<./..       i  M  t 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

was  hoped,  long  remain  so.  In  a  few  years  the  city,  heavily 
though  it  suffered  by  the  war — for  its  losses  have  been  pub- 
licly estimated  to  amount  to  50,800,000  francs  (£2,032,000) 
will  flourish  again,  and  its  wounds,  which  we  inflicted  with 
heavy  hearts. will  be  healed. 


Sedan 

(See  map) 

Sedan  is  situated  on  the  railway  from  Thionville  to 
Mezieres,  at  the  place  where  it  crosses  the  road  leading  out 
of  Belgium  by  Bouillon.  It  has  16,000  inhabitants  and  is 
an  important  manufacturing  town.  In  the  low-lying 
meadow-land  to  the  westward  there  are  many  water-courses 
running  into  the  Meuse,  which  flows  through  the  fortress. 
A  mile  (4.68  English  miles)  above  Sedan,  at  Remilly,  the 
river  receives  the  waters  of  the  Chiers.  On  the  east  the 
ground  rises  to  some  steep  wooded  heights  which  make 
the  approach  from  that  quarter  difficult.  The  fortress  of 
Sedan  lies  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  opposite  the  sub- 
urb of  Torcy,  which  is  enclosed  by  fortifications  consisting 
of  four  bastioned.  fronts.  This  bridge-head  is  united  with 
the  main  work  by  connecting  lines  of  a  similar  character. 
The  citadel  with  its  high  profile,  and  the  castle,  in  which 
Marshal  Turenne  was  born  in  1622,  form  the  kernel  of  the 
whole.  Several  hornworks  with  ravelins  cover  the  citadel 
on  the  east,  and  in  front  of  them  a  spacious  entrenchment 
has  been  thrown  out,  in  order  to  bring  under  fire  the  ground, 
which  is  much  cut  up,  and  also  the  road  to  Luttich.  The 
ditches  are  wet  only  on  the  south  front,  which  lies  low,  and 
here,  as  in  other  parts  of  the  fortifications,  they  have  re- 
taining walls  in  good  repair.  The  fortress  may,  therefore, 
be  considerd  as  perfctly  secure  from  assault,  and  an  attack 
is  not  practicable  without  regular  engineering  preliminaries. 
However,  the  masonry  is  not  everywhere  suflficiently  cov- 
ered, considering  the  present  ranges  of  artillery,  for  a  long 
resistance.  Nor  does  the  place  possess  sufficient  bombproof 
casements  for  the  garrison  and  the  provisions.     Moreover 

—513— 


c 

t 

c 

I 

i 
1: 

I 
I 
t 
t 
t 

} 
■V 

1 
f 

ment  politically,     rue  German  city  ot  strasburg  haa  sur- 
rendered to  us,  had  again  become  German,  and   would,  it 

—512— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

was  hoped,  long  remain  so.  In  a  few  years  the  city,  heavily 
though  it  suffered  by  the  war — for  its  losses  have  been  pub- 
licly estimated  to  amount  to  50,800,000  francs  (£2,032,000) 
will  flourish  again,  and  its  wounds,  which  we  inflicted  with 
heavy  hearts  will  be  healed. 


Sedan 

(See  map) 

Sedan  is  situated  on  the  railway  from  Thionville  to 
Mezieres,  at  the  place  where  it  crosses  the  road  leading  out 
of  Belgium  by  Bouillon.  It  has  16,000  inhabitants  and  is 
an  important  manufacturing  town.  In  the  low-lying 
meadow-land  to  the  westward  there  are  many  water-courses 
running  into  the  Meuse,  which  flows  through  the  fortress. 
A  mile  (4.68  English  miles)  above  Sedan,  at  Remilly,  the 
river  receives  the  waters  of  the  Chiers.  On  the  east  the 
ground  rises  to  some  steep  wooded  heights  which  make 
the  approach  from  that  quarter  difficult.  The  fortress  of 
Sedan  lies  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  opposite  the  sub- 
urb of  Torcy,  which  is  enclosed  by  fortifications  consisting 
of  four  bastioned.  fronts.  This  bridge-head  is  united  with 
the  main  work  by  connecting  lines  of  a  similar  character. 
The  citadel  with  its  high  profile,  and  the  castle,  in  which 
Marshal  Turenne  was  born  in  1622,  form  the  kernel  of  the 
whole.  Several  hornworks  with  ravelins  cover  the  citadel 
on  the  east,  and  in  front  of  them  a  spacious  entrenchment 
has  been  thrown  out,  in  order  to  bring  under  fire  the  ground, 
which  is  much  cut  up,  and  also  the  road  to  Luttich.  The 
ditches  are  wet  only  on  the  south  front,  which  lies  low,  and 
here,  as  in  other  parts  of  the  fortifications,  they  have  re- 
taining walls  in  good  repair.  The  fortress  may,  therefore, 
be  considerd  as  perfctly  secure  from  assault,  and  an  attack 
is  not  practicable  without  regular  engineering  preliminaries. 
However,  the  masonry  is  not  everywhere  sufficiently  cov- 
ered, considering  the  present  ranges  of  artillery,  for  a  long 
resistance.  Nor  does  the  place  possess  suflficient  bombproof 
casements  for  the  garrison  and  the  provisions.     Moreover 

—513— 


Siege  Operations 

the  spacious  and  extended  works  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Meuse  are  not  such  as  to  receive  the  numbers  of  troops  nec- 
essary for  counter-attacks  on  a  large  scale.  This  is  a  most 
essential  point  if  a  fortress  is  to  be  of  use  in  modern  warfare. 
The  stock  of  provisions  on  hand  was  in  no  case  sufficient  to 
maintain  even  for  a  few  days,  the  great  masses  of  French 
troops  who  were  compelled  to  fall  back  upon  the  fortress ;  so 
that,  immediately  after  the  battle,  it  became  necessary  to 
have  recourse,  by  agreement,  to  the  resources  of  the  neigh- 
boring fortress  of  Mezieres. 

The  fortress  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  having  in  itself 
any  great  strategical  importance.  Nevertheless,  in  its  im- 
mediate neighborhood,  owing  to  the  unexpected  course  of 
the  events  of  war,  was  fought  one  of  the  most  important 
battles  of  the  campaign  of  1870,  having  results  of  the  wid- 
est influence  on  its  further  progress. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  immediately  after  the  bat- 
tles round  Metz,  the  movements  and  strength  of  MacMa- 
hon's  army  remained  for  some  time  unknown.  Meanwhile 
that  army  had  reached  Chalons,  and  the  Marshal  had  to 
march  thence  to  the  northward  by  the  positive  command  of 
Count  Palikao,  the  War  Minister,  with  the  object  of  divid- 
ing the  German  forces  and  relieving  Marshal  Bazaine,  who 
was  shut  up  in  Metz.  But  the  German  Army,  on  the  con- 
trary, which  was  advancing  on  Paris,  closed  up  to  the  north- 
ward, covered  its  right  flank  with  the  Thionville-Montmedy- 
Sedan  railroad  and  thus  drove  the  enemy's  forces  from  the 
line  Stenay-Varennes,  into  the  narrow  space  between  the 
Mezieres  and  Sedan  railway  and  the  boundary  of  the  neu- 
tral country  of  Belgium. 

In  consequence  of  the  victory  won  at  Beaumont  on  the 
30th  of  August  by  the  1st  Bavarian,  the  IVth  Prussian  and 
the  Xllth  corps,  the  situation  of  the  French  Army  in  that 
position  became  precarious,  and  they  were  compelled  to 
concentrate  immediately  around  Sedan.  The  march  to 
Metz  must  be  considered  as  completely  abandoned  at  this 
time. 

On  the  31st  of  August  the  German  army  undertook 
such  movements  as  were  necessary  for  surrounding  the 

—514— 


Campaign  x^gainst  Fiance  1870-71 

enemy.  They  kept  in  contact  with  him,  and  the  artillery 
of  the  1st  Bavarian  army  corps  had  an  opportunity  of 
shelling  the  French  columns  as  they  were  retreating  at 
first  in  some  order,  but  at  last  in  complete  rout,  upon  Sedan, 

It  was  not  impossible  that  the  French  corps  in  and 
round  Sedan,  threatened  as  they  were  by  the  German  army, 
but  still  concentrated,  might  nevertheless  endeavour,  by 
a  rapid  march  to  the  west  or  east,  to  set  themselves  free 
from  their  position.  For  this  reason  the  German  army  had 
to  draw  more  closely  round  them  an  unbroken  girdle  of 
investment. 

Accordingly,  on  the  evening  of  the  31st  of  August  and 
during  the  following  night,  the  German  armies  were  posted 
as  follows: — 

IV th  Arjny  — Right  Wing. 

The  Guard  Corps  at  Carigiian  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Chiers. 

The  Xllth  Saxon  Corps  at  Mairy. 

The  IVth  Corps  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse  at  Sedan. 

Ilird  Army. — Left   Wing. 

The  1st  Bavarian  Corps  at  Remilly. 
The  Ilnd  Bavarian  Corps  at  Raucourt. 
The  Vth   Prussian  Corps  at  Chehery. 
The  Xlth   Prussian  Corps  at  Donchery. 
The   Royal  Wurtemberg-  Division  at  Boutaucourt. 
The  Vlth  Army  Corps  in  Reserve  at  Attigny  and  Semuy,  ready 
to  stop  the  enemy  if  he  should  break  out  to  the  westward. 

Opposite  to  the  position  of  the  Germans  the  French 
on  the  same  night  stood  thus : — 

1.  Right    Wing — 12th    corps,    General    Leburn,    at    La    Moncelle, 

Platiniere,   and    Petite    Moncelle. 

2.  In    the    Centre,    on    the    heights    of    Daigny    and    between    La 

Moncelle  and  Givonne,  the  1st  Corps,  General  Ducrot.  The 
5th  Corps,  General  Wimpffen,  on  the  heights  which  com- 
mand the  Givonne  valley,  rested  its  right  on  the  1st  and  its 
left  on  the  3rd  corps. 

3.  Left  Wing.^ — The  3rd  Corps,   General  Douay,   from  Floing  as 

far  as  the  hill  of  Illy. 

The  position  described  an  ai"c  of  a  circle  round  Sedan  from  south- 
west to  north-west,  and  extended  over  a  line  of  5  kilometres 
(31/10  miles)  in  length,  about  4  kilometres  (2a  miles  from 
the  fortress ) . 

There  was  thus  a  gap  on  the  east  through  which  the 
French  army,  even  if  in  disorder,  might  reach  the  Belgian 

—515— 


Siege  Operations 

frontier.  They  accepted  battle,  however,  and  that  opening 
was  practically  closed  for  the  first  time  in  the  course  of 
the  afternoon  of  the  1st  September,  at  Illy,  by  the  Guard 
and  the  Vth  Corps. 

On  the  morning  of  the  1st  September  the  fight  began 
with  a  general  advance  of  the  German  corps  towards  the 
French  position.  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  and  King 
halted  on  the  hill  at  Frenois.  In  what  follows  we  will  only 
mention  the  critical  events  of  this  day  of  hard  fighting 
in  the  order  in  which  they  occurred. 

The  fight  began  at  4  o'clock  in  the  morning  at 
Bazeilles.  This  place  was  taken  after  several  sanguinary 
attacks,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  back  beyond  Balan  by 
the  1st  Bavarian  corps  and  Walther's  division  of  the  Ilnd 
Bavarian  corps.  The  Emperor  Napoleon  was  present,  close 
to  the  fight  round  Bazeilles. 

From  half-past  6  till  half -past  9  o'clock  the  fight  was 
pivoted  on  the  position  of  La  Moncelle-Daigny.  The  Xllth 
corps  with  its  23rd  division  took  Moncelle ;  about  12  o'clock 
Daigny  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  same  corps  aided  by  the 
2nd  guard  division.  The  23rd  division  pursued  the  advan- 
tage they  had  gained  and  the  guards  got  round  the  flank 
of  the  enemy  at  Illy.  All  the  batteries  went  up  the  cap- 
tured heights,  and  nearly  100  guns  were  in  action  on  the 
right  wing.  As  already  mentioned,  the  connection  of  the 
guard  corps  with  the  Vth  corps  at  Illy  was  completed  about 
3  o'clock. 

On  the  left  wing  of  the  combined  German  armies  the 
Xlth  corps  took  Monges  and  thrust  back  the  enemy  on  to 
his  strong  position  between  Floing  and  Illy.  Here  they 
came  under  a  reverse  fire  from  the  Bavarian  batteries 
which  were  posted  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  north 
and  north-east  of  Frenois. 

The  corps-artillery  of  the-  Xlth  and  Vth  corps  came 
into  action  most  eifectively  at  Fleigneux.  The  Xlth  corps 
and  the  19th  infantry  brigade  took  Floing  about  1  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon.  The  enemy  made  some  vigorous,  but 
unavailing,  attacks  with  his  cavalry. 

—516— 


b7C 

oo| 


( 


Battle  at  Sedan 

September  1,1870. 
Positions  of   the  German  Troops  at)out  noon 


<fe5(    tl  Guar^  Corps     ifa    Ba.„r,c,n:, 
^^mm      Front   French  InFanfry  L,n 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

About  3  o'clock  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat  from 
different  sides  on  Sedan,  after  Illy  had  been  captured  and 
he  had  lost  the  Bois  de  la  Garenne. 

During  the  fight  nearly  25,000  prisoners  were  made, 
partly  by  the  IVth  army;  partly  by  the  Bavarian  troops, 
the  Xlth,  and  the  Vth  corps,  and  25  guns,  7  machine  guns,  2 
flags,  and  1  eagle  were  captured. 

On  the  French  side  Marshal  MacMahon  was  wounded 
at  the  beginning  of  the  battle,  and,  in  the  course  of  the 
action  on  the  German  side,  General  von  Gersdorf,  com- 
manding temporarily  the  Xlth  araiy  corps,  was  also 
wounded.  At  first  General  Ducrot  became  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  French  Army ;  but  subsequently,  in  consequence 
of  an  order  from  the  Ministry,  General  Wimpffen,  being 
senior  in  the  service,  took  the  command.  The  former,  act- 
ing on  instructions  received  from  the  Marshal,  made  ar- 
rangements for  a  retreat  on  Meziers,  but  the  latter  can- 
celled the  orders.  It  was,  in  fact,  plain  from  the  move- 
ments of  the  French  during  the  fight  that  they  first  intended 
to  break  through  to  the  west,  and  then  to  the  eastward. 
Round  Sedan  there  were  at  the  last  400  to  500  German 
guns  in  action.  The  fortress  itself  was  only  shelled  by 
some  Bavarian  batteries  during  the  later  hours  of  the 
afternoon,  and  a  forage  store  was  set  on  fire.  The  Emperor 
Napoleon  was  taken  prisoner;  and  the  French  army,  com- 
pletely shut  in  by  a  force  of  twice  their  strength,  unable 
to  break  through  or  to  prolong  their  resistance  after  a 
council  of  war  had  been  held  under  the  presidency  of  Gen- 
eral Wimpffen,  were  compelled  to  surrender.  The  nego- 
tiations were  carried  on  in  the  chateau  of  Bellevue  at 
Frenois  and  concluded  at  midday  on  the  2nd  September. 

Besides  the  prisoners  made  on  the  previous  day,  there 
fell  thus  into  the  hands  of  the  victors  83,000  men,  14,000 
French  wounded,  400  field  guns,  including  70  mitrailleurs, 
many  horses,  and  military  stores,  besides  the  fortress  of 
Sedan  with  184  garrison  guns. 

As  a  proof  of  the  communication  that  existed  between 
the  generals  of  the  French  armies  at  Sedan  and  at  Metz, 

—517— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

About  3  o'clock  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat  from 
different  sides  on  Sedan,  after  Illy  had  been  captured  and 
he  had  lost  the  Bois  de  la  Garenne. 

During  the  fight  nearly  25,000  prisoners  were  made, 
partly  by  the  IVth  army;  partly  by  the  Bavarian  troops, 
the  Xlth,  and  the  Vth  corps,  and  25  guns,  7  machine  guns,  2 
flags,  and  1  eagle  were  captured. 

On  the  French  side  Marshal  MacMahon  was  wounded 
at  the  beginning  of  the  battle,  and,  in  the  course  of  the 
action  on  the  German  side.  General  von  Gersdorf,  com- 
manding temporarily  the  Xlth  army  corps,  was  also 
wounded.  At  first  General  Ducrot  became  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  French  Army ;  but  subsequently,  in  consequence 
of  an  order  from  the  Ministry,  General  Wimpffen,  being 
senior  in  the  service,  took  the  command.  The  former,  act- 
ing on  instructions  received  from  the  Marshal,  made  ar- 
rangements for  a  retreat  on  Meziers,  but  the  latter  can- 
celled the  orders.  It  was,  in  fact,  plain  from  the  move- 
ments of  the  French  during  the  fight  that  they  first  intended 
to  break  through  to  the  west,  and  then  to  the  eastward. 
Round  Sedan  there  were  at  the  last  400  to  500  German 
guns  in  action.  The  fortress  itself  was  only  shelled  by 
some  Bavarian  batteries  during  the  later  hours  of  the 
afternoon,  and  a  forage  store  was  set  on  fire.  The  Emperor 
Napoleon  was  taken  prisoner;  and  the  French  army,  com- 
pletely shut  in  by  a  force  of  twice  their  strength,  unable 
to  break  through  or  to  prolong  their  resistance  after  a 
council  of  war  had  been  held  under  the  presidency  of  Gen- 
eral Wimpffen,  were  compelled  to  surrender.  The  nego- 
tiations were  carried  on  in  the  chateau  of  Bellevue  at 
Frenois  and  concluded  at  midday  on  the  2nd  September. 

Besides  the  prisoners  made  on  the  previous  day,  there 
fell  thus  into  the  hands  of  the  victors  83,000  men,  14,000 
French  wounded,  400  field  guns,  including  70  mitrailleurs, 
many  horses,  and  military  stores,  besides  the  fortress  of 
Sedan  with  184  garrison  guns. 

As  a  proof  of  the  communication  that  existed  between 
the  generals  of  the  French  armies  at  Sedan  and  at  Metz, 

—517— 


Siege  Operations 

we  may  here  add,  for  the  sake  of  completeness,  that  on  the 
31st  August  and  the  1st  September  a  severe  action  took 
place  at  the  latter  fortress  also,  Bazaine's  army  attempting 
to  force  its  way  out. 

As  the  Convention  of  Sedan  was  taken  as  a  model  on 
several  other  similar  occasions  in  the  course  of  the  cam- 
paign its  text  is  here  given : — 

"Between  the  undersigned,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of 
King  William  of  Prussia,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  German  armies, 
and  the  General-in-Chief  of  the  French  armies,  both  provided  with 
full  powers  from  their  Majesties  King  William  and  the  Emperor 
Napoleon,  the  following  convention  has  been  concluded: 

"Art.  1.  The  French  army,  under  the  command  of  General 
Wimpffen,  being  now  surrounded  by  superior  forces  at  Sedan,  give 
themselves  up  as  prisoners  of  war. 

"Art.  2.  In  consideration  of  the  courageous  defence  made  by 
the  French  army,  all  the  generals,  officers,  and  officials  ranking 
with  officers  are  to  receive  their  freedom  as  soon  as  they  shall  have 
given  their  words  of  honour  in  writing  not  to  take  up  arms  again 
during  the  present  war,  nor  to  act  in  any  way  contrary  to  the 
interests  of  Germany.  The  officers  and  officials  who  accept  these 
conditions  are  to  retain  their  arms  and  the  personal  property  belong- 
ing to  them. 

"Art.  3.  All  arms  and  warlike  stores,  consisting  of  flags,  eagles, 
guns,  ammunition,  &c.,  will  be  given  over  in  Sedan  to  a  military 
commission  appointed  by  the  French  General,  who  will  hand  them 
over  forthwith  to  a  German  commission. 

"Art.  4.  The  fortress  of  Sedan  will  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
his  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia,  in  its  present  condition,  by  the 
2nd  September  at  the  latest. 

"Art.  5.  The  officers  who  do  not  enter  into  the  engagement 
mentioned  in  the  2nd  article,  as  well  as  the  troops,  will  be  surrendered, 
without  their  arms,  and  drawn  up  by  regiments  and  corps  in  military 
order.  This  proceeding  will  commence  on  the  2nd  September  and 
be  ended  on  the  3rd.  The  bodies  of  troops  will  be  marched  on  to 
the  ground  which  is  bounded  by  the  Meuse  and  Iges,  in  order  to  be 
given  over  to  the  German  commissioners  by  the  officers,  who  will 
then  hand  over  their  command  to  the  non-commissioned  officers.  The 
staff  surgeons  shall,  without  exceptions,  remain  behind  to  attend  the 
wounded.     Given  at  Fresnois  on  the  2nd  September,  1870. 

"Von  Moltke. 
"Graf  Wimpffen." 

Metz 

(See  map) 

Metz  has  50,000  inhabitants,  and  is  one  of  the  strong- 
est fortresses  of  Europe,  and,  as  a  fortification,  much  more 
considerable  than  Paris.  It  has,  during  centuries  past, 
been  often  besieged,  but  never  taken. 

—518— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

The  fortress  is  situated  on  both  sides  of  the  Moselle, 
which  forms  on  the  south  the  islands  of  St.  Symphorien 
and  Sauley,  and  on  the  north  the  island  of  Chambiere.  The 
river  is  navigable  at  Metz,  is  200  to  250  paces  wide  above 
the  fortress,  but  only  100  to  180  paces  below  it,  and  is  4 
feet  deep ;  but  often,  after  heavy  storms  of  rain,  or  when 
the  snow  is  thawing,  becomes  as  much  as  8  or  10  feet.  The 
principal  part  of  the  town  lies  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle,  and  is  enclosed  by  a  girdle  of  fortifications.  The 
lines  commence  at  the  island  of  Sauley,  cross  from  the 
left  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  and  continue  on  that 
side  until  they  reach  the  island  of  Chambiere.  Here  there 
are  two  advanced  works,  the  lunettes  Chambiere  and 
Miellis,  whose  fire  is  directed  upon  the  two  arms  of  the 
river.  Between  the  Sauley  defences  and  the  Chambiere 
lunette,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle,  lies  the  large  fort 
La  Moselle,  consisting  of  two  whole  and  two  half  bastions. 
This  work  commands  the  roads  to  Thionville  and  Verdun 
(Paris)  as  well  as  the  railway  from  Thionville  to  Metz,  for 
which  the  temporary  railway  station  (Devant-les-ponts) 
is  situated  close  to  the  foot  of  the  glacis. 

The  connected  lines  of  the  place  turn  to  the  east  on 
the  island  of  Chambiere,  and  from  the  eastern  and  southern 
defences  of  the  town,  consisting  of  eleven  irregular  bas- 
tioned  fronts,  with  ravelines  outside.  The  ditches  are  partly 
dry  and  partly  wet,  but  in  time  of  war  can  all  be  placed 
under  water.  This  is  effected  by  sluices  connected  with 
the  small  right  arm  of  the  Moselle.  The  enceinte  of  the 
city  is  covered  by  several  advanced  works  close  in  front. 
Among  these  are,  on  the  south,  the  citadel,  consisting  of 
a  crown-work  with  a  ravelin,  and  the  advanced  lunettes 
d'Arcon  and  Rogniat.  These  command  the  island  of  St. 
Symphorien  and  the  ground  to  the  south,  with  the  railway 
works,  as  well  as  the  road  to  Nancy.  The  redoubt  du  Pate 
lies  to  the  east  of  the  citadel  to  command  the  low  ground 
of  the  Seylle,  which  can  be  made  use  of  for  an  extensive 
inundation.  The  stream  flows  between  the  redoubt  and  the 
advanced  work,  Fort  Gisors,  into  the  town.    The  latter  fort 

—519— 


Siege  Operations 

commands  the  road  to  Strasburg  and  the  valley  of  the 
Chenan  rivulet,  which  also  can  be  turned  to  account  to 
flood  the  hollow  ground. 

On  the  northeast  of  the  town,  between  the  roads  lead- 
ing to  Saarlouis  and  Bouzonville,  and  guarding  those  roads, 
lies  the  great  Fort  Bellecroix,  consisting  of  three  bastioned 
fronts,  with  ravelins.  The  left  demi-bastion  and  the  adjoin- 
ing bastion  flank  also  the  island  of  Chambiere,  and  the 
left  bank  of  the  Moselle  in  the  direction  of  St.  Eloy. 

In  front  of  these  inner  works,  which  serve  for  the 
immediate  defence  of  the  town,  at  a  distance  of  3,000  to 
5,000  paces  from  the  enceinte,  are  a  number  of  detached 
forts,  pushed  forward  on  the  surrounding  heights  and  points 
of  defensive  importance.  These  guard  most  effectively, 
and  at  greater  distances  from  the  place,  the  roads  leading 
to  Metz.  The  traces  of  these  works  are  exceedingly  well 
laid  out,  and  they  have  strong  profiles,  and  the  forts 
possess,  therefore,  almost  without  exception,  great  capa- 
bilities of  defence.  Their  development  of  front  is  consid- 
erable. Some  of  their  garrisons  amount  to  3,000  men,  and 
the  armaments  in  some  of  them  to  upwards  of  100  guns. 
These  detached  forts  are  as  follows :  Foi't  St.  Julien,  on  the 
north-west  of  the  town,  on  a  height  about  770  feet  above 
the  Moselle,  to  command  the  valley  of  the  lower  Noseele 
and  the  road  leading  to  Bouzonville;  Fort  Queleu,  at  an 
elevation  of  693  feet,  between  the  road  to  Strasburg  and 
Seylle;  Fort  St.  Quentin  and  Fort  Plappeville,  the  latter 
named  also  Des  Carrieres,  covering  Fo7^t  Moselle,  and  fir- 
ing over  an  elevated  plateau  1,000  feet  high,  across  which 
passes  the  road  to  Verdun  and  Paris. 

Between  these  four  older  forts  a  number  of  additional 
detached  works  have  been  inserted  more  recently,  particu- 
larly since  the  Luxemburg  affair  in  1867,  namely,  Forts 
Embarcadere  and  St.  Privat  on  the  south,  Les  Bottes  on  the 
east  of  the  fortress,  on  the  road  to  Saarlouis,  St.  Eloy, 
between  the  Moselle  and  the  road  to  Thionville,  and  two 
smaller  works  north  of  Fort  St.  Julien,  on  the  road  to 
Bouzonville. 

—  520— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

All  the  forts,  though  their  construction  was  not  quite 
completed,  were  connected  by  lines  of  telegraph  with  the 
main  work,  and  to  some  extent  with  one  another. 

In  the  protection  afforded  by  these  detached  forts 
lies  the  real  strength  of  Metz,  for  they  render  it  difficult 
completely  to  surround  the  fortress,  and,  owing  to  the  great 
circumference  of  the  works,  make  it  necessary  to  employ  a 
very  large  investing  force.  They  secure  the  main  work 
from  bombardment,  and  the  attack  upon  the  enceinte  cannot 
even  be  commenced  until  one  or  more  of  them  have  fallen. 
Finally,  they  give  the  main  work  the  character  of  an 
entrenched  camp,  and  allow  of  the  concentration  under  their 
shelter  of  vast  masses  of  troops  and  of  rapid  offensive 
operations. 

Metz  possesses  enormous  military  stores  of  every 
description,  and  was  most  amply  provided  with  powder 
and  with  guns.  As  regards  military  establishments,  it 
contains  a  military  clothing  factory,  a  depot  for  the  equip- 
ment of  cavalry,  a  laboratory-school,  a  school  of  fortifica- 
tion, and  a  powder  factory.  The  manufacture  of  powder 
is  a  monopoly  in  France.  The  arsenal  for  the  engineers, 
almost  the  only  one  in  France,  and  two  arsenals  for  the 
artillery,  are  situated  in  the  Guisen  entrenchment,  which 
adjoins  the  citadel.  These  depots  contained  arms  and  equip- 
ment complete  for  an  army  of  150,000  men. 

The  barracks  of  the  engineers,  the  only  ones  in  the 
fortress  that  are  bombproof,  are  on  the  Konigsplatz,  those 
of  the  artillery  at  the  Chambiere  gate,  and  those  of  the 
infantry  in  Fort  Moselle,  where  also  is  situated  the  hospital 
prepared  for  the  reception  of  1,900  men. 

The  drinking-water  in  Metz  is  bad,  and  tends  to  produce 
fevers ;  during  the  last  few  years,  therefore,  an  underground 
conduit  has  been  made,  which  draws  its  supply  from  Gorze, 
two  miles  (9.4  English  miles)  to  the  west  of  the  fortress, 
and  brings  daily  to  the  place  10,000  cubic  metres  of  whole- 
some water.  Another,  but  a  secondary  conduit,  brings 
water  to  the  place  from  a  collecting  reservoir  near  Grave- 
lotte. 

—521— 


Siege  Operations 

Metz  was  originally  a  German  city.  Under  the  secret 
influence  of  the  priests,  as  at  Strasburg,  it  was  transferred 
by  treachery  into  the  hands  of  France,  whose  King,  Henry 
II.,  in  the  year  1552,  caused  the  city  and  fortress  to  be 
occupied  by  the  Constable  Montmorency.  A  fruitless  siege 
was  undertaken  by  the  Emperor  Charles  V.,  and  conducted 
by  the  Duke  of  Alva  for  a  period  of  sixty-five  days,  against 
the  fortress,  which  was  even  then  of  great  strength.  The 
place  was  first  formally  handed  over  to  France  by  the 
Treaty  of  Westphalia  in  1648. 

Nothwithstanding  the  great  strategical  importance  of 
Metz  in  a  war  with  Germany,  and  in  spite  of  its  important 
position  on  the  actual  theatre  of  war,  the  fortress  was  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  campaign  in  an  unprepared  condition. 
Serious  preparations  for  a  siege,  as  regards  both  the  forti- 
fications and  the  artillery  were  first  undertaken  after  the 
battle  of  Forbach,  and  for  this  purpose  nearly  15,000 
peasants  were  summoned  from  the  country  to  the  fortress, 
who  later  on  were  unable  to  get  out  again,  and  consequently 
had  to  be  subsisted. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  would  not  have  been 
absolutely  impossible  for  the  Prussians,  at  the  expense, 
perhaps,  of  heavy  losses,  to  have  established  themselves 
in  Fort  Bellecroix,  after  the  battle  of  the  14th  August. 
It  is  another  question  whether  it  would  have  been  possible  to 
hold  this  position,  situated  immediately  in  front  of  the 
main  work,  when  the  French,  after  three  days'  disorder  of 
their  closely  massed  forces,  had  fallen  back  upon  the 
fortress,  some  160,000  strong,  on  the  night  of  the  18th-19th 
August.  The  consequences  of  the  battles  of  the  14th,  16th, 
and  18th  of  August  were  not  known  until  after  the.  capitula- 
tion of  Metz,  on  the  27th  October.  In  the  French  army, 
which  had  been  beaten  four  times  in  succession,  discipline 
was  relaxed,  the  power  of  taking  the  offensive,  always 
considered  a  special  attribute  of  the  French,  was  wanting, 
and  the  army  required,  before  everything,  a  thorough  re- 
organization. This  was  a  circumstance  that  stood  us  in 
good  stead,  and  prevented  the  French  from  making  use  of 

—522— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

the  advantages  offered  to  them  by  the  strength  of  the 
fortress. 

After  the  investment  of  the  fortress  by  the  1st  and  II 
armies  the  preparation  of  the  fortifications  and  the  arma- 
ments for  the  defence  were  continued.  The  works  in 
progress  were  in  great  measure  masked  from  the  investing 
force,  owing  to  the  extent  of  the  circle  round  which  the 
French  field-army  was  posted.  The  garrison  and  the  na- 
tional guards,  together  amounting  to  30,000  men,  were  in  the 
fortress  during  the  investment. 

Fort  Plappeville,  as  well  as  all  the  other  detached 
forts,  was  strengtheend  by  the  construction  of  traverses, 
expense  magazines,  and  stockades,  and  brought  into  com- 
munication with  the  adjoining  Fort  St.  Quentin  by  a  covered 
road.  This  road  was  flanked  by  a  lunette  placed  in  the 
centre.  The  chief  object  was  to  complete  as  speedily  as 
possible  the  works  in  course  of  construction,  and  to  put 
the  place  in  a  defensive  condition  by  completing  the  parapets 
and  the  gorges  of  the  works,  by  constructing  temporary 
bombproofs,  and  by  clearing  the  zone  of  fire.  In  the  main 
work  only  were  the  preparations  complete  for  resisting  a 
sudden  attack,  the  gates  and  bridges  properly  guarded, 
the  flank  defences  put  in  a  condition  to  sweep  the  ditches 
effectively,  the  ramparts  prepared  for  defence  by  infantry 
and  artillery,  and  the  glacis  cleared.  The  field  army  out- 
side the  fortress  had  in  their  possession  about  25  or  30 
farms  and  villages.  They  secured  themselves  in  these  by 
barricading  the  entrances  and  provided  for  eventually 
placing  the  outposts  in  security  by  shelter-trenches  covered 
from  the  view  of  the  enemy  outside.  Ground  that  afforded 
natural  or  artificial  cover  was  arranged  for  defence  as, 
for  example,  the  railway  embankment  at  Montigny  on  the 
south  of  the  fortress,  and  the  park  and  chateau  of  Ladon- 
champ  on  the  north.  Communications  were  stopped  up, 
where  necessary,  by  abattis;  new  routes  for  troops  were 
made  through  the  copses,  and  pontoon  bridges,  as,  for  in- 
stance, at  Moulines,  were  thrown  across  the  Moselle  to 
connect  the  two  sides  of  the  river.     As  sorties  might  have 


Siege  Operations 

to  be  made  on  a  large  scale,  the  number  of  communications 
over  the  river  was  increased,  and  for  this  purpose  some 
bridge-trains,  that  had  opportunely  come  v^^ithin  the  limits 
of  the  fortress  in  the  general  retreat  of  the  Army,  afforded 
the  means. 

As  the  hills  around  the  fortress  were  occupied  by  the 
forts,  and  afforded  excellent  sites  from  which  to  observe 
the  Prussian  position,  special  observatories  were  not 
erected.  The  highest  traverses  in  the  works  were  used  for 
this  purpose. 

Lodging  of  the  Troops. — While  the  field  army  was 
accommodated  in  camps  and  in  the  strongly  occupied  farms 
and  villages  that  lay  around,  the  barracks  were  occupied  by 
the  war  garrison  in  Metz  and  in  the  forts  in  the  manner 
customary  in  time  of  war.  But  even  with  great  crowding 
the  total  accommodation  available  in  them  was  insufficient, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  convert  to  this  use  the  magnificent 
cathedral  of  St.  Stephan,  celebrated  for  its  fine  stained 
glass  and  its  tower  350  feet  high,  and  the  churches  of  St. 
Eucaire  and  St.  Segolene.  The  most  important  camps  were 
on  the  north-east  slope  of  Mount  St.  Quentin,  south  of  the 
fortress  near  Fort  Embarcadere  and  St.  Queleu,  and  north- 
east of  Metz,  between  Forts  St.  Julien  and  Les  Bottes.  The 
ground  used  for  these  camps  was,  however,  hilly,  and  as 
it  was  the  wet  season,  this  caused  the  water  to  accumulate 
and  made  swamps  of  the  camping-grounds,  thus  rendering 
the  sleeping-places  unhealthy. 

All  authorities  agree  that  the  fortress  was  amply  pro- 
visioned for  its  own  war  garrison  of  30,000  men  for  three 
months,  and  received  further  supplies  from  a  number  of 
provision  trains,  that  were  orignally  destined  for  the 
French  army  that  marched  out  to  the  west  of  Metz,  but 
after  the  first  battles  on  the  German  frontier,  were  stopped 
on  their  road  and  retained  in  the  fortress.  From  Paris, 
particularly  at  this  time,  immense  convoys  arrived  for  the 
fortress  was  intended  to  form  the  base  of  operations  for 
the  army  on  the  Rhine.  The  position  of  affairs  was  changed 
after   the   battles   around    Metz,   when   the   fortress   was 

—524— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

blockaded  and  all  communication  with  the  outside  was 
cut  off.  The  great  masses  of  cavalry  enclosed  in  the 
blockade,  having  a  strength  of  some  24,000  horses,  must 
have  suffered  most.  Their  evil  plight  first  became  apparent 
in  the  early  part  of  September.  Subsequently,  lean  horses 
were  driven  beyond  the  outposts,  and  the  slaughter 
of  the  better  ones  began  about  this  time.  The  rations  for 
the  men  became  scarcer  by  degrees,  and  by  the  end  of 
August  engagements  of  the  outposts  took  place  with  the 
object  of  obtaining  all  the  provisions  out  of  the  villages  and 
digging  up  potatoes  in  the  country  round.  In  Nouilly,  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  (3^  miles  English)  eastward  from  Metz, 
large  stores  of  provisions  intended  for  the  French  were 
discovered  by  the  Prussians.  The  French,  it  is  true,  kept 
up  for  a  long  time  their  communication  with  the  country, 
which  ended,  when  discovered  by  the  Prussians  in  the 
destruction  of  the  villages  concerned.  Thus  the  Prussians 
burnt  the  village  of  Peltre,  and  blew  up  with  dynamite  a 
farm  there  called  Le  Grange  aux  Bois  because  it  was  evi- 
dently useful  to  the  French  in  their  foraging  expeditions. 
The  beef  was  generally  reserved  for  the  hospitals.  The 
water  for  drinking  in  Metz  had  to  be  filtered  after  the 
destruction  of  the  conduit  near  Gorze,  in  order  to  render 
it  at  all  drinkable;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  wine  was 
not  all  gone,  and  there  was  some  left  up  to  the  time  of  the 
surrender. 

In  the  second  half  of  September  the  soldiers  received 
half  rations  of  horseflesh.  The  want  of  salt,  however,  pre- 
vented the  meat  from  being  pickled  in  the  regular  manner, 
and  preserved  in  this  way  it  did  not  answer  their  expecta- 
tions because  they  had  neglected  to  slaughter  the  horses  at 
the  right  time  for  this  purpose.  There  was  great  scarcity 
of  straw  for  bedding,  the  supply  being  barely  sufficient 
for  the  sick  and  wounded. 

In  the  beginning  of  October,  for  want  of  forage,  the 
field  batteries  were  reduced  from  6  to  4  guns,  and  a  kind 
of  influenza  carried  off  many  horses,  who  fell  victims  to 
disease  partly  owing  to  the  length  of  time  they  were  in 

—525— 


Siege  Operations 

bivouac  in  very  bad  weather  and  to  want  of  care,  and 
partly  owing-  to  change  of  diet,  as  they  had  barley  and  corn 
in  their  food.  The  rinderpest  coming  on  carried  off  all 
that  were  left  of  the  cattle. 

The  distress  became  worse  as  the  investment  was  pro- 
longed. At  first  400,  then  300  grammes  (about  three- 
fifths  of  a  pound  of  horseflesh  and  bread  were  served  out  to 
each  man  as  his  daily  ration.  The  field  army  was,  in  this 
respect,  much  worse  off  than  the  garrison  of  the  fortress, 
of  whom  none  during  the  investment  suffered  actual  hunger. 
At  the  end  of  October  the  commandant  established  a  sys- 
tem of  rations  for  the  inhabitants,  and  fixed  the  price  of 
provisions  for  them,  and  they  shared  the  sufferings  of  the 
garrison  with  a  praiseworthy  spirit  and  endurance.  At 
this  time  in  Metz  butter  was  14  francs  the  pound,  meat 
and  bacon  8  francs  the  pound,  potatoes  20  sous,  horseflesh 
20  sous,  an  egg  15  sous,  a  schoppen  (pint)  of  milk  14 
sous,  and  lastly  a  pound  of  salt  20  francs.  The  fourteen 
corn  mills  in  Metz  remained  at  work  to  within  two  days 
of  the  capitulation.  It  may  be  assumed  that  during  the  in- 
vestment nearly  20,000  horses  were  slaughtered. 

Hospitals. — Owing  to  the  great  numbers  of  sick  and 
wounded,  which  daily  increased  during  the  investment,  and 
at  the  capitulation  amounted  to  20,000  men,  the  energies 
of  the  medical  branch  were  taxed  to  the  uttermost;  and, 
particularly,  a  great  want  of  hospital  attendants  was  ex- 
perienced. The  military  hospitals  for  1,900  sick  soon  proved 
insufficient,  and,  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  September, 
it  became  necessary  also  to  quarter  the  sick  and  wounded 
in  the  barracks  of  the  engineers,  the  artillery  barracks  of 
the  Chambieres  gate,  the  civil  hospitals,  the  churches  of 
St.  Martin,  St.  Maximin,  and  St,  Vincent,  and  in  many 
private  houses.  In  front  of  the  Palais  de  Justice,  close  to 
the  Porte  Serpenoise,  336  tents  were  pitched  for  the  sick; 
and,  on  the  parade  near  the  artillery  barracks,  there  were 
collected  288  railway  goods  wagons,  in  which  3,500  sick 
were  lodged.  In  particular  diarrhoea,  dysentery,  typhus, 
and  scurvy  made  their  appearance,  the  last  in  consequence 

—526— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

of  not  having  salt,  and  owing  to  the  want  of  variety  in  the 
diet;  but,  it  should  be  observed  that  the  dreaded  and  dan- 
gerous miasmi  from  the  neighboring  battle-fields  and  the 
numbers  of  unburied  carcases  of  horses  turned  out  to  have 
less  effect  on  health  than  was  naturally  anticipated;  a 
blessing  for  which  apparently  thanks  were  due  to  the  cold 
weather  in  September  and  October.  The  result  in  this 
respect  was  different  with  regard  to  the  stagnant  inunda- 
tions of  the  Seylle  on  the  south  of  the  town.  As 
early  as  the  first  half  of  September,  Marshal  Bazaine 
requested  Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  allow  the  sick  and 
wounded  in  Metz  to  be  sent  away  to  the  interior  of  France, 
which  request  was  naturally  refused.  A  similar  reply  was 
given  to  his  request  at  the  beginning  of  September  that 
surgeons  with  medical  appliances  might  be  sent  into  Metz. 
The  inhabitants  of  Metz  endeavoured  to  alleviate  the  suffer- 
ings of  the  French  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  with  all  their 
power,  and  the  troops  had  to  thank  the  wives  and  daugh- 
ters of  the  inhabitants  that  it  was  found  possible  to  distrib- 
uate  large  stores  of  winter  clothing  to  the  army. 

Intelligence  Department. — Owing  to  the  large  military 
traffic  by  rail  to  and  from  the  theatre  of  war,  the  postal 
service  during  the  first  half  of  August  got  into  the  greatest 
confusion,  and  with  the  commencement  of  the  investment 
all  communication  of  the  French  army  with  Paris,  the 
neighbouring  French  fortresses  and  the  adjoining  country, 
was  cut  off.  Nevertheless  various  expedients  were  adopted 
to  keep  up  the  communication  with  the  government  in  Paris 
and  with  the  military  headquarters  of  France.  Carrier- 
pigeons  and  spies  were  made  use  of.  One  of  the  latter, 
disguised  as  a  Franciscan  monk,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
1st  Prussian  army  on  the  4th  August,  and  with  him  a  cor- 
respondence between  Marshals  Bazaine,  Palikao,  Trochu, 
and  MacMahon.  The  French  tried  to  send  news  on  wood- 
floats,  and  concealed  in  pigs'  bladders,  down  the  Moselle  to 
Thionville.  Many  gas-balloons  were  sent  up,  of  which  one 
came  into  the  hands  of  the  Prussians  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Paully,  2  miles   (9^  English  miles)  north-east  of  Metz. 

—527— 


Siege  Operations 

By  this  means,  however,  no  serviceable  intelligence  of  a 
trustworthy  character  was  obtained  of  the  French  army. 
Generally,  this  post  was  sent  up  at  night,  so  as  the  better 
and  more  securely  to  cross  the  investing  lines  of  the  Prus- 
sians. 

The  works  of  fortification  of  the  blockading  army  had 
for  their  object  to  prevent  surprise  by -an  advance  of  the 
enemy  in  force,  and  to  detain  them  long  enough  to  permit 
of  the  troops  being  concentrated  in  sufficient  numbers.  The 
French  had  the  advantage,  that  they  could  choose  what 
point  they  liked  in  the  circle  of  investment,  and  there  make 
a  sortie.  The  Prussians,  on  the  other  hand,  besides  being 
fewer  in  number,  were  at  a  disadvantage  in  having  to  be 
ready  to  receive  an  attack  from  the  French  throughout  the 
whole  circle  of  the  investment.  It  became  necessary,  there- 
fore, that  the  Prussians  should  be  able  to  concentrate  on 
any  point  in  the  shortest  possible  time.  For  this  purpose 
bridges  were  thrown  over  the  Moselle  above  and  below  the 
fortress,  for  instance,  at  Argency,  Hauconcourt,  and  sev- 
eral other  places ;  roads  for  troops  were  traced  or  cut,  and 
all  the  special  arrangements  suitable  for  the  attainment  of 
this  object  were  made.  After  the  battles  of  the  16th  and 
18th  August,  notwithstanding  that  movements  to  the  rear 
had  again  become  necessary  in  some  cases,  the  complete 
investment  of  the  positions  held  by  the  enemy  was  accom- 
plished rapidly  and  with  the  accustomed  precision.  The 
headquarters  of  the  army  corps  were  placed  in  communica- 
tion with  one  another,  and  with  the  headquarters  of  the 
arjny  by  means  of  lines  of  field  telegraph,  and  the  technical 
troops  charged  with  this  duty  had  thus  a  very  wide  field 
of  activity,  and  one  that  was  intimately  associated  with 
the  military  operations.  The  existing  French  telegraph 
lines  and  railways  leading  to  Thionville  and  Paris  and  to 
Strasburg  were  destroyed,  and  their  materials  were  used 
for  the  purposes  of  the  investment.  The  intercourse  with 
the  fortress  by  means  of  the  flag  of  truce  was  reduced  to 
a  minimum  after  the  French,  contrary  to  every  custom  of 
war,  had  fired  upon  some  of  the  bearers.     This  happened 

—528— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

on  the  19th  August  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Ver —  and 
Captain  von  Winterfield,  on  the  24th  August  to  First  Lieu- 
tenant von  Kurowsky,  and  on  the  1st  October  to  Lieutenants 
von  Roder  and  Manegold. 

Observatories  were  set  up  on  the  highest  points  of  the 
ground,  and  two  artillery  officers  provided  with  good  tele- 
scopes did  duty  in  each.  Each  army  corps  had  its  own ; 
such  was,  for  instance,  that  on  the  hill  of  Le  Horimont  south 
of  the  village  of  Feves,  If  miles  (8.2  miles  English), 
north-west  of  Metz,  whence  -a  complete  view  was  obtained 
over  the  broad  plain  of  the  valley  to  the  north  of  the  fortress 
and  the  French  bivouacs  there,  and  which  was  of  eminent 
service. 

As  it  was  expected  that  the  blockaded  army  of  the 
French  intended  to  break  out  in  a  northerly  direction 
towards  Thionville,  the  main  point  was  to  watch  the  for- 
tress, and  therefore  its  investment  was  completed  before 
any  idea  was  entertained  of  following  up  this  operation 
immediately  with  a  bombardment. 

As  long  as  the  French  held  Metz,  the  railway  com- 
munication by  the  lines  Saarbruck  to  Metz  and  Nancy  on 
the  one  hand,  and  Metz  to  Thionville  on  the  other,  was 
interrupted.  The  construction  was,  therefore,  commenced 
of  a  railway  from  Remilly  to  Pont-a-Mousson,  so  as  to  work 
round  the  railway  junction  at  Metz.  Accordingly  on  the 
9th  August  Captain  Golz  of  the  general  staff  received 
orders,  in  conjunction  with  field  railway  detachments  No. 
1,  under  Commissioner  Dircksen,  and  No.  4,  under  Super- 
intending Engineer  Menen  to  restore  the  communication 
with  Saarbruck  out  of  the  partly  destroyed  line  from 
Saarbruck  to  Remilly,  and  next  to  construct  a  new  railroad 
passing  to  the  south  of  Metz  from  Remilly  to  Pont-a-Mous- 
son.  The  first  portion  of  this  order  being  executed  by  the 
13th  August,  the  preparations  for,  and  the  setting  out  of  the 
new  junction  line,  about  5  miles  (23^  miles  English)  in 
length,  were  commenced  on  the  14th.  The  actual  comple- 
tion of  the  united  lines  took  place  on  the  23rd  September, 
or  in  round  numbers  after  5  weeks  work.    The  road  was  a 


-529- 


Siege  Operations 

single  line  with  a  formation-width  of  12  feet.  Among  the 
larger  works  were  two  viaducts  near  Remilly,  of  which  the 
largest  was  about  350  feet  long  and  22  feet  high,  besides 
two  bridges  over  the  Moselle  and  its  affluent  the  Seylle. 
All  these  works  were  made  of  timber. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Gravelotte,  on  the 
18th  August,  the  positions  of  the  outposts  on  either  side 
were  not  finally  determined.  Backward  and  forward  move- 
ments of  the  opposing  forces  took  place.  On  the  night  of 
the  19th-20th  August  the  French  for  the  first  time  took  up 
in  force  the  positions  which  they  held,  with  few  exceptions 
apparently  unaltered,  during  the  whole  of  the  investment. 
The  length  of  the  circumference  occupied  by  the  Prussian 
outposts  was  nearly  6  miles  (28  English  miles),  and  that 
occupied  by  the  main  body,  consequently,  8  miles  (37| 
English  miles).  Without  telegraphic  communication  the 
success  of  a  sudden  attempt  of  the  French  in  force  to  break 
through  would  not  have  been  improbable  under  the  circum- 
stances above  mentioned. 

The  troops  were  at  first  quartered  in  open  bivouacs 
and  in  huts  of  brushwood ;  but,  by  the  middle  of  September, 
they  were,  as  far  as  practicable,  lodged  in  conveniently 
situated  close  contonments.  For  the  outposts  and  pickets 
weather-screens  and  huts  of  brushwood  and  other  materials 
were  erected,  and  houses  and  stables  conveniently  situated 
were  also  made  use  of;  but,  in  spite  of  all,  the  troops  suf- 
fered terribly  from  the  inclemency  of  the  weather.  As 
Gorze  lay  within  the  lines  of  investment,  the  waterworks 
there  could  not  remain  unnoticed  or  concealed.  By  the  end 
of  August  they  were  destroyed. 

The  arrangements  for  defence  which  were  undertaken 
on  the  part  of  the  besiegers  consisted  in  the  formation  of 
the  ground  in  various  ways  so  as  to  adapt  it  to  the  tactical 
conditions  mentioned  in  the  beginning  of  this  section.  The 
limits  of  this  book  would  be  far  exceeded,  if  we  were  to 
enter  upon  the  details.  Some  general  observations  will 
suffice. 


-530— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

Outposts  and  pickets  lay  in  shelter-trenches,  or  in 
hollows  in  the  ground  provided  with  banquettes  for  this 
purpose,  according  as  hollow  roads,  gravel-pits,  or  the 
ditches  of  high  roads  presented  themselves.  By  a  singular 
accident,  the  shelter-trenches  which  were  constructed  by 
the  enemy,  on  their  retreat  during  the  battle  of  Gravelotte 
towards  evening  on  the  18th  August,  were  used  for  a  long 
time  by  the  Prussian  outposts.  The  French  are  very  ready 
at  making  such  trenches  in  a  short  time,  A  similar  thing 
happened  with  regard  to  a  battery  between  St,  Privat  and 
Amanvillers,  which  on  the  same  day  had  been  of  great 
service  to  the  French,  but  was  now  turned  towards  the 
fortress.  In  front  of  all  was  formed  a  sort  of  line  of 
obstructions. 

The  Prussian  outposts  were  partly  armed  with  chasse- 
pot  rifles,  on  account  of  their  great  range.  Routes  for 
columns  of  troops  were  made  where  necessary,  roads  were  im- 
proved, and  the  edges  of  woods  were  obstructed  by  abattis 
and  rendered  impassable.  Farms  situated  in  important 
places,  especially  those  from  which  fire  could  be  directed 
on  the  roads  by  which  the  enemy  would  advance,  as  at  Ortly, 
Tournebide,  Frescati — both  the  latter  on  the  south  of  the 
fortress — were  prepared  for  defence;  that  is  to  say,  loop- 
holes were  cut  in  the  masonry,  the  entrances  were  barricaded 
and  they  were  made  secure  with  palisades.  Favourable 
situations  for  artillery  were  made  use  of  for  the  erection 
of  the  larger  batteries,  or  were  prepared  by  excavation  for 
the  reception  of  the  guns,  as  it  was  confidently  anti-cipated 
that  their  practice  would  be  fatal  to  the  enemy's  operations 
especially  by  checking  the  advance  of  his  attacking  columns. 
Such  batteries  were  situated,  among  other  places,  on  the 
heights  at  Chieulles,  Vany,  Failly,  and  Servigny,  to  the 
north-east  of  the  fortress,  where,  in  spite  of  the  ground 
being  much  broken,  a  good  and  wide  view  of  the  scene  of 
action  was  obtained,  and  also  at  Saulny,  Nocroy,  Bellevue, 
Feves,  Semecourt,  and  elsewhere.  All  the  defiles  which 
could  be  possibly  used  by  the  French  for  breaking  out  were, 
in  the  course  of  time,  fortified  as  formidably  as  circum- 


Siege  Operations 

stances  permitted;  and,  in  places  where  the  enemy  was 
actually  expected  to  appear,  the  besiegers  had,  moreover, 
taken  the  trouble  to  construct  independent  field  redoubts 
in  the  line  of  defence. 

The  continuance  of  bad  weather  and  the  extremely  ar- 
duous duty  of  the  investing  force  had  undoubtedly  at  times 
a  bad  effect  on  their  state  of  health.  Diarrhoea  and  typhus 
carried  off  some  victims,  but  these  diseases  would  have  had 
very  far  more  serious  results  and  a  wider  range  had  it  not 
been  that  every  possible  care  was  bestowed  upon  the  hos- 
pital establishments  and  upon  the  nursing  and  subsistence. 
In  the  latter  respect  there  was  no  failure,  and  the  continual 
supplies  and  issues  of  pease-sausage*  of  fresh  and  of  pre- 
served meat,  produced  the  •  best  effects.  A  difficulty 
seemed  likely  to  occur  in  the  supply  of  meat  when  the 
rinderpest  broke  out  in  Lorraine  and  Alsace,  but  mutton 
was  issued  instead  of  beef,  and  steps  were  taken  to  bring 
up  herds  of  cattle  from  Belgium  and  Holland  for  the  supply 
of  the  troops. 

Sorties. — Having  described  the  position  of  the  oppos- 
ing armies  in  and  before  the  fortress  in  their  chief  features, 
we  turn  now  to  the  most  important  sorties  on  a  large  scale 
which  took  place  from  the  19th  August  to  the  28th  October. 

The  idea  of  a  regular  siege  of  the  great  fortress  was, 
with  accurate  knowledge  of  the  circumstances,  renounced 
from  the  very  first.  The  large  forces  shut  in,  both  in  and 
round  the  fortress,  would  have  rendered  it  unusually  diffi- 
cult to  establish  parks,  and  conduct  the  attacks  against 
the  detached  forts,  which  were  well  situated  and  amply 
supplied  with  guns  and  stores,  and  these  forces  might,  in 
the  end,  have  produced  a  very  critical  state  of  affairs. 
It  was  determined,  therefore,  only  to  invest  Metz,  and  for 
this  duty  there  were  allotted  the  1st,  Ilnd,  Ilird,  Vllth, 
Vlllth  and  Xth  army  corps,  the  18th  division,  the  division 
of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse,  and  the  landwehr  reserve 
division  von  Kummer.  The  1st  army  was  thus  amalga- 
mated with  the  Ilnd  army,  and  placed  under  the  sole  com- 

♦Erbswurst. 

—532— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

mand  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles.  This  army,  amounting 
to  about  230,000  men,  being  thus  detained,  however,  it 
became  impossible  to  employ  them  even  partially  in  opera- 
tions in  the  open  field  elsewhere. 

Under  these  circumstances,  after  their  terrible  exer- 
tions in  the  battles  of  Mars-la-Tour  and  Gravelotte,  both 
friend  and  foe  required  some  days  of  rest,  in  order  that 
they  might  both  settle  themselves  down  to  the  new  condi- 
tion of  affairs.  Towards  the  end  of  the  month,  however, 
on  the  26th  August,  movements  of  troops  were  observed  in 
the  French  camps,  from  the  left  to  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle,  which  might  be  preparatory  to  an  attempt  to  break 
through  the  Prussian  lines.  The  enemy  confined  himself, 
however,  to  skirmishing  with  the  outposts,  as  he  found  the 
Prussians  ready  to  fight.  Meanwhile,  news  was  received 
of  the  advance  of  MacMahon's  army  from  Chalons  and  its 
encounter  with  the  IVth  army  at  Beaumont.  In  the  invest- 
ing lines,  therefore,  preparations  were  made  for  the 
expected  junction  of  Marshals  MacMahon  and  Bazaine. 

Then  came,  on  the  31st  August  and  the  1st  September, 
the  battle  of  Noisseville.  The  Prussian  troops  engaged 
were  posted  on  the  30th  August  as  follows: — 

1.  The  1st  Landwehr  Division  von  Kummer,  with  a  brigade  of 
the  line,  behind  the  line  Malroy-Charly,  the  landwehr  in  reserve. 

2.  The  1st  Infantry  Division — the  1st  Brigade  of  infantry  in 
and  behind  the  line  Failly-^ervigny,  the  2nd  Brigade  of  infantry  in 
reserve. 

3.  The  2nd  Infantry  Division — the  4th  Brigade  of  infantry  at 
Ars-Laquenexy  with  their  front  on  the  line  Mercy-le-Haut-Aubigny- 
Colombey,  the  3rd  Brigade  of  infantry  in  reserve. 

4.  The  divisional  cavalry — the  1st  and  10th  regiments  of 
dragoons  between  Noisseville  and  Colombey. 

5.  The  3rd  Cavalry  Division  and  the  28th  brigade  of  infantry 
gijarding  the  ground  between  the  2nd  infantry  division  and  the 
Moselle. 

On  the  31st  August,  at  half -past  7  in  the  morning, 
the  French  had  taken  up  a  position  south  of  Fort  St. 
Julien  on  the  line  Metz-Bellecroix.  The  following  move- 
ments consequently  took  place. 

1.  The  3rd  Brigade  of  infantry  of  the  2nd  Division,  with  two 
batteries,  marched  to  the  high  road  to  Saarbruck  on  the  heights  of 
Puche. 

—533— 


Siege  Operations 

2.  The  1st  Brigade  of  cavalry  of  the  3rd  Cavalry  Division  marched 
to  Retorfay  to  cover  the  ground  between  the  high  roads  to  Saarbruck 
and  Saarlouis.  By  command  of  General  Steinmetz  the  whole  of  the 
cavalry  division  was  moved  to  that  place. 

3.  A  cavalry  regiment  and  a  battery  of  the  Kummer  division 
marched  to  St.  Barbe.  The  division  of  the  Grand-Duchy  of  Hesse 
crossed  the  Moselle  to  the  support  of  the  Kummer  division.  The 
centre  stood  fast,  v/hile  the  wings  alone  were  at  first  engaged. 

About  9  o'clock  the  French  attacked  the  Prussian  left 
wings ;  Colombey  was  lost  to  us,  but  Aubigny  and  Mercy-le- 
Haut  were  held.  The  28th  brigade  of  infantry  was  brought 
on  the  battle-field,  as  a  reinforcement,  and  took  up  a  posi- 
tion at  Laquenexy  without  coming  into  the  action,  which 
was  fought  by  the  2nd  division  alone.  The  former  marched 
to  the  bivouac  at  Courcelles. 

The  Prussian  right  wing  was  attacked  by  a  French 
cavalry  regiment,  with  artillery,  who  were,  however, 
beaten  back  by  the  artillery  of  General  von  Kummer.  Fort 
St.  Julien  opened  fire  and  covered  the  retreat  of  the  enemy. 
At  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  enemy  commenced  a 
heavy  fire  from  Fort  St.  Julien,  and  from  several  batteries 
that  were  drawn  up  there  to  the  southward,  and  were 
answered  from  seven  Prussian  field-batteries,  in  whose 
favour  the  engagement  was  decided  about  5  o'clock. 

Meantime  Leboeufs  whole  corps  advanced  by  Nouilly 
to  Noisseville ;  the  3rd  brigade  of  infantry  retired  from  the 
field  after  a  severe  engagement  round  the  village  and  the 
brevv-ery  there,  and  fell  back  in  good  order  on  Servigny. 
Batteries  of  the  enemy  debouched  towards  evening  from 
Kouilly  and  fired  on  the  Prussian  artillery  at  Servigny. 
Noisseville  vv^as  finally  taken  by  Memerty's  brigade,  the 
whole  position  was  held,  and  the  fight  terminated  appar- 
ently about  9  o'clock.  Unexpectedly,  however,  the  enemy 
recommenced  the  action,  took  possession  of  Flanville, 
Coincy,  and  Noisseville,  and  captured  a  portion  of  Retonfay 
which  nevertheless  they  had  to  give  up  again.  At  the  same 
time  attacks  were  made  upon  Servigny,  Poixe,  and  Failly. 
In  expectation  of  its  renewal  on  the  following  day,  the 
infantry  and  cavalry  brigade  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse 
and  the  corps  artillery  of  the  9th  army  corps  were  directed 

^534—. 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

during  the  night  to  cross  the  Moselle  to  the  scene  of  action 
at  St.  Barbe.  Accordingly,  on  the  following  morning,  the 
positions  were  as  follows :  Kummer's  landwehr  division 
and  the  1st  army  corps  on  the  field  of  battle  during  the  whole 
night;  the  25th  and  28th  divisions  at  Antilly  and  advancing 
on  Charly;  the  Ilird  and  Vlllth  army  corps,  as  on  the  pre- 
vious day;  the  Ilnd,  Ilird,  and  Xth  army  corps  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Moselle,  near  Montmedy,  only  1^  mile  (7  Eng- 
lish miles)  from  Metz. 

On  the  1st  September,  at  4  in  the  morning,  the  battle 
was  renewed,  and  turned  first  upon  the  possession  of  the 
thrice-captured  Noisseville.  It  was  not  possible,  however, 
in  spite  of  the  great  bravery  of  the  troops,  to  keep  our 
hold  of  it,  so  that  we  contented  ourselves  for  the  time 
with  preventing  the  enemy  from  debouching  from  it.  As 
soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  strong  reinforcements  were 
about  to  arrive,  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  was  commenced 
from  50  guns  against  the  place  and  Noisseville  was  taken. 

On  the  left  wing  the  village  of  Flanville  was  captured 
about  9  o'clock  in  the  morning  by  the  28th  brigade  of  in- 
fantry, particularly  by  detachments  of  the  53rd  regiment. 
The  28th  infantry  brigade  thereupon  took  Coincy,  and  were 
subsequently  employed  to  cover  the  Saarbruck  road. 

At  the  same  time  unsuccessful  attempts  were  made  by 
the  French  on  the  right  wing  to  take  Failly  and  Rupigny. 
They  were  beaten  back  and  pursued  as  far  as  the  Bois  de 
Grimont  by  the  brigades  of  Below  and  Blankensee. 

In  the  centre  the  French  advanced  about  half-past  10 
to  the  attack  of  Poixe  and  Servigny,  but  their  movements 
appeared  hesitating  and  wanting  in  vigour.  The  Prussian 
artillery  beat  them  back  at  both  places.  This  failure  was 
the  signal  for  the  French  to  retire  into  their  original  posi- 
tions, while  ours  were  held,  though  with  great  losses.  These 
amounted  altogether  to  151  officers  and  2,848  men.  The 
French  lost  141  officers  and  2,664  men. 

On  the  2nd  September  the  Xlllth  army  corps  arrived 
before  Metz,  and  in  consequence  the  German  army  was 
distributed  for  the  investment  as  follows:  Kummer's  land- 

—535— 


Siege  Operations 

wehr  division  on  the  line  Malroy-Charly ;  to  its  left,  the 
1st  army  corps  as  far  as  the  Saarbruck  road;  and  then 
came  the  Xlllth  corps  as  far  as  Poully.  The  Vllth  corps 
was  placed  on  the  south  of  Metz  on  both  sides  of  the  Moselle, 
covering  also  the  passages  over  the  Seylle.  On  the  left 
bank  were  the  Vlllth  corps  from  Jussy  to  Chatel,  the  Ilird 
corps  from  Chatel  to  Saulny,  the  Xth  corps  from  Saulny 
to  Marange.  In  reserve,  on  the  natural  line  of  communi- 
cation of  the  enemy  with  the  interior  of  France,  was  the 
IXth  corps  extended  on  the  line  from  Roncourt  to  Pierre- 
villiers. 

The  battle  of  Noisseville  was  the  last  great  attempt 
made  by  Marshal  Bazaine  to  break  through  the  investing 
army,  and  was  followed  by  three  weeks  of  apparent  rest. 
The  next  engagements  brought  on  by  the  French  were  for 
the  purpose  of  covering  their  foraging  expeditions  in  search 
of  hay,  straw,  and  provisions,  especially  potatoes,  a  sure 
preventive  of  scurvy,  which  appeared  in  the  fortress  owing 
to  the  want  of  salt.  Eventually  the  French  used  generally 
to  advance  with  strong  columns  against  our  outposts,  who 
thereupon  fell  back  upon  the  positions  previously  fortified. 
If  such  an  attack  succeeded,  they  retired  with  their  booty 
under  cover  of  the  forts,  and  the  Prussian  outposts  in  the 
evening  were  back  again  in  their  old  positions.  In  this 
way  villages  and  farms  were  burnt  and  much  damage  of 
other  kinds  was  done.  Such  was  the  character  of  the 
engagements  at  Peltre  on  the  22nd  and  23rd  September,  and 
at  Mercy-le-Haut  on  the  26th  September.  Perhaps  also  in 
these  engagements  the  French  had  some  idea  of  making  an 
attempt  to  break  through  in  the  direction  of  Strasburg. 
The  Vllth  and  1st  army  corps  were  engaged  in  both  the 
first  mentioned  fights,  which  did  not  assume  large  propor- 
tions. Of  a  more  serious  character,  however,  was  the  fight 
on  the  27th  September,  which  was  at  first  directed  against 
these  same  troops,  but  subsequently  also  against  detach- 
ments of  the  Xth  corps  at  La  Maxe  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Moselle.  On  this  occasion  the  French  troops  were  brought 
immediately  on  to  the  battle-field  by  the  railway,  which  had 

—536— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

been  reconstructed  within  the  line  of  their  outposts.  These 
battles  had  no  particular  consequences,  although  the  loss 
was  considerable  on  both  sides. 

After  the  fall  of  Strasburg  Marshal  Bazaine  seemed 
to  have  an  idea  of  breaking  through  to  the  northward,  in 
the  first  instance  to  Thionville,  in  order  to  occupy  that 
place  or  to  pass  over  with  his  army  to  neutral  territory. 
Consequently,  the  distribution  of  the  investing  force  had 
to  be  altered.  For  the  execution  of  his  plan  Marshal 
Bazaine  chose  the  moment  when  Rummer's  landwehr  divi- 
sion came  on  to  the  line  of  outposts  in  the  place  of  the 
Xth  army  corps.  The  most  advanced  outposts  consisted  of 
two  landwehr  battalions  in  patches  of  wood  north  of  the 
Bois  de  Woippy,  and  pushed  forward  to  Bellevue,  St.  Remy, 
Les  Petites  and  Les  Grandes  Tapes,  with  pickets  at  St. 
Agathe  and  Ladonchamps. 

On  the  night  of  the  2nd  October  the  enemy  attacked, 
threw  the  outposts  above  mentioned  back  upon  the  pickets  at 
St.  Remy,  which  they  assailed  in  vain,  and  of  which  the 
garrison,  consisting  of  two  companies  of  the  Neutomischl 
landwehr  battalion,  was  at  once  reinforced  by  two  com- 
panies of  the  Kosten  landwehr  battalion. 

About  5  o'clock  the  enemy  made  a  fruitless  attack  on 
St.  Remy,  whose  garrison  had  been  meanwhile  strengthened 
by  four  more  companies,  and  also  on  Bellevue,  which  was 
defended  by  the  Freistadt  landwehr  battalion.  The  six 
companies  of  the  last  named  battalion  retook  St.  Agathe, 
two  Prussian  batteries  fired  on  Ladonchamps  from  Seme- 
court,  and  from  9  o'clock  a.m.  a  third  Prussian  battery 
which  had  taken  up  a  position  at  Les  Tapes,  joined  in  the 
cannonade.  Upon  these  was  directed  the  concentrated  fire 
of  several  French  batteries  placed  at  St,  Eloy,  and  they  had 
in  consequence  to  retire.  Whilst  the  landwehr  division 
held  their  ground  against  a  vastly  superior  enemy,  the 
artillery  fire  on  both  sides  was  kept  up  until  the  evening, 
and  by  it  St.  Remy  and  Franclochamps  were  set  in  flames. 

On  the  7th  October  the  French  made  a  second  attack 
on  the  field  of  battle,  on  which  they  had  already  learnt  by 

—537— 


Siege  Operations 

experience  the  bravery  of  Kummer's  landwehr  division,  and 
an  engagement  lasting  nine  hours  took  place  at  Woippy. 
At  1  o'clock  in  that  afternoon  our  outposts  of  Kummer's 
landwehr  division  were  attacked  at  Bellevue  and  St.  Remy, 
as  well  as  at  Les  Petites  and  Les  Grande  Tapes,  by  French 
columns  greatly  superior  in  numbers,  about  30,000  or  40,- 
000  men,  and  after  a  brave  resistance  beat  them  back.  The 
Prussian  landwehr  fought  here  with  the  greatest  obstinacy, 
the  most  stubborn  endurance,  and  the  most  brilliant  cour- 
age, so  that  the  enemy  was  unable  to  gain  ground.  Sim- 
ultaneously with  the  commencement  of  this  attack  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Moselle,  the  French  made  a  demonstration 
on  the  right  bank,  against  the  position  of  the  1st  army  corps 
at  Servigny  and  Noisseville,  and  against  the  Xth  army  corps 
at  Malroy  and  Charly.  The  fight  here  was  only  with 
artillery  and  musketry,  which  the  French  thought  suffi- 
cient to  prevent  these  troops  from  crossing  the  Moselle. 
In  spite  of  this,  Wedell's  brigade  of  the  Xth  corps,  the  16th 
and  57th  regiments,  crossed  the  Moselle  at  Argency,  Here 
they  formed  to  attack  on  the  flank  of  the  left  wing  of 
Kummer's  division,  while  at  the  same  time,  on  the  right 
wing,  Conta's  brigade  of  the  48th  and  4th  regiments  of 
infantry,  advanced  and  occupied  the  Bois  de  Woippy  and  a 
farm  close  by.  The  French  being  vigorously  attacked  both 
in  front  and  on  their  left  wing,  had  to  give  up  again  the 
positions  they  had  taken  earlier  in  the  day,  and  to  fall  back 
upon  the  fortress,  whilst  the  Prussians  remained  masters 
of  the  same  ground  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight.  They 
took  Bellevue,  St.  Remy,  and  the  two  Tapes  by  storm.  On 
the  other  hand  they  failed  in  an  attempt  made  late  in  the 
evening  to  take  the  Chateau  Ladonchamps,  w^hich  was 
strongly  occupied  by  the  French  and  fortified.  The  loss  on 
the  Prussian  side  amounted  to  65  officers  and  1,665  men.  - 

Capitulation. — Marshal  Bazaine,  after  the  failure  of 
all  his  sorties,  could  not  but  be  aware  that  further  enter- 
prises of  the  same  description  would  only  be  attended  by 
similar  results.  His  honour  as  a  soldier  was  saved,  and 
his  duty  to  his  country  was  done,  in  detaining  230,000  men 

—538— 


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I  r/  r    r  1/        I       If 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

before  Metz.  But  if  he  had  succeeded  in  breaking  out — 
if  the  Marshal  had  marched  towards  Paris,  he  would  but 
have  come  between  two  fires;  arid  as  regarded  any  other 
objects  of  his  march,  without  cavalry  or  horses  for  trans- 
port, with  his  guns  wretchedly  horsed,  with  no  safe  com- 
munication to  the  rear,  without  the  means  of  supporting 
his  army,  he  would  have  been  exposed  to  the  most  harassing 
pursuit.  The  consideration  of  these  circumstances  clears 
the  Marshal  of  blame,  considering  the  question  from  a 
military  point  of  view,  and  the  more  so,  as  although  cut 
off  from  all  communication  by  either  land,  water,  or  tele- 
graph, he  had  held  out  in  a  place,  which,  having  been  orig- 
inally provisioned  for  15,000  or  20,000  men  for  three  months 
had  already  maintained  eight  times  that  number  of  troops 
for  nine  weeks.  Whether  the  Marshal  had  any  ulterior 
political  reason  for  his  conduct,  we  know  just  as  little  as 
we  know  the  motive  of  the  mysterious  journey  of  General 
Bourbaki  from  Metz  to  the  Empress  Eugenie.  In  no  way 
had  the  capitulation  been  of  use  to  M.  Gambetta,  whose  plan 
was  to  raise  the  siege  of  Paris  by  armies  newly  formed  in 
the  North  and  South.  This  plan  was  frustrated  now  that 
the  1st  and  Ilnd  Prussian  armies  before  Metz  had  become 
available. 

The  time  for  negotiations  for  a  surrender  had  come, 
and  to  delay  was  to  starve.  Marshal  Bazaine  wished  to  sur- 
render himself  and  the  army,  but  to  keep  the  fortress  for 
France,  On  the  side  of  the  Prussians,  however,  this  could 
not  be  agreed  to,  because  the  place,  if  excluded  from  the 
capitulation,  was  in  a  condition  to  hold  out  for  many  months. 
Nothing  came,  therefore,  of  the  negotiations  to  this  effect, 
which  General  Boyer  was  engaged  in  from  the  13th  to  the 
15th  October,  at  the  German  headquarters  at  Versailles. 

On  the  21st  October  General  Coffnieres,  the  comman- 
dant of  the  fortress,  informed  General  Bazaine  that  he  had 
no  provisions  for  the  troops  quartered  outside  the  fortress. 
In  consequence  of  this,  desertions  were  tacticly  allowed,  but 
the  deserters  were  turned  back  by  the  Prussian  outposts  in 
great  numbers.     It  was  also  thought  that  the  Prussians 

—539— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

before  Metz.  But  if  he  had  succeeded  in  breaking  out — 
if  the  Marshal  had  marched  towards  Paris,  he  would  but 
have  come  between  two  fires;  arid  as  regarded  any  other 
objects  of  his  march,  without  cavalry  or  horses  for  trans- 
port, with  his  guns  wretchedly  horsed,  with  no  safe  com- 
munication to  the  rear,  without  the  means  of  supporting 
his  army,  he  would  have  been  exposed  to  the  most  harassing 
pursuit.  The  consideration  of  these  circumstances  clears 
the  Marshal  of  blame,  considering  the  question  from  a 
military  point  of  view,  and  the  more  so,  as  although  cut 
off  from  all  communication  by  either  land,  water,  or  tele- 
graph, he  had  held  out  in  a  place,  which,  having  been  orig- 
inally provisioned  for  15,000  or  20,000  men  for  three  months 
had  already  maintained  eight  times  that  number  of  troops 
for  nine  weeks.  Whether  the  Marshal  had  any  ulterior 
political  reason  for  his  conduct,  we  know  just  as  little  as 
we  know  the  motive  of  the  mysterious  journey  of  General 
Bourbaki  from  Metz  to  the  Empress  Eugenie.  In  no  way 
had  the  capitulation  been  of  use  to  M.  Gambetta,  whose  plan 
was  to  raise  the  siege  of  Paris  by  armies  newly  formed  in 
the  North  and  South.  This  plan  was  frustrated  now  that 
the  1st  and  Ilnd  Prussian  armies  before  Metz  had  become 
available. 

The  time  for  negotiations  for  a  surrender  had  come, 
and  to  delay  was  to  starve.  Marshal  Bazaine  wished  to  sur- 
render himself  and  the  army,  but  to  keep  the  fortress  for 
France.  On  the  side  of  the  Prussians,  however,  this  could 
not  be  agreed  to,  because  the  place,  if  excluded  from  the 
capitulation,  was  in  a  condition  to  hold  out  for  many  months. 
Nothing  came,  therefore,  of  the  negotiations  to  this  effect, 
which  General  Boyer  was  engaged  in  from  the  13th  to  the 
15th  October,  at  the  German  headquarters  at  Versailles. 

On  the  21st  October  General  Coffnieres,  the  comman- 
dant of  the  fortress,  informed  General  Bazaine  that  he  had 
no  provisions  for  the  troops  quartered  outside  the  fortress. 
In  consequence  of  this,  desertions  were  tacticly  allowed,  but 
the  deserters  were  turned  back  by  the  Prussian  outposts  in 
great  numbers.     It  was  also  thought  that  the  Prussians 

—539— 


Siege  Operations 

might  be  compelled  to  take  the  army  prisoners,  by  bringing 
on  a  battle  with  this  intention.  At  last  they  thought  to 
sally  out  by  Gravelotte,  on  the  night  of  the  24th-25th  Octo- 
ber, but  this  plan  was  not  executed. 

On  the  25th  October,  General  Changarnier  entered  upon 
fresh  negotiations  with  Prince  Frederick  Charles.  The  terms 
of  the  capitulation  of  Sedan  were  taken  as  a  basis,  and  the 
officers  who  chose  imprisonment  were  permitted  to  carry 
their  arms  away  with  them. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  October  the  fortress  fell 
into  our  hands,  perfectly  uninjured,  together  with  its  mili- 
tary establishments,  with  its  3  marshals,  50  generals,  6,000 
officers,  173,000  men,  53  eagles,  300,000  stand  of  arms,  66 
mitrailleurs,  541  field  guns,  800  garrison  guns,  the  stores  of 
85  field  batteries,  and  2,000  military  vehicles.  On  the  same 
day  the  Crown  Prince  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  were 
made  Field  Marshals.  Thanks  are  due  also,  however,  to 
the  brave  investing  army,  who  for  ten  weeks  bore  all  the 
hardships  with  a  stedfast  endurance  peculiarly  their  own; 
who,  by  steady  vigilance  and  unequalled  courage,  brought 
about  a  result  without  example  in  military  history,  and  had 
compelled  the  army  of  the  enemy  to  lay  down  their  arms  in 
Metz,  which  had  been  called  by  them  with  proud  confidence 
an  impregnable  fortress. 

Already,  eight  days  before  the  capitulation,  railway 
wagons,  with  provisions  for  the  garrison  and  inhabitants 
of  Metz,  were  standing  in  the  railway  station  of  Courcelles. 

On  the  day  of  the  capitulation  an  artillery  and  an 
engineer  officer  from  each  Prussian  army  corps,  with  non- 
commissioned officers,  were  told  off,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  take  over  the  powder  magazines  and  destroy  any  mines 
that  might  exist.  Next  the  forts  were  occupied,  each  by 
two  battalions  of  infantry,  a  company  of  garrison  artillery, 
and  a  detachment  of  pioneers  (engineers)  ;  then  the  gates 
of  the  town,  and  finally  the  town  itself,  were  taken  posses- 
sion of.  Steps  were  immediately  taken  for  restoring  the  10 
kilometres  (6  English  miles)  of  railway  from  Metz  to  Cour- 
celles, and  the  very  first  train  that  ran  into  Metz  brought, 
to  the  great  delight  of  the  inhabitants,  1,000  sheep  into  the 

—540— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

fortress.  At  the  same  time  German  forethought  was 
brought  into  action  for  the  benefit  of  the  town  and  fortress, 
by  the  immediate  appointment  of  an  extraordinary  sanitary 
commission  to  prevent  the  seeds  of  epidemic  disease  from 
being  sown.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  they  may  also  succeed, 
by  suitable  measures  and  arrangements  with  regard  to  the 
inhabitants,  both  as  citizens  and  as  Christians,  in  bringing 
universal  contentment  to  the  hearts  of  this  originally  Ger- 
man Population. 


Paris 

(See  map  opposite  page  608) 

Paris,  with  its  1,850,000  inhabitants,  is  the  centre  of 
the  business,  the  manufactures,  and  the  finance  of  France, 
and  even  on  these  grounds  is  the  capital  of  the  country. 
Eight  railways,  numerous  high  roads,  water  communication 
of  every  description,  form  its  means  of  intercourse  with  the 
other  chief  business  towns.  The  circumference  of  the  city 
is  six  or  seven  leagues,  and  the  total  length  of  its  streets 
a  hundred  miles  (468  English  miles). 

The  Seine,  200  to  300  paces  broad,  and  spanned  by  21 
bridges,  divides  the  town  into  two  unequal  parts.  The  forti- 
fications consist  of  the  enceinte,  which  comprises  98  bas- 
tions, generally  very  spacious,  with  revetted  ditches  35 
paces  wide,  but  without  ravelins.  In  this  rampart  there  are 
47  gates,  14  sally-ports,  10  openings,  for  railways,  4  for  wa- 
ter-communications. The  terreplein,  or  military  road  pass- 
ing along  and  within  the  line  of  the  bastions,  is  paved ;  near 
and  in  some  parts  parallel  to  it  runs  the  circular  railway 
which  connects  the  railway  stations  with  one  another,  and 
was  of  great  use  for  the  armament  and  defence  of  the  for- 
tress. 

Round  this  inner  line  of  works,  at  a  distance  of  2,500 
to  3,500  paces,  runs  the  outer  line,  the  circumference  of 
which  amounts  to  12  leagues.  It  consists  of  a  circle  of  15 
detached  forts,  whose  distance  apart  is  on  the  average  3,500 


—541- 


Siege  Operations 

paces ;  they  cover  by  their  fire  a  space  about  18  leagues 
round.    The  north  and  north-east  fronts  are  the  strongest. 

The  north  front  commences  with  St.  Denis,  the  key  of 
the  outer  line,  around  which  are  the  forts  De  la  Briche,  Dou- 
ble Couronne  du  Nord,  and  De  I'Est ;  these  three  works  are 
connected  by  a  wall  and  ditch  and  are  moreover  especially 
strengthened  by  an  inundation,  controlled  by  sluices  on  the 
swift-running  stream  of  Rouillon,  and  which  again  is  covered 
by  the  redoubt  of  Stains.  Railway  and  road  embank- 
ments, lines  of  canals,  many  villages  built  solidly  and  easily 
adapted  for  defense,  wooded  heights,  and  the  inundation 
above  mentioned,  which  may  be  positively  relied  upon,  give 
to  this  tract  of  ground  great  capabilities  of  defense.  South 
of  the  railway  leading  to  Soissons,  and  east  of  the  canal  of 
St.  Denis,  lies  Fort  D'Aubervilliers.  The  parts  of  the  canal 
from  St.  Denis,  and  Ourcq  lying  in  rear  of  this  fort  are  pro- 
vided with  parapets  and  small  flanking  earthworks. 

South  of  the  canal  of  Ourcq  and  the  road  to  Metz,  on 
the  heights  of  Belleville  and  Pantin,  lies  the  important  fort 
of  Romainville,  which  is  connected  with  the  canal  by  lines 
en  cremaillere,  along  the  slope  of  the  hill.  The  crest  of  the 
plateau  of  Romainville  is  crowned  by  the  three  forts  Noisy, 
Rosny,  and  Nogent,  in  the  intervals  between  which  the  re- 
doubts Noisy,  Montreuil,  Boissiere  and  Fontenay,  are  judi- 
ciously placed. 

At  this  point  terminates  a  section  of  the  defences 
formed  by  the  Marne,  a  river  of  the  width  of  100  paces,  and 
this  section  is  in  addition  protected  at  the  southeast  angle 
by  a  line  of  fortifications  2,800  paces  long ;  the  redoubts  De 
la  Gravelle  and  De  la  Faisanderie,  placed  on  its  flanks,  im- 
part to  it  considerable  powers  of  resistance.  The  well-known 
fortified  castle  of  Vincennes  serves  as  a  keep  to  this  work, 
and  is  surrounded  by  a  park  of  the  same  name ;  there  is  also 
here  the  great  arsenal  and  the  artillery  practice  ground, 
which  extends  to  the  Marne.  Fort  Charenton,  in  the  angle 
formed  by  the  Marne  and  the  Seine,  forms  the  southern  ter- 
mination of  the  defenses  of  the  north-east  front. 

The  southern  front  of  the  outer  line  of  defenses  com- 
mences on  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine,  opposite  Fort  Charen- 

—542— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

ton,  with  Fort  Ivry,  and  thence  is  continued  on  a  hilly,  wooded 
plateau,  intersected  by  ravines,  by  forts  Bicetre,  Montrouge, 
Vanvres,  and  Issy,  the  last  commanding  the  Seine ; 
in  front  of  the  last  three  lie  the  heights  of  Bagneux,  Cla- 
mart,  Meudon,  and  Chatillon,  which  became  of  such  impor- 
tance during  the  siege.  The  forts  command  the  railways 
to  Sceaux  and  to  Versailles. 

The  west  front  is  bounded  by  the  Seine  and  the  Bois  de 
Boulogne,  and  is  defended  by  the  fortress  of  Mont  Valer- 
ien,  which  stands  at  a  height  of  415  feet  above  the  river. 
This  work  is  at  distances  of  1^  miles  (7  English  miles)  and 
1  mile  (4f  English  miles)  respectively,  from  the  forts  on 
either  side,  namely,  St.  Denis  and  Fort  d'Issy.  The  course 
of  the  Seine  from  Fort  Issy  to  the  fortifications  of  St.  Denis 
confers  upon  this  portion  of  the  city  of  Paris  great  defen- 
sive strength. 

As  the  forts  were  built  almost  all  at  the  same  time, 
they  have  on  the  whole  been  treated  almost  alike  as  regards 
their  defensive  details ;  they  have  a  bastioned  trace,  revetted 
ditches,  similar  arrangements  of  the  communications  within 
and  without  and  ramparts  of  almost  the  same  very  substan- 
tial profile.  They  are  all  rendered  quite  proof  against  as- 
sault, and  furnished  with  the  requisite  powder  magazines. 
Bombproof  cover  for  the  garrisons  is  provided  partly  in 
casements  under  the  ramparts,  in  the  curtains  and  flanks, 
and  partly  in  keeps  and  barracks  apart;  where  necessary, 
cavaliers  are  added  to  obtain  a  better  view  of  the  ground  in 
front.  There  are  no  ravelins ;  for  this  reason  the  more  im- 
portant forts  have  hornworks  in  front  of  them,  for  the 
greater  security  of  the  front  of  attack.  The  interior  space 
and  extent  of  the  forts  vary  according  to  the  importance  of 
the  work  they  are  designated  to  perform,  and  the  size  of  the 
garrisons  allotted  to  them;  the  largest  is  the  fortress  of 
Mont  Valerien,  which  has  a  base  of  some  500  paces,  and 
the  least  has  a  base  of  about  300.  Some  of  the  prominent 
features  of  the  fortifications  of  Paris,  with  reference  to  their 
general  arrangement  and  to  the  various  points  of  attack,  are 
mentioned  further  on  in  their  proper  places. 


-543— 


Siege  Operations 

Excitement  and  agitation  spread  through  Paris  on  the 
receipt  of  the  news  of  the  retreat  of  the  French  armies, 
which  became  necessary  after  the  engagements  at  Spich- 
eren,  Wiessembourg,  Worth.  The  order  was  given  to  call 
out  the  national  guard  and  the  garde  mobile.  In  the  former 
were  placed  all  citizens  between  30  and  40  years  of  age,  and 
in  the  latter  those  under  30.  The  populace  of  Paris  showed 
signs  jf  a  disposition  to  revolt.  The  issue  of  bank  notes 
rose  to  a  total  of  2,400  million  francs.  The  governor,  Gen- 
eral Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  declared  the  town  in  a  state  of 
siege,  in  order  that  he  might  be  aided  by  the  rigour  of  mar- 
tial law  in  putting  the  fortress  in  a  state  of  defense.  This 
entailed  serious  interference  with  the  daily  avocations  of  the 
citizens,  but  was  recognized  as  necessary,  as  no  preparations 
had  been  made  during  the  long  peace,  either  in  the  place 
itself  or  in  the  detached  forts.  Attention  was  first  bestowed 
upon  the  safety  of  the  town  itself.  There  was  indeed  a  re- 
vetted enceinte  with  a  ditch  in  existence,  but  the  protection 
of  the  gates  and  entrances  of  the  openings  for  railways  and 
canals  had  in  great  part  to  be  provided  for.  The  ditches 
were,  for  the  sake  of  the  traffic  of  the  city,  crossed  in  some 
places  by  bridges,  in  others  by  embankments.  These  com- 
munications, as  well  as  in  some  places  the  profile  of  the 
ditch,  required  radical  reconstruction  to  put  them  in  a  secure 
state  of  defense.  The  gateways  were  reduced  to  the  smallest 
number  the  traffic  would  allow,  the  drawbridges  were  hung 
and  made  passable,  the  number  of  railway  openings  was  re- 
duced as  far  as  practicable,  and  they  were  covered  by  tra- 
verses. Barricades  were  prepared,  as  far  as  the  traffic  per- 
mitted, in  the  avenues  De  la  Grande  Armee,  Du  Roule  and 
other  places,  and  openings  that  could  be  closed  were  left  for 
the  passage  of  the  traffic.  The  openings  of  the  underground 
canals  and  aqueducts  at  Asnieres  and  at  the  aqueduct  d'Huys 
were  covered  with  gratings  or  closed,  and  dams  were  pre- 
pared at  suitable  points  on  the  Seine,  as  well  as  at  the 
Viaduct,  d'Auteuil  and  at  the  Port  Napoleon,  in  order  to 
supply  the  ditches  of  the  fortifications  with  water.  Earth- 
works, constructed  for  the  purpose,  protected  these  dams 
from  destruction  by  distant  artillery  fire.  On  the  west,  north 

—544— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

and  east  fronts  ten  bomb-proof  powder  magazines  were 
formed  with  walls  six  feet  thick,  with  coverings  of  strong 
timbers,  and  completely  covered  up  with  earth.  At  the  same 
time,  that  this  was  done,  the  spaces  around  the  fortresses 
were  cleared,  a  measure  which,  in  spite  of  the  strict  law  on 
the  subject  existing  in  France,  was  necessary,  and  was  re- 
morselessly executed.  Buildings  and  hedges  were  demol- 
ished, and  ditches,  banks,  etc.,  affording  cover  to  the  enemy, 
were  so  sloped  off  as  to  be  grazed  by  the  line  of  fire  from  the 
ramparts.  Where  necessary,  the  entrances  into  the  fortifi- 
cations were  protected  by  earthworks  thrown  up  in  front 
against  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  so  as  to  render  them  more  thor- 
oughly defensible.  The  communications  from  the  fortress 
were  made  impassable  for  a  long  distance,  by  tearing  up  the 
causeways,  by  destroying  bridges,  and  erecting  barricades. 
A  part  of  the  iron-plated  gunboats,  armed  each  with  one 
heavy  gun,  originally  intended  for  the  Rhine,  was  allotted 
to  the  defence  of  Paris  and  for  operations  on  the  Seine; 
they  were  commanded  by  naval  officers,  and  manned  by  ma- 
rines, and  special  districts  and  stations,  well  protected,  were 
assigned  to  them.  Thus  some  were  in  the  upper  Seine  under 
the  fire  of  forts  Ivry  and  Charenton;  others  between  Mau- 
don,  Sevres,  and  the  island  of  Bellevue,  at  St.  Cloud  and  Sur- 
esnes ;  and  others  on  the  lower  Seine  under  the  guns  of  the 
defenses  of  St.  Denis. 

The  maneuvering  of  the  gunboats  was  much  interferred 
with,  in  spite  of  their  small  draught,  by  the  shallowness  of 
the  water,  and  subsequently  by  the  breaking  up  of  the  ice  on 
the  Seine.  Excepting  steamboats  of  some  use  in  the  defense, 
all  the  boats  available  for  ferrying  purposes  were  sunk  in 
the  Seine  or  the  Marne. 

The  inundation  of  the  east  front  of  the  defenses  of  St. 
Denis  was  forthwith  carried  out,  because  it  was  always  be- 
lieved in  Paris  that  an  enemy  would  only  have  to  choose 
between  the  front  of  St.  Denis-Pantin  and  the  front  Romain- 
ville-Charenton.  French  military  writers  were  disputed  only 
on  this  point,  whether  the  one  of  the  other  was  the  key  of 
Paris ;  no  thought  was  bestowed  on  any  other  front  of  at- 
tack   but  these  two.     Great  importance  was  attached  to 

—545— 


Siege  Operations 

strengthening  the  ground  in  front,  the  sole  point  in  dispute 
among  French  mihtary  writers ;  let  us  accordingly  commence 
our  description  on  the  south.  In  front  of  the  line  of  defense 
in  that  part,  between  Fort  d'Issy  and  Fort  Bicetre,  there 
runs  a  range  of  woody  heights,  over  which  are  scattered 
villages,  parks  and  country  houses.  As  the  defences  were 
designed  in  1840,  these  heights  were  beyond  the  range  of 
the  guns  of  the  period,  and  this  was  the  reason  that  they 
were  not  considered.  Since  the  introduction  of  long-range 
rifled  ordnance,  however,  detached  elevated  spots,  which  look 
into  the  forts  and  hollows,  have  become  dangerous.  At  the 
same  time  therefore,  that  the  place  was  put  into  a  state  of 
defense,  as  above  mentioned,  the  erection  of  detached  works 
was  undertaken,  of  which  we  name  only  the  most  impor- 
tant: 

1.  A  group  of  field-works  on  the  ground  in  advance  and  to  the 
west  and  south  of  Mont  Valerien,  namely,  the  Muhlen  and 
Wolfsgruben  redoubts,  and  the  lunette  of  Suresnes. 

2.  A  work  at  Montretout,  immediately  above  the  railway  station 

of  St.  Cloud. 

3.  A  work  between  forts  Issy  and  Vanvres. 

4.  A  redoubt  by  the  side  of  the  porcelain  manufactory  at  Sevres, 

afterwards  called  the  Kronprinzen-Schanze. 

5.  A  work  to  the  southward  of  Sevres,  afterwards  called  the 
Jagerschanze. 

6.  A  redoubt  in  the  park  of  Meudon. 

7.  A  work  at  Notre  Dame  de  Clamart. 

8.  A  work   at  Moulin  de  la  Tour,  afterwards  called  the  Bauern- 

schanze. 

The  last  two  entrenchments  were  situated  upon  spots 
commanding  forts  Issy,  Vanvres,  and  Montrouge.  The  ram- 
parts of  these  forts  were  raised  about  2  metres  to  prevent 
the  enemy  seeing  into  them. 

9.  A  smaller  work  at  the  hamlet  L'Hay  for  the  defense  of  the 

ground  in  front  of  Villejuif  and  the  Fontainbleau  road. 

10.  The  works  of  Chatillon  and  Clamart,  and  of  Villejuif  with  a 

defensible  communication  to  Fort  Bicetre. 

11.  A  work  1,000  paces  to   the  west  of  Villejuiff,  and  south-west 

of  Fort  Bicetre;  this  was  originally  open  at  the  gorge  and 
was  afterwards  converted  into  a  redoubt.  The  technical  exe- 
cution and  arrangement  of  this  work  was  praised  as  being 
a  model,  and  we  give,  therefore,  some  details  of  its  construc- 
tion. The  entrenchment  was  traced  as  a  five-sided  redoubt, 
with  a  ditch  and  parapet  of  a  strong  profile,  and  with  a  bas- 
tioned  forge.  The  casemates  for  the  accommodation  of  the 
soldiers  were  placed  under  the  ramparts  and  constructed  of 

—546— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

wood,  and  their  roofs  were  formed  of  railway  iron.  All  the 
ramparts  were  arranged  for  artillery  defense,  and  they  had 
numerous  hollow  traverses,  which  served  for  cover  for  var- 
ious purposes.  The  ditch  was  flanked  partly  by  caponiers 
built  of  timber,  partly  by  a  loopholed  wall,  which  ran  along 
the  foot  of  the  counterscarp  and  likewise  served  as  a  palisad- 
ing. 

12.  A  terraced  work   in   tiers  at  Cashan  for   eight  guns  to  fire 

upon  the  valley  of  Bievre. 

13.  The  defences  of   Vitry,  with  a  communication  attached  lead- 

ing to  Villejuif,  and  communications  to  the  rear  to  Fort  Ivry, 
and  as  far  as  the   Seine. 

14.  Works  of  defense  at  Bercy,  where  the  Seine  passes  into  the 
fortress,  and  at  Point  du  Jour,  where  it  passes  out  of  the  for- 
tifications. 

15.  Works  to  strengthen  the  position  in  front  of  Fort  Vincennes, 

and  the  advanced  position  on  the  Marne  peninsula. 

16.  Defenses    of   Mont    Avron,   consisting    of   batteries,    rows    of 

musketry  trenches,  and  arrangements  for  the  defense  of  the 
network  of  buildings;  the  object  was  to  take  in  flank  the  posi- 
tion of  the  blockading  force  on  the  east. 

17.  The  defenses  of  the  position  of  La   Courneuve,  Le  Bourget, 

and  Drancy,  where  the  roads  had  been  made  defensible;  the 
places  named  had  been  fortified,  and  an  independent  earth- 
work had  been  constructed  to  serve  as  a  keep  to  the  whole. 

18.  A   redoubt  at   Pierrefitte,  northward   from    St.   Denis   to   fire 

upon  the  roads  to  Calais  and  Amiens  and  the  railway  to  Creil. 

19.  A    redoubt   at   Colombes,   to   command   the    peninsula    of  the 

Seine  at  that  place. 

20.  An  entrenchment  between  Billancourt  and  the  Seine,  for  the 

defense  of  the  passage  of  the  river  there  in  case  it  should 
be  attempted. 

21.  Barricades  in   Billancourt,  and  the  reconstruction   of  a    cov- 

ered trench  to  Fort  Issy,  in  connection  with  which  it  was 
necessary  to  establish  a  means  of  communication  over  the 
Seine;  a  similar  means  of  communication  existed  from  Fort 
Charenton  over  the  Marne  to  the  Champ  des  Maneuvers. 

A  great  number  of  batteries  were  also  constructed  and 
secured  by  special  means,  such  as  musketry  trenches  and  de- 
fensible communications,  of  which  here  only  the  principal 
ones  will  be  enumerated. 

22.  Batteries  at  St.  Quen,  westward  of  Courbevoye,  for  the  de- 
fense of  the  Nanterre  peninsula;  these  were  intended,  in  con- 
junction with  the  work  of  Colombes,  to  fill  up  the  great  gap 
in  the  defenses  between  the  fortifications  of  Mont  Valerien 
and  St.  Denis. 

23.  Batteries  on  the  heights  of  Argenteuil. 

24.  Batteries  on  the  flank  of  Villejuif,  and  at  the  mill  of  Saquot. 

25.  Batteries  on  the  Marne  peninsula,  which  in  conjunction  with 

forts  Charenton  and  Nogent  fired  over  the  ground  round 
Champigny  and  Champignolles. 

26.  Batteries  at  Drancy  and  Courneuve;  these  were  to  fire  over 
the  flat  ground  in  front  on  both  sides  of  the  road  to  Lille. 


-547— 


Siege  Operations 

The  greater  part  of  the  works  mentioned  were  executed 
during,  or  at  the  end  of  the  defense,  according  as  it  became 
practicable  at  various  periods  to  complete  the  circle  of  the 
French  fortifications;  for  there  was  no  other  opportunity 
of  producing  much  real  eflfect  on  the  defense. 

Much  astonishment  was  occasioned  by  the  abandonment 
of  the  defense  of  Fort  Vincennes  from  the  very  beginning; 
as  the  reason  for  this  remarkable  course,  the  unsatisfactory 
structural  condition  of  the  buildings  there  for  defensive  pur- 
poses was  assigned  and  also  the  necessity  for  retaining  the 
work  in  use  as  a  prison. 

The  ground  in  front  of  Paris  is  extraordinary  favoura- 
ble in  general  for  the  construction  of  fortifications,  and  was 
taken  advantage  of  for  defensive  works  of  every  descrip- 
tion; for  musketry  trenches — sometimes  in  a  simple  form, 
sometimes  in  successive  tiers — for  defensive  communica- 
tions between  the  several  points  important  for  the  defense, 
for  the  conversion  into  defensible  posts  of  walls  and  enclos- 
ures, of  which  a  detailed  list  would  here  occupy  us  too  long. 
The  French  understood  thoroughly  how  to  bring  such  worKS 
into  connection  both  with  the  older  and  with  the  more  re- 
cently constructed  systems  of  defenses,  and  thereby  to  pre- 
pare to  the  best  advantage  the  defensible  positions  on  the 
ground  in  the  front  for  a  step-by-step  defense,  and  for  an 
astonishing  increase  in  the  number  of  guns  in  position.  The 
gangs  of  men  employed  in  the  execution  of  these  works  could 
not  be  .  engineer-soldiers ;  men  of  the  civil  population  of 
suitable  trades  were  employed  for  this  purpose,  and  no  arms 
were  given  them  since,  as  is  well-known,  there  were  none  to 
spare  especially  at  the  beginning  of  the  siege. 

Abundant  and  extensive  use  was  made  of  obstacles  for 
preventing  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  such  as  abattis,  trous- 
de-loup,  wire  fences,  land  and  water  torpedoes,  etc.,  in  every 
place  where  they  could  be  applied,  in  front  of  all  trenches, 
batteries  and  minor  defenses.  A  peculiar  description  of 
ground  torpedoes  was  discovered  in  the  captured  forts ;  they 
were  exploded  by  friction,  caused  by  the  pressure  of  the 
foot  driving  in  a  hammer;  they  must  have  been  intended  for 


-548- 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

use  against  columns  of  assault  and  for  the  defence  of  the 
breach. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  General  Trochu — whose 
headquarters  were  at  the  hotel  of  the  President  of  the  Coun- 
cil— arranged  for  the  construction  of  the  defences  and  for 
the  other  dispositions  for  the  defence  with  great  ability  and 
energy.  His  Chief  of  Staff  was  General  Schmidt;  with  Gen- 
eral Foy  as  assistant.  General  Trochu  is  the  more  deserving 
of  credit  for  this,  since  he  must  have  been  actively  and  use- 
fully employed  on  a  multitude  of  internal  arrangements, 
which  equally  demanded  prudence  and  thought.  The  meas- 
ure, not  recognized  by  international  law,  for  the  ruthless 
banishment  of  all  Germans  settled  in  Paris  or  in  France 
emanated  from  him.  He  ordered  the  removal  of  the  boards 
of  railway  directors,  and  other  civil  authorities  unnecessary 
in  a  siege,  as  well  as  the  transfer  of  the  art  treasures  in  the 
museum  of  the  Loucre  to  provincial  towns.  The  seat  of  gov- 
ernment had  been  previously  moved  to  Tours.  All  who 
could  not  show  that  they  had  means  of  existence,  or  who  dis- 
turbed the  public  order,  or  who  in  any  way  endangered  the 
safety  of  persons  and  property  were  compelled  to  leave 
Paris.  General  Trochu  instituted  a  committee  of  defense, 
which  consisted,  with  himself  as  chairman,  of  Marshal  Vail- 
lant.  Admiral  Rignault  de  Genoully,  Jerome  David,  the  Min- 
ister of  Public  Works,  and  the  Generals  of  Divisions,  Chab- 
uad  la  Tour,  Guiod,  D'Autemarre,  D'Erville,  and  Soumaine. 
The  plan  of  defense  which  the  governor  intended  to  follow  in 
case  of  a  siege,  was  in  the  main  as  follows : 

First  Circle  of  Defence — Marshal  Vinoy,  with  his  corps 
and  the  survivors  of  MacMahon's  army  assembled  at  Laon, 
defended  the  position  at  Argenteuil ;  General  Mellinet  occu- 
pied the  position  at  Sceaux-Bourg  with  some  regiments  of 
the  line  and  newly  formed  troops ;  the  provincial  garde  mo- 
bile, with  some  line  regiments,  were  at  Noissy-Villiers.  A 
cavalry  corps  was  placed  at  Bourget,  eastward  of  St.  Denis. 

Second  Circle  of  Defence — This  included  the  defence 
of  the  forts  which  were  occupied  by  gardes  mobiles  and  by 
marine  artillery. 

—549— 


Siege  Operations 

Third  Circle  of  Defence — This  comprised  the  defence 
of  the  enceinte,  which  was  strengthened  in  rear  by  prepar- 
ing the  streets  and  buildings  lying  near  for  defence.  Much 
assistance  was  derived  from  the  circular  railway,  which  was 
very  advantageous  for  military  purposes.  It  should  be  ob- 
served that  this  railway  rendered  most  remarkable  service 
in  preparation  of  works  and  armaments  in  the  conveyance 
of  great  quantities  of  materials,  such  as  timber,  and  earth, 
for  increasing  the  thickness  of  parts  of  the  ramparts,  and 
the  construction  of  numerous  traverses  and  bombproofs  as 
well  as  in  transporting  troops  at  a  subsequent  period. 

Fourth  Circle  of  Defence — To  this  belonged  the  in- 
terior defence  by  means  of  barricades,  dividing  the  streets 
into  sections,  and  by  the  system  of  street  defence,  projected 
and  executed  by  the  Emperor  Napoleon  for  street-fighting. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  fundamental  idea  of  this  sys- 
tem of  defence  was  well  considered,  and  it  would  perhaps 
have  fulfilled  the  expectations  entertained  of  it,  if  the 
course  of  events  had  been  such  as  to  require  a  step-by-step 
defence,  and  if  they  had  had  well  disciplined  troops  available 
in  Paris. 

On  this  point  it  remains  to  be  stated  that  the  particu- 
lars of  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  army  of  Paris 
have  varied,  and  no  approximation  to  accuracy  has  been  at- 
tained. The  original  garrison  of  Paris  was  in  part  rein- 
forced by  the  addition  of  the  4th  battalions  of  the  field  regi- 
ments. After  the  battle  of  Sedan  there  came  from  the 
north,  from  the  neighborhood  of  Mezieres,  Vinoy's  corps, 
strengthened  by  the  survivors  of  MacMahon's  army  and 
the  garrison  of  the  camp  of  Lyons.  Moreover,  20,000  labour- 
ers were  formed  into  battalions.  In  the  middle  of  Septem- 
ber, some  time  before  the  investment,  the  strength  of  the 
army  amounted  to — 

Regulars 80,000  men 

Parisian   Garde  Mobile  and  Garde 

Nationale   100,000  men 

Free    Corps    10,000  men 

Garde  Mobile  from  other  places 60,000  men 

TOTAL 250,000  men 

—550— 


Campaign  Against  Fiance  1870-71 

Further  levies  from  classes  whose  age  did  not  exempt 
them  from  service,  however,  brought  the  army  up  to  nearly 
double  this  strength,  or  500,000  men.  A  Polish  legion,  com- 
posed of  men  belonging  to  that  nationality,  though  not  ac- 
tually under  that  title,  and  an  English-North-American  le- 
gion placed  themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the  committee  of 
defence.  The  Polytechnic  school  furnished  skirmishers,  and 
the  artillery  for  regular  duty  in  the  garrisons  of  bastions  86 
and  87  of  the  enceinte. 

The  Paris  garde  mobile  and  garde  nationale  were  divid- 
ed into  four  divisions,  whose  head-quarters  were  situated 
in  the  Palais  Royal,  the  Conservatoire,  the  Elysee,  and  the 
Luxembourg  Palace.  The  hap-hazard  formation  of  this  army 
and  lack  of  good  military  training  and  discipline,  their  ignor- 
ance of  the  mode  of  handling  their  arms  above  all,  the  want 
of  capable  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  made  the 
army  of  Paris  unfit  for  great  enterprises,  so  that  their  num- 
erical superiority  over  the  comparatively  weak  German 
army  of  investment  could  not  give  rise  to  any  difficulty. 
General  Trochu  made  proposals  to  recall  the  army  of  Ba- 
zaine  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  which  were  at  first  ap- 
proved, but  could  not  after^^'ards  be  carried  out,  because  the 
Marshal  was  shut  up  in  Metz ;  General  Trochu  protested 
against  the  marching  away  of  MacMahon's  army  to  the 
north,  but  without  result. 

During  the  progress  of  the  siege,  however,  the  condi- 
tion of  the  garrison  improved,  since  to  their  numerical 
strength  they  added  internal  cohesion  and  tactical  skill.  The 
garde  nationale  and  garde  mobile  were  obliged  to  drill  thor- 
oughly, and  were  made  acquainted  with  the  duties  of  the 
defences,  which  required  daily  70,000  men.  In  the  middle 
of  October  we  find  the  "ordre  de  bataille"  as  follows :  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, General  Trochu ;  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
General  Schmitz ;  of  the  artillery.  General  Goyo ;  of  the  en- 
gineers. General  Chabaud  la  Tour;  Intendant  General  Wolf. 

First  Army— General  Clement  Thomas,  Commanding;  Chief  of 
the  Staff,  Colonel  Montagut;  226  battalions  of  sedentary  National 
Guard. 

Second  Army — General  Ducrot,  Commanding;  Chief  of  the  Staff, 
General  Oppert. 

—551— 


Siege  Operations 

1st  Corps — Three  divisions,  General  Blanchard;  Chief  of  the 
Staff,  Colonel  Filippi. 

2nd  Corps — Three  divisions.  General  Renault;  Chief  of  the  Staff, 
General  Forri  Pisani. 

3rd  Corps — Two  divisions  of  infantry,  a  division  of  cavalry,  Gen- 
eral d'Exea;  Chief  of  the  Staff,  Colonel  de  Belgarde. 

Third  Army — General  Vinoy,  commanding.  Six  infantry  divis- 
ions, including-  the  marines  and  two  cavalry  brigades. 

The  defence  of  the  enceinte  was  divided  into  nine  sec- 
tions named  after  the  suburbs  in  front  of  them ;  each  was 
placed  under  the  command  of  a  general  of  division,  or  vice- 
admiral,  whose  staff  was  complete  in  all  arms  and  branches. 
The  garrison  of  these  sections  consisted  of  national  guards 
— generally  25  to  40  battalions  to  each,  according  to  the 
number  of  bastions  included  in  it.  Strict  instructions  and 
regulations  were  issued  for  the  guards  at  the  gateways  and 
sally  ports,  and  for  the  duty  on  the  ramparts  of  the  bas- 
tions. 

Neither  the  casemates  in  the  town  of  Paris,  nor  the 
bomb  proofs  in  the  bastions  could  accommodate  the  whole 
of  this  numerous  garrison.  A  great  part  of  them  went  un- 
der canvas  at  Meaux,  in  the  Bois  de  Vincennes,  and  in  the 
Bois  de  Boulogne,  as  well  as  in  other  places,  or  were  shel- 
tered in  tents  and  close  cantonments  in  the  villages  lying 
between  the  enceinte  and  the  forts.  These  arrangements 
were  constantly  changed.  Line  troops,  as  far  as  possible, 
did  duty  in  the  forts. 

When  the  enormous  circumference  of  the  works  to  be 
prepared  for  defence  is  considered,  every  credit  must  be 
given  to  the  engineer  authorities  concerned,  at  whose  head 
was  General  Chabaud  la  Tour.  This  officer  was  a  highly 
accomplished  engineer,  and  under  his  direction  the  east 
front  of  the  place,  which  is  excellently  defiladed,  was  exe- 
cuted in  1842-44 ;  he  called  in  the  aid  of  civil  engineers  who 
were  fit  for  the  work,  of  whom  it  has,  however,  been  re- 
corded, that  owing  to  their  ignorance  of  military  matters, 
a  great  number  of  demolitions  were  undertaken,  which  did 
not  obstruct  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  Numerous  bridges 
and  roads  were  demolished,  waymarks  were  removed,  many 
tunnels  and  railways  were  destroyed,  where  no  real  neces- 
sity existed  on  any  reasonable  grounds.    The  principal  de- 

—552— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

molitions  undertaken  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of 
Paris  were  as  follows :  the  destruction  of  about  60  bridges, 
viz.,  those  at  Sevres,  St.  Cloud,  Suresnes,  Bougival,  Marly, 
St.  Germain,  Ouen,  Le  Pecq,  Meaux,  Esbly,  Lagny,  Illes  de 
Villenoy,  Villeneuve,  etc.,  and  the  blowing  up  of  the  railway 
tunnels  at  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  Nanteuil,  and  of  the  via- 
duct of  Chantilly. 

It  is  well  known  that  Trochu  issued  an  order  for  the 
burning  of  the  forests  and  woods  round  Paris  in  order  that 
the  investing  army  might  be  deprived  both  of  firewood  for 
their  bivouacs  and  also  of  timber  for  the  construction  of 
their  works.  Thus  the  woods  of  Bondy  Montmorency,  and 
St.  Gratien,  and  the  park  of  Monceaux  were  actually  burnt 
down.  The  appearance  of  our  troops  on  the  south  front, 
who  there,  and  all  round  Paris,  took  up  their  positions,  with 
the  rapidity  and  precision  for  which  they  are  remarkable, 
prevented  in  great  part  the  execution  of  this  act  of  vandal- 
ism. Thus  the  large  and  magnificient  parks  of  St.  Cloud, 
St.  Germain,  and  Meudon  were  saved. 

The  artillery  in  the  works  was  under  the  orders  of  Gen- 
eral Goyo. 

The  armament  of  Paris  with  artillery  was  pressed  on 
most  energetically,  simultaneously  with  the  preparation  of 
the  fortifications.  We  give  the  particulars  of  the  armaments 
as  they  have  been  made  known,  to  us  in  the  report  of  the 
Cardinal  von  Wideren,  and  observe  that  they  must  be  ac- 
cepted only  as  a  general  statement,  as  continual  changes 
took  place  during  the  progress  of  the  siege. 

The  armament  was  made  up  partly  of  heavy  and  partly 
of  light  naval  guns ;  in  this  way  many  smooth-bore  pieces 
were  brought  upon  the  ramparts. 

1.  The  98  bastions  of  the  enceinte,  each  with  400  me- 
tres (438  yards)  development  of  front,  were  each  to  receive 
8  to  10  twelve-pounders.  The  gateways  and  sally-ports 
were  defended  by  guns  of  a  greater  calibre.  The  carriages 
were  of  cast  iron.    Total  1,226  pieces. 

2.  The  armament  of  the  detached  forts  is  given  as 
follows :  Charenton,  70 ;  Vincennes,  117 ;  Nogent,  53 ;  Rosny, 
56 ;  Noisy-le-Est  Sec,  57 ;  Romainville,  49 ;  Aubervillers,  66 ; 

—553— 


Siege  Operations 

Fort  de  I'Est  de  Saint  Denis,  52 ;  La  Briche,  61 ;  Mont  Valer- 
ien,  79 ;  Issy,  64 ;  Vanvres,  45 ;  Montrouge,  43 ;  Bicetre,  40 : 
Ivry  70. 

It  is  to  be  understood  that  the  numbers  of  guns  men- 
tioned include  not  only  the  armaments  of  the  detached  forts 
but  also  of  the  detached  outworks  in  connection  with  them, 
and  the  auxiliary  redoubts  and  other  defensible  posts,  as 
well  as  a  suitable  artillery  reserve.  After  the  occupation 
of  the  works  by  the  Germans,  it  became  evident,  moreover; 
that  the  above  estimates  were  right  as  regarded  the  total 
numbers;  we  should  not  be  far  wrong  in  placing  the  total 
number  of  guns  in  barbe  at  about  2,000  pieces.  An  artil- 
lery park  was  formed  in  the  gardens  of  the  Tuileries. 

From  these  facts  it  is  clear  that  the  proportion  of  ar- 
tillery in  Paris,  as  in  other  French  fortresses  was  every- 
where ample,  although  the  nature  of  the  pieces,  the  variety 
of  their  construction,  and  the  description  of  carriages  may 
not  have  been  altogether  suitable  to  the  requirements  of 
the  present  time.  In  this  respect  they  were  not  in  France, 
and  least  of  all  in  Paris,  so  far  advanced,  nor  so  well  pre- 
pared for  the  attack  and  defence  of  fortresses,  as  in  Prus- 
sia. Anyone  who  knows  the  arrangements  of  an  artillery 
depot,  or  the  peace  preparations  for  the  artillery  defence 
of  a  Prussian  fortress,  will  be  best  able  to  judge  what  was 
wanted  in  such  a  case  at  Paris.  Meanwhile,  an  endeavour 
was  made  with  creditable  activity,  and  with  much  judg- 
ment, to  supply  the  deficiencies.  As  early  as  the  middle  of 
August  6,800  men  (later  on  also  women,  to  some  extent) 
were  employed  in  the  manufacture  of  cartridges  and  case- 
shot.  Considerable  supplies  of  ammunition  of  all  sorts  were 
brought  up  from  Toulon  and  Montpellier,  where  there  are 
great  cartridge  factories.  The  large  foundries  and  iron 
works  in  Paris  were  exclusively  employed  in  preparing  shot 
and  shell,  and  were  in  some  measure  converted  into  arsenals. 
During  the  siege  251,572  projectiles  from  cannon  and  1,000,- 
000  bullets  from  mitrailleurs  were  made  in  Paris.  In  the 
engine  works  of  Cail  locomotives  were  built,  with  iron  plated 
trucks,  in  which  guns  were  placed.  Subsequently,  goods 
wagons  were  converted  to  this  use,  and  they  had  plating  4^ 

—554— 


Campaign  Against  Fiance  1870-71 

inches  thick.  The  works  to  resist  assault  were  armed  with 
guns  of  every  description  and  this  was  hurried  on  princi- 
pally at  Point  de  Jour,  Auteuil,  and  Vaugirard,  and  at  the 
detached  forts. 

To  supply  in  some  measure  the  want  of  trained,  expert 
gunners,  marine  artillery  were  ordered  to  Paris  in  great 
numbers,  and  to  their  soldierlike  bearing  and  steadiness 
under  fire  all  praise  is  due. 

The  fire  of  the  batteries  on  the  works  was  however, 
kept  up  with  an  inexcusable  waste  of  ammunition,  appar- 
ently according  to  no  pre-arranged  plan,  and  without  skillful 
supervision.  The  cost  of  this  waste  of  ammunition  on  the 
night  of  the  28th  to  29th  November  alone  has  been  esti- 
mated at  120,000  thalers  (£18,000) .  Frequently  costly  pro- 
jectiles were  aimed  at  in  other  cases  without  any  good  rea- 
son that  could  be  assigned.  We  refer  to  the  destruction  of 
the  magnificient  palaces  of  St.  Cloud  and  Malmaison,  to  the 
laying  in  ashes  of  the  towns  and  numerous  villas  there, 
acts  that  were  done  by  the  French  themselves  in  the  most 
reckless  manner. 

The  garrison  artillery  paid  not  the  least  attention  to 
watching  their  fire  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  its  elevation 
and  direction ;  similarly  they  appeared  to  profit  but  little 
by  the  great  advantage  they  had  on  their  side  of  being  able 
to  ascertain  the  distances  accurately.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  possession  of  the  best  material  was  of  no  use  to 
them.  Nevertheless,  the  pertinacity  and  bravery  of  the  gar- 
rison artillery  in  the  working  their  guns  was  not  to  be  de- 
nied, and  they  understood  how  to  take  advantage  of  the 
warxt  of  cover  of  their  opponents  on  every  occasion.  The  artil- 
lery fire  of  the  forts  derived  substantial  assistance  from  the 
guns  which  were  mounted  in  the  field  redoubts  in  front  of, 
betxyeen,  and  in  rear  of  them,  and  in  separate  emplace- 
ments. Most  of  the  forts  were  in  fact  connected  with  one 
another  by  a  military  road  constructed  for  the  purpose; 
from  these  roads  trenches  branched  out  to  important  points, 
which  afforded  a  favourable  opportunity  for  bringing  an  un- 
expected fire  to  bear  on  the  ground  in  front. 

—555— 


Siege  Operations 

During  the  siege  particular  attention  was  attracted  to 
a  new  long-ranging  gun,  which  fired  from  the  fortress  of 
Mont  Valerien  and  strewed  the  batteries  erected  against 
the  south  front  with  its  ponderous  projectiles,  as  far  as 
9,000  paces  to  the  westward.  The  French  named  it  Sanite 
Valerie.  The  bore  had  a  calibre  of  36  centimetres  (14^ 
inches).  The  projectiles  weighed  80  lbs.,  (82|  lbs.  Eng- 
lish). The  breech  closing  gear  was  removed  when  the  fort 
was  given  up,  so  that  the  gun  was  unserviceable;  it  is  now 
among  the  captured  artillery  at  Berlin. 

Provisioning — The  chief  in  this  department  was  the 
Intendant-General  of  the  army  of  Paris,  Wolf.  With  regard 
to  the  provisioning  of  Paris,  the  defence  committee  had  to 
solve  a  very  serious  problem,  and  they  performed  their  task 
so  as  to  elicit  general  approval.  So  early  as  about  the  mid- 
dle of  August  convoys  of  provisions  ceased  to  be  sent  to  the 
French  army  of  the  Rhine,  since  it  was  very  well  known, 
among  those  who  were  concerned,  that  their  arrival  at  their 
destination  was  doubtful.  Resort  was  then  had  to  England, 
and  shortly  after,  twenty-eight  ships,-  laden  with  flour,  left 
Liverpool  under  sail  for  Havre.  The  defence  committee 
originally  contemplated  the  provision  of  food  for  two  mil- 
lion inhabitants  for  two  months,  and  arranged  that  all  the 
stocks  of  grain  should  be  sent  to  Paris  from  the  depart- 
ments of  the  Seine  and  Marne,  where  corn  is  abundant,  and 
which  are  also  in  other  respects  fertile  and  wealthy.  This 
measure  was  proved  to  be  of  practical  utility  and  it  was 
made  more  stringently  operative  by  a  decree  to  the  effect 
that  all  stores,  which  were  in  the  line  of  advance  of  the 
Prussians  into  the  country,  should  be,  without  exception, 
destroyed.  The  issue  of  the  provisions  took  place  according 
to  a  plan,  of  which  the  preparation  and  execution  were  un- 
dertaken by  a  special  commission. 

The  herds  of  cattle  and  sheep  brought  up  by  the  Gov- 
ernment were  placed  in  the  Bois  de  Vincennes,  in  the  Jardin 
des  Plantes,  in  the  outer  Boulevards,  and  in  the  Bois  de 
Boulogne;  for  the  want  of  fodder,  and  from  the  unfavoura- 
ble weather,  which  early  became  very  cold,  the  cattle  suf- 
fered extremely,  and  succumbed  in  great  numbers,  and  lat- 

—556— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

terly  cows  were  only  maintained  to  supply  milk  for  the 
hospitals  and  for  children.  The  Government,  moreover, 
took  all  the  care  that  circumstances  permitted ;  for  the  cat- 
tle were  bought  on  their  account,  and  sold,  either  to  the 
butcher  or  the  public,  at  a  fixed  price.  Naturally,  in  the 
course  of  the  siege,  a  great  advance  took  place  in  the  prices 
of  all  provisions,  and  the  want  of  butter,  salt,  and  of  vege- 
tables, eggs  and  milk  was  much  felt ;  the  flour  and  wine  were 
not  exhausted  even  in  the  last  days  of  the  siege.  That  people 
were  driven  to  killing  dogs,  cats,  and  even  rats,  need  not 
much  astonish  us  with  so  large  a  population,  which  included 
a  considerable  number  of  the  poorer  classes ;  but  the  inhab- 
itants, as  a  whole  must  have  suffered  much,  and  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  among  the  aged  and  the  children  a  greater  mor- 
'tality  took  place  than  under  ordinary  circumstances;  this 
was,  moreover,  increased  by  hunger  and  the  cold  of  winter. 
The  subsistence  of  the  soldiers  was  naturally  a  great  source 
of  anxiety;  an  actual  failure  of  provisions  for  the  troops 
were  not  experienced  during  the  whole  siege,  although  at  the 
last  they  were  reduced  to  the  consumption  of  horseflesh, 
salt  meat,  bread  and  wine,  and  a  reduction  of  the  rations 
took  place  to  150  grammes  (one-third  of  a  pound).  Pris- 
oners and  wounded,  who  fell  into  our  hands  in  the  sorties  of 
December,  had  their  rations  for  four  or  five  days  with  them ; 
as  the  prisoners,  however,  if  it  was  proposed  to  send  them 
back  to  the  fortress,  preferred  to  remain  with  us,  it  may  be 
concluded  that  the  subsistence  and  service  in  the  army  of 
Paris  was  not  much  to  their  taste. 

The  want  of  coals  for  fuel  and  for  the  manufacture  of 
gas  was  much  felt;  and  wood  also,  in  the  later  periods  of 
the  siege,  was  scarcely  to  be  found;  severe  measures  must 
have  bean  adopted  to  secure  the  timber-yards  and  the  tim- 
ber in  the  defences  from  plunder  and  depredation. 

As  was  the  case  at  Metz,  the  means  of  existence  in 
Paris  lasted  some  weeks  longer  than  one  was  at  first  in- 
clined to  expect.  What  amount  of  provisions  were  actually 
in  the  town  on  the  19th  September  will  never  be  known  with 
any  accuracy ;  at  that  time  the  authorities  concerned  appar- 
ently did  not  beheve  in  the  possibility  of  holding  out  131 

—557— 


Siege  Operations 

days,  to  the  28th  January.  In  this  respect  the  report  is  at 
length  gaining  credit  that  the  stores  originally  existing  in 
Paris,  exclusive  of  the  special  provision  made  for  the  siege, 
had  been  seriously  underestimated ;  for  the  quantity  of  provi- 
sions that  could  have  been  conveyed  subsequently  into  the  be- 
sieged place  in  spite  of  the  blockade,  is  not  worth  taking 
into  account. 

The  imminent  failure  of  provisions — the  actual  pres- 
sure of  hunger  in  the  city — was,  at  any  rate,  one  of  the  chief 
causes  of  the  commencement  of  negotiations  for  surrender ; 
at  the  time  of  the  three  weeks'  truce,  moreover,  it  was  at 
its  height.  The  stocks  of  flour  and  horseflesh  were  suffi- 
cient only  for  eight  and  fourteen  days  respectively;  and 
with  regard  to  this,  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  get- 
ting in  of  fresh  supplies,  which  was  much  facilitated  by  the 
German  army  of  investment  handing  over  3,000,000  rations, 
and  throwing  open  the  roads  for  traffic,  took  fourteen  days 
longer,  during  which  time  the  want  of  provisions  in  Paris 
continued.  It  should  be  added  finally,  that  at  the  capitula- 
tion the  provisions  of  the  garrison  were  not  exhausted,  so 
that  a  portion  of  them  were  available  for  the  use  of  the  civil 
population. 

Intelligence. — Very  soon  after  the  appearance  of  the  in- 
vesting army  before  Paris  all  further  communication  with 
the  country  outside  was  cut  off;  the  last  post  was  despatched 
on  the  18th  September.  Subsequently  an  underground  tele- 
graph to  Tours  was  discovered  and  also  another  line  which 
was  led  along  the  bed  of  the  river  Seine  to  Havre ;  the  latter 
was  fished  up  accidentally  at  Bougival  during  the  pontoon- 
ing  operations  of  the  Prussians  for  the  military  bridge  at 
that  place,  and  it,  as  well  as  the  former,  was  destroyed.  A 
like  fate  befell  the  floating  hollow  balls  and  diving  machines  ;* 
the  Prussians  had  nets  spread  across  the  stream  and  caught 
them.  Letter-carriers,  disguised  as  sellers  of  vegetables 
endeavoured  to  slip  through  the  outposts ;  this  also  was  im- 
practicable ;  only  five  out  of  eighty-five  returned.    The  only 


*Taucher-boten — probably    some    apparatus    arranged    to      float 
down  with  the  stream  below  the  surface  of  the  water. 

—558— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

road  not  suspected  was  that  through  the  catacombs  of 
Paris,  but  the  foolhardy  people  who  ventured  by  it  perished 
there ;  even  bloodhounds  undertook  the  conveyance  of  letters, 
but  they  also  did  not  come  back. 

The  chief  part  in  the  transmission  of  news  was  played 
by  air-balloons,  and  for  their  manufacture  and  filling  special 
factories  with  hundreds  of  workmen  were  established  at  the 
Northern  and  Eastern  railway  stations ;  they  were  under  the 
management  of  the  well-known  aeronaut  Godard.  A  school 
of  aeronauts  was  established;  a  committee  of  professional 
and  scientific  persons  devoted  themselves  to  this  business. 
The  first  voyage  through  the  air,  that  was  of  any  use,  was 
made  by  the  aeronaut  Duruof  on  the  23d  September ;  on  the 
8th  October  M.  Gambetta,  followed  him,  and  probably  also 
officers,  with  special  commissions  to  arrange  for  combined 
action  with  the  generals  commanding  the  masses  of  the  ene- 
my who  were  operating  in  the  open  field.  During  the  period 
from  23d  September  1870  to  the  23d  January  1871,  fifty- 
four  balloons  were  sent  off  from  Paris ;  they  conveyed  some 
persons  who  took  charge  of  the  balloons,  and  several  hun- 
dred-weights of  letters.  The  use  of  this  contrivance  by  the 
public  was  regulated  by  special  orders,  and  letters  conveyed 
by  balloon  were  not  allowed  to  exceed  4*  grammes  in 
weight.  Altogether,  2,500,000  letters,  weighing  about  10,- 
OOOf  kilogrammes,  were  forwarded.  The  ascents  were 
made  from  the  railway  stations  of  the  Orleans,  Northern 
and  Eastern  railways  from  Montmartre,  the  Tuileries  gar- 
dens, etc.  Some  balloons,  moreover,  strayed  away  to  Roth- 
enburg,  to  Hesse,  to  Holland,  and  to  Norway ;  of  the  fate  of 
many  others  nothing  was  heard.  Besides  these  larger  air- 
balloons,  there  were  smaller  ones  six  to  sevenj  metras  in 
diameter,  called  ballons  libres,  by  which  letters  only  were 
sent  to  the  care  of  "the  esteemed  finder."  Captive  balloons 
with  cords  and  ropes,  hanging  over  Paris,  served  for  observ- 
ing the  positions  of  the  enemy,  and  for  watching  the  sorties 
from  the  fortress. 


*About  l/7th  part  of  an  oz.,  avoirdupois. 
fAbout  9  tons  16  cwt. 
$20  to  23  feet. 

—559— 


Siege  Operations 

Great  numbers  of  carrier  pigeons  had  been  brought 
from  Belgium  and  the  prefect  of  Lille  sent  900  of  these  birds 
to  Paris  just  before  the  investment.  They  were  generally 
sent  out  with  the  air-balloons — of  course  enclosed  in  cages 
— were  intended  to  bring  back  the  answer  to  the  balloon  let- 
lers.  These  carriers,  however,  during  the  latter  part  of  the 
siege,  frequently  failed  to  come  in,  and  proved  untrustwor- 
thy. Some  were  prevented  from  returning  by  the  foggy 
weather,  and  some  sought  their  Flemish  homes.  Of  200 
carrier-pigeons  let  go  from  Paris  only  73  got  back.  The  des- 
patches tied  to  them  contained  70,000  words,  which  werfe 
reduced  in  size  by  photography.  The  management  of  the 
air-balloons  and  carrier-pigeons  was  entrusted  to  the  ingen- 
ious post-master,  Ramport  de  Chin. 

Observatories  were  establisshed  on  Momtmatre,  the 
Pantheon,  and  the  towers  of  Notre  Dame,  which  were  chiefly 
employed  in  watching  the  flat  country  on  the  west  and 
north-east  sides.  The  forts  were  connected  by  underground 
telegraph  with  the  several  head-quarters  particularly  with 
the  Place  Vendome,  and  also  with  one  another.  Besides  all 
this,  visual  signals — in  part  also  arranged  for  use  at  night 
— were  used  for  enabling  the  commandants  of  forts  to  com- 
municate with  one  another. 

From  the  fortress  of  Mont  Valerien,  which  afforded  the 
most  extensive  view,  pre-arranged  flag-signals,  were  made ; 
on  the  side  of  the  Germans  it  was  believed  that  there  was 
a  certain  warning  if  a  sortie  was  contemplated,  and  the  at- 
tention of  the  besiegers  was  always  doubly  increased  by 
these  signals. 

By  electrical  light-apparatus,  which  was  directed  on  the 
positions  of  the  enemy  before  the  town,  they  endeavoured  to 
observe  the  works  undertaken  there  at  night.  An  ample 
supply  of  the  requisite  material,  and  excellent  apparatus 
worked  by  skillful  operators,  were  abundant  in  Paris,  and 
rendered  easy  this  mode  of  illumination. 

On  the  German  side  there  were  told  off  for  the  invest- 
ment of  Paris  the  Illd  Army,  under  the  command  of  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  consisting  of  the  Vth,  Vlth,  and 
Xlth  Prussian  corps,  the  two  Bavarian  corps,  and  the  Wur- 

—560— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

temberg  division,  about  140,000  strong ;  and  the  IVth  Army 
under  the  command  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  com- 
posed of  the  Prussian  guard  and  IVth  Corps  and  of  the 
Xllth  (Saxon)  corps,  about  80,000  strong.  The  German 
army  of  investment  was  thus  of  the  total  strength  of  only 
220,000  men,  for  the  reinforcement  sent  from  Germany  had 
not  at  that  time  arrived. 

As  early  as  the  16th  September,  the  advanced  guard 
of  the  German  cavalry  division,  which  had  been  pushed  for- 
ward one  or  two  marches  in  front  of  the  attacking  armies, 
appeared  at  Curteil,  Nouilly,  Corbeille,  and  Clamart.  Their 
task  was  to  destroy  the  telegraphs,  as  well  as  to  intercept  the 
supplies  for  Paris,  and  they  were  intended  on  the  other 
hand,  to  save  the  railways  and  prevent  the  demolition  of 
the  bridges ;  under  these  circumstances  there  occurred  some 
minor  engagements  with  the  French  detachments,  sent  out 
of  the  forts  to  reconnoitre. 

September  17. — Nevertheless,  the  advanced  guards  of 
the  Illd  army  found  the  permanent  bridges  over  the  Seine  at 
Corbeille  and  Villeneuve-St.  George  destroyed.  It  became 
necessary,  therefore,  at  once  to  establish  a  new  means  of 
crossing  the  Seine.  For  this  purpose,  the  5th  pioneer  bat- 
talion formed  a  pontoon  bridge  above  Villeneuve-St.  George 
at  half-past  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  which  was  immedi- 
ately crossed  by  the  2nd  division  of  cavalry. 

To  cover  the  formation  of  the  bridge  the  17th  brigade 
of  infantry,  with  two  squadrons  and  two  batteries,  had 
taken  up  a  position  on  the  heights  at  Limeuil,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Boissy  St.  Legere.  This  detachment  was  attacked 
at  2  p.m.,  by  six  French  battalions  and  two  batteries.  After 
a  severe  engagement  in  the  woods  of  Valenton  the  enemy 
fell  back  on  Creteil,  and  the  passage  of  the  German  forces 
over  the  pontoon-bridge,  which  had  been  formed  in  the 
meantime,  was  not  further  interfered  with. 

On  the  18th  of  September  the  Vth  army  corps  com- 
menced their  march  on  Palaiseau  and  Bievre.  At  Dame  Rose 
there  was  a  slight  engagement  between  detachments  of  the 
9th  division  and  French  out-posts,  but  this  did  not  at  all 
delay  the  further  advance  on  Versailles. 

—561— 


Siege  Operations 

On  the  19th  of  September,  a  more  serious  encounter 
took  place  on  the  plateau  of  Petit  Bicetre,  and  Plessis-Pi- 
quet,  which  had  been  carefully  prepared  for  defence.  The 
Royal  Bavarian  army  had  also  in  great  part  crossed  the 
Seine  at  Corbeille  on  pontoon-bridges  and  was  on  the  18th 
brought  forward  as  far  as  the  neighbourhood  of  Longju- 
meau  and  Palaiseau  ;  their  lid  corps  on  the  19th,  followed  the 
Prussian  Vth  corps  on  the  road  to  Versailles,  to  which  place 
the  headquarters  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  were  to  be 
transferred  on  the  20th  September.  On  the  French  side, 
General  Ducrot,  with  the  13th  corps,  had  advanced  to  the 
road  from  Fontainebleau  and  Orleans,  in  order  to  prevent  the 
occupation  of  the  plateaus  Clamart-Chatillon  and  Plessis- 
Piquet,  which  were  of  the  greatest  military  importance.  As 
a  point  d'appui  he  occupied  the  intrenchment  of  Moulin  de 
la  Tour,  previously  mentioned,  which  was  not  yet  finished. 
On  the  left  the  French  had  occupied  Sceaux;  their  right 
rested  on  the  park  of  Meudon. 

By  6  a.m.,  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Vth  Prussian 
corps  (King's  grenadiers,  and  47th  Regiment)  had  attacked 
the  enemy,  who  was  six  times  stronger  than  themselves. 
At  Petit-Bicetre,  a  brisk  engagement  began,  and  was  main- 
tained with  equal  obstinacy  on  both  sides  for  several  hours. 
It  did  not  cease  until  a  brigade  of  the  1st  Bavarian  Divis- 
ion, under  Colonel  Diehl,  was  sent  forward  in  support.  Later 
on  the  10th  division  was  directed  on  Villa  Coublay,  and  the 
corps  artillery  was  advanced.  About  11  o'clock,  the  enemy 
beat  a  retreat  on  the  entrenchments  of  Moulin  de  la  Tour. 
While  a  Bavarian  brigade  was  directed  on  Sceaux  the  8th 
Brigade  of  the  4th  Bavarian  division  was  sent  to  Croix  de 
Bernis,  the  7th  towards  Bourg;  with  these  movements  the 
enemy  was  to  be  outflanked.  In  the  meanwhile,  about  a 
quarter  to  12,  the  enemy  again  made  a  stand,  and  attacked 
Fontenay  and  Plessis  vigorously.  The  fight  thickened,  and 
the  artillery  took  a  large  share  in  it.  The  French  fired  with 
six  batteries  from  the  entrenchment  of  Moulin  de  la  Tour, 
and  other  strongly  fortified  positions  in  front  of  and  beside 
it,  the  Germans  from  well-covered  positions  opposite.  About 
half-past  1  o'clock,  the  French  ventured  an  attack  on  the 

—562— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

Bavarian  position,  and  then,  failing  of  success,  fell  back 
about  half-past  two.  The  3rd  Bavarian  Division  pursued 
them  with  the  3rd  battalion  of  jagers,  detachments  of  the 
14th  regiment,  two  batteries,  and  a  regiment  of  light  horse 
occupied  the  abandoned  entrenchment  of  Moulin  de  la  Tour, 
and  captured  there  seven  12-pounder  field-pieces.  The 
French  continued  their  retreat  uninterrupted  to  Paris.  The 
Vth  corps  had,  in  the  forenoon,  when  the  enemy  fell  back 
at  Petit-Bicetre,  resumed  their  advance  on  Versailles.  They 
arrived  there  towards  evening,  took  2,000  of  the  garde  mo- 
bile prisoners,  and  occupied  at  once  the  entrenchments 
thrown  up  by  the  French  at  Montretout  and  Sevres.  The 
captured  works  at  Sevres,  and  Moulin  de  la  Tour,  were  hence- 
forth named  by  the  Germans,  the  Kronprinz,  the  Jager, 
and  the  Bavarian  entrenchments.  The  Vlth  Prussian  corps 
crossed  the  Seine  at  Villeneuve,  the  advanced  guard  by  the 
bridge  made  by  the  Vth  corps,  the  rest  by  one  they  had  made 
themselves  in  the  meantime,  and  went  on  to  Orly.  Its  fur- 
ther advance  was  prevented  by  the  fire  from  the  lately-con- 
structed but  unfinished  French  entrenchment  at  Villejuif. 
Towards  evening  this  redoubt  was  reoccupied  by  the  Prus- 
sians, but  unfortunately  was  given  up  again,  because  it  was 
no  longer  tenable  in  the  face  of  the  heavy  fire  from  the  re- 
tired positions  of  the  French.  The  army  corps  placed  their 
outposts  on  the  line  Chevilly  to  Choisy. 

On  the  evening  of  the  19th  September,  the  outposts  of 
the  Ilird  army  stood  on  the  line  Bougival,  Sevres,  Meddon, 
Bourg,  L'Hay,  Chevilly,  Thiais,  Choisy-le-Roi,  Bonneville, 
Creteil,  Champigny,  Brie ;  in  corresponding  positions  in  rear 
were  the  Vth  Corps,  the  1st  and  Ilnd  Bavarian  Corps,  the 
Vlth  and  Xllth  Corps  and  the  Wurtemberg  division. 

At  Les  Tanneries,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Bougival 
and  Tournay,  communication  was  established  over  the  Seine 
and  Marne  respectively,  by  means  of  Pontoon-bridges,  with 
the  IVth  army.  This  army  performed  their  march  on  Paris 
without  meeting  with  any  resistance;  except  that,  between 
Pierrefitte  and  Montmagny,  a  slight  engagement  took  place, 
which  resulted  in  the  capture,  by  detachments,  of  the  IVth 
corps,  of  the  fortified  positions  occupied  by  the  French.    Le 

—563— 


Siege  Operations 

Bourget  and  Erancy  remained  in  the  occupation  of  the  ene- 
my, who  did  not  fall  back  here  till  the  20th  of  September. 
The  outposts  of  the  IVth  Army  stood  generally  on  the  line 
Neuilly,  Villemomble,  Le  Bourget,  Dugny,  Stains,  Pierre- 
fitte,  Epinay,  Argenteuil,  Besons.  The  headquarters  of  the 
IVth  army  were  in  Grand  Tremblay;  those  of  the  King  in 
Ferriers,  the  chateau  of  the  Rothschilds,  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Marne  and  not  far  from  Lagny;  from  this  point  he 
overlooked  the  positions  of  the  two  investing  armies. 

The  machinery  of  government,  organized  and  central- 
ized in  Paris  for  the  whole  of  France,  was  thus  thrown  out 
of  gear,  and  all  communication  between  the  army  in  Paris 
and  the  armies  in  the  field,  either  investing  or  in  process 
of  formation,  was  cut  off. 

The  leader  of  the  German  army  had,  with  unerring 
glance,  selected  the  south  as  generally  the  weakest  front 
for  the  principal  attack;  and  this  on  a  close  examination 
was  seen  to  have,  also  defensively,  a  special  cause  of  weak- 
ness which  we  will  mention  here. 

The  fortress  of  Mont  Valerien  protects  the  west  side 
of  Paris.  This  work  is  intended  not  only  to  prevent  any 
approach  on  the  peninsula  of  Nanterre  to  the  gorge  of  the 
works  of  St.  Denis,  but  also  to  defend  effectively  the  ground 
towards  St.  Cloud  and  Sevres.  The  guns  of  the  adjoining 
work.  Fort  Issy,  cover  the  bend  of  the  Seine  at  Billancourt. 
But  in  order  to  strengthen  the  position  protected  by  Mont 
Valerien  in  the  direction  of  St.  Cloud  and  Sevres,  where  the 
effective  action  of  the  fort  was  weakened,  not  only  by  the 
d'stance  of  4,000  to  4,500  metres,  but  also  by  the  formation 
of  the  ground,  the  work  already  mentioned  was  constructed 
at  Montretout,  as  soon  as  Paris  was  put  into  a  state  of 
defense.  The  work  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Prussians 
when  half-finished.  Under  these  circumstances  the  fort 
of  Mont  Valerien  had  to  protect  the  ground  as  far  as  St. 
Cloud,  where  the  duty  was  taken  up  by  Fort  Issy.  Reckon- 
ing the  effective  range  of  the  guns  of  the  two  works  at 
8,500  metres,  there  would  remain  at  Sevres,  and  Bsllevue  a 
dead  space,  which  was  of  great  advantage  to  us.     These 

—564— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

circumstances  were  favourable  for  an  approach,  as  secure 
as  possible,  to  Fort  Issy,  and  also  to  Point  du  Jour,  The 
exit  of  the  Seine,  moreover,  weakens  the  latter  point,  which 
we  should  probably  have  selected  in  case  of  need,  for  an 
advance  on  Paris. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  as  the  result  showed,  the  deter- 
mination to  take  up  a  position  and  on  the  south  of  the  for- 
tress and  direct  the  principal  attack  on  that  side  was  most 
fortunate,  and  the  immediate  capture  of  the  works,  which 
had  been  just  thrown  up  by  the  French  in  preparation  for 
the  siege  had  the  most  important  results  on  the  progress 
of  the  attack. 

The  next  step  was  for  the  investing  army  to  establish 
itself  firmly  in  the  positions  which  it  occupied,  that  not 
only  should  all  communications  be  cut  off  between  the  cap- 
ital and  the  people  of  the  country,  but  it  should  also  become 
impossible  for  the  garrison,  in  spite  of  its  superiority  of 
numbers,  to  break  through  and  establish  communication 
with  the  French  armies  of  the  north  and  south,  which  were 
in  process  of  formation  or  in  the  field ;  that  in  fact  the 
French,  at  every  point  of  the  girdle  around  them,  might  be 
so  long  held  at  bay  as  to  allow  the  German  troops  to  arrive 
in  sufficient  force  to  drive  them  back  into  the  fortress.  Each 
army  corps  had  its  own  well-defined  position  of  the  circle  of 
investment  which  it  had  to  occupy  and  strengthen  by  suit- 
able works,  of  fortification.  The  redoubts  captured  at  the 
first  onset  of  the  German  army  afforded  a  strong  point 
of  support,  for  which  purpose  they  were  turned  about 
towards  the  enemy,  the  original  gorge  being  converted  into 
the  front  of  the  work,  and  entrance  made  upon  our  side. 
At  a  greater  distance  points  of  support  were  also  found  in 
the  numerous  villages,  which  from  their  very  massive  con- 
struction were  well  adapted  for  the  purposes  of  defence. 
The  approaches  to  the  villages  were,  therefore,  barricaded, 
the  communications  of  every  kind  repaired,  walls  favourably 
situated  were  provided  with  loopholes  and  banquettes,  alarm 
posts  were  established,  and  huts  built  to  shelter  those  troops 
who  were  held  in  constant  readiness. 

—565— 


Siege  Operations 

The  principal  objects  during  the  whole  of  the  operations 
of  the  investment  were  the  construction  of  works  for  the 
security  of  the  troops  at  a  greater  or  less  distance  from  the 
forts,  and  the  establishment  of  a  line  of  obstacles  to  be 
defended  by  musketry.  This  was  intended  to  compel  the 
enemy  to  deploy  his  forces  as  slowly  as  possible,  and  to 
give  our  troops  time  to  occupy  the  line  of  work  in  rear. 
In  the  line  of  obstacles  openings  were  left  in  case  of  our 
being  able  to  take  the  offensive.  The  obstacles  consisted 
of  abattis,  and  the  existing  walls  and  buildings,  which 
were  made  capable  of  defence.  The  line  of  defences  behind 
these  obstacles,  and  prepared  in  a  similar  manner,  was  prin- 
cipally occupied  by  infantry,  owing  to  the  ground  in  front 
not  being  generally  exposed  to  view.  According  to  the 
nature  of  the  ground,  greater  or  smaller  entrenchments 
were  formed  in  this  line  of  defences,  and  partly  in  front, 
partly  in  flank  or  rear,  artillery  emplacements  were  made 
and  strongly  secured  by  works  to  resist  the  sorties  in  force, 
which  were  to  be  expected  subsequently. 

It  would  take  too  long  to  enumerate  the  several  works 
of  this  kind  in  the  circle  of  investment ;  we  will  take,  there- 
fore, only  one  section  of  the  ground,  and  select  that  which 
the  Vth  and  Vlth  corps  had  to  occupy  and  arrange  for 
defence. 

The  Vth  corps  had  the  ground  between  Meudon  and 
Bougival  to  defend.  The  line  of  obstacles  in  that  quarter 
comprised  the  northern  boundary  fence  of  Meudon,  was 
continued  by  rifle-pits,  etc.,  round  Bellevue  to  the  Crown 
Prince  battery,  and  followed  thence  the  steep  slope  to  St. 
Cloud,  as  far  as  the  Montretout  redoubt,  where  a  gap 
occurred  for  the  attack  of  the  ground  in  front  of  Mont 
Valerien.  Abattis  and  rifle-pits  crowned  the  heights  of 
Garches,  and  led  on  to  the  eastern  boundary  of  Bougival, 
ending  here  on  the  Seine.  The  line  of  obstacles  was  flanked 
along  its  length  by  being  broken  back  in  some  places,  by 
blockhouses  on  it  and  annexed  to  it,  and  by  the  Crown  Prince 
and  Montretout  redoubts.  The  line  of  works  in  rear  began 
in  the  east  with  the  parks  of  Chalais,   Meudon,   and  St. 

—566— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

Cloud,  which  were  arranged  for  defence;  a  series  of  en- 
trenchments led  over  the  plateau  of  Garches  to  the  stud 
enclosure,  which,  as  the  centre  of  the  position,  was  secured 
by  abattis,  a  number  of  batteries  and  self-defensible  earth- 
works, and  so  on  in  the  same  manner  to  Bougival.  In  rear 
of  this  line,  on  the  edge  of  the  plateau  towards  the  villages 
Ville  d'Avray,  Marnes,  and  Vaucresson,  emplacements  were 
arranged  for  batteries  and  strongly  defended  with  works. 

The  Vlth  corps  had  to  cover  the  ground  between  the 
Seine  and  Bievre,  beginning  at  Villeneuve-St,  George,  the 
same  place  where  subsequently  were  the  two  bridges  allotted 
for  the  use  of  the  siege-train.  Next  was  the  northern 
boundary  of  Choisy,  particularly  the  churchyard,  which  was 
fortified  in  the  most  formidable  manner,  barricaded,  and 
rendered  completely  secure  against  the  assault  of  infantry. 
Opposite,  lay  the  village  of  Vitry,  also  fortified  by  the 
French,  and  close  at  hand  were  some  gunboats  on  the  Seine. 
Further  to  the  westward,  and  within  our  position  came  the 
villages  of  Thiais  and  Choisy,  both  fortified ;  opposite,  but 
in  the  possession  of  the  French,  were  Ville juif,  which  was 
also  fortified,  and  a  redoubt  at  the  same  place,  both  covered 
by  Fort  Bicetre.  At  the  junction  of  the  high  roads  to 
Versailles  and  Fontainebleau  and  inside  the  German  posi- 
tion lay  the  strongly  entrenched  farm  of  La  Belle  Epine,  the 
central  point  of  an  artillery  position  containing  84  field 
guns,  strengthened  and  covered  by  shelter  trenches  for  six 
battalions;  and  next  to  it,  pushed  forward  on  the  slope  of 
the  right  bank  of  the  Bievre,  was  the  village  of  L'Hay  with 
the  wall  skirting  its  edge  arranged  for  a  determined  resist- 
ance, being  the  point  of  support  for  a  brigade. 

Opposite  lay  the  enemy's  redoubt  of  Haute  Bruyeres 
(Cachan)  covered  by  Fort  Bicetre.  The  outposts  of  the 
Prussian  position  at  this  point  were  also  protected  by  a  line 
of  obstacles  with  shelter  trenches  and  other  arrangements 
for  defence,  whilst  the  section  of  ground  to  be  held  was 
rendered  secure  by  formidable  fortified  posts  and  entrenched 
emplacements  for  the  employment  of  masses  of  artillery. 

—567— 


Siege  Operations 

In  the  low  country  eastward  of  St,  Denis,  where  the 
French  positions  were  protected  by  inundations,  the  Guard 
Corps  had  in  a  similar  manner  rendered  the  section  from 
Seoran  to  Dugny  impassable  by  damming  up  the  Moree 
stream,  so  that  only  two  narrow  defiles  were  available, 
namely,  at  Port  Iblon  on  the  embanked  high  road  of  Lille, 
and  at  Aulnay.  This  inundation  was  defended  by  the 
strongly  fortified  villages  of  Dugny,  Le  Blanc-Mesnil,  and 
Aulnay,  which  were  somewhat  retired,  Le  Blanc-Mesnil, 
being  the  centre  of  the  defense.  Shelter  trenches  and  posi- 
tions for  artillery  were  formed  on  the  undulating  ground 
in  rear  of  the  inundation,  and  gave  a  great  power  of  resist- 
ance to  the  section  of  the  ground.  Opposed  was  the  French 
position  as  described,  and,  from  a  consideration  of  their 
mutual  position,  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  the  village 
of  Le  Bourget  became  the  object  of  constant  attacks  from 
both  sides.  The  intended  inundation  of  the  Moree  by  the  Ger- 
mans would  hardly  have  succeeded  on  account  of  the  small 
supply  of  water,  had  it  not  received  a  considerable  contribu- 
tion by  damming  up  the  Ourq  canal  at  Sevran.  This  arrange- 
ment proved  further  disadvantageous  to  the  enemy  by 
reducing  the  supply  to  the  St.  Denis  inundation  and  with- 
drawing a  certain  quantity  of  drinking  water  from  the 
inhabitants  of  Paris.  The  execution  of  this  interesting 
work  was  entrusted  to  Captain  von  Krause  of  the  Engineers. 
When  the  inundation  froze  during  the  winter  it  had  to 
be  taken  up  in  a  number  of  places. 

The  establishment  of  communications  by  constructing 
roads  for  the  supply  and  transport  columns,  and  providing 
them  all  with  guide  posts  for  the  information  of  troop*, 
caused  considerable  labor,  as  did  also  the  erection  of  bar- 
ricades of  all  sorts  and  the  buildings  of  bridges  and  roads 
for  the  communications  between  the  corps;  of  this  kind 
were  the  bridges  built  at  Le  Pecq,  Bougival,  Les  Tanneries, 
Triel,  Villeneuve,  St.  Georges,  at  Gournaz  over  the  Marne, 
at  Chatout,  two  at  Corbeille,  without  counting  many  other 
foot-bridges  over  brooks  and  hollow  roads.    In  places  where 


—568— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

it  was  necessarj%  these  structures  were  secured  against  a 
coup-de-main  by  an  entrenchment. 

Later,  when  the  winter  set  in,  it  required  great  care 
to  preserve  them,  or  some  at  least,  from  the  floating  masses 
of  ice  on  the  Seine;  a  few  had  to  be  removed  and  the  per- 
manent bridges  lying  far  in  rear  of  the  investing  army  to 
be  utilized. 

With  regard  to  the  tactical  considerations  of  the  besieg- 
ing army,  it  was  above  all  things  necessary  to  adapt  the 
defence  in  the  best  manner  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  ground. 
Each  division  had  above  one-fifth  to  one-sixth  of  its  strength 
on  outpost  duty.  These,  together  with  the  picquets  (some- 
times with  guns  attached)  and  the  supports,  had  fortified 
the  particular  point  indicated  to  them  where  a  stand  was  to 
be  made,  and  had  instructions  to  receive  the  enemy  in  that 
position.  The  woods  and  undulations  of  the  ground,  which 
limited  the  field  of  view  towards  the  enemy,  made  the  erec- 
tion of  observations  a  necessity  for  the  investing  army ;  one 
was  on  the  Marly  aqueduct  which  carries  water  for  the 
fountains  at  Versailles  over  the  Seine  on  36  arches  at  a 
height  of  643  metres  above  the  Seine;  this  was  often  used 
by  the  Emperor-King  on  account  of  the  distant  view  it 
commanded ;  besides  this  there  were  others,  viz.,  in  the 
redoubt  of  Moulin  de  la  Tour  at  Malmaison,  at  Bougival, 
at  the  Lantern  of  Diogenes,  in  the  Villa  du  Barry,  at  Sevres, 
at  Le  Blanc-Mesnil  and  other  places.  Semaphores  also  were 
erected  for  signalling  by  day  and  night. 

At  the  principal  commands  intelligence-bureaux  were 
established  and  a  service  for  the  transmission  of  important 
orders  by  mounted  orderlies,  organized  in  relays,  posted 
partly  at  the  picquets,  and  partly  at  cross  roads.  Independ- 
ently of  this,  all  divisional  staffs  were  connected  with  the 
corps  and  headquarter  staff,  by  means  of  the  field  telegraph. 

As  occurred  before  many  other  French  fortresses,  so 
at  Paris  the  bearers  of  flags  of  truce  were  fired  upon,  con- 
trary to  all  the  customs  of  war ;  this  happened,  for  example, 
on  the  1st  of  October  to  Lieutenant  v.  Rissing,  and  on  the 
23d  December  to  1st  Lieutenant  v.  Uslar. 


-569- 


Siege  Operations 

The  destruction  of  the  tunnel  at  Nanteuil  to  which 
allusion  has  already  been  made,  did  not  particularly  increase 
the  difficulties  of  the  advance  of  the  Illd  Army,  but  it  was 
a  serious  obstacle  in  the  formation  of  the  siege  parks. 
During  its  restoration,  when  the  temporary  wooden  sup- 
ports were  nearly  completed,  the  whole  gave-way  in  con- 
sequence of  the  pressure  of  the  superincumbent  chalk,  so 
that  recourse  had  to  be  made  to  a  branch  line  to  turn  the 
obstacle,  which  was  finished  in  the  latter  part  of  November. 
With  the  fall  of  Soissons,  a  second  line  of  rail  became  avail- 
able for  the  besiegers  on  the  east  side,  but  on  the  west  and 
north-west  front  the  line  of  communication  to  the  rear  by 
Laon  and  Compiegne  was  only  opened  after  the  fall  of  La 
Fere. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  siege,  in  consequence  of  the 
want  of  railway  communication  with  the  provision  maga- 
zines in  rear,  the  supply  of  the  armies  was  a  very  difficult 
task;  it  required  the  greatest  activity  and  foresight  on  the 
part  of  the  commissariat  officials  to  carry  on  the  duty  in 
a  satisfactory  manner.  In  addition,  to  the  regular  service 
of  supplies  of  all  kinds  from  Germany,  which  were  accum- 
ulated in  the  magazines  in  rear  of  the  investing  army,  neces- 
sity soon  required  the  levy  of  requisitions  in  the  districts 
beyond  the  immediate  neighbourhood,  which  had  been  al- 
ready exhausted  by  the  French.  Opinions  have  been  expressed 
very  strongly  against  this  mode  of  requisitioning,  without 
recognizing  the  laws  of  war  by  which  an  army  has  to  sup- 
port itself  in  an  enemy's  country.  Requisitions  of  this 
sort  required  convoys,  as  not  only  was  the  populace  hostile, 
but  collisions  with  the  f  rancs-tireurs  were  of  constant  occur- 
rence. The  escorts  for  them  were  provided  by  detachments 
of  cavalry  accompanied  by  infantry  on  wagons.  When, 
during  December  and  January,  the  railway  by  Amiens  and 
Laon,  and  the  lines  to  Rouen  and  Orleans  became  available, 
the  supply  of  provisions  was  an  easier  task ;  as  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  requirements,  we  may  add,  that  the  daily  provi- 
sion and  forage  transport  for  a  single  army  corps  was  about 
5  trains  of  32  wagons  each.    The  daily  provision  and  forage 

—570— 


Campaign  Against  Fiance  1870-71 

supply  for  the  armies  before  Paris  was  about  the  following : 
148,000  three-pound  loaves,  1,020  cwt.  of  rice  or  grain,  595 
bullocks  or  1,020  cwt.  of  bacon,  144  cwt.  of  salt,  9,600  cwt. 
of  oats,  2,400  cwt.  of  hay,  28,000  quarts  of  brandy. 

After  this  description  of  the  circumstances  of  the  in- 
vestment we  shall  notice  next  the  principal  sorties,  and 
after  them,  the  artillery  attacks  which  led  to  the  fall  of 

the  capital. 

The  object  of  the  smaller  sorties  was  to  molest  and 
alarm  our  outposts,  as  well  as  to  make  demonstrations  for 
special  purposes ;  they  never  caused  any  important  inter- 
ruption in  the  works  of  the  investment  or  siege,  and  did 
not  appear  to  have  that  purpose  in  view ;  it  was  only  in 
the  last  days  of  the  siege,  about  the  middle  of  January,  that 
small  sorties  were  made  against  the  batteries  of  the  attack 
on  the  south  front.  The  sorties  en  masse,  however,  played, 
an  important  part,  having  no  less  an  object  than  to  pierce 
the  investing  line,  and  form  a  junction  with  the  French 
armies  operating  in  the  north,  south  and  west. 

Such  sorties  were  preconcerted  with  the  commanders  of 
the  armies  in  the  field,  who  were  probably  informed  of  the 
intended  operations  by  means  of  the  balloon  post.  We  re- 
ceived information  of  these  undertakings,  days  and  weeks 
beforehand,  partly  by  means  of  prisoners  or  deserters,  partly 
also  by  the  visible  stir  on  the  other  side,  so  that  we  were 
always  found  prepared.  These  lengthened  preparations 
were  probably  necessitated  by  political  reasons,  such  as  to 
tranquilize  the  Parisian  populace,  who,  in  ignorance  of  the 
true  state  of  things  were  pressing  for  sorties  which  could 
have  no  good  result.  The  march  of  large  bodies  of  troops 
towards  the  locality  of  the  intended  sortie,  which  took  place 
generally  by  means  of  the  circular  railway,  conspicuous  on 
its  embankment,  as  well  as  on  those  sections  of  rail  leading 
beyond  the  works  and  the  movement  of  the  troops  between 
the  enceinte  and  the  outer  forts,  could  not  escape  the  notice 
of  those  in  the  observatories,  or  in  the  German  outposts. 


—571— 


Siege  Operations 

It  was  in  consequence  of  the  movement  of  troops  out  of 
Paris  on  the  19th  of  September,  that  St.  Cloud  was  occu- 
pied on  the  21st  of  that  month. 

September  23.  The  French  undertook  small  recon- 
naissances directed  from  St.  Denis  against  Pierrefitte  from 
Aubervilliers  towards  Le  Bourget,  and  from  Fort  Bicetre 
against  Villejuif. 

September  24.  The  outposts  at  Sevres  and  St.  Cloud 
were  engaged  with  some  gunboats  stationed  at  Suresnes. 

On  September  30  there  was  a  more  considerable  sortie, 
which  the  enemy  had  announced  the  27th  and  28th  by 
changes  in  the  positions  of  the  troops  outside  the  fortress. 
General  Vinoy  attacked  the  12th  Division  with  six  battal- 
ions between  Choisy  le  Roi  and  La  Bel  Epine,  supported  by 
Forts  Montrouge  and  Bicetre,  whilst  he  made  demonstra- 
tions on  his  left  wing  with  a  brigade  against  the  Xlth  corps, 
and  on  his  right  wing  with  three  battalions  against  the  Vth 
corps  at  Sevres,  and  Meudon.  At  Bas  Meudon  he  threw  a 
bridge  over  the  Seine.  The  fighting  began  at  6  o'clock  in 
the  morning  and  turned  on  the  possession  of  L'Hay  which 
was  bravely  defended  by  the  23d  regiment  but  had  eventu- 
ally to  be  evacuated.  It  was  soon  perceived  tbat  the  attacks 
on  the  wings  were  only  demonstrations ;  the  Vlth  corps 
therefore  concentrated  its  reserves  and  supported  by  some 
Bavarian  detachments,  drove  the  enemy  again  out  of  L'Hay 
behind  his  intrenchments.  General  Guilhelm  fell  here  and 
his  body  was  handed  over  to  the  French  next  day.  These  es- 
timated their  loss  at  1,200  men;  on  the  German  side  there 
were  80  killed  and  300  wounded — but  300  unwounded 
French  prisoners  were  taken. 

It  was  not  known  whether  the  French  intended  to  pierce 
our  lines  on  this  occasion,  or  only  to  destroy  the  passages  of 
the  Seine;  or  perhaps  to  retaliate  for  the  check  they  had 
received  on  the  19th  September. 

On  the  3d  of  October  the  headquarters  of  the  King  were 
removed  from  the  Chateau  of  Ferrieres  to  Versailles. 

After  frequent  alarms  on  both  sides,  and  much  useless 
cannonading  from  the  forts,  the  next  sortie  took  place  on 

—572— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

the  7th  of  October;  on  this  occasion  also  there  were  great 
movements  of  troops  on  the  preceding  day  to  the  entrench- 
ments in  rear  of  d'  Ivry  and  Bicetre.  Probably  this  was 
only  a  demonstration.  But,  in  the  afternoon,  a  French  force 
of  all  arms  marched  out  of  Fort  Mont  Valerien  towards 
Rueil,  returning  towards  the  evening,  having  covered  the 
destruction  of  part  of  our  line  of  defence  at  Malmaison. 

On  the  13th  October  the  palace  of  St.  Cloud  was  set  on 
fire  by  the  guns  of  Mont  Valerien,  without  any  apparent 
reason;  the  5th  jager  battalion,  and  the  58th  Regiment  at- 
tempted to  save  as  much  as  possible  from  the  flames.  The 
same  day  10  French  battalions  of  Blanchards  division,  with 
cavalry  and  field  guns,  advanced  in  three  columns  against 
the  position  of  the  Ilnd  Bavarian  corps,  and  drove  their 
outposts  out  of  Chatillon  and  Bagneux;  the  enemy  had  his 
reserves  in  readiness  behind  Fort  Montrouge,  in  case  the 
capture  of  the  heights  of  Chatillon  and  the  Bavarian  re- 
doubt should  succeed.  After  a  combat  of  six  hours  duration, 
in  which  first  the  8th,  then  the  7th  Bavarian  brigade  took 
part,  the  enemy  was  driven  back  with  considerable  loss. 
In  this  sortie,  which  in  the  French  reports  is  described  as 
an  "offensive  reconnaissance,"  the  guns  from  the  French  re- 
doubt, constructed  on  the  height  between  L'Hay  and  Ville- 
juif,  gave  a  good  support,  and  annoyed  the  Bavarian  right 
flank  considerably;  their  loss  was  10  officers  and  360  men. 

October  14th.  A  sortie  of  several  French  battalions  was 
repulsed  by  the  piquets  and  some  guns  of  the  Xllth  corps. 

At  this  period  the  22nd  Division  under  General  von 
Wittich,  and  the  1st  Bavarian  corps  under  General  von 
Tann  were  withdrawn  from  the  investing  force,  in  order  to 
operate  against  the  French  army  which  had  been  formed  in 
the  south.  On  the  other  hand  the  guard  landwehr  divisions 
had  arrived  before  Paris,  and  numerous  changes  were  made 
in  the  positions  of  the  troops. 

In  the  night  of  the  19th-20th,  of  October,  a  lively  fire 
was  kept  up  by  the  forts  and  repeated  night  attacks  by 
strong  infantry  detachments  were  made  against  our  outposts 
at  Chevilly,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  direction  of  Orleans,  but 
without  any  result  whatever. 

—573— 


Siege  Operations 

October  21st.  The  sortie  made  on  this  day  against  the 
Vth  corps  was  preceded  by  a  heavy  fire  from  Fort  Mont 
Valerien,  which  was  continued  later  from  the  gunboats  sta- 
tioned on  the  Seine;  the  latter  fired  principally  against  St. 
Cloud  and  Sevres.  The  following  troops  were  drawn  up 
under  the  command  of  General  Ducrot :  General  Berthaut, 
with  3,400  men,  20  guns,  and  one  squadron  between  the 
railroad  to  St.  Germain  and  Rueil ;  General  Noel  with  1,350 
men  and  10  guns  to  operate  against  Bougival  and  the  park 
of  Malmaison ;  Colonel  Colleton  with  1,000  men  and  28  guns 
to  keep  up  the  communication  between  the  two  first-men- 
tioned columns,  and  also  to  join  in  the  attack  on  Bougival. 
Besides  there  were  two  main  columns  of  reserve,  one  under 
General  Martenot  with  2,000  men  and  18  guns  the  other 
under  General  Paturel,  consisting  of  2,000  men,  28  guns  and 
two  squadrons.  The  whole,  roundly  speaking,  10,000  men, 
94  guns,  and  three  squadrons,  under  the  supreme  command 
of  General  Ducrot,  were  in  position  an  hour  after  mid-day, 
supported  by  the  fortress  of  Mont  Valerien.  The  attack  was 
directed  against  the  10th  Division  on  the  line  Bougival,  Mal- 
maison, Garches.  The  19th  brigade  formed  the  outposts, 
with  the  46th  regiment  as  the  left  wing  and  the  6th  regiment 
as  the  right ;  the  20th  brigade  in  reserve.  Towards  3  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  four  of  the  enemy's  battalions  attacked  the 
park  of  Malmaison ;  after  an  obstinate  fight  they  were  re- 
pulsed by  the  46th  Regiment,  two  battalions  of  the  6th  Regi- 
ment, and  detachments  of  the  1st  guard  landwehr  regiment ; 
whilst  this  attack  was  in  progress,  the  enemy  directed  an- 
other against  La  Celle,  which  was  beaten  back  by  portions 
of  the  50th  Regiment ;  the  5th  and  6th  companies  of  which 
assisted  by  some  men  of  the  6th  regiment,  captured  two  guns 
and  brought  them  safely  away,  notwithstanding  the  heavy 
firing  of  the  enemy.  On  the  right  wing  the  advanced  troops 
of  the  9th  division  were  engaged.  The  batteries  of  the  IVth 
corps  at  Chatou  and  Besons,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Seine, 
cooperated  with  good  effect  towards  the  end  of  the  fight, 
which  terminated  at  5  o'clock  in  a  general  retreat  of  the 
enemy  towards  Neuilly  and  to  Fort  Mont  Valerien,  under 
cover  of  the  guns  of  the  latter  place.    The  troops  which  had 

—574— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

taken  part  in  the  sortie  retreated  very  slowly  to  the 
fortress,  so  that  the  Prussian  detachments  had  to  remain 
under  arms  until  late  in  the  evening.  In  Versailles  the 
troops  had  taken  up  their  defensive  positions.  Our  losses  in 
this  combat  are  given  as  15  officers  and  297  men  killed  and 
wounded,  whilst  those  of  the  enemy  were  28  officers  and 
232  men,  exclusive  of  300  prisoners. 

A  small  sortie  took  place  at  the  same  time  against  the 
Wurtemberg  division ;  three  battalions,  supported  by  the 
Faisandrie  redoubt,  crossed  the  Marne  at  Joinville  and  ad- 
vanced against  Champigny,  but  were  repulsed  by  the  2nd 
jager  battalion  and  part  of  the  7th  regiment  with  a  loss  of 
3  killed  and  30  wounded. 

The  fight  on  the  30th  October  at  La  Bouget,  which  was 
occupied  by  only  one  company  of  the  guard  was  of  more  im- 
portance; the  village  had  been  attacked  on  the  28th  by  su- 
perior French  forces  from  Fort  d'Aubervilliers,  and  the 
garrison  driven  out.  The  place  lay  under  a  cross-fire  from 
the  forts  at  St.  Denis,  d'Aubervilliers,  and  Romainville,  and 
the  French  made  every  effort  to  secure  this  advantageous 
position  and  fortify  it.  An  attempt  was  made  on  the  29th 
to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Le  Bourget  by  the  fire  from  the 
batteries  in  rear,  but  it  failed. 

The  re-capture  of  this  post  of  such  importance  to  the 
Prussians  was,  therefore,  ordered  for  the  30th  of  October; 
the  2d  division  of  foot  guards,  under  the  command  of  Lieut.- 
General  v.  Budritzky,  was  told  off  for  this  service.  It  was 
arranged  that  a  right  column  consisting  of  two  battalions  of 
the  Franz  regiment,  a  centre  column  composed  of  the  3d 
grenadiers  of  the  guard,  and  one  battalion  of  the  Queen's 
(Konigin)  regiment  and  a  left  column  of  two  battalions  of 
the  Alexander's  regiment,  with  three  companies  of  the  bat- 
talion of  sharpshooters  of  the  guard,  the  whole  supported 
by  artillery  and  engineers  as  well  as  the  necessary  reserves, 
should  attack  Le  Bourget  simultaneously,  and,  if  possible, 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  on  St.  Denis.  Preparations 
had  also  been  made  for  the  attack  to  be  supported  on  both 
flanks  by  other  troops  of  the  investing  force. 


—575- 


Siege  Operations 

Le  Bourget  was  occupied  by  6,000  men,  besides  a  re- 
serve of  several  battalions  on  the  Paris  road. 

The  combat  was  opened  at  8  o'clock  in  the  morning  by 
a  fire  from  retired  artillery  positions  in  the  lines  Garges- 
Aulnay;  the  left  column  was  immediately  set  in  motion, 
crossed  the  Moleret  stream  without  much  resistance,  and 
reached  the  road  south  of  Le  Bourget,  drove  the  enemy  out 
of  his  entrenched  position  and  forced  the  reserve  into  a 
hurried  retreat.  In  the  meantime  the  other  columns  had  ad- 
vanced to  storm  Le  Bourget,  where  a  most  obstinate  hand- 
to-hand  fight  took  place  in  the  streets  and  houses.  The  brave 
General  von  Budritzky  led  his  troops  in  person,  flag  in  hand, 
against  the  barricades  at  the  northern  entrance  to  Le  Bour- 
get, followed  by  Colonel  Count  Kanitz  and  Von  Zaluskowsky, 
the  latter  of  whom  was  killed  in  the  street  of  the  village. 

On  the  other  side  the  Augusta  regiment  had  pushed 
into  the  village ;  its  colonel,  Count  Waldersee,  who  had  only 
just  rejoined  after  recovery  from  a  severe  wound  at  Grave- 
lotte,  fell  here,  with  another  oflicer,  by  French  treachery, 
having  been  shot  from  a  house,  the  defenders  of  which  had 
lured  him  on  by  the  waving  of  handkerchiefs. 

In  consequence  of  this  the  fight  was  continued  with  the 
greatest  bitterness  by  the  Prussians ;  Le  Bourget  was  in  their 
possession  by  halfpast  12  o'clock.  The  Prussians  lost  35  of- 
ficers and  449  men  killed  and  wounded.  The  French  30  offi- 
cers, 1,250  unwounded  prisoners. 

According  to  the  statements  of  the  prisoners  and  judg- 
ing by  the  large  supply  of  provisions  captured  at  Le  Bourget, 
the  enemy  seem  to  have  intended  to  include  this  place  in  the 
line  of  their  fortified  outposts  and  to  construct  large  works 
round  it.  However,  the  result  was  different  from  what  they 
had  proposed,  for  the  2d  pioneer  company  of  the  guard, 
under  command  of  Captain  v.  Spanckeren  of  the  engineers, 
which  had  particularly  distinguished  itself  in  the  battle- 
field, immediately  prepared  to  construct  the  defenses  of  the 
place. 

The  failure  of  the  French  sorties  caused  great  dissatis- 
faction in  Paris,  and  led  to  a  rising  in  the  night  of  the  30th- 

—576— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

31st  of  October,  in  which,  however,  the  mob  was  crushed  by 
the  troops  at  the  disposal  of  Government.  In  the  first  days 
of  November,  there  were  negotiations  which  extended  over 
a  period  of  five  days  for  the  conclusion  of  an  armistive,  but 
without  result.  The  Ilnd  Prussian  corps,  which  arrived 
before  Paris  in  the  latter  half  of  November,  was  attached  to 
the  Ilird  Army,  and  went  into  cantonments,  in  rear  of  the 
Vlth  Prussian  and  Ilnd  Bavarian  corps,  from  Longjumeau 
to  the  Seine.  At  the  same  time  the  Xllth  (Saxon)  corps 
moved  its  left  wing  across  the  Marne,  and  the  Wurtemberg 
Division  closed  towards  the  Vlth  corps.  The  latter  was 
transferred  to  the  IVth  army  after  the  sortie  of  Le  Bourget, 
with  instructions  to  operate  against  the  bands  of  f  ranc-tireurs 
that  were  making  their  appearance  in  rear  of  the  position, 
and  especially  at  Meaux  and  Lagny  on  the  line  of  communi- 
cation. For  this  purpose  a  battalion,  accompanied  by  one 
squadron  and  two  guns,  was  despatched  as  a  flying  column 
to  Nangis,  and  succeeded  in  capturing  with  small  loss,  5 
officers,  597  men,  and  two  guns. 

Although  after  the  fight  at  Le  Bourget  the  conflicts  be- 
tween the  outposts  were  of  less  importance,  and  the  extrava- 
gant waste  of  ammunition  from  the  forts  was  diminished  on 
the  whole,  yet,  towards  November,  there  were  indications 
of  an  imporant  sortie,  probablj^  in  the  south  or  south-east; 
in  which  direction  General  Trochu  hoped  to  effect  a  junc- 
tion with  the  army  which  had  been  organized  in  feverish 
haste  by  Gambettta,  and  was  pushing  forward  to  the  relief 
by  way  of  Beaune  under  the  command  of  General  de  Pala- 
dines. 

On  the  29th  of  November,  a  sortie  was  made  against 
the  position  of  the  Vlth  Corps  at  L'Hay,  Chevilly,  Thiais, 
and  Choisy  le  Roi.  It  began  with  heavy  cannonade  during 
the  night  of  the  28th-29th  November  from  some  of  the 
southern  forts  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  fatiguing  our 
troops,  who  had,  in  consequence,  to  be  under  arms  during 
half  of  the  night.  Some  works  of  fortification,  which  were 
in  progress  at  the  time,  had,  therefore,  to  be  given  up  for 
the  moment;  among  them  the  construction  of  a  redoubt,  at 
Villa  Conblay,  for  the  defense  of  the  siege  parks.     The  at- 

—577— 


Siege  Operations 

tacking  columns  of  the  enemy  were  launched  from  Arcueil 
and  Vitry  against  L'Hay,  whilst  the  two  wings  were  di- 
rected on  the  villages  of  Thiais  and  Chevilly,  lying  on  either 
side  of  the  Fontaineblau  road.  The  enemy's  strength  was 
about  3,000  men,  but  he  found  the  Vlth  corps  in  a  strong 
position  to  receive  him. 

After  a  hard  fight  of  three  hours,  without  any  result, 
the  French  were  thrown  back,  leaving  2  officers  and  200 
men  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans ;  the  latter,  sheltered  be- 
hind their  strongly  entrenched  position,  never  permitted  the 
French  to  develop  their  forces,  and  caused  them  great  losses 
both  in  killed  and  wounded ;  on  our  side  the  loss  was  200,  of 
whom  3  officers  and  32  men  were  killed. 

On  the  30th  of  November,  the  battle  was  renewed  with, 
increased  forces,  under  the  personal  command  of  General 
Trochu;  an  attempt  was  made  to  penetrate  the  lines  of  the 
Wurtemberg  division,  on  the  ground  in  front  of  the  penin- 
sula of  St.  Maur.  The  enemy  commanded  the  ground  where 
the  Marne  bends  to  the  south,  the  villages  of  La  Varenne, 
Pont  Mesnil,  and  the  district  behind  St.  Maur,  including  the 
wood  of  les  Fosses,  by  means  of  Forts  Charenton,  and 
Nogent,  and  the  works  thrown  up  in  advance.  Near  Creteil 
is  Mont  Mesly,  which  is  high  enough  to  be  regarded  as  the 
commanding  point  of  the  surrounding  country. 

The  concentration  of  the  enemy's  forces  took  place  near 
Fort  Charenton,  in  the  camp  of  St.  Maur  (Forest  of  Vin- 
cennes),  and  between  Forts  Rosny  and  Nogent. 

The  first  offensive  movement  was  from  Fort  Charenton 
against  the  hill  of  Mesly ;  the  second  from  Joinville  towards 
Champigny;  and  the  third  from  Nogent,  directed  against 
Brie  and  Villiers.  The  three  companies  of  Wurtembergers, 
forming  the  garrison  of  Mesly,  were  unable  to  resist  the 
overwhelming  attack  made  against  their  position  at  day- 
break, and  fell  back  on  their  supports  whilst  the  enemy  took 
possession  of  the  Mesly  heights  and  brought  two  batteries  in 
action  on  them.  An  artillery  fight  now  developed  itself, 
whilst  the  division  of  Wurtembergers  formed  up  and  ad- 
vanced against  the  heights  with  the  2d  and  3rd  brigades, 
and  re-captured  them,  after  heavy  fighting,  about  mid-day. 

—578— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

They  were  supported  by  the  7th  brigade  of  the  Ilnd  corps, 
which  was  in  position  with  one  battery  at  Villeneuve  St. 
Georges,  and  joined  in  the  attack  from  the  side  of  Valenton, 
thus  taking  the  enemy  in  flank,  and  preventing  the  action 
of  reserves,  who  were  forced  in  consequence  to  retreat  from 
the  wood  of  Creteil,  to  the  village  of  that  name,  and  Fort 
Charenton. 

How  gallantly  the  Wurtembergers  fought  may  be  gath- 
ered from  the  fact  that  their  losses  were  40  officers  and  700 
men,  whilst  according  to  General  Trochu's  report  those  of 
the  French  amounted  to  nearly  2,000  killed  and  wounded. 

At  Champigny,  and  Brie,  the  Wurtembergers  had  been 
relieved  just  before  daybreak  by  the  Saxons ;  six  companies 
of  the  latter  occupied  these  places,  but  they  were  obliged  to 
give  way  before  the  advancing  French  columns,  who  im- 
mediately took  possession  of  the  village  of  Villiers,  lying 
more  to  the  north.  The  French  did  not  attempt  a  further 
advance  against  the  German  main  position.  In  the  mean- 
time, the  reserves  had  come  up.  The  Germans,  namely, 
the  48th  Infantry  brigade  (Saxons),  and  the  1st  Wurtem- 
berg  brigade,  drove  the  enemy  with  great  bravery  out  of 
Villiers,  though  Champigny  and  Brie  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  latter.  In  the  afternoon  the  fight  raged  with  the 
greatest  bitterness  between  Neuilly  and  Coeuilly;  the  in- 
fantry fighting  for  the  possession  of  the  villages,  whilst  the 
artillery  were  posted  in  the  intervals ;  between  Noisy  and 
Villiers  alone,  there  were  42  guns  of  the  Xllth  corps  in  ac- 
tion. The  fight  which  had  been  carried  on  with  the  greatest 
determination  on  both  sides,  was  only  brought  to  a  close  by 
the  approaching  darkness. 

This  sanguinary  day,  which  cost  the  Saxons  29  officers 
and  879  men,  and  the  Wurtembergers  1,500  whilst  they  cap- 
tured 940  prisoners,  gave  the  impression  that  the  French 
had  itiade  every  effort  to  break  through  the  German  lines; 
for  not  only  had  all  the  preparations  been  carefully  planned 
for  this  purpose,  five  bridges  constructed  over  the  Marne, 
and  a  supply  of  fresh  troops  always  at  hand,  but  offensive 
movements  had  been  directed  against  other  points  of  the 
investing  army.    A  continuous  cannonade  was  kept  up  from 

—579— 


Siege  Operations 

all  the  forts,  and  even  iron-plated  railway  wagons  and  gun 
boats,  the  latter  on  the  Seine  and  Marne,  had  been  set  in 
motion  to  flank  the  battlefield.  Sorties  were  made  on  both 
flanks  of  the  battlefield,  namely,  against  the  Xllth  corps  in 
the  direction  of  Chelles,  and  a  second  time  against  the  Vlth 
Corps  at  Chevilly.  At  the  latter  place  the  entrenchments 
were  held ;  and  the  enemy  advancing  from  his  fortified  po- 
sition, was  thrown  back  as  early  as  11  o'clock,  so  that  the 
Vlth  corps  was  able  to  detach  6  battalions,  2h  squadrons, 
and  2  batteries  of  horse  artillery  through  Villeneuve  St. 
Georges,  to  the  assistance  of  the  hard-pressed  Wurtemberg- 
ers.  At  3  o'clock  the  French  renewed  their  attack,  which 
was  repulsed  with  comparative  ease. 

Simultaneously,  with  these  sorties  to  the  south  and 
southeast  of  the  fortress,  others  were  undertaken  from  St. 
Denis  against  the  positions  of  the  IVth  and  guard  corps,  as 
well  as  from  St.  Cloud  against  the  Vth  corps,  but  without 
result;  the  enemy  brought  about  a  brigade  into  the  field 
at  these  points.  All  round  the  city  there  were  therefore  en- 
gagements with  the  enemy.  General  Trochu  had  made  a 
great  noise  in  Paris  about  his  victories  at  Champigny  and 
Brie,  nevertheless  he  found  it  necessary  to  maintain  himself 
quietly  next  day  in  the  positions  which  he  had  occupied. 

On  the  1st  of  December,  the  troops  did  not  come  into 
collision,  but  the  French  demanded  an  armistice  until  4 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  for  the  purpose  of  burying  their 
dead. 

In  consequence  of  an  order,  to  be  prepared  under  any 
circumstances  for  a  renewal  of  the  attack,  the  whole  Ilnd 
corps  was  brought  over  to  the  right  flank  of  the  Seine,  and 
on  the  night  of  the  lst-2nd  December  took  up  a  position  be- 
tween Coeuilly  and  Chennevieres  as  reserve  in  rear  of  the 
Wurtembergers ;  a  measure  which  proved  to  be  most  useful. 
The  portion  of  the  Xllth  corps  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Marne, 
the  Ilnd  corps,  a  brigade  of  the  Vlth  corps,  and  the  Wurtem- 
berg  division  were  placed  under  the  command  of  General 
von  Franseky,  commander  of  the  Ilnd  corps.  At  dawn  on 
the  2nd  of  December,  at  7  o'clock,  the  1st  Wurtemberg  bri- 
gade, in  company  with  the  Saxons,  renewed  the  attack  on 

—580— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

Champigny.  They  succeeded  after  a  short  time  in  taking 
the  village,  but  the  Germans  could  not  maintain  themselves 
there,  on  account  of  the  defences  in  the  place,  and  the  con- 
stant arrival  of  fresh  troops  on  the  field,  which  were  brought 
by  the  railroad  passing  close  to  Fort  Nogent.  The  7th 
Prussian  brigade,  under  the  command  of  General  du  Trossel, 
advanced  to  the  attack  from  Chennevieres  at  an  opportune 
moment,  but,  as  the  lower  part  of  the  village  of  Champigny 
was  under  effective  fire  of  the  heavy  guns,  the  Germans  were 
only  enaoled  to  keep  their  hold  in  the  upper  part  of  the  vil- 
lage. The  3rd  infantry  division,  and  the  whole  of  the  corps 
artillery  had  been  in  action  in  Champigny  and  on  the  line 
Champigny-Villiers  since  9  o'clock  in  the  morning;  whilst 
the  8th  brigade  and  a  brigade  of  the  Vlth  corps  remained 
in  reserve  at  Chennevieres. 

After  10  hours  hard  fighting,  the  firing  ceased  here 
about  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  24th  (Saxon)  di- 
vision had  been  ordered  to  re-capture  Brie;  about  8  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  the  place  was  attacked  and  the  enemy  driven 
into  the  lower  part  of  the  village,  where  he  made  a  stand 
covered  by  good  artillery  positions.  The  fight  in  and  round 
Brie  came  to  a  standstill.  As  the  enemy  in  his  well  en- 
trenched position,  was  constantly  receiving  reinforcements, 
it  was  impossible  to  get  possession  of  the  whole  of  the  vil- 
lage, notwithstanding  the  devoted  bravery  of  the  1st  and 
2nd  Battalions  of  the  sharpshooters,  of  the  107th  regiment, 
and  a  battalion  of  the  104th  regiment.  Although  the  Ger- 
mans had  a  numerous  artillery  at  their  disposal,  the  ground 
was  so  unfavourable  that  it  could  not  come  fully  into  action. 
Round  Villiers,  and  especially  in  the  park,  which  was 
bravely  defended,  first,  by  the  Wurtembergers,  and  after- 
wards by  the  Saxons,  the  fighting  continued  with  great  cour- 
age on  both  sides.  At  nightfall  the  enemy  retired.  The 
losses  of  the  Saxons  on  this  day  amounted  to  55  officers  and 
1,096  men,  those  of  the  Wurtembergers  were  48  officers 
and  700  men.  The  troops  went  into  cantonments  in  the 
villages  on  the  battlefield,  in  order  to  occupy  on  the  morning 
of  the  3rd  of  December  the  positions  previously  held  by  them. 
The  French  repeated  on  this  day  some  offensive  movements 

—581— 


Siege  Operations 

against  Champigny,  but  without  any  energy;  they  main- 
tained themselves  however  at  Brie.  The  Ilnd  Corps  lost, 
on  the  30th  November,  and  the  2d  and  3rd  December,  89 
officers  and  1,517  men. 

The  concentrated  position  taken  up  by  the  Germans  on 
this  day  behind  Champigny  and  Brie,  induced  the  French  to 
retire  from  the  places  remaining  in  their  possession ;  they 
retreated  from  all  points  across  the  Marne,  removing  the 
bridges  of  boats  after  crossing  the  river.  The  necessity  for 
strengthening  this  position  with  additional  fortifications 
was  now  recognized,  and  strong  detachments  of  pioneers 
were  ordered  to  the  spot  from  the  south  front. 

Thus  these  great  efforts  of  the  French  to  break  out, 
for  which  purpose  70,000  of  their  best  troops  had  been 
brought  into  action  on  the  30th  of  November,  and  the  2d 
of  December,  were  repulsed  without  their  having  been  of 
the  slightest  advantage  to  them;  they  failed  as  on  former 
occasions  from  not  following  up  with  resolution  the  ad- 
vantages which  had  been  gained  by  a  vigorous  attack.  Gen- 
eral Ducrot  who  commanded  on  the  2d  and  3d  December, 
and  had  five  horses  shot  under  him  on  the  first  day,  paid  a 
tribute  to  the  bravery  of  the  German  troops  in  his  general 
orders.  The  occupation  and  fortifying  of  Mont  Avron  by 
the  PYench,  on  the  28th  of  November,  was  highly  disadvan- 
tageous to  us. 

Nearly  three  weeks  passed  without  any  sorties  from 
Paris ;  in  the  meantime,  an  attempt  was  made  on  the  French 
side  to  form  a  junction  of  the  army  of  Paris  with  that  of 
General  Faidherbe,  commander  of  the  northern  army,  and 
at  the  same  time,  to  threaten  our  north-easterly  line  of 
communication.  The  enemy  had  also  in  view  the  molestation 
of  our  works  in  progress  for  the  bombardment  of  Mont 
Avron.  This  led  to  a  sortie  "en  masse"  on  the  21st  of  De- 
cember, of  three  divisions  under  the  command  of  General 
Ducrot,  directed  against  the  north-easterly  portion  of  the 
investing  line  in  two  simultaneous  attacks,  each  on  two 
roads.  One  attack  was  covered  by  Forts  St.  Denis  and 
d'Aubervilliers,  the  other  by  Forts  Romainville,  Rosny,  and 
Nogent.    The  advance  was  made  against  four  points :  Stains 

—582— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

and  Le  Bourget  defended  by  the  guards  corps,  and  Sevran 
and  Chelles  which  were  held  by  the  Xllth  Corps. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  of  December,  the  move- 
ment of  large  bodies  of  the  enemy's  troops  out  of  St.  Denis 
was  noticed ;  the  guard  corps  therefore  made  the  necessary 
dispositions.  It  was  not  possible  on  the  morning  of  the  21st 
December  to  make  out  at  what  point  the  enemy  intended  to 
attack.  Suddenly  Le  Bourget,  which  was  garrisoned  by  one 
battalion  of  the  3rd  regiment  of  guards,  and  one  company  of 
sharpshooters,  was  unexpectedly  assailed  from  the  northern 
edge,  the  churchyard  was  captured  and  125  men  taken,  but 
the  southern  edge  of  the  village  was  bravely  held.  With 
the  assistance  of  three  companies  of  the  3rd  grenadiers  of 
the  guard,  and  two  companies  of  the  sharpshooters  of  the 
guards,  who  were  sent  to  the  succor  of  the  hardly-pressed 
garrison,  they  succeeded  after  a  hard  fight  in  driving  the 
French  out  of  the  village  at  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Three 
officers  and  356  men  were  taken  prisoners. 

Almost  at  the  same  time  Stains,  which  was  garrisoned 
by  the  2nd  battalion  of  the  1st  regiment  of  guards,  one  com- 
pany of  the  3d  regiment  of  guards,  and  the  fusilier  bat- 
talion of  the  1st  regiment  of  guards,  the  latter  in  reserve, 
was  attacked,  under  support  from  the  guns  of  St.  Denis ; 
but  the  enemy  failed  to  penetrate  into  the  village  and  had 
to  retire.  The  forts  bearing  on  the  field  of  battle  kept  up  a 
heavy  fire  during  the  entire  day,  supported  by  a  numerous 
field  artillery,  against  which  only  six  batteries  of  the  guard 
corps  were  in  action ;  towards  evening  the  firing  ceased,  and 
the  Prussian  troops  were  enabled  to  take  up  their  old  posi- 
tions. Three  officers  and  356  unwounded  prisoners  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Prussians ;  our  loss  was  14  officers  and  400 
men,  that  of  the  French  considerable;  they  had  40,000  men 
under  fire. 

On  the  19th  and  20th  of  December,  demonstrations 
had  been  made  from  Mont  Avron  towards  the  Maison 
Blanche  and  Ville  Evrart,  against  the  Xllth  corps.  In  the 
afternoon  of  the  20th  December,  the  enemy,  concentrated 
about  two  divisions  and  11  batteries  at  Noisy-le-Sec,  under 
the  command  of  Generals  Malroi  and  Blaise;  this  force  was 

—583— 


Siege  Operations 

further  strengthened  during  the  night  by  mean  of  the  rail- 
road. Fresh  batteries  were  unmasked  on  Mont  Avron. 
About  mid-day  the  enemy  attacked  from  Neuilly;  Maison 
Blanche  and  Ville-Evrart,  which  were  only  held  by  our  out- 
posts were  lost.  A  further  advance  against  the  very  strong 
position  of  the  24th  division  at  Chelles  was  prevented  by 
the  flanking  fire  of  the  Wurtemberg  Batteries  Nos.  7,  8,  and 
9  at  Noisy-le-Grand,  and  by  the  overflowing  of  the  Marne. 
As  soon  as  the  24th  division  was  completed  by  the  arrival 
of  the  five  battalions  of  the  101st  and  107th  regiments,  the 
13th  jager  battalion,  all  of  which  had  been  detached  to  sup- 
port the  guard  corps,  and  also  nine  batteries  which  had 
taken  up  a  position  at  Livry,  it  advanced  against  Maison 
Blanche  and  Ville-Evrart.  The  former  was  immediately 
taken  by  storm,  but  the  fighting  round  Ville-Evrart  was  most 
obstinate  and  only  ceased  at  midnight,  when  500  French 
were  made  prisoners;  the  place  had  to  be  evacuated  on  ac- 
count of  the  rising  of  the  river.  The  Saxons  lost  on  this 
day  1  officer  and  40  men,  most  of  them  slightly  wounded. 

On  the  21st  December,  the  4th  infantry  division  was 
placed  in  reserve  behind  the  Xllth  corps,  and  the  8th  bri- 
gade, together  with  four  batteries,  was  advanced  as  far  as 
the  bridge  over  the  Marne  at  Voires,  but  there  was  no  colli- 
sion with  the  enemy. 

Whilst  these  sorties  were  in  progress,  the  French  made 
demonstrations  at  several  points,  for  instance,  from  Fort 
Mont  Valerien  towards  Montretout  and  Buzenval;  the  out- 
posts of  the  5th  Jager  battalion  sufficed  to  repel  them.  Be- 
sides this,  a  heavy  and  useless  shell  fire  was  kept  up  from 
the  forts  against  the  corps  not  attacked. 

On  the  22nd  of  December,  two  French  brigades  ad- 
vanced along  the  Marne  against  the  left  wing  of  the  Xllth 
corps,  but  two  Wurtemberg  batteries  placed  at  Noisy  soon 
compelled  them  to  retreat. 

On  the  15th  of  January,  there  were  more  sorties  of 
the  Paris  garrison  against  the  position  of  the  guard  and 
Xllth  Corps  in  the  direction  of  Le  Bourget,  Digny,  and  Mont 
Avron,  which  were  repulsed  by  the  German  troops.  It  is 
not  impossible  that  the  larger  sorties  on  this  front  were  in 

—584— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

connection  with  the  operations  of  General  Faidherbe  in  the 
north ;  though  they  may  only  have  been  intended  to  disturb 
our  preparations  for  the  attack  on  Mont  Avron. 

In  the  last  days  of  December  and  during  January, 
whilst  the  artillery  attack  was  being  developed,  the  political 
and  social  condition  of  the  beleagued  city  was  becoming 
more  serious.  All  hopes  were  based  on  the  success  of  a 
sortie  "en  masse".  General  Trochu  yielded  eventually  to 
pressure,  and  on  the  19th  of  January  an  attempt  was  made 
from  Mont  Valerien  with  100,000  men  to  pierce  the  posi- 
tion occupied  by  the  Vth  army  corps  and  the  guard  land- 
welir  division.  In  the  event  of  a  success,  a  further  advance 
was  to  be  made  on  Versailles,  the  seat  of  Royal  headquarters. 

At  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  three  columns  were  seen 
debouching  from  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  Mont  Val- 
erien ;  the  right  column,  under  command  of  General  Ducrot, 
was  to  operate  along  the  Seine  towards  Rueil ;  the  center 
column,  under  General  Bellemare,  was  to  reach  the  plateau 
of  La  Bergerie  (the  heights  of  Garches),  and  the  left  col- 
umn, commanded  by  General  Vinoy,  was  to  capture  the  re- 
doubt of  Montretout  in  order  to  support  the  attack  in  the 
centre. 

The  Prussians  had  occupied  the  heights  of  Garches  as 
well  as  the  chateau  and  park  of  La  Bergerie,  as  a  point  of 
support  to  the  position.  The  French  attack,  carried  out 
with  superior  forces  and  great  energy,  only  caused  the  Prus- 
sian outposts  to  retire  on  their  supports,  but  they  did  not 
succeed  in  taking  either  La  Bergerie,  which  was  bravely 
defended  by  one  battalion  of  the  39th  regiment  and  a  com- 
pany of  jagers,  or  the  village  of  Garches;  General  Ducrot 
arrived  on  the  battlefield  too  late  to  cooperate  with  good  ef- 
fect at  the  right  moment.  Meanwhile,  the  Prussian  re- 
serves had  come  up,  and  a  hard  fight  ensued  for  the  posses- 
sion of  the  heights  of  Garches.  They  were  stormed  about  2 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  by  two  battalions  of  the  King's 
grenadiers,  with  detachments  of  the  59th  reginlent  and  the 
5th  jager  battalion  supported  on  the  flank  by  a  battalion  of 
the  47th  regiment. 


Siege  Operations 

Although,  towards  the  end  of  the  battle,  the  head  of 
General  Ducrot's  column  was  able  to  join  in  the  fight,  still 
as  the  darkness  came  on,  the  French  were  repulsed  and  had 
to  retire  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  Fort  Mont  Valerien. 
These  had  been  engaged  with  the  Prussian  artillery  during 
the  day  in  order  to  draw  off  the  fire  from  the  infantry.  The 
5th  light  battery  of  the  Vth  corps  in  action  at  Brezin  suffered 
most;  it  was  at  this  spot  that  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia 
took  up  a  position  during  the  battle.  Towards  evening  our 
outposts  occupied  the  same  ground  as  in  the  morning. 

In  the  attack  on  Montretout  the  French  were  more 
fortunate  the  weak  garrison  of  60  men  had  to  evacuate  it 
and  fight  their  way  out.  The  enemy  soon  made  a  lodgment 
there,  and  brought  guns  into  action  on  the  right,  so  that  it 
was  not  retaken  till  after  dark.  This  was  effected  at  11 
o'clock  in  the  evening  by  detachments  of  the  47th,  58th  and 
82nd  regiments.  It  was  observed  in  the  afternoon  and  ev- 
ening, that  a  large  force  of  the  French  were  bivouacking 
outside  the  fortress,  and  it  was  necessary,  therefore,  for  the 
Prussians  to  make  preparations  to  meet  a  renewal  of  the  at- 
tack ;  consequently  a  Bavarian  brigade  of  the  I  Corps,  which 
had  arrived  before  Paris  a  few  days  previously  from  the 
southern  army,  and  some  guard  landwehr  were  moved  to 
Versailles. 

Our  loss  was  39  officers  and  616  men,  that  of  the  enemy 
was  very  considerable,  it  amounted  to  7,000  men,  of  whom 
1,000  were  left  dead  on  the  battlefield.  There  was  also  a 
small  fight  this  day  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  investing  line ; 
a  company  of  the  100th  regiment  together  with  one  of  the 
101st  surprised  the  enemy's  outposts  on  the  farm  of  Groslay 
and  took  5  officers  and  150  men  prisoners. 

On  the  20th  of  January  detachments  of  the  58th  regi- 
ment, and  the  5th  jager  battalion  surrounded  and  captured 
18  officers  and  322  men  in  St.  Cloud,  to  which  place  they  had 
retired  in  the  expectation  that  the  battle  would  be  renewed 
there. 

Although  the  investing  army  was  constantly  engaged 
in  its  front  by  these  repeated  sorties,  they  did  not  remain 
unmolested  in  their  rear,  where  franc-tireur  bands,  more 

—586— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

or  less  organized,  threatened  the  railways  and  telegraphs, 
and  carried  off  transport,  patrols  and  officials ;  it  became 
necessary  therefore  up  to  the  last  days  of  the  siege  to  des- 
patch large  columns  against  them  and  as  late  as  the  27th  of 
January  a  force  consisting  of  2  infantry  and  2  cavalry  regi- 
ments with  8  guns  marched  from  the  southern  post  of  the 
investing  circle  towards  Auxerre. 


From  the  beginning  of  the  investment  the  internal  con- 
dition of  Paris  had  been  anxiously  watched  at  headquarters, 
and  the  fall  of  the  capital  would  have  been  a  mere  matter  of 
time,  as  the  provisions  decreased  daily  whilst  the  political 
difficulties  increased. 

The  capitulation  of  Metz  and  the  destruction  of  the 
newly  formed  armies  in  the  south  and  north,  seemed  to  have 
no  effect  on  the  character  of  the  defense ;  the  negotiations 
for  an  armistice,  which  had  been  carried  on  in  the  first  days 
of  November  between  the  headquarters  at  Versailles  and 
the  French  Government,  had  been  broken  off  after  lasting 
for  five  days. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  necessity  of  a  regular 
siege  or  bombardment  of  the  capital  had  become  inevitable 
as  the  only  means  of  bringing  the  war  to  a  speedy  conclu- 
sion ;  but  the  preparations  were  on  such  a  large  scale,  that, 
as  regards  the  principal  attack  on  the  south  front,  we  shall 
have  to  treat  them  separately. 

A  large  siege  train  had  to  be  brought  up  for  the  attack, 
composed  partly  of  guns  from  the  home  fortresses  and 
partly  from  the  trains  which  had  been  already  employed 
against  other  French  fortresses,  but  at  the  same  time  the 
sieges  then  in  progress,  which  required  a  great  amount  of 
material,  could  not  be  interrupted.  It  was  not  surprising 
therefore,  that,  exactly  the  most  appropriate  guns  should 
not  have  been  used  in  the  artillery  attack  on  the  south  front, 
or  that  the  Germans  were  unprepared  for  the  extraordi- 
nary rapid  wear  of  the  guns,  which  influenced  the  progress 
of  the  siege. 

—587— 


Siege  Operations 

The  siege  train  contained  about  300  pieces  of  ordnance, 
namely,  70  long  24-pdrs.,  15  short  24-pdrs.,  100  12-pdrs.,  40 
6-pdrs.,  exclusive  of  rifled  breech-loaders  besides  20  25-pd. 
shell  guns,  20  50-pr.  mortars,  and  6  rifled  21-cwt.  mortars. 
Each  gun  was  provided  with  500  rounds  for  curved  fire  with 
the  necessary  side  arms  and  stores ;  the  carriages,  platform 
wagons,  gyns,  etc.,  with  all  their  gear  had  to  be  brought  up. 

The  Ballon  guns  of  which  there  were  twenty,  and  which 
were  much  spoken  of  at  the  time,  were  not  guns  but  wall 
pieces,  on  a  small  four-wheeled  wagon  with  a  platform  and 
spindle  moved  by  means  of  a  ball;  they  did  not,  however 
succeed. 

The  parking  of  the  siege  guns  for  the  south  front  oc- 
cupied much  time  as  only  one  line  of  rail,  that  through 
Nancy,  was  available  at  first,  and  this  could  not  ev6n  be 
used  in  its  entire  length  most  of  the  time,  as  several  tun- 
nels and  bridges  over  the  Marne,  between  La  Ferte  and 
Meaux,  had  been  destroyed  by  the  enemy  and  had  to  be  re- 
paired. All  the  other  bridges  on  the  line  had  to  be  carefully 
inspected  and  strengthened  so  that  they  should  not  break 
down  under  the  immense  loads;  more  than  100,000  cwt.  of 
stores  and  ammunition  alone  had  to  be  moved,  which  for  the 
reasons  given  above,  had  to  be  unloaded  by  road  from  Meaux 
and  Lagny  to  the  siege  train  park  at  Villa  Coubiay  before 
Paris,  a  distance  of  12  miles  (56  English  miles).  Special 
roads  had  to  be  made  for  the  transports  and  bridges  built 
over  the  Seine.  Several  thousand  draught  horses  were  re- 
quired as  the  requisitioned  teams  were  insufficient  and  the 
drivers  were  constantly  deserting,  sometimes  with  and  some- 
times without  their  wagons,  so  that  the  necessary  horses 
had  to  be  provided  from  the  troops;  but  the  arrangement 
was  not  found  convenient  as  a  permanency.  Twenty-four 
transport  columns,  each  of  40  wagons,  were  therefore 
brought  from  Germany  and  equipped  partly  with  the  French 
wagons  and  harness  taken  at  Metz.  The  transport  for  the 
first  establishment  of  the  siege  train  occupied  several  weeks, 
both  night  and  day,  and  had  even  to  be  continued  in  the 
same  manner  during  the  siege. 

—588— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

Two  of  the  Strousberg  traction  engines  were  brought 
into  use.  The  hilly  nature  of  the  country,  the  soft  roads, 
and  the  slipperiness  in  frosty  weather  and  snow  caused  the 
greatest  difficulties  to  the  numberless  wagons.  Although 
the  guns,  ammunition,  and  other  stores  were  all  safely  con- 
veyed to  the  artillery  park,  still  it  was  necessary  to  have 
special  escorts  to  protect  them  against  the  hostile  population. 
These  circumstances  increased  immensely  the  difficulties  of 
preparing  for  the  attack  on  the  south  front,  for  whilst  on  the 
east  and  north  fronts  everything  brought  from  Germany  was 
delivered  by  rail  close  up  to  the  parks,  in  the  other  case  all 
the  material  had  to  be  transferred  to  the  wagons  and  carried 
from  for  four  to  five  days  by  road  before  reaching  its  des- 
tination. No  person  without  a  knowledge  of  the  extensive 
organization  required  for  a  siege  park  can  form  any  idea 
of  the  vast  preparations,  or  the  energy  and  foresight  neces- 
sary to  carry  out  such  an  undertaking.  The  establishment 
of  the  engineer  park  and  depots  presented  similar  difficul- 
ties. 

To  the  right  rear  of  the  gun  park,  were  the  store  sheds, 
the  empty  shells  and  other  projectiles,  the  laboratories, 
a  fuze  magazine,  and  six  powder  magazines,  with  their 
proper  guardhouses,  all  screened  from  the  enemy's  view  by  a 
wood.  The  situation  of  Villa  Coublay  was  very  convenient 
for  the  purposes  of  the  siege,  but  it  required  some  addi- 
tional security  against  hostile  enterprise,  and  three  field 
works  were  constructed  on  the  plateau  of  Moulin  de  la  Tour, 
of  which  the  center  one  was  armed  with  12,  and  the  other 
two  each  with  6  rifled  12-pounders.  The  rocky  chalk  soil, 
frozen  later  to  a  depth  of  Ij  feet,  made  the  construction  of 
the  batteries  a  work  of  great  difficulty;  the  laying  of  the 
platforms  had  to  be  executed  in  the  rock  with  crowbars  and 
miner's  tools.  On  the  other  hand  the  presence  of  the  woods 
and  the  material  they  afforded  were  of  great  service  in 
building  the  batteries.  In  consequence,  of  being  thus  hidden, 
they  were  not  unmasked  until  the  moment  of  opening  fire; 
in  one  case  an  artificial  screen  was  foimed  by  planting 
trees  and  boughs,  behind  which  the  constru  tion  of  the  bat- 
teries proceeded  quite  unperceived  by  the  enemy.  Countless 

—589— 


Siege  Operations 

vehicles  with  the  baulks  and  platforms  (both  of  which  had 
to  be  brought  from  Germany)  fascines  and  gabions  which 
were  made  by  the  Vth  and  Ilnd  Bavarian  corps,  filled  the 
roads  and  paths  leading  to  the  batteries  for  months,  gen- 
erally at  night  so  as  to  be  unobserved  by  the  French.  The 
production  and  accumulation  of  the  different  materials  were, 
under  the  circumstances,  works  of  uncommon  difficulty ;  for, 
although  the  equipment  provided  the  greater  part  of  the 
tools,  still  a  considerable  quantity  had  to  be  obtained  by  re- 
quisition or  forwarded  from  Germany.  All  these  prepara- 
tions required  much  time,  both  on  account  of  the  variety  of 
difficulties  that  had  to  be  encountered,  and  the  shortness  of 
the  days;  but  until  everything  necessary  for  carrying  out 
the  siege  thoroughly  was  in  its  place,  the  opening  of  the 
attack  could  not  be  thought  of. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  the  time  and  manner 
of  carrying  out  the  siege  had  already  been  decided  by  the 
authorities;  and  if  there  was  any  delay  in  opening  the  at- 
tack, it  was  on  account  of  circumstances,  which  have  been 
already  been  noticed,  a  detailed  account  of  which  would  be 
beyond  our  province. 

Paris  was  to  be  attacked  on  three  sides  simultaneously, 
so  as  to  force  the  enemy  to  use  his  heavy  guns  on  more  than 
one  front.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  most  broken 
ground  had  to  be  selected  for  the  artillery  attack,  and  that 
in  order  to  reach  the  body  of  the  place,  several  of  the  outer 
forts  would  have  to  be  engaged  first  and  perhaps  have  to  be 
captured. 

A  short  account  of  the  different  attacks  in  the  east, 
north  and  south,  under  the  direction  of  Major-General 
Prince  Kraft,  of  Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen,  commander  of  the 
guard  artillery  brigade,  will  follow  here,  in  the  order  in 
which  they  were  carried  out. 


I.    Artillery  Attack  on  the  East  Front 

The  object  of  the  French  position  on  Mont  Avron  was, 
in  conjunction  with  the  forts  in  rear,  to  prepare  sorties,  and 

—590— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

to  support  them  with  the  fire  of  the  guns ;  it  commanded 
the  valley  of  the  Marne  and  covered  the  assembly  of  troops 
there,  as  well  as  the  passages  over  the  Marne,  and  at  the 
same  time  it  flanked  the  greater  part  of  our  eastern  line  of 
investment.  These  favourable  circumstances  induced  the 
enemy  continually  to  strengthen  this  position,  so  that  in  the 
end  there  were  six  30-pounders,  six  short  24-pounders, 
twenty-three  7-pounders,  thirty-four  12-pounders,  seven 
mitrailleuses,  altogether  76  guns  distributed  in  eight  bat- 
teries; the  latter,  however,  were  imperfectly  constructed 
and  unprovided  with  bombproofs  and  traverses,  on  account 
of  the  difficulty  of  working  in  the  frozen  ground.  The  com- 
mandant on  the  plateau  of  Mont  Avron  was  the  well-known 
and  able  Colonel  Stoffel,  who  before  the  war  had  been  at- 
tache to  the  French  embassy  in  Berlin.  There  was  no  in- 
tention on  the  German  side  of  occupying  Mont  Avron,  es- 
pecially as  it  lay  under  the  cross-fire  of  Forts  Rosny,  No- 
gent,  and  Noisy,  and  of  the  redoubts  Montreuil,  La  Boissiere, 
and  Fontenay,  situated  in  the  intervals.  Our  positions  were 
so  close  that  our  heavy  guns  could  engage  Mont  Avron  as 
well  as  the  forts  lying  behind  it. 

The  following  batteries  were  constructed : 

A.    On  the  Plateau  of  Raincy 

Batteries  Nos.  1,  2,  3,  and  4,  armed  respectively  with 
six  24-pounders,  six  12-pounders,  six  short  24-pounders,  and 
four  short  24-pounders,  altogether  22  guns,  directed  chiefly 
against  Mont  Avron,  Fort  Rosny  and  other  less  important 
places,  such  as  the  villages  of  Avron,  Rosny,  Villemomble, 
and  the  redoubts  of  la  Bossiere  and  Montreuil. 

B.  On  the  Plateau  of  Mont  Fermeil  on  the  Side 
Nearest  to  Gagny 

Batteries  Nos.  5,*  6,  7,  and  8,  armed  respectively  with 
six  12-pounders,  six  long  24-pounders,  six  12-pounders,  and 
six  12-pounders,  total  24  guns,  to  fire  over  the  same  ground 
as  the  other  batteries,  and  also  to  sweep  the  valley  of  the 


*In  the  plate  No.  5  battery  is  shown  on  the  plateau  of  Raincy. 

—591— 


Siege  Operations 

Marne.    To  destroy  any  bridges  that  might  be  thrown  over 
the  river  and  prevent  a  passage. 

C.  In  Position  Between  Noisy  and  Gournay 

Batteries  Nos.  9  and  10,  armed  respectively  with  six  12- 
pounders,  and  six  long  24-pounders,  together  12  guns.  To 
fire  on  the  Marne  valley  and  the  valley  of  Villemomble  and 
prevent  the  assembly  of  troops  in  these  localities. 

D.  In  Position  Southwest  of  Noisy-Le-Grand 

Batteries  Nos.  11,  12  and  13,  each  armed  with  six  long 
24-pounders,  making  a  total  of  18  guns  to  sweep  the  sides  of 
Mont  Avron  the  villages  of  Villemomble  and  Neuilly,  the 
railway  junction,  the  Fontenay  redoubt  and  Fort  Nogent. 

The  distances  of  the  different  batteries  from  Mont  Av- 
ron varied  from  3,500  to  6,000  paces. 

The  park  of  artillery  was  established  at  Brou,  half  a 
league  to  the  east  of  Chelles,  to  which  were  brought  36  rifled 
12-pounders,  30  rifled  24-pounders,  10  rifled  short  24- 
pounders,  altogether  76  siege  guns. 

A  transport  column  of  700  wagons  was  cantoned  there 
in  improved  barracks  and  stables.  Ten  companies  of  gar- 
rison artillery  were  available.  The  whole  was  placed  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  Barsch  as  chief  of  the  siege  artil- 
lery while  Colonel  Oppermann  superintended  the  works  of 
the  engineers. 

On  the  13th  of  December  the  construction  of  the  bat- 
teries was  begun ;  it  had  to  be  carried  on  almost  entirely  at 
night,  with  the  exception  of  the  batteries  on  the  plateau  of 
Raincy,  which  were  screened  by  the  woods. 

Trench  communications  were  made,  where  necessary, 
between  the  batteries,  covered  by  traverses ;  roads  and 
bridges  were  constructed,  as  well  as  bombproofs  of  all  de- 
scriptions. 

Fire  opened  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  December 
at  half -past  8  o'clock  from  76  guns,  and  it  succeeded  by  the 
next  day  in  silencing  Mont  Avron  after  a  good  resistance 
and  considerable  loss  among  the  gun  detachments ;  only  the 

—592— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

works  in  rear  continued  to  respond  to  the  fire,  and  the  Ger- 
man artillery  succeeded  in  driving  the  French  garrison  out 
of  Bondy  and  out  of  the  railway  station  at  Noisy  le  Sec. 

The  French  evacuated  the  position  of  Mont  Avron  on 
the  night  of  the  28th-29th  of  December.  They  had  thrown 
a  garrison  into  it  on  the  previous  night,  of  two  divisions 
under  the  command  of  General  d'Hughes,  with  the  intention 
of  occupying  it  defensively.  Their  withdrawal  during  the 
night,  together  with  the  removal  of  the  artillery  materiel 
took  place  under  the  eyes  of  General  Trochu  who  had  hurried 
to  the  spot,  and  was  performed  in  wonderfully  good  order, 
covered  by  the  marines  and  three  field  batteries.  On  the 
30th  of  December,  Mont  Avron  was  occupied  by  Saxon  de- 
tachments. Supported  by  a  covering  party  they  levelled  the 
enemy's  works  and  destroyed  the  ammunition  and  other  ma- 
teriel found  there;  the  magazine  had  been  prepared  for 
demolition.  The  next  thing  was  to  drive  the  French  out  of 
the  villages  of  Drancy  and  Bobigny,  which  they  held  in 
force,  and  for  this  purpose  emplacements  Nos.  14  and  15 
were  constructed.  Two  other  batteries,  Nos.  16  and  17, 
were  built  at  Chennevieres  to  command  the  plateau  of  Vil- 
liers.  To  oppose  the  French  position  of  Courneuve,  Le  Bour- 
get,  and  Drancy,  No.  1  battery  at  Blanc  Mesnil,  and  Nos.  2 
and  3  batteries*  at  Pont  Iblon  were  constructed,  and  armed 
altogether  with  18  guns,  so  as  to  render  an  offensive  move- 
ment from  that  direction  impossible.  Some  of  these  latter 
batteries  were  advanced  afterwards  as  far  as  Le  Bourget, 
and  were  thus  in  a  position  to  cooperate  against  St.  Denis 
in  the  attack  on  the  north  front. 

On  the  2nd  and  3rd  of  January  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
siege  batteries  was  continued  against  the  whole  of  the  east 
front,  and  was  only  replied  to  feebly  from  Fort  Nogent. 

As  the  east  front  had  always  been  considered  the 
strongest  of  the  Paris  defenses,  our  successes  against  Mont 
Avron  had  raised  a  great  alarm  in  the  city,  and  ignorance 
of  the  military  circumstances  had  caused  an  unreasonable 
despondency,   as  well   as   distrust  in  their   military   chief. 


*These  three  batteries  formed  at  the  same  time  the  left  wing  of 
the  attack  on  the  north  front. 

—593— 


Siege  Operations 

Meanwhile  the  enemy  remained  in  possession  of  the  villages 
of  Bondy,  Bobigny,  Drancy,  and  Rosny,  and  disturbed  our 
outposts  from  those  places  by  frequent  alarms ;  thus,  on  the 
nights  of  the  10th  and  15th  of  January,  the  Saxon  outposts 
were  attacked  on  the  railway  in  advance  of  Aulnay  and  at 
Nonneville,  whilst  the  same  thing  happened  to  the  Guards  in 
Le  Bourget  three  times  during  the  night  of  the  14th  of  Jan- 
uary. On  account  of  these  offensive  movements,  the  siege 
batteries  bombarded  those  places  for  48  hours  on  the  16th 
of  January,  the  results  of  which  could  only  be  ascertained 
by  a  reconnaissance  of  detachments  of  the  2nd  div^ision  of 
foot  guards  against  Drancy,  and  of  the  23rd  infantry  divi- 
sion against  Groslay  farm,  on  which  occasion  6  officers  and 
130  men  were  taken  prisoners. 

On  the  night  of  the  2Sth-27th  of  January  the  batteries 
of  the  attack  ceased  firing. 


II.    Artillery  Attack  Against  the 
South  Front 

The  command  here  was  entrusted  to  Colonel  von  Rieff, 
President  of  the  committee  on  artillery  experiments.  This 
officer  had  arrived  before  Paris  towards  the  end  of  Septem- 
ber; the  special  reconnaissances,  and  all  arrangements  for 
the  preparation  and  execution  of  the  attack  had  been  car- 
ried out  under  his  orders.  There  were  at  his  disposal  30 
companies  of  garrison  artillery,  with  their  staff,  and  a 
numerous  body  of  belonging  to  the  store  department  for 
duty  in  the  various  parks  and  depots. 

The  following  batteries  were  constructed : 

A.  Left  Wing 

Battery  No.  1  (St.  Cloud)  for  six  12-pounders. 
Battery  No.  2  (Meudon)  for  eight  12-pounders. 

Both  these  batteries  to  act  against  Bullancourt,  the  Bois 
de  Boulogne,  and  the  islands  in  the  Seine. 

Battery  No.  3  (Meudon)  six  24-pounders. 
Battery  No.  4  (Meudon)  six  24-pounders. 

—594— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

These  batteries  to  counter-batter  and  enfilade  the  south 
and  west  fronts  of  Fort  Issy. 

Dismounting  battery  No.  16  (Meudon)  four  12-pound- 
ers  to  fire  against  the  gun  emplacements  at  Fort  Issy. 

Dismounting  and  breaching  battery  No.  19  (Fleury  and 
Clamart)  armed  with  four  long  and  four  short  24-pounders, 
against  the  south  front  of  Fort  Issy,  the  long  24-pounders 
against  the  Paris  enceinte. 

Dismounting  battery  No.  20  (Clamart)  for  six  long 
24-pounders,  to  fire  against  the  south  front  and  the  north- 
west bastion  of  Fort  Vanvres. 

B.  Centre 

Enfilade  and  dismounting  battery  No.  5  (Clamart)  six 
24-pounders,  against  the  southwest  curtain  and  the  south 
bastion  of  Fort  Issy. 

Enfilade  battery  No.  6  (Clamart)  six  24-pounders, 
against  the  southeast  front  of  Fort  Vancres. 

Enfilade  and  dismounting  battery  No.  7  (Moulin  de  la 
Tour)  for  six  24-pounders,  against  the  south  front  and 
the  southwest  bastion  of  Fort  Issy. 

Dismounting  battery  No.  17  (Moulin  de  la  Tour)  for 
six  12-pounders,  against  the  emplacements  between  Forts 
Issy  and  Vanvres. 

Dismounting  and  breaching  battery  No.  8  (Moulin  de  la 
Tour)  for  six  24-pounders,  against  the  south  front  of  Fort 
Vanvres. 

Enfilade  and  dismounting  battery  No.  9  (Moulin  de  la 
Tour)  for  eight  12-pounders,  to  fire  on  west  front  of  Van- 
vres and  its  southwest  bastion. 

Enfilade  and  breaching  battery  No.  10  (Moulin  de  la 
Tour)  for  six  24-pounders,  against  the  south  and  west  front 
of  Fort  Vanvres. 

Dismounting  battery  No.  21,  (Chatillon)  six  short  24- 
pounders,  directed  against  the  southwest  front  of  Vanvres, 
and  the  neighbouring  gun  emplacements. 


-595- 


Siege  Operations  ] 

C.  Right  Wing 

Enfilade  and  dismounting  battery  No.  11  (Fontenoy) 
with  eight  12-pounders,  to  fire  on  the  west  front  of  Fort 
Montrouge. 

Enfilade  and  dismounting  battery  No.  12  (Fontenoy) 
eight  21-pounders,  also  to  fire  against  the  west  front  of  Fort 
Montrouge. 

Dismounting  battery  No.  18  (Chatillon)  for  six  24- 
pounders  to  fire  against  Fort  Montrouge,  the  emplacements 
to  the  west  of  it,  and  the  city. 

Dismounting  and  enfilade  battery  No.  22  (Chatillon) 
for  six  12-pounders,  with  the  same  object  as  No.  18. 

D.  Batteries  for  Vertical  Fire 

Mortar  battery  No.  13,  for  two  rifled  mortars  at  the 
Tour  des  Anglais  to  fire  against  Fort  Issy. 

Mortar  battery  No.  14,  armed  like  No,  13,  to  fire  against 
Fort  Vanvres. 

Mortar  battery  No.  15,  armed  like  No.  13,  against  Fort 
Montrouge. 

Mortar  battery  No.  23,  for  four  50-pounder  mortars 
against  Fort  Issy. 

Mortar  battery  No.  24,  armed  like  No.  23,  against  Fort 
Vanvres. 

In  order  to  secure  the  right  flank  of  the  artillery  attack, 
against  which  the  French  made  particular  exertions,  es- 
pecially from  Villejuif,  and  to  occupy  the  enemy's  batteries 
there  continuously  a  flank  attack  was  organized  on  the  line 
La  Rue-Chevilly,  under  command  of  General  von  Ramm, 
to  be  carried  on  independently.  The  park  attached  to  it 
was  at  Rungis,  and  t.vo  batteries,  each  for  six  12-pounders, 
were  at  first  built  in  the  given  line,  but  afterwards  advanced 
somewhat  nearer  to  Villejuif. 

The  original  armament  of  some  of  the  batteries  was 
changed  in  the  course  of  the  siege  operations  to  meet  the  al- 
terations in  the  range;  the  greatest  distance  was  4,090 
paces  and  the  smallest  1,700  paces;  during  the  last  days  of 
the  bombardment,  the  interior  of  the  city  was  the  object  of 

—596— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

attack  of  nearly  all  the  batteries  some  of  which  sent  their 
projectiles  to  a  distance  of  12,000  paces. 

The  garrisons  of  Forts  Issy,  Vanvres  and  Montrouge 
observed  the  ground  in  iheir  front,  by  means  of  outposts  and 
piquets,  patrols  from  which  had  frequently  small  collisions 
with  ours,  thus  on  the  16th  December  1870,  two  companies 
advancing  from  Fort  Issy  attempted  to  occupy  the  village 
of  Meudon,  but  were  repulsed  by  the  Prussian  outposts, 
leaving  five  wounded  behind  them. 

With  the  object  of  gaining  some  ground  on  our  side, 
the  French  outposts  were  driven  out  of  Bas  Meudon,  Le 
Moulineaux,  and  Fleury  shortly  after  midnight  on  the  3rd 
January ;  strong  reserves  had  been  brought  up  for  tha  occa- 
sion. During  the  same  night,  the  arming  of  the  German 
batteries  was  completed ;  but  the  opening  of  the  fire  on  the 
4th  January  had  to  be  postponed  on  account  of  the  fog.  In 
order  to  take  off  the  attention  of  the  enemy  from  the  attack 
on  the  south  front,  the  Xllth  Corps  received  orders  to  make 
demonstrations  on  the  east  side.  In  accordance  with  these, 
on  the  4th  January,  the  24th  Division  undertook  a  recon- 
naissance from  Chelles  against  Fort  Nogent,  whilst  at  the 
same  time,  the  demolitions  on  Mont  Avron  were  carried  on 
with  great  activity,  to  create  the  impression  on  the  enem.y 
that  German  batteries  were  to  be  established  there.  Two 
battalions  of  the  101st  regiment,  and  a  light  battery  ad- 
vanced against  Neuilly  sur  Marne,  and  occupied  a  part  of 
the  village  and  evacuated  it  again  during  the  night;  as  a 
consequence,  of  this,  the  enemy  increased  his  force  in  the 
front,  and  remained  under  arms  till  morning. 

On  the  5th  of  January  there  were  more  demonstrations, 
principally  against  the  villages  of  Nogent  and  Rosny.  The 
2d  battalion  of  the  105th  regiment  and  the  3rd  battalion  of 
the  106th  regiment,  accompanied  by  a  light  battery,  were 
directed  against  Nogent,  whilst  the  enemy's  outposts  were 
threatened  from  Mont  Avron,  and  the  3rd  Battalion  of  the 
101st  regiment  was  sent  against  the  garrison  of  Bondy. 
Other  movements  of  troops  also  occurred  in  this  district. 
The  Saxon  detachments  retired  from  all  points  to  their 
original  positions,  after  accomplishing  the  tasks  with  which 

—597— 


Siege  Operations 

they  had  been  charged,  whilst  the  French  maintained  an 
extremely  heavy  fire  from  31  guns  against  the  German  artil- 
lery position  on  the  plateau  of  Raincy.  From  the  31st  of 
December  until  the  5th  of  January  the  artillery  of  the  de- 
fense on  the  east  front  remained  almost  silent. 

During  these  occurrences  on  the  east  front,  the  arming 
of  the  German  batteries  on  the  south  front  had  been  com- 
pleted without  molestation ;  on  the  5th  of  January,  towards 
morning,  the  French  made  several  small  sorties  against  the 
outposts  on  the  hill  of  Clamart.  The  latter  had  occupied  the 
summit  of  the  hill,  and  were  attacked  during  the  previous 
night,  three  times  in  succession,  on  the  last  occasion,  with 
one  battalion,  which,  however,  retired  when  the  bombard- 
ment opened.  The  80th  regiment  also  repulsed  a  sortie  made 
against  Meudon. 

On  the  5th  of  January,  as  soon  as  the  fog  permitted  a 
good  view  of  the  enemy's  position,  the  batteries  opened  their 
fire,  which  had  been  ordered  to  commence  at  half  past  8 
o'clock.  The  principal  attack  fired  this  day  on  Forts  Issy, 
Vanvres,  and  Montrouge,  from  battries  No.  1  to  17 ;  the  col- 
lateral attack  directed  its  fire  against  the  entrenchments  at 
Villejuif  and  the  gunboats  that  appeared  on  the  Seine, 

For  the  sake  of  brevity,  we  cannot  give  all  the  details 
of  the  artillery  fight  which  had  now  commenced ;  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  remark  that  everywhere  the  French  artillery,  but 
particularly  from  the  main  enciente,  and  from  the  batteries 
at  the  Point  du  Jour,  showed  the  greatest  activity,  and 
proved  itself  to  be  an  opponent  worthy  of  our  respect,  forc- 
ing us  often  enough  to  give  up  the  tasks  originally  assigned 
to  single  batteries,  in  order  to  meet  him  with  united  strength. 

January  6th. — Clear  weather;  the  fire  from  Fort 
Issy  was  temporarily  silenced.  The  enemy  fired  into  St. 
Cloud,  Bougival,  and  Vaucresson  from  Fort  Mont  Valerien, 
and  unmasked  four  new  batteries  at  the  Point  du  Jour ;  the 
guns  on  both  sides  of  the  aqueduct  engaged  No.  1  battery 
and  fired  on  to  the  plateau  of  Meudon ;  Forts  Issy  and  Van- 
vres only  fired  slowly;  on  the  other  hand  Fort  Montrouge 
directed  a  heavy  fire  against  the  redoubt  of  Moulin  de  la 
Tour,   which  was  occupied  by  the  Bavarians,   as   well   as 

—598— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

against  the  village  of  Clamart.  Our  fire  was  chiefly  against 
Fort  Issy  and  beyond  that  towards  Paris  against  the  Point 
du  Jour  and  the  adjoining  batteries  on  the  railway  embank- 
ment and  the  aqueduct.  In  the  neighbourhood  of  Point  du 
Jour  the  flames  broke  out  in  several  places. 

January  7th  and  8th — Thick  weather;  the  firing  was 
continued  and  set  the  barracks  in  Forts  Vanvres  and  Mont- 
rouge  in  flames;  our  projectiles  ranged  from  9,000  to  9,500 
paces  up  to  the  gardens  of  the  Luxembourg  Palace.  The 
revetments  and  buildings  inside  Fort  Issy  were  being  de- 
molished ;  the  fort  answering  the  fire  but  feebly.  From  Fort 
Vanvres  there  was  only  a  dropping  fi.re.  Montrouge  was  en- 
gaged with  the  Bavarian  batteries  at  Moulin  de  la  Tour;  a 
barrack  in  the  fort  was  set  on  fire.  Against  the  Point  du 
Jour  and  the  adjoining  batteries  the  artillery  fight  contin- 
ued. Some  of  the  batteries  were  silenced,  but  the  well- 
conducted  defence  and  extended  front  of  the  fortress  en- 
abled them  soon  to  be  replaced. 

The  authority  of  the  Governor,  General  Trochu.  over 
the  Parisian  populace  was  beginning  to  be  shaken;  he 
yielded  to  the  pressure  put  on  him  and  allowed  himself  to  be 
hampered  by  a  council  of  eight  members ;  in  a  proclamation 
issued  he  repudiated  the  idea  of  a  capitulation. 

January  9th. — The  object  of  our  fire  now  was  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  constructing  new  earthworks  for  gun 
emplacements,  communications,  etc. ;  the  reply  to  it  from  his 
positions  was  less  energetic ;  it  seemed  as  if  the  enemy  were 
engaged  in  withdrawing  the  heavy  calibres  from  the  ad- 
vanced positions.  As  the  day  was  foggy  with  continuous 
driving  snow,  the  batteries  of  attack  were  ordered  to 
slacken  their  fire.  The  government  of  Paris  made  a  protest 
against  the  bombardment  of  the  city,  which,  considering 
that  the  siege  had  now  been  in  progress  for  three  months 
and  a  half,  and  that  in  the  conduct  of  the  defense  neither 
towns,  villages,  nor  palaces  on  their  own  soil  had  been 
spared,  was  naturally  rejected ;  on  the  8th-9th  of  January 
some  of  the  batteries  received  orders  to  bombard  the  inner 
portions  of  the  town.  At  half  past  8  in  the  evening  Le  Val 
was  attacked  by  the  10th  company  of  the  87th  regiment,  and 

—599— 


Siege  Operations 

a  subdivision  of  the  11th  Company  of  the  same  regiment 
was  sent  against  MouKneaux,  as  the  enemy  had  located  him- 
self again  in  these  places;  after  a  good  resistance  he  was 
driven  out,  and  the  besiegers  by  the  capture  of  these  places 
were  enabled  to  approach  from  1,500  to  1,600  paces  nearer 
to  Fort  Issy. 

January  10th,— At  3  o'clock  in  the  morning,  some  chas- 
seurs managed  to  penetrate  into  a  new  battery  on  the  hill 
of  Clamart,  which  only  opened  fire  on  this  day,  but  the  cov- 
ering party  drove  them  out  again.  This  spot  was  of  the 
utmost  importance  both  for  the  attack  and  the  defense,  and 
for  weeks  the  ground  had  been  disputed  by  the  outposts. 
Similar  small  affairs  occurred  at  other  places  evidently  with 
the  intention  of  making  our  approach  more  difficult.  Our 
fire,  which  was  continued  without  intermission,  was  an- 
swered by  the  enemy,  but  only  to  a  limited  extent.  Paris  was 
burning  in  several  places.  The  battery  at  St.  Cloud  fired 
into  Billancourt  and  the  Bois  de  Boulogne. 

On  the  11th  of  January,  a  heavy  fire  was  maintained 
against  the  enemy's  works  and  gun  emplacements.  The 
barracks  in  Fort  Issy  were  set  in  flames,  as  well  as  several 
houses  in  the  suburbs  of  Gentilly  and  Vaugirard,  and  in  the 
northeast  part  of  the  city;  German  projectiles  ranged  as 
far  as  the  church  of  St.  Sulpice  a  distance  of  10,000  paces ; 
in  the  more  exposed  streets  of  Paris,  the  stone  paving  was 
torn  up.  The  enemy  made  a  skilful  use  of  the  entrench- 
ments in  front  of,  between,  and  in  rear  of  the  forts  connect- 
ing the  gun  emplacements  to  construct  new  batteries  and 
change  the  position  of  the  guns.  The  garrison  of  Fort  Mont 
Valerien  undertook  a  reconnaissance  against  our  outposts 
at  St,  Germain,  but  were  soon  compelled  to  retreat, 

January  12th, — The  fog  which  had  been  continuous 
for  the  last  two  days,  still  interfered  with  our  fire.  The 
enemy  replied  to  it  vigorously  from  the  main  enceinte.  Cov- 
ered by  the  fog,  the  garrison  of  Montrouge  managed  to 
mount  some  fresh  guns.  The  besiegers  threw  their  pro- 
jectiles far  into  the  town  beyond  the  Luxembourg  Palace, 
but  the  storming  of  the  south  forts,  which  at  one  time  was 
considered  a  necessity  by  some  of  the  authorities,  was  aban- 

—600— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

doned.  In  view  of  the  original  intention,  a  parallel  had  been 
constructed  between  Clamart  and  Chatillon,  at  a  distance  of 
1,500  paces  from  Forts  Issy  and  Vanvres;  which  would  have 
foiTned  the  basis  of  a  regular  attack  against  those  forts. 

A  decree  published  by  the  provisional  government  se- 
cured to  citizens  wounded  by  the  enemy's  shells,  the  same 
claim  to  pension  as  the  military. 

January  13th. — On  account  of  the  continued  fog  the 
fire  on  both  sides  was  slack.  During  the  previous  night 
a  vigorous  sortie  of  the  French  by  a  force  of  about  4,000 
mobiles  stationed  in  and  behind  the  forts,  was  repulsed 
by  detachments  of  the  Xlth  corps  at  Meudon  and  by  the 
Ilnd  Bavarian  corps  at  Clamart. 

January  14th. — The  fire  from  the  besiegers  batteries 
was  continued ;  the  three  forts  of  Issy,  Vanvres,  and  Mont- 
rouge  had  almost  ceased  to  fire,  but  the  latter  made  an  at- 
tempt to  reply  with  field  guns  when  there  was  a  favourable 
opportunity. 

January  15th. — After  great  labour  and  exertion  bat- 
tery No.  1  (St.  Cloud)  managed  to  silence  the  French  bat- 
teries established  at  the  Point  du  Jour  in  the  south  bastion, 
and  was  enabled  now  to  continue  its  fire  against  the  three 
batteries  in  the  north  bastion  and  the  town.  Prussian  pro- 
jectiles were  thrown  as  far  as  the  church  of  Notre  Dame  and 
the  Jardin  des  Piantes.  The  dissatisfaction  and  ferment  in- 
creased to  such  an  extent  in  the  town,  that  General  Trochu 
had  publicly  contradicted  the  report  that  several  generals 
had  been  committed  for  treachery. 

January  16th. — Battery  No,  21  opened  fire  today  to  de- 
molish the  casemates  in  Fort  Issy. 

January  17th  and  18th. — The  enemy  showed  great  en- 
ergy in  re-arming  along  his  front  and  in  the  unexpected  un- 
masking of  guns  which  had  been  mounted  in  emplacements 
within  the  entrenchments. 

Then  occurred  that  momentous  event  in  the  history  of 
the  world  when  King  William,  within  sound  of  the  thunder 
of  the  siege  batteries,  accepted  for  himself  and  his  descen- 
dants the  title  of  Emperor,  offered  him  by  the  German 
princes  and  free  towns,  with  the  vow  to  uphold  in  German 

—601— 


Siege  Operations 

faith,  the  rights  of  the  empire  and  its  members,  to  preserve 
peace,  and  by  the  help  of  his  people  to  maintain  the  indepen- 
dence of  Germany,  as  had  been  done  gloriously  by  Prussia's 
kings  for  170  years.  This  ceremony  took  place  on  the  18th 
of  January  1871  in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors  at  Versailles,  in  the 
presence  of  the  German  princes  and  surrounded  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  German  Army. 

January  19th. — Notwithstanding  the  sortie  from  Fort 
Mont  Valerien  against  the  heights  of  Garches,  the  guns  on 
both  sides  kept  up  an  uninterrupted  fire. 

January  20th. — There  was  a  slackening  of  the  fire  from 
the  artillery  of  the  defense,  probably  in  consequence  of 
the  failure  of  the  sortie  of  the  previous  day ;  thus,  the  fire 
from  Montrouge  where  the  guns  had  been  admirably  fought, 
almost  ceased  towards  midday ;  in  the  batteries  at  the  Point 
du  Jour  the  fire  ceased  altogether  for  a  time;  the  eastern 
barracks  in  Fort  Vanvres  were  set  in  flames.  General  Tro- 
chu  sent  General  Count  d'Herison  to  the  commander  of  the 
3d  army  to  demand  an  armistice  of  48  hours,  which,  how- 
ever, was  only  conceded  on  the  line  from  St.  Cloud  to  Gar- 
ches for  a  sufficient  time  to  bury  the  dead. 

January  21st  and  22nd. — Heavy  fire  from  the  batteries 
and  adjoining  Point  du  Jour  and  the  emplacements  between 
the  three  south  forts ;  among  the  latter  a  French  redoubt 
constructed  in  the  interval  between  Forts  Vanvres  and 
Montrouge  distinguished  itself  particularly;  it  required 
nearly  a  whole  day  for  our  batteries  to  master  it.  A  pow- 
der magazine  in  rear  of  Clamart  was  blown  up.  Insurrec- 
tionary movements  of  the  Parisian  populace  were  observed. 

January  23rd. — Lively  fire  from  the  enceinte  of  the 
city;  fresh  batteries  were  unmasked  by  the  French  at  the 
entrance  to  the  Bois  de  Boulogne.  The  artillery  of  the  at- 
tack did  not  allow  itself  to  be  troubled  by  this,  but  managed 
to  silence  several  batteries  of  the  main  enceinte,  and  sub- 
due the  fire  of  the  field  battery  which  had  been  so  active  on 
the  previous  day. 

January  24th. — The  fire  of  the  besiegers'  batteries 
could  only  be  continued  at  intervals  on  account  of  the  fog, 

—602— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

the  enemy  replying  but  feebly.  A  serious  outbreak  occurred 
in  Paris  in  which  the  prison  of  Mazas  was  stormed,  the 
prisoners  liberated  and  the  granaries  with  supplies  of  bread 
and  wine  plundered  by  the  mob;  in  front  of  the  Hotel  de 
Ville  the  national  guard  fired  on  the  insurgents. 

January  25th. — The  enemy  attempted,  under  cover  of 
the  fog  to  construct  earthworks  in  and  round  Fort  Issy,  but 
were  prevented.  The  bombardment  continued  as  on  the 
previous  days. 

January  26th. — Clear  weather,  the  bombardment  was 
only  weakly  answered  from  the  enceinte  of  the  city,  from 
Fort  Montrouge  and  from  the  emplacements  between  Forts 
Vanvres  and  Issy ;  notwithstanding  the  weather  being  clear 
the  artillery  of  the  defence  were  unable  to  accomplish  any- 
thing. Equally  futile  was  the  heavy  fire  from  the  battery 
at  the  Point  du  Jour  against  No.  1  battery.  The  batteries 
in  front  of  Clamart  were  fired  at  but  slightly  from  the  forti- 
fications of  the  town  and  from  Fort  Montrouge  and  the 
neighbouring  mortar  batteries  scarcely  at  all. 

January  27th. — After  midnight  the  batteries  on  both 
sides  ceased  firing  by  common  consent. 

The  losses  of  the  German  artillery  in  the  22  days' 
bombardment  were  12  oflficers  and  200  men  killed  and 
wounded;  the  field  hospitals  were  established  at  Malabry 
and  Sceaux,  the  chief  hospital  at  Igny,  between  Versailles 
and  Palaiseau,  Lieutenant  General  von  Kamecke,  who  had 
been  in  command  of  the  14th  Division  during  the  campaign, 
was  ordered  from  Mezieres  to  Paris  to  take  over  the  chief 
command  of  the  engineering  works  of  the  attack.  The  works 
which  had  been  carried  out  by  the  engineers  during  the  ar- 
tillery bombardment  were  covered  communications  be- 
tween the  batteries,  shelter  trenches,  traverses,  assistance 
in  building  batteries  and  powder  magazines,  shell  stores, 
posts  of  observation,  underground  storerooms  (all  bomb- 
proof) rendering  the  barracks  which  were  not  bombproof 
secure  as  guard  houses,  preparation  of  defences,  construct- 
ing and  maintaining  roads,  etc.  Although  the  trenches  were 
filled  in  some  places  with  water  which  increased  the  diflJ- 
culties  of  using  them,  it  was  an  evil  which  could  only  be 

—603— 


Siege  Operations 

partially  remedied ;  it  must  always  occur  at  a  siege  carried 
on  during  the  winter,  as  the  trenches  follow  the  lie  of  the 
ground  and  become  the  natural  points  of  accumulation  for 
the  surface  and  subsoil  drainage. 


III.  Artillery  Attack  Against  the  North  Front 
(St.  Denis) 

The  intricate  works  of  St.  Denis  are  among  the  strong- 
est of  the  defences  of  Paris,  but  they  have  one  defect,  that 
they  have  not  a  sufficient  command  to  be  defiladed  from  the 
hills  in  front,  consequently  they  can  be  seen  into,  and  in 
some  places  even  the  works  of  the  gorge  can  be  fired  at. 

On  the  21st  of  December,  there  was  a  sortie  at  Epinay 
le  St.  Denis  against  the  troops  holding  the  investing  line  at 
that  place;  the  gunboats  on  the  Seine  co-operated,  but 
eventually  it  was  successfully  repulsed  by  Prussian  batteries 
of  position  at  Orgemont  and  Enghien. 

As  long  as  Mont  Avron  continued  in  possession  of  the 
French,  it  was  impossible  for  the  German  batteries  on  the 
northeast  front  to  approach  nearer,  because  the  German 
position  on  that  side  of  Paris  as  well  as  the  strong  French 
position  La  Courneuve,  Le  Bourget,  and  Drancy,  was 
brought  under  an  effective  flanking  fire.  The  capture  of 
Mont  Avron  which  was  of  the  utmost  importance,  as  well 
as  the  unsuccessful  sortie  of  the  French  against  Le  Bourget 
on  the  21st  December,  must  have  proved  to  the  enemy  that 
any  attacks  against  the  position  of  the  Guards  there  could 
lead  to  no  result.  In  consequence  of  these  occurrences  the 
French  defense  at  that  point  lost  its  energy,  and  the  fire  of 
the  Prussian  batteries  was  therefore  turned  against  the  vil- 
lages of  Drancy,  Bobigny,  Bondy,  and  Rosny,  with  good  ef- 
fect ;  the  forts  of  Noisy  and  Rosny  were  only  fired  at  occa- 
sionally. In  the  meantime,  a  number  of  other  German  bat- 
teries were  built  on  the  line  Livry-Garches,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  making  a  frontal  attack  against  the  French  position 
of  La  Courneuve-Drancy.  Two  batteries  at  Garches  were 
directed  at  the  same  time  to  enfilade  the  works  of  St.  Denis. 

—604— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

For  the  actual  bombardment  of  St.  Denis,  on  the  cap- 
ture of  which  great  value  was  very  properly  set  at  head- 
quarters, it  was  necessary,  exclusive  of  the  24  6-pounder 
field  guns,  to  organize  a  special  siege  train,  made  up  from 
the  guns  which  had  been  employed  at  Mezieres  and  Peronne ; 
namely : 

26  long  24-pounders,  10  short  24-pounders,  32  12- 
pounders,  and  3  rifled  mortars. 

The  necessary  preparations  for  the  attack  on  St.  Denis 
began  on  the  10th  of  January ;  the  siege  train  park  was  es- 
tablished at  the  railway  station  of  Gonesse,  a  new  trans- 
port park  for  700  wagons  was  prepared  at  Ecouen,  and  a 
suflicient  materiel,  which  was  already  partially  prepared, 
for  the  construction  of  the  batteries  was  collected  in  depots 
at  Arnouville  and  Montmorency.  In  order  not  to  postpone 
the  building  of  the  batteries  until  after  the  arrival  of  the 
siege  artillery  companies,  from  Mezieres,  the  emplacements 
were  constructed  by  men  from  the  field  artillery  and  by 
the  pioneers  of  the  guard  and  4th  corps.  The  following  15 
batteries  were  made: — 

Batteries  Nos.  1,  2,  and  3,  armed  each  with  six  long  24- 
pounders,  and  six  12-pounders  to  fire  against  Drancy,  Bo- 
bigny,  and  La  Courneuve. 

Battery  No.  4,  armed  with  eight  long  24-pounders, 
against  Fort  Aubervilliers  and  the  suburb  of  La  Vilette. 

Batteries  Nos.  5,  6,  7,  8,  and  9  armed  respectively  with 
six  long  24-pounders,  six  short  24-pounders,  eight  12-pound- 
ers, and  three  rifled  mortars  against  the  fort  and  village  of 
AuberviUiers,  Fort  de  I'Est,  Double  Couronne,  Fort  de  la 
Briche,  and  St.  Denis. 

Batteries  Nos.  10  and  11,  each  armed  with  six  long  24- 
pounders  and  eight  12-pounders,  against  the  fortifications 
of  St.  Denis  and  the  Seine. 

Battery  No.  12,  armed  with  six  long  24-pounders  to 
fire  at  the  same  objects. 

Battery  Nos.  13,  14  and  15,  armed  with  eight  12-pound- 
ers, four  short,  and  six  long  24-pounders,  against  Forts  de 
la  Briche,  Double  Couronne,  and  the  whole  fortress  of  St. 
Denis. 

—605— 


Siege  Operations 

All  these  batteries  opened  fire  on  the  21st  of  January. 

A  glance  at  the  map  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  be- 
siegers' batteries  had  the  advantage  of  a  concentric  fire 
against  St.  Denis,  the  collateral  forts,  and  the  French  posi- 
tions generally.  As  early  as  the  22nd  of  January,  the  fire 
from  St.  Denis  was  almost  silenced.  The  town  was  in  flames 
in  several  places.  The  repulse  of  the  sortie  on  the  19th  of 
January  and  the  effect  of  the  bombardment  against  the 
whole  circle  of  Paris  fortifications,  with  the  exception  of 
Mont  Valerien,  had  produced  the  greatest  discord  and  dis- 
satisfaction among  the  populace  of  the  capital.  Serious  ris- 
ings occurred  among  the  people,  which  led,  on  the  23rd  of 
January,  to  a  severance  of  the  functions  of  President  of 
committee  of  national  defense  from  those  of  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  army.  General  Vinoy  was  appointed  to  the 
chief  command  of  the  army  of  Paris,  whilst  General  Trochu 
continued  to  be  a  member  of  the  government  only. 

In  the  meantime,  on  the  25th  and  26th  of  January,  the 
bombardment  of  the  north  front  went  on  without  inter- 
ruption until  the  night  of  the  26th-27th  of  January,  when 
the  fire  on  both  sides  ceased  here  also. 

On  the  evening  of  the  28th  of  January  an  armistice  of 
three  days  was  declared,  for  the  negotiation  of  which  Jules 
Favre,  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  for  the  Paris  Govern- 
ment, had  during  the  last  few  days  visited  Versailles,  and 
been  backwards  and  forwards  between  that  place  and  Paris. 
The  conditions  with  regard  to  Paris  was  settled  with  a  mili- 
tary commission  which  arrived  from  the  capital.  They  were 
as  follows : 

All  forts  to  be  given  up;  the  main  enceinte  to  be  dis- 
armed. 

The  troops  of  the  line,  marines  and  guards  mobiles  to 
become  prisoners  of  war,  with  the  exception  of  12,000  men 
for  the  preservation  of  order  in  the  city.  The  prisoners  to 
remain  within  the  gates  of  the  city  during  the  armistice  and 
to  hand  over  their  arms ;  the  garde  nationale  and  the  gens- 
daiTnerie  to  retain  their  arms.  All  franc-tireur  corps  to  be 
disbanded.  The  Germans  to  assist  the  French  commissaries 
as  far  as  possible  in  the  reprovisioning  of  Paris.     Persons 

—606— 


Campaign  Against  France  1870-71 

desirous  of  quitting  Paris  to  obtain  a  permit  from  the 
French  authorities  with  a  German  visa.  The  municipahty 
of  Paris  to  pay  a  contribution  for  the  town  of  200  milHon 
francs  within  14  days.  Public  property  not  to  be  removed 
during  the  armistice. 

In  accordance  with  the  above  stipulations,  on  the  29th 
of  January,  at  11  o'clock  in  the  morning,  all  forts,  with  the 
exception  of  Vincennes,  were,  after  a  previous  reconnais- 
sance for  mines,  etc.,  occupied  by  the  besieging  army ;  Mont 
Valerien,  and  Fort  Issy  by  the  Vth  Prussian  corps;  Fort 
Vanvres  and  Montrouge  by  the  Bavarian  corps,  Fort  Char- 
enton  by  the  1st  Bavarian  corps,  Forts  Ivry  and  Bicetre  by 
the  Vlth  Prussian  corps,  the  redoubts  of  Gravelle  and  Fais- 
anderie  by  the  Wurtemberg  division,  Forts  Nogent,  Rosny, 
Noisy,  and  Romainville  by  the  Xllth  Saxon  corps.  Fort 
d'Aubervilliers  by  the  guard  corps,  and  the  works  of  St. 
Denis  by  the  guard  and  IVth  corps.  At  the  same  time  the 
outposts  were  brought  within  from  500  to  700  paces  of  the 
enceinte  of  the  town,  and  the  main  positions  advanced  in  a 
corresponding  degree.  In  all  the  forts  occupied  by  the  Ger- 
mans, the  necessary  works  were  commenced  that  might  be 
required  if  the  bombardment  had  to  be  continued  at  the  re- 
duced range.  In  the  intervals  between  the  south  forts,  and 
other  suitable  positions,  six  new  batteries  were  erected  be- 
sides emplacements,  which  were  armed  with  the  necessary 
guns  and  prepared  for  opening  fire. 

The  execution  of  the  convention  with  Paris,  and  the  dis- 
armament, was  carried  out  without  interruption;  though 
the  delivery  of  a  large  portion  of  the  arms  did  not  take  place 
on  account  of  the  angry  feeling  of  the  inhabitants,  and  for 
other  reasons.  However,  near  200,000  Chassepot  rifles,  600 
field  guns,  and  1,350  garrison  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  victors.  The  total  loss  of  the  Paris  army  during  the 
siege  is  given  as  17,000  killed. 

On  the  1st  of  March  10,000  men  from  each  of  the  Vlth 
and  Xlth  Prussian  corps,  and  the  Ilnd  Bavarian  corps 
marched  into  the  Bois  de  Boulogne,  where  they  were  to  re- 
main two  days  for  a  review  which  the  Emperor  King  was  to 

—607— 


Siege  Operations 

hold  in  the  Champs  Elysees  and  the  adjoining  part  of  the 
town. 

Lieutenant  General  Kamecke  acted  as  commandant  of 
that  part  of  Paris  which  was  occupied  by  the  German  troops. 
The  latter  were  to  be  relieved  on  the  3rd  of  March  by  a  body 
of  equal  strength  from  the  guard  corps,  the  siege  artillery, 
and  pioneers,  and  the  King's  grenadiers  which  had  been  spe- 
cially recalled  from  Orleans  for  the  purpose. 

This,  however,  never  took  place,  as  the  ratification  of 
the  preliminaries  of  peace  by  which  the  town  was  to  be 
evacuated  at  once  arrived  from  Bordeaux  on  the  day  before. 
His  Majesty  nevertheless,  held  a  review  on  Longchamps 
and  on  the  same  day,  our  troops  marched  out  of  Paris. 

The  German  armies  now  retired  behind  the  line  of  the 
Seine;  those  troops  which  were  prevented  by  the  circum- 
stances mentioned  above  from  passing  in  review  before  His 
Majesty  in  Paris,  namely,  the  Xth  Saxon  corps,  the  1st  Ba- 
varians, and  the  Wurtemburg  division,  were  inspected  by 
the  King  of  Villiers. 

This  brings  to  a  close  the  description  which  we  have 
given  in  broad  outline  of  the  glorious  siege  of  Paris,  which 
was  carried  on  during  four  months  and  a  half  with  an  expen- 
diture of  men  and  material  on  both  sides,  quite  without  par- 
allel in  the  history  of  war;  no  other  siege  can  be  compared 
with  it  either  for  military  importance  or  political  conse- 
quences. 


—608— 


PlateXVIII 


Flaw 

SIEGEOF  PARIS 

1870-1871 


'l>f  T^mtlof 


^^W-'Sh^  "-"^ 


S'&nf     <r 


rjrntrrii,         ^ 


.M\ 


^- 


t\. 


•^ 


s^r-^^\.j 


cv 


-^frfi 


^s 


^ 


J^.  y^T  -.    '  ^    /        /^  /  '',w7^'*&.        ^"^  /no/As  \       //m/™  //-f 


■>y-r^ 


Ci     4i.  ^         }->//      //     '^f       I'iJi  ;>«    »r«w^ 


■^'l* 


\/ 


■^r 


■ix^  Ojrliy 


^& 


K 


y  *, 


%^'J 


AC^^  ^^,5 


l<^ 


-/ 


41  imc^mmr*^ 

\\  y  Pa.      a. 


yi^ 


OiO%vyi*T 


V-: 


•  7(   ^^ 


^' 


V 


-'/ 


^T'f 


"^PJ. 


'>     O/    **      * 


^"    ^% 


*->' 


German  G2^Estimates  of  the  Situ 
ation.      Shown  Graphically 

These  maps  are  corrected  maps  originally  drawn  by  Colonel 
Bird,  British  Army. 


Redrawn    by 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza 

Field  Artillery 


1 


German  G2^Estimates  of  the  Situ 
ation.      Shown  Graphically 

These  maps  are  corrected  maps  originally  draivn  by  Colonel 
Bird,  Bi'itish  Army. 


Redrawn    by 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza 

Field  Artillery 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


\  30^  July 


POSITIONS     OF    FRENCH. 


-610— 


Positions  of  French 


•J "",    .Auf'ui 


POSITIONS    OF    FRENCH 


fflEJ^Cff       O 


Sa/xrhriwh,  J 


ere  art    no-  Sh^ns   of  ^ 

Frtnch     X if    ^O**    °"~*- 


S^rxtLslnj-ra 


W^5^ 


—611- 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


gOStTlONS    or    FWCNCM. 


-612- 


Positions  of  French 


POSITIOISS    OF    FRENCH. 


-613- 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


//  ^"^jtli^Mf 


POSlTJONS    OP    FRENCH. 


—614- 


Positions  of  French 


POaiTIOlse    OF    FNCNCH. 


—615— 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


tf  f*^Myi«^^,6:0O  ffM.  ypSITIOINS    OF    FRENCK 


-616- 


Positions  of  French 


i^^f*^«^i<j^.  "-"p^ 


POSITIONS    OF    ^■RENCH. 


—617- 


\Jp^tr/a/  JJr^/'crA 


Position  Sketches 
^3^  First  Army 


22'Army. 


hiBri^.  '     ^Leii horses 
2nct.Re^f.\ 
fsT.D/y.  ■■■.Led  horjes 

5rd.Re^f.  I 
Pnd.Bng.       ^ed  horjfs 

^tkRe^f.  mPack  horses  i  carh. 
lEFie/d  foroes. 
V  ^  Reti'l.Hq.  Hftifi/is. 
A  4^  Iwaons  higher  Hqn 
5  ik  Regi  \^-  fr.Rosp.  if  comia/  etpn^eJ. 
5 ret  Brig.        ■m  Led  hones 
2no.Div.     <5///%/| 

"Led  ncrses 

4/A  Brig.        \led  horses 

8fh.Red\ 


'T 


*Lfd  horses. 


^t6Diy.Aug.3. 
W  eusvreiler 


ft  f^ck  horses  Sr  carh. 
1 1   y.FielS  forces. 
^1  {3 -Re oil.  Hf  wagons 
^    Vt  na^ons  of  higher  Ht(rs 
1 1    \s.l/^Hosp.  if  combat  enpecfed 

CorpsTnL[^^''^'''f^'"f"  //f.^  J;fe;fW, 
I  dralers  Come/.  Tn.  Bn. 

il.  Medicine  carh. 
2  Carfrid^e  rrafS. 
5.0 f fleers  ba^ofg 
^.E^uipmen-/-  rraas. 
S.ffa^.  Cols.  m.  ^  Diy. 
6F.Hosps.Aff:h  Dii>'. 

I  Medicine  carls. 
iCarlridqe  ivagj. 
Tn .      H-  Officers  ba^^aft 

jS.ndy.  Co/s  AH  fo  Diy. 
\^/^ Hasps.  AH  h DiV 

y.  h/.Seclion,  Am. Col.  def. 
)  0cols.).  Farlherfronfif 
1  neoffssary. 

\1  2nd  Secl/onAm.  Col  Hal. 
J  C6  doli)  (Disla/jce  astna/l 
.  days  march. 
\2.  Ponlon  col. 

fl.  f^orse  depol: 
J  2-  Proi'is.  Cols. 
li.Unall.F.Nosjos. 
\t  Field  Bakery  Col. 
\5.  m  Pk.  Cols. 


Page   618S 


Position  Sketches 

First  Army 


Jp^C/a/  JJf^^'^^ 


Field  Hc4A  7^6.  101 
Ccnray  Sfjwn  Aua  5,  TBI 
Mcrs^  D*p.  arr  Auy.  /3,  SH 


Auq.^. 


I^Armi 


-619- 


Position  Sketches 


Jp^c/af  Skf^d 


I^A 


rmi 


ES^c  Tns  W. 


2nd  Sec  Am  Cols  £M 
Cas+el 

I  Sec  Am  Cots  JW 
Mef+nich 
h If eld 


/rtf.        , 

C.ArA!§D 
^      •Nunkirchen 


Thole 


Inf  m 


t^-4sch 
Dirminqe 
,^Lebach. 
Inf.m      ^°^^ 


ISO IV 


'''•W   Mair.zweiler        _,^  „      „ 
^j^  ^OlSDm^Sfh.  Diy  m  Corps 

r.Hoip.lK  '6D,y 
^"^IllinqenlZr      oj^^ 
farnjecT^s.  *^^'^^' 


elskirchen 


—620- 


First  Army 


Spec/a/  J/f^M 


*  Hermeskeil 


•  Kelt 


Aug.  6 


ItlArrry 


a//  to  D/ys 


Cas+el 
2ncfjfc  Am  CohJM 


^Uf  Sec  AmC</l  m 

uMarpiho 

AscKbach     /      UrexV^- 

Lebacl]^       Eppelborn'^v:^      ^  OjMeil^^f  Neumuns+er 

Weibelskirchen 
Neunkircben 


Saar-louis 


i5  0> 

Gr  Rosselin 


—621— 


Position  Sketches 


J/fMal  Jk/^c/? 


!^*A 


rmy 


Neunkirchen 


-622— 


First  Army 


J  pec/a/  Jke/o^ 


Saarlouis 


ll»Army 


^^^^ 


—623— 


PART  III 
French  Accounts 


Proclamation  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  to  the  French  Nation 
ON  the  23rd  July  1870 

There  are  solemn  moments  in  the  life  of  nations  when  national 
honour,  violently  roused,  attains  to  an  irresistable  force,  dominates 
all  other  interests  and  assumes  the  sole  direction  of  the  country's 
destinies.     One  of  these  decisive  hours  has  struck  for  France. 

Prussia,  tow^ards  whom  we  testified  nothing  but  the  most  concilia- 
tory feelings,  both  during  and  since  the  war  of  1866,  has  paid  no  at- 
tention to  our  good  will  and  forbearance.  Launched  on  the  stream 
of  invasion,  she  has  provoked  mistrust  everywhere,  necessitated  ex- 
cessive armaments,  and  turned  Europe  into  a  camp  where  uncertainty 
and  fear  for  the  morrow  reign  supreme. 

A  recent  incident  has  revealed  the  instability  of  international 
relations  and  exhibited  the  whole  gravity  of  the  situation.  We  have 
entered  our  protests  against  the  last  pretensions  of  Prussia.  They 
have  been  evaded  and  followed  by  contemptuous  acts.  Our  country 
was  pervaded  by  a  deep  sense  of  irritation,  and  at  once  a  cry  for  war 
echoed  from  one  end  of  France  to  the  other.  There  remains  nothing 
for  us  but  to  entrust  our  destiny  to  the  decision  of  arms. 

We  war  not  with  Germany,  whose  independence  we  esteem.  We 
wish  that  the  nations  forming  the  gi*eat  German  nationality  may  freely 
dispose  of  their  destinies.  As  for  ourselves,  we  demand  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  state  of  things  which  shall  guarantee  our  safety  and 
give  us  an  assurance  for  the  future.  We  desire  to  gain  a  lasting- 
peace  based  on  the  true  interests  of  nations,  and  to  put  an  end  to  this 
precarious  state  in  which  one  nation  employs  its  resources  to  arm 
against  another. 

The  glorious  standard,  which  we  once  more  unfurl  against  those 
who  challenge  us,  is  the  same  which  bore  throughout  Europe  the 
civilizing  ideas  of  our  great  revolution.  It  represents  the  same  prin- 
ciples and  will  inspire  the  same  spirit  of  freedom. 

Frenchmen !  I  am  about  to  place  myself  at  the  head  of  that 
valiant  army  which  is  animated  by  love  of  duty  and  of  country.  It 
knows  what  it  can  do,  for  it  has  seen  victory  accompanying  its  march 
in  all  quarters  of  the  globe. 

I  take  my  son  with  me  despite  his  youth.  He  knows  the  duties 
which  his  name  imposes  upon  him,  and  he  is  proud  of  sharing  the 
dangers  of  those  who  are  fighting  for  their  country. 

May  God  speed  our  efforts!  A  great  people  defending  a  just  cause 
is  invincible. 

Napoleon. 


-625- 


Order  of  Battle  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine 

Order  of  Battle  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  at  the 
Beginning  of  August  1870 

Commander-in-Chief Napoleon  II J 

Chief    of    Staff    Marshal    le    Boeuf 

Sub-Chiefs General  Lebrun  and  General  Jarra? 

Commander  of  Artillery General  Soleille 

Commander    of    Engineers    General    Coffinieres    de    Nordeck 

Director-General  of  Parks General  Mitrece 

Intendant-General Wolf 

Commandant  of  Head-quarters General  Letellier  Blanchard 

Total  of  the  Troops 


Number  of 


K 


Imperial  Guard 24 

1st  Corps   McMahon   j  52 

2nd    Corps    Frossard    39 

3rd   Corps    Bazaine    j  52 

4th    Corps    LadmirauU    i  39 

5th   Corps   Failly    39 

6th   Corps    Canrobert    49 

7th  Corps  Douay,  Felix 38 

Cavalry    Reserve    

Artillery  Resei-ve 

Total    332 


24 
28 
16 
28 
16 
16 
24 
20 


220* 


12 
20 
15 
20 
15 
15 
20 
15 
6 
16 
154 


60 
96 
72 
96 
72 
72 

114 
72 
30 
96 

780 


12 
24 
18 
24 
18 
18 
6 
18 


*It  appears  doubtful  whether  the  four  squadrons  per  regiment, 
the  number  here  assumed,  has  as  a  general  rule  been  exceeded. 

After  the  mobilization  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  there  remained 
behind  in  France  and  Italy: 

3  battalions  of  light  infantry  in  Algiers. 
The  foreign  regiment  in  Algiers. 

4  infantry  regiments  in  Algiers. 

4  infantry    regiments    near    Toulouse. 
2  infantry   regiments  in   Civita   Vecchia. 
115   Fourth  battalions  in  process  of  mobilization  in  the   in- 
terior. 
6  Cavalry  regiments  in  Algiers. 

2  Cavalry  regiments  near   Toulouse  and  in  Civita   Vecchia. 
10  batteries    (8  in  Algiers,  2  in  Civita  Vecchia). 


—626— 


PART  III 

French  Accounts 


French  G2  Estimates  of  the  Situa- 
tion.     Shown  Graphically 

These  mays  are  corrected  maps  origitially  drawn  by  Colonel 
Bird,  British  Army. 


Redrawn    by 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza 

Field  Artillery 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


26.  July 


■^-\   V       forte  i 
POSlTIO^<S/ar     CERMAIS-S         ^- 


n.Hh.,^  wi£f;<c;. 


Scale  of  Miles 


FRENCB        O 
GERMAIN'S      C3 

LCX.XMBUK.G 


uiwe, 


-630- 


Positions  of  Germans 


ao^Jui 


POSITIONS    or    GERMANS. 


7l  Bodi/ 

U7^ 


Charla^J 


Noi    locaf*d 


22  '  ■'       [Prince    f, 


...      ^. 
NoUl-.Tofal      Frtnch( forcti    sitotrn    -  abf   2aa.»<>o/<. 


■BaumholcU 


KaitersbtuterTu 


K  Spi 


—631— 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


5"^ August 


POSITIONS    Ol'     GERMANS. 


7 


FRENCH      O  ^„   .,- 

0EKMAJVS    C3  (         r„»rch"l1  \^_^r^'- 

^.„^^  \  ^       ^'^  Heinovnr  Jul<^  J' 

Scale  of  Mrlet  \      Xr*"'^  >  rrrs 

■f  'f  *e  '•.       >^  ^^  LiLI 

r  Irtvts 

xSakrburg  BauTfOiaUM 


■w*ft 


(ill)  f'Suarfuemirus 

®  (v) 


//o/«  •      /<//\  informtfitn       rtctn'td 
inc/i  catcd-^Strm9ni    art    nof  C^fia^f* 


.^' 


^    Sh  ajbuj-^ 


-632- 


Positions  of  Germans 


i!iyujl,6oo  pr^ 


—633- 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


.Evenmc)  of  6' '"  Aui/usi 


POSITIONS    OF    CERMArsS 


rRc-NCH       O 
GERMANS     O 

Scalf  ofMilfs 
f  '■''  y  *f 

LUXEMBURG 


ThwnyiVe 


■wts^ 


•Carlsruhe 


—634- 


Positions  of  Germans 


POSITIONS    Of     GERMANS 


—635— 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


POSITIONS    or    GERMANS. 


^  ■4  iiimpti'arj    bridfei 
reeAf   at  /»«•'<  '•>  #.»'^'* 


\ 


StrusJna-cf      /^ 


-636— 


Positions  of  Germans 


26"'  August 


POSITIONS    OF     CERMANS. 


flfcner-es 


BELG  EUM 


Retyrui « 


rf3 


S^Me7t<ihcuid\^^  ^0  <5<?*W 


lu^embt:rg  /^■. 


/' 


•""'IT- 

v 

OERMAJVS 

0      « 

.6« 

'Vir'trj 

L-_ 


V^  ^■-.         /,o^e  :      The    po/-f-»w^.S-'V-ii.-'/ 


V 


J_L 


i i. 


—637— 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


2Sl^Auaujt 


POSITIONS     or     CEFIMAMS. 


/' 


Tietfiel 


o- 


BELGIUM 

,  ^  "    a  a 

"Cll      ^     Crown  Fr,'U*j\VcrJui% 


LUXEMBURG 


JVa, 


L_^^ 


—638— 


Positions  of  Germans 


iO^^Au^iul 


POSITIONS    or    GERMANS. 


'«4»t.  BELGIUM 

Or 


S.      'Moriimedy 


FRET<CH  O 

tyrft/^-  of  MUej 


ojLon^ycn 


\  Lin^iMBURG  . 


<«^  /»0^    cUitly- 


fry  Gt.rmt 


-639- 


G2  Estimates,  Graphic 


Mf August 


POeiTIONS    or   CCRMANS. 


o  /-.  /?  /V/i  /^-  f    o 


—640— 


French 
Messages  and  Orders 

RELATING  TO 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SPICHEREN 

August  6th  1870 


TRANSLATED   BY 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza 

Field  Artillery 


Orders: 


G.  H.  Q.  4  August. 


It  must  always  be  assumed  that  the  enemy  will  do  that  which 
is  most  reasonable.  English  newspapers  state  that  General  von 
Steinmetz  occupies  a  central  position  between  Saarebruck  and  Sarre- 
louis;  he  is  supported,  in  rear,  by  the  corps  of  Prince  Frederick- 
Charles,  while  his  left  rests  on  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince,  which 
is  in  Rhenish  Bavaria.     The  enemy  intends  to  advance  on  Nancy. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  I  order  the  following  troop  disposi- 
tions : 

4th  Corps:  headquarters,  General  Ladmirault,  to  Boulay;  one 
division  to  Boucheborn,  the  third  division  to  Tererchen. 

3d  Corps:  headquarters.  Marshal  Bazaine,  to  Saint  Avoid;  one 
division  to  Marienthal,  the  third  division  to  Puttelange,  the  fourth 
division,  at  the  discretion  of  the  marshal,  either  in  front  or  in  rear 
of  the  other  divisions:  The  2d  Corps  (Frossard)  will  remain  in  its 
present  positions. 

4th  Corps:  General  de  Failly,  will  march  to  Bitche,  uniting  with 
the  division  now  there;  there  two  divisions  will  be  under  the  orders 
of  Marshal  MacMahon,  while  the  division  at  Sarreguemines  will 
maintain  connection  with  the  division  at  Puttelange,  and  will  be  un- 
der the  orders  of  Marshal  Bazaine.    ' 

The  Cavalry  Division  (Forton),  now  at  Pont-a-Mousson,  will 
proceed  to  Faulquemont. 

Marshal  Canrobert,  with  three  divisions  of  the  6th  Corps,  will 
proceed  to  Nancy. 

It  is  to  be  understood  that  the  division  which  General  Ladmirault 
is  to  send  to  Boucheborn  will  not  proceed  to  this  place  until  the  6th 
instant. 

Napoleon. 


—641- 


French  Messages  and  Orders 

G.  H.  Q.  U  August. 
Telegram 

To  Makshal  Bazaine: 

Tomorrow  the  5th  instant  send  Decaen's  division  to  Saint  Avoid, 
where  your  headquarters  and  reserves  are  also  to  be;  send  Metman's 
division  to  Marienthal,  Montaudon's  division  to  Sarreguemines,  Cas- 
tagny's  division  to  Puttelange. 

Napoleon. 


iiJfO  A.  M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  General  Frossard  : 

Prepare  against  a  serious  attack,  which  may  take  place  today. 
Remain  at  your  PC  and  do  not  report  to  the  Emperor. 

Bazaine. 

(NOTE:  The  Emperor  Napoleon  had  ordered  the  corps  com- 
manders to  report  to  him  for  a  conference,  to  be  held  at  Saint  Avoid 
at  1:30  P.M.,  August  6th.— C.H.L.) 


6:00  A.  M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  General  Frossard: 

The  Chief  of  Staff,  1st  Division,  3d  Corps,  not  yet  fully  arrived 
at  Sarreguemines,  reports  that  he  is  expecting  an  attack.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  sub-prefect  at  Sarreguemines  reports  "The  telegraph 
line  and  the  railroad  has  just  been  interrupted  at  Bliesbrucken,  on 
the  line  to  Bitche." 

I  have  asked  for  more  precise  information. 

If  the  enemy  really  makes  a  serious  offensive  movement  on  Sar- 
reguemines, it  will  be  necessary  to  send  the  division  now  at  Spich- 
eren  towards  Grossbliederstroff. 

Bazaine. 


9:10  A.M.   6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

I  hear  artillery  fire  on  my  outpost  line,  and  I  am  going  there  at 
once.  Would  it  not  be  well  if  Montaudon's  division  would  send  a 
brigade  towards  Grossbliederstroff,  and  Decaen's  division  advance  to- 
wards Merlebach  and  Rosbruck  ? 

Frossard. 


—642- 


The  Battle  of  Spicheren 

10:10  A.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

Strong  hostile  reconnoitering  forces  of  infantry  and  cavalry  have 
advanced  against  us  from  the  heights  of  Sarrebruck;  but  no  attack 
has  yet  developed.  We  have  taken  position  on  the  high  ground,  and 
across  the  road;  I  am  not  going  to  Saint-Avoid. 

Frossard. 


10:40  A.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

I  am  informed  that  the  enemy  is  at  Rosbruck  and  at  Merlebach, 
that  is  in  my  rear  (half  way  between  Sorbach  and  Saint-Avoid),  you 
should  provide  forces  in  this  direction. 

Frossard. 


11 :15  A.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  General  Frossard: 

Although  I  have  very  few  troops  available  to  guard  the  Saint 
Avoid  position,  I  am  sending  Metman's  division  (from  Marienthal , 
towards  Macheren  and  Bening;  this  last  place  is  at  most  but  9  kilo- 
meters from  Forbach)  ;  and  Castagny's  division  (from  Puttelange)  to- 
wards Farswiller  and  Theding  (this  last  place  is  but  9  kilometers 
at  most  from  Forbach,  and  about  3  kilometers  east  from  Bening) .  I 
can  do  no  more,  but  as  you  have  your  three  divisions  united,  it 
appears  to  me  that  the  one  at  Oeting  might  very  well  send  a  brigade 
or  even  more  towards  Morsbach,  in  order  to  observe  Rosbruch  from 
this  direction,  that  is  the  road  through  Emersweiller  and  Grande- 
Rossel  (Gross-Rossel)  to  Sarrlouis — Our  line  is  unfortunately  very 
thin  on  account  of  the  last  dispositions  made,  and  if  the  movement  is 
really  so  serious,  it  would  be  well  for  us  to  concentrate  at  the  Caden- 
brun  position.     Keep  me  well  informed.' 

Bazaine. 


6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

I  am  heavily  engaged  along  the  road,  as  well  as  in  the  woods 
and  heights  of  Spicheren,  and  a   serious  battle  is  under  way. 

Frossard. 


-643— 


French  Messages  and  Orders 

(NOTE:  The  foregoing  telegram,  taken  in  connection  with  the 
following  one,  and  the  descripiton  of  events,  would  seem  to  have  been 
sent  about  1:30  P.M.— C.H.L.) 


2:00  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  General  Frossard: 

I    am   sending    Montaudon    to    Grossbliederstroff.     The    Dragoon 
Brigade  is  proceeding  to  Forbach. 

Bazaine. 


2:00  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  H.  M.  The  Emperor: 

In  connection  with  my  despatch  of  noon  today,  I  have  made  the 
following  dispositions:  General  Metman,  with  one  brigade  is  march- 
ing to  Betting-les-Saint-Avold  (a  little  more  than  a  kilometre  west 
of  Bening),  the  other  brigade  is  proceeding  towards  Macheren  and 
Mittenberg.  General  Castagny  is  sending  a  brigade  to  the  Theding 
position,  to  the  left  of  Cadenbron,  and  he  will  support  it  by  proceed- 
ing in  person  with  his  other  brigade  to  Farschweiler,  General  Montau- 
den  will  proceed  to  Rouhling  and  Grossbliederstroff,  leaving  to  Lapa- 
set's  brigade  of  the  5th  Corps  the  mission  of  covering  Sarreguemines, 
as  it  is  occupying  that  place. 

This  morning's  reconnaissance  reported  nothing;  nevertheless 
about  eight-thirty  this  morning,  while  I  was  on  the  Carling  road 
visiting  the  outposts  of  the  85th  Infantry,  we  received  some  shots 
from  cavalry  patrols. 

I  will  keep  your  Majesty  advised. 

Bazaine. 


i  :30  P.M. 
Telegram 

To  Bening: 

If  General  Metman  is  at  Bening,  direct  him  to  proceed  to  For- 
bach at  once. 

Frossard. 


6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  General  Frossard: 

To  reassure  me,  send  me  news;  do  not  forget  Montaudon's  divi- 
sion, which  should  be  at  Sarreguemines. 

Bazaine. 


—644- 


The  Battle  of  Spicheren 


(NOTE:  The  foregoing  telegram  appears  to  have  been  sent 
about  5:00  P.M.  The  following  telegram  appears  to  be  the  reply. — 
C.H.L.) 

Forbach,  5:45  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

The  battle  which  has  been  very  lively  is  declining;  but  it  will 
undoubtedly  recommence  tomorrow;  send  me  a  regiment. 

Frossard. 


5:50  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

My  right  on  the  heights,  has  been  obliged  to  retreat.    I  find  my- 
self seriously  compromised.    Send  me  troops  as  quickly  as  possible. 

Frossard. 


6:15  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  General  Frossard: 

I  am  sending  you  a  regiment  by  rail;  General  Castagny  is 
marching  towards  you ;  he  will  be  ordered  to  rejoin  you.  General 
Montaudon  left  Sarreguemines  at  5  P.M.  for  Grossbliederstorff  (on 
the  road  to  Spicheren).  General  Metman  is  at  Betting.  You  should 
have  already  received  Juniac's  Dragoon  Brigade. 

Bazaine. 


7:22  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

We  are  turned  through  Werden;  I  am  sending  all  my  troops  to- 
wards the  heights. 

Frossard. 


8:05  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  General  Frossard: 

I  have  sent  you  everything  I  can.     Explain  clearly  which  posi- 
tions you  think  you  should  occupy. 

Bazaine. 

—645— 


French  Messages  and  Orders 

(NOTE  1:  This  message  appears  to  relate  to  the  indefinite  ex- 
pression as   to   "the  heights"   in  the  preceding  telegram. — C.H.L.) 

(NOTE  2:  No  reply  was  sent  to  this  telegram.  Frossard  ap- 
pears to  have  been  busy  in  making  a  retreat. — C.H.L.) 


G.  H.  Q.  S:20  P.M.  6th  August. 
Telegram 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

The  enemy's  movements  tend  to  separate  you  from  General  Fros- 
sard; order  General  Ladmirault's  entire  corps  to  join  you.  Take 
necessary  measures  to  direct  the  retreat  of  General  Frossard  and 
troops  at  Sarreguemines  to  a  point  in  rear,  which  I  believe  should 
be  Puttelange.  The  Guard  should  be  half  way  between  Courcelles- 
Chaussy  and  Saint-Avoid. 

Napoleon. 


.?.  7th  August. 

Message. 

To  Marshal  Bazaine: 

In  compliance  with  a  telegram  received  yesterday  at  7:30  P.M., 
I  proceeded  from  Bening  to  Forbach.  I  tried  all  night  to  find  General 
Frossard.  This  morning  I  marched  from  Forbach  to  Puttelange.  The 
men  are  without  rations. 

'    Metman. 


Extract  from  the  War  Diary  of  Montaudon's  Di- 
vision FOR  August  6th 

(NOTE:     This  division  arrived  at  Sarreguemines  at  6:00  A.M., 
August  6th.— C.H.L.) 

Towards  noon  while  at  Sarreguemines  we  heard  lively- 
artillery  firing  in  the  direction  of  Sarrebruck.  At  3 : 00  P.M. 
the  division  received  orders  from  Marshal  Bazaine  to  march 
to  Grossbliederstorff  to  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  2d 
Corps,  which  was  engaged  beyond  Forbach.  The  division 
left  Sarreguemines  at  4:00  P.M.  At  7:00  P.M.  it  arrived 
on  the  high  ground  near  Rouhling,  and  went  on  a  little  fur- 
ther to  the  left,  to  a  position  on  the  high  ground  of  Caden- 
bron.  After  arrival  here,  General  Montaudon  found  a  staff 
officer  of  the  2d  Corps  looking  for  him ;  but  as  it  was  already 

—646— 


The  Battle  of  Spicheren 

too  late  to  arrive  in  time  on  the  battlefield,  the  division  re- 
mained on  the  position.  The  division  commander  sent  a 
captain  of  the  General  Staff  with  the  2d  Corps  ofllcer  to 
Forbach  to  inform  General  Frossard  that  he  (Montaudon) 
would  be  at  his  disposition  for  the  following  day.  At  mid- 
night these  two  officers  returned  with  the  information  that 
the  2d  Corps  was  retreating  towards  Sarreguemines.  The 
division  was  called  to  arms,  and  by  a  night  march  pro- 
ceeded to  Puttelange,  where  between  9:00  A.M.  and  10:00 
A.M.,  August  7th,  it  went  into  camp. 


—647- 


MARCH  OF  THE  FRENCH  5  th 
CORPS  TOWARDS  WORTH 

August  Uh  to  6th,  1870. 


SUMMARY  OF  ACCOUNTS 

Compiled   By 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza, 

Field  Artillery. 

The  French  5th  Corps,  August  4th  to  6th,  1870 

1.  On  August  4th,  1870  the  5th  Corps  (General  de 
Failly)   was  stationed  as  follows: 

3d  Division  (General  de  Lespart),  three  regiments  cavalry 
attached,  at  Bitche. 

5th  Corps  (less  3d  Division),  three  regiments  cavalry  at- 
tacked, about  Sarreguemines. 

Hostile  patrols  had  been  observed  on  the  frontier  for 
several  days. 

2.  In  view  of  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Wissembourg 
on  this  date,  which  was  a  defeat  for  the  French,  who  retired 
from  that  point  southwards,  GHQ  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
4th  wired  General  de  Failly  "Support  your  division  at 
Bitche  with  your  other  two  divisions." 

3.  In  compliance  with  this  telegram  the  5th  Corps 
issued  orders  on  the  4th  for: 

1st  Division  (General  de  I'Abadie)  to  march  at  once  as  far 
as  possible  towards  Bitche  via  the  main  road; 

2d  Division  (General  Goze)  to  march  on  the  5th  by  brigades. 

4.  The  1st  Division  marched  on  the  4th  to  Wissing 
farm,  about  4  miles  distant  and  bivouacked.  It  continued 
its  march  on  the  5th  instant  to  Fremenberg  farm,  about  12 
miles  further,  and  about  2  miles  west  of  Bitche,  arriving 
about  dark.    The  long  time  taken  for  this  march  appears  to 


-649— 


March  of  French  5th  Corps 

have  been  due  to  the  fact  that  the  march  was  made  in  one 
column,  neither  a  flank  guard  nor  an  advance  guard  being 
used. 

5.  On  the  5th,  the  leading  brigade  (Maussion)  2d 
Division,  left  Sarreguemines  with  the  Corps  Artillery  (6 
batteries)  and  the  1st  and  5th  Lancers  attached.  The 
remaining  brigade  (Lapasset)  of  the  2d  Division  with  the 
Corps  Trains  and  1  regiment  cavalry  remained  at  Sarregue- 
mines awaiting  relief  by  a  division  of  the  3d  Corps,  which 
General  de  Failly  had  arranged  for,  as  in  his  opinion  it  was 
inadvisable  to  abandon  Sarreguemines.  As  the  relieving 
division  did  not  arrive  until  late  in  the  day,  the  5th  Corps 
detachment  at  Sarreguemines  remained  there  until  the 
following  day. 

6.  Maussion's  detachment  having  sent  the  5th  Lan- 
cers out  to  reconnoiter,  arrived  at  12 :00  noon  at  Rorbach 
without  incident.  He  found  the  inhabitants  to  be  greatly 
excited,  and  learnt  that  a  Prussian  cavalry  regiment  had 
been  near  there  on  the  preceding  evening,  and  had  searched 
neighboring  villages.  Shortly  after  information  was  re- 
ceived that  hostile  infantry  and  cavalry  were  in  sight.  A 
party  of  the  infantry  brigade  at  once  deployed  and  opened 
fire,  when  it  was  discovered  that  the  supposed  enemy  was 
the  5th  Lancers  with  a  few  men  of  the  3d  Division  (68th 
Infantry)  returning  from  reconnaissance.  In  view  of  the 
foregoing  facts  the  detachment  commander  decided  it  was 
inadvisable  to  continue  his  march,  and  remained  at  Ror- 
bach. The  Corps  commander  being  advised  of  the  decision 
approved  of  it.  In  the  5th  Corps  reports  this  approval  is 
based  on  the  importance  of  the  Rorbach  valley — Maus- 
sion's detachment  remained  overnight  at  Rorbach.  5th 
Corps  headquarters  moved  to  Bitche. 

7.  On  August  5th,  GHQ  issued  an  order  placing  the 
5th  Corps  under  the  orders  of  Marshal  MacMahon.  The 
latter  believing  that  the  5th  Corps  would  be  found  at 
Bitche,  telegraphed  at  8:00  P.M.  to  the  Corps  commander 
"Move  at  once  to  Reichshoffen  with  your  entire  corps.  I 
expect  you  to  assist  me  tomorrow." 


-650- 


Summary  of  Accounts 

8.     At  3:00   A.M.   August  6th,   General  de   Faiily 
wired  Marshal  MacMahon  in  reply  to  the  effect: 

a.  That  only  the  3d  Division  could  be  sent  on  the  5th  to  Reichs- 

hoffen. 

b.  That  the   1st  Division  would  remain   at  Bitche  on  the   5th, 

marching   on   the   7th   to   Phillippsbourg. 

c.  That  Maussion's  detachment  would  march  to  Bitche  on  the 

7th. 

d.  That  the   balance   of   the   5th   Corps   was   at    Sarreguemines, 

completely  cut  off  from  the  troops  previously  mentioned. 

9.  The  5th  Corps  issued  orders  early  on  the  5th  as  in- 
dicated in  preceding  paragraph.  The  detachment  at  Sarre- 
guemines (Lapasset)  was  ordered  to  remain  there  because 
its  rail  communications  had  been  cut  by  hostile  cavalry  at 
Bliesbrucken.  Maussion  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Frem- 
denberg,  2  miles  west  of  Bitche.  5th  Corps  headquarters 
remained  at  Bitche. 

10.  The  Division  (Lespart)  received  its  order  at  6:00 
A.M.  to  march  via  Niederbronn  about  13  miles  distant,  and 
moved  out  at  7:30  A.M.  The  inhabitants  reported  hostile 
troops  in  the  vicinity.  The  12th  Chasseurs  marched  at  the 
head  of  the  division  without  distance.  There  was  no  ad- 
vance guard  nor  anj^  flank  guard.  At  each  cross  roads  the 
column  halted  while  the  cavalry  and  sometimes  the  infantry 
searched  the  vicinity.  No  hostile  troops  were  seen  during 
the  march.  Artillery  firing  was  heard  towards  the  east 
since  early  in  the  morning.  As  the  columns  approached 
Niederbronn,  wounded  and  stragglers  were  met,  becoming 
more  and  more  numerous  and  bringing  discouragitfig  reports 
as  to  the  battle  near  Worth.  At  5:00  P.M.  the  column  ar- 
rived on  the  high  ground  overlooking  Niederbronn  in  time 
to  witness  French  troops  retreating  south  through  that 
town. 

11.  Communication  was  now  established  for  the  first 
time  with  Marshal  MacMahon,  who  ordered  the  division  to 
deploy  one  brigade  on  each  side  of  the  road,  and  its  artil- 
lery to  take  position  for  action.  This  being  done  the  Prus- 
sians stopped  their  pursuit  and  did  not  proceed  beyond 
Neiderbronn. 


—651— 


March  of  French  5th  Corps 

12.  The  5th  Corps  commander  having  learnt  at  Bitche 
of  the  loss  of  the  battle  at  Worth,  convened  a  council  of 
war  at  7:00  P.M.  on  August  6th  to  discuss: 

a.  Was   it   possible   for   the   troops   at   Bitche,   about   i   of   the 
corps,  to  accept  battle  at  that  place? 

b.  Should  the  1st  Corps  be  followed  in  its  retreat? 

The  council  decided  on  the  latter  alternative. 


-652— 


FRENCH  ORDERS 

AND 

MESSAGES 

August  13-15,  1870. 


Translated   By 

Colonel  Conrad  H.  Lanza 

Field  Artillery. 
Orders:  G.H.Q.  IS  August,  1870. 

{Extract) 

The  1st  and  3d  Reserve  Cavalry  Divisions  will  march  at  1:00  P  M. 
August  14th  from  their  bivouacs  towards  Verdun;  the  1st  Divi- 
sion will  take  the  road  from  Gravelotte  to  Doncourt  and  Conflans; 
the  3d  the  road  from  Gravelotte  to  Mars-la-Tour, 

The  3d  and  4th  Corps  will  take  the  first  of  these  roads;  the  2d 
and  6th  Corps  will  follow  the  last. 

The  Guard  will  follow  the  6th  Corps. 

Bazaine. 

Note:  The  French  Army  on  the  morning  of  the  14th  appears 
to  haye  been  in  a  defensive  position  about  1*  or  2  kilometers  east 
of  the  Metz  forts,  in  the  following  order  from  south  to  north — 6th 
Corps;  2d  Corps  (Frossard)  ;  3d  Corps  (Decaen) ;  4th  Corps  (Lad- 
mirault).  The  Guard  Corps  (Bourbaki)  was  in  army  reserve  in 
rear  of  the  center. — C.H.L. 


Orders:  August  15,  1870. — P.M. 

At  4:00  A.M.  tomorrow  morning  soup  will  be  served.  At  4:30 
A.M.  troops  will  be  ready  to  march,  horses  saddled  and  tents  rolled. 
The  2nd  and  6th  Corps  will  probably  have  a  hostile  force  of  about 
30,000  men  in  their  front,  and  should  expect  an  attack  tomorrow. 

Bazaine. 


War  Diary.  Army  of  the  Rhine. 

August  15. 

The    army   continued    its    movement   on    Verdun.      The    Marshal, 
C-in-C  gave  orders  to  occupy  the  following  positions: 

—653— 


French  Orders  and  Messages 

GHQ  to  Gravelotte; 

2d  Corps  to  Rezonville  and  Vionville  as  far  as  Mars-la-Tour. 

3d  Corps,  in  rear  of  the  4th,  as  far  as  Verneville,  across  the  road 
Verneville;   Saint-Marcel. 

4th  Corps  to  Doncourt-les-Conflans; 

5th  Corps  ,in  rear  of  the  2d  at  Rezonville; 

Guard  Corps  in  vicinity  of  Gravelotte. 

1st  Reserve  Cavalry  Division  (du  Barail)  towards  Jarny;  3d 
Reserve    Cavalry   Division    (de   Forton)    to   Mars-la-Tour. 

Upon  arrival  at  Mars-la-Tour  this  division  met  hostile  forces 
at  9:30  A.?,2.  After  a  little  artillery  firing  the  enemy  retired  towards 
Puxieux. 

The  3rd  Reserve  Cavalry  Division  remained  in  position  at  Mars- 
la-Tour  until  1:00  P.M.  and  then  retired  to  Vionville  where  they  found 
the  2d  Corps  Cavalry. 

On  account  of  the  delay  caused  by  the  battle  of  the  14th  instant, 
the  3d  and  4th   Corps  were  unable  to  occupy  the  positions  ordered. 

The  3rd  Corps  has  only  the  1st  Division  (Montaudon)  at  Saint 
Marcel^^;  the  2nd  and  4th  Divisions  rejoin  during  the  night,t  and 
the  3rd  Division  (Metman)  remains  at  Haison  de  Planches.  The 
4th  Corps  is  at  Devant-les-Ponts  and  Woippy;  only  the  3rd  Divi- 
sion camps  at  Lessy. 

The  1st  Corps  is  proceeding  to  Saint  Dizier;  no  information  as 
to  the  5th   Corps. 

Marshal  Leboeuf  has  been  detailed  to  command  the  3rd  Corps,  in 
place  of  General  Decaen,  wounded  at  the  battle  of  Borny. 


War  Diary,  2d  Corps 

August   15. 
(Extract) 

At  daybreak  the  2d  Corps  continued  its  movement  towards  Mars- 
la-Tour,  but  on  account  of  delays  caused  by  other  Corps,  an^  order 
was  received  from  the  Marshal  C-in-C  to  halt  at  Rezonville. 

Lapasset's  Brigade  at  the  head  of  the  column  was  followed  by 
Verge's  Division  which  arrived  at  a  point  1  kilometer  beyond  Rezon- 
ville, and  camped  on  the  left  of  the  main  road  in  two  lines. 

Bataille's  Division  also  camped  in  two  lines  in  front  of  the  2nd 
Division. 

During  this  time,  Lapasset's  Brigade  faced  to  the  rear  and  left 
and  camped;  its  right  on  the  high  ground  overloolcing  and  command- 
ing the  exit  of  the  Gorze  valley;  its  left  at  Rezonville.  The  large 
woods  of  Saint- Arnould  and  des  Ognons  which  covered  this  exit 
were  carefully  observed. 

After  resting  some  time  at  Longeville,  the  Cavalry  Division 
continued  its  march,  being  always  the  extreme  rear  guard  of  the 
Army.  It  arrived  about  mid-day  a  little  in  rear  of  Vionville,  where 
it  camped,  with  outposts  on  the  Verdun  roads  and  roads  to  the  left, 
leading  into  the  Valley  of  the  Rupt  de  Mad. 

The  reserve  and  the  Corps  Artillery  camped  at  Rezonville,  on 
the  left  and  close  to  the  road. 


*This  division  was  really  at  Montigny-la-Grange  and  Verneville. 
fThese  divisions  really  stayed  all  night  at  Verneville  and  Devant- 
les-Ponts,  respectively. 

—654— 


August  13-15,  1870 


The  Engineer  Train  with  the  Reserve  Company  remained  at 
Gravelotte;  the  6th  Corps  moved  up  on  our  right  on  the  other  side 
of  the  road  and  beyond  Rezonville.  Headquarters  of  the  2nd  and 
6th  Corps  were  at  Rezonville. 


Diary  of  A.  Q.  M.  Bouteiller,  2d  Corps: 

August  15,  1S70. 

(Extract). 

The  2d  Corps  continued  its  movements  towards  the  West,  at 
daybreak  on  the  15th;  but  at  the  moment  when  the  Headquarters 
Train  was  about  to  start  its  march,  Army  General  Staff  officers  came 
down  the  road,  and  caused  all  wagons  to  get  off  to  the  right  and 
left,  in  order  to  leave  space  for  the  Emperor's  baggage  train.  *  *  *  * 
All  our  wagons  had  to  take  to  the  fields;  our  convoy,  which  we  had 
had  so  much  trouble  to  get  in  order,  was  cut.  in  several  places,  and 

the  head  of  the  convoy  had  to  wait  more  than  *  hours  at 

Maison-Neuve  befoi-e  being  able  to  resume  the  march. 


Message  Gravelotte,  15  August. 

To  General  Frossard,  Rezonville: 
Please  give  orders  to  have  soup  served  at  4:00  A.M.  tomorrow, 
and  be  ready  to   march   at  4:30   a.m.      Tents   are  to  be   struck  and 
horses  saddled  but  not  bridled  until  ready  to  leave  bivouacs. 

Please  let  me  know  the  exact  location  of  your  headquarters,  in 
order  that  my  orders,  should  I  have  any  to  give,  may  certainly  reach 
you  in  the  quickest  possible  manner. 

Bazaine. 

Note:     A  similar  message  was  sent  to  the  Guard  Corps. — C.  H.  L. 


To  Marshal  Bazaine:  Midnight,  15th    August. 

In  compliance  with  your  Excellency's  orders  the  2d  Corps  will 
be  ready  to  march  at  4:30  a.m. 

My  headquarters,  together  with  that  of  Marshal  Canrobert  are 
at   Rezonville. 

The  2d  Corps  is  camped  between  Rezonville  and  Vionville. 

Forton's  Division   and  the  Cavalry  Division  is  beyond  Vionville. 

The  Corps  Artillery  is  camped  at  Rezonville. 

I  beg  your  excellency  to  let  me  know  in  ample  time  the  direction 
and  the  order  of  march  for  the  2d  Corps.  Forton's  Division  which 
occupied  Mars-la-Tour  this  morning,  fell  back  to  Vionville  before 
Prussian  forces  which  appeared  on  its  left. 

A  Prussian  detachment  of  about  two  regiments  (infantry  and 
cavalry)    commanded  by  a  general  and  coming  from  Noveant  passed 


*Number  of  hours  left  blank  in  the  original  document. — C.  H.  L. 

—655— 


French  Orders  and  Messages 

through  Gorze  at  9:00  P.M.  where  they  inquired  how  far  It  was  from 
there  to  the  Verdun  road.  Immediately  afterwards  they  retired 
suddenly  by  the  same  route.  They  attempted  to  avenge  themselves 
on  the  inhabitants  who  had  refused  to  give  them  information. 

Frossard. 

Note:      GHQ  informed  the  Guard  Corps   as  to  the  above  infor- 
mation concerning  the  enemy. — C.  H.  L. 


3rd  Corps  War  Diary.  15th  August. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  the  3rd  Corps  crossed  the  Moselle, 
and  was  massed  in  a  very  restricted  space  on  the  side  of  the  Plappe- 
ville  hill. 

On  the  15th,  the  Army  was  to  commence  its  march  on  Verdun ;  the 
road  via  Doncourt  and  Jarny  had  been  assigned  to  the  3rd  and  4th 
Corps,  while  the  road  via  Mars-la-Tour  was  to  be  followed  by  the 
2nd,  6th  and  Guard  Corps.  In  order  to  avoid  congestion  in  the 
Rozerieulles  defile,  the  3rd  Corps  was  sent  via  Lessy,  Chatel-Saint- 
Germain  and  Verneville  to  the  positions  where  it  was  to  bivouac 
which  extended  from  Saint  Marcel  to  Amanvillers. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  as  the  heads  of  the  columns  moved 
out,  Marshal  Leboeuf  who  succeeded  General  Decaen  joined. 


The  march  of  the  3rd  Corps  was  considerably  delayed  by  the  lack 
of  width  of  roads,  which  lead  from  the  high  ground  of  Lessy  to 
Chatel-Saint-Germain,  and  by  detachments  of  troops  and  materiel, 
among  which  a  ponton  train,  belonging  to  other  corps. 

On  the  evening  of  the  15th  the  Divisions  of  Montaudon  and  Nay- 
ral  took  position  between  Amanvillers  and  Verneville  with  their  left 
extending  towards  la  Caulre.  The  Marshal  established  his  Headquar- 
ters at  Bagneux  Farm.  Aynard's  Division  was  unable  to  occupy  its 
position  on  the  Doncourt  road  opposite  la  Caulre  until  the  morning 
of  the  15th. 

The  Cavalry  Division  also  took  position  on  the  morning  of  the  15th 
in  rear  of  Verneville.  The  Corps  Artillery  went  to  near  Villers-aux- 
Bois.  As  for  Metman's  Division,  this  was  first  cut  by  4th  Corps 
troops,  then  ordered  afterwards  by  the  Marshal  C-in-C  until  the  17th 
instant  in  cooperating  with  the  concentration  of  the  Army,  and  did 
not  rejoin  the  3rd  Corps  until  the  evening  of  that  day. 


Orders.  3rd  Corps  Near  Metz. 

Monday,  15th  August. 

(Extract) 

At  1:00  P.M.  the  four  divisions  of  the  3rd  Corps  will  break  camp, 
to  follow  one  another  in  the  order  in  v/hich  they  are  now  camped.  They 
will  take  the  road  via  Plappeville  to  Chatel-Saint-Germain  where  they 
will  receive  orders  from  the  Chief  of  Staff  as  to  the  road  to  take. 

—656— 


August  13-15,  1870 


The  infantry  will  march  at  a  slow  and  moderate  gait,  halting  as 
Division  commanders  deem  best. 

Lebouef. 


Message.  3rd  Corps-Bagneux. 

15th  August. 

(Extract) 
To  G.  H.  Q.: 

I  have  just  arrived  at  my  headquarters  at  Bagneux  after  having 
reconnoitered  the  position  from  Amanvillers  to  Verneville  extending 
as  far  as  Saint-Marcel,  across  the  Gravelotte;  Doncourt  road  and 
returning  by  Rezonville. 

This  is  the  position  the  3rd  Corps  is  to  occupy  under  instructions 
from  your  Excellency.  It  is  a  fine  position  and  easy  to  defend  although 
a  little  wooded. 

Unfortunately  at  this  moment  (6:30  p.m.)  Montaudon's  Division 
on  the  extreme  right  is  the  only  one  in  position,  besides  the  Corps 
Artillery  which  arrived  via  Gravelotte. 

As  to  my  other  three  divisions  and  the  cavalry  they  will  not 
arrive  until  7:00  or  10:00  p.m.  today. 

As  soon  as  I  can  get  hold  of  a  regiment  of  dragoons  I  will  push 
them  forward  to  Doncourt  to  protect  the  4th  Corps  Trains.* 

Leboeuf. 


War  Diary.  Ath  Corps 

Lille,  15th  August. 

(Extract) 

The  4th  Corps  bivouacked  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  before 
P'ort  Moselle,  at  Devant-les-Ponts  on  both  sides  of  the  road  to  Thion- 
ville. 

This  day  the  Corps  received  the  order  to  proceed  to  Doncourt- 
en-Jarnisy;  but  the  troops  were  tired  from  the  marches  they  had 
just  made,  and  the  battle  they  so  gloriously  fought  on  the  14th.  In 
addition  it  was  necessary  to  draw  ammunition.  It  was  therefore 
impossible  to  reach  Doncourt  on  this  date.  But  the  Corps  commander 
in  order  to  comply  with  the  orders  received,  started  the  3rd  Division, 
which  had  suffered  the  least  at  the  fight  of  the  14th  on  its  march  at 
about  3:00  p.m  f 

As  the  road  by  Longeville  was  as  congested  as  on  the  preceding 
day,  this  Division  marched  via  Plappeville,  between  the  fort  of  that 
name  and  Fort  Saint-Quentin.  It  had  to  camp  near  Lessy  with  a 
view  to  marching  the  next  day  via  Gravelotte  to  Doncourt. 


*Note:  At  this  time  the  4th  Corps  Trains  were  really  at  Metz. 
The  C.  G.  3rd  Corps  appears  to  have  been  under  the  impression  that 
they  were  en  route  to  Verdun,  which  they  should  have  been,  but  were 
not!— C.  H.  L. 

fNote:  The  4th  Corps  had  been  ordered  by  the  C-in-C  to  march 
via  Longeau;  but  the  War  Diary  omits  all  reference  to  this. — C.H.L. 

—657— 


Fi'ench  Orders  and  Messages 

On  the  following  morning  the  two  other  divisions  were  to  follow 
at  daybreak;  but  in  the  evening  the  corps  commander  learning  that 
the  road  to  Plappeville  was  jammed  with  the  ,3rd  Corps  Trains  de- 
cided to  mai'ch  on  Doncourt  via  Briey,  thence  via  Habonville  and 
Jouaville. 

He  advised  the  Commanding  General,  3rd  Division  as  to  his 
decision,  in  order  that  the  former  might  reconnoiter  the  roads  lead- 
ing to  Doncourt. 


Diary  of  General  Henry,  Chief  of  Staff,  6th  Corps. 

15th  August. 

About  11:00  P.M.  on  the  14th,  an  officer  from  GHQ  arrived  with 
verbal  orders  for  the  6th  Corps  to  move  out  at  daybreak  on  the  15th; 
Tixier's  Division  to  cross  the  Moselle  by  the  railroad  bridge.  This 
movement  was  completed  by  5:00  a.m.  (on  the  15th)  ;  several  minutes 
after  the  engineers  blew  up  one  arch  of  this  bridge;  but  the  blowing 
up  of  the  bridge  at  Jouy  and  at  Noveant  was  entirely  forgotten,  and 
the  enemy  crossed  over  them  at  once.  The  division  halted  on  the 
Longeville-Moulins  road  where  it  received  some  shells  from  a  Prus- 
sian battery  which  had  followed  and  which  fired  from  across  the 
river.  Marshal  Canrobert  took  post  at  daybreak  at  the  Porte  de 
France;  iie  did  not  find  there  any  officer  from  GHQ  to  inform  him  as 
to  the  direction  to  take;  he  directed  his  own  staff  to  supervise  the 
march. 

The  Imperial  Guard  took  the  road  to  Longeville;  its  cavalry  was 
at  Ban-Saint-Martin.  A  large  part  of  the  6th  Corps  infantry  was 
routed  over  the  road  Plappeville  and  Lessy  hill  on  Gravelotte. 

At  noon,  the  entire  6th  Corps  was  assembled  about  Gravelotte, 
waiting  for  orders.* 

Between  4:00  ^p.m.  and  5:00  p.m.  the  Emperor  arrived  at  this 
village  and  the  6th  Corps  was  ordered  to  Rezonville;  the  2nd  Corps 
was  already  beyond  this  place  on  the  left  of  the  road;  the  6th  Corps 
was  to  take  position  beyond  this  village  on  the  right  of  the  road. 
The  Marshal  reconnoitered  the  teri'ain;  upon  arrival  he  sent  some 
farmers  to  reconnoiter  the  woods  towards  Ars  and  Gorze;  the  Mar- 
shal recognized  the  fact  that  the  position  could  be  turned  by  the 
defiles  through  the  Bois  des  Ognons,  and  therefore  directed  the  Divi- 
sion of  Levassor-Sorval   to  observe  them,   remaining   in   second  line. 

The  remainder  of  the  Corps  formed  with  its  right  at  the  Bois  de 
Saint-Marcel,  and  the  left  on  the  Rezonville  road.  Marshal  Can- 
robert returned  to  his  quarters  at  night  time. 

Forton's  Cavalry  Division  is  covering  our  front  at  a  great  dis- 
tance; we  received  information  as  to  this  on  August  14th. 

During  the  evening  the  Marshal  received  the  order  to  be  ready  to 
march  at  4:30  a.m.  on  the  16th.  tents  to  be  struck  and  horses  saddled. 


*Note:  This  is  an  error.  From  the  War  Diaries  of  the  6th 
Corps,  it  appears  that  the  leading  division  (the  3rd)  at  noon  was 
halted  at  Point-du-Jour. — C.H.L. 


—658- 


August  13-15,  1870 

War  Diary.  Iviperial  Guard. 

15th  August. 

The  Prussians  having  placed  a  battery  on  the  high  ground  com- 
manding the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle,  shells  fell  in  the  1st  Divi- 
sion camp,  which  thereupon  moved  closer  to  Moulins. 

One  battalion.  3rd  Grenadiei's,  was  detailed  to  guard  the  rail- 
road bridge,  of  which  one  arch  was  blown  up. 

In  compliance  with  an  order  received  about  1:00  p.m.,  the  Guard 
was  placed  in  march  for  Gravelotte,  in  the  following  order: 

Via  Longeville  to   Moulins-les-Metz: 

At  2:30  P.M.,  the  entire  Cavalry  Division; 

At  3:00  P.M.,  the  Corps  Artillery  with  their  field  trains; 

At  3:15  P.M.,  the  Engineers,  the  Engineer  Train. 

preceding  Headquarters  and  the  Headquarters  Train,  and  the  artil- 
lery Park;  Picard's  Division  forming  a  rear  guard  consisting  of  a 
regiment  of  infantry,  a  squadron  of  cavalry  and  a  battery  of  artillery. 

Deligny's  Division  left  in  advance  under  verbal  orders  of  the 
Guard  Commander,  and  went  to  Point-du-Jour.  His  foot  chasseur 
battalion  with  one  battery  was  posted  on  the  left  of  the  Gravelotte 
road,  in  order  to  observe  the  exits  of  the  Bois  de  Vaux. 

Picard's  Division  was  posted  to  the  south  and  east  of  Gravelotte, 
observing  the  same  ravine  and  wood. 

The  Cavalry  with  the  Corps  Artillery  and  Artillery  Park  was 
north  of  this  village. 

The  Corps  Supply  Train,  an  attached  train,  remained  at  Ban- 
Saint-Martin. 

The  last  troops  arrived  at  Gravelotte  at  11:30  P  M. 

The  Emperor  was  at  Gravelotte  with  his  headquarters. 


Memorandum  on  preceding  document  submitted  by  General 
Bourhaki  to  a  Court  of  Inquiry. 

15tk  August. 

The  Voltigeur  Division  left  its  camp  to  march  via  the  Verdun 
road  and  bivouac  according  to  the  orders  of  the  Marshal  on  the 
right  of  this  road  on  the  high  ground  at  Moscou  farm.  The  rest  of 
the  Guard  camped  in  the  vicinity  of  Gravelotte,  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Mance  ravine,  as  far  as  the  Ars  ravine,  which  separates  Grave- 
lotte from  the  Moscou  farm. 

It  is  beyond  question  that  on  that  day  we  had  in  our  possession 
the  two  roads  to  Verdun,  via  Conflans  and  via  Mars-la-Tour,  and 
that  if  we  had  received  the  least  order,  or  the  least  indication  regard- 
ing the  intentions  of  the  M8.rshal,  we  could  have  thrown  the  Prus- 
sians back  into  the  Moselle. 


Message.  1st  Cavalry  Division, 

Doncourt-les-Conflans ; 
6:15  P.M.,  15th  August. 
To    GHQ: 

I  have  just  this  moment   (6:15  P.M.)   received  your  message,  and 
I  beg  to  advise  you  that  in   compliance  with  the   order   sent  me  by 

—659— 


French  Orders  and  Messages 

Captain  Jung,  I  proceeded  this  morning  from  Gravelotte  to  Jarny. 
Just  as  I  was  proceeding  to  bivouac  my  attention  was  attracted  to 
quite  lively  artillery  firing  in  the  direction  of  Mars-la-Tour.  I  at 
once  proceeded  in  this  direction  and  on  the  way  met  a  staff  officer 
of  General  Forton  who  asked  that  I  support  an  offensive  movement 
vv'hich  he  had  started  against  hostile  cavalry. 

Just  as  I  arrived  on  the  high  ground  overlooking  the  village 
the  enemy  retired  to  the  woods  south  of  the  village. 

I  therefore  returned  to  Jarny,  where  I  arrived  at  4:00  p.m.,  and 
not  seeing  any  infantry  arriving  and  learning  that  the  hostile  cav- 
alry had  reoccupied  Mars-la-Tour,  I  retreated  to  a  point  in  front  of 
Doncourt,  where  I  am  holding  a  good  position,  with  an  •  advance 
guard  at  Jarny. 

Our  patrols  which  have  just  returned,  have  brought  in  a  few 
prisoners,  whom  I  am  sending  to  GHQ. 

In  engagements  between  the  hostile  cavalry  and  our  men,  about 
twenty  of  the  former  were  struck  down  by  our  fire. 

I  am  sending  Lieutenant  Lorain  to  you  to  supplement  my  re- 
port. 

Du  Barail. 


Message.  GHQ.  Gravelotte, 

15th  August. 
To  General  du  Barail: 

I  have  just  received  your  report.  I  am  much  pleased  with  your 
success  of  this  morning  and  I  congratulate  you  thereon.  I  have  re- 
ceived with  pleasure  the  information  transmitted  through  your  staff" 
officer. 

General  Frossard  and  Marshal  Canrobert,  who  are  at  Vionville 
and  Rezonville  inform  me  that  from  information  received  a  hostile 
force  estim^ated  at  30,000  men  is  in  front  of  them,  and  that  they 
expect  to  be  attacked  tomorrow.  I  suggest  you  watch  carefully  to 
your  front  and  as  far  out  as  possible,  and  inform  me  without  delay 
of  everything  that  occurs. 

Please  give  orders  to  have  soup  served  at  4:00  A.M.,  and  be 
ready  to  march  at  4:30  a.m.  Tents  are  to  be  struck  and  horses  sad- 
dled but  not  bridled  until  time  of  departure. 

Bazaine. 


War  Diary. 

3rd  Cavalry  Division    (de  Forton) 

15th  August. 

At  5:15  a.m.,  the  15th,  the  Division  left  for  Mars-la-Tour.  It 
arrived  at  this  village  at  9:00  a.m.,  reconnoitering  and  searching  all 
neighboring  ground.  The  1st  Brigade  was  sent  out  to  reconnoiter 
beyond  Tronville,  towards  Puxieux,  through  which  it  passed  looking 
for  the  enemy,  who  the  Brigade  found  in  rear  of  that  village;  the 
Brigade  then  retired.  At  9:15  a.m.  patrol  and  artillery  fighting  com- 
menced -and  lasted  about  an  hour. 

Being  faced  by  hostile  infantry,  and  on  the  advice  of  the  Com- 
manding General,  2nd  Corps,  this  Division  after  having  held  its  posi- 

—660— 


August  13-15,  1870 


tion  until   2:00  P.ivi.  left  Mars-la-Tour,   and  at  3:30  p.m.  camped  at 
Vionville. 


Telegram.  War  Department,  Paris. 

9:15  AM.,  15th  August. 
To  Marshal  Bazaine. 
Metz. 

The  mayor  of  Vigneulles  reports  that  at  3:00  a.m.  today  small 
parties  of  Prussians  arrived  there,  stating  that  20,000  more  men 
would  arrive  later  today. 


Telegram.  War  Department,  Paris. 

3:50  P.M.,  15th  August. 
To  Marshal  Bazaine. 
Metz. 

Prussians    have    arrived    at    Commercy.      Prussian    Uhlans    and 
Wurttemberg  Dragoons.     No  information  as  to  their  numbers. 


Telegram.  War  Departm,ent,  Paris. 

i:30  P.M.,  15th  August. 
To  Chief  of  Staff. 
Metz. 

A  farmer  fi'om  the  Vosges*  has  arrived  at  Bayon  and  reports 
that  he  saM^  1000  or  2000  Prussians  constructing  several  bridges 
across  the  Moselle  for  the  use  of  important  bodies  of  troops. 


Telegram,.  Verdun, 

5:08  P.M.,  15th  August. 
To  Marshal  Bazaine. 

Metz. 
The  mayor  of  Saint-Mihiel   reports  as  follows: 
"At  noon   I  was   at  the  railroad  station   at   Commercy  with  the 
Prefect;  a  Prussian  patrol  arrived  at  the  station. 

"I  am  expecting  each  instant  orders  to  blow  up  the  bridges  and 
tunnels." 

The  Commanding  General. 

Note:      The  above   information   from   the  mayor  of  Saint-Mihiel 
was  confirmed  separately  by  a  despatch  from  the  Prefect. — C.  H.  L. 


''Note:      Probably  Vosges  department,  not  mountains.- — C.  H.  L. 


—661— 


French  Orders  and  Messages 

Telegram.  Verdun, 

6:05  P.M.,  15th  Axigust. 
To  Marshal  Bazaine. 
Metz. 

(Extract) 

I  have  just  received  the  following  message  from  Saint-Mihiel: 
"A   man   from    Nonsard,   Vigneulles   township,    informs   me   that 
Prussians  have  arrived  at  that  place.     They  have  made  requisitions: 
he  says  they  are  very  numerous  about  Nonsard,  Pannes,  Essey." 

The  Commanding  General. 


Message.  Thionville,  15ih  August. 

To  Marshal  Leboeuf. 

Metz. 

{Extract) 

I  have  the  honor  to  advise  you  that  at  about  4:00  a.m.  this  morn- 
ing a  Prussian  Corps,  estimated  at  7,000  to  8,000  men,  consisting  of 
the  23d,  68th,  and  69th  Infantry,  the  8th  Artillery  and  the  12th 
Engineers  with  several  squadrons  of  cavalry,  principally  hussars, 
made  a  raid  on  Thionville. 

The  alarm  having  been  given  in  time,  we  opened  fire  to  such  an 
extent  and  so  promptly  that  the  enemy  who  came  via  Boulay, 
Kedange,  Metzervisse,  etc.,  and  \\;ho  attempted  to  take  position  on 
the  edge  of  the  Klange  forest,  aljout  21  kms.  from  the  town  con- 
sidered it  best  to  retreat.  *  *  *  * 

-  -  These  troops  consisted  largely  of  Landwehr.  They  retired 
towards  the  frontier  via  Metzervisse.  Many  of  the  soldiers  appeared 
completely  discouraged.  They  asked  for  nev/s  from  Metz,  and  com- 
plained of  hunger,  and  of  being  compelled  to  fight  against  their 
wishes,  etc. 

The  enemy  had  thirteen  guns  with  them.  -  -  - 

No  further  news  from  Treves,  Gonz  and  Sarrebourg. 

Special  Agent. 


Message.  iWi  August. 

{Received  on   the  15th). 

An  army  corps,  said  to  be  about  35,000  strong,  appears  to  be 
concentrating  up  to  this  evening  betv/een  Perl,  Merzig  and  Sarre- 
bourg, to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  Prussian  army  in  case  nf  defeat, 
or  to  support  its  movement  for.vard  in  case  of  victory. 

Prefect  of  Moselle. 


15th  August. 

Memorandum  by  the  General  Staff.     (G2)  : 

Between  August  12th  and  16th,  we  concentrated  about  Metz, 
halting  our  march  on  Verdun.  The  country  people  gave  us  infoima- 
tion  willingly  but  of  little  value,  as  no  one  ever  came  in  from  vil- 

—662— 


August  13-15,  1870 

lages  within  the  Prussian  lines.  On  August  15th,  the  enemy  was 
reported  at  Rezonville,  as  passing  through  Ars-la-Moselle  and  as 
concentrating  via  the  defile  at  Gorze;  but  at  Gorze  itself  there  are 
as  yet  but  in  very  small  numbers. 


Metz,  15th  August. 

I  am  sending  to  GHQ  a  Prussian  who  has  just  been  captured. 
From  questions  asked  him  by  the  post  commander  it  appears  that 
an  army  of  more  than  200,000  Prussians  is  marching  on  Nancy.  This 
army  is  commanded  by  Prince  Frederick. 

A  force  of  150,000  men  is  advancing  on  Metz  to  attack  it.  Ac- 
cording to  the  deserter  the  advance  guard  of  this  force  is  on  the 
battlefield  of  yesterday,  and  another  force  of  130,000  men  is  con- 
siderably in  rear,  but  will  join  this  advance  guard. 

The  troops  which  fought  yesterday  have  retired  (Xlllth  Divi- 
sion). The  XlVth  Division  has  replaced  them  and  is  awaiting  an 
attack. 

It  is  3  kms.  from  Metz. 

Lieutenant, 
Outpost    Commander. 


Telegram.  Signal  Post,  Metz  Cathedral. 

11  -.SO  A.M.,  (15  A2cgust) 

No  enemy  in  view  on  either  bank  of  the  Moselle. 

Note:     Haze  appears  to   have   prevented  earlier   observations. 
C.  H.  L. 


Telegram.  Signal  Post,  Metz  Cathedral. 

1:15  P.M.,  {15  Aug.) 

Considerable  hostile  troops  in  march  along  the  cross  road  Petit- 
Marais;  Colligny.  They  are  passing  in  rear  of  Flanville,  towards 
the  Saarebruck  road.  *  *  *  * 


Telegram.  Signal  Post,  Metz  Cathedral. 

2:20  P.M.,   {15  Aug.) 

Prussian  columns  are  marching  beyond  Marly  and  d'Augny  to- 
wards the  Moselle  at  Jouy  and  Corny. 


Telegram.  Signal  Post,  Metz  Cathedral. 

3:50  P.M.   {15  Aug.) 

No   artillery  firing  heard. 

Hostile  troops  passing  in  rear  of  Augny,  moving  towards  our 
right.  A  long  column  is  moving  along  the  road  beyond  Coin-sur- 
Seille,  towards  the  upper  Moselle. 


—663— 


French  Orders  and  Messages 

I'elegram.  Signal  Post,  Metz  Cathedral. 

A -.50  P.M.   {15  Aug.) 

A  column  is  marching  away  from  us  on  the  Metz;  Nomeny  road 
beyond  Verny.  The  movement  is  apparently  towards  Pont-a-Mous- 
son.     Should  not  the  bridges  be  destroyed? 

A  column,  with  cavalry  at  a  trot  at  its  head,  is  marching  from 
Luppy  to  Lechy  and  beyond  on  a  road  not  shown  on  our  map  leading 
towards  Pont-a-Mousson. 


Telegram.  Signal  Post,  Metz   Cathedral. 

5:20  P.  M.   {15  Aug.) 

The  Ars  bridge  has  just  been  blown  up. 

The  Prussian  rear  guard  appears  to  be  on  the  road  from  Col- 
ligny  to  Domangeville  bridge  towards  Marsilly.  The  entire  army 
is  making  a  flank  march  towards  Pont-a-Mousson.  The  advance 
guard  is  approaching  that  town. 


Telegram.  Signal  Post,  Metz  Cathedral. 

6:h0  P.M.  {15  Aug.) 

Two  hostile  columns  are  marching  away  from  us  on  the  Pontoy; 
Basse-Beux  road  and  are  disappearing  in  rear  of  the  telegraph  hill; 
a  third  column  is  ascending  Mecleuves  hill,  taking  the  Strasbourg 
road.  Are  these  the  troops  which  yesterday  attacked  the  Mercy 
position? 


Telegram.  Queuleu,  6:^4  P.M.,  15  August. 

I  have  been  watching  for  an  hour  through  my  field  glasses  an 
enormous  body  of  Prussian  troops  ascending  the  Mecleuves  hill  on 
the  left  of  the  road:   cavalry  is  marching  on  the  right  of  the  road. 

They  are  going  in  the  direction  of  Nancy 

Commanding  Officer. 


-664— 


EXTRACT  FROM 

BATTLES  AROUND  METZ 

The  Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and 

Saint  Privat  August  1  7  th  and 

18th,  1870 

ACCORDING  TO  THE 

FRENCH  GENERAL  STAFF  ACCOUNT 

DISCUSSED  BY 

E.  VON  SCHMID, 

Colonel,  Reserve  List,   Wtirttemberg  Army 


(This  Is  Part  7  of  "Truth  and  Falsity  of  the  French  General  Staff 

Account.") 


Leipzig,    1907 


Translated   by 

Harry  Bell, 
Army  Service  Schools,  July  1915. 


The  French  Army  the  Morning  of  August  1  8 

Even  the  day  after  the  battle*  Marshal  Bazaine  did  not 
have  any  reliable  information  of  the  enemy ;  he  believed  that 
in  that  battle  he  was  opposed  by  the  combined  armies  under 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  and  General  von  Steinmetz  and 
that  the  King  of  Prussia  had  arrived  with  an  additional 
109,000  men  in  the  vicinity  of  Pange  and  that  he  had  made 
his  headquarters  in  the  Chateau  at  Aubigny. 

From  the  reports  and  information  received  it  was 
believed  that  the  Second  Army  under  General  Steinmetz 
(  !  !  )  had  crossed  the  Mosel  at  x\rs  and  that  the  enemy 
occupied  the  road  to  Verdun.  The  morning  of  August  17th 
the  War  Minister  had  telegraphed  that  a  large  corps  of 
troops  were  at  Apremont  and  that  5000  cavalry  with  some 
infantry  and  artillery  had  reached  St.  Mihiel. 

On  the  other  hand,  on  August  17th  the  observation 
posts  on  the  exterior  forts  Queuleu  and  St.  Quentin  and 
that  on  the  Cathedral,  reported  that  throughout  the  day 
large  columns  of  troops  were  marching  from  the  vicinity 
of  Marly,  Augny  and  Verny  towards  the  Mosel  and  were 
crossing  that  stream.  Marshal  Canrobert  reported  that 
according  to  the  statements  of  inhabitants  10,000  men  had 
arrived  in  Gorze  the  evening  of  the  17th  and  that  an  attack 
would  undoubtedly  be  made  the  next  morning. 

It  was  reported  erroneously  by  the  3d  Corps,  Leboeuf, 
that  Gravelotte  was  occupied  by  the  Germans  and  that 
these  were  throwing  up  defensive  works  there. 

All  these  messages,  contradicting  each  other  in  part, 
had  a  most  unfavorable  influence  on  the  Marshal,  for  al- 
ready now,  on  the  17th  of  August,  he  had  come  to  a  con- 
clusion to  draw  back  to  a  position  still  closer  to  the  walls 
of  Metz. 

He  had  directed  Colonel  Lewal  of  the  general  staff 
to  locate  a  position  farther  to  the  rear  together  with  the 


^This  refers  to  the  battle  on  August  16th. 
—667— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

assistant  chief  of  staff  of  the  army,  and  in  the  forenoon  of 
the  18th  of  August  these  two  staff  officers  rode  over  the 
position  until  the  thunder  of  cannon  coming  from  Verne- 
ville  brought  the  reconnaissance  to  an  end. 

On  August  18th,  very  early  in  the  morning,  Marsha! 
Bazaine  received  a  report  from  Marshal  Leboeuf  that 
hostile  troops  were  marching  on  Doncourt,  but  merely 
replied  to  that  message:  "that  he  should  hold  himself  in 
his  strong  position." 

When  towards  9  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Marshal 
was  busy  with  his  chief  of  staff,  Jarras,  in  considering 
recommendations  for  promotion,  he  received  the  report  of 
the  march  of  larger  bodies  of  troops  on  St.  Marcel  and  of 
the  appearance  of  fresh  columns  from  the  woods  of  St. 
Arnould.  Thereupon  the  Marshal  merely  remarked  that 
his  position  was  completely  secured  against  any  attack,  that 
no  serious  attack  was  to  be  feared  and  that  such  an  attack 
could  not  succeed  in  any  case.  The  Marshal  expressed  this 
opinion  to  all  officers  sent  to  him  in  the  course  of  the  fore- 
noon. 

To  go  somewhat  deeper  into  the  matter,  the  Marshal's 
intentions  can  be  seen  in  an  order  he  sent  to  Marshal  Can- 
robert  at  about  10  o'clock.  This  order  deserves  to  be  pub- 
lished, because  it  best  shows  how  deficient  the  Marshal  was 
in  the  qualities  that  go  to  make  a  leader  of  troops.  The 
orders  read   (extract) : 

"Marshal  Leboeuf  reports  to  me  that  strong  hostile  forces 
are  marching  against  his  position.  However  this  may  be,  you 
should  arrange  yourself  firmly  in  your  position  and  maintain 
good  connection  with  the  right  wing  of  the  4th  Corps.  The 
troops  should  camp  in  two  lines  and  on  as  a  narrow  a  front  as 
possible. 

"If  the  enemy  appears  to  be  deploying  in  your  front  and 
appears  also  to  make  a  more  serious  attack  on  St.  Privat,  you 
should  take  all  necessary  security  measures  so  as  to  hold  your 
position  until  the  entire  right  wing  of  the  army  can  execute,  if 
necessary,  a  change  of  front  to  occupy  the  positions  situated 
farther  in  rear,  which  are  at  the  pi*esent  moment  being  recon- 
noitered. 

"I  do  not  like  to  be  forced  by  the  enemy  to  take  that  step; 
but  if  the  movement  is  going  to  be  made  it  will  be  done  for  the 
purpose  of  facilitating  subsistence  matters,  to  get  more  water 
for  the  horses,  and  to  give  the  iroops  an  opportunity  to  wash 
themselves. 

—668— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

"Utilize  the  momentary  rest  pause  to  bring  up  everything 
you  still   need. 

"I  am  told  that  the  meat  was  rejected  yesterday  because 
it  smelled;  however,  this  is  no  time  to  be  stingy  and  the  supply 
department  undoubtedly  could  procure  fresh  meat  by  butchering. 

"I  sent  to  you  the  Brigade  of  Bruchard — Mounted  Chas- 
seurs— which  will  remain  with  you  until  another  cavalry  division 
can  be  formed." 

The  French  General  Staff  says  the  following  about 
these  orders : 

"These  orders,  if  nothing  else,  show  clearly  why  the  battle 
had  to  be  lost.  The  carelessness  of  the  Marshal,  his  indifference 
to  the  reports  coming  in,  the  inexplicable  task  he  set  his  right 
wing  corps  and  the  already  expressed  intention  of  falling  back 
with  the  entire  army,  sufficiently  explain  the  conduct  of  the 
commandei*-in-chief  on  this  unfortunate  day." 

If  we  do  not  consider  at  all  the  incorrect  or  faulty 
composition  of  these  orders,  it  still  appears  to  us  inexplicable 
for  the  Marshal  to  order  the  retreat  of  a  part  of  his  army 
of  150,000  men  on  the  flimsy  pretext  of  giving  the  soldiers 
an  opportunity  to  wash  themselves.  Such  a  reason  for  re- 
treating probably  was  never  before  stated  in  military  his- 
tory. 

The  general  conduct  of  the  Marshal  on  this  day  was 
entirely  inexplicable,  for  even  when  the  cannon  commenced 
to  thunder  he  remained  tranquilly  in  his  quarters  and  when 
General  Jarras  caused  the  horses  to  be  saddled  and  urged 
the  Marshal  to  start,  the  latter  requested  him,  his  chief  of 
staff,  to  put  his  best  efforts  in  getting  ready  the  promotion 
lists,  on  which  the  army  was  waiting.  Thus  the  chief  of 
staff  was  chained  to  his  office  at  the  very  commencement  of 
one  of  the  biggest  battles  and  when  the  Marshal  finally — 
after  2  o'clock — mounted  his  horse — not  to  ride  to  the  bat- 
tlefield, but  to  exterior  fort  Queuleu — and  when  the  chief 
of  staff  made  arrangements  to  accompany  him,  he  said  that 
he  needed  neither  the  chief  of  staff  nor  his  staff  and  that 
the  clerical  work  should  be  continued. 

This  conduct  of  the  Marshal  is  the  more  inexplicable, 
as  toward  2  p.m.  hundreds  of  guns  were  in  action,  for  which 
reason  alone  the  Marshal  could  not  be  in  any  doubt  as  to 
the  serioiisness  of  the  battle. 

—669— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

While  French  headquarters  thus  performed  its  usual 
routine  work  the  morning  of  the  battle,  as  if  in  the  midst 
of  peace,  the  greatest  excitement  reigned  among  the  troops 
and  entire  divisions  worked  like  ants  to  fortify  their  posi- 
tions. 

As  mentioned  above  the  army  corps  had  reached  their 
positions  the  evening  of  August  17th,  which  they  main- 
tained on  the  18th  with  the  utmost  tenacity  throughout  the 
bloody,  heavy  battle.  The  night  of  August  17-18th  had 
been  a  very  restless  one,  as  probably  half  the  army  was 
under  arms  since  one  o'clock  because  of  false  alarms. 

Concerning  this  false  alarm,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Rous- 
set  writes  in  his  History  of  the  4th  Army  Corps : 

"Because  the  6th  Corps  had  to  march  from  Verneville  to 
St.  Privat  and  the  4th  Corps  from  Doncourt  to  Amanvillers 
crossings  and  stoppages  in  the  march  resulted,  and  the  troop.s 
reached  their  bivouac  places  only  late  at  night. 

"When  thereafter  Cissey's  Division  arrived  at  the  Jeru- 
salem farm  it  had  to  be  drawn  back  to  Amanvillers  because 
ti'oops  of  the  6th  Corps  arrived  at  St.  Privat. 

"A  new  position  was  taken  up  in  the  dark  and  outposts 
placed  out  on  the  east  while  a  few  cavalry  regiments  went  into 
a  bivouac  facing  Metz  and  thus  offered  their  rear  to  the  enemy. 

"Those  very  important  points  for  the  defense  like  St.  Marie- 
aux-Chenes,  St.  Ail,  and  the  woods  de  la  Cusse  and  Champenois 
situated  in  front  of  the  position,  had  not  been  occupied  and  not 
a  single  picket  vv^as  posted  west  of  the  bivouacs. 

"Thus  it  happened  that  stragglers  from  the  6th  Corps, 
wandering  around  the  field,  entered  in  the  dark  the  tents  of  the 
troops  of  the  4th  Corps  and  made  such  a  noise  there  that  every- 
one was  called  to  arms  and  that  that  alarm  spread  throughout  the 
entire  army." 

The  French  General  Staff  has  the  following  to  say  of 
the  positions  the  different  corps  took  the  morning  before 
the  battle: 

In  the  2d  Army  Corps,  forming  the  left  wing  of  the 
line  on  the  heights  of  Point  du  Jour,  the  advanced  posts 
opened  at  daybreak  a  hot  fire  on  the  German  outposts  in  the 
opposite  woods  and  all  troops  of  the  corps  stood  under  arms 
very  early  in  the  morning.  Hostile  troops  had  been  observed 
the  evening  before  south  of  Gravelotte  and  in  the  ravine 
running  to  Ars,  and  in  the  morning  it  was  believed  that 
Germans  could  be  observed  intrenching  at  Gravelotte.  From 


—670- 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

this  General  Frossard  concluded  that  an  attack  was  immi- 
nent and  issued  orders  to  the  divisions  to  reinforce  their 
positions  as  much  as  possible. 

On  both  sides  of  the  3d  Jager  Battalion,  defending 
the  farm  of  Point  du  Jour  were  four  batteries — 5th,  6th 
and  12th  of  the  5th  and  11th  of  the  5th  Regiment — were  in 
position  on  both  sides  of  Point  du  Jour  which  was  held  and 
prepared  for  defense  by  the  3d  Chasseur  Battalion;  3  bat- 
teries of  the  2d  Infantry  Division — 7th,  8th  and  9th  of  the 
5th  Regiment — were  on  the  Roman  road  on  Hill  346;  and 
the  10th  Battery  of  the  5th  and  7th  of  the  2d  Regiment 
stood  on  Hills  834  and  332.  The  batteries  on  the  Roman 
road  and  on  Hills  334  and  332  had  a  clear  field  of  fire  on 
the  forest  de  Vaux  and  towards  Rozerieulles  and  Jussy. 

These  nine  batteries  did  not  go  into  position  under 
cover  as  the  French  account  expressly  states,  so  that  they 
must  have  been  seen  by  the  enemy ;  but  they  stood,  however, 
in  complete  readiness  for  action  in  the  emplacements  pro- 
vided by  the  engineers,  while  4  additional  batteries  were 
in  reserve  about  400  meters  behind  Point  du  Jour. 

Fourteen  battalions  deployed  while  the  batteries  went 
into  position.  Commencing  at  10  A.M.  seven  battalions — 
1st  of  the  32d  Regiment,  3d-  Chasseur  Battalion,  1st  and  2d 
of  the  55th,  1st  of  the  76th  and  1st  and  2d  of  the  77th  Regi- 
ment— occupied  the  skirmish  trenches  and  ditches  along- 
side the  road  prepared  for  defense,  running  from  the  bend 
in  the  road  east  of  St.  Hubert  farm  to  beyond  the  large 
quarry  of  Point  du  Jour,  while  the  other  battalions  of  those 
regiments  were  in  the  second  line  a  few  hundred  meters 
behind  the  firing  line.  The  other  regiments  of  the  2d  Corps 
stood  under  arms  on  their  bivouac  places. 

On  the  extreme  left  wing  the  Brigade  of  Lapasset  oc- 
cupied the  nose  of  the  hill  facing  Rozerieulles  with  five 
battalions — 84th  Regiment  and  2d  Battalion,  97th  Regi- 
ment— the  3d  Battalion  of  the  latter  regiment  being  at  St. 
Ruffine. 

In  rear  of  the  left  wing  of  the  2d  Corps  three  cavalry 
divisions  —  13    regiments  —  stood   entirely    inactive  in  the 

—671— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

ravine  at  Longeau ;  they  merely  sent  out  a  few  patrols 
towards  Jussy  and  St.  Ruffine ;  but  these  patrols  did  not  go 
very  far  ahead. 

Thus,  before  any  attack  took  place,  the  entire  2d  Army 
Corps  was  in  readiness  to  meet  any  attack ;  the  commanding 
general,  Fossard,  had  proceeded  to  the  hill  at  Point  du 
Jour  at  about  11  A.M.,  observing  from  there  the  approach 
of  the  Vllth  Corps. 

The  3d  Corps  was  in  close  connection  with  the  right 
wing  of  the  2d  Corps,  and  had  occupied  the  battle  positions 
by  10  A.M.  In  that  corps  the  cavalry  showed  a  little  more 
activity ;  the  cavalry  division  had  struck  their  tents  as  early 
as  five  o'clock  and  was  ready  to  march  off.  One  platoon  of 
each  regiment  was  sent  out  for  reconnaissance,  and  these 
platoons  reported  by  8  o'clock  that  strong  hostile  masses 
were  marching  on  St.  Marcel  and  that  columns  were  march- 
ing from  the  St.  Arnould  forest  to  the  heights  west  of 
Rezonville.  Other  patrols  reported  hostile  columns  on  the 
march  to  Verneville  and  along  the  Gravelotte  road  to 
Malmaison,  and  finally  large  masses  were  seen  behind 
Gravelotte  from  the  hills  near  the  Moscou  and  Leipzig 
farms. 

Even  before  these  reports  of  the  cavalry  reached  corps 
headquarters  on  the  hill  near  the  "Arbre  mort,"  that  head- 
quarters had  seen  columns  marching  in  the  direction  of 
Doncourt  and  even  the  officers  in  front  of  them  could  be 
clearly  distinguished,  as  stated  in  the  French  account.  Mar- 
shal Leboeuf ,  as  stated  above,  reported  the  approach  of  the 
enemy  to  army  headquarters,  and  had  sent  at  the  same 
time  orders  to  the  divisions  to  occupy  the  woods  in  front 
of  their  lines  and  to  entrench  themselves  as  well  as  possible. 

Under  the  supervision  of  General  of  Engineers  Vialla 
the  Moscou,  Liepzig  and  La  Folie  farm  buildings  were  pre- 
pared for  defense  and  numerous  strong  battery  emplace- 
ments were  constructed  and  trenches  dug  along  the  entire 
front. 

While  these  reinforcements  were  under  way,  the 
troop  vehicles  and  ammunition  carts  had  been  sent  back  to 

—672— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

bring  up  provisions  and  ammunition,  and  these  vehicles 
were  mistaken  for  marching  columns  of  troops  by  patrols, 
and  caused  a  belief  that  the  army  was  retreating. 

The  troops  of  the  3d  Corps  occupied  their  positions  at 
about  10  A.M. ;  in  close  connection  with  the  right  wing  of 
the  2d  Corps  at  the  great  bend  in  the  road,  two  battalions 
of  the  4th  Division— 1st  of  the  80th  and  1st  of  the  85th 
Regiment — occupied  the  trenches ;  the  2d  Battalion,  85th 
Regiment,  was  sent  to  St.  Hubert  farm  which  had  been  pre- 
pared for  defense ;  the  other  three  battalions  of  these  regi- 
ments being  in  the  second  line. 

The  fortified  Moscou  farm  was  occupied  by  the  3d 
Battalion,  44th  Regiment,  and  the  2d  Battalion,  60th  Regi- 
ment; the  trenches  in  front  of  those  farm  buildings  were 
occupied  by  three  battalions — 1st  and  2d,  59th  and  1st,  44th 
Regiment — while  three  additional  battalions — 1st  Chasseurs, 
1st  of  the  60th  and  2d  of  the  44th  Regiment — were  on  the 
Roman  road  in  second  line  while  the  3d  Battalion,  60th 
Regiment,  was  sent  into  the  woods  in  front  of  the  St.  Hu- 
bert farm  building. 

The  three  batteries  of  the  4th  Division — 8th,  9th  and 
10th  of  the  11th  Regiment — were  in  position  between  Mos- 
cou and  the  main  road,  three  additional  batteries — 5th, 
6th  and  7th  of  the  11th  Regiment — north  of  Moscou — and 
thus  the  entire  4th  Division  and  two  battalions  of  the  59th 
Regiment  of  the  3d  Division  were  deployed  for  battle  close 
to  the  Moscou  farm  building. 

West  and  southwest  of  the  "Arhre  mort"  (dead  tree) 
the  3d  division  Metman  had  deployed  two  battalions — 1st 
of  the  7th  and  1st  of  the  29th  Regiment — in  the  trenches; 
behind  them  in  second  line  6  battalions — 2d  and  3d  of  the 
7th,  3d  of  the  29th  and  the  71st  Regiment. 

The  7th  Chasseur  Battalion  was  sent  to  the  western 
edge  of  the  Forest  of  Genivaux  and  occupied  the  road  lead- 
ing to  Malmaison.  The  2d  Battalion,  29th  Regiment,  and 
three  companies  of  the  71st  Regiment  were  sent  into  those 
woods. 


—673- 


Battles  Around  Metz 

The  2d  Division,  Nayral,  had  struck  camp  at  9  A.M. 
and  occupied  its  combat  positions.  Two  battalions  of  the 
19th  Regiment  occupied  the  trenches  south  of  the  Leipzig 
farm  building,  that  farm  building  itself  being  occupied  by 
two  companies  of  the  69th  and  3  companies  of  the  19th 
Regiment,  while  one  and  two-third  battalions  of  the  69th 
Regiment  occupied  the  western  edge  of  the  woods  at  Leip- 
zig. 

The  remaining  battalions  of  the  division — 15th  Chas- 
seurs, 3d  of  the  19th  Regiment  and  the  41st  Regiment — 
were  in  second  line  behind  the  hill  and  the  3d  Battalion, 
69th  Regiment,  was  also  sent  into  the  Genivaux  forest. 

The  three  batteries  of  the  division — 9th,  11th  and  12th 
of  the  4th  Regiment — went  into  position  between  Leipzig 
and  the  "Arbre  mort." 

In  the  1st  Division,  Montaudon,  the  entire  infantry  was 
under  arms  by  10  o'clock,  one  brigade  occupying  La  Folie, 
the  other  the  Genivaux  forest. 

La  Folie  was  occupied  by  three  companies  of  the  51st 
Regiment,  while  Hill  343  northwest  thereof  was  occupied 
by  two  battalions  of  that  regiment  and  two  batteries — 6th 
and  8th  of  the  4th  Regiment — the  18  Chasseur  Battalion 
and  the  62  Regiment  stood  south  of  the  buildings  in  reserve. 

The  de  la  Charmoise  woods,  southwest  of  La  Folie,  were 
occupied  by  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions,  95th  Regiment,  and 
the  2d  Battalion,  81st  Regiment,  facing  the  I'Envie  farm 
building.  The  other  two  battalions  of  the  81st  Regiment 
remained  as  reserve  at  the  south  corner  of  the  de  la  Char- 
moise woods.  The  3d  Battalion  of  the  95th  Regiment  oc- 
cupied the  northeastern  corner  of  the  Genivaux  forest  oppo- 
site the  Chantrenne  farm  and  the  three  battalions  of  the 
90th  Regiment  were  deployed  within  the  forest,  facing  Mal- 
maison. 

The  1st  Battalion,  69th  Regiment,  also  went  from  Leip- 
zig into  the  Genivaux  forest,  had  crossed  the  Chantrenne 
brook  and  occupied  the  northern  edge  of  the  woods  opposite 
Verneville,  but  very  soon  thereafter  fell  back  again. 

—674— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

A  little  in  rear  of  the  Leipzig  farm  were  six  batteries 
of  the  corps  artillery  in  position,  as  well  as  four  regiments 
of  the  cavalry  division  of  the  3d  Corps. 

Thus,  the  3d  Corps  was  deployed  on  a  line  3.5  kilometers 
long  from  La  Folie  to  the  large  bend  in  the  road,  and  had 
but  few  troops  in  reserve. 

When  Marshal  Leboeuf  reported  the  approach  of  the 
enemy  to  Marshal  Bazaine,  the  latter  infoiTned  the  com- 
manding general  of  the  Guard  that  strong  masses  were* 
marching  against  the  positions  of  the  2d  and  3d  Corps  and 
that  a  serious  battle  might  be  expected.  He  requested  Gen- 
eral Bourbaki  to  place  one  Guard  brigade  on  the  ridge — 
Hill  313 — projecting  towards  St.  Germain,  as  a  reserve,  and 
so  two  Voltigeur  regiments  arrived  there  at  about  11  o'clock 
with  the  remarkable  orders  from  General  Bourbaki  that 
they  should  take  orders  from  no  one  except  himself  or  Gen- 
eral Devigny,  the  division  commander. 

Thus,  before  11  o'clock  seven  divisions,  4  cavalry  divi- 
sions, and  34  batteries  were  on  the  line  from  La  Folie  to 
Point  du  Jour,  in  a  position  which  was  difficult  to  approach 
on  the  left  because  of  the  steep  slopes  and  natural  obstacles 
and  which  was  almost  impregnable  in  the  center  because 
of  artificial  works. 

While  the  2d  and  3d  Corps  had  entrenched  their  posi- 
tions exceedingly  well,  no  fortification  works  of  any  kind 
were  undertaken  by  the  4th  Corps  camping  on  both  sides 
of  Amanvillers.  All  troop  vehicles  and  ammunition  wagons 
had  left  at  7  a.m.  to  refill  at  Metz.  No  outposts  had  been 
placed  in  front  and  the  cavalry  division  remained  inactive 
behind  Amanvillers,  sending  merely  a  few  patrols  towards 
Verneville  and  a  hussar  squadron  toward  Gravelotte.  To- 
wards 9  A.M.  General  Ladmirault  received  copies  of  the  re- 
ports which  had  reached  the  3d  Corps ;  some  individual 
soldiers,  looking  on  their  own  hook  for  provisions  in  Verne- 
ville, reported  the  approach  of  hostile  detachments.  A 
camp  picket,  posted  west  of  the  Montigny  farm  building 
also  reported  hostile  detachments  at  Verneville,  and,  finally, 
large  clouds  of  dust  were  perceived  opposite  St.  Vincent 

—675— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

and  in  the  direction  of  Malmaison — Verneville.  In  spite  of 
these  reports  and  observations  General  Ladmirault  took  na 
special  measures,  he  did  not  want  to  interfere  with  the  rest 
of  the  troops,  and  merely  sent  word  to  the  division  com- 
manders to  be  prepared  for  an  attack,  but  not  to  inform  the 
troops  so  as  to  avoid  any  and  every  excitement  among  them. 
When  General  Ladmirault  received  additional  infor- 
mation from  Marshal  Bazaine  between  10  and  11  o'clock, 
together  with  the  request  to  have  the  forest  roads  leading 
to  the  rear  in  direction  of  Norroy  reconnoitered,  he  still 
did  not  believe  that  the  situation  was  serious — however  he 
ordered  the  divisions  to  throw  up  defensive  works.  But 
nothing  was  done  in  that  line  even  then;  the  infantry  did 
not  dig  trenches,  and  only  the  corps  artillery  hitched  up; 
all  other  troops  remained  tranquilly  in  their  bivouacs  so 
that — as  stated  in  the  French  account — they  were  actually 
taken  by  surprise  in  their  unprepared  position  just  when 
the  noon  roll  was  called. 

Shortly  before  the  opening  of  the  battle  the  engineer 
companies  started  to  prepare  Amanvillers  and  Montigny 
for  defense. 

In  the  6th  Corps  also  no  defensive  measures  were  ar- 
ranged for  because  there  were  no  entrenching  tools  avail- 
able and  because  no  one  had  thought  of  procuring  them 
from  the  surrounding  villages. 

That  old  war-horse,  Marshal  Canrobert,  occupied  him- 
self during  the  morning  of  the  battle  with  minor  details; 
he  had  issued  a  lengthy  order  in  which  division  comman- 
ders were  requested  to  at  once  submit  casualty  lists  cover- 
ing the  16th  of  August,  as  well  as  recommendations  for 
promotion ;  recommendations  for  promotion  to  general  offi- 
cer, for  award  of  medals,  etc.  At  the  same  time  it  was 
ordered  that  lists  of  lost  camp  utensils,  lost  knapsacks  and 
'  boots  be  sent  in,  and  that  arms  should  be  cleaned  •  the  orders 
closed  with  directions  to  entrench  as  well  as  practicable. 
But  nothing  was  done  in  spite  of  these  orders,  and  the  most 
important  portion  of  the  entire  position  remained  devoid 
of  artificial  strengthening. 

—676— 


]-»attles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

The  evening  before  Marshal  Canrobert  had  received 
two  regiments  of  mounted  Chasseurs  as  reinforcement  and 
he  issued  orders  at  5  o'clock  in  the  morning  to  General  du 
Barail  to  send  out  patrols ;  these  patrols  returned  very  soon 
without  any  news.  Between  7  and  8  o'clock  patrols — con- 
sisting of  one  corporal  and  four  troopers  each — were  sent 
into  the  country  in  front  of  St.  Privat  and  officers'  patrols 
towards  Montois,  Auboue  and  St.  Ail.  Finally,  after  9 
o'clock,  three  squadrons  of  Chasseurs  were  sent  towards 
Auboue  which  discovered  hostile  troops  in  the  valley  of  the 
Orne  brook  as  well  as  at  Moineville  and  Valleroy  and  finally 
also  at  Batailly — they  discovered  the  approach  of  the  Sax- 
ons. 

These  patrols  returned  to  St.  Privat  before  11  o'clock, 
''satisfied  ivith  havmg  obtained  this  information,"  and  so 
touch  with  the  enemy  was  again  lost. 

But  General  du  Barail  had  learned  in  the  morning 
from  the  chaplain  of  the  division,  who  had  accompanied 
wounded  to  Gorze,  that  the  entire  hostile  army  was  ap- 
proaching and  that  a  battle  was  imminent.  A  patrol  of 
Chasseurs  d'Afrique  had  arrived  from  Chalons  with  a  re- 
port from  General  Margueritte — who  had  accompanied  the 
Emperor  with  two  squadrons — stating  that  he  would  re- 
main with  both  squadrons  in  Chalons.  The  arrival  of  this 
patrol  proved  that  the  road  to  Chalons  was  free  of  the 
enemy. 

The  troops  of  the  6th  Corps  remained  in  their  camps 
ready  to  start  and  only  a  few  minor  shiftings  of  troops  took 
place.  At  11  o'clock  Marshal  Canrobert  received  definite 
information  that  the  Saxons  were  coming  up  the  valley  of 
the  Orne ;  he  knew  that  they  had  occupied  Moineville  and 
that  patrols  had  been  pushed  out  as  far  as  St.  Marie  and 
that  strong  bodies  wath  artillery  were  marching  on  Batilly. 
He  had  to  expect  that  the  enemy  would  appear  at  any  mo- 
ment in  front  of  his  position,  but  nevertheless  his  troops 
were  no  more  ready  than  those  of  the  4th  Corps.  No  out- 
posts had  been  pushed  out  and  there  were  merely  a  few 
interior  guards  posted ;  the  main  position  was  not  prepared 

—677— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

for  defense  and  could  be  plainly  seen  by  the  hostile  patrols 
on  the  hills  opposite  Roncourt  and  St.  Privat.  The  troop 
vehicles  and  ammunition  wagons  had  been  started  at  8 
o'clock  for  Plappeville  under  guard  of  a  Hussar  squadron. 

No  changes  occurred  in  the  Guard  Corps  during  the 
forenoon  except  that  two  Voltigeur  regiments  were  sent 
to  the  3d  Corps ;  the  troops  remained  quietly  in  their 
bivouacs  on  the  heights  of  Plappeville. 

The  Guard  Corps  had  sent  a  few  patrols  towards  Ars 
in  the  valley  of  the  Mosel,  which  there  encountered  German 
outposts,  but  they  did  not  discover  anything  new  besides 
that.  Marshal  Bazaine  subsequently  sent  to  the  Guard 
the  remarkable  orders  not  to  send  out  any  further  patrols, 
as  that  was  the  duty  of  the  cavalry  of  the  line.  General 
Bourbaki  at  the  same  time  was  requested  to  secure  the  road 
from  Moulins  to  Longeau,  so  that  ammunition  trains  for 
the  2d  and  3d  Corps  would  not  be  interfered  with  by  hos- 
tile raiders. 

Thus,  five  French  corps,  of  188  battalions  and  79  bat- 
teries, of  a  total  strength  of  167,600  men  were  ready  for 
defense  before  noon. 

With  the  occupation  of  that  position  the  fate  of  the 
French  army  was  sealed,  for  now  the  necessary  time  had 
been  given  the  Germans  to  block,  with  greatly  superior 
force,  the  retreat  of  the  French  Army  to  Chalons. 

The  French  General  Staff  Account  is  justified  in  blam- 
ing Marshal  Bazaine  for  bringing  the  6th  Corps  to  St. 
Privat  instead  of  to  Amanvillers,  which  caused  crossings 
of  the  troops  and  consequent  long  delays  in  the  march.  The 
account  further  blames  him  for  having  the  6th  Corps 
occupy  the  most  endangered  wing,  because  that  corps,  not 
having  any  artillery  of  its  own,  was  specially  weak  in  that 
arm. 

However,  the  greatest  error  committed  was  undoubtedly 
the  Marshal's  placing  the  entire  Guard  Corps  and  three 
cavalry  divisions  in  rear  of  the  left  wing,  instead  of  the 
right  wing  or  at  least  near  the  center,  from  where  they 
could  have  met  the  envelopment  through  Roncourt. 

—678— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

In  regard  to  Bazaine's  measures  for  the  retreat,  Col- 
onel Roiisset  writes : 

"The  fact  that  the  Marshal  had  140,000  men  in  one  body  execute 
this  retrograde  movement  under  the  ridiculously  small  protection  af- 
forded by  only  one  infantry  division,  shows  clearly  that  the  com- 
mander-in-chief was  totally  lacking  in  the  most  elementary  knowledge 
of  tactics.  Had  a  single  army  corps,  or  only  cavalry  with  some  artil 
lery  encountered  this  mixed  up  mass  of  troops,  columns  and  vehicles, 
enormous  confusion  undoubtedly  would  have  resulted,  the  army 
would  have  been  forced  to  halt  and  to  fight  under  the  worst  kind  of 
conditions." 

And  at  another  place  he  writes  with  full  justification : 

"On  August  17th  Bazaine  should  have  continued  the  march  very 
early  and  without  interruption,  for  though  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
had  brought  up  the  principal  part  of  the  IXth  Corps  the  evening  of 
the  16th  and  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Corps  the  morning  of  the  18th, 
the  Germans  could  not  think  of  renewing  the  attack  immediately  in 
view  of  the  exhaustion  of  the  troops  of  the  Hid  Corps  and  other 
troops." 

The  trains  should  have  been  sent  back  during  the 
night  or  else  destroyed,  as  the  country  was  rich  enough  in 
supplies  to  sustain  the  army  passing  through  for  a  few 
days.  The  4th  Corps  completely  assembled  and  plentifully 
supplied  with  ammunition,  should  have  covered  the  retreat, 
the  2d  Corps,  Guard  and  6th  Corps  could  have  marched 
across  country  if  necessary  and  could  have  reached  by  Moine- 
ville  and  Auboue  the  Orne  sector,  while  the  3d  Corps 
marched  from  St.  Marcel  to  Doncourt  and  Hatrize. 

Making  a  march  of  only  20  kilometers  the  entire  army 
could  have  reached  the  strong  position  behind  the  40  to  50 
meters  broad  Orne,  which  then  if  the  bridges  were  de- 
stroyed, would  have  formed  a  strong  obstacle. 

Once  behind  the  Orne,  Bazaine  would  have  had  no  cause 
to  fear  anything,  he  could  have  permitted  the  enemy  to 
run  his  head  against  the  position  and  then  attack  him  in 
turn.  If  the  army  were  not  attacked  on  the  Orne,  it  could 
resume  the  retreat  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  and  have 
reached  that  same  evening  a  strong  position  on  the  Meuse, 
where  good  resistance  could  have  been  offered  and  reinforce- 
ments awaited. 

The  French  General  Staff  Account  concludes  the  de- 
scription of  the  French  position  with  the  little  complimen- 

—679— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

tary  judgment  which  General  Jarras  passed  on   Marshal 
Bazaine,     The  former  stated : 

"The  Marshal  was  absolutely  devoid  of  firmness  of  character, 
his  words  and  deeds  did  not  coincide;  what  he  praised  today  he 
would  blame  tomorrow  and  vice  versa;  and  these  contradictory  ac- 
tions were  quite  natural  with  him.  He  was  unscrupulous.  The 
Marshal  was  incapacitated  by  his  ignorance,  faulty  military  educa- 
tion and  weakness  of  character  from  saving  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine  in  the  perilous  position  in  which  it  found  itself  when  he  as- 
sumed supreme  command.  He  was  mainly  deficient  in  one  character- 
istic, indispensable  in  difficult  situations,  and  that  is  the  energy  to 
order  things;  he  could  not  say  I  WILL,  and  he  could  at  no  time  issue 
a  definite  order.  In  addition  he  felt  that  his  abilities  and  power  were 
unequal  to  the  situation  and  events  and  he  succumbed  to  this  depress- 
ing truth." 

The  account  of  the  enormous  battle  is  divided  in  the 
French  General  Staff  Account  into  three  main  chapters,  i.  e., 

1.  The  combat  at   Amanvillers   between  the   Prussian   IXth 
Corps  and  the  French  4th  Corps; 

2.  The   combat   at   Gravelotte   between   the    Prussian    Vllth, 
Vlllth  and  lid  Corps  and  the  French  2d  and  3d  Corps; 

3.  The  combat  at  St.  Privat  between  the  Xllth  (Saxon)   and 
Prussian  Guard  Corps  and  the  French  6th  Corps. 

The  French  General  Staff  Account,  which  has  taken 
the  events  on  the  German  side  mainly  from  the  German 
General  Staff  Account  and  the  works  of  the  German  mil- 
itary writers  Hoenig  and  Kunz,  describes  the  fights  on  the 
different  points  of  the  battlefield,  not  as  whole,  but  sub- 
divided into  sections  according  to  definite  hours,  which  di- 
visions we  will  adhere  to  also. 


Deployment  of  the  French  4th  Corps 

Already  before  noon  the  cavalry  videttes  sent  out  by 
the  4th  Corps  come  galloping  back  into  camp,  reporting  the 
approach  of  hostile  columns  from  Verneville.  The  few  in- 
fantry outposts  soon  after  reported  the  same,  soon  after 
the  first  cannon  shot  was  fired.  By  that  time  the  infantry 
of  Grenier's  Division  had  just  assembled  for  the  noon  roll- 
call  and  stood  in  rear  of  the  line  of  stacked  arms.  The 
general,  completely  taken  by  surprise  by  the  enemy  attack- 
ing his  unprepared  position,  at  once  had  his  batteries  go  into 


-680— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

position  and  had  his  infantry  advance  from  its  camps,  so  as 
to  give  the  artillery  a  chance  to  sweep  at  least  the  slopes  of 
the  L'Envie  and  Champenois  farms. 

Even  before  the  infantry  was  deployed,  all  batteries  of 
the  4th  Corps  were  in  position.  Six  batteries  of  the  corps 
artillery,  which  had  stood  with  teams  hitched  up  in  the 
camp  since  early  morning,  were  the  first  to  be  in  position  in 
the  ridge  immediately  west  of  Montigny;  five  other  bat- 
teries went  into  position  to  the  right  of  the  former  on  the 
ridge  327—331  on  the  La  Folie  road.  On  the  left  wing 
of  this  long  artillery  line  and  south  of  the  La  Folie  road 
the  6th  and  8th  Batteries,  4th  Regiment,  of  Montaudon's 
Division  of  the  3d  Corps,  had  gone  into  position,  covered 
by  two  battalions  of  the  51st  Regiment  in  trenches,  the  3d 
Battalion  of  that  regiment  holding  the  La  Folie  farm  build- 
ing. On  the  extreme  right  wing  the  5th,  9th  and  12th  Bat- 
teries of  the  15th  Regiment  of  Cissey's  Division  had  gone 
into  position  north  of  the  railroad  on  Hill  323,  covered  by 
the  20th  Chasseur  Battalion  and  the  3d  Battalion,  73d  Regi- 
ment, the  latter  having  dense  skirmish  lines  on  both  sides 
of  the  railroad. 

All  these  batteries  fired  first  on  the  infantry  coming  out 
of  Verneville  and  the  few  companies  in  the  La  Cusse  woods, 
there  they  took  up  a  duel  with  the  Prussian  batteries  and, 
though  the  French  batteries  were  instructed  to  keep  up  only 
a  slow  fire,  a  heavy  artillery  battle  ensued,  lasting  for  hours. 

Shortly  after  1  o'clock  the  nine  Prussian  batteries  were 
opposed  by  16  French,  which  soon  thereafter  were  rein- 
forced by  four  additional  batteries  of  the  3d  Corps  going 
into  position  on  the  left  wing  of  the  long  artillery  line. 
(These  were  the  7th  and  10th  of  the  4th  and  3d  and  4th 
Horse  Batteries  of  the  17th  Regiment.) 

While  the  batteries  went  into  position  and  opened  the 
battle,  the  French  infantry  also  went  to  its  positions. 

The  Division  of  Grenier  occupied  the  road  from  La 
Folie  to  St.  Ail  running  across  ridge  343 — 331  and  which 
was  lined  with  poplars.  On  the  right  wing  the  5th  Chas- 
seur Battalion  occupied  the  defile  and  served  at  the  same 

—681— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

time  as  artillery  guard;  this  battalion  opened  a  long  con- 
tinued fire  fight  with  hostile  detachments  in  the  La  Cusse 
woods.  To  the  left  of  the  Chasseurs  and  south  of  the  road 
the  13th  and  43d  Regiments  of  Bellecourt's  Brigade  had 
advanced  some  400  meters  beyond  their  camps,  had  de- 
ployed on  one  line  and  had  occupied  the  road  with  strong 
skirmish  lines.  To  the  left  of  this  brigade  Pradier's  Bri- 
gade (64th  and  98th  Regiments)  deployed.  The  64th  Regi- 
ment had  advanced  somewhat  beyond  the  road  and  had  sent 
two  companies  to  Knoll  332,  from  where  these  companies 
effectively  fired  on  the  Prussian  batteries  going  into  position. 
To  the  left  of  that  regiment  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions,  98th 
Regiment  deployed  in  a  dense  skirmish  line,  the  3d  Battal- 
ion at  the  Chateau  of  Montigny. 


The  Action  Between  the  IXth  Corps  and  Grenier's 
Division  up  to  2:00  p.m. 

The  situation  of  the  Prussian  batteries  soon  became 
very  difficult  as  they  received  an  exceedingly  hot  fire  from 
the  superior  French  Artillery  and  from  numerous  infantry 
battalions,  and  they  soon  had  great  losses. 

The  five  batteries  of  the  French  right  wing  on  ridge 
324 — 331  and  the  chasseur  companies  there  fired  on  the  left 
flank  batteries  of  the  Prussian  position.  In  a  short  time 
the  4th  Heavy  Battery,  receiving  the  machine  gun  fire  of 
the  8th  Battery,  1st  Regiment,  at  800  meters  range,  lost  3 
officers,  45  men  and  all  horses  except  eight,  and  then  a  dense 
skirmish  line  of  the  3d  Battalion,  13th  Regiment,  started 
for  that  battery.  Only  with  great  difficulty  did  the  wounded 
battery  commander  succeed  in  bringing  back  two  pieces  be- 
behind  the  La  Cusse  woods,  the  other  pieces  were  captured 
by  a  platoon  of  the  3d  Company,  13th  Regiment,  under  Lieu- 
tenant Parent.  This  French  officer  requested  General 
Bellecourt  to  send  him  teams  to  bring  the  guns  away,  but 
as  the  battery,  charged  with  complying  with  that  request 
(the  9th,  of  the  8th  Regiment)  did  not  send  sufficient  horses, 


-682- 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

only  two  of  the  guns  could  be  taken  to  the  rear,  whereupon 
the  French  infantry  returned  to  its  original  position. 

In  order  to  relieve  the  endangered  artillery,  the  1st 
Company,  84th  Regiment,  advanced  from  the  southeast 
corner  of  the  La  Cusse  woods  to  a  depression  in  front  of  the 
woods ;  it  however,  was  so  rapidly  fired  on  by  three  bat- 
talions of  the  73d  Regiment  and  the  5th  Chasseur  Battalion 
that  it  had  to  retreat  into  the  woods  again,  being  received 
by  the  3d  Company.  Though  General  Bellecourt  did  not 
understand,  as  the  French  account  states,  how  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  this  evident  sign  of  weakness  of  the  enemy,  the 
situation  of  the  Prussian  batteries  was  nevertheless  a  very 
precarious  one. 

The  2d  Horse  Battery  as  well  as  the  3d  and  4th  Light 
Batteries  had  heavy  losses  and  only  the  batteries  on  the 
right  wing  did  not  suffer  too  much;  still,  towards  2  p.m.  the 
Prussian  batteries  were  hardly  able  to  continue  the  fight 
as  the  bringing  up  of  the  ammunition  wagons  was  extremely 
difficult  because  of  the  nature  of  the  ground. 

But  in  spite  of  all  this  the  batteries  of  the  18th  Division 
gained  one  advantage  over  the  French  batteries,  for  the  6th 
and  8th  Battery,  4th  Regiment,  of  Montaudon's  Division 
on  Knoll  343  had  fired  away  almost  all  their  ammunition, 
the  breechlocks  of  the  machine  guns  no  longer  worked 
smoothly,  and  so  these  batteries  went  back  to  behind  La 
Folie. 

However,  their  places  were  immediately  taken  by  the 
7th  and  10th  Battery,  4th  Regiment,  of  the  3d  Corps,  while 
to  the  right  of  them  the  3d  and  4th  Battery,  17th  Regiment, 
of  the  3d  Corps  went  into  position  at  the  gallop.  Thus  there 
were  shortly  after  2  P.M.  fifteen  batteries  of  the  4th  and  3d 
Corps  in  action  between  La  Folie  and  Amanvillers  against 
nine  Prussian  batteries,  but  there  was  among  the  French 
batteries  an  absence  of  united  leadership,  each  battery  com- 
mander acted  as  he  saw  fit,  picked  his  target  as  it  suited 
him,  and  some  of  the  batteries  fired  on  targets  offered  by 
chance,  such  as  very  small    infantry  detachments. 

While  the  French  batteries,  though  twice  the  number 
of  the  German  batteries,  had  not  yet  succeeded  in  silencing 

—683— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

the  latter,  the  infantry  regiments  of  Grenier's  Division 
opened  fire  on  them  also.  Still  the  French  infantry  suf- 
fered under  the  fire  of  the  Prussian  guns,  and  even  before 
2  P.M.  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions  of  the  64th  Regiment,  having 
fired  away  their  ammunition,  were  drawn  back  to  behind  the 
park  at  Montigny. 

Now  General  Pradier  caused  the  3d  Battalion  of  the 
98th  Regiment,  which  up  to  then  had  been  in  reserve  at 
Montigny  to  advance,  and  it  prolonged  the  left  wing  of  its 

,  It 

regiment  which  extended  a  little  beyond  the  road  and  also 
had  suffered  losses  by  the  Prussian  artillery  fire. 

Between  one  and  two  o'clock,  as  already  mentioned, 
Lorencez's  Division  of  the  4th  Corps  deployed  in  rear  of 
Grenier's  Division.  Thereafter  General  Ladmirault  had 
the  33d  Regiment  deploy  on  both  sides  of  the  Montigny 
park  with  orders  to  "hold  itself  there  at  all  costs  during  the 
entire  battle."  On  Knoll  331  the  2d  Chasseur  Battalion  and 
the  1st  Battalion,  54th  Regiment,  prolonged  the  skirmish  line 
of  the  5th  Chasseur  Battalion,  while  the  3d  Battalion,  54th 
Regiment,  took  position  behind  the  13th  Regiment  and  the 
2d  Battalion,  54th  Regiment,  at  the  west  entrance  of  Aman- 
villers. 

The  65th  Regiment  and  two  battalions  of  the  15th 
Regiment — the  latter  having  been  called  up  from  St.  Vincent 
— deployed  in  one  line  between  Montigny  and  Amanvillers 
and  thus  formed  a  second  line  for  Grenier's  Division. 

The  machine  gun  battery — 9th  of  the  1st  Regiment — of 
Grenier's  Division  went  into  position  on  the  road  from 
Amanvillers  to  Habonville,  and  thus  two  complete  infantry 
divisions  were  deployed  before  two  o'clock  between  Montigny 
and  the  railroad  with  Cissey's  Division  to  the  right  of  the 
railroad.  The  entire  4th  Corps  and  the  1st  Division  of  the 
3d  consequently  were  deployed  against  the  few  troops  of 
the  IXth  Corps  and  in  action  with  them. 


-684- 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

The  French  Batteries  Fall  Back  at  4  p.m. 

Between  4  and  4:30  p.m.  nearly  all  French  batteries, 
which  up  to  then  had  been  in  action  against  the  IXth  Corps, 
departed.    Concerning  this  the  French  account  says: 

"The  5th  Battery,  4th  Regiment  on  Hill  343  fell  back  towards 
4  o'clock  to  behind  the  La  Folic  farm  building  though  it  had  lost 
but  nine  men  and  12  horses.  The  machine  gun  battery  (8th  of  the 
4th  Regiment) ,  which  was  under  better  cover,  held  out  a  little 
longer;  it  lost  11  men  and  13  horses,  and  fell  back  because  the 
breech  blocks  of  the  machine  guns  refused  to  work  longer. 

"On  the  right  the  7th  and  10th  Batteries  of  the  4th  Regiment 
were  again  in  position  after  having  replenished  their  ammunition. 
But  when  the  batteries  of  the  Prussian  I  lid  Corps  went  into 
position,  they  also  went  back  to  the  woods. 

"Several  batteries  at  Montigny  were  forced  to  drive  off.  The 
5th  Horse  Battery  of  the  17th  Regiment  had  enormous  losses, 
though  the  soft  ground  decreased  the  effect  of  the  hostile  shells. 
The  batteries  at  Verneville  and  the  horse  batteries  on  the  left 
wing  of  the  batteries  of  the  18th  Division  were  threatened  with 
annihilation  and  therefore  fell  back.  The  6th  Battery,  17th  Regi- 
ment had  suffered  less,  being  out  of  the  enemy's  sight  on  account 
of  the  poplars  along  the   La  Folie   road.  But  after  the  bat- 

teries had  left  Knoll  343  and  when  the  batteries  had  only  50  to 
60  shells  left  after  having  fired  more  than  1000  rounds,  they 
fell  back  to  behind  the  park  of  Montigny,  its  place  being  taken  by 
the  18th  Battery  of  the  4th  Regiment,  coming  up  again.  The  10th 
Battery,  1st  Regiment,  which  had  gone  into  position  close  to 
Montigny  on  the  road,  had  difficulty  in  seeing  the  Prussian  bat- 
teries because  of  the  poplars  in  front.  It  fired  at  random  and 
expended  much  ammunition  with  but  negative  results.  It  drove 
off  at  4  P.M.  to  replenish  its  ammunition. 

"Shortly  thereafter  the  9th  Battery,  88th  Regiment,  having 
replenished  its  ammunition,  again  went  into  position  at  Montigny, 
but  it  had  again  fired  away  its  ammunition  after  half  an  hour's 
firing  and  fell  back  to  the  railroad  station  at  Amanvillers. 

"The  11th  and  12th  Batteries,  1st  Regiment,  had  been  in 
action  since  noon;  by  2  P.M.  they  had  suffered  material  loss,  but 
they  held  their  position.  After  a  part  of  the  Prussian  batteries 
had  fallen  back,  the  11th  Battery  fired  on  hostile  infantry  in  the 
La  Cusse  woods;  but  when  the  batteries  of  the  Prussian  Illd  Corps 
appeared,  the  battery  at  once  fired  on  these,  but  was  forced  to 
cease  its  fire  after  fifteen  minutes,  as  no  observation  was  possible. 
Toward  4:30  P.M.  General  of  Artillery  Lafaille  directed  the  two 
batteries  to  remain  in  their  position  for  the  present  but  not  to 
fire  until  further  orders.  From  4:30  P.M.  on  only  4  batteries 
of  the  12  remained  in  position  on  the  heights  of  Montigny,  eight 
having  driven  off. 

"On  the  right  wing  of  the  4th  Corps  the  situation  of  the 
batteries  was  as  had— "dis as h-o us."  The  Hessian  batteries,  after 
having  driven  off  the  8  batteries  of  Cissey's  Division  directed 
their  fire  on  the  6  batteries  on  Hills  331  to  327.  Shortly  after 
4:30  P.M.  the  6th  Battery,  8th  Regiment,  departed,  having  fired 
off  all  its  ammunition  and  having  lost  16  men  and  17  horses.  The 
machine  gun  battery   (8th  of  the  1st  Regiment)   had  fired  on  the 

—685— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

left  wing  of  the  Prussian  artillery  until  that  artillery  drove  off 
and  then  directed  its  fire  on  the  infantry  in  the  woods.  When 
the  batteries  of  the  lid  Corps  appeared,  they  fired  on  them, 
but  with  little  effect  as  the  range  was  2500  meters.  The  bat- 
teries fell  back  to  Amanvillers  at  about  4  P.M. 

"The  9th  Battery,  1st  Regiment,  in  position  on  the  road  from 
Amanvillers  to  Habonville,  suffered  much  from  the  Hessian 
batteries;  within  half  an  hour  it  lost  24  men  and  18  horses  and 
was  put  out  of  action.  One  caisson  exploded,  and  at  4:30  P.M. 
the  battery  went  back  to  behind  Amanvillers. 

"The  three  batteries  of  Grenier's  Division — 5th,  6th  and 
7th  of  the  1st  Regiment — were  soon  silenced  by  the  Hessian  bat- 
teries in  position  behind  the  railroad  embankment  and,  having 
fired  away  their  ammunition  and  suffered  material  losses  they 
fell  back  to  behind  Amanvillers. 

"Thus  before  5  o'clock  the  French  infantry  was  left  to  itself 
as  the  six  batteries  of  the  right  wing  had  also  fallen  back  to  be- 
hind Amanvillers,  and  only  four  batteries  remained  in  position  at 
Montigny." 

According  to  this  French  statement,  21  Prussian  bat- 
teries— nine  of  the  IXth  Corps,  six  Hessian  and  six  batter- 
ies of  the  Illd  Corps — succeeded  in  forcing  19  batteries  to 
abandon  their  positions  before  5  P.M. 

The  unusual  bravery  and  stubbornness  of  the  Prussian 
batteries  is  shown  by  a  comparison  of  the  losses,  for  while 
the  Prussian  batteries,  which  fell  back,  lost  17  officers,  187 
men  and  370  horses,  the  19  French  batteries  lost  a  total  of 
12  officers,  218  men  and  250  horses. 

Thus  the  Prussian  IXth  Corps  had  achieved  a  great 
success  by  five  o'clock  by  forcing  five  hostile  battalions  and 
19  batteries  to  cease  fighting. 


The  Battle  at  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes 

During  the  time  the  IXth  Corps  was  hotly  engaged  in 
battle  with  the  French  4th  Corps,  Prince  August  of  Wurt- 
temberg  promised  good  support  to  General  Manstein  by  the 
entire  Guard  Corps.  The  latter,  however,  declared  that  the 
attack  on  St.  Privat  was  the  most  necessary  thing  and  re- 
quested for  the  present  only  one  Guard  brigade  as  support ; 
this  brigade  soon  arrived  and  went  into  position  behind  the 
left  wing  at  Anoux-la-Grange. 

Shortly  after  noon  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  ridden 
to  Habonville  and  there  seen  that  the  enemy  extended  to  St. 

—686— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Privat ;  he  at  once  gave  orders  to  the  Guard  Corps  to  make 
an  enveloping  attack. 

Prince  Albert  of  Wurttemberg,  hastening  ahead  of  his 
corps,  also  arrived  at  Habonville  at  1  o'clock;  he  also  saw 
that  the  enemy  extended  to  St.  Privat  and  intended  to  pre- 
pare the  attack  with  his  entire  artillery  but  to  engage  his 
infantry  only  when  the  Saxon  envelopment  became  effec- 
tive. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  in  the  meantime  received 
information  that  the  24th  Infantry  Division  was  advancing 
on  St.  Marie-aux-Chenes,  the  23d  Division  advancing  by 
Coinville  and  the  woods  between  Coinville  and  Roncourt, 
and  would  attack  the  French  right  wing. 

During  this  time  the  troops  had  continued  on  the  march ; 
General  von  Pape  arrived  toward  12 :45  P.M.  south  of  Habon- 
ville with  the  advance  guard  of  the  1st  Guard  Division  and, 
while  the  infantry  continued  the  march  on  St.  Ail,  he  placed 
his  batteries  in  position  for  the  present,  at  one  o'clock,  south 
of  the  railroad  and  the  village  of  Habonville.  But  as  these 
batteries  achieved  no  material  effect  from  there,  they  crossed 
the  railroad  cut,  fenced  in  with  wire,  at  the  gallop  and 
went  into  a  position  south  of  St.  Ail. 

Shortly  thereafter  Prince  August  of  Wurttemberg  had 
five  additional  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  cross  the  rail- 
road to  prolong  the  line  of  guns  as  far  as  Hill  284  south  of 
St.  Ail,  so  that  now  nine  batteries  of  the  Guard  were  in  po- 
sition southwest  of  St.  Ail,  firing  on  the  artillery  of  the 
French  6th  Corps,  though  themselves  receiving  a  hot  fire 
from  the  93d,  25th  and  26th  Regiments  at  1000  meters 
range. 

To  cover  the  Guard  artillery,  the  1st  Battalion  of  the 
Guard  Fusilier  Regiment  occupied  the  northeastern  edge  of 
Habonville,  while  the  other  three  battalions  of  the  advance 
guard  continued  the  march  on  St.  Ail. 

When  these  battalions,  advancing  along  the  ravine 
running  northward,  approached  St.  Ail,  they  observed  what 
seemed  to  be  strong  hostile  infantry  detachments  running 
towards  the  village  from  the  north.  The  3d  Battalion  of 
the  Guard  Fusilier  Regiment  succeeded  however  in  occu- 

—687— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

pying  in  time  the  village  of  St.  Ail,  gaining  a  very  impor- 
tant supporting  point  thereby. 

The  Deployment  of  the  French  6th  Corps 

Prior  to  these  movements  on  the  German  side  the  en- 
tire French  6th  Corps  stood  under  arms,  ready  for  battle,  in 
its  bivouac  places. 

As  early  as  11  o'clock  Marshal  Canrobert  had  learned 
from  his  cavalry  patrols  with  certainty  that  an  attack  was 
imminent  and  when  the  artillery  commenced  firing  he  at 
once  rode  along  the  road  south  of  St.  Privat,  giving  orders 
to  the  Division  of  Levassor-Sorval  to  advance. 

The  25th  and  26th  Regiment  deployed  in  one  line  on 
ridge  312 — 326 — 308,  behind  them  in  second  line  were  the 
70th  and  28th  Regiments,  with  the  right  flank  in  rear  of 
Hill  333,  and  with  the  left  flank  800  meters  from  the  rail- 
road, in  close  touch  with  Cissey's  Division  of  the  4th  Corps 
and  its  batteries. 

The  batteries  of  the  Division — 7th  and  8th  of  the  18th 
Regiment — brought  forward  by  Marshal  Canrobert  in  per- 
son, went  into  position  on  Ridge  333 — 326  and  from  1  o'clock 
on  fired  on  the  four  Prussian  Guard  batteries  south  of  St. 
Ail  as  well  as  on  the  Hessian  batteries  and  the  infantry 
advancing  along  the  railroad  east  of  Habonville.  But  as 
the  French  batteries  had  hardly  any  effect  on  the  hostile 
batteries  at  the  railroad,  the  former  moved  off  at  2  P.M. 
and  took  a  new  position  north  of  St.  Privat. 

When  Marshal  Canrobert  shortly  after  one  o'clock  saw 
Prussian  infantry  appearing  also  at  Habonville,  he  feared 
that  his  left  wing  would  be  pierced  and  now  caused  Tixier's 
Division  to  advance  from  its  bivouacs.  The  1st  Brigade 
— 9th  Chasseurs,  4th  and  10th  Infantry  Regiments — de- 
ployed on  one  line  300  meters  west  of  the  St.  Privat — Aman- 
villers  road,  while  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  12th  Regiment 
and  the  100th  Regiment  halted  in  massed  battalions  east 
of  the  road,  right  flank  at  the  Jerusalem  farm  building. 
The  1st  Battalion,  12th  Regiment,  held  the  south  edge  of 
St.  Privat. 

—688— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

At  the  sound  of  the  first  cannon  shot  the  Division  of  La 
Font  de  Villers  took  up  arms,  the  1st  Brigade — 75th  and  91st 
Regiments — occupied  the  space  between  St.  Privat  and  Ron- 
court,  the  2d  Brigade — 93d  and  94th  Regiments — taking 
position  about  200  meters  w^est  of  the  first  houses  of  St. 
Privat. 

Thus,  before  even  a  single  German  grenadier  had 
passed  St.  Ail,  25  Battalions  of  Canrobert's  Corps  and  18 
battalions  of  Cissey's  Division — 20th  Chasseurs,  the  1st, 
6th,  57th  and  73d  Regiments — were  deployed  between  the 
Ste.  Marie — St.  Privat  road  and  the  railroad.  There  was 
in  addition  a  full  cavalry  division  at  the  Amanvillers  rail- 
road station,  but  the  majority  of  these  troops  remained,  as 
the  French  account  expressly  states,  inactive  for  hours, 
without  firing  a  single  shot. 

While  the  right  wing  of  Marshal  Canrobert's  force  was 
threatened  with  envelopment,  he  feared  more  for  his  left 
wing  and  employed  only  one  infantry  division  north  of  the 
main  road,  and  a  single  infantry  regiment  in  addition,  which 
was  to  hold  the  advance  position  at  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes. 

When  the  enemy  appeared  at  Habonville,  Marshal  Can- 
robert  decided  shortly  after  one  o'clock  to  push  his  right 
wing  forward  to  meet  any  envelopment.  He  therefore  is- 
sued orders  to  General  Colin  to  occupy  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes 
with  one  regiment  and  with  his  other  regiment  block  the 
space  between  the  road  and  Levassor's  Division. 

The  other  brigade,  Sonnay,  occupied  Roncourt  with  the 
1st  Battalion,  75th  Regiment,  and  then  deployed  the  other 
battalions  of  the  75th  and  91st  Regiments  on  Hills  304  and 
296  west  of  the  road  from  St.  Privat  to  Roncourt,  the  3d 
Battalion,  91st  Regiment  standing  close  to  the  road. 

The  93d  Regiment  deployed  two  battalions  on  Hills  295 
and  312,  facing  St.  Ail,  the  3d  Battalion  being  in  reserve  on 
the  main  road. 

In  second  line,  on  the  St.  Privat — Roncourt  road,  stood 
two  battalions,  9th  Regiment,  to  their  left  the  cavalry  divi- 
sion of  Barail — 3  regiments  of  chasseurs  with  2  horse  bat- 
teries, while  the  3d  Battalion,  9th  Regiment,  stood  close  to 
the  northern  edge  of  St.  Privat. 

—689— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

General  Colin  led  2i/j  battalions  of  the  94th  Regiment 
to  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes  and  caused  the  west  and  north 
edge  of  the  village  to  be  occupied  and  prepared  for  defense, 
while  three  companies  of  the  regiment  were  kept  back  to 
occupy  the  west  side  of  St.  Privat. 

When  the  94th  Regiment  arrived  at  Ste.  Marie,  Colonel 
Geslin  sent  one  company  to  the  low  ridge  283,  600  meters 
south  of  the  village,  where  it  had  a  short  fire  fight  with 
Prussian  skirmishers  from  St.  Ail,  and  then  withdrew  at 
once  by  direct  orders  from  the  division  commander.  The 
regiment  in  Ste.  Marie  was  supported  by  the  5th  Battery 
of  the  14th  Regiment,  which  had  gone  into  position  on  knoll 
312,  southwest  of  St.  Privat. 

Within  St.  Privat  portions  of  the  91st  and  94th  Regi- 
ment occupied  the  west  side;  the  3d  Battalion,  9th  and  1st 
Battalion,  12th  Regiment,  were  in  reserve  close  to  the  vil- 
lage. 

Even  before  the  infantry  of  the  6th  Corps  was  fully 
deployed,  Marshal  Canrobert  caused  all  his  batteries  to  go 
into  position.  The  7th  of  the  14th,  the  6th  of  the  19th,  the 
8th  of  the  8th  Regiment  went  into  position,  their  right  flank 
on  Knoll  304,  their  left  on  the  road.  The  5th  Battery,  19th 
Regiment,  went  into  position  at  the  west  entrance  of  the 
village  behind  a  garden  wall ;  the  7th  and  8th  Batteries,  18th 
Regiment  north  of  St.  Privat,  after  these  two  batteries  had 
been  in  action  south  of  Hill  333,  where  they  produced  but 
little  effect,  however. 

Five  batteries  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Montluisant — 
7th  of  the  8th,  9th  of  the  13th,  5th  of  the  8th,  12th  of  the 
8th  and  10th  of  the  13th — went  into  position  on  ridge  333 
to  327  south  of  the  road,  in  close  connection  with  the  three 
batteries  of  Cissey's  Division  north  of  the  railroad. 

The  batteries  on  the  left  fired  partly  on  the  Prussian 
Guard  batteries  and  partly  on  the  Hessian  batteries;  they 
had  but  little  effect  in  spite  of  the  large  amount  of  ammuni- 
tion expended,  as  the  range  was  too  great  and  their  shells 
exploded  in  most  cases  far  in  front  of  the  hostile  batteries, 
as  is  expressly  stated  in  the  French  account.     In  addition, 

—690— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

the  French  batteries  had  been  ordered  to  fire  very  slowly,  so 
as  to  husband  the  ammunition. 

Marshal  Canrobert  had  only  two  batteries  of  the  Cav- 
alry Division  of  du  Barail  in  reserve,  all  the  other  11  bat- 
teries were  in  action. 

Thus,  at  the  very  opening  of  the  battle  at  Ste.  Marie-aux- 
Chenes  the  nine  batteries  of  the  Prussian  Guard  and  the  14 
of  the  IXth  Corps  were  opposed  by  15  batteries  between  hill 
304  at  Roncourt  and  the  railroad  and  by  18  additional  bat- 
teries between  the  railroad  and  La  Folic,  so  that  23  German 
batteries  were  engaged  against  33  French  batteries,  until 
an  additional  12  batteries  (Saxon)  entered  the  action  at 
about  4  P.M. 


The  Artillery  Battle  Between  1:30  and  4  p.m. 

While  Marshal  Canrobert  had  engaged  only  a  small 
portion  of  his  infantry  for  the  defense  of  Ste.  Marie,  all 
batteries  of  the  6th  Corps  were  engaged  in  the  battle. 

When  the  nine  Prussian  Guard  batteries  went  into 
position  south  of  St.  Ail,  they  were  immediately  opposed  by 
all  the  batteries  of  the  6th  Corps  and  several  of  the  4th 
Corps,  which  up  to  then  had  not  fired  a  shot.  Though  the 
batteries  were  ordered  to  fire  only  very  slowly,  so  as  to 
husband  the  ammunition,  the  5th  Battery  of  the  14th  Regi- 
ment, which  had  taken  an  advanced  position  on  Hill  312 
southwest  of  St.  Privat,  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to 
shoot  the  hostile  guns  to  pieces  as  it  could  enfilade  them 
at  close  range.  The  5th  Battery  of  the  19th,  and  the  6th 
Battery,  14th  Regiment,  also  fired  on  the  Prussian  Guard 
batteries  and  were  very  soon  reinforced  by  the  6th  Battery, 
19th  Regiment,  which  however,  had  but  little  effect  because 
of  the  long  range  from  north  of  the  road.  The  5  batteries 
—8th  of  the  7th,  8th  and  9th  of  the  13th  and  7  and  8th  of 
the  18th  Regiment — which  Marshal  Canrobert  had  person- 
ally directed  to  go  into  position  on  knoll  333,  had  different 
successes.  The  8th  Battery,  close  to  the  road,  had  hardly 
fired  10  rounds  per  piece  on  the  hostile  infantry,  when  the 

—691— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

Marshal  drew  it  back  to  St.  Privat,  where  it  took  a  new  po- 
sition south  of  the  road,  its  right  at  the  first  houses.  The 
7th  Battery,  8th  Regiment,  and  the  9th  of  the  13th  Regiment 
on  knoll  333  fired  first  on  the  infantry  appearing  between 
Habonville  and  La  Cusse,  and  later  on  against  the  Hessian 
batteries;  the  7th  and  8th  Batteries  of  the  18th  Regiment 
also  fired  on  the  Hessian  batteries. 

Of  the  three  batteries  on  the  left — 6th  and  12th  of  the 
8th,  and  10th  of  the  13th  Regiment — only  the  10th  bat- 
tery kept  up  a  slow  fire  on  the  Hessian  infantry  attempting 
to  cross  the  railroad,  the  other  two  batteries  went  back  under 
cover  behind  the  ridge. 

Thus  the  five  batteries  north  of  the  road — 5th  and  6th 
of  the  14th,  5th  and  6th  of  the  19th  and  9th  of  the  8th  Regi- 
ment— were  in  action  with  Prussian  Guard  batteries  from 
1 :30  P.M.  on,  while  the  other  seven  batteries — 7th  of  the 
8th,  9th  of  the  13th,  7th  and  8th  of  the  18th,  5th  and  12th  of 
the  8th  and  10th  of  the  16th  Regiment — joined  their  fire 
with  that  of  the  batteries  of  Cissey's  Division  against  the 
batteries  between  Habonville  and  La  Cusse.  In  spite  of  the 
rapidity  of  the  fire  at  the  start,  which  soon  decreased  in 
order  to  husband  the  ammunition,  the  hostile  batteries  suf- 
fered but  little  under  the  fire  of  the  French  guns. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  hostile  artillery  at  St.  Ail  was 
greatly  harassed  by  the  fire  of  the  skirmishers  of  the  2d 
Battalion,  93d  Regiment,  and  3d  Company,  2d  Battalion, 
28th  Regiment,  but  in  spite  of  this  the  Prussian  batteries 
fired  but  little  on  the  French  infantry,  mainly  firing  against 
the  batteries.  Therefore  the  French  batteries  furthest  ad- 
vanced between  Ste.  Marie  and  St.  Privat,  soon  gave  up  the 
fight.  When  the  5th  Horse  Battery  of  the  19th  Regiment 
had  fired  about  200  rounds,  it  was  forced  by  the  constantly 
increasing  hostile  artillery  fire  to  take  a  new  position  be- 
hind the  road  embankment,  but  after  firing  a  very  few 
shots  from  there  the  battery  received  orders  from  Marshal 
Canrobert  to  come  closer  to  the  village.  Two  guns  remained 
in  the  position  to  the  flank,  while  four  guns  went  into  po- 
sition on  the  road  behind  low  garden  walls. 


—692- 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

The  5th  Battery,  14th  Regiment,  on  knoll  312  also  be- 
lieving it  necessary  to  save  its  ammunition,  fell  back  with 
the  6th  Battery  of  the  same  regiment  in  a  northerly  direc- 
tion. 

The  7th  and  8th  batteries,  18th  Regiment,  suffered  ma- 
terial losses.  In  a  very  short  time  the  7th  Battery  lost 
10  men  and  18  horses ;  2  pieces  had  but  one  horse  left,  and 
both  batteries  drove  off  through  the  village  of  St.  Privat 
and  took  up  a  position  north  of  the  village  to  be  able  to 
sweep  the  road  to  Ste.  Marie. 

Towards  3  P.M.,  when  the  Saxon  batteries  w^re  in 
position  and  when  22  German  batteries  were  in  action  north 
of  Habonville,  the  situation  with  the  French  batteries  was 
about  as  follows : 

On  knoll  333  the  three  left  wing  batteries — 5th  and 
12th  of  the  8th,  and  10th  of  the  13th  Regiment — had  almost 
completely  ceased  firing  in  front  of  the  Hessian  batteries; 
they  had  but  10  to  15  rounds  per  gun  and  fired  a  shot 
only  every  quarter  of  an  hour.  Only  the  9th  Battery,  13th 
Regiment,  on  the  left  wing  of  the  ridge  continued  a  slow 
fire  in  the  direction  of  Habonville.  North  of  Knoll  333  six 
batteries— 7th  of  the  8th  Regiment  on  Hill  333,  8th  of  the 
8th  and  5th  of  19th  on  the  main  road ;  8th  of  the  19th  on 
Hill  293  northwest  of  St.  Privat  and  7th  and  8th  of  the  18th 
north  of  that  village — remained  in  their  positions  and  kept 
up  a  very  slow  fire. 

Even  before  the  artillery  battle  started  Marshal  Can- 
robert  had  feared  for  his  ammunition  supply;  but  it  was 
impossible  to  bring  up  ammunition  from  the  rear.  On  his 
several  requests  to  Marshal  Bazaine  for  an  ammunition 
column,  a  number  of  ammunition  wagons  were  sent  off,  but 
entirely  too  late,  so  that  they  did  not  arrive  until  the  battle 
was  over,  and  only  four  ammunition  wagons  were  received 
by  the  4th  Corps. 

Thus  at  3  P.M.,  the  German  artillery  was  master  of 
the  battlefield  and  the  few  French  batteries  still  in  position 
were  not  in  a  situation  to  play  an  important  role  in  the  de- 
fense of  Ste.  Marie,  so  that  that  defense  was  a  special  phase 

—693— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

in  the  battle,  from  which  all  troops  of  the  6th  Corps,  except 
the  94th  and  portions  of  the  93d  Regiment,  kept  aloof. 

After  Marshal  Canrobert  had  observed  the  deployment 
of  the  hostile  infantry  masses  at  Ste.  Marie  and  had  seen 
numerous  batteries  go  into  position  north  of  Habonville, 
it  appeared  to  him — though  the  enemy  had  been  delayed 
by  the  94th  Regiment  in  Ste.  Marie — that  an  attack  on  St. 
Privat  was  imminent,  and  he  therefore  decided  to  assemble 
all  of  his  troops  on  the  heights  of  St.  Privat,  abandoning  his 
advanced  post  of  Ste.  Marie. 

Towards  2:30  P.M.,  General  Tixier  received  orders  to 
lead  two  of  his  regiments  to  St.  Privat  to  oppose  on  the 
right  an  attack  indicated  by  the  progress  of  the  hostile  fire. 

While  the  engineer  companies  of  the  division  prepared 
the  walls  of  the  village  for  defense,  five  battalions  of  the 
10th  and  12th  Regiments — though  belonging  to  different 
brigades — were  thrown  into  the  village.  The  2d  and  3d 
Battalions,  12th  Regiment,  took  position  behind  hedges  and 
garden  walls  at  the  west  edge  of  the  village  and  there  rein- 
forced the  seven  companies  of  the  93d  and  94th  Regiments. 
On  the  run  the  battalions  of  the  10th  Regiment  then  ad- 
vanced under  the  hostile  artillery  fire;  the  1st  Battalion 
took  position  at  the  northwest  corner  of  the  village  behind 
low  garden  walls,  the  3d  Battalion  prolonged  the  right 
wing,  while  the  2d  Battalion  formed  the  extreme  right 
wing  with  three  companies.  The  remaining  seven  battal- 
ions of  Tixier's  Division,  9th  Chasseurs,  4th  and  100th 
Regiments — remained  for  the  present  south  of  Jerusalem. 

When  towards  3:30  P.M.  the  hostile  infantry,  pushing 
forward  from  the  south  and  west  against  Ste.  Marie,  be- 
came denser  and  denser,  General  Colin  sent  a  message  to 
St.  Privat  that  he  could  hold  his  position  only  if  reinforced 
on  the  right. 

Up  to  then  the  skirmishers  of  the  2d  Battalion,  93d 
Regiment  and  two  companies  of  the  1st  Battalion,  which 
had  advanced  across  Knoll  312,  had  furnished  the  only  sup- 
port, by  firing  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Prussian  Guard  bat- 
talions. 


—694- 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Now  General  Tixier  received  orders  to  assist  the  en- 
dangered 94th  Regiment,  but  he  contented  himself  with 
sending  the  10th  Regiment  and  the  2d  Battalion,  12th  Regi- 
ment, some  few  hundred  paces  ahead,  where  these  bat- 
talions remained  inactive  however. 

By  3:30  P.M.  11  battalions  were  deployed  iii  two  lines 
north  of  the  main  road  opposite  Roncourt,  which  had  not 
yet  fired  a  shot.  Behind  them  the  6th  Battery  of  the  19th, 
the  7th  and  8th  of  the  18th  and  the  7th  of  the  14th  Regi- 
ment were  still  in  position.  South  of  the  main  road  also 
were  12  battalions  of  Levassor's  Division  deployed  in  two 
lines  about  2000  meters  from  the  hostile  artillery,  but  so 
far  only  a  few  of  the  skirmish  groups  had  become  engaged. 
Seven  batteries — 5th  of  the  19th,  8th  of  the  8th,  1st  of  the 
8th,  9th  of  the  13th,  5th  of  the  12th  and  10th  of  the  13th 
Regiment — were  still  in  position,  but  they  did  not  fire  any 
more.  St.  Privat  itself  was  occupied  by  25  companies  of 
different  regiments,  while  seven  battalions  of  Tixier's  Di- 
vision and  2  Battalions  of  the  9th  Regiment  were  south 
of  Roncourt,  and  three  cavalry  regiments  of  the  Division  of 
du  Barail  were  between  Roncourt  and  St.  Privat. 

Counter  Attack  by  Sonnay's  Brigade 

When  the  Saxon  battalions,  pursuing  the  94th  Regi- 
ment toward  Roncourt  left  Ste.  Marie  in  a  northeasterly 
direction.  General  La  Font  de  Villers  ordered  his  1st  Bri- 
gade to  advance  to  effective  rifle  range. 

The  1st  Battalion,  75th  Regiment  remained  observing 
the  forest  exits  (Auboue)  at  the  west  exit  of  Roncourt. 
The  other  five  battalions  of  Connay's  Brigade — 75th  and 
91st  Regiments — advanced  from  their  positions  where  they 
had  remained  three  hours  without  firing  a  shot. 

With  dense  skirmish  lines  in  front  of  the  2d  and  3d 
Battalions,  the  1st  Regiment,  followed  by  the  2d  Battalion, 
12th  Regiment,  advanced  close  to  Ste.  Marie,  while  south 
of  the  road  the  2d  Battalion,  93d  Regiment,  protected  itself 
against  the  artillery  fire  from  hill  295,  while  the  fire  action 
with  the  Guard  Jagers  increased. 

—695— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

But  even  before  then,  on  the  German  side,  the  2d 
Battalion,  105th  Regiment,  which  had  been  joined  on  the 
right  by  the  4th  Company,  105th  Regiment,  and  the  four 
Jager  companies,  and  on  the  left  by  the  7th  and  8th  Com- 
panies, 104th  Regiment,  had  forced  Colonel  Geslin  to  re- 
treat with  the  remnants  of  his  regiment  to  Roncourt. 
Shortly  thereafter  the  third  battalions  of  the  104th  and 
105th  Regiments  prolonged  the  fighting  line  on  both  wings, 
which  now  extended  to  the  depression  243.  The  3d  Battal- 
ion, 105th  Regiment,  on  the  left  wing  formed  a  hook,  fac- 
ing north  towards  the  Auboue  woods. 

The  battalions  of  the  91st  Regiment  and  the  companies 
of  the  93d  south  of  the  road,  delivered  a  rapid  fire  on  the 
companies  in  front  of  Ste.  Marie,  while  on  the  extreme  right 
wing  the  battalions  of  the  75th  Regiment  forced  two  Saxon 
batteries  in  position  north  of  Ste.  Marie  to  fall  back  to  be- 
hind the  road. 

One  battery  of  the  du  Barail's  Cavalry  Division — 6th 
of  the  19th  Regiment — had  come  up  to  within  700  meters 
of  the  hostile  infantry. 

The  position  of  the  Saxon  companies  became  the  more 
untenable,  as  the  range  of  the  opposing  skirmish  lines  was 
within  chassepot,  but  not  within  German  rifle  range.  The 
Saxon  battalions  could  hold  their  own  only  under  heavy 
loss ;  and  when  General  von  Nehrhoff  observed  that  the  bat- 
tle assumed  larger  and  larger  proportions — not  at  all  in 
accordance  with  the  intentions  of  army  headquarters — he 
ordered  the  47th  Brigade  to  break  off  the  battle  and  retreat 
to  behind  Ste.  Marie. 

Thus  the  Saxon  brigade,  having  first  occupied  the  woods 
of  Auboue  as  a  supporting  point,  had  sufi"ered  through  the 
hostile  infantry  fire  a  reverse  in  the  open,  having  met  fresh 
infantry  and  the  two  Saxon  batteries  on  the  left  were  also 
compelled  to  withdraw  to  the  rear. 

Though  the  Brigade  of  Sonnay  assumed  merely  a  de- 
fensive attitude,  breaking  off  the  battle  was  not  an  easy 
matter  for  the  Saxons ;  the  battalions  fell  back  in  echelons, 
and   again   assembled   northwest   of   Ste.   Marie   about    5 

—696— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

o'clock.  The  3d  Battalion,  108th  regiment,  marched  into 
the  woods  of  Auboue  and  there  joined  the  other  battalions 
of  its  regiment. 

The  French  Brigade  of  Sonnay  also  fell  back  on  St. 
Privat,  as  it  received  too  hot  a  fire  from  the  German  bat- 
teries after  the  French  batteries  had  withdrawn,  and  be- 
cause it  feared,  in  addition,  of  being  enveloped  on  the  right. 
The  skirmish  lines  of  the  75th  regiment  were  the  first  to 
fall  back,  for  the  receiving  of  which  the  2d  Battalion,  10th 
Regiment,  had  come  up  on  the  run.  Then  followed  the  bat- 
talions of  the  91st,  and  the  2d  Battalion,  12th  Regiment, 
all  of  them  taking  position  about  600  meters  west  of  the 
village  edge.  Five  companies  of  the  93d  Regiment  re- 
mained in  their  position  south  of  the  road.  The  other  com- 
panies had  fallen  back  into  St.  Privat  after  having  fired 
away  their  ammunition. 

In  order  to  get  ahead  of  the  envelopment  making  itself 
felt  through  the  Auboue  woods,  Marshal  Canrobert  per- 
sonally led  the  9th  Chasseur  Battalion  and  the  1st  Battal- 
ion, 12th  Regiment,  into  a  position  west  of  the  village,  the 
left  resting  on  the  road  to  Ste.  Marie.  The  4th  Regiment  and 
the  3d  Battalion,  100th  Regiment,  took  position  on  the  other 
side  of  the  northern  edge  of  the  village,  while  the  1st  and  3d 
Battalions,  100th  Regiment,  remained  at  Jerusalem. 

Of  the  9th  Regiment  the  1st  Battalion  occupied  Ron- 
court,  and  the  2d  was  with  the  Cavalry  Division  of  du  Bar- 
ail  on  the  road  from  Roncourt  to  St.  Privat. 

Thereafter,  when  the  Saxon  batteries  had  gone  into 
position  north  of  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes,  the  French  bat- 
teries again  opened  fire  at  about  3  :30  P.M.  but  the  expendi- 
ture of  ammunition  merely  hastened  the  moment  when  the 
batteries  had  to  fall  back  to  behind  the  ridge.  The  5th 
Battery,  19th  Regiment,  at  the  entrance  of  the  village,  had 
procured  some  ammunition  from  the  4th  Corps,  one  of  its 
pieces,  somewhat  advanced  ahead  of  the  others,  was  de- 
stroyed; the  other  pieces  had  gone  into  position  with  two 
meters  interval,  on  the  road,  leaving  their  limbers  and  cais- 
sons under  cover  of  the  houses.  But  when  the  Saxon  bat- 
teries north  of  Ste.  Marie  swept  the  entire  length  of  the 

—697— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

road,  the  battery  suffered  severe  loss  in  a  very  short  time, 
one  shell  smashed  two  guns,  another  one  killed  or  wounded 
all  the  men  of  another  piece  and  thus  the  battery  had  to 
fall  back  to  behind,  the  houses  to  escape  utter  annihilation. 

The  six  batteries  under  Colonel  Montluisant  bravely 
held  the  position  on  Hill  333  until  about  5  P.M.,  part  of 
them  on  the  crest,  part  behind  it,  waiting  a  favorable  mo- 
ment for  fire.  But  when  the  Saxon  batteries  took  position 
on  the  ridge  north  of  Ste.  Marie,  these  six  batteries  suffered 
severely  under  a  fire  to  which  they  could  not  reply.  When 
Colonel  Montluisant  observed  the  infantry  falling  back  on 
St.  Privat,  he  had  his  batteries  fall  back  by  echelon.  The 
three  batteries — 5th  and  12th  of  the  8th  and  10th  of  the 
13th  Regiment — of  the  left  wing  fell  back  first  to  the  quar- 
ries at  La  Croix,  taking  a  position  in  echelon  to  cover  the 
infantry  should  it  retreat  from  St.  Privat.  Immediately 
thereafter  the  other  three  batteries  fell  back,  the  7th  and 
8th  of  the  8th  Regiment  taking  position  at  La  Croix,  while 
the  9th  of  the  13th  Regiment,  going  around  St.  Privat  on 
the  south,  took  up  a  new  position  south  of  Roncourt  near 
the  9th  Regiment. 

The  7th  and  8th  Batteries,  18th  Regiment,  had  again 
opened  fire  north  of  St.  Privat,  but  when  their  last  shell 
was  fired  at  3  :30  P.M.,  they  fell  back  as  far  as  Plappeville. 

The  5th  and  6th  Batteries,  14th  Regiment,  having  re- 
plenished ammunition,  had  again  gone  into  position  on 
knoll  328  with  the  7th  Battery  and  now  fired  on  the  Saxons 
north  of  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes. 

The  hostile  shells  did  not  burst  in  the  soft  ground,  and 
thus  the  batteries  suffered  but  little.  The  6th  Battery, 
19th  Regiment  which  had  gone  into  position  to  the  left  of 
the  just  mentioned  three  batteries,  took  part  in  repulsing 
the  Saxon  Brigade,  and  then  went  to  behind  St.  Privat. 
Thus  the  greater  part  of  the  French  batteries  had  left  the 
battlefield  by  4  P.M.  only  a  few  batteries  were  still  in  posi- 
tion, while  at  the  same  time  12  Saxon  Batteries  were  in 
position  between  Ste.  Marie  and  the  Auboue  woods. 


-698— 


Battles  at  Gravalotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Retreat  of  the  Regiments  of  Lavassor's 
Division 

Ammunition  very  soon  ran  short  in  the  25th  Regiment 
and  a  premature  retreat  brought  the  larger  portion  of  the 
regiment  back  to  St.  Privat;  it  appears  that  the  1st  Bat- 
talion in  position  on  the  left  at  the  road  crossing  on  Hill 
326  was  the  first  to  fall  back,  as  it  was  threatened  in  the 
flank  by  the  right  of  the  Prussian  Grenadiers.  The  2d 
Battalion  at  once  joined  the  retrograde  movement ;  it  had  de- 
ployed one  company  as  skirmishers  when  the  Prussians 
started  the  attack,  which  had  opened  a  rapid  fire  in  con- 
junction with  the  skirmish  lines  of  the  9th  Chasseur  Bat- 
talion deployed  on  the  road.  Though  that  firing  line  was 
reinforced  by  two  additional  companies  from  the  2d  Bat- 
talion, 25th  Regiment,  the  weak  lines  kept  falling  back  be- 
fore the  oncoming  2d  Grenadier  Regiment.  But  when  the 
Prussian  companies  stopped  their  advance  on  the  road,  the 
retreat  of  the  battalions  on  the  left  created  a  very  favorable 
impression  on  the  2d  Battalion.  However,  this  battalion  fell 
back  in  excellent  order,  firing  volleys  from  time  to  time.  The 
skirmishers  of  the  9th  Chasseur  Battalion  and  of  the  1st 
Battalion,  70th  Regiment,  whose  commander — Major 
Bergebier — had  been  killed,  retreated  also  to  St.  Privat,  so 
that  no  troops  were  left  on  the  main  road  as  far  as  the 
village. 

In  the  center  some  3  to  400  men  of  the  25th  Regiment 
again  led  forward  by  their  officers,  assembled  around  the 
colors  and  continued  the  fight.  But  when  a  few  minutes 
later  the  skirmish  lines  of  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  70th 
Regiment,  appeared  this  detachment  of  the  25th  Regiment 
also  fell  back,  after  having  fired  away  its  last  round  of  am- 
munition. 

So  far  the  battalions  of  the  70th  Regiment  had  stood 
in  readiness  behind  knoll  338 ;  now  the  2d  Battalion  de- 
ployed along  the  hedge  road  and  threw  a  rapid  fire  on  the 
4th  Grenadier  Regiment.  Farther  to  the  left  was  the  3d 
Battalion;  it  had  one  company  deployed  as  skirmishers. 
The  1st  Battalion  was  in  readiness  at  Jerusalem.     At  the 

—699— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

time  the  25th  and  70th  Regiments  commenced  the  fire  fight, 
the  eight  batteries  on  knoll  833  had  long  since  left  their  po- 
sition; five  of  them  were  led  back  to  the  quarries  of  La 
Croix  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Montluisant — these  were  the 
5th,  7th,  8th  and  12th  of  the  8th  and  the  10th  of  the  13th 
Regiment,  while  the  9th  of  the  13th,  and  the  7th  and  8th 
of  the  18th  Regiment,  together  with  the  6th  of  the  19th, 
again  went  into  position  south  of  Roncourt. 

When  the  4th  Guard  Brigade  started  its  attack  there 
were  no  batteries  in  position  south  of  the  St.  Privat — Ste. 
Marie  road.  After  the  battalions  of  the  70th  Regiment 
had  deployed,  three  batteries  again  went  into  position  south 
of  the  road.  The  8th  Battery  of  the  8th  Regiment,  after 
having  left  its  position,  replenished  ammunition  and  again 
went  into  position  at  Jerusalem.  Shortly  thereafter  the 
6th  and  7th  Batteries,  13th  Regiment,  of  the  main  reserve 
went  into  position  on  the  left  of  the  8th  about  3  to  400 
meters  south  of  the  road  on  Hill  333;  these  batteries  had 
finally  been  sent  by  Marshal  Bazaine  as  support. 

Unfortunately  these  batteries  could  not  fire  on  the 
hostile  infantry,  because  that  infantry  was  then  too  close 
to  the  70th  Regiment  and  could  be  only  partly  seen  by  the 
batteries  in  position  some  50  meters  behind  the  hedge  road. 
They  therefore  fired  mainly  on  the  Guard  batteries  that 
had  gone  into  position  southeast  of  Ste.  Marie.  This  des- 
perate battle  with  the  far  superior  hostile  artillery  was 
the  more  unfavorable,  as  the  gunners  had  the  sun  in  their 
faces  and  could  hardly  aim  correctly  or  observe  the  shots. 
In  spite  of  the  great  superiority  of  the  hostile  artillery  the 
three  batteries  suffered  little. 

While  the  25th  Regiment  was  engaged  with  the  charg- 
ing Guard  companies,  the  26th  Regiment  in  position  on  the 
eastern  slope  of  Hill  326  took  no  part  in  the  action,  except 
that  some  of  its  sharpshooters  fired  at  long  range  on  the 
Hessian  infantry  in  the  La  Cusse  woods,  and  when  subse- 
quently the  Prussian  Guard  advanced  to  the  attack,  com- 
pletely hidden  from  sight  of  the  26th  Regiment,  only  the 
skirmishers  on  knoll  326  were  able  to  fire  on  the  charg- 
ing Guard.     When  thereafter  the  25th  Regiment  started  to 

—700— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

fall  back,  the  62d  Regiment  was  endangered  in  flank  and 
was  thus  carried  along  in  the  general  retreat  to  St.  Privat. 

Colonel  Lamothe,  informed  by  the  brigade  commander, 
Colonel  Gibon,  of  the  attack  against  the  25th  and  26th  Regi- 
ments, now  led  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  28th  Regiment,  as 
relief  as  far  as  the  hedge  road  at  hill  326,  the  battalions 
prolonging  the  line  of  the  70th  Regiment  which  had  ar- 
rived there  about  the  same  time.  The  3d  Battalion,  28th 
Regiment,  remained  in  second  line  behind  the  left  wing. 
Thus,  before  the  last  charge  of  the  Prussian  Guard  com- 
menced, the  hedge  road  was  occupied  by  four  battalions. 

Under  the  annihilating  artillery  fire,  and  being  hotly 
fired  on  by  the  hostile  skirmishers  lying  behind  small  nat- 
ural cover  at  close  range,  the  freshly  brought  up  battalions 
of  the  28th  and  70th  Regiments  suffered  such  heavy  loss 
that  their  resistance  was  of  short  duration.  These  bat- 
talions were  also  not  better  supplied  with  cartridges 
than  were  the  others ;  soon  detachments,  having  fired  away 
all  their  ammunition,  fell  back  one  after  the  other  and  in 
a  short  time  the  entire  line  was  retreating  without  the  offi- 
cers being  able  to  maintain  order.  The  3d  Battalion  held 
out  until  the  last  cartridge  was  expended  when  Captain 
Astier  led  it  back  to  St.  Privat.  The  2d  Battalion  retired 
in  more  disorder,  but  the  officers  succeeded  in  keeping  to- 
gether a  small  detachment  to  guard  the  colors  of  the  regi- 
ment. The  1st  Battalion,  so  far  in  the  second  line,  at- 
tempted a  charge  when  the  other  two  battalions  fell  back; 
this  charge  brought  the  enemy  to  a  stand  ( ?)  ;  thereafter 
the  battalion  also  fell  back  on  St.  Privat. 

The  three  deployed  battalions  of  the  70th  Regiment 
fell  back  simultaneously  with  those  of  the  28th  Regiment, 
assembling  on  the  east  side  of  St.  Privat. 

With  the  departure  of  the  infantry,  the  6th  and  7th 
Batteries  of  the  13th  Regiment  also  fell  back  because  the 
regimental  commander,  who  was  with  them,  feared  that 
they  would  be  captured  by  the  hostile  infantry.  The  8th 
Battery  of  the  8th  Regiment  on  the  road  had  also  retired 
to  behind   St.   Privat,    and   when   towards    6:30    P.M.   the 

—701— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

Prussian   Grenadiers  charged   the  hedge   road,   the   entire 
ridge  had  been  abandoned  by  the  defenders. 

While  the  greater  portion  of  the  4th  Guard  Grenadier 
Regiment  charged  and  captured  in  conjunction  with  the 
9th  and  12th  Companies,  2d  Guard  Grenadier  Regiment, 
the  hedge  road,  the  3d,  4th  and  5th  Companies  of  the  4th 
Guard  Regiment  and  the  2d  and  4th  of  the  1st  Grenadier 
Regiment  on  the  extreme  right  advanced  against  the  French 
left  wing,  occupying  ridge  310 — 326,  where  they  laid  down 
and  rained  a  rapid  fire  on  the  now  approaching  Division  of 
Cissey.  These  companies  were  hard  pushed  by  the  enemy 
until  Captain  von  Prittwitz  brought  on  his  own  responsibil- 
ity the  2d  Heavy  Guard  Battery  to  knoll  310.  Three  of  the 
guns  of  that  battery  remained  for  a  time  stationary  under 
the  enormous  rapid  French  fire,  the  others  unlimbered  and 
now  fired  on  the  infantry  of  Cissey's  Division.  The  effect 
of  the  fire  of  the  approaching  infantry,  delivered  at  700 
meters  range,  was  such  that  all  further  advance  was  out 
of  the  question,  and  a  hot  fight  ensued.  The  other  three 
guns  shorty  after  also  came  into  position  and  about  10 
minutes  later  the  3d  and  4th  Heavy  Guard  Batteries  went 
into  position  on  the  left  of  the  2d.  In  the  meantime  the 
3d  Light  Battery  had  also  come  up  and  gone  into  position, 
by  orders  of  General  von  Berger,  on  knoll  326,  firing  on 
the  battalions  of  Levassor's  Division  fleeing  in  all  haste 
to  St.  Privat. 

The  situation  of  the  infantry  was  entirely  relieved  by 
these  batteries  going  into  position,  and  they  were  subse- 
quently joined  on  the  right  by  the  1st  and  2d  Light,  and 
1st  Heavy  Guard  Batteries.  In  spite  of  the  hot  enfilading 
fire  coming  from  St.  Privat,  these  batteries  held  their  posi- 
tions and  it  is  mainly  due  to  their  fire  that  the  attack  of 
Cissey's  Division  subsequently  failed. 

After  the  hedge  road  had  been  captured  General  von 
Berger  received  orders  not  to  advance  any  further  but  to 
hold  the  captured  position. 

Even  before  the  hedge  road  had  been  stormed  by  the 
Prussian  Guard  a  portion  of  the  French  Division  of  Cissev 

—702— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

entered  the  fight,  making  a  short  charge  against  the  4th 
Guard  Grenadier  Regiment,  which  is  described  as  follows: 

Counter  Attack  of  Cissey's  Division 

When  the  Prussian  artillery  again  increased  its  fire  in 
support  of  the  4th  Guard  Brigade,  General  Cissey  caused 
his  three  batteries — 5th,  9th  and  12th  of  the  15th  Regi- 
ment— to  again  go  into  position  to  help  out  his  infantry 
which  suff"ered  much — "elle  souffrait  cruellement."  Though 
the  57th  and  73d  Regiment,  except  the  3d  Battalion,  73d 
Regiment,  on  the  railroad  embankment,  had  not  yet  become 
engaged  in  the  infantry  fight,  they  remained  behind  the 
knoll  at  the  swamp,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  Hessian  bat- 
teries at  La  Cusse  which  caused  them  much  loss.  The  shells 
of  these  batteries  also  struck  among  the  6th  Regiment  which 
was  held  in  reserve  behind  the  ridge. 

General  Cissey  had  in  vain  awaited  orders  to  advance 
until  5  P.M. ;  he  had  observed  the  advance  of  the  Brigade 
of  Sonnay  in  the  direction  of  Ste.  Marie  and  believed  it  his 
duty  to  support  them.  In  his  report  he  says :  "No  one 
doubted  but  what  the  victory  would  be  ours ;  the  left  wing 
of  the  6th  Corps  still  held  the  ridge  west  of  St.  Privat  and 
even  appeared  to  make  progress.  All  of  a  sudden  the  hos- 
tile artillery  fire,  which  had  died  down  before  them,  in- 
creased in  intensity  along  the  entire  line;  the  infantry  of 
the  division  suffered  enormously  under  it;  the  batteries  of 
the  division  again  went  into  position  under  a  perfect  hail 
of  projectiles  and  opened  fire." 

When  General  Cissey  observed  the  advance  of  the  4th 
Guard  Brigade  at  5:30  P.M.,  which  threatened  the  left  wing 
of  the  6th  Corps  with  envelopment,  he  ordered  his  2d  Bri- 
bade,  commanded  by  General  Goldberg,  to  execute  a  right 
turn.  That  movement  was  executed  as  if  on  the  drill  ground 
and  the  hostile  advance  halted  thereby. 

At  5:45  P.M.  the  skinnish  lines  of  three  battalions  of 
the  57th  and  73d  Regiments  advanced  against  the  slope 
leading  down  to  depression  308 ;  the  battalions  themselves 
followed  the  skirmishers  in  close  order,  while  the  other  two 
battalions  halted  behind  the  crest  at  the  swamps.     When 

—703— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

these  battalions  advanced  against  the  right  wing  of  the 
4th  Guard  Regiment  the  Prussian  battery  of  von  Prittwitz, 
had  just  gone  into  position  on  knoll  310  and  was  firing  on 
the  machine  gun  battery — 5th  of  the  15th  Regiment — 
while  the  two  other  batteries  of  Cissey's  Division  fired  on 
the  Hessian  Batteries. 

When  the  French  infantry  appeared  in  the  open,  a 
few  Prussian  companies  directed  a  rapid  fire  on  them,  and 
these  companies,  having  no  support  behind  them,  soon  fell 
back. 

Again  the  long  skirmish  line  of  Goldberg's  Brigade 
executed  a  rush  forward  to  near  depression  308 ;  but,  taken 
by  surprise  by  the  fire  of  the  batteries  of  von  Prittwitz,  the 
men  threw  themselves  down,  while  the  battalions  of  the  sec- 
ond line  also  stopped  and  fired  over  the  skirmishers  who, 
lying  down,  suffered  great  loss.  The  advance  was  not  con- 
tinued ;  the  three  battalions  kept  up  a  lively  fire  fight,  three 
companies  of  the  6th  Regiment  participating  in  this  action 
on  the  right  wing. 

In  spite  of  his  enormous  superiority  General  Cissey 
stopped  the  advance,  because  he  was  satisfied  in  having 
stopped  the  advance  of  the  enemy  and  because  he  consid- 
ered it  unnecessary  to  demand  larger  sacrifices  of  his  brave 
troops,  though  those  troops  clamored,  in  spite  of  their 
losses,  to  be  allowed  to  charge  the  enemy  with  the  bay- 
onet. 

The  report  of  Cissey's  Division  which  is  very  indef- 
inite, merely  shows  that  the  general  made  a  short  counter- 
attack with  only  three  battalions  when  he  could  have  em- 
ployed fourteen  battalions  just  as  well — and  to  better  pur- 
pose. Had  he  inserted  his  entire  division,  it  would  have 
been  an  easy  matter  for  him  to  almost  annihilate  the  4th 
Guard  Regiment. 

By  6:30  P.M.  10  companies  of  the  2d  Guard  Regiment 
of  the  4th  Guard  Brigade  had  gained  a  firm  foothold  along 
both  sides  of  the  main  road;  two  companies  of  that  regi- 
ment and  seven  of  the  4th  had  captured  the  hedge  road,  and 
three  companies  together  with  the  4th  of  the  1st  Guard 

—704— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Kaiser  Alexander  Regiment  and  the  above  mentioned  bat- 
teries held  the  southwest  slope  of  the  ridge. 

In  spite  of  enormous  losses  the  4th  Guard  Brigade  and 
5  batteries  had  succeeded  in  not  only  forcing  the  Division 
of  Levassor  and  three  batteries  to  retreat  and  captured  their 
positions,  but  also  in  driving  back  the  battalions  of  the  93d 
and  91st  Regiment  from  the  main  high  road.  The  brigade 
had  been  in  action  not  only  with  the  Division  of  Levassor 
but  also  with  Cissey's  Division,  but  the  French  generals 
did  not  understand  how  to  correctly  use  their  immense  su- 
periority in  numbers. 

Just  as  General  Levassor  inserted  one  regiment  after 
the  other,  resulting  in  their  being  defeated  singly,  so  Gen- 
eral Cissey  committed  the  same  error,  so  that  the  two  di- 
visions did  not  advance  to  the  attack  simultaneously  and 
together  and  with  their  approximately  twenty-six  battal- 
ions they  failed  to  drive  back  the  Guard  Brigade. 


The  Attack  of  the  1st  Guard  Brigade 

Marshal  Canrobert,  in  the  midst  of  the  first  line,  di- 
rected the  defense  in  the  village  personally. 

Though  there  was  plenty  of  infantry  available  for  de- 
fense, there  was  a  shortage  of  artillery,  for  most  of  the 
batteries  of  the  6th  Corps,  as  mentioned  above,  had  fallen 
back  at  5  P.M.,  to  the  quarries  at  La  Croix  and  only  four 
batteries— 9th  of  the  13th  and  5th,  6th  and  7th  of  the  14th 
Regiment — were  in  position  between  St.  Privat  and  Ron- 
court,  while  three  other  batteries — 8th  of  the  8th  and  6th 
and  7th  of  the  13th  Regiment — were  still  in  action  south 
of  the  St.  Privat — Ste.  Marie  road. 


While  Marshal  Canrobert  made  arrangements  for  re- 
treat, he  directed  General  du  Barail  to  relieve  the  hard 
pressed  infantry  by  a  cavalry  charge.  The  general  had  at 
his  disposal  three  regiments  of  chasseurs ;  but  he  consid- 
ered a  charge  useless  and  impossible  of  execution,  because 

—705— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

he  was  only  600  meters  distant  from  the  infantry  and  2000 
meters  from  the  Saxon  artillery.  He  did  not  know  that 
the  Prussian  Guard  was  completely  exhausted,  but  on  the 
other  hand  he  observed  the  Saxon  artillery  massed  in  posi- 
tion between  Montois  and  Roncourt,  as  well  as  the  4th 
Guard  Regiment  which  formed  a  strong  supporting  line  for 
the  Prussian  firing  line. 

General  Bruchard  now  received  orders  to  attack  the 
infantry  with  the  2d  and  3d  Chasseur  Regiments.  The  five 
squadrons  of  the  3d  Regiment,  in  close  column  of  squadrons, 
followed  by  the  2d  Regiment,  charged  against  the  ridge ;  the 
two  leading  squadrons  took  up  the  gallop  and  charged  de- 
ployed across  the  ridge,  while  all  other  squadrons  errone- 
ously remained  behind  the  crest. 

The  troops  were  first  fired  on  by  the  2d  Battalion  of 
the  1st  Guard  Regiment,  then  by  the  entire  line,  and  the 
thin  line  of  troopers  went  back  behind  the  ridge.  In  his 
report  General  Bruchard  erroneously  states  that  his  charge 
caused  the  hostile  infantry  to  halt  and  he  did  not  think  it 
necessary  to  have  the  other  squadrons  charge  also;  that 
he  caused  the  two  regiments  to  fall  back  to  the  east  side  of 
St.  Privat,  where  they  took  position  facing  Roncourt,  which 
place  had  in  the  meantime  been  occupied  by  the  Saxons. 

Marshal  Canrobert  personally  sent  the  2d  Regiment 
Chasseurs  d'Afrique  forward;  it  did  not  become  engaged 
however  and  fell  back  to  the  forest  of  Jaumont,  where  it 
subsequently  became  engaged  in  a  short  fire  fight  with  the 
Saxons. 

On  the  German  side,  the  2d  Guard  Ulan  Regiment, 
standing  at  Ste.  Marie,  rode  against  the  French  cavalry; 
but  it  did  not  become  engaged  and  fell  back  again  to  Ste. 
Marie. 

The  XIIth  Corps 

The  4th  Heavy  Guard  Battery  had  gone  into  position 
on  knoll  307 ;  the  3d  Light  on  knoll  326,  and  farther  south 
on  knoll  310,  the  2d  Heavy,  as  well  as  the  1st  and  2d  Light 
and  1st  Heavy  Guard  Batteries.  The  first  named  five  bat- 


—706- 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

teries  fired  on  the  French  in  front  of  Amanvillers  and  were 
very  soon  reinforced  by  the  1st  and  2d  Hessian  batteries. 

When  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  observed  at  5:45 
P.M.  the  dangerous  situation  of  the  Prussian  Guard,  he  gave 
orders  to  the  Saxon  Batteries  between  Ste.  Marie  and  the 
Auboue  woods  to  advance  more  to  the  front  and  fire  on 
St.  Privat. 

Shortly  after  6  P.M.  seven  batteries  of  the  corps  artil- 
lery went  into  position  on  the  Ste.  Marie — Montois  road, 
being  shortly  afterwards  followed  by  four  batteries  of  the 
24th  Division,  which  were  reinforced  by  three  of  the  23d 
Division  when  the  Saxons  started  from  Montois,  all  of  them 
going  into  position  on  both  sides  of  the  road.  These  14  bat- 
teries at  once  opened  fire  on  St.  Privat  and  on  the  hostile 
batteries  near  there. 

Starting  at  7:15  P.M.  150  German  guns  threw  their 
shells  into  the  village,  which  was  soon  changed  into  a 
smoking  ruin.  Not  a  single  French  battery  answered  that 
fire,  as  all  the  batteries  of  the  6th  Corps  had  long  before 
then  retreated  to  the  quarries  of  St.  Croix. 

The  Defense  of  the  St.  Privat — Roncourt  Ridge 

After  the  French  account  has  recited  the  first  attack  of 
the  Prussian  Guard  and  Saxons  in  the  above  little  satis- 
factory manner,  the  account  of  the  defense  of  the  heights 
of  Roncourt — St.  Privat  is  taken  up  in  a  special  chapter,  in 
which  many  statements  discussed  in  previous  chapters  are 
repeated  about  as  follows: 

As  stated,  the  five  companies  of  the  93d  Regiment, 
which  had  fired  on  the  approaching  2d  Guard  Grenadier 
Regiment  from  the  Ste.  Marie  road,  very  soon  fell  back  on 
the  3d  Battalion,  93d  Regiment  which  was  deployed  about 
400  meters  west  of  St.  Privat  on  both  sides  of  the  road. 
But  this  latter  battalion  also  shortly  retreated  to  the  edge 
of  the  village.  When  then  the  1st  Guard  Brigade  advanced 
north  of  the  road,  it  appears  that  it  was  fired  on  for  a  short 
time  by  the  companies  of  the  93d  Regiment  and  by  the  1st 
Battalion,  91st  Regiment  deployed  a  few  hundred  meters 

—707— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

north  of  the  road  and  about  400  meters  west  of  St.  Privat; 
however  all  these  troops  went  back  to  St.  Privat  very  short- 
ly after  six  o'clock. 

When  the  Brigade  of  Sonnay  had  fallen  back  after 
making  its  short  counter  attack  on  Ste.  Marie — as  has  al- 
ready been  stated — the  1st  Battalion,  91st  Regiment  and 
on  its  right  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  10th  Regiment  had  held 
their  positions  a  short  time  west  of  knoll  304  and  fired  on 
the  100th  (Saxon)  Regiment  when  it  advanced  from  the 
Auboue  woods.  When  the  hostile  fire  commenced  to  get 
stronger  and  stronger,  soon  all  companies  of  the  1st  Bat- 
talion, 91st  Regiment,  were  deployed  in  the  firing  line  and 
still  the  battalion  was  soon  forced  to  fall  back  in  front  of 
the  superior  hostile  attacking  forces,  as  the  artillery  fire 
had  greatly  shaken  it. 

Thereupon  the  2d  Battalion,  10th  Regiment,  on  the 
right  was  threatened  on  its  left  by  the  advancing  1st  Guard 
Brigade  and  on  the  right  by  the  advancing  Saxons  and 
it  was  thus  forced  to  fall  back  to  the  ridge  west  of  St. 
Privat,  on  which  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  75th  Regiment, 
had  again  deployed. 

During  this  engagement  with  the  Saxon  Brigade  the 
1st  and  2d  Battalions,  10th  Regiment,  which  were  at  St. 
Privat,  had  also  become  engaged  although  they  had  not 
yet  fired  a  single  shot  though  exposed  to  a  hot  artillery 
fire.  After  the  1st  Guard  Brigade  had  crossed  the  high 
road  and  commenced  its  attack  on  St.  Privat,  nine  com- 
panies of  the  10th  Regiment  had  advanced  and  opened  an 
enormous  fire  at  point  blank  range,  which  brought  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Guard  Brigade  to  a  halt.  The  companies  of 
the  10th  Regiment  probably  arrived  on  the  crest  of  the 
ridge — ^terrace — just  when  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  91st 
Regiment,  were  deployed  there;  still  small  detachments  of 
the  last  named  regiment  had  already  commenced  to  re- 
treat on  St.  Privat.  Even  the  last  three  companies  of  the 
10th  Regiment  had  deployed  on  the  right  of  the  battalions 
of  the  75th  Regiment  onto  which  the  1st  Battalion,  10th 
Regiment  fell  back  after  having  been  driven   off  by  the 

—708— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Saxons.  Soon  the  battalions  of  the  91st  and  the  nine  com- 
panies of  the  10th  Regiment  commenced  to  retreat  slowly 
to  the  walls  of  St.  Privat,  where  by  that  time  numerous 
troops  were  deployed.  From  there  they  went  to  behind 
the  village,  and  left  the  garrison  of  St.  Privat  to  meet  the 
1st  Guard  Brigade. 

In  the  meantime  the  defenders  of  the  heights  of  Ron- 
court  had  been  hard  pressed  by  the  45th  Brigade  coming 
from  the  west,  and  by  the  48th  Brigade  coming  from  Mon- 
tois  and  after  a  short  engagement  were  forced  to  fall  back 
on  the  Jaumont  forest. 

While  the  French  infantry  fell  back  to  St.  Privat,  the 
batteries  in  position  on  the  ridge  south  of  Roncourt — 5th, 
6  th  and  7th  of  the  14th  and  9th  of  the  13th  Regiment- 
commenced  to  leave  their  position,  though  they  suffered 
but  slight  loss.  By  about  6  o'clock  the  9th  Battery  had  only 
a  few  rounds  left;  it  received  orders  to  fall  back  on  the 
batteries  under  Colonel  Montluisant  at  the  La  Croix  quar- 
ries so  as  to  cover,  in  case  of  need,  the  retreat  of  the  infan- 
try in  the  Saulny  woods.  The  other  three  batteries  remained 
in  position  until  the  infantry  had  gotten  to  behind  St.  Pri- 
vat whereupon  they  also  fell  back  to  the  quarries  where  by 
then  most  of  the  batteries  of  the  6th  Corps  were  assembled. 

When  the  Saxon  48th  Brigade  advanced  in  direction  of 

Montois  toward  6:15  P.M.  and  threatened  the  defenders  of 
Roncourt,  already  hard  pressed  by  the  45th  Brigade — Mar- 
shal Canrobert  considered  a  retreat  unavoidable.  He  in- 
formed General  Ladmirault  at  about  6:30  P.M.  that  he 
was  forced  to  abandon  St.  Privat  and  that  he  would  fall 
back  on  the  Saulny  woods.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  an 
officer  to  the  commander  of  the  Guard,  General  Bourbaki, 
to  inform  him  of  the  situation  and  to  request  him  to  cover 
his  retreat. 

The  Marshal  undoubtedly  considered  the  time  past  for 
further  defense  of  the  supporting  point  of  his  right  wing; 
he  believed  he  would  have  to  confine  himself  to  holding 
St.  Privat,  to  which  point  all  troops  rolled  back ;  and  by 


-709- 


Battles  Around  Metz 

doing  so  he  believed  that  that  would  be  the  only  means  to 
cover  an  unavoidable  retreat  to  Metz. 

The  g-arrison  of  the  village  of  St.  Privat  was  again 
reinforced. 


CHAPTER  V  . 
The  Fight  in  Front  of  Amanvillers,  5  to  7  P.M. 

Shortly  after  4  P.M.  relative  quiet  reigned  on  the  bat- 
tlefield west  of  Amanvillers.  Only  after  5  P.M.  when  the 
Prussian  Guard  and  the  Saxons  started  the  attack  on  St. 
Privat  and  Roijcourt  the  infantry  fight  broke  out  anew  be- 
tween the  Prussian  IXth  and  the  French  4th  Corps.  Con- 
cerning this  the  French  account  says : 

At  the  time  a  pause  in  the  fighting  occurred  along  the 
entire  line  of  the  French  4th  and  6th  Corps,  seventeen 
French  battalions  stood  west  of  Amanvillers  and  Montigny 
on  the  road  leading  from  La  Folie  to  Ste.  Marie;  their 
right  on  the  railroad,  their  left  on  hills  326  and  366  opposite 
the  L'Envie  farm  which  was  but  weakly  held  by  the  enemy. 

General  Ladmirault  had  more  than  six  fresh  battal- 
ions in  position  as  reserve  between  Amanvillers  and  Mon- 
tigny; therefore  his  situation  was  not  at  all  unfavorable 
as  his  fighting  line  was  not  yet  shaken  and  he  had  a  strong 
reserve.  In  addition,  the  1st  Guard  Division  was  at  St. 
Vincent,  only  2000  meters  off. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  artillery  of  the  4th  Corps  had 
been  placed  out  of  action,  "reduite  a  rien,"  for  of  fifteen 
batteries  of  the  corps  only  the  11th  and  12th  of  the  1st 
Regiment  were  in  position  at  Montigny;  the  10th  of  the 
4th  Regiment  of  the  3d  Corps  was  there  also.  But  these 
batteries  had  so  little  ammunition  left  that  they  could  not 
offer  any  material  resistance  and  they  soon  had  to  retire. 

At  5  P.M.  General  Ladmirault  was  informed  by  Gen- 
eral Bourbaki  that  he  was  approaching  with  the  1st  Guard 
Division  on  Amanvillers  and  General  Ladmirault  at  once 
transmitted  this  cheering  news  to  his  generals.  But  as  will 
be  shown  later  the  Guard  did  not  appear. 

—710— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

In  the  meantime  the  13th  Regiment  on  the  right  wing, 
which  had  kept  up  firing  for  hours  and  had  fired  away  al- 
most all  of  its  ammunition,  had  suffered  heavy  loss.  It  fell 
back  on  the  43d  Regiment  of  its  brigade  which  had  re- 
treated earlier,  and  its  place  was  immediately  taken  by 
the  1st  and  2d  Battalions  of  the  15th,  and  the  3d  of  the 
54th  Regiment,  while  the  3d  Battalion,  65th  Regiment, 
reinforced  the  center  of  the  98th  Regiment.  At  the  same 
time  the  11th  Battery  of  the  1st  Regiment  in  front  of  Mon- 
tigny  had  retreated  and  by  5 :30  P.M.  there  was  only  one 
French  battery  in  action. 

After  the  13th  Regiment  had  fallen  back  there  were 
only  14  French  battalions  deployed  in  the  first  line,  which 
had  advanced  their  skirmishers  somewhat  across  the  road 
on  the  right,  while  on  the  left  the  battalions  of  the  64th 
and  98th  Regiments  were  advanced  to  opposite  Hill  332, 
from  where  they  could  fire  on  I'Envie  and  Champenois. 
Five  battalions  were  still  at  Montigny.  The  3d  Brigade  of 
the  Prussian  Guard  advanced  against  that  position. 


The  French  Guard  Between  5  and  7  P.M. 

Before  recounting  the  activity  of  the  French  Guard  in 
more  detail  it  will  be  best  to  revert  to  the  activity  which 
Marshal  Bazaine  showed  during  the  battle.  As  mentioned 
before  this,  Jarras,  the  chief  of  staff,  had  caused  the  horses 
to  be  saddled  at  the  first  cannon  shot  and  was  ready  to  depart 
with  the  entire  staff.  However,  the  Marshal  ordered  the 
chief  to  keep  on  preparing  the  promotion  lists  in  all  haste, 
because  the  army  was  awaiting  them  with  impatience.  The 
Marshal  further  explained  that  the  matter  could  not  be  so 
very  serious  and  he  adhered  to  that  opinion,  on  the  one 
hand  so  as  not  to  have  to  take  any  measures  as  commander- 
in-chief,  and  on  the  other  hand,  because  he  believed  that 
a  reverse  would  best  justify  the  retreat  which  he  had  long 
since  decided  on.  As  a  matter  of  fact  he  merely  sent  a 
few  artillery  orderlies  to  St.  Quentin  to  observe  the  Mosel 
valley  and  one  of  these  non-commissioned  officers  reported 

—711— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

to  him  at  1  P.M.  that  strong  hostile  columns  were  crossing 
the  Mosel  and  were  appearing  in  the  Gorze  valley.  Shortly 
thereafter  an  aid  sent  by  Marshal  Canrobert  arrived  with 
a  request  for  men  and  ammunition,  and  now  Marshal  Ba- 
zaine  sent  word  to  Marshal  Canrobert  that  he  would  send 
him  one  Guard  Division,  two  batteries  and  ammunition 
and  that  the  latter  should  send  his  ammunition  wagons  to 
Plappeville  for  replenishment  of  ammunition. 

Though  Marshal  Bazaine  knew  that  a  battle  was  in 
progress,  he  remained  at  his  headquarters  in  Plappeville, 
and  mounted  his  horse  only  between  3 :30  and  4  o'clock. 
Before  them,  that  is  at  3  P.M.,  one  of  Marshal  Canrobert's 
aids  had  arrived  and  reported  to  Marshal  Bazaine  to  have 
the  departure  of  the  division  and  ammunition  hastened. 
This  officer  pointed  out  to  the  Marshal  on  the  map  where 
the  6th  Corps  was,  and  explained  what  a  dangerous  situa- 
tion it  was  in,  and  still  the  Marshal  merely  replied  that  he 
had  taken  all  necessary  steps  to  start  the  troops.  But  when 
shortly  thereafter  a  division  general  of  the  6th  Corps  said 
that  the  situation  was  not  so  precarious,  the  division  was 
not  started  and  the  aid  merely  was  authorized  to  go  and 
get  four  ammunition  wagons  in  Plappeville  (!!). 

The  Marshal  finally  mounted,  but  did  not  proceed  to 
either  the  6th  or  the  3d  Corps,  but  to  the  fortress  of  St.  Quen- 
tin,  where  he  personally  aimed  two  pieces  that  fired  for  a 
long  time  on  the  26th  Prussian  Brigade  coming  from  Ars. 

While  Marshal  Bazaine  was  almost  a  complete  failure 
as  a  commander-in-chief,  General  Bourbaki  at  least  arrived 
at  a  decision.  During  the  course  of  the  forenoon  the  Volti- 
geur  Brigade  of  the  Guard,  under  General  Brincourt,  had 
been  sent  to  the  projecting  hill,  nose  313,  northwest  of  Cha- 
tel  to  serve  as  a  reserve  for  the  3d  Corps,  and  had  intrenched 
itself  there  immediately.  General  Bourbaki  in  Plappeville 
had  learned  nothing  of  the  battle  that  had  started  at  Aman- 
villers  and  Pont-du-Jour,  but  when  Marshal  Bazaine  told 
him  that  Marshal  Canrobert  was  being  attacked,  he  had 
issued  orders  to  the  Guard  to  hold  itself  in  readiness,  and 
had  ridden  with  his  chief  of  staff  to  the  hill  at  St.  Vincent 
to  reconnoiter.     From  there  he  observed  thick  clouds  of 

—712— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

smoke  on  the  other  side  of  the  woods,  and  this  left  him  in  no 
doubt  as  to  the  importance  of  the  battle,  and  he  now  gave 
orders  to  General  Picard  to  advance  with  the  Grenadier 
Division  on  Gros  Chene. 

Leaving  its  tents  and  knapsacks,  the  division  started 
at  once,  and  later  deployed  in  two  lines  at  the  farm  build- 
ings of  St.  Vincent;  this  was  at  about  4  P.M.  When  then 
General  Bourbaki  observed  dense  clouds  of  dust  on  the  St. 
Privat — Woippy  road,  he  at  once  caused  the  division  to  ad- 
vance in  the  direction  of  Amanvillers,  but  had  it  stop  at 
5  P.M.,  behind  the  piece  of  woods  connecting  the  forests  of 
Rappes  and  Saulny. 

Thus,  as  the  French  account  specially  points  out,  be- 
fore the  attack  against  the  French  6th  Corps  had  com- 
menced, the  entire  Guard  Division  remained  halted  less 
than  4  kilometers  from  Amanvillers,  and  no  advantage  was 
taken  of  the  independent  decision  arrived  at  by  General 
Bourbaki. 

When  General  Ladmirault  received  information  at  5 
P.M.  that  the  Guard  was  approaching  he  sent  out  an  officer 
to  hasten  its  march  on  Amanvillers  and  to  guide  that  di- 
vision. This  officer  was  charged  with  notifying  General 
Bourbaki  "that  the  fire  on  both  sides  was  slackening,  that 
the  enemy  appeared  to  be  exhausted,  and  that  consequently 
fresh  troops  would  win  the  victory." 

When  this  officer  explained  at  6:15  P.M.,  to  General 
Bourbaki  the  situation  of  the  6th  Corps,  the  latter  had  ob- 
served a  very  great  number  of  dispersed  men  of  that  corps 
and  showed  little  inclination  to  advance  towards  Amanvil- 
lers. 

Shortly  thereafter  another  officer  sent  by  General  Lad- 
mirault urgently  requested  that  the  Guard  Division  be 
started,  and  now  Bourbaki  gave  orders  at  6 :25  P.M.  for  the 
division  to  continue  the  march  and  also  caused  the  corps 
artillery  to  be  brought  up.  General  Ladmirault's  aide  rode 
back  and  reported  that  the  division  was  starting  and  then 
again  returned  to  Bourbaki. 

In  the  meantime  Bourbaki,  hastening  ahead  of  his 
troops,  arrived  on  Ridge  331 — 343  and  observed  the  disorder 

—713— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

and  events  with  the  4th  Corps  south  of  St.  Privat.  He  con- 
cluded therefrom  that  the  whole  right  wing  was  retreating 
and  that  the  question  was  now  not  to  help  the  4th  Corps 
to  gain  the  victory,  but  to  protect  its  retreat,  and  he  then 
issued  orders  for  a  retreat. 

The  Guard  Brigade,  advancing  along  both  sides  of  the 
road  filled  with  wounded  and  stragglers,  immediately  start- 
ed the  retreat ;  a  large  number  of  the  dispersed  men  of  the 
4th  Corps  believed  that  the  Guard  had  been  driven  back  and 
hastened  off  with  loud  yells,  proclaiming  that  belief.  A 
panic  resulted ;  vehicles,  wounded,  etc.,  fled  in  haste  in  di- 
rection of  Lorry  and  came  to  a  halt  only  when  two  batteries 
on  the  other  side  of  the  exit  from  the  woods  went  into  posi- 
tion on  both  sides  of  the  road  and  completely  blocked  the 
road. 

Bourbaki  succeeded  at  least  with  the  use  of  the  Regi- 
ment of  Zouaves,  in  bringing  this  most  unfortunate  move- 
ment to  a  stand  but  the  batteries  and  the  Grenadier  regi- 
ment no  longer  paid  any  heed  to  the  voice  of  authority  and 
the  troops  never  stopped  until  St.  Vincent  was  reached. 

When  Captain  de  la  Tour  reported  to  General  Ladmir- 
ault,  that  the  Guard  had  retreated  and  when  at  7  P.M.  in- 
formation arrived  of  the  retreat  of  the  6th  Corps,  General 
Ladmirault  sent  word  to  General  Bourbaki  that  he  now  also 
was  forced  to  retreat  so  as  not  to  be  enveloped. 

This  conduct  on  the  part  of  General  Bourbaki,  which 
is  recounted  plainly  in  the  French  account,  plainly  shows 
the  absence  of  comradeship  among  the  French  generals, 
and  even  if  the  Guard  Division  had  arrived  too  late  to 
bring  about  a  turn  in  the  situation  with  the  6th  Corps,  it 
could  at  least  have  brought  most  material  assistance  with 
its  numerous  batteries  to  the  4th  Corps  which  had  no  artil- 
lery of  its  own. 

"By  this  time,  at  7  P.M.,  Roncourt  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Ger- 
mans, Marshal  Canrobert  had  sent  a  large  number  of  his  troops 
back  to  the  Saulny  forest,  and  only  St.  Privat  was  still  occupied,  but 
the  resistance  there  could  only  be  short-lived. 

"South  of  the  highroad  the  Division  of  Levassor  had  retreated 
completely,  and  the  batteries  of  Cissey's  Division  had  also  driven  off. 

"South  of  the  railroad  the  Division  of  Lorencez  still  held  out  and 
there  was  every  expectation  that  it  could  hold  that  position  until 
nightfall." 

—714— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Assault  on  St.  Privat 

When  the  Saxons  appeared  in  front  of  Roncourt,  Mar- 
shal Canrobert  considered  it  impossible  to  hold  his  support- 
ing point,  St.  Privat,  any  longer;  all  he  now  intended  to  do 
was  to  hold  that  village  to  cover  his  retreat.  At  6:30  P.M. 
he  sent  information  to  General  Ladmirault  at  Amanvillers 
that  he  could  not  hold  out  any  longer,  and  that  he  was  com- 
pelled to  start  the  retreat  to  the  forest  of  Saulny.  At  the 
same  time  he  sent  by  another  officer,  information  of  his 
situation  to  General  Bourbaki  requesting  him  to  cover  his 
retreat. 

Thereupon  the  Marshal  brought  his  last  fresh  troops 
to  St.  Privat.  The  4th  Regiment  was  led  in  person  by  Gen- 
eral Pechot  to  the  west  edge  of  the  village,  forming  a  second 
line  of  defense  in  rear  of  the  12th  Regiment.  The  3d  Bat- 
talion, 100th  Regiment,  occupied  the  north  edge  of  the  vil- 
lage, while  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions  of  that  regiment  de- 
ployed east  of  Roncourt  as  far  as  the  forest  of  Jaumont, 
facing  Roncourt.  On  its  right  extending  to  the  edge  of 
the  woods  five  squadrons  Chasseurs  dAfrique  were  de- 
ployed in  echelon. 

By  seven  o'clock  St.  Privat  was  occupied  by  10^  bat- 
talions which  stood  partly  behind  low  stone  garden  walls 
or  in  trenches.  Loopholes  and  passage  ways  had  been  cut 
in  the  houses  so  as  to  have  connections  towards  all  sides. 
A  stone  barn  in  front  of  the  Jerusalem  building  was  pre- 
pared with  loopholes  and  a  trench  100  meters  long  connec- 
ted the  building  with  the  village. 

East  of  the  village  were  the  73d  and  91st  Regiment  as- 
sembled at  7  o'clock,  having  formed  squares  by  direction  of 
Marshal  Canrobert  to  meet  any  cavalry  attack  coming  from 
Montois.  The  93d  Regiment  soon  joined  these  two  regi- 
ments also. 

The  2d  and  3d  Mounted  Chasseurs  were  deployed  along 
the  road  from  St.  Privat  to  the  Jaumont  quarries,  in  rear 
of  them  was  the  94th  Regiment.  South  of  the  road  and 
east  of  Jerusalem  were  the  20th,  26th  and  28th  Regiments 

—715— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

of  Levassor's  Division,  while  the  70th  Regiment  of  that  Divi- 
sion was  at  Marengo. 

12  batteries  of  the  6th  Corps  had  gone  into  position  in 
tiers  at  the  La  Croix  quarry  east  of  Marengo  and  on  their 
left  eleven  batteries  of  the  4th  Corps  formed  a  hook  on 
knolls  342 — 343  facing  Amanvillers,  so  that  23  French  bat- 
teries were  in  readiness  to  meet  the  advance  of  the  Ger- 
mans out  of  St.  Privat. 

However,  all  these  troops  of  the  6th  Corps  were  greatly 
shaken  and  at  the  very  start  of  the  German  attack  disor- 
der reigned  in  the  ranks  of  the  different  regiments.  The 
25th  and  26th  Regiments  had  been  halted,  it  is  true,  after 
their  flight  from  Jerusalem,  but  a  number  of  dispersed 
men  were  in  the  woods. 

The  panic  had  not  taken  possession  of  the  troops  north 
of  the  road ;  the  entire  right  wing,  however,  had  retreated 
to  the  Jaumont  forest  and  even  if  some  portions  of  the  nine 
companies  of  the  10th  Regiment  still  remained  at  the  west 
edge  thereof,  the  largest  portion  had  fled  to  Marengo  and 
only  the  companies  of  the  93d  Regiment  on  the  high  road 
held  their  positions  behind  the  low  garden  walls  for  some 
time  longer.  The  28th  and  70th  Regiments  had  also  re- 
treated to  Marengo  at  about  6 :45  P.M.  in  more  or  less  dis- 
order. Though  there  are  no  details  given  of  this  retreat  it 
is  certain  that  a  large  amount  of  dispersed  men  fled  along 
the  high  road. 

The  movement  eastward  was  so  pronounced  that  as 
early  as  6:30  P.M.  General  Ladmirault  at  Amanvillers  had 
the  impression  "that  his  right  wing  was  suddenly  aban- 
doned by  the  troops"  and  General  Bourbaki  concluded  there- 
from "that  the  right  wing  of  the  army  was  in  complete 
flight." 

But  in  spite  of  all  this  the  situation  of  the  6th  Corps 
was  not  a  desperate  one  at  all,  for  a  retreat  to  Metz  was 
still  feasible  and  there  was  every  hope  of  bringing 
the  exhausted  enemy  to  a  stand  in  front  of  the  woods.  But 
by  7  o'clock  the  battle  was  lost  as  far  as  the  right  wing  was 
concerned  and  everyone  felt  that  the  only  thing  now  left 
was  to  protect  the  retreat. 

—716— 


Battles  at  Giavelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

When  the  Saxons  received  the  request  of  the  Prussian 
Guard  for  help,  Colonel  von  Schweidnitz  led  the  1st  and 
2d  Battalions  of  the  107th  Regiment  on  St.  Privat  east  of 
the  Roncourt  road.  General  von  Craushaar  had  two  bat- 
talions of  the  101st  Regiment  turn  to  the  right  about  1500 
paces  west  of  Roncourt  and  advance  on  the  northwest 
corner  of  St.  Privat,  through  which  movement,  these  troops 
obtained  a  connection  with  the  Guard, 

The  Body  Grenadier  Regiment  also  had  approached 
Roncourt  and  had  then  turned  to  the  right  and  filled  the  gap 
between  the  101st  and  107th  Regiments  with  seven  com- 
panies, while  the  five  other  companies  advanced  southeast- 
ward against  hill  327  with  the  3d  and  4th  Companies  of 
the  1st  Guard  Regiment,  and  engaged  the  Mounted  Chas- 
seurs and  the  French  100th  Regiment. 

Seven  companies  of  the  Prussian  Guard — 3d  and  4th 
companies  of  the  1st  Guard  Regiment,  1st  Pioneer  Company, 
and  1st  Battalion,  3d  Regiment — joined  the  right  wing  of 
the  Saxons,  while  still  farther  to  the  right  the  4th  Guard 
Regiment  in  depression  278  approached  the  churchyard  of 
St.  Privat  to  within  800  paces  and  deployed  with  all  three 
battalions  against  the  northwest  corner. 

When  the  assault  commenced,  Colonel  von  Schweid- 
nitz led  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions,  107th  Regiment  on  the 
left  wing  of  the  Saxons  and  in  the  first  line  east  of  the  Ron- 
court  road.  But  when  these  battalions  had  arrived  to  with- 
in 1000  paces  of  St.  Privat  they  received  a  hot  rapid  fire 
from  the  2d  Battalion,  9th  Regiment,  in  position  behind  a 
low  field  wall.  On  the  run,  and  without  firing  a  shot,  these 
battalions  charged  forward  and  occupied  the  wall,  which 
the  French  had  left  in  the  meantime  to  take  position  behind 
a  wall  still  farther  to  the  rear.  The  Saxon  battalions  then 
deployed  behind  this  wall  and  when  thereafter  the  bat- 
teries of  the  45th  Brigade  came  up,  the  two  battalions  of  the 
107th  Regiment  again  advanced  and  stormed  a  field  wall 
about  300  paces  in  front  of  St.  Privat,  but  again  suffering 
great  loss. 

On  their  right  the  two  Grenadier  Battalions  of  the  4th 
Guard  Regiment  had  charged  up  to  a  wall  situated  in  front 

—717— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

of  the  northwest  side  of  the  village,  while  the  Fusilier  Bat- 
talions became  mixed  up  with  the  Saxons, 

In  the  meantime  the  battalions  of  the  45th  Brigade 
under  General  von  Craushaar  had  inserted  themselves  be- 
tween the  Guard  and  the  107th  Regiment.  Eight  compan- 
ies of  the  101st  Regiment  joined  the  left  wing  of  the  4th 
Guard  Regiment  and  on  a  line  with  them,  but  east  of  the 
Roncourt  road,  seven  companies  of  Body  Grenadier  Regi- 
ment No.  100  had  deployed — the  3d  Battalion  on  the  right, 
then  the  7th,  8th  and  4th  Company.  All  these  troops 
had  reached  the  different  walls  on  the  run,  but  had  suf- 
fered material  losses. 

On  the  extreme  left  five  companies  of  the  Body  Grena- 
dier Regiment — 3  of  the  1st  Battalion  and  the  5th  and 
6th  Companies — and  the  left  of  the  107th  Regiment,  had 
turned  against  knoll  327  and  found  here  also  cover  be- 
hind field  walls.  They  were  opposed  by  two  battalions  of 
the  French  100th  Regiment  and  by  dismounted  Chasseurs 
d'Afrique.  There  the  Saxons  joined  the  3d  and  4th  Com- 
panies of  the  Prussian  3d  Guard  Regiment — here  Colonel 
von  Roeder  fell. 

The  1st  and  4th  Companies  of  the  3d  Guard  Regiment 
had  turned  against  the  northern  entrance  of  St.  Privat  and 
gained  a  firm  foothold  near  the  101st  Regiment.  But  soon 
the  4th  Company  started  for  Roncourt,  where  the  1st  Bat- 
talion of  the  101st  Regiment  had  also  taken  position. 

While  thus  the  Saxon  and  Prussian  battalions  had  got- 
ten to  within  short  range  of  St.  Privat,  Crown  Prince  Albert 
of  Saxony,  at  Roncourt,  had  also  sent  forward  his  batteries 
by  echelons.  By  7  :15  P.M.,  sixteen  Saxon  batteries  were  in 
position  along  an  arc  on  knolls  321,  304,  and  293  and  sur- 
rounded St.  Privat  on  the  north  and  west  at  a  range  of  1400 
paces.  To  their  right,  south  of  the  road,  stood  nine  Guard 
batteries  and  2  batteries  of  the  Xth  Corps,  so  that  25  bat- 
teries fired  on  the  village. 

Shortly  thereafter  an  additional  five  batteries  of  the 
Xth  Corps  went  into  position  on  the  right  wing  of  the 
Saxons.  Even  if,  as  the  French  account  states,  a  portion  of 

—718— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

these  batteries  could  not  see  the  low  stone  walls  on  the  west 
edge  of  the  village,  still  the  left  of  the  Saxon  batteries  held 
an  excellent  position  and  could  fire  on  the  exterior  de- 
fensive line,  while  most  of  the  other  batteries  could  fire  on 
the  houses,  of  which  a  large  number  were  soon  set  afire. 
Concerning  the  defense  of  the  village  the  French  ac- 
count gives  no  details.  It  is  mainly  based  on  the  German 
account  and  merely  says: 

"Unfortunately  it  is  impossible  to  give  the  exact  deployment 
of  the  battalions  defending  the  village.  According  to  the  scant 
information  at  hand  we  can  only  conclude  that  the  9th  Chasseur 
Battalion,  reinforced  by  portions  of  the  25th  Regiment,  held 
Jerusalem  and  adjoining  trenches.  On  its  right  three  companies 
of  the  1st  Battalion,  94th  Regiment,  held  the  low  garden  walls. 
The  remainder  of  the  west  edge  was  occupied,  presumably,  by 
men  of  the  12th  Regiment,  of  which  regiment  some  companies 
were  in  the  streets  or  occupied  houses. 

"On  the  north  edge  the  2d  and  8d  Battalions,  9th  Regiment, 
continued  the  defense,  especially  against  the  107th  Regiment, 
which  had  pushed  into  the  gardens. 

"The  3d  Battalion,  100th  Regiment,  was  more  to  the  right. 
The  4th  Regiment,  which  arrived  in  the  village  very  late,  was  dis- 
tributed clear  around  the  village  and  formed  the  second  line. 

"These  troops  were  joined  by  a  number  of  dispersed  men, 
who  had  again  bravely  halted,  But  that  number  is  offset  by  the 
losses.  Though  the  defenders  formed  a  double  line — about  1000 
meters  in  circumference — there  were  still  strong  reserves  in 
the  streets. 

"But  before  the  assault  proper  commenced,  i.e.,  at  7:30  P.M., 
the  German  artillery  had  fired  on  the  village  for  20  minutes.  All 
cover  had  been  destroyed,  numerous  houses  were  in  flames,  roofs 
and  walls  were  falling.  It  may  be  assumed  therefore,  that  within 
a  quarter  of  an  hour,  preceding  the  assault,  a  large  number 
the  defenders  left  their  position,  which  had  been  made  untenable 
by   the   hostile   shells." 

This  in  the  entire  statement  of  the  Official  Account,  and 
the  individual  reports  of  the  regiments  which  participated 
furnish  no  additional  or  better  details,  except  that  the  4th 
Regiment  states  in  its  report : 

"The  regiment  hastened  up  on  the  run  and  dispersed  through- 
out the  village;  the  fire  was  annihilating;  the  enemy,  advancing 
anew,  retreated  again  to  300  meters  from  the  village,  throwing 
himself  to  the  ground,  his  artillery  redoubling  its  fire.  Shells 
came  from  all  directions,  the  walls  of  the  village  tumbled  down 
but  our  men  held  their  ground.  The  bursting  of  the  shells,  the 
horrible  noise  made  by  the  falling  roofs  and  walls,  the  cries  of 
the  dying,  the  rattle  of  the  infantry  fire  and  the  shrieking  of  the 
shells  and  shot  made  an  absolute  inferno  out  of  the  streets.  We 
have  to  admire  the  valor  and  self-sacriflce  displayed  by  our  men, 

—719— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

which  remained  in  position  facing  certain  destruction,  rifles  aimed, 
fingers  on  the  trigger.  The  Prussian  officers  attempted  to  get 
their  men  to  charge  by  calls  and  signs.  Incendiary  shells  struck 
the  roofs  from  all  sides,  a  hospital  was  soon  afire  as  well  as  other 
buildings  and  very  soon  the  entire  village  was  enveloped  in  flames. 
One  battery  near  Ste.  Marie  swept  the  main  street,  the  shells 
cleared  everything  away  in  that  street  and  still  our  men  retreated 
only  step  by  step.  Now  the  colonel  ordered  all  to  retreat,  the 
men  leave  the  village  in  all  directions,  pursued  by  the  fire  of  the 
enemy,  who  does  not  dai-e  to  attack  us  with  the  bayonet. 

"At  the  quarries  our  officers  assembled  a  portion  of  the  regi- 
ment, whereupon   it  marched  to  Woippy. 

"The  insignificant  number  of  wounded  is  a  clear  proof  that 
the  regiment  showed  but  little  tenacity  in  the  fight." 

While  the  Saxon  Battalions  and  the  battalions  of  the 
4th  Guard  Regiment  had  gotten  close  to  St.  Privat  and  pre- 
pared for  the  final  assault,  other  fresh  troops  arrived. 

The  108th  Rifle  Regiment  came  from  Roncourt,  behind 
it  the  46th  Brigade,  while  the  20th  Infantry  Division,  having 
arrived  at  St.  Ail  after  7  p.m.,  received  orders  to  advance 
on  St.  Privat  also. 


The  French  6th  Corps  After  the  Assault 
AND  THE  Artillery  Fight 

Concerning  the  departure  of  the  French  from  St. 
Privat  and  the  subsequent  artillery  battle,  the  French  ac- 
count says : 

When  Marshal  Canrobert,  remaining  until  the  very  last 
in  St.  Privat,  perceived  that  the  Saxons  approached  the -vil- 
lage, he  sent  Major  Caffarel  at  7:30  P.M.  to  inform  Mar- 
shal Bazaine  at  Plappeville  that  he  was  forced  to  fall  back 
to  Woippy,  as  his  ammunition  had  run  out.  This  report 
did  not  seem  to  surprise  the  Marshal  in  the  least;  he  re- 
plied to  the  ofiicer : 

"You  need  not  be  so  downhearted  about  this  retreat,  for  the 
movement  just  now  started  would  in  any  case  have  been  made  to- 
morrow, we  only  make  it  some  12  hours  earlier  and  the  Prussians 
will  not  be  able  to  brag  that  they  forced  us  to  retreat." 

Simultaneously  with  sending  Major  Caffarel  to  Marshal 
Bazaine,  Marshal  Canrobert  issued  orders  for  the  retreat. 


-720— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Though  numerous  men  left  the  village  of  St.  Privat  in 
disorder,  detachments  of  the  4th,  as  well  as  the  2d  and  3d 
Battalions  of  the  9th  Regiment  offered  a  most  brave  resist- 
ance on  the  north  side ;  they  retired  only  step  by  step  when 
the  Prussian  Guard  advanced  from  the  south  and  threatened 
them  in  rear.  The  3d  Battalion,  9th  Regiment,  was  the  last 
battalion  in  the  village  streets,  while  the  2d  took  up  a  cov- 
ering position  some  few  hundred  meters  east  of  the  village. 

With  the  9th  Regiment  the  3d  Battalion  of  the  100th 
Regiment  also  fell  back  from  the  northwest  corner  and 
joined  its  2d  Battalion  so  as  to  receive  the  individual  men 
still  fighting  in  the  village. 

In  the  meantime  General  Pechot  had  caused  the  two 
battalions  of  the  100th  Regiment,  the  Regiment  of  Chas- 
seurs d'Afrique  and  the  94th  Regiment  to  front  against 
St.  Privat.     But  these  troops  also  fell  back  very  soon. 

Four  regiments  of  the  Division  of  La  Font  de  Villiers 
and  three  of  the  Division  of  Levassor-Sorval  remained  for 
a  short  time  in  front  of  the  woods,  but  they  also  started  the 
retreat  at  about  8  P.M.,  or  a  little  thereafter.  When  they 
learned  that  Marshal  Canrobert  was  still  at  St.  Privat 
they  halted  at  the  woods ;  but  when  after  8  P.M.  the  Marshal, 
accompanied  by  a  few  officers,  arrived  where  they  were, 
they  continued  the  retreat. 

Shortly  after  St.  Privat  had  been  stormed  by  the  Prus- 
sians, numerous  German  batteries  went  to  St.  Privat  and 
fired  from  there  on  the  retreating  French  infantry.  First 
three  horse  batteries  of  the  Guard  went  into  position  on 
ridge  326—333,  towards  7  :30  P.M.  the  batteries  of  the  2d 
Guard  Division — 6th  Light  and  5th  and  6th  Heavy — to- 
gether with  the  3d  Horse  Battery  of  the  Xth  Corps  advanced 
by  echelons  to  Hill  333,  their  left  on  the  road.  The  1st 
Horse  Battery  of  the  Xth  Corps  could  not  find  any  room 
and  went  into  position  north  of  the  road  with  the  batteries 
of  the  20th  Division. 

The  four  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  6th  Corps 
— the  4th  and  5th  Heavy,  6th  and  5th  Light — went  into  po- 
sition on  knoll  326.     On  their  right,  in  the  intervals  between 

—721— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

the  batteries  of  the  1st  Guard  Division  and  the  Russian  bat- 
teries, the  Horse  Batteries — 1st  of  the  4th,  2d  of  the  10th 
Regiment — and  those  batteries  of  the  10th  Division — 1st 
Light,  1st  and  2d  Heavy  of  the  Xth  Corps — went  into  posi- 
tion. The  2d  Light  Battery  of  the  Xth  Corps  went  into  posi- 
tion farther  north  and  to  the  left  of  the  2d  Horse  Battery  of 
the  Guard. 

North  of  the  railroad  and  east  of  Habonville  were  the 
3d  Battery  of  the  IXth  Corps  and  the  1st,  2d  and  3d  Light 
and  1st  and  2d  Heavy  of  the  Hessian  Division. 

Thus,  20  German  batteries  were  in  position  along  the 
St.  Privat  road  between  the  railroad  and  the  high  road,  all 
of  them  in  action. 

North  of  St.  Privat  and  along  the  road  leading  to  the 
Jaumont  quarries  seven  Saxon  batteries  had  gone  into  po- 
sition, which  were  soon  joined  by  four  from  the  Xth  Corps, 
going  into  position  on  the  right  of  the  Saxons.  When  these 
German  batteries  went  to  the  front,  they  were  immediately 
opposed  by  23  French  batteries  between  the  Amanvillers 
railroad  station  and  the  quarries  of  La  Croix. 

Arrival  of  the  French  Guard  at  Amanvillers 

Shortly  after  the  final  artillery  battle  had  commenced 
one  Guard  Brigade  finally  arrived  on  the  left  of  the  French 
batteries.  The  Grenadier  Division  of  the  Guard  and  seven 
batteries  deployed  at  St.  Vincent  after  7 :45  P.M.,  and  four 
batteries  immediately  trotted  to  the  front  by  orders  of 
General  Bourbaki,  taking  position  on  the  road  from  the 
Amanvillers  railroad  station  leading  to  the  La  Croix  quar- 
ries, covered  by  one  battalion  of  the  Zouaves  and  one  of  the 
1st  Grenadier  Regiment.  These  batteries  opened  fire  before 
8  o'clock  on  the  Prussian  batteries  at  Jerusalem,  but  that 
fire,  delivered  at  3500  meters  range  appears  to  have  had  no 
effect. 

The  larger  part  of  the  Grenadier  Division — 1st  Bat- 
talion Zouaves,  two  battalions  each  the  1st  and  3d  Grenadier 
Regiments  and  two  batteries — remained  at  St.  Vincent  in 
reserve. 

—722— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Though  30  French  batteries  could  have  gone  into  ac- 
tion, most  of  them  were  short  of  ammunition,  so  that  only 
from  ten  to  twelve  participated  in  the  battle.  The  batteries 
of  the  4th  Corps  especially  remained  in  a  waiting  position 
and  did  not  fire. 

When  the  four  French  Guard  batteries  opened  fire,  the 
5th  and  6th  Light  Batteries  of  the  Xth  Corps  left  the  long 
artillery  line  and  went  into  position  on  hill  328 — at  "Mares" 
on  the  map — and  opened  fire  on  this  newly  appearing  enemy. 
But  these  batteries  were  immediately  fired  on  by  the  skir- 
mishers of  Cissey's  Division  of  the  railroad  until  they,  with 
the  help  of  other  Prussian  batteries,  succeeded  in  driving 
these  hostile  skirmishers  away. 

Shortly  after  8  P.M.  the  French  batteries  fell  back,  most 
of  them  having  fired  their  last  shell.  The  French  account 
expressly  states  that  in  this  last  artillery  fight  their  own 
batteries  had  but  a  small  loss,  while  the  Prussian  batteries 
at  St.  Privat,  being  vividly  illuminated  by  the  flames  of  the 
burning  village,  suffered  much  loss  by  the  fire  of  the  French 
skirmish  lines  retreating  into  the  forest.  In  most  cases  the 
French  shells  fell  too  short  and  caused  very  immaterial 
losses. 

Long  before  this  last  artillery  fight  took  place  an  inde- 
pendent, short  action  took  place  north  of  St.  Privat  between 
the  1st  Battalion  9th  Regiment  and  dispersed  men  of  other 
regiments  which  had  occupied  the  edge  of  the  Jaumont 
woods. 

The  1st  Battalion,  9th  Regiment,  retreating  from  Ron- 
court  into  the  woods  was  pursued  by  the  left  wing  of  the 
Saxons — 1st  Battalion  and  12th  Company  of  the  106th  Regi- 
ment. The  French  were  lying  down  along  the  edge  of  the 
woods  and  along  the  ditches  of  the  road  leading  into  the 
forest.  The  3d  Battalion,  107th  Regiment,  soon  joined  the 
5  companies  of  the  106th  and  after  a  short  fire  fight  the 
Saxons  took  the  edge  of  the  woods  under  the  leadership  of 
Colonel  von  Abendroth,  who  was  severely  wounded  in  this 
charge.  The  French  fell  back  to  the  Jaumont  quarries,  but 
were  driven  away  from  there  also  and  then  commenced  their 
retreat  through  the  forest  into  the  Bronvaux  ravine.    Even 

—723— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

before  the  edge  of  the  woods  was  captured,  the  three  com- 
panies of  the  106th  Regiment,  which  had  been  sent  to  Malan- 
court,  and  the  13th  Jager  BattaHon  as  well  as  the  3d  Bat- 
talion, 103d  Regiment  also  came  up  and  formed  a  strong 
reserve. 

The  battle  around  St.  Privat  ceased  with  these  fights. 

Concerning  the  subsequent  retreat  of  the  French  6th 
Corps,  the  French  account  has  but  little  to  say;  a  few  ex- 
tracts are  quoted  from  regimental  reports  and  the  most 
material  of  these  extracts  is  about  the  following: 

It  is  impossible  to  describe  the  valorous  fighting  that 
took  place  in  the  streets  of  St.  Privat  until  dark.  When  the 
Germans  forced  their  way  into  the  village  disorder  seemed 
to  be  more,  pronounced  among  the  defenders  than  among  the 
attackers,  for  all  cohesion  between  platoons,  companies  and 
battalions  was  lost  and  only  single  groups  of  heroes  de- 
fended the  smoking  ruins  step  by  step,  inspired  to  action  by 
Marshal  Canrobert  in  person.  The  bravery  and  self-sacri- 
fice of  the  last  defenders  cannot  be  doubted  and  it  is  not  con- 
sidered necessary  to  prove  it  further. 

The  time  when  fighting  finally  ceased  also  cannot  be 
correctly  ascertained ;  the  retreat  commenced  towards  7  :30 
P.M.,  and  it  appears  that  the  last  defenders  left  the  village 
with  the  Marshal  at  about  between  8  and  8  :30  p.m.,  every 
one  who  remained  behind  them  being  captured. 

Toward  8  o'clock  Colonel  Gibon  led  a  few  hundred  men, 
who  had  been  gathered  together  around  Marengo  and  who 
belonged  to  the  25th  Regiment,  with  band  playing  against 
Jerusalem;  but  Marshal  Canrobert,  who.  rode  to  the  rear 
with  General  Levassor-Sorval  personally  ordered  him  to 
retreat. 

Even  before  the  German  batteries  went  into  position  on 
both  sides  of  St.  Privat,  the  regiments  of  the  Divisions  of 
Levassor-Sorval  and  La  Font  de  Villers  had  started  to  re- 
treat, being  covered  by  the  94th  Regiment,  which  had  re- 
ceived personal  orders  from  Marshal  Canrobert  to  hold 
out  on  the  left  of  the  road  until  the  last  limber  had  de- 
parted. When  the  last  battery  had  finally  departed  at 
dark,  this  regiment  also  retreated. 

—724^ 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

The  retreat  seems  to  have  been  carried  out  in  great 
disorder  by  some  organizations  for  the  Official  Account  says : 

The  long  road  defile  between  Marengo  and  the  village  of 
Saulny  was  filled  with  vehicles  of  all  sorts  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  battle  on ;  ammunition  wagons  of  the  ar- 
tillery, ambulances,  regimental  baggage  wagons  and  farm- 
ers' wagons  abandoned  by  their  drivers  were  crowded  to- 
gether along  the  road.  Draft  horses  with  traces  cut  and  led 
horses,  cattle,  and  dispersed  men  fled  in  all  haste  in  the 
direction  of  Metz  and  the  steadily  increasing  number  of 
fugitives  augmented  the  disorder  among  the  troops  re- 
treating along  the  road. 

A  few  retreating  batteries  increased  the  confusion. 
Thus  the  batteries  of  the  Division  of  Levassor-Sorval,  after 
having  traversed  Saulny,  driving  at  the  highest  gait,  caused 
a  senseless  panic  among  the  subsistence  columns  on  the 
road,  for  the  artillery  men  called  in  passing:  "Save  your- 
selves if  you  can,  the  Prussians  are  behind  us" — whereupon 
200  men  of  the  convoy  simply  fled  in  wild  haste,  and  the 
drivers  cut  the  traces  and  rode  oflf  in  haste  on  the  animals. 

All  along  the  road  were  capsized  artillery  vehicles, 
train  wagons,  etc.  The  officers  did  their  best  to  assemble 
the  men  at  all  free  spaces  along  the  road,  but  many  of  the 
men  first  plundered  the  provision  wagons  on  the  road. 

The  Official  Account  quotes  several  other  instances  of 
such  confusion,  and  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  such  in- 
stances never  happened  before  in  the  French  Army,  but  that 
the  panic  which  took  hold  of  the  columns  and  trains  was 
caused  by  nervousness,  exhaustion  and  mental  excitement 
and  that  the  plundering  of  the  provision  wagons  was  due  to 
hunger. 

The  very  inexact  French  Official  Account  closes  with  a 
short  extract  taken  from  General  Kessel's  report,  about  as 
follows — leaving  out  all  unimportant  details : 

"The  village  was  completely  in  our  possession;  considering 
the  darkness  and  general  exhaution  it  was  very  difficult  to  find 
the  men  of  my  regiments;  the  very  first  group  of  men  I  gathered 
together,  I  at  once  dispersed  again  with  instruction  to  direct  all 
men  of  the  brigade  they  encountered  to  the  road.     I  also  sent  men 

—725— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

to  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes.  The  rest  of  the  brigade  bivouacked 
partly  at  Ste.  Marie,  partly  at  Roncourt.  I  omit  describing  the 
exhaustion  of  the  troops. 

"At  noon  we  had  sent  for  water  in  vain,  the  hot  day  passed 
without  a  drop  of  refreshment.  The  well  men  could  bear  this, 
but  the  wounded,  lying  in  the  fields,  suffered  greatly. 

"The  greatest  confusion  reigned  in  the  villages;  the  streets 
were  overcrowded  with  vehicles,  guns,  and  men.  Everyone  strove 
for  Ste.  Marie,  where  the  confusion  reached  the  highest  degree. 
Many  wounded  men  were  in  the  crowd;  all  endeavors  to  create 
order,  to  bring  help,  were  in  vain,  there  were  not  enough  officers. 
The  broad  and  deep  ditches  along  the  roads  proved  very  danger- 
ous to  many;  the  shouts  and  curses  of  the  teamsters  drowned 
the  call  of  the  wounded,  many  of  whom  had  sought  safety  in  the 
ditches.  I  reached  Ste.  Marie  after  great  exertions  and  found  the 
streets  and  squares  filled  with  such  a  disorderly  crowd  that  I 
abandoned  all  hope  of  being  able  to  find  any  of  my  men.  I  passed 
the  night  on  straw  at  the  bivouac  of  the  1st  Guard  Regiment." 

That  is  all  the  French  General  Staff  account  has  to  say 
of  the  Battle  of  St.  Privat  and,  what  is  remarkable,  it  con- 
tains no  discussion  of  the  tactical  measures  taken.  But 
it  shows  clearly  that  the  7  Prussian  Guard  Regiments, 
supported  by  9  Saxon  Battalions  and  by  the  fire  of  30  bat- 
teries, completely  defeated  the  French  6th  Corps,  which  held 
an  excellent  and  fortified  position  with  40  battalions,  and 
that  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  towards  the  end  of  the 
battle  that  corps  was  supported  by  Cissey's  Division  of  the 
4th  Corps. 

Still,  the  losses  were  unusually  heavy  for  the  Prussian 
Guard  regiments  and  the  Saxons  lost  a  total  of  313  officers, 
9224  men,  of  these  132  officers  and  2147  men  killed. 

The  loss  of  the  French  was  comparatively  small  as  com- 
pared with  that  of  the  Germans,  for  the  6th  Corps  lost  195 
officers  and  4616  men,  inclusive  of  3106  missing. 

As,  according  to  German  official  reports  about  2000  un- 
wounded  French  were  captured,  the  French  loss  in  dead  and 
wounded  was  about  6500  men,  or  a  little  less  than  one-third 
of  the  German  loss ;  this  is  a  clear  proof  of  the  value  of  a 
fortified  position. 

If  we  compare  the  loss  of  the  infantry  with  that  of  the 
artillery,  we  are  surprised  at  the  small  effect  the  artillery 
of  both  sides  produced.  The  batteries  of  the  Prussian 
Guard  lost — mainly  through  infantry  fire — 17  officers,  185 

—726— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

men  and  275  horses ;  while  the  16  Saxon  Batteries  had  a  loss 
of  only  5  officers,  32  men  and  50  horses. 

Most  of  the  13  batteries  of  the  Xth  Corps — which  of 
course  were  in  action  only  a  short  time — had  no  losses  at  all 
— their  total  loss  being  only  6  men  and  18  horses.  The  loss 
of  all  the  batteries  was  22  officers,  223  men,  and  343  horses. 
And  withal  a  very  enormous  amount  of  ammunition  was 
expended,  for  the  44  German  batteries  in  action  in  front 
of  St.  Privat,  expended  a  total  of  11,800  shells. 

The  batteries  of  the  French  6th  Corps  and  those  of 
Cissey's  Division  expended  a  total  of  12,179  shells  and  had 
a  total  loss  of  6  officers,  113  men  and  137  horses. 

At  the  present  day  it  is  an  absolute  mystery  to  us  how  it 
happened  that  12,000  shells  fired  by  the  Germans  disabled 
only  100  cannoneers  and  the  same  amount  fired  by  the  French 
disabled  only  220  cannoneers,  we  are  justified  in  stating 
that  the  artillery  effect  was  next  to  nothing,  as  it  took  about 
one  hundred  shells  to  disable  one  cannoneer.  But  we  must 
not  overlook  the  fact  that  the  effect  of  the  Guard  artillery 
on  the  infantry  of  the  French  left  at  Jerusalem  was  most 
excellent,  and  that  several  regiments — especially  the  25th, 
26th,  and  28th — were  driven  back  mainly  by  artillery  fire. 

The  Prussian  Guard  has  many  times  been  blamed  by 
military  writers  for  having  adhered  too  long  to  mass  forma- 
tion in  its  advance,  thus  causing  its  enormous  loss.  This 
blame  is  probably  justified  and  may  be  explained  by  the 
teachings  of  the  drill  ground,  but  the  main  error  the  Guard 
committed  was  in  starting  their  attack  entirely  too  soon,  in- 
stead of  waiting  for  the  effect  of  the  Saxon  envelopment 
making  itself  felt,  and  that  there  was  insufficient  artillery 
preparation  and  that — as  the  French  account  correctly  states 
— not  all  the  cover  offered  by  the  terrain  was  thoroughly 
utilized. 

Though  we  cannot  be  satisfied  with  the  tactical  leader- 
ship of  the  Guard,  we  must  give  due  measure  of  apprecia- 
tion to  the  bravery  of  the  troops ;  they  had  performed  an 
almost  superhuman  task,  and  the  case  probably  will  happen 
very  seldom  in  future  of  such  decimated  troops  not  only 
holding  the  battlefield  but  also  taking  up  the  offensive. 

—727— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

However,  the  premature  attack  of  the  Guard  was  not 
alone  due  to  the  impatience  of  the  leader,  but  it  main  cause 
is  to  be  sought  in  the  fact  that  the  cavalry  failed  to  clear  up 
the  situation  as  to  the  French  right  wing.  Had  it  been 
known  at  noon  that  the  French  right  extended  far  beyond 
St.  Privat,  then  the  Saxon  Corps  could  have  been  started 
earlier  and  along  a  shorter  route  to  Roncourt.  Failure  to 
reconnoiter  the  situation  brought  in  its  wake  the  subse- 
quent heavy  consequences. 

Now,  if  tactical  errors  were  committed  on  the  German 
side,  the  conduct  of  the  higher  French  leaders  is  absolutely 
inexplicable;  for  though  Marshal  Canrobert  and  General 
Ladmirault  several  times  urgently  requested  help  from 
Marshal  Bazaine,  the  latter  left  the  entire  Guard  corps  with 
its  12  Batteries,  and  with  16  batteries  of  the  artillery  re- 
serve, inactive  in  the  vicinty  of  Plappeville  until  late  in 
the  evening. 

Marshal  Bazaine  remained  the  entire  day  in  his  quar- 
ters in  Plappeville,  where  he  said  of  the  most  important 
reports  sent  to  him  by  his  corps  commanders  nothing  but: 
"That  is  nothing,  I  know  that  it  is  nothing!" 

At  4  P.M.,  Marshal  Bazaine,  leaving  his  entire  head- 
quarters staff  in  Plappeville,  proceeded  to  St.  Quentin  with 
a  couple  of  officers  where  he  personally  aimed  a  few  guns  on 
the  village  of  Jussy.  He  returned  to  Plappeville  at  6  P.M., 
but  at  no  time  did  he  go  to  the  decisive  point. 

The  fact  that  a  commander-in-chief  of  a  large  army 
personally  aimed  a  few  guns,  probably  never  happened  be- 
fore nor  since — excepting  the  case  of  Napoleon  I  at  Mont- 
ereau;  but  the  fact  that  Bazaine  kept  more  than  150  guns 
inactive  in  bivouac  is  absolutely  inexplicable. 

Had  the  French  Guard  entered  the  battle  with  15  to  20 
batteries  between  6  and  7  o'clock  north  of  St.  Privat,  which 
was  entirely  feasible,  those  fresh  troops  would  have  had 
no  difficulty  whatever  in  defeating  the  Saxon  Corps  and 
thus  changing  defeat  into  a  great  victory. 

Therefore  Marshal  Bazaine  alone  is  responsible  for  the 
fact  that  his  6th  Corps  was  defeated,  and  thereby  the  en- 
tire battle  lost. 

—728— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 
CHAPTER  VII 

THE  END  OF  THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  HEIGHTS  OF 
AMANVILLERS  AFTER  7  P.M. 

Retreat  of  Cissey's  Division 

The  batteries  of  Cissey's  Division  had  expended  their 
ammunition  before  7  p.m.  and  could  no  longer  support  their 
infantry,  which  General  Cissey  had  sent  forward  as  far  as 
depression  308.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Prussian  batteries 
now  redoubled  their  fire. 

There  was  no  sense  in  remaining  any  longer  under  the 
hostile  fire ;  the  batteries  saw  themselves  obliged  to  retreat 
and  that  was,  as  the  report  of  one  battery  reads,  the  most 
frightful  stage  of  the  day,  in  the  5th  Battery  a  shell  shat- 
tered the  limber  of  one  piece,  so  that  it  had  to  be  left  behind. 
In  the  12th  Battery  three  caissons  remained  behind,  the 
teams  having  been  killed ;  and  so  the  batteries  fell  back  to 
the  La  Croix  quarries  where  they  joined  the  batteries  of 
the  8th  Corps  in  position  there. 

Detachments  of  the  Prussian  4th  Guard  Regiment  had 
reached  the  hedge  road  on  knoll  326 — 333;  they  threatened 
the  right  of  Cissey's  Division,  for  which  reason  the  1st 
Regiment  in  the  second  line  executed  a  right  turn  and 
met  the  Grenadiers. 

The  division  had  been  under  artillery  fire  for  the  past 
five  hours  and  now  General  Cissey  requested  orders  from 
General  Ladmirault. 

In  front  of  Amanvillers  the  troops,  shaken  by  the  shell 
fire  of  the  Guard  and  Hessians,  showed  signs  of  unrest ;  the 
1st  and  2d  Battalions,  16th  Regiment,  and  the  2d  Chasseur 
Battalion  had  fallen  back  somewhat  and  though  they  were 
led  forward,  their  conduct  caused  apprehension. 

It  was  now  plainer  and  plainer  that  the  retreat  of 
the  6th  Corps  was  approaching,  and  soon  the  right  wing  of 
the  4th  Corps  would  be  entirely  unprotected. 

General  Ladmirault  had  received  information  that  the 
6th  Corps  was  falling  back  and  that  the  French  Guard  Divi- 
sion had  turned  about ;  he  had  to  take  up  a  covering  position 

—729— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

northeast  of  Amanvillers  to  prevent  being  enveloped.  Three 
times  he  had  asked  General  Bourbaki  for  support  but  re- 
ceived no  answer;  he  therefore  ordered  General  Cissey  to 
fall  back  to  the  edge  of  the  Saulny  v^oods. 

The  57th  and  two  battalions  of  the  73d  Regiment,  as 
well  as  half  of  the  20th  Chasseur  Battalion,  retired  in  good 
order  in  spite  of  the  heavy  artillery  fire ;  the  6th  Regiment 
and  the  other  Chasseur  companies  with  it  followed,  so  that 
only  the  1st  Regiment  remained.  This  regiment,  fired  on 
from  the  rear  and  flanks,  could  not  however,  hold  its  posi- 
tion ;  it  again  took  up  a  position  at  the  railroad  embankment 
facing  north  and  then  retreated  one  hour  later. 

The  other  troops  of  the  division  fell  back  under  shell 
fire;  and  that  fire  prevented  them  from  getting  the  knap- 
sacks they  had  left  back  in  their  camps.  General  Cissey  as- 
sembled his  troops  at  the  edge  of  the  Saulny  forest,  and  at 
the  Saulny  quarries,  but  he  perceived  "that  many  men  were 
completely  exhausted  and  that  hunger  drove  them  to  sneak 
in  the  dark  through  the  woods  in  small  groups  toward  Metz." 

Before  7  o'clock  and  before  Cissey's  Division  had  fallen 
back.  General  Ladmirault  had  informed  Marshal  Leboeuf 
of  his  desperate  situation  and  begged  him  for  a  few  battal- 
ions to  help  out.  At  the  same  time  he  directed  General  Lor- 
encez  to  hold  the  heights  of  Amanvillers  to  the  last  man ;  he 
then  rode  to  the  quarries  where  his  batteries  were  and 
where  the  57th  and  73d  Regiments  were  about  to  assemble. 

Towards  7  o'clock  —  on  the  German  side  —  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  encountered  at  the  La  Cusse  woods  Gen- 
eral von  Manstein,  who  wanted  to  get  hold  of  Amanvillers  at 
all  cost.  By  this  time  numerous  battalions,  more  or  less 
mixed  up,  were  at  La  Cusse,  and  these  had  suffered  great 
loss ;  only  the  1st  and  2d  Battalions  of  the  4th  Hessian  Regi- 
ment and  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  Elizabeth  Regiment  were 
still  fresh.  As,  on  the  other  hand,  the  companies  of  the  3d 
Guard  Brigade  appeared  to  be  completely  exhausted  and 
unfit  for  further  offensive  action.  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
ordered  that  one  brigade  of  the  Hid  Corps  should  support 
the  attack  on  Amanvillers. 

—730— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Very  early  that  day  General  von  Alvensleben  had  in- 
tended to  start  from  Verneville  with  his  entire  corps  against 
the  woods  and  the  farm  of  La  Folie,  thinking  to  meet  with 
great  success  in  doing  so;  but  under  existing  conditions  he 
could  not  procure  the  sanction  of  the  army  commander  for 
that.  But  when  he  received  orders  to  send  off  one  brigade, 
he  caused  his  entire  infantry  to  advance  between  Champ- 
enois  and  the  woods  of  La  Cusse,  the  6th  Division  being  the 
first,  and  the  5th  in  the  second  line. 

At  this  time  the  fight  between  Leipzig  and  Moscou  had 
again  flared  up ;  General  von  Bulow  sent  word  that  the  bat- 
teries at  Chantrenne  were  heavily  fired  on.  In  order  to 
prevent  the  French  from  breaking  out  of  the  woods",  both 
divisions  were  sent  in  that  direction  and  the  12th  Brigade 
received  orders- to  capture  the  woods  in  front  at  the  point  of 
the  bayonet.  But  as  the  enemy  had  stopped  his  forward 
movement,  no  fighting  resulted  at  this  point. 

By  7  o'clock  the  Prussian  Grenadiers  had  approached 
the  French  position  to  within  400  meters,  but  they  were 
hardly  able  to  get  farther  without  support. 

On  the  French  side,  more  and  more  batteries  were  seen 
going  into  position  after  7  o'clock — two  Hessian  batteries 
had  gone  to  knoll  315,  while  Hessian  battalions  were  sent 
even  to  the  front  of  these  batteries. 

By  the  retreat  of  Cissey's  Division  the  right  wing  of 
the  5th  Chasseur  Battalion  was  uncovered  and  the  situation 
became  very  precarious  for  the  defenders  of  knoll  331.  The 
shells  of  a  Prussian  battery,  which  swept  the  entire  length 
of  the  French  position,  struck  in  continually  larger  numbers 
among  the  ranks  of  the  Chasseurs  standing  elbow  to  elbow, 
many  houses  in  Amanvillers  were  in  flames ;  the  camps 
there  were  ploughed  up  by  the  Prussian  shells — several 
sentinels  being  killed.  An  hour  earlier  an  orderly  retreat 
would  have  been  still  possible,  but  now  it  was  too  late  and  the 
commanding  ofl^cers  of  the  three  wing  battalions — 1st  of  the 
54th  Regiment  and  5th  and  2d  Chasseur  Battalions — saw 
that  the  only  thing  left  for  them  was  to  retreat  on  the  run  to 
the  heights  near  the  quarries  east  of  Amanvillers.  The  en- 
tire line  rose  up  and  fell  back  on  Amanvillers  under  a  hail  of 

—731— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

shells;  in  that  village  several  dressing  stations  were  shot 
into  flames  before  all  the  wounded  could  be  removed. 

The  two  Chasseur  battalions  assembled  behind  the 
village,  while  the  1st  Battalion,  54th  Regiment,  stopped  on 
this  side  of  the  village  where  the  2d  Battalion  was  and  later 
on  joined  the  3d  Battalion,  whereupon  the  entire  regiment 
took  up  the  retreat.  The  remaining  battalions  belonging  to 
Generals  Lorencez'  and  Pradier's  divisions  remained  in 
their  positions  while  the  Chasseurs  fell  back,  the  2d  Bat- 
talion, 65th  Regiment,  only  fell  back  when  it  had  no  ammu- 
nition left;  but  it  was  at  once  replaced  by  the  3d  Battalion 
of  that  regiment. 

The  2d  Battalion  of  the  Elizabeth  Regiment  in  the 
woods  of  La  Cusse  received  orders  at  7  o'clock  to  attack, 
and  soon  the  entire  Guard  Brigade  again  charged  forward. 
But  even  before  that  another  French  counter-attack  took 
place  against  the  2d  Battaliofi  of  the  1st  Guard  Grenadier 
Regiment. 

Under  the  apprehension  that  the  right  of  the  Prussian 
Grenadiers  would  advance  across  knoll  330,  the  1st  Batta- 
lion of  the  French  65th  Regiment  executed  a  right  turn  and 
charged  the  ditches  along  the  road  to  Verneville,  from  where 
it  fired  rapidly  on  the  2d  Battalion,  1st  Guard  Grenadier 
Regiment.  This  was  a  critical  moment,  as  stated  in  the 
history  of  the  Alexander  Regiment,  for  nearly  all  cartridges 
had  been  expended,  nearly  all  officers  had  been  killed  or 
wounded,  but  the  cry  "Do  not  fire  at  more  than  100  meters 
range"  resounded  along  the  ranks;  and  the  French  were 
received  with  a  hot  rapid  fire.  The  French  battalion  turned 
about  and  fell  back  on  Amanvillers,  carrying  along  the  3d 
Battalion  of  the  54th,  and  the  1st  of  the  33d,  and  the  3d  of 
the  64th  Regiment.  The  Grenadier  battalion  pursued  the 
fleeing  French  with  the  bayonet  for  no  ammunition  was  left 
to  keep  up  a  pursuit  by  fire. 

Shortly  before  that  time  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  Eliza- 
beth Regiment,  the  6th  and  7th  Companies  in  the  first,  and 
the  5th  and  8th  in  the  second  line,  advanced  to  the  charge 
with  drums  beating  to  the  left  of  the  Fusilier  Battalion: 

—732— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

the  other  portions  of  the  brigade  joining  the  attack  on  both 
sides. 

Without  firing  a  shot,  the  2d  BattaHon  charged  with 
the  bayonet  Hke  a  wedge  into  the  French  line,  during  which 
charge  the  6th  and  7th  Companies  also  participated  in  the 
hand  fighting  close  to  Amanvillers. 

On  the  French  side,  both  battalions  of  the  15th  Regi- 
ment and  the  3d  of  the  64th  on  their  right  and  the  1st  of  the 
33d  Regiment  immediately  fled ;  the  1st  Battalion,  65th  Reg- 
iment, was  mixed  up  with  the  companies  of  the  15th  Regi- 
ment and  its  colors  were  in  great  danger  of  being  captured. 

Immediately  in  front  of  the  village  the  French  made  a 
stand  again  and  by  8  P.M.  6  (sic)  battalions — 1st  and  3d  of 
the  54th,  1st  and  2d  of  the  15th,  1st  of  the  65th,  3d  of  the 
64th  and  1st  of  the  93d  Regiment — stood  immediately  west 
of  the  village. 

Finally  additional  support  arrived  for  the  French,  for 
Marshal  Leboeuf  sent  the  41st  and  71st  Regiments  and 
two  batteries  as  a  support  as  soon  as  he  learned  of  the 
dangerous  situation  of  the  4th  Corps.  But  only  a  small 
portion  of  these  troops  got  as  far  as  Amanvillers,  for  the 
71st  Regiment  took  up  a  covering  position  in  the  Chatel 
woods  about  two  kilometers  south  of  Montigny,  and  the  two 
batteries,  which  had  been  previously  in  action  at  Leipzig, 
received  orders  en  route  from  the  artillery  general  Berckein 
to  return,  because  he  believed  that  the  Prussians  had  fallen 
back. 

The  41st  Regiment  under  Colonel  Saussier  has- 
tened as  rapidly  as  possible  towards  Montigny,  arriving 
there  at  8  p.m.  Then  the  regiment  deployed  in  two  lines  for 
battle  and  with  bugles  sounding  the  charge  and  shouts  of 
"Vive  la  France"  it  charged  the  right  wing  of  the  Prussian 
Grenadiers.  But  no  contact  resulted ;  however,  the  defenders 
of  Amanvillers  were  greatly  encouraged  by  the  appearance 
of  a  fresh  regiment  on  their  left  wing. 

The  evacuation  of  Amanvillers  commenced  between  8 
and  9  o'clock,  the  15th  Regiment,  two  battalions  of  the  65th, 
the  1st  Battalion  of  the  33d  and  the  3d  of  the  64th  Regiment 
proceeded   to  the  bivouac   places   of  the  morning;   a  few 

—733— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

hundred  paces  west  of  the  village  two  battalions  of  the  54th 
Regiment  and  on  the  left  of  them  the  41st  Regiment  and 
the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  33d  Regiment,  covered  the  re- 
treat. 

At  9  P.M.  the  left  wing  of  the  Prussian  Guard  Brigade 
again  made  a  short  attack  and  drove  the  skirmish  line  of 
the  54th  Regiment  off ;  it  then  occupied  the  French  position 
and  thereafter  there  was  no  more  fighting  along  the  entire 
line. 

After  this  final  blazing  up  of  the  battle,  the  54th  Regi- 
ment and  the  other  troops  went  back  to  the  heights 
of  St.  Vincent  and  thus  the  French  position  at  Amanvillers 
was  completely  evacuated  by  10  P.M.  but — as  the  French 
Official  Account  states — the  Prussian  3d  Guard  Brigade  was 
in  such  a  condition  of  exhaustion,  that  it  fell  back  to  be- 
hind the  woods  of  La  Cusse,  leaving  only  a  few  pickets  from 
the  3d  Grenadier  Regiment  in  the  captured  position. 

The  troops  at  the  north  edge  of  the  Saulny  forest  also — 
1st  Guard  Brigade  with  three  batteries,  Cissey's  Division, 
and  the  7th  Hussar  Regiment — started  the  retreat  to  Plap- 
peville,  Woippy  and  St.  Vincent  between  9  and  10  P.M. 

The  troops  at  St.  Vincent — Lorencez'  Division  of  the 
4th  Corps — resumed  their  retreat  on  Metz  at  midnight. 

A  few  regiments  of  the  4th  Corps  remained  at  the 
Montigny  Chateau.  The  41st  Regiment  and  two  battalions 
of  the  33d,  which  had  fallen  back  from  Amanvillers  to 
Montigny,  halted  on  the  north  side  of  the  park,  but  started 
off  again  at  1  A.M. 

West  of  the  chateau,  facing  Champenois — I'Envie  there 
remained  two  battalions  of  the  64th  and  the  96th  Regiment 
— they  had  received  no  orders  whatever. 

To  the  left  of  the  98th  Regiment,  on  hill  313  and  in  the 
La  Folie  farm  yard  were  the  battalions  of  the  51st  Regi- 
ment, connecting  with  the  troops  of  the  3d  Corps  between 
La  Folie  and  Leipzig.  The  line  of  the  51st  Regiment  was 
prolonged  behind  the  southeast  corner  of  the  Charmoise 
woods  by  six  battalions  of  different  regiments  and  between 
the  woods  of  Charmoise  and  the  Genivaux  forest  by  the 
third  battalions  of  the  69th,  81st  and  95th  Regiments. 

—734— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

All  these  French  troops  left  before  break  of  day,  as 
will  be  shown  later. 

On  the  German  side,  Prince  Frederick  Charles  had 
ordered  that  the  troops  should  bivouac  in  the  captured  po- 
sitions and  place  out  strong  outposts,  so  as  to  prevent  any 
attempt  made  by  the  French  to  pierce  through  the  German 
line.  Accordingly  the  line  of  outposts  ran  in  front  of  the 
IXth  Corps  from  the  I'Envie  farm  and  Champenoise  along 
the  defensive  position  the  French  had  occupied,  i.e.,  across 
hills  327 — 331  connecting  with  the  outposts  of  the  Hessian 
division  and  the  Guard  south  of  St.  Privat. 

The  Hessian  Division  and  3d  Guard  Brigade  camped 
west  of  the  La  Cusse  woods,  the  18th  Division  between 
Verneville  and  Chantrenne. 

The  French  account  closes  with  the  following  com- 
ments : 

"Though  the  3d  Guard  Brigade  had  achieved  the  great  suc- 
cess of  driving  back  the  right  wing  of  the  4th  Corps  on  Aman- 
villers, that  supporting  point  was  actually  abandoned  only  because 
of  the  defeat  of  the  6th  Corps,  which  latter  brought  about  the  re- 
treat of  the  Division  Cissey.  Had  Marshal  Canrobert  held  out 
until  night,  Ladmirault  also  would  have  held  out. 

"As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  attack  of  the  Saxons  on  the  ex- 
treme French  right  wing  brought  about  the  decision  in  the  battle, 
for  it  robbed  the  6th  Corps  of  all  thought  of  resistance  and  forced 
all  troops  on  the  five  kilometers  long  line  from  Montigny  to 
Roncourt  to  fall  back  in  rapid  succession.  Thus  the  Germans 
had  gained  an  actual  victory,  while  General  von  Moltke — chained 
to  the  heels  of  his  Sovereign — had  stopped  the  entire  day  on  an- 
other part  of  the  battlefield  and  already  thought  of  resuming  the 
battle  the  following  day  and  to  regain  the  fortune  of  arms  which 
he  thought  lost  for  quite  a  time." 

Though  this  comment  is  about  correct  in  a  general  way, 
the  credit  due  the  3d  Guard  Brigade  is  not  lessened  thereby — 
it  stormed  the  French  position. 

The  heavy  battle  which  the  Prussian  IXth  Corps  car- 
ried on  against  three  divisions  of  the  French  4th  and  the 
Division  of  Montaudon  of  the  3d  Corps,  was  at  the  end,  but 
the  cost  was  enormous.  According  to  the  French  account  the 
4th  Corps  and  the  Division  of  Montaudon  of  the  3d  Corps 
lost  a  total  of  286  officers  and  5672  men. 

It  is  very  remarkable  that  the  losses  of  the  attacker 
were  smaller  than  that;  and  this  was  presumably  caused 

—735— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

by  the  French  making  several  counter  attacks  on  this  part 
of  the  battlefield  for  according  to  French  statements,  the 
German  batteries  caused  the  French  infantry  enormous 
losses. 

The  losses  of  the  IXth  Corps  and  of  the  3d  Guard  Bri- 
gade was  248  officers,  5741  men  and  671  horses.  A  com- 
parison of  losses  and  expenditure  of  ammunition  of  the 
artillery  on  both  sides  might  be  of  special  interest. 

The  21  French  batteries  had  a  total  loss  of  16  officers, 
278  men  and  298  horses ;  they  fired  16,800  shells. 

The  losses  of  the  German  artillery  were  far  heavier,  for 
the  14  batteries  of  the  IXth  Corps  alone  lost  36  officers,  400 
men  and  680  horses,  so  that  the  total  loss,  including  the 
batteries  of  the  Hid  Corps  and  the  Guard  battery 
amounted  to  41  oflficers,  471  men  and  779  horses. 

The  batteries  of  the  IXth  Corps  fired  9,697  shells,  the 
10  batteries  of  the  Illd  Corps  fired  2,586,  the  Guard  bat- 
teries 375  shells,  a  total  of  12,658  shells. 

As  in  prior  battles  we  again  see  the  peculiarity  that  the 
ratio  of  shells  to  loss  is  very  large.  On  the  German  side 
the  losses  were  caused  mainly  by  infantry  fire — 5800  men 
were  placed  out  of  action  and  still  the  French  fired  more 
than  16,000  shells. 

On  the  French  side  the  loss  was  5,835  men  and  the 
Germans  fired  12,600  shells. 


The  Retreat  of  the  French  Right  Wing  (266) 

As  Marshal  Canrobert  received  no  reply  to  his  several 
messages  sent  from  St.  Privat,  he  independently  ordered 
the  retreat,  as  mentioned  before  this.  He  had  received  a 
general  outline  from  the  assistant  chief  of  staff  of  Bazaine's 
orders  for  August  19th  and  intended  to  execute  the  old  or- 
ders. But  the  haste  with  which  the  troops  were  started, 
the  disorder  among  the  troops,  the  impossibility  of  distin- 
guishing between  friend  and  foe  in  the  dark  brought  it 
about  that  the  troops  of  the  corps  were  dispersed  over  the 
whole  stretch  between  Ban-St.  Martin  and  Woippy. 

—736— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

The  infantry  of  Tixier's  1st  Division  arrived  at  Woippy 
toward  11  o'clock  and  camped  between  the  railroad  and 
the  road  from  Metz  to  Woippy,  only  the  10th  Regiment  of 
the  division  camping  at  the  Thionville  gate. 

The  9th  Regiment,  having  been  the  last  to  leave  the 
Jaumont  forest,  was  separated  into  two  parts  and  camped 
with  two  battalions  at  the  St.  Elroy  farm  building  east  of 
Woippy,  and  with  one  battalion  at  the  Devant-les-Ponts  rail- 
road station. 

The  4th  Division,  Levassor-Sorval,  was  assembled  at 
the  commencement  of  the  retreat  and  in  spite  of  the  blocked 
condition  of  the  roads  arrived  at  1  o'clock  between  Woippy 
and  the  railroad. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  3d  Division  of  La  Font  de  Vil- 
liers  was  badly  split  up ;  its  1st  Brigade  had  arrived  south  of 
Woippy  around  11  o'clock,  while  the  93d  Regiment  camped 
on  the  glacis  of  the  fortress  in  front  of  the  Thionville  gate 
and  the  94th  Regiment  at  the  Red  House  east  of  Woippy. 

The  regiments  of  the  Cavalry  Division  of  du  Barail  were 
separated  from  each  other  because  of  the  blockades  along 
the  road;  the  regiments  of  African  Chasseurs  camped  at 
Ban-St.  Martin,  the  two  French  Chasseur  regiments  at  the 
Thionville  gate. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Dragoon  Brigade  of  the  4th 
Corps  had  followed  the  6th  Corps  and  after  12  o'clock 
camped  amongst  the  troops  of  that  corps  south  of  Woippy, 

The  artillery  of  the  6th  Corps,  which  had  remained  in 
action  at  the  quarries  of  La  Croix  until  its  ammunition  was 
exhausted  was  much  split  up.  Of  the  corps  artillery  four 
batteries — 5th,  7th,  8th  and  12th  of  the  8th  Regiment — 
arrived  south  of  Woippy  at  2  o'clock  in  the  morning,  while 
on  their  left  the  corps  artillery  of  the  4th  Corps  camped 
and  two  batteries — 9th  and  10th  of  the  13th  Regiment 
— and  the  6th  Horse  Battery  of  du  Barail's  Division  camped 
at  Ban-St.  Martin.  Three  batteries — 5th,  6th  and  7th  of 
the  14th  Regiment — of  the  3d  Division  camped  at  Devant- 
les-Ponts,  the  7th  and  8th  of  the  18th  Regiment,  having 
left    the    battle    very    early    to    get    fresh    ammunition 

—737— 


Battles  Around  Metz 

from  Plappeville  and  who  had  lost  several  wagons  in  the 
general  panic,  camped  north  of  Plappeville.  In  addition  to 
the  troops  of  the  6th  Coit»s  Cissey's  Division  of  the  4th 
Corps  also  camped  at  Woippy, 

As  mentioned  earlier,  the  2d  Brigade  of  this  corps  left 
the  northern  fringe  of  the  Saulny  woods  at  8:30  P.M.,  ar- 
riving near  Woippy  at  about  2  A.M.,  while  the  1st  Brigade 
with  which  the  commanding  general,  Ladmirault,  was,  ar- 
rived there  at  4  A.M.,  having  marched  by  St.  Vincent  and 
Lorry. 

The  batteries  of  Cissey's  Division  also  were  separated 
the  12th  of  the  15th  Regiment  was  at  Lorry,  under  protec- 
tion of  two  chasseur  companies,  while  the  5th  and  9th  bat- 
teries of  the  same  regiment  camped  at  Sansonnet. 

Of  the  4th  Corps,  one  brigade  of  the  Grenadier's  2d 
Division — 64th  and  98th  Regiments — remained  back  at  Mon- 
tigny,  the  other  brigade  of  that  division  was  at  the  north- 
ern edge  of  the  Saulny  woods  and  marched  from  there  with 
the  three  battalions  of  the  division  at  9:30  o'clock  via 
Lorry  to  Sansonnet.  Pradier's  Brigade  having  remained 
on  the  battlefield,  had  received  no  orders  up  to  4 
o'clock  in  the  morning;  but  when  the  commanding  general 
observed  the  troops  of  the  3d  Corps  on  his  left  marching 
off,  he  decided  at  6 :30  A.M.,  to  also  march  off,  and  marched 
by  Amanvillers  and  Lorry  to  Sansonnet,  joining  his  division 
there.  In  this  retreat  a  squadron  of  Hessian  Dragoons  ad- 
vanced against  the  departing  French,  but  it  was  driven  off 
by  the  fire  of  two  companies  of  the  98th  Regiment. 

The  3d  Division  of  Lorencez,  which  had  marched  close 
to  the  Bellecourt's  Brigade  of  the  2d  Division  at  St.  Vincent, 
received  orders  for  the  start  at  11:30  o'clock  and  had 
started  at  about  12  o'clock  via  Lorry,  followed  by  the  7th 
Hussar  Regiment.  The  latter  regiment  arrived  at  Sanson- 
net at  about  3  A.M.,  where  also  the  batteries  of  the  divi- 
sion— 8th,  9th  and  10th  of  the  1st  Regiment — camped, 
while  the  infantry  of  the  division  and  three  batteries  of 
the  2d  Division  went  into  camp  at  4  A.M.  south  of  Sanson- 
net, their  right  wing  at  the  railroad. 

—738— 


Battles  at  Gravelotte,  Amanvillers  and  Saint  Privat 

Thus  the  troops  of  the  4th  and  6th  Corps  were  assem- 
bled at  daybreak  between  Woippy  and  the  fortress;  with- 
out reference  to  the  orders  issued  by  Marshal  Bazaine  they 
had  taken  up  the  position  offered  them  by  the  chances  of 
a  night  march. 

The  Guard  Division  Picard,  reaching  with  6  Batteries 
the  northern  edge  of  the  Saulny  forest  late  in  the  evening, 
also  left  its  positions  shortly  after  9  P.M.  and  reached  its 
old  camping  places  again  at  Plappeville  by  about  11  o'clock, 
so  that  the  entire  right  wing  of  the  French  army  had  with- 
drawn to  beneath  the  guns  of  the  fortress  by  midnight. 


—739- 


PART  IV 

Miscellaneous  Accounts 


THE  DAILY  NEWS  CORRE- 
SPONDENCE 

OF 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN 
GERMANY  AND  FRANCE 

1870-71 

London  and  New  York 

MacMillan  &  Company 

1871 


Extract 


Weissenburg 

A  correspondent  at  Weissenburg  of  the  Daily  News,  who 
was  with  the  French  army,  transmitted  the  following  brief 
account  of  the  action : 

"Whilst  General  Douay's  division,  composed  of  the  74th 
and  50th  Regiments  of  the  Line,  the  16th  Battalion  of  Chas- 
seurs on  foot,  one  regiment  of  Turcos,  and  a  regiment  of 
mounted  Chasseurs,  were  encamped  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Weissenburg,  they  were  startled  by  a  tremendous  dis- 
charge of  artillery.  As  the  patrols,  which  had  been  posted 
all  along  the  line  of  the  frontier,  had  not  signalled  the  pres- 
ence of  any  Prussian  troops,  the  men  believed  for  a  moment 
that  they  were  surrounded  by  the  enemy.  This  was  not  the 
case;  but  the  Prussians,  in  great  force  and  well  supplied 
with  artillery,  appeared  on  the  heights  of  Schweigen,  occu- 
pying the  whole  of  the  country  near  the  small  Bavarian  vil- 
lage.    General  Douay  ordered  his  troops  to  advance  before 

—743— 


War  Correspondence 

the  enemy,  keeping  as  much  as  possible  behind  Weissenburg, 
which  lay  just  between  them  and  the  Prussian  forces.  But 
this  precaution  proved  quite  useless,  for  the  guns  were  pour- 
ing a  tremendous  fire  upon  them,  and  the  troops  were  fall- 
ing in  great  numbers  in  the  village  of  Weissenburg  itself. 
The  French  retired  from  their  former  position,  and  com- 
menced marching  on  the  right  side  of  the  village.  The 
Prussian  guns  were  firing  at  a  tremendous  rate,  and  three 
rounds  fell  partly  in  the  town  and  partly  among  the  troops. 
Several  of  the  houses  were  set  on  fire  and  a  good  number  of 
soldiers  lay  dead  or  wounded.  At  about  eleven  o'clock  Gen- 
eral Voscan's  division  began  to  retire.  However,  a  new  at- 
tack was  ordered.  The  Turcos  led  the  way,  and,  bayonet  in 
hand,  threw  themselves  on  one  of  the  Prussian  batteries  of 
artillery.  All  proved  useless.  Had  the  French  insisted  on 
attacking  the  enemy  any  longer,  there  would  not  have  been 
one  of  them  left  alive  on  the  ground. 

"As  soon  as  what  was  left  of  General  Douay's  forces 
began  retiring,  the  Prussian  artillery  pursued  them.  About 
twelve  o'clock  General  Douay  himself  fell  a  victim  to  the 
Prussian  artillery.  The  French  troops  commenced  running 
without  order,  crossing  roads  and  vineyards  until  they 
reached  the  farthest  part  of  Weissenburg.  The  number  of 
dead  and  wounded  must  have  been  very  large  indeed.  The 
remaining  troops  are  eager  to  revenge  the  death  of  their 
general.  The  country  people  seem  to  be  in  great  conster- 
nation. The  roads  which  lead  to  Hagenau  are  covered 
with  peasants  carrying  their  goods  and  cattle  with  them, 
and  lamenting  over  the  sad  fate  reserved  for  their  humble 
cottages." 


Worth 

The  Special  Correspondent  of  the  Daily  News  with  the 
army  of  the  Crown  Prince  wrote,  on  the  10th  of  August, 
from  headquarters: 

"The  swift  and  skilful  movement  against  Weissenburg 
resulting  in  complete  success  to  the  German  arms,  was  but 

—744— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

a  foretaste  of  the  storm  which  threatened  the  northern 
part  of  Alsace.  On  the  second  day  after  Weissenburg 
came  the  battle  of  Worth,  and  the  Crown  Prince  gained  a 
great  victory  over  the  ablest  generals  in  France.  It  is  ad- 
mitted that  the  French  fought  with  reckless  courage,  and 
that  they  inflicted  heavy  loss  on  their  opponents,  but  the 
fact  of  this  hard  fighting  and  of  this  heavy  loss  shows  how 
serious  a  defeat  was  sustained  by  MacMahon.  I  traversed 
the  battle-field  whilst  the  dead  still  lay  unburied  on  the 
trampled  ground,  and  could  form  a  good  notion  of  how  the 
fight  had  gone  by  the  ghastly  evidence  which  remained. 
Worth  is  at  the  bottom  of  a  fertile  valley  between  two 
ridges  of  cultivated  ground.  There  is  a  quantity  of  wood- 
land in  the  neighbourhood,  and  especially  behind  the  French 
position,  or  on  the  western  side  of  the  valley,  there  is  a 
strip  of  forest  which  forms  a  cover  for  retreating  troops. 
The  little  River  Bruder,  not  deep  enough  in  summertime 
to  float  a  skiff,  flows  through  the  village,  and  a  high  road 
comes  winding  down  towards  it  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
valley,  flanked  by  trees.  Here  was  the  German  position, 
stretching  far  to  right  and  left.  Along  this  road  were  heaps 
of  spiked  helmets  to  be  seen,  and  cart-loads  of  needle-guns 
collected  under  the  trees.  At  a  distance  the  French  mus- 
ketry fire  had  told  more  heavily  than  the  German,  and  I 
heard  that  the  French  artillery  had  been  very  well  served. 
But  though  the  burying  parties  were  busy  with  the  Ger- 
man dead  on  this  eastern  side  of  Worth,  there  was  more 
than  an  exchange  of  slaughterous  work  on  the  western  side. 
Here  the  Prussians  and  Bavarians  had  pushed  forward  in 
strong  force,  and  their  fire  had  told  fearfully  upon  the 
French.  The  high  spirit  and  rigid  discipline  of  the  one 
army  had  been  more  than  a  match  for  the  desperate  re- 
sistance of  the  other.  Whole  companies  of  Frenchmen  had 
been  mowed  down  in  their  wild  attempts  to  check  the  ene- 
my's advance.  It  had  been  a  tolerably  equal  fight  in  some 
places,  for  the  ground  was  strewn  with  German  dead.  But 
more  and  more  Frenchmen  had  fallen  in  proportion.  Black 
Turcos  and  wide-trousered  Zouaves  lay  thick  at  many 
points,  and  the  Cuirassiers  had  suffered  much.    There  were 

—745— 


War  Correspondence 

steel  breast-plates  and  brass  helmets  scattered  thickly  on 
the  line  of  the  retreat,  whilst  the  dead  horses  in  all  direc- 
tions might  be  counted  by  hundreds.  And  so,  westward 
through  the  wood,  went  the  traces  of  increasing  disaster: 
officers  and  men  lying  grimly  where  they  had  fallen,  some 
of  them  in  quiet,  shady  spots,  as  though  they  were  pick- 
nickers  asleep;  pools  of  blood  where  the  wounded  had  been 
found ;  knapsacks,  rifles,  and  overcoats,  either  thrown  away 
in  flight  or  left  by  the  wounded  on  the  field.  Then  came 
a  spot  where  the  French  had  rallied,  and  where  the  dead 
of  both  sides  lay  thick.  Turcos  might  be  seen  who  had 
evidently  fought  to  the  last,  and  had  tried  to  fire  their 
pieces  as  they  lay.  Frenchmen  of  the  line  regiments  had 
here  and  there  fallen  in  numbers,  as  though  they  had  halted 
and  faced  about  in  regular  order.  But  the  aspect  of  the 
fields  beyond  the  wood  seemed  to  indicate  a  hasty  retreat. 
Wagons  were  overturned,  baggage  was  thrown  out  upon 
the  roadside,  and  many  knapsacks  were  to  be  seen.  No 
one  who  had  passed  over  that  battle-ground  of  Worth  when 
I  did  could  have  failed  to  realize  that  a  great  disaster  had 
befallen  the  French  arms,  though,  at  a  time  when  most  of 
the  wounded  had  been  removed  and  on  so  large  a  scene  of 
action  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  judge  of  the  exact 
loss  sustained.  However,  I  see  no  reason  to  doubt  the  offi- 
cial return  on  the  German  side,  which  gives  about  10,000 
Frenchmen  and  7,000  Germans  hors  de  combat,  and  about 
7,000  prisoners  taken  by  the  victors — 4,000  in  the  battle, 
and  3,000  more  in  the  pursuit.  These  losses,  with  the  fur- 
ther loss  of  cannon  and  colours,  made  Worth  an  evil  day 
for  France.  Well  might  the  wounded  Germans  raise  them- 
selves to  cheer  the  Crown  Prince  as  he  passed,  and  cry 
that  Germany  was  safe.  It  will  often  be  told  how  the 
armies  met  on  the  6th  of  August,  and  how  MacMahon  made 
his  unsuccessful  effort  to  repel  the  invasion  of  Alsace,-  how 
the  Prussians  held  the  left  of  the  line,  the  Bavarians  and 
Wurtembergers  the  right,  and  how  a  few  Baden  troops, 
held  in  reserve  by  the  Crown  Prince,  were  brought  up  just 
in  time  to  share  the  honours  of  the  day.  There  was  a 
fierce  attack  on  both  sides,  it  being  difficult  to  say  which 

—746— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

party  began,  and  gradually,  as  the  German  troops  pressed 
round  upon  their  opponents'  line  of  retreat,  the  French 
were  forced  to  make  so  hasty  a  retrogade  movement  that 
the  retreat  became  very  nearly  a  rout.  The  Crown  Prince 
handled  his  army  so  as  to  make  the  most  of  the  deadly  fire 
of  his  infantry.  The  cavalry  was  not  used  for  an  attack  in 
the  first  instance,  but  was  sent  in  pursuit  when  the  enemy 
began  his  retreat.  It  was  a  victory  due  to  the  patriotic  ar- 
dour of  the  German  troops,  as  much  as  to  anything  in 
their  discipline  or  tactics ;  but  we  must  not  forget  that  the 
French  showed  ardour  likewise,  and  that  the  scale  was 
turned  for  the  Germans  at  Worth  by  their  intelligent  un- 
derstanding of  the  breech-loader  drill,  and  by  their  steadi- 
ness in  firing.  These  matters  take  time  to  learn,  and  I 
hope  that  our  volunteers  will  have  a  chance  of  learning 
them  before  they  are  called  upon  to  face  a  foe  who  may 
have  learnt  the  new  weapon  at  his  leisure.  We  see  the 
glorious  results  which  Germany  is  reaping  from  her  care- 
ful preparation. 

"The  prisoners  were  assembled  near  the  first  station 
of  the  reopened  railway  through  Weissenburg.  I  could  see 
many  Turcos  and  Zouaves  among  them,  though  the  greater 
part  were  soldiers  of  the  line.  We  drove  past  them  very 
slowly,  for  the  road  was  blocked  with  ammunition  wagons, 
and  I  noticed  that  they  seemed  wofully  discouraged.  There 
were  no  songs  and  no  laughter  to  be  heard  among  them, 
and  the  few  that  were  occupying  themselves  with  pick- 
ing fruit  on  trees  that  they  had  climbed  had  not  a  very 
lively  air,  for  Frenchmen  in  such  a  position  as  fruit-pick- 
ing. Then  came  the  convoys  of  wounded  moving  to  the 
rear.  Suffering  had  made  them  brothers  in  misfortune. 
The  mingled  Germans  and  Frenchmen,  with  such  opposite 
ideas  about  the  Rhine  in  their  heads  all  the  while,  sat  or 
lay  quietly  side  by  side,  as  if  they  were  old  comrades.  The 
only  enemy,  and  the  common  enemy  too,  was  the  jolting 
wagon.  As  we  neared  Worth  there  was  a  constant  stream 
of  wagons  bringing  down  wounded  men.  Prussians  and 
Bavarians,  Turcos  and  Frenchmen,  bore  the  agony  of  the 
road  with  equal  silence.    It  was  rare  to  hear  a  cry,  though 

—747— 


War  Correspondence 

the  poor  fellows'  faces  showed  much  pain.  They  were  sad- 
der to  see  in  their  blood-stained  bandages,  with  suffering 
still  about  them,  than  the  men  who  lay  grimly  on  the  hill- 
sides. Worth  itself  was  a  mere  hospital,  and  all  the  in- 
habitants were  either  nursing  the  wounded  or  burying  the 
dead.  It  was  an  evil  fate  for  the  picturesque  little  place 
that  more  than  a  hundred  thousand  men  on  one  side  and 
the  other  should  have  settled  their  quarrel  so  near  at  hand. 
"Of  coming  movements,  I  must  say  not  a  word.  The 
event  of  yesterday  was  the  capture  by  Wurtemberg  troops 
of  the  little  fortress  of  Leuchtenberg,  where  a  large  amount 
of  military  stores  is  reported  to  have  been  found.  The 
assailants  fired  heavily  into  the  place,  and  we  heard  their 
guns  booming  all  yesterday  forenoon." 

Two  days  afterwards  the  same  correspondent  wrote: 
"The  more  we  gather  of  the  details  of  the  battle  of 
Worth,  the  more  clearly  does  it  appear  that  there  was  no 
miracle  about  the  affair,  no  sudden  surprise  to  military  crit- 
ics— as  though  a  new  weapon  had  been  discovered.  From 
the  villages  in  rear  of  the  field  I  gather  far  more  of  the 
French  movements  than  could  be  learned  from  the  prison- 
ers or  the  villagers  upon  the  field  itself.  It  would  seem 
that  the  Imperial  commanders  in  this  quarter  were  alto- 
gether outmaneuvered  h(y  the  Crown  Prince;  and  that, 
whatever  the  merits  of  the  respective  small-arm  fire,  there 
was  no  comparing  the  tactics  of  the  two  armies.  The 
French  allowed  themselves  to  be  so  placed  as  to  have  re- 
quired no  common  degree  of  fighting  to  save  them.  First 
we  hear  of  their  blind  confidence,  and  of  their  cries  of  "To 
Berlin" !  whilst  they  were  really  in  desperate  danger.  Then 
came  the  news  of  the  surprise  at  Weissenburg  and  of  the 
death  of  General  Douay.  He  was  posted  in  a  corner  of  the 
French  territory  with  masses  of  German  troops  collected 
on  both  his  flanks,  and  was  much  farther  from  his  supports 
than  prudence  warranted  in  face  of  such  an  enemy.  It 
can  never  be  known  whether  the  French  commander  would 
have  extricated  his  men  with  less  loss  than  they  actually 
sustained,  had  he  lived  to  direct  them,  for  he   fell  by  one 

—748— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

of  the  first  discharges  of  artillery.  Thus  was  a  step  gained 
by  the  Germans.  They  had  gallantly  stormed  the  position 
at  Weissenburg,  and  had  begun  to  shatter  the  enemy  in 
detail.  MacMahon  and  De  Failly  were  now  called  on  to 
act.  The  former  marched  against  the  Crown  Prince  with 
his  whole  corps  d'armee,  and  expected  De  Failly  to  support 
his  left  in  case  of  a  check.  Here  again  was  displayed  the 
impetuous  over-confidence  which  Frenchmen  are  apt  to 
show.  The  second  opportunity  of  beating  them  in  detail 
was  given  to  the  Germans,  and  a  bloody  battle  was  the  re- 
sult. The  Prussians  and  Bavarians  together  far  outnum- 
bered the  corps  of  MacMahon,  and  before  the  French  Mar- 
shal had  been  long  engaged  he  was  sending  aide-de-camp 
after  aide-de-camp  to  beg  help  from  De  Failly.  The  dis- 
tance was  not  great  to  Bitsche,  and  the  message  must  have 
arrived  in  time  to  bring  the  needed  help,  if  only  everything 
had  been  ready.  But  here  again  over-confidence  had  pre- 
vailed. One  French  corps  was  destroyed  before  the  other 
came  to  its  support.  People  who  saw  it  tell  with  wonder 
of  the  rush  of  MacMahon's  beaten  army  westward,  and  the 
advance  of  angry  and  almost  incredulous  troops  coming  to 
their  aid,  towards  the  front.  It  was  too  late  to  renew  the 
battle,  too  late  to  save  the  fine  regiments  which  lay  strewn 
over  the  fields  at  Worth.  The  more  desperate  the  resis- 
tance, the  greater  had  been  the  slaughter,  until  at  last 
there  had  been  a  sort  of  panic.  Frenchmen  seldom  retreat 
in  good  order  after  a  defeat.  The  fugitives  from  Worth 
were  in  great  disorder  as  they  passed  through  villages 
more  than  ten  miles  in  the  rear.  The  corps  of  De  Failly 
could  only  have  sacrificed  itself  uselessly  when  once  Mac- 
Mahon's soldiers  had  been  demoralized,  and  to  have  fought 
a  second  battle  of  Worth  would  have  been  to  play  into  the 
hands  of  the  Crown  Prince,  who  would  like  nothing  better 
than  to  engage  the  while  French  army  in  detail,  and  beat 
them  by  degrees.  We  must  remember  that  he  is  the  better 
general  who  has  the  larger  force  present  in  the  nick  of 
time." 


—749— 


War  Correspondence 

At  Metz 

At  Metz  the  excitement  of  the  heterogeneous  multi- 
tude which  had  been  collected  there,  was  extreme.  A  Special 
Correspondent  of  the  Daily  News,  who  arrived  there  in 
the  midst  of  it,  wrote  on  the  7th  of  August: — 

"I  reached  Metz  this  morning  at  six  o'clock  from  Nancy. 
On  my  alighting  at  the  Hotel  de  I'Europe  I  immediately 
perceived  that  something  was  going  wrong.  The  scene  at 
the  hotel  presented  a  most  exciting  aspect.  The  waggons 
of  the  Etats-Majors,  which  for  several  days  had  been 
filling  up  the  whole  courtyard,  were  being  got  ready  for 
leaving.  The  officers  were  packing  up  their  things  in  great 
haste.  Some  of  them  seemed  very  busy  giving  orders ; 
others  were  taking  breakfast  in  the  table-de-hote  room ; 
others  again,  seemed  ready  for  starting,  and  were  discussing 
with  great  passion  the  issue  of  late  events.  Though  I  was 
about  the  only  bourgeois  there,  and  saw  that  the  officers 
looked  at  me  in  a  very  suspicious  sort  of  way,  I  did  not 
stir  from  my  place.  I  had  not  been  sitting  down  an  hour 
at  the  cafe  before  the  hotel,  when  up  came  a  veterinary 
officer  whom  I  had  known  not  long  ago,  and  whom  I  knew 
to  belong  to  General  Ladmirault's  corps.  The  news  he  gave 
me  was  sufficient  to  justify  the  terror  and  panic  one  read 
in  everybodys'  face.  A  fierce  battle  had  been  going  on 
ever  since  Thursday.  The  rest  of  the  army  was  completely 
en  deroute,  and  notwithstanding  the  valour  shown  by  the 
troops,  it  seemed  impossible  to  arrest  the  progress  of  the 
Prussians.  The  76th  and  77th  Regiments  of  the  Line  had 
kept  for  four  hours  their  position  against  something  like 
fifty  thousand  men.  One  regiment  of  Chasseurs  and  an- 
other of  Cuirassiers  had  been  completely  destroyed.  One 
battalion  of  the  40th,  a  thousand  strong,  had  retired  with 
105  men.  Of  the  three  other  battalions,  it  was  with  the 
greatest  difficulty  that  two  could  be  formed  with  only  one 
officer  per  company.  As  to  the  feeling  in  the  whole  army 
against  General  MacMahon  and  the  leading  officers,  it  is 
something  tremendous.  What  was  your  plan?  They  keep 
asking.    Why  weaken  our  forces  by  occupying  such  a  long 

—750— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

line  when  the  enemy  was  only  a  few  miles  distant,  and  it 
would  be  impossible  for  us  to  concentrate  at  a  given  point 
when  the  enemy  might  be  upon  us  at  any  moment?  Why 
march  against  Saarbruck  when  the  whole  army  was  not 
yet  in  a  position  to  engage  in  separate  battles?  Not  half 
of  the  African  corps  had  arrived.  Thousands  of  men  had 
not  yet  joined  their  regiments,  and  as  to  speaking  of  the 
commissariat  department,  it  has  proved  truly  inefficient. 
It  is  not  a  question  of  time — it  is  a  question  of  military 
organization.  The  Prussian  system  is  so  easy  and  so  simple, 
that  an  army,  however  numerous  it  may  be,  is  sure  to  meet 
with  no  such  inconveniences  as  have  been  experienced  on 
this  occasion  by  the  French.  What  moral  influence  can  a 
general  such  as  MacMahon  have  on  his  army,  when  the 
men,  even  the  most  uninstructed,  see  with  their  own  eyes 
the  mismanagement  of  the  whole  undertaking?  What  can 
men  think  of  their  generals,  and  with  what  heart  can  they 
combat  to  invade  a  hostile  country,  when  food  and  straw 
and  hay,  and  all  that  is  requisite  for  an  army,  is  wanting 
them  in  their  own  country? 

"How  is  it  possible  that  the  general  officers  immediately 
under  the  commanders  of  this  miserable  war  can  execute 
with  zeal  and  with  punctuality  the  orders  they  receive, 
when  a  general  like  MacMahon  is  heard  to  say,  after  having 
fought  for  so  many  hours,  that  he  must  stop  because  they 
have  no  more  ammunition?  The  fact  is,  that  the  morale 
of  the  whole  army  has  greatly  suffered.  When  on  the  field 
of  battle,  soldiers  will  never  lament  much  at  seeing  a  regi- 
ment returning  from  the  fight  reduced  to  a  half  or  a  quarter 
of  its  number,  as  long  as  they  are  assured  that  some  good 
has  come  out  of  it.  But  when  they  perceive  that  valour 
and  elan  are  useless  before  an  enemy  who  only  acts  accord- 
ing to  strict  strategy,  they  lose  their  spirits.  The  people 
at  Metz  are  in  a  most  excited  state  of  mind.  They  have 
not  one  man  in  town,  and  the  Prussians  are  reported  to 
have  occupied  St.  Avoid,  which  is  only  about  fifteen  miles 
from  here.  The  Prussians  have  now  the  line  to  Forbach, 
and  have  taken  possession  of  it.     Some  friends  of  mine 

—751— 


War  Correspondence 

were  at  the  railway  station  all  night  yesterday,  waiting  to 
see  the  arrival  of  the  wounded,  but  not  one  appeared.  Where 
are  they  ?  In  whose  hands  ?  Some  of  the  officers  who  have 
made  their  way  back  here,  say  they  lost  all  their  baggage. 
"While  I  was  writing  I  heard  a  great  row  going  on  in 
the  courtyard.  I  went  down  and  saw  that  the  guards  at 
the  gate  had  been  ordered  off.  The  servants  were  putting 
the  officers'  baggage  in  the  waggons  and  they  all  seemed  to 
be  in  a  great  hurry.  I  am  told  that  the  Emperor  intends 
removing  his  headquarters,  perhaps  to  Nancy,  as  the  Prus- 
sians appear  to  be  directing  themselves  towards  that  town. 
*  *  *  *  Great  excitement  prevails.  The  Emperor's  carriage 
and  horses  are  being  brought  to  the  railway  station." 


With  German  Third  Army 

The  Special  Correspondent  of  the  Daily  News  with 
the  Crown  Prince  wrote,  on  the  11th  of  August: — 

"There  has  been  a  shifting  of  quarters  from  village  to 
village  since  I  last  wrote;  indeed,  the  army  of  the  Crown 
Prince  is  so  active  that  this  shifting  of  quarters  is  an  almost 
daily  occurrence.  Everything  is  done  in  perfect  order.  The 
carriages  are  told  off  in  a  slow  moving  column,  with  mounted 
troopers  at  intervals  to  regulate  the  line  of  march,  and 
when  all  are  placed  there  is  a  halt  of  a  few  minutes  to 
allow  the  Prince  and  his  Staff  to  pass.  Well  may  the  vil- 
lagers stare  at  the  show,  for  they  are  not  likely  to  see 
again  so  many  fine  horses  and  bright  uniforms.  Old  and 
young  crowd  the  wayside  as  His  Highness  goes  by,  and  doff 
their  caps  respectfully,  but  without  any  sign  of  welcome. 
It  is  curious  to  see  these  German  Frenchmen,  or  rather 
these  Gallicized  Germans,  dealing  with  the  invaders.  The 
powers  of  understanding  one  another  makes  their  inter- 
course much  less  disagreeable  than  might  be  suspected.  Yet 
nevertheless,  there  is  a  strong  sympathy  with  France  among 
the  Alsatian  peasants,  because  they  have,  thanks  to  the 
conscription,  such  a  number  of  their  sons  serving  in  the 
French  Army,  I  notice  that  the  younger  folks  can  all  speak 

—752— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

a  little  French,  though  they  answer  the  question  of  the 
soldiers,  "Parlez  vous  Chassepot?"  with  a  sententious 
"Nein,"  which  seems  to  imply  utter  ignorance  of  the  lan- 
guage referred  to.  Poor  Souls !  they  are  very  much  fright- 
ened by  this  astounding  invasion,  and  make  the  most  of  their 
rough  Alsatian  dialect,  as  a  means  of  propitiating  the  new 
and  dreaded  invaders  of  the  empire.  I  must  say,  in  justice 
to  the  German  troops,  that  this  dread  of  the  invaders  is 
founded  on  a  notion  of  what  might  be,  rather  than  on  what 
really  happens.  Beyond  compulsory  service  in  country 
waggons  to  carry  wounded  men,  or  loads  of  hay,  and  com- 
pulsory sales  of  provisions  to  the  military  authorities,  there 
is  little  to  complain  of.  It  is  as  with  Wellingtons'  Army 
in  Southern  France  in  1814,  rather  than  as  with  the  Allied 
Armies  in  that  memorable  year.  No  invasion  can  be  pleas- 
ant to  the  conquered  people,  but  this  one  of  1870  is  con- 
ducted on  the  humane  principles  of  modern  warfare.  The 
Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  has  resolved  to  strike  only  at  the 
French  Government,  and  at  the  armed  forces  which  oppose 
him,  and  to  spare  as  far  as  possible  the  unfortunate  people 
who  inhabit  the  scene  of  hostilities." 


The  Battle  of  Borny 
August  14,  1870 

Some  of  the  aspects  of  the  battle  were  thus  described 
by  a  Correspondent  of  the  Daily  News,  who  was  shut  up 
in  Metz,  in  a  letter  dated  August  15 : — 

"Yesterday  we  thought  all  chance  of  sending  letters 
gone,  for  we  got  nothing  even  from  Paris.  But  this  morn- 
ing I  hear  a  post  will  start  for  the  capital,  and  I  take  my 
chance  of  your  getting  what  I  am  able  to  tell  from  the 
inside  of  a  town  which  is  surrounded  by  armies — whether 
French  or  Prussian  does  not  much  matter  so  far  as  news 
is  concerned.  At  eleven  o'clock  yesterday  Bazaine  effected 
a  reconnaissance  with  one  division.  At  two,  a  battle  com- 
menced on  the  right,  at  Borny.    Till  four  it  was  of  no  great 


—753- 


War  Correspondence 

importance,  but  then  the  4th  Army  Corps,  forming  the  first 
line  of  battle,  accomplished  a  manoeuvre  intended  to  deceive 
the  Prussians  into  the  belief  that  it  was  retreating.  This 
was  at  a  quarter  past  four.  The  Prussians  rushed  forward 
and  attacked  with  surprising  vigour.  Then  the  4th  Corps 
whose  retreat  to  the  left  was  a  mere  feint,  fell  at  once  on 
the  enemy's  flank,  while  Canrobert,  on  the  right,  attacked 
simultaneously.  The  Prussian  attack  meantime  had  been 
developed  in  great  force  on  the  French  centre.  The  move- 
ments on  both  sides  were  effected  with  singular  precision, 
and  the  whole  spectacle  was  like  a  review  at  Chalons.  The 
Prussians  advanced  in  close  column  against  the  French 
line,  which  their  artillery,  splendidly  served  as  it  was,  had 
vainly  attempted  to  shake.  The  French  officers  consider 
that  the  Prussian  infantry  is  relatively  inferior  to  their 
artillery.  The  needleguns  is  heavy,  and  appears  to  incom- 
mode them  greatly  when  climbing  a  height  or  moving  rapidly 
over  broken  ground.  The  soldiers  themselves  are  active. 
They  fire  lying  flat  on  the  ground  seeking  cover  from  every 
irregularity,  but  do  not  put  their  knapsacks,  as  the  French 
do,  to  make  little  ramparts  in  front  of  them,  and  rests  for 
their  guns.  The  Prussians  fired  with  great  deliberation, 
while  the  French  rattle  away  as  fast  as  they  could  discharge 
their  Chassepots.  The  regiments  most  closely  engaged  were 
the  69th,  90th,  44th,  60th,  80th,  33rd,  54th,  65th,  and  85th 
of  the  Line,  the  11th  and  15th  Foot  Chasseurs,  and  the  8th, 
9th,  and  10th  Batteries  of  the  1st  Regiment  of  Artillery. 
Those  which  suffered  most  were  the  44th  and  90th  of  the 
Line,  and  15th  Foot  Chasseurs.  The  44th  especially  was 
terribly  shattered,  while  the  85th,  though  in  the  thickest 
of  the  action,  lost  but  thirty-five  men  killed  and  wounded. 
The  colonel  of  the  44th  was  killed.  The  colonel  of  the  3rd 
Horse  Chasseurs,  and  Generals  Duplessis  and  Castamar, 
were  wounded.  The  above  details  are  mostly  gathered  from 
officers  coming  into  town  after  the  fight  was  over.  At  the 
beginning  I  followed  a  troop  of  Hussars  as  far  as  permitted, 
and  what  I  saw  of  the  fight  was  from  a  hillock,  close  by  the 
walls.    A  Staff  officer  came  to  summon  the  Hussar  regiment 

_754— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

with  some  officers  of  which  I  was  seated  in  a  cafe.  In  five 
minutes  they  were  off,  and  halted  at  first  on  the  hillock 
above  mentioned.  On  a  sudden  signal  they  went  tearing 
away  to  the  front,  and  in  a  moment  more  the  artillery  on 
both  sides  had  covered  the  valley  of  the  river,  and  the  whole 
works  in  front  and  the  ground  beyond,  with  a  thick  cloud 
of  smoke.  There  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  return  to  town. 
By  half-past  eight  in  the  evening  a  bulletin  was  placarded 
in  the  streets,  saying :  "Firing  is  nearly  over.  The  Prussian 
lines  extended  three  leagues.  Ground  gained  in  every 
direction."  It  does  not  say  by  whom  ground  was  gained. 
Officers  who  came  back  later  from  the  field  maintained 
that  victory  rested  with  the  French,  that  the  Prussians  had 
been  out-generalled  and  lost  heavily,  while  the  French  were 
comparatively  little  exposed.  But  a  Prussian  officer  who 
had  been  taken  prisoner  and  who  came  into  my  cafe  on 
parole  with  a  French  officer,  told  a  different  story.  Said  he, 
"You  had  better  surrender  at  discretion.  We  are  more 
than  200,000  strong.  You  will  be  crushed.  As  to  the  battle, 
you  had  your  own  way  at  first,  for  we  believed  we  had  only 
a  division  in  front  of  us,  but  you  know  what  the  end  was." 
It  was  difficult  to  question  even  officers  closely,  so  keen  are 
still  the  suspicions  about  spies ;  and  to  ask  whether  the 
French  army  had  suffered  a  defeat  would  be  to  expose 
myself  to  instant  expulsion,  or  worse.  Hence  I  can  give  you 
only  such  particulars  as  are  collected  in  the  ways  I  have 
mentioned.  I  do  not  know  why  the  advanced  columns  have 
returned  again  under  the  walls  of  the  fortress. 

"This  morning,  Monday,  there  were  reports  of  heavy 
artillery  towards  Thionville,  but  all  is  again  quiet.  We  only 
know  that  Sunday's  conflict  was  not  decisive,  and  that 
another  battle  is  imminent.  The  troops  are  never  at  rest, 
manoeuvres  in  one  direction  or  another  are  going  on  con- 
stantly. Orders  have  this  moment  been  issued  that  no 
civilian  shall  leave  the  city  on  any  pretext.  Two  shots  from 
Fort  St.  Quentin  have  just  demolished  the  head  of  the 
Thionville  Railway  bridge  at  Metz  Station.  I  am  told  it 
was  done  to  cut  off  a  detachment  of  500  Prussians  encamped 

—755— 


War  Correspondence 

at  Montigny,  who  attempted  to  cross  the  Moselle,  and  were 
seen  from  the  fort.  At  seven  this  morning  t\vo  Prussian 
cuirassiers  entered  that  town.  They  were  followed  by  four 
others.  Breakfast  was  served  to  the  six,  and  paid  for ;  they 
promenaded  the  town  till  eight,  and  withdrew,  not  only 
unmolested  by  anybody,  but  carrying  off  two  prisoners — a 
St.  Cyr  pupil  and  an  orderly.  All  this,  at  a  mile  and  a 
half  from  Metz,  will  give  you  some  notion  of  the  dash  and 
boldness  of  the  Prussian  cavalry.  Last  night  we  thought 
we  heard  the  Prussians  shouting  victory,  notwithstanding 
the  defeat  we  believe  they  suffered.  But  it  seems  some  of 
their  regiments  sing  hymns  nightly,  with  accompaniments 
from  their  military  bands,  a  custom  they  have  preserved 
from  the  battle  of  Leuthen,  where  they  advanced  to  the 
charge  singing  Luther's  Hymn.  They  end  with  hurrahs. 
We  heard  them  distinctly.  The  Emperor  and  his  Staff, 
Prince  Imperial  and  all,  are  at  Longeville.  As  I  write, 
there  passes  a  closed  carriage  escorted  by  a  picket  of 
Hussars  in  command  of  a  captain  of  the  Staff.  It  contains 
a  Prussian  envoy,  re-conducted  to  his  own  lines.  Frenc]:i 
officers  say  he  brought  a  request  for  an  armistice,  and 
admitted  that  Prussian  losses  were  considerable.  But  he 
did  not  tell  his  errand  to  them  nor  to  me." 


The  Battles  Near  Metz 

A  correspondent  who  witnessed  the  battle  from  the 
King's  field  headquarters — near  the  Prussian  right — 
wrote  to  the  Daily  News  the  following  account: — 

"The  first  realization  we  had  at  Pont-a-Mousson  of  the 
extent  to  which  fighting  had  been  going  on  at  the  front  was 
the  coming  in  of  wounded  men.  At  first  it  was  surmised 
that  these  had  been  wounded  in  skirmishes;  but  on  the 
16th,  late  in  the  evening,  there  were  signs  that  the  work 
was  becoming  warm.  On  that  evening  soldiers  with  ghastly 
wounds  walked  about  the  market-place  in  Pont-a-Mousson, 
surrounded  by  eager  groups  of  their  newly-arrived  com- 
rades, and  told  a  story  of  disaster.    Poor  fellows !    It  surely 

■ — 756— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

was  disaster  to  them — borne  away  as  they  had  been  from 
the  field  without  having  heard  of  any  result.  I  stood  amon.o,- 
these  groups,  and  the  narratives  of  the  men  all  amounted 
to  their  having  been  set  to  confront  a  much  larger  force 
than  their  own,  and  that  their  division  had  been  cut  up.  I 
was  struck  by  the  fact  that,  though  there  was  some  dissatis- 
faction suggested  by  their  tone  of  voice,  I  heard  no  word 
uttered  by  narrators  or  listeners  which  accused  any  one. 
They  dwelt  rather  on  the  fact  that  a  heavy  blow  had  been 
dealt  on  the  14th;  and  that  though  the  10th  Division  had, 
as  an  available  organization,  been  demolished,  it  had  sold 
its  life  dear.  On  the  17th  the  wounded  from  the  preceding 
day  began  to  pour  into  Pont-a-Mousson.  They  were  brought 
in  long  uncovered  grain  carts,  lying  upon  hay.  From  my 
v/indow,  which  overlooked  the  main  street,  and  commanded 
also  a  view  of  the  market-place,  I  counted  more  than 
ninety  of  these  long  carts,  each  holding  on  an  average  about 
ten  men.  Many  more  must  have  gone  to  the  various  hos- 
pitals. It  was  strange  to  see  the  French  citizens  unable  to 
conceal  their  joy.  But  now  came  the  other  side  of  the 
account.  The  streets  began  to  swarm  with  other  waggons, 
with  other  wounded — the  wearers  of  red  trousers.  Now 
and  then  a  batch  of  prisoners.  And  at  length  a  carriage 
came  in  with  a  French  general.  It  was  followed  by  a  vast 
crowd  of  French,  and  for  a  little  time  it  seemed  as  if  there 
might  be  a  collision  between  the  inhabitants  and  the  Prus- 
sians, so  earnest  were  the  demonstrations  of  the  populace. 
"But  it  was  now  at  least  evident  that  the  struggle  was 
very  serious  at  the  front.  At  midnight,  or  a  little  after 
(17th-18th),  all  the  trumpets  for  miles  around  began  to 
sound.  This  was  the  first  time  we  had  been  startled  at 
that  hour  by  such  wild  music.  Trumpet  answered  to  trumpet 
through  all  the  bivouacs  around  the  little  city.  For  several 
days  previous  there  had  been  troops  almost  perpetually 
marching  through ;  but  now  the  tramp  through  every  street 
and  by-way  made  between  midnight  and  dawn  a  perpetual 
roar.  Hastily  dressing,  I  ran  out  into  the  darkness,  and  man- 
aged to  get  a  seat  on  a  waggon  that  was  going  in  the  direc- 

—757— 


War  Correspondence 

tion  of  the  front — now  understood  to  be  a  mile  or  two 
beyond  the  village  of  Gorze.  Gorze  is  some  twelve  miles  from 
Pont-a-Mousson,  On  our  way  we  met  a  considerable  batch 
of  French  prisoners,  who  were  looked  upon  with  great 
curiosity  by  the  continuous  file  of  German  soldiers  with 
whom  we  advanced ;  but  only  one  or  two  offensive  cries 
towards  the  prisoners  were  heard,  and  these  fortunately 
they  could  not  understand.  The  way  was  so  blocked  with 
waggons,  &c.,  that  I  finally  concluded  that  I  could  go  the 
six  or  seven  miles  remaining  better  on  foot.  So  I  got  out 
of  my  carriage  and  began  to  walk  and  run  swiftly  ahead. 
At  Noveant-aux-Pres,  on  the  Moselle,  about  half  way  to 
Metz,  I  found  vast  bodies  of  cavalry,  Uhlans  and  Hussars, 
crossing  the  river  by  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  hurrying  at  the 
top  of  their  speed  towards  Gorze.  Hastening  my  steps,  I 
soon  heard  the  first  thunder  of  the  cannonade,  seemingly 
coming  from  the  heart  of  a  range  of  hills  on  the  right.  Pass- 
ing through  the  village  and  ascending  to  the  high  plain 
beyond,  I  found  myself  suddenly  on  a  battle-field,  strewn 
(literally)  as  far  as  my  eye  could  reach  with  dead  bodies — 
the  field  of  the  battle  of  Vionville  on  the  16th.  On  one  or  two 
parts  of  the  field  the  parties  were  still  burying  the  dead, 
chiefly  Prussians.  The  French,  being  naturally  buried  last, 
were  still  lying  in  vast  numbers  on  the  ground.  A  few  of 
these — I  saw  five — were  not  dead.  As  I  hurried  on,  a 
splendid  regiment  of  cavalry  came  on  behind,  and  when 
they  came  to  the  brow  of  the  hill,  they  all  broke  out  with  a 
wild  hurrah,  and  dashed  forward.  A  few  more  steps,  and 
I  gained  the  summit,  and  saw  the  scene  which  had  roused 
their  cry,  and  even  seemed  to  thrill  their  horses.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  imagine  a  grander  battle-field.  From  the 
particular  hill  to  which  I  had  been  directed  to  come  by  good 
authority  it  was  occupied  by  the  Royal  Headquarters — the 
sweep  of  the  Prussian  and  French  centres  could  be  seen, 
and  a  considerable  part  of  their  wings.  The  spot  where  I 
stood  was  fearful — it  was  amidst  ghastly  corpses,  and 
burdened  with  the  stench  of  dead  horses,  of  which  there 
were  a  great  many.     I  was  standing  on  the  battle-field  of 


—758- 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

the  16th,  on  the  Prussian  side.  On  the  left  stretched  like 
a  silver  thread  the  road  to  Verdun,  to  Paris  also  for  the 
possession  of  which  this  series  of  battles  had  begun.  It  was 
between  lines  of  poplars,  which  stood  against  the  horizon 
on  my  left,  and  on  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach  towards 
Metz,  with  military  regularity.  Strung  on  this  road  like 
beads  were  the  pretty  villages,  each  with  its  church  tower, 
which,  although  they  have  separate  names  are  really  only 
a  few  hundred  yards  apart — Mars-la-Tour,  Flavigny  (a  little 
south  of  the  road),  Vionville,  Rezonville,  Malmaison,  Grav- 
elotte.  On  my  right  were  the  thickly-wooded  hills,  behind 
which  was  the  most  important  village  of  the  neighbourhood, 
the  one  I  had  just  left — Gorze.  Such  was  the  foreground 
of  this  battle,  which  should,  one  would  say,  be  called  the 
battle  of  Gravelotte,  for  it  was  mainly  over  and  beyond 
that  devoted  little  town  that  it  raged.  The  area  I  have 
indicated  is  about  four  miles  square.  Owing  to  having 
come  on  foot  rather  than  along  the  blocked  road,  I  was  for- 
tunate enough  to  arrive  just  as  the  battle  waxed  warm — 
that  is,  about  noon.  The  great  representatives  of  Prussia 
were  standing  on  the  same  ground  watching  the  conflict. 
Among  them  the  only  ones  I  recognized  were  the  King, 
Count  Bismarck,  General  von  Moltke,  Prince  Charles, 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  Prince  Adalbert,  and  Adjutant 
Kranski.  Lieutenant-General  Sheridan,  of  the  United 
States,  was  also  present. 

"At  this  moment  the  French  were  making  a  most  desper- 
ate effort  to  hold  on  to  the  last  bit  of  the  Verdun  road, 
that  between  Rezonville  and  Gravelotte — or  that  part  of 
Gravelotte  which  on  some  maps  is  called  Malmaison.  Des- 
perate but  unavailing!  For  every  one  man  in  their  ranks 
had  two  to  cope  with,  and  their  line,  at  the  place  indicated, 
was  already  beginning  to  waver.  Soon  it  was  plain  that 
this  wing  was  withdrawing  to  a  new  position.  This  was 
swiftly  taken  up  under  protection  of  a  continuous  blaze 
of  their  artillery  from  heights  beyond  the  village.  The 
movement  was  made  in  good  order,  and  the  position  reached 
was  one  that,  I  believe,  nine  of  ten  military  men  would  have 

—759— 


War  Correspondence 

regarded  as  normally  impregnable.  My  reader  will  observe 
that  the  battle-field  was  from  this  time  transferred  to  the 
regions  beyond  Gravelotte.  The  fields  in  front  of  that 
village  were  completely  covered  by  the  Prussian  reserves, 
and  over  it  interminable  lines  of  soldiers  were  perpetually 
marching  onward — disappearing  into  the  village,  emerging 
on  the  other  side  of  it  with  flaming  volleys.  This,  second 
battle-field  was  less  extensive  than  the  first,  and  brought  the 
combatants  into  fearfully  close  quarters.  The  peculiarity 
of  it  is  that  it  consists  of  two  heights,  intersected  by  a 
deep  ravine.  This  woody  ravine  is  over  100  feet  deep,  and 
at  the  top  from  200  to  300  yards  wide.  The  side  of  the 
chasm  next  to  Gravelotte,  where  the  Prussians  stood,  is 
much  lower  than  the  other  side,  which  gradually  ascended 
to  a  great  height.  From  this  their  commanding  eminence 
the  French  held  their  enemies  fairly  beneath  them,  and 
subjected  them  to  a  raking  fire.  Their  artillery  was  sta- 
tioned far  up  by  the  Metz  road,  between  its  trees.  There 
was  not  an  instant's  cessation  of  the  roar;  and  easily  dis- 
tinguishable amid  all  was  the  curious  grunting  roll  of  the 
mitraileuse.  The  Prussian  artillery  was  to  the  north  and 
south  of  the  village,  the  mouths  of  the  guns  on  the  latter 
side  being  necessarily  raised  for  an  awkward  upward  fire. 
The  French  stood  their  ground  and  died,  the  Prussians 
moved  ever  forward  and  died — both  by  hundreds,  I  had 
almost  said  thousands ;  this  for  an  hour  or  two  that  seemed 
ages,  so  fearful  was  the  slaughter.  The  hill  where  I  stood 
commanded  chiefly  the  conflict  behind  the  village  and  to 
the  south  of  it.  The  Prussian  reinforcements  on  their 
right  filed  out  of  the  Bois  des  Ognons  and  it  was  at  that 
point,  as  they  marched  on  to  the  field,  that  one  could  per- 
haps get  the  best  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  the  invading 
army  now  in  the  heart  of  France.  There  was  no  break 
whatever  for  four  hours  in  the  march  of  the  men  out  of  that 
wood.  It  seemed  almost  as  if  all  the  killed  and  wounded 
had  recovered  and  came  again  out  of  the  wood.  Birnam 
Wood  advancing  to  Dunsinane  was  not  a  more  ominous  sight 
to    Macbeth   than    these   men    of   General    Goben's    army, 

—760— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

shielded  by  the  woods  till  they  were  fairly  within  range  of 
their  enemies.  So  the  French  must  have  felt,  for  between 
four  and  five  o'clock  they  concentrated  a  most  furious  fire 
upon  that  point,  and  shelled  the  woods  perpetually.  Their 
fire  here  took  effect.  The  line  of  Prussian  infantry  became 
less  continuous  from  that  direction.  About  five  o'clock, 
however,  an  infantry  brigade  emerged  from  the  same  point. 
As  soon  as  they  did  so  they  advanced  by  double-quick  time 
towards  the  point  where  their  services  were  needed.  I 
watched  this  brigade  through  a  strong  glass  from  the  first. 
It  resembled  some  huge  serpent  gliding  out  on  the  field. 
But,  lo!  it  left  a  track  behind  it — a  dark  track.  Beneath 
the  glass  that  track  is  resolved  into  fallen,  struggling  men. 
"As  the  horrid  significance  of  that  path  so  traced  came 
upon  me  I  gazed  yet  more  intently.  Many  of  those  who  had 
fallen  leapt  up  and  ran  forward,  struggling  to  catch  up  with 
their  comrades  again.  I  did  not  see  any  running  backward, 
though  many  fell  in  their  effort  to  rush  on.  I  do  not  know 
whether  after  that  another  movement  was  made  from  behind 
the  wood ;  but  I  do  know  that  half  an  hour  afterwards  vast 
numbers  of  troops  began  to  march  over  the  southern  edge  of 
the  hill  where  I  was  standing  towards  the  battle-field,  and  I 
have  an  impression  that  these  were  General  Goben's  mon 
moving  by  a  less  dangerous  route.  The  conflict  on  the 
Prussian  left  was  so  fierce  that  it  soon  became  nearly  lost 
to  us  by  reason  of  its  smoke.  Now  and  then  this  would 
open  a  little  and  drift  under  the  wind,  and  then  we  could 
see  the  French  sorely  tried,  but  maintaining  themselves 
steadily.  In  order  to  see  this  part  of  the  conflict  batter, 
I  went  forward  as  near  as  I  thought  safe.  It  seemed  to 
me  that  in  the  vicinity  of  Malmaison  the  French  were  hav- 
ing the  best  of  it.  But  it  must  have  been  only  because  they 
were  more  visible  on  their  broad  height,  and  fought  so  ob- 
stinately— plainly  silencing  a  battery  now  and  then.  But 
from  this  northern  point  also  there  are  more  forces  to 
come;  and  from  far  behind  them — away  seemingly  in  the 
direction  of  Verneville — huge  bombs  are  coming  and  burst- 
ing with  terrible  force  upon  the  French  ranks.     These  were 


-761- 


War  Correspondence 

the  men  and  these  the  guns  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles, 
who  was  slowly  veering  southward  to  make  his  connection 
with  Steinmetz's  army,  completing  the  investment  of  Metz. 

"The  battle  raged  at  this  point  with  indescribable  fury. 
The  French  Generals  must  have  known  the  significance  of 
these  new  guns,  and  known  that,  if  their  right  retreated, 
the  result  must  be  that  incarceration  in  Metz  which  now 
exists.  How  long  they  held  out  here  I  do  not  know.  I  could 
hear  that  the  puff  of  their  guns  was  from  a  gradually 
receding  line;  that  the  mysterious  pillars  of  cloud  from 
the  north  as  steadily  approached ;  but  the  last  fired  on  that 
terrible  evening  were  on  that  side,  and  the  point  must  have 
been  yielded  at  about  nine  o'clock. 

"Perhaps  I  should  here  say  something  of  the  movements 
of  the  King,  and  those  with  him.  The  King's  face,  as  he 
stood  gazing  upon  the  battle-field,  had  something  almost 
plaintive  in  it.  He  hardly  said  a  word ;  but  I  observed  that  his 
attention  was  divided  between  the  exciting  scenes  in  the  dis- 
tance and  the  sad  scenes  nearer  his  feet — where  they  were 
just  beginning  (what  must  yet  be  a  long  tasl;c)  to  bury  the 
French  who  fell  on  the  Tuesday  before.  On  these  he  gazed 
silently,  and  I  thought,  sadly.  Count  Bismarck  was  intent 
only  on  the  battle,  and  could  not  conceal  his  excitement  and 
anxiety;  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  King,  I  am  pretty  sure 
he  would  have  gone  nearer;  and,  as  it  was,  his  towering 
form  was  always  a  little  ahead  of  the  rest.  When  the 
French  completely  gave  up  their  hold  upon  the  road  up  to 
Gravelotte,  the  horses  of  the  grand  head-quarters  were 
hastily  called,  and  the  party  mounting  them,  rode,  with  the 
King  at  their  head,  swiftly  down  to  a  point  not  very  far 
from  the  village.  Then  shouts  and  cheers  arose,  which  I 
could  plainly  hear  from  the  point  they  had  left,  where,  not 
having  a  horse,  I  was  compelled  to  remain  a  little  longer. 

"A  little  after  four  o'clock  a  strange  episode  took  place. 
From  the  distant  woods  on  the  left  a  splendid  regiment  of 
cavalry  galloped  out.  They  paused  a  moment  at  the  point 
where  the  Conflans  road  joins  that  leading  to  Metz;  then 
they  dashed  up  the  road  towards  Metz.    This  road  between 

—762— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

Gravelotte  and  St.  Hubert  is  cut  through  the  hill,  and  there 
are  on  each  side  of  it  cliffs  from  forty  to  sixty  feet  high, 
except  at  the  point  where  it  traverses  the  deep  ravine 
behind  the  village.  When  it  is  remembered  that  at  this  time 
the  culminating  point  to  which  this  road  directly  ascends 
was  held  by  the  French,  it  will  not  be  wondered  at  that  only 
a  moiety  of  that  regiment  survived.  What  the  survivors 
accomplished  I  do  not  know,  nor  could  I  learn  the  name  and 
number  of  the  regiment.  The  situation  hardly  admits  yet 
of  our  asking  many  questions.  But  their  plunge  into  that 
deep  cut  in  the  hill-side,  where  next  day  I  saw  so  many  of 
them  and  their  horses  lying  dead,  was  of  that  brave,  unhesi- 
tating, unfaltering  kind,  which  is  so  characteristic  of  Ger- 
man soldiers,  among  whom  cowards,  stragglers,  and 
deserters  seem  to  be  absolutely  unknown,  in  whatever  rank. 
"I  must  record,  also,  that  what  seemed  an  inexplicable 
thing.  The  army  of  Steinmetz  was  fighting  very  hard,  and 
evidently  suffering  heavily.  It  was  in  the  centre  of  Gravel- 
otte, though  occasionally  rallying  to  one  side  or  the  other. 
Though  they  had  large  reserves,  these  had  been  diminished 
to  an  important  extent  by  the  engagements  of  the  14th  and 
16th.  A  considerable  portion  of  his  army  required  rest, 
and  two  divisions  perhaps,  certainly  one,  reorganization. 
There  seemed  at  one  time — about  half-past  four — some 
danger  that  the  intensity  of  the  fighting  required  on  the 
right  and  left  extremes  -Would  produce  a  kind  of  atrophy 
along  that  very  central  Verdun  road  for  which  the  armies 
were  struggling.  At  that  time  a  vast  army  came  from  some 
region  utterly  mysterious  to  us  who  had  been  following  the 
army  for  some  miles.  They  came  over  the  very  point  which 
had  been  the  Royal  head-quarters  in  the  morning.  Their 
march  was  begun  at  the  time  I  have  mentioned,  and  did  not 
cease  at  all — not  even  after  dark — so  long  as  the  fighting 
was  still  going  on  upon  the  heights.  This  new  army — 
whose  was  it?  whence  was  it?  It  did  not  come  from  the 
direction  of  Goben,  nor  of  Steinmetz,  nor  of  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles.  Of  course  it  could  not  be  said  that  it  did  not 
belong  to  either  of  these,  but  the  cry  and  rumour  went 

—763— 


War  Correspondence 

around  that  these  men  were  from  the  army  of  the  Crown 
Prince.  I  do  not  know  whether  to  believe  this  or  not,  but 
it  is  freely  said  and  believed  by  many  officers  here  that  a 
detachment  of  the  Crown  Prince's  army  was  sent  up  from 
Toul  to  help,  if  help  were  needed.  To  whosoever  or  where- 
soever this  Army  Corps  (for  it  was  about  that  in  extent) 
belonged,  its  presence  was  nearly  all  that  was  required.  It 
was  laid  along  the  road,  out  of  immediate  danger,  so  that  if 
the  French  centre  had  defeated  the  troops  with  which  it 
was  contending,  it  must  simply  have  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  a  fresh  and  prepared  corps. 

"The  advance  of  this  new  corps  must  have  been  felt  by 
them  as  a  final,  a  fatal  blow  for  that  day.  Like  the  spirits 
in  the  "Inferno,"  their  enemies  were  consumed  only  to 
spring  up  to  full  stature  again.  They  must  have  realized 
how  hopelessly  they  were  outnumbered.  From  that  time 
the  struggle  at  that  part  became  very  weak  on  the  French 
side,  and  the  Prussians  got  a  decided  hold  farther  up  the 
Metz  road — that  is,  on  the  southern  side  of  it.  But  there 
seemed  to  be  a  redoubled  fury  on  their  left.  From  seven 
o'clock  to  eight  there  was  little  firing  beyond  the  village, 
but  a  great  tower  of  cloud  and  fire  at  each  extremity  of 
the  battle-field.  A  little  before  eight  a  large  white  house 
on  the  heights  beyond  Gravelotte  caught  fire.  It  seemed 
through  the  gloom  to  be  a  church;  its  spire  was  now  a 
mass  of  flame  and  it  sent  up  a  vast  cloud  of  black  smoke, 
which  contrasted  curiously  with  the  white  smoke  of  battle. 

"Darkness  was  now  drawing  on,  and  after  eight  we 
could  trace  the  direction  of  troops  by  the  fiery  paths  of  their 
bombs,  or  the  long  tongue  of  fire  darting  from  each  can- 
non's mouth.  The  lurid  smoke-clouds  of  burning  houses 
joined  with  the  night  to  cast  a  pall  over  the  scene  and  hide 
it  for  ever.  At  half-past  eight  o'clock  one  more  terrible 
attack  by  the  French  on  the  Prussian  right — and  that  is 
over.  At  a  quarter  to  nine  a  fearful  volley  against  the 
extreme  Prussian  left,  a  continuous  concert  of  artillery, 
and  the  growling  whirr  of  the  mitrailleuse  above  all — and 
then  that  is  still.     The  battle  of  Gravelotte  is  ended,  the 

—764— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

Prussians  hold  the  heights  beyond  the  Bois  de  Vaus — 
heights  which  command  the  surrounding  country  up  to  the 
Hmits  of  the  gun-ranges  of  Metz.  As  I  went  back  to  the 
village  of  Gorze  to  pass  the  night,  I  turned  at  the  last  point 
to  look  upon  the  battle-field.  It  was  now  a  long,  earth-bound 
cloud  with  two  vast  fires — burning  houses — at  each  end  of 
it.  The  day  had  been  beautiful,  and  now  the  stars  looked 
down  with  splendour,  except  where  the  work  of  agony  and 
death  had  clouded  the  glow  of  heaven." 


The  Advance  of  the  German  Third  Army 
August,  1870 

As  the  army  was  making  its  way  past  Phalsburg,  the 
Special  Correspondent  of  the  Daily  News  wrote,  on  the 
15th  of  August: — 

"Since  my  last  letter  there  has  been  marching  to  the 
front  and  spreading  out  on  the  flanks.  There  has  been 
more  and  more  French  territory  occupied  by  the  Prussians, 
and  yet  no  further  fighting  of  importance,  as  far  as  we 
know,  up  to  the  present  moment.  It  would  appear  that  the 
French  are  concentrating  their  forces  on  Metz,  and,  per- 
haps, on  Chalons.  We  see  that  they  wish  to  avoid  a  contest 
until  they  have  a  better  chance  than  at  Worth,  which  is 
very  wise  on  their  part.  Meanwhile  the  fortresses  of  Stras- 
burg,  Phalsburg,  and  Bitsche,  form  islands  in  the  sea  of 
invasion.  I  will  not  say  barriers  against  invasion  but  islands 
to  impede  the  rush  of  the  tide  a  little.  They  are  the  material 
holds  which  France  still  keeps  on  her  semi-German  province 
and  in  case  of  a  check,  might  prove  dangerous  to  the  rear- 
guard of  the  great  invading  army.  I  set  no  high  value  on 
any  but  first-class  fortresses.  A  place  that  would  hold  fifty 
thousand  men  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Worth  would  have 
saved  Alsace  from  invasion — or  saved  all  but  the  north- 
eastern part  of  it,  at  any  rate — if  only  MacMahon  had  made 
his  stand  behind  the  works.  But  little  fortresses  like 
Bitsche  and  Phalsburg  are  useless,  save  as  checks  to  the 

—765— 


War  Correspondence 

invader.  They  cannot  stop  him  for  an  instant,  though  they 
can  and  do  occupy  many  of  his  troops.  Here  is  Phalsburg, 
for  example,  which  has  already  detained  a  number  of  Ger- 
man guns  for  two  or  three  days,  and  which,  when  I  last 
saw  it,  showed  no  signs  of  giving  in.  True,  the  guns  thus 
detained  are  of  light  calibre.  They  are  nevertheless  kept 
from  other  work,  and  this  is  something  for  Phalsburg  to  do. 
"The  town  was  sharply  cannonaded  this  morning,  and  I 
went  to  see  the  German  batteries  open  fire.  There  was  a 
slight  haze  over  the  surrounding  country  at  daybreak,  but 
as  the  sun  grew  more  powerful,  the  haze  lifted  into  gently 
driving  clouds.  A  breeze,  just  strong  enough  to  temper  the 
heat  of  the  weather  stirred  the  leaves  of  the  tall  poplar 
trees  along  the  straight  French  chaussees,  and  it  was  alto- 
gether as  fine  a  morning  as  you  could  wish  to  see.  From  a 
hillock  behind  the  village  of  Zilling,  there  was  a  splendid 
view  of  both  the  attack  and  defence.  Phalsburg  could  be 
seen  among  the  trees  at  the  top  of  a  stretch  of  rising  ground 
and  we  could  distinguish  a  part  of  the  old  rampart  with 
its  shady  avenue.  To  our  left,  across  the  open  fields,  dotted 
with  red-roofed  farm  buildings,  was  some  rising  ground 
opposite  to  Phalsburg,  and  here  were  the  besieging  batteries, 
which  could  scarcely  be  distinguished  at  all  until  their  fire 
commenced.  The  whole  district,  for  miles  away,  was  spread 
out  like  a  map  before  us,  and  we  saw  the  Vosges  mountains  to 
the  eastward  shutting  us  off  from  the  valley  of  the  Rhine. 
Had  it  not  been  such  a  deadly  game  that  was  to  be  played, 
such  a  terrible  moment  of  a,nxiety  for  the  people  of  the  little 
town,  there  could  have  been  no  pleasanter  excursion  than 
this  one  to  see  the  batteries  begin  their  work.  I  tell  no 
secret  when  I  say  that  the  German  attack  was  made  with 
field  artillery,  and  that  a  great  many  of  these  light  guns 
had  been  brought  into  position.  The  capture  of  Phalsburg 
is  an  important  point  for  the  Crown  Prince,  but  not  impor- 
tant enough  to  make  the  ar^my  wait  for  heavy  siege  guns. 
Prussian  tactics  are  to  push  forward  and  mask  the  fortresses 
which  are  encountered  on  the  way,  leaving  a  few  battalions 
to  watch  them. 

—766— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

"From  our  positions  on  the  hillock  behind  Zilling  every- 
thing is  to  be  seen.  Now  a  puff  of  white  smoke  goes  up  on 
the  left  and  a  fierce  rush  through  the  air  tells  of  a  passing 
shell.  It  falls  in  the  town.  Poor  souls  within,  they  did 
not  fancy  when  war  was  declared  how  soon  their  rafters 
would  be  crashing  about  their  ears.  Yet  they  live  in  a 
fortified  place,  and  must  take  their  chance.  But  we  cannot 
help  a  wish  that  the  shells  may  only  damage  public  property, 
as  shriek  after  shriek  through  the  air  tells  of  their  passage. 
Now  there  is  firing  from  the  right.  The  French  gunners 
have  manned  their  pieces,  and  reply  in  excellent  style. 
Flash  after  flash  comes  out  from  the  old  rampart.  The 
smoke  curls  up  among  those  shady  trees  where  the  garrison 
have  often  sat  in  summer  evenings  with  pipe  or  cigar,  and 
where  the  nursemaids  have  brought  children  to  play.  You 
know  the  look  of  these  old  ramparts  in  peace  time,  and  can 
fancy  them  now,  with  only  soldiers  upon  them  who  are  in 
no  sporting  mood.  There  is  flash  after  flash  from  the  ram- 
parts and  from  the  opposite  rising  ground.  There  is  a  con- 
stant whistling  and  shrieking  across  the  space  between,  and 
a  flying  up  of  dust  among  the  German  guns,  or  a  crash 
among  the  roofs  of  the  town,  as  one  side  or  the  other  makes 
a  hit.  If  Phalsburg  is  in  good  order  the  determined  com- 
mandant may  earn  promotion  by  a  long  defence  but  if  his 
works  once  get  disabled,  he  is  lost.  The  Germans  have  a 
strong  force,  as  we  can  see,  ready  to  advance,  and  after 
Weissenburg  we  know  that  mere  ramparts  will  not  stop 
them.  See  the  dark-coloured  smoke  rising  above  the  trees 
and  floating  away  behind  the  church  tower.  One  column 
of  smoke,  then  another.  It  is  clear  that  houses  are  burning 
but  not  so  clear  that  the  French  guns  are  silenced.  They 
fire  more  slowly  than  their  assailants,  and  seem  to  aim 
rather  high.  But  there  is  heavy  metal  in  the  blooming 
reports  which  came  from  the  Phalsburg  ramparts.  Three 
distinct  columns  of  dark  smoke  rise  from  the  town.  It  is 
sad  to  think  of  the  suffering  of  any  inhabitants  who  may 
have  rashly  remained.  What  would  our  friend  the  "Con- 
scrit"  of  Erckmann-Chatrian's  delightful  tales  say   if  he 

—767— 


War  Correspondence 

saw  the  days  of  the  great  war  come  back  again,  and  the 
foe  from  beyond  the  Rhine  besieging  his  dear  old  town? 
That  big  gun  from  the  rampart  booms  forth  again,  and  the 
smoke-clouds  rise  thicker  than  ever.  It  is  a  good  defence. 
One  can  fancy  how  the  hearts  of  the  villagers  round  about 
must  beat  at  each  shriek  of  the  besiegers'  shells.  They  have 
doubtless  friends  and  relations  who  may  be  injured  in  per- 
son or  property  by  every  shot  that  is  fired.  Would  that 
the  lesson  of  the  "Conscrit"  and  its  sequel  had  gone  home  in 
France,  and  that  this  war  had  not  been  brought  about! 

"The  people  have  become  more  and  more  French  as  we 
have  advanced.  They  have  gradually  ceased  to  speak  Ger- 
man at  all,  and  the  confusion  of  a  veritable  foreign  conquest 
has  arisen.  From  the  stolid  careless  air  of  the  Alsatian 
peasants  we  have  come  among  men  who  are  bitterly  wounded 
at  what  is  happening  around  them.  The  fluent,  though 
rough,  German  dialect  of  a  few  days  back  is  exchanged  for 
a  stray  sentence  of  broken  German,  and  a  copious  supply  of 
clear  metallic  French,  rattled  out  with  an  irreproachable 
accent.  We  are  at  least  really  in  France.  I  have  seen 
twenty  cases  of  mistaken  phrases,  and  of  consequently  mis- 
taken wrath.  "Sagen  sie  mir  wo  ist  das  aupt-Quartier,"  is 
met  by  "Ah,  Monsieur,  nous  n'avons  plus  du  cognae;"  and 
so  on,  with  every  variety  of  blunder.  The  soldiers  are  not 
inclined  to  be  harsh,  if  only  they  get  what  they  think  they 
ought  to  have,  and  there  is  nothing  to  alarm  the  inhabitants 
in  the  demeanour  of  their  terrible  foes.  But  this  difference  of 
language  begins  to  make  the  every  day  intercourse  of  con- 
querors and  conquered  far  from  smooth.  The  French 
accept  their  ill-luck  fairly  enough ;  what  they  are  put  out 
of  temper  by  is  being  shouted  at  in  strange  tongues  and 
shaken  by  the  shoulder  if  they  are  dull.  One  of  their  fav- 
ourite theories  is  that  all  civilized  men  speak  a  little  of  the 
language  of  the  world,  and  here  are  thousands  of  men,  civil- 
ized enough  to  outshoot  the  Chassepot,  who  speak  not  a  single 
intelligible  word.  It  is  very  hard  for  our  lively  neighbours. 
Let  me  do  them  justice — let  me  do  both  sides  justice — they 
bear  it  like  sensible  men,  and  the  Germans  are  not  angry  or 

—768— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

vindictive.  I  cannot  but  think  that  the  whole  scene  as  we 
advance  is  a  tribute  to  modern  civilization.  Here  are  young 
girls  standing  laughing  at  the  cottage  doors,  not  a  bit 
afraid  of  violence;  and  we  pass  after  a  hundred  thousand 
men,  more  or  less,  have  gone  by  along  that  same  road.  It 
would  not  have  been  so  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  It  would 
scarcely  have  been  so  some  fifty  years  back.  But  here  it 
is  to-day.  The  village  maidens  stand  half  shy,  half 
curious,  to  see  the  Prince  and  his  Staff  ride  on  their  way; 
the  old  people  sit  basking  in  the  sunshine,  and  shaking  their 
heads  over  the  evil  daj^s.  One  can  remember  1814,  with  the 
Allies  going  to  Paris;  another  has  seen  something  of  the 
army  of  the  First  Napoleon,  and  thinks  that  if  the  Old 
Guard  were  alive  they  would  make  a  breakfast  of  these 
gentlemen.  I  notice  that  the  younger  and  more  active  men 
look  gloomily  at  the  long  columns  which  pass.  The  honour 
of  La  Belle  France  is  involved  in  this  affair,  and  they  are 
sad  to  see  her  territory  invaded.  Take  it  as  a  whole,  the 
conduct  of  the  people  is  quiet  and  reasonable.  They  shrug 
their  shoulders  and  say  with  a  smile.  We  have  not  had  our 
turn  yet ;  wait  till  the  Emperor  is  ready ! 

"It  is  the  Fete  Napoleon  and  no  flags  or  fireworks  are 
allowed  in  honour  of  the  day.  Nevertheless  I  notice  that  many 
villagers  are  in  holiday  attire.  The  habit  of  the  thing  is 
followed  without  any  particular  care  to  compliment  the  Im- 
perial family,  for,  as  you  may  imagine,  I  hear  many  curses 
against  the  policy  of  war.  As  we  came  along  to-day  through 
the  harvest-fields,  a  few  people  were  at  work,  in  spite  of 
the  fete,  and  the  invasion,  and  everything  else,  for,  as  one 
of  the  peasants  said,  it  is  such  a  hard  time  for  them  that 
they  must  earn  all  they  can.  A  battle  must  soon  occur,  but 
we  know  st)  little  of  the  French  movements,  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  say  in  which  direction  the  blow  will  fall.  "For- 
ward to  Paris"  is  the  cry  of  the  German  soldiers.  The  com- 
manders are  content  as  yet  to  bear  heavily  against  the 
French  centre  in  Lorraine,  and  to  threaten  the  road  to 
Chalons." 


-769- 


War  Correspondence 

The  Morale  of  Paris, 
August,  1870 

In  the  middle  of  August,  the  Special  Correspondent  at 
Paris  wrote : 

"A  spirit  has  sprung  up  which  will  render  the  war  a  war 
of  patriotism.  The  word  "peace"  is  the  last  word  that  will 
be  listened  to  in  Paris.  The  Parisians  will  fight  first,  and 
settle  their  domestic  difficulties  afterwards.  I  have  talked 
to  a  varied  set  of  residents  on  the  subject,  and  I  may  say 
that,  not  day  by  day,  but  hour  by  hour,  the  determination 
to  stand  by  Paris  to  the  last  becomes  more  intensified.  But 
the  people  are  pathetically  ignorant  of  the  situation  of  af- 
fairs outside  the  walls.  They  are  driven  to  imagining  all 
sorts  of  routes  and  strategical  feats  on  the  part  of  Bazaine 
and  MacMahon.  The  cafes  on  the  Boulevard  des  Italiens  are 
crowded  each  evening  with  quidnuncs,  who  exchange  speci- 
mens of  the  most  profound  geographical  ignorance  with 
each  other.  I  heard  a  gentleman  who  was  enjoying  that 
French  beverage  which,  upon  my  word,  I  never  saw  a' 
Frenchman  taking  before — a  glass  of  cold  water  with  a 
dash  of  sugar  in  it — bring  a  large  group  around  his  table  by 
insisting  that  some  Uhlans  had  got  within  the  lines  of  the 
fortifications  and  had  been  captured.  This,  indeed,  was  an 
exceptional  display  of  credulity,  and  was  heard  with  num- 
erous shrugs  and  interjections  suggestive  of  disbelief .  Spies 
and  Uhlans  are  the  ingredients  with  which  most  of  the  can- 
ards, or  rather  rocs,  are  stuffed. 

"I  think  by  this  time  there  ought  to  be  provisions  enough 
here  to  stand  a  very  long  siege  indeed ;  but  the  cattle  still 
continue  to  arrive,  and  vast  quantities  of  flour  pass  through 
the  streets  to  the  depots  every  hours.  Wherever  yon  move 
you  come  across  carts  piled  with  luggage,  many  of  the 
household  goods  being  exhibited  with  a  candour  and  an  ab- 
sence of  vanity  almost  primitive.  The  horses  attached,  to 
the  vehicles  are  sorry,  hollow-backed  jades  of  a  Wouvermans 
colour,  and  with  the  patient  manner  of  broken-spirited 
donkeys.  The  men  in  charge  are  dusty  and  travel-stained, 
and  there  is  always  a  dog  and  a  bird  cage  amongst  the  ef- 

—770— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

fects.  The  children,  must,  I  imagine,  have  been  imported 
into  the  city  in  another  set  of  ambulances,  as  I  have  not 
seen  them  with  the  van." 


The  German  Third  Army  at  Sedan 

The  special  correspondent  v/ith  the  Crown  Prince's 
army  has  thus  described  the  advance  of  the  Third  Army,  and 
the  positions  of  the  Germans,  in  a  letter  dated  August  31st 
on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Sedan : 

''There  need  be  no  hesitation  or  reserve  as  to  speaking  of 
tomorrow's  possibilities.  The  plot  has  thickened  since  I  last 
wrote,  and  the  French  must  now  be  perfectly  aware  of  the 
movement  against  their  right  flank.  I  necessarily  write  in 
such  haste,  and  in  the  midst  of  such  confusion,  noise,  dust, 
and  trampling  of  feet,  that  it  is  difficult  to  give  you  a  clear 
account  of  what  is  going  on  around  me.  On  this  bright 
August  day,  the  last  day  of  the  month,  hot,  dry,  and  dusty, 
a  great  historical  drama  is  hurrying  to  its  close.  How  the 
trumpets  ring  out  upon  the  evening  air,  as  the  long  columns 
of  cavalry  clatter  and  jingle  through  the  village  streets ! 
How  ceaseless  is  the  rumbling  of  waggons !  Battalion  after 
battalion  of  Prussian  infantry  has  come  by  hot  and  dusty — 
a  whole  army  has  passed  through  the  village  during  this 
memorable  day  of  the  forced  march.  To  put  it  in  more 
exact  and  technical  fashion,  the  French  advance  from 
Rheims  towards  Metz  and  Thionville  has  been  thwarted  by 
a  movement  of  the  12th  and  4th  Corps  af  the  Second  Army 
in  the  enemy's  front,  and  by  wonderfully  rapid  marching  of 
the  Crown  Prince's  army  against  the  right  flank  of  their 
opponents.  Picture  to  yourself  two  lines  of  road,  running 
nearly  parallel,  the  one  considerably  to  the  northward  of  the 
other.  From  Chalons  to  Metz  is  the  first  line,  from  Rheims 
to  Thionville  is  the  second.  It  would  seem  that  the  French 
abandoned  their  camp  at  Chalons,  and  left  open  the  road  to 
Paris,  in  order  that  they  might  take  the  second  or  northernr 
most  of  these  two  routes,  and  proceed  to  the  relief  of  Metz. 
We  have  no  reasoL  to  doubt  but  that  they  seriously  intended 

—771— 


War  Correspondence 

to  cut  their  way  through,  and  that  four  corps  d'  armee  were 
assembled  under  the  Emperor's  orders.  Where  they  seem 
to  have  been  deceived  was  in  the  belief  that  a  forward 
movement  could  be  safely  effected  before  the  Crown  Prince 
would  be  upon  them.  Never  were  plans  better  laid  than 
those  of  the  Prince  and  his  chief  of  the  Staff,  General  Blum- 
enthal.  Many  days  ago  this  whole  manoeuvre  of  doubling 
up  the  French  line  by  swinging  round  upon  it,  "left  shoulders 
forward,"  was  arranged  at  the  Prince's  headquarters.  It 
was  calculated  that,  by  almost  superhuman  efforts  in  the 
way  of  marching,  the  5th  and  11th  Prussian  Corps,  the 
Bavarians,  and  Wurtembergers,  might  effect  such  a  con- 
centration as  would  baffle  the  French  design  of  relieving 
Metz.  The  6th  Corps  was  scarcely  able  to  get  up  in  time 
by  any  efforts — that  is,  to  swing  round  in  time  in  its  wide 
circle  to  the  westward — but  it  would  be  ready  to  guard  the 
left  flank  of  the  Germans,  and  to  act  as  a  support  to  the 
Wurtembergers  in  case  of  need.  Here  was  the  trap  ready 
laid.  Here  was  a  repetition  of  the  shutting  in  of  a  French 
force  northward  of  the  main  road,  such  as  had  been  wit- 
nessed at  Metz.  But  this  time  it  was  even  more  serious  for 
those  likely  to  be  so  shut  in.  The  Belgian  frontier  was  the 
rock  ahead  in  case  of  defeat.  The  Belgian  frontier  and  the 
frontier  of  neutral  Luxemburg  are  not  far  off  from  our 
present  position.  One  great  defeat,  one  hard  struggle,  end- 
ing in  favour  of  Germany,  and  the  whole  French  army, 
baggage,  artillery,  military  chest,  may  be  driven  into  the 
unwilling  embrace  of  our  good  allies  of  Belgium.  I  speak 
thus  at  length  of  the  great  shutting  in  of  the  French,  of  the 
wonderful  forced  march  of  the  Crown  Prince's  army,  to  ex- 
plain a  catastrophe  of  which  you  will  have  heard  by  tele- 
graph. The  needle-gun  may  do  as  well  as  the  Chassepot  in 
a  battle;  but  whichever  weapon  be  the  more  destructive, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  dogged  pluck  of  the  Prussians  in 
marching,  their  utter  indifference  to  fatigue,  has  done  more 
than  their  steady  f usilade  to  win  successes  for  King  William. 
"First  through  rain  and  slush,  then  in  milder  weather, 
and  with  dust  instead  of  mud  under  foot,  the  Third  Army 
has  swung  round  upon  its  foe.    Had  the  French  been  strong 

—772— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

enough  to  have  a  well  appointed  corps  of  observation  to  the 
southward  of  Vitry — of  say  80,000  men — this  wheeling 
round  of  the  Prussians  could  hardly  have  been  risked.  But 
the  Crown  Prince  has  disregarded  the  slight  danger  of  an 
attack  upon  his  rear  by  an  ill-organized  militia,  and  with 
the  6th  Corps  covering  his  left,  more  by  necessity  than 
choice,  has  closed  upon  MacMahon.  There  was  hard  march- 
ing to  reach  the  point  of  vantage,  but  when  we  rode  out 
yesterday  to  see  the  advance  against  the  French  position  it 
was  lovely  weather.  The  bayonets  of  the  infantry  glittered 
in  the  sunshine.  You  must  fancy  yourself  moving  from  hill 
to  hill  across  valleys  full  of  armed  men.  You  must  crowd 
the  white  straight  roads  with  rumbling  trains  of  artillery, 
and  great  masses  of  cavalry  far  to  the  front,  where  the 
farthest  patches  of  woodland  grow  indistinct  among  the  red 
and  brown  fields.  The  whole  country  southward  of  the  road 
from  Beaumont  to  Le  Chene  is  alive  with  German  troops. 
The  Bavarians  are  near  Beaumont ;  the  4th  Prussian  Corps 
is  farther  to  the  right,  and  closes  round  upon  the  line  of  the 
Meuse.  Immediately  before  us  is  the  5th  Prussian  Corps, 
pushing  towards  Stonne  and  Chemery.  We  see  flashes  of 
artillery  near  Beaumont.  Then  a  heavy  cannonade  begins 
on  the  distant  ridge  behind  that  place — the  1st  Bavarian 
Corps  has  surprised  a  French  division  in  the  little  town, 
capturing  a  good  deal  of  baggage.  These  "slow"  Germans 
are  to  the  fore  again !  The  French  reply  with  vigour  to 
their  assailants,  and  white  puffs  of  smoke  break  out  in  all 
directions.  "There  is  evidently  a  sharp  struggle  to  our  right 
front  about  Beaumont  and  Mouzon,  but  to  the  left  and 
center  the  battle  languishes.  There  is  a  little  distant  shell- 
ing, and  some  skirmishing  in  the  extreme  front,  though  the 
two  parties  are  not  in  force  near  one  another.  Stonne  is 
abandoned  by  the  French,  and  we  mount  to  its  central  po- 
sition, from  which  everything  can  be  seen.  That  battle  on 
the  right  grows  fiercer — crash  after  crash  of  musketry  re- 
sounds from  the  woods  near  Beaumont.  We  can  see  the 
flashes  brightly  on  the  hills,  and  as  night  comes  on  we  hear 
with  thrilling  effect  the  sharp  rolling  volley  of  the  mitrail- 
leuses.    They  must  be  fighting  very  hard,  and  the  troops 

—773— 


War  Correspondence 

bivouacked  upon  the  hills  near  Stonne  are  eager  to  be  among 
the  combatants.  But  they  cannot  get  there  tonight,  and 
must  rest  upon  their  position,  with  that  dull  rolling  and 
grumbling  of  the  cannonade  to  stir  them  round  their  spark- 
ling watch-fires. 

"The  fighting  of  August  30th  was  a  preparation  for  the 
decisive  closing  in  of  August  31st.  The  4th  Corps  took  sev- 
eral thousand  prisoners,  several  French  cannon,  and  checked 
all  advance  to  the  south-eastward.  The  Bavarians  also  took 
cannon  and  prisoners,  and  the  Prussians  of  the  Third  Army 
pushed  into  a  good  position  close  to  the  enemy's  outposts. 
It  will  probably  be  found  that  yesterday's  battle  was  an  im- 
portant affair — more  important  than  one  at  first  imagined." 

The  battle  of  Sedan  was  described  by  the  same  Corres- 
pondent in  the  following  letter,  dated  Chemery,  September 
1st: 

"The  German  arms  have  today  been  crowned  with  won- 
derful success.  The  greatest  triumph  of  the  war  has  been 
achieved  in  this  battle  of  Sedan,  and  the  Emperor  of  the 
French  himself  is  among  the  prisoners.  I  have  not  time  to 
tell  of  the  clamour  and  rejoicings  of  the  soldiery  round  about 
me.  Before  the  post  goes  out  there  will  not  be  time  enough 
to  describe  the  battle  in  its  barest  details.  An  army  cut  oflt 
and  surrounded — an  Emperor  taken  prisonerlTHese  are 
not  common  results.  It  is  so  overwhelming  a  catastrophe  for 
France  that  one  can  excuse  the  tears  in  the  old  soldier's 
eyes,  who  dashes  his  crutch  upon  the  floor,  and  will  not  even 
smoke  his  pipe.  It  is  so  overwhelming  a  catastrophe  that 
one  cannot  but  sigh  over  the  evident  pleasure  of  the  ordi- 
nary villagers  at  seeing  a  hope  of  peace. 

"How  did  it  come  about  that  they  were  caught?  Thous- 
ands of  my  countrymen  will  be  asking  this  question.  The 
answer  is  plain.  The  French  were  out-manoeuvred  in  the 
first  rush  of  the  war.  They  were  beaten  into  a  corner  at 
Metz,  blockaded  in  Alsace,  and,  generally  speaking,  "done 
for"  by  the  splendid  organization  of  their  enemies.  I  have 
often  spoken  to  you  of  the  same  organization — have  often 
suggested  that  it  must  prevail.  There  is  no  need  to  go 
further  back  than  the  blocking  of  Bazaine  at  Metz  to  ex- 

—774— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

plain  Jhe  capture  of  Napoleon  at  Sedan.  Itwas  felt  that 
Bazaine  must  be  relieved  at  any  cost,  and  here  is  the  price 
paid  without  success.  Napoleon  moved  from  Rheims  to^ 
v\-aFdsT\Ietz,  along  the  northern  frontier  of  his  empire,  in  the 
desperate  hope  of  fighting  his  way  to  the  eastward,  or  of 
being  allowed  to  pass  without  a  battle.  The  Germans  swung 
around  their  left  wing  with  tremendous  energy,  brought  up 
their  center  sharply  into  line,  and  pinned  the  French 
againsit"the  Belgian  frontier  in  the  little  fortress  of  Sedan. 
Never  was  such  marching  seen  as  that  of  the  5th  and  11th 
Corps.  Whilst  the  4th  Corps,  on  the  left  of  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony's  army,  and  the  Bavarians  on  the  right  of 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia's  army,  were  engaged  in  that 
sharp  affair  of  August  30th,  the  5th  and  11th  Corps,  on  the 
left  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  were  marching  round 
the  outside  of  the  circle  to  the  westward  of  the  German 
forces.  As  we  returned  to  head-quarters  after  the  battle  of 
the  30th,  near  Beaumont  and  Mouzon,  we  found  thousands 
of  men  camped,  or  rather  bivouacked,  on  the  hills  near 
Stonne.  They  cheered  the  Crown  Prince  loudly,  and  were 
full  of  spirit  for  whatever  might  be  wanted  of  them.  Though 
they  had  marched  some  five  and  twenty  miles  that  day,  they 
were  in  excellent  condition.  Their  bivouacs  were  well  or- 
dered ;  their  camp-fires  were  blazing  bright  and  clear.  The 
light  of  the  camp-fires  on  one  hill  was  as  significant  as  the 
flashes  of  rifle  and  mitrailleuse  on  the  other  hill,  which  told 
of  where  Frenchmen  and  Germans  were  fiercely  contending. 
These  camp-fires  to  the  extreme  left,  these  crowded  masses 
of  men  cheering  the  Prince,  told  of  the  energy  with  which 
Blumenthal  was  supporting  the  plans  of  Moltke,  and  of  the 
determined  shutting  in  which  was  destined  to  ruin  the 
French. 

"They  tramped  along  in  light  marching  order,  their 
knapsacks  carried  in  waggons  which  followed  at  a  distance. 
They  rushed  into  cottages  for  water,  or  for  a  glass  of  wine, 
if  any  could  be  found.  Tired  and  thirsty,  the  Prussian 
regiments  thronged  through  Chemery  on  the  31st  August. 
Tifed"a"hd  thirsty,  they  passed  on  to  the  front.  As  each 
bartalion  neared  the  Prince's  quarters  the  drums  rolled  out, 

—775— 


War  Correspondence 

the  men  held  up  their  heads,  and  went  by  as  at  a  review  in 
Berlin,  but  that  every  one  seemed  to  have  been  previously 
rolled  in  dust-bins.  Dusty  as  they  were,  the  infantry  had 
a  fine  appearance.  They  all  seemed  to  understand  the  need 
of  hard  marches,  and  to  be  buoyed  up  with  the  hope  of  com- 
plete victory. 

"So  the  net  was  spread,  and  the  ends  were  drawn  in,  and 
the  Frencli  army  at  Sedan  was  doomed  to  destruction.  The 
battle  of  August  30th  had  shown  that  it  would  not  be  able  to 
proceed  eastward,  as  the  Germans  were  everywhere  so 
strong.  Would  it  be  able  even  to  escape  in  a  westerly  di- 
rection? The  French  had  got  so  near  to  Belgium  that,  as 
you  might  say  of  a  ship,  the  least  puff  of  wind  would  put 
them  ashore.  They  had  a  chance  of  escaping  on  the  morning 
of  August  31st,  by  leaving  their  baggage  and  most  of  their 
artillery  in  Sedan,  and  making  a  running  fight  of  it  with 
the  whole  army  towards  Mezieres  and  Laon.  But  they  were 
too  proud  to  run  away,  too  slow  in  their  movements  to  re- 
treat with  dignity,  and  were  caught  at  a  hopeless  disad- 
vantage. 

"The  battle  of  Sedan  was  begun  by  the  Bavarians. 
General  von  der  Tann,  chief  of  the  1st  Bavarian  Corps,  was 
ready  in  the  grey  twilight  to  open  fire,  and  was  only  pre- 
vented from  leading  off  the  attack  at  4  A.M.  by  the  thick 
mistjn  the  valley  of  the  Meuse.  When  we  came  to  the  hill 
above  Donchery,  at  about  six  o'clock,  there  was  still  a  mist 
in  the  valley,  but  it  had  somewhat  lifted,  and  the  dull  boom- 
ing of  cannon  told  that  the  Bavarians  were  at  work.  ^  You 
must  fancy  a  great  half  circle  closing  in  to  form  a  complete 
circle  of  fire  round  the  town.  Place  yourself  in  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia's  station  on  the  hill  above  Donchery,  and 
take  the  corps  in  the  order  in  which  they  stand.  The  5th 
and  11th  Prussian  Corps  are  straining  northward  to  close 
round  to  the  left.  The  6th  Corps  is  coming  round  far  be- 
hind, to  the  left  rear,  and  will  bear  no  part  in  the  action, 
but  the  Wurtembergers  also  on  the  left,  and  in  advance  of 
the  6th  Corps,  will  have  a  battle  of  their  own  with  the 
French  from  Mezieres.  Just  before  us  there  is  Sedan,  pro- 
tected by  its  ramparts  and  by  an  artificial  inundation  of  the 

—776— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

meadows  beside  the  Meuse.  To  the  right  of  the  hill  above 
Donchery,_Bismarck  and  Von  Moltke  are  with  the  King, 
Blunienthal  is  with  the  Prince  of  Prussia.  With  the  Prince 
■are  also  several  other  men  of  note,  attached  to  his  Highness 
Staff.  The  Duke  of  Augustenburg  and  Prince  Leopold  of 
Hohenzollern  are  both  serving  on  the  Staff,  the  former  in 
Bavarian  uniform,  the  latter  in  Prussian.  The  Duke  of 
Coburg  Gotha  is  there,  and  so  are  the  Princes  of  Weimar, 
of  Mecklenburg,  and  Wurtemberg.  It  was  natural  that 
they  should  be  present,  because  they  have  been  on  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Prussia's  Staff  throughout  the  war.  But 
their  presence,  together  with  fighting  of  Bavarians  and 
Saxons  side  by  side  with  Prussians  on  September  1st,  and 
the  fighting  of  the  Wurtembergers  on  the  same  day,  to- 
wards Mezieres,  gives  an  additional  stamp  of  German  unity 
to  the  final  effort.  All  Germany  seems  to  be  here:  the 
Princess  and  the  commonalty  coming  forth  with  equal  zeal 
to  repel  an  invasion.  And  here  is  the  deadly  counter-stroke 
by  which  it  is  being  met. 

"Thejwhole  country  as  far  as  the  frontier  lies  spread  out 
like  a  map  before  us.  Donchery  is  as  clearly  to  be  seen  as 
though  a  biscuit  could  be  tossed  down  into  it,  and  where 
the  mist  rises  still  farther  the  course  of  the  Meuse  may  be 
traced  by  stunted  willows  in  the  great  bend  northward 
which  it  makes  hereabouts.  There  is  no  better  way  of  re- 
alizing the  features  of  the  locality  than  by  taking  a  horse- 
shoe, protruding  one  end  straight  to  your  left,  and  the  other 
eniJ"  somewhat  backward  to  your  right.  On  the  part  straight 
to  your  left  is  Donchery,  with  its  line  of  hills  across  the 
back  of  the  shoe.  On  the  part  prolonged  to  your  right  is 
Bezeilles,  with  a  railway  bridge  in  excellent  condition.  Se- 
dan lies  on  the  river  to  the  right  hand,  where  the  first  nail 
would  be,  and  the  off-side  of  the  horseshoe  bend.  Cazal 
and  Floring  are  farther  along  on  the  right  side,  and  St. 
Meiiges  is  about  at  the  front  of  the  shoe.  The  villages  of 
Daigny  and  Givonne  lie  back  to  the  right,  oF  behind  the 
town,  where  the  country  is  hilly  and  wooded.  The  great 
plain  is  to  the  left  of  the  bend,  and  as  the  Prussian  troops 
arrive  on  that  side  they  move  quickly  forward  across  the 

—777— 


War  Correspondence 

plain  to  turn  round  the  end  of  the  horseshoe  and  come  back 
down  its  right  side.  The  Belgian  frontier  is  a  little  way 
beyond  the  front  of  the  shoe,  so  that  there  is  ample  room 
for  the  5th  and  11th  Corps  to  act  upon  the  line  of  retreat 
from  Sedan  in  that  direction.  We  can  hear  a  constant  rum- 
bling of  wagons  and  clattering  of  hoofs,  as  the  German  left 
is  advanced,  whilst  there  is  a  louder  and  louder  roll  of  mus- 
ketry and  booming  of  cannon  where  the  Bavarians  are  hold- 
ing the  French  in  play  to  the  right.  At  first  there  is  a  line  of 
white  smoke  puffs,  forming  less  than  a  semicircle  to  the 
so^uth,  south-west,  and  south-east  of  the  French.  The  battle 
is  hotly  maintained  near  Bazeilles,  and  the  French  respond 
with  energy  to  the  attack  of  the  Germans.  It  is  a  very  sultry 
day.  The  smoke-clouds  hang  lower  and  lower  over  the 
Meuse,  as  the  mist  was  hanging  a  few  hours  earlier.  Bright 
sunshine  glitters  upon  the  cuirasses  of  a  Prussian  regiment 
that  trots  down  to  the  right  to  support  the  Bavarian  guns, 
at  the  base  of  the  horseshoe.  A  second  and  yet  a  third  regi- 
ment of  cavalry  follow  with  great  jingling  and  clatter.  The 
scene  upon  the  hill,  near  the  Crown  Prince's  Staff,  is  one  of 
active  preparation.  There  are  guns  dragged  lumberingly 
at  the  heels  of  the  cavalry,  and  innumerable  waggons  follow 
as  hard  as  they  can  go.  Stragglers  hurry  up  to  join  their 
corps,  orderlies  gallop  away  reckless  of  their  necks,  or  gal- 
lop back  with  panting  steeds  up  the  steep  road.  It  is 
thought  better  for  the  escort  to  dismount,  and  for  the  offi- 
cers' horses  to  be  held  a  little  to  the  rear,  so  as  not  to  draw 
the  French  fire  upon  the  Staff  by  an  unnecessary  display 
of  force.  That  same  French  fire,  is  however,  distracted 
and  dispersed  by  numerous  assailants.  The  roar  of  cannon 
grows  more  intense  with  each  minute  as  noontide  ap- 
proaches. It  is  clear  that  the  army  of  MacMahon — we  af- 
terwards learnt  that  the  Marshal  had  been  wounded — at  an 
early  hour,  and  that  De  Wimpffen  had  taken  the  command — 
is  in  desperate  peril.  Like  some  ship  labouring  in  the 
trough  of  the  sea,  the  beieagured  host  of  France  is  pitifully 
helpless.  There  wa^  ajime  wheii  a  squadron  of  light  horse, 
or  e:v£n  a  travelling  carriage  at  a  brisk  trot,  might  have  got 
away  to  Belgium.     The  northerii-i^oad  was  open  when  the 

—778— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

battle  began,  but  the  French  seemed  to  have  no  idea  of  flight. 
CrushecT'and  hampered  as  they  are,  they  fight  like  brave 
men.  The  battle  is  a  mere  battue  by  one  o'clock,  and  the 
circle  of  white  smoke  puffs  almost  shuts  in  the  theTTerich 
position.  This  is  essentially  an  affair  of  artillery,  and  the 
German  guns  seem  to  be  well  served,  besides  being  powerful. 
But  there  is  a  constant  rattle  of  small-arm  fire  in  the  di- 
rection of  Bazeilles,  where  flames  and  black  smoke  tell  of  a 
conflagration.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  too,  is  coming 
steadily  on.  It  has  appeared  for  a  moment  that  he  was 
checked  by  the  efforts  of  the  despairing  French;  but  the 
German  right  is  growing  evidently  stronger,  and  the  circle 
of  white  smoke  puffs  is  very  clearly  defined  to  the  north- 
westward. Then  to  the  left  there  is  a  sharp  engagement; 
as  the  11th  Prussian  Corps  forces  its  way  into  Cazal  and 
Floing,  a  splendid  artillery  fire  supports  the  attacks  of  the 
infantry.  We  can  see  that  all  escape  has  been  cut  off  as  the 
Prussians  get  from  village  to  village  towards  the  slope  of 
rising  ground  behind  Floing,  and  north-westward  of  Sedan. 
If  that  slope  be  once  cleared  of  Frenchmen,  the  only  thing 
for  the  French  to  do  will  be  to  cut  their  way  out  through 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony's  army,  or  to  retreat  almost 
within  the  walls  of  the  town.  They  cannot  fight  on  their 
present  line  with  Prussians  in  their  rear. 

"It  is  a  sight  of  terrible  interest.  The  hill-j,ide  behind 
Floing  has  been  the  scene  of  a  regular  stand-up  battle  be- 
tween lines  of  infantry,  and  there  is  a  cannonade  from  an- 
other sloping  ground  more  to  the  left,  which  smites  the 
French  wiith  startling  precision.  Loud  rattle  the  volleys 
of  the  mitrailleuses.  Some  four  or  five  pieces  are  planted 
on  the  hill,  and  work  hard  to  keep  back  the  Prussians.  But 
they  seem  to  be  silenced  or  withdrawn,  and  the  dark  masses 
of  King  William's  soldiers  gain  several  acres;  all  about  the 
little  cottage  and  two  trees  at  the  hill-top  there  is  a  fierce 
encounter.  Lines  of  infantry  stand  firing  at  one  another, 
and  it  is  clear  that  the  loss  is  considerable,  for  many  men 
fall  killed  and  wounded.  What  a  wild  confusion  it  is,  now 
that  the  lines  have  advanced  and  retired  several  times! 
There  are  scattered  parties  of  Frenchmen  rallied  by  their 

—779— 


War  Correspondence 

officers,  and  Germans  brought  back  to  the  charge  with 
hearty  zeal.  Both  sides  fight  splendidly.  But,  on  the  whole, 
the  Prussian  fire  seems  to  prevail,  and  the  French  wither 
before  it.  The  shells  are  doing  much  that  we  cannot  ap- 
preciate at  a  distance.  Dust  flies  up  now  and  then;  but 
it  is  hard  to  see  what  has  been  done.  Yet  we  notice  that 
the  efforts  of  the  French  reserves  to  restore  the  battle  fail 
before  the  steadiness  of  the  Prussian  attack.  When  one 
Prussian  battalion  hesitates,  when  even  there  is  a  charge 
in  line  by  a  body  of  French  infantry,  which  requires  a  good 
deal  of  ground,  there  is  always  a  creeping  up  of  more  and 
more  of  dark-coated  assailants.  Their  guns  cease  firing  for 
fear  of  hitting  them,  and  a  gallant  dash  of  French  light 
cavalry  is  made  to  recover  the  hill-side.  They  ride  forward 
half  hidden  in  dust,  and  seem  for  a  moment  to  succeed ;  but 
the  artillery  re-opens,  the  infantry  pour  in  a  deadly  fire,  and 
we  see  the  ground  strewn  with  men  and  horses.  The  cav- 
alry wheel  about,  and  go  galloping  back  like  a  receding 
wave.  That  hill-side  must  remain  in  Prussian  hands.  No, 
there  is  another  rally  by  the  French  Infantry.  Once  more 
they  come  on.  The  thin,  blue  smoke  rises  above  the  line,  and 
they  almost  run  in  their  wild  attempt  to  push  home.  But 
the  attack  withers  away,  and  nothing  can  be  seen  of  the 
regiment  which  made  it.  There  has  been  heavy  loss  it  is 
easy  to  see,  though  the  men  who  fall  cannot  now  be  well 
distinguished  in  the  confusion, 

"There  are  other  points  carried  by  the  Germans,  and  a 
closing  in  of  the  circle  of  white  smoke  round  Sedan.  Then 
a  fresh  attempt  to  break  through,  as  though  somebody  of 
importance  w^ere  to  be  cut  out  at  any  cost.  We  see  numbers 
of  Frenchmen  making  for  the  gates  of  the  town,  others  wan- 
dering about  as  though  not  knowing  what  to  do.  There  is 
a  gradual  cessation  of  the  cannonade,  and  by  about  five 
o'clock  all  is  quiet,  save  for  the  dropping  shots  from  the  bat- 
teries near  the  King's  position.  There  is  a  great  outburst 
of  flame  and  smoke  in  the  town,  as  if  some  stores  of  com- 
bustibles had  taken  light,  and  there  is  a  rumour  that  the 
white  flag  has  been  hoisted  by  the  French.  Then  it  is 
whispered  that  all  these  crowded   troops — sixty,   seventy, 

—780— 


War  Between  Germany  and  France 

perhaps  eighty  thousaud  men,  must  surrender,  for  that  they 
have  no  food.  They  surrender?  Not  only  they,  the  Im- 
perial soldiers,  but  the  Emperor  too.  It  is  known  that  Gen- 
eral Rille,  an  aide-de-camp  of  Napoleon,  has  come  out  to 
King  William  with  a  letter  from  the  Emperor  to  his  Prus- 
sian Majesty.  The  troops  are  wild  with  joy;  they  have 
caught  him  then,  and  there  will  be  an  end  to  the  war." 


-781— 


TH.S   BOOK  Sn   THE   DAr/n.^"''^  ^°   "^"''N 
WILL  INCREASE  tS  SO  c/n?«S-    """^  "^^'"T^ 

OAY    AND    TO    J  OO    ON    the    -^"^  '^°'"''"" 
OVERDUE.  ^"^    SEVENTH     DAY 


--Mm^M-t96t- 


REC'DLB    MAR 


MAroTl994 


'Q 


0 


"> .  i  u  «,  .- 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRAR 


THIS  BOOK  ON  rS  OATe'^OU."''^  ^°  '^^"'"^ 
WILL.  'NCREASE  TO  sS  CEN?^  o  """^  ^^ALTY 
DAY  AND  TO  $i.ol  ON  T„  ."^  """^  ''^"''TH 
OVERDUE.  ^    ^"^    SEVENTH     DAY 


REC'DLB    MAR 


— BBm^H 

MAY  0  6 

itt 

1994 

;Lro~M^ 

L'O  8i-ioo,-«-7/4o (eases') 

Operations  of  the  l''Amy  uuJItT  GenerJ  vnr  Sle 
3 


inmeta 


General    Plan 


iisp  ! 


ir.Tj  S   Kinf  iC  es  Coinhill,  I  ondo 


opyrigh 


Scale   1  SOOIIOII. 


% 


